Stopping refugees to help them, or
ourselves?
Boat refugees arriving in Europe (Time, 2014).
A study on the justificatory discourse used by states in military
(humanitarian) interventions relating to refugees.
Name: Ewa Slutzky Studentnumber: 5875307 Research project: Global Migration Supervisor: Jeroen Doomernik Date: 27 June 2014
‘Doing nothing for others is the undoing of ourselves.’ Horace Mann.
Content
INTRODUCTION ... 5
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY ... 9
1. CONCEPTUALIZATION ... 9
1.1 REFUGEE FLOWS STEMMING FROM NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS ... 10
1.2 MILITARY (HUMANITARIAN) INTERVENTION ... 12
1.3 RELATION BETWEEN REFUGEE FLOWS AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ... 13
2. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EFFECT ... 16
2.1 HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS ... 16 2.2 SELF-INTEREST ... 19 2.3 CHANGES SINCE 9/11 ... 23 2.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION ... 24 3. METHODOLOGY ... 26 3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ... 26 3.2 CASE ANALYSIS ... 26 3.3 INTERVIEWS ... 27
3.4 TRIANGULATION AND LIMITATIONS ... 29
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ... 30
4. CASES BEFORE 9/11 ... 30
4.1 RWANDA ... 30
4.1.1 Background ... 30
4.1.2 Discourse ... 31
4.2 FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:BOSNIA ... 33
4.2.1 Background ... 33 4.2.2 Discourse ... 34 4.3 MACEDONIA ... 36 4.3.1 Background ... 36 4.3.2 Discourse ... 37 4.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION ... 37
5 CASES AFTER 9/11 ... 39 5.1 GEORGIA ... 39 5.1.1 Background ... 39 5.1.2 Discourse ... 39 5.2 LIBYA ... 41 5.2.1 Background ... 41 5.2.2 Discourse ... 42 5.3 MALI ... 45 5.3.1 Background ... 45 5.3.2 Discourse ... 46 5.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION ... 49 6 DISCOURSE IN GENERAL ... 51 CONCLUSION ... 53 SOURCES ... 56 LEGAL DOCUMENTS ... 56 LITERATURE ... 56 MEDIA ... 59 OTHER ... 60 UNRECORDS ... 61 APPENDICES ... 63
APPENDIX I:INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ... 63
APPENDIX II:INTERVIEW HARRY VAN BOMMEL ... 66
APPENDIX III:INTERVIEW IVAN BRISCOE ... 68
APPENDIX IV:INTERVIEW CAROLINE ORT ... 71
Introduction
‘Political language…is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable’ George Orwell wrote in his 1946 essay ‘Politics and the English Language’. This relates perfectly to the topic of this research as it is concerned with how interventions –with their relating inevitable deaths- are justified, possibly using refugees. Refugee flows, and large migration patterns of any kind, can have a large effect on neighbouring countries, the region and the international community and many people feel very strongly about them. Therefore, refugees are often the topic of popular political speech. They can be used to justify the decisions made about interventions and to interfere with the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference.
The principles of state sovereignty and non-interference are two of the most, if not the most, important principles in international relations and law. However, in some cases international law has determined that these principles have to be set aside and a military intervention can be justified and legal. Military interventions have increased rapidly over the years and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter: UNHCR) calls displacement the biggest concern of the 21st century (UNHCR, 2013). Although military interventions are only allowed if the Security Council (hereinafter: SC) has decided so because of a situation that threatens international peace and stability they have taken place for many other reasons. Often, humanitarian reasons have been mentioned by state leaders and in many cases other reasons (such as economic concerns) will be the main reason to intervene. A reason that is also mentioned is to prevent refugee flows. To this end, military intervention may be deemed necessary and this has often been the case.
The main object of the thesis however is not to examine the relationship between the two but to examine how states justify the means (military intervention) to this particular end (stop or prevent refugee flows). It is relevant to know why states find it so important to stop these refugee flows that they are willing to possibly violate international law, sacrifice lives and risk becoming involved in a full-fledged war. However, political language can differ from the true motivations and within the scope of this research it is not possible to offer truthful statements on this matter. In a perfect world, a perfect democracy, the justifications used
would match the true motivations of politicians and state leaders. It is no surprise this is not always the case. Therefore, this research will continuously speak of justifications used instead of motivations.
This research aims to provide insight in how states justify their decisions to intervene. More specifically, how states justify and frame the need to intervene in relation to refugee flows. Since it focuses on the willingness to intervene it does not matter if an actual intervention took place. Furthermore, a possible discrepancy between the true motivations of states to want to intervene (prevent refugee flows) and the official reasons given at, for example, the UN (maintain international peace) may be uncovered.
The main research question will be ‘How to explain the different justifications used by states to stop refugee flows by military intervention in a non-international armed conflict?’
As the theoretical framework will present a change in the used justifications may have occurred since 9/11, after which realist considerations may have gained ground over idealist considerations (Carlton 2010). However, before 9/11 interventions were also widely present such as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Thus, although the justification to intervene may have changed from idealist to realist considerations the number of instances where this happened might have stayed (almost) the same.
A large part of the research will focus on whether Carlton’s statement can truly be backed up by several cases. The relating sub-questions are as follows: ‘what justification was used to intervene in non-international armed conflicts prior to 9/11?’ and ‘what justification was used to intervene in non-international armed conflicts after 9/11?’ This will be done by the careful examination of three conflicts that took place before 9/11 and three conflicts that took place after 9/11. It can then be examined if and how the used justifications differ.
This change in reasons to want to stop refugee flows stemming from non-international armed conflicts was perfectly worded by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Timmermans while justifying the Dutch intervention in Mali: ‘the traditional (…) attitude about Africa: ‘That’s where people in need of help live”. That is over. (…) The mission to Mali is about hard security political interests of Europe (…) You can note that among the boat refugees who reach Europe a terrifying high percentage intends to do bad things, as a criminal or terrorist.’
(Albers & Broer, 2013) The same Minister wrote in a letter to the Dutch Parliament that the reasons for the military intervention are first and foremost about the possible security threat but continues to emphasize solidarity with the Malians and the importance to secure the Dutch economic interests within Mali. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Political speech and the need to manoeuvre within legal frameworks and popularity will often have this effect, especially when the stakes are high. Therefore, it is expected the official reasons and ‘true motivations’ (for as far they can be determined) differ in different political circumstances. A last sub-question will thus be: ‘does the justification used differ in different settings? If so, why?’
The research finds that the cases prior to 9/11 hardly mention the security interests of the intervening states, or other states than the one where the conflict is taking place. Security is mostly mentioned in relation to the security of refugees themselves and most states do not consider refugees -as such- as a security threat. However, as senior research fellow at the Clingendael institute Briscoe points out this may be because of the fact that refugees often do not influence the Western countries at all, they mostly stay in the region. In the case of the conflict in Rwanda it is seen that no-one mentions the security threat the fleeing Hutu’s pose. No-one except Burundi, the neighbouring country actually dealing with them. In the case of the conflict in Bosnia this already differed a little bit and although within the United Nations (hereinafter: UN) the refugees were mostly framed as victims, United States of America (hereinafter: US) –then Secretary of State- Madeleine Albright pointed at the US’ self-interest by stating the conflict may have a spill-over caused by the thousands of refugees. This is turn would threaten their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter: NATO) partners and ultimately the US.
In the cases after 9/11 this security discourse is seen to be much more present, also by countries not directly bordering the country where the conflict takes place. The already mentioned quote by Timmermans is an excellent example in the case of Mali, the reluctance of Algeria to intervene in Libya is another. However, within the UN it are still mostly humanitarian considerations that are mentioned, but they are now combined with the security discourse. In domestic politics and speeches the humanitarian considerations are sometimes mentioned by Obama but then quickly turns the argument into the self-interest of the US.
Concluding –in the examined cases- it can be carefully claimed the discourse has indeed changed after 9/11, now focusing more on international peace than international solidarity as states seem to think this is a more acceptable reason for the public to intervene and sacrifice lives. The political language has changed, to make murder sound respectable, as George Orwell would say.
Theoretical framework and methodology
To answer the research question a number of concepts will have to be explained, which will be done in chapter 1. First, refugee flows stemming from non-international conflicts will be expanded upon after which will be continued to military (humanitarian) intervention. Also, it will be examined where refugees go when leaving their home country. These indicators can then be used to analyse the cases, as certain States ‘should’ then want to intervene to stop the refugee flows. To answer the research question the dependent variable is: the justification used. The independent variable will be: military intervention to stop refugee flows stemming from non-international armed conflicts. After an introduction to both concepts the relation between the two will be examined.
Chapter 2 focuses on the two main IR paradigms that will be used to explain possible justifications to intervene militarily. The first, based on liberalism and idealism, comes down to humanitarian considerations and genuine concern for the refugees and upholding their human rights. This presents itself in two modern-day theories and doctrines: the Just War theory and the doctrine on the Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter: R2P). The second possible justification, based on realism, is self-interest. Within self-interest the main concern would be security reasons but also economic, social and cultural reasons can play a part. Finally, the last chapter lays out the methodology that will be used in order to answer the research questions.
1. Conceptualization
This chapter will start in the first paragraph with defining refugees and non-international armed conflicts looking at the legal definitions. Next, an important part of the behaviour of refugees for this research, namely where they go after they have left their home country will be shortly reviewed. Important indicators include: geographical proximity, cultural and ethnic similarities and colonial bonds. The second paragraph focuses on the concept of military (humanitarian) intervention and the difference between a military intervention and a humanitarian intervention, although they will often collide. Some possible motivations for a military intervention will be mentioned as it is important to bear in mind there may be other
motivations for states to intervene than to stop refugee flows. In the last paragraph the connection between the two concepts will be examined and the possible reactions and concerns of both refugee sending and refugee receiving states will be laid down.
1.1 Refugee flows stemming from non-international armed conflicts
In legal terms refugees are people who fulfil the definition of Article 1A of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees. Article 1A(1) speaks about refugees prior to 1939, Article 1A(2) provides us with the current definition. From this definition several criteria can be distilled. The individual must be: outside one’s country (Schaknove, 1985), lacking state protection and in need of protection of another state and facing a genuine risk of serious harm (well-founded fear of persecution1) relating to his/her civil or political status. Internally Displaced Persons2 (hereinafter: IDPs), and for example environmentally displaced persons do not meet these criteria and legally speaking are not refugees (Keane, 2004). For the purposes of this research anyone who crosses the border while fleeing an armed conflict will be considered a refugee and it is not necessary that he/she faces individual persecution. This research will focus on refugee flows stemming from non-international armed conflicts. According to Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions a non-international armed conflict can be defined as ‘an armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.’ This means hostilities between the state armed forces and a governmental armed group or between two or more non-governmental groups. The hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity to be classified as an armed conflict. (ICRC, 2008) Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts excludes internal disturbances and violence from the definition of international armed conflict and states that the non-governmental armed groups must be considered parties to the conflict.
By the end of 2012 there were 10.5 million refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2013) mainly from Asia and Africa. The top 6 source countries of refugees were: Afghanistan (2,585,600),
1 A well-founded fear of persecution is present if it can be assumed that if the refugee returns home he/she is
likely to be persecuted (UNHCR, 1992).
Somalia (1,136,100), Iraq (746,400), Syrian Arab Republic (728,500)3, Sudan (569,200)4 and the Democratic Republic of Congo (509,400).
3.5 million of all refugees were hosted in UNHCR’s Asia and Pacific region, of which 2.5 million were Afghans. The Middle East and North Africa hosted 1.6 million, mainly from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. As to individual countries hosting refugees, the top 6 was as follows: Pakistan (1,638,500), the Islamic Republic of Iran (868,200), Germany (589,700), Kenya (564,900), Syrian Arab Republic (476,500) and Ethiopia (376,400). Almost all refugees hosted by Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran come from Afghanistan. Kenya hosts refugees mostly from Somalia just like Ethiopia. Germany hosts refugees from all over the world.5 The Syrian number has diminished significantly but hosted mainly Iraqi refugees (UNHCR, 2013).
It is important to give some thought to where these refugees flow; which countries will bear the consequences? The most logical place to go to for refugees would be a neighbouring (safe) country since in most instances this will be the ‘easiest’ (and only) way out of the conflict and into safety. Moreover, many refugees won’t have the means to go any further than just across the border. The numbers mentioned above strongly back this line of thought as –except from Germany- all top 6 refugee-hosting states are direct neighbours of one of the top 6 refugee-producing states.
However, if refugees have the means they will often go to states that speak the same language or have other cultural, religious or ethnic similarities. Loescher and Milner (2005) claim ethnic similarity will increase the willingness of a state to receive these refugees as they will be seen as less of a threat to the cultural and ethnic balance as can be seen in the case of the millions of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran who were received with open arms as they were perceived as being ‘one of us’. Also, following from regular migration theory it can be
3 Since the end of 2012 a lot has changed in the Syrian Arab Republic and the following number of refugees
from Syria has increased greatly while the number of refugees hosted by Syria has diminished significantly. However, the exact numbers are not yet up to date and this does not have any important consequences for the current research.
4 This number may also include people from South-Sudan.
5 This presents an interesting observation; why do so many refugees go to Germany? However, answering that
assumed that refugees will, just as regular migrants, go to states where they already know people.
Finally, the colonial history will often play an important role in where refugees go but also which states will voluntarily concern themselves with the conflict. This is already apparent in the Mali case where France –its former colonizer- was the first to intervene in the conflict. This may be because of a sense of responsibility felt by France itself but also because the people in Mali will first look at its former colonizer for help, as will the international community. Lastly, it can also connect to the fact that –as its former colonizer- this will work as a major pull factor for refugees from Mali.
1.2 Military (humanitarian) intervention
The principles of state sovereignty and non-interference are two of the most, if not the most, important principles in international relations and law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits states from the ‘threat or use of force’ against other states, acting in self-defence is the only exception to this rule. Strictly speaking the only legitimized interventions are those decided on by the Security Council on the basis of Articles 39-42 in case it has determined there is a ‘threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. Some argue that this means military intervention can only take place in such a case.
However, over the past year many military interventions took place with and without a SC resolution, not because the conflict presented a threat to international peace and stability but because of humanitarian concerns. Leaving aside the question of whether this is legally allowed the concept has to be defined. A working definition of humanitarian intervention is at best limited and in this research the following narrow definition by Murphy will be applied: ‘humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights’ (Murphy, 1996). Military intervention would then be defined as ‘the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization’, which can be for any reason.
In 1999 the UN produced three documents on the humanitarian considerations or what the international community should do when civilians and refugees are at risk. These were the
Secretary-General’s Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and the two UN Reports on Srebrenica and Rwanda. The first recommends that the Security Council, ‘in the face of massive and ongoing abuses, consider the imposition of appropriate enforcement action’ (UN Secretary-General 1999, recommendation number 40).
Reasons to intervene in non-international armed conflicts can range from humanitarian considerations to security reasons to economic and political interests. Mitchell (1970) argued that the decision to intervene is based upon four factors. Namely, characteristics of the country in conflict, characteristics of the intervener, linkage patterns between the groups on the target and intervener and the character of the international system. Although it goes beyond the scope of this research to examine all possible motivations for intervention it is important to bear in mind that stopping refugee flows because of either humanitarian or security concerns is only a very specific partial reason that may play a part in the decision to intervene or not. Important other motivations will depend on the four factors as set out by Mitchell which will, in practice, often come down to economic interests such as the presence of oil, anterior events and existing relationships between states (for better or worse), the functioning of the UN with regards to the conflict in question and possible ideological differences and international framing of the events. Therefore, it must again be emphasized that the research is not about the true motivations, it is about the justification used for this small part of the motivation to intervene. After all, it cannot be said an intervention took place solely because of the large numbers of refugees. It can be said how the justification used relates to refugees.
1.3 Relation between refugee flows and military interventions
Roberts (2011) describes five connections between refugee flows and power politics. First, refugees can serve as proof of the unpopularity of certain dictatorial regimes. During the Cold War the many refugees from communist countries that fled to the West helped to legitimize Western positions by proving the communist regimes were so bad people fled their homes. Second, refugees played a significant factor in ending the Cold War. The massive outflow of people in 1989 forced the communist regimes to rethink their key policy and the Berlin Wall. Hungary, who had acceded to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status on Refugees in 1989 as the first Eastern European country dealt with a huge influx of ethnic Hungarians from Romania and permitted East Germans to transit through Hungarian territory to Austria. Third,
refugee flows can be the deliberate consequence of military action, a different form of ethnic cleansing. After all, it is not necessary to kill all members of a certain group, as long as they leave the country. Fourth, refugees can themselves become involved in military matters. This can have various reasons such as the need to protect themselves from their old persecutors, forcible repatriation, the presence of armed movements in refugee camps6 and the fact that many refugees want to return home to fight the regime that forced them to flee. Fifth, one of the goals of most military interventions is to enable refugees to return home after a change in the regime has taken place.
The fourth and fifth connections present the manner in which refugee flows may be used as a justification for military intervention because of two very different considerations. Preventing connection number four is clearly aimed at preventing more insecurity and the spreading of the armed conflict; self-interest, while connection number five uses military intervention to help the refugees return home7; humanitarian considerations.
Salehyan (2008) conducted a large quantitative study on the influence of refugee flows between states on the likeliness of a militarized interstate dispute. A militarized interstate dispute is not entirely the same as military intervention but, as can be seem in Salehyan’s (2008) research, the latter is one of the various shapes a militarized interstate dispute can take. Data from 1955-2000 was included and Salehyan found that refugee migration increases the probability that the receiving country will initiate a militarized interstate dispute against the sending country. The first reason for this positive effect is, according to Salehyan (2008), that refugee sending states may violate the territorial sovereignty of the refugee hosting states to attack their fled rivals and punish the states that host them. Secondly, the country that receives the refugees may initiate a militarized interstate dispute because of the negative burden that refugees constitute for their country. In response to this negative burden and in attempt to stop it receiving states may choose to seal their borders by military actions, threaten the sending regimes with violence or invade the country to prevent further refugee flows. The research at hand focuses on this last possibility.
6 One example is the Gaza strip were, for years, the UN had to distribute food and needed help doing this. Hamas
filled the gap, meanwhile recruiting new members (Roberts, 2011).
7 Sometimes refugees explicitly call for military interventions in their home country, enabling them to return
Although military interventions often take place in relation to refugee flows it remains the topic of legal debate whether it is justified to intervene with the goal of stopping refugee flows. Dowty and Loescher (1996) argue that it is allowed under customary law because ‘a country that forces its people to flee or takes actions that compel them to leave in a manner that threatens regional peace and security has in effect internationalized its internal affairs, and provides a cogent justification for policymakers elsewhere to act directly upon the source of the threat. Although at first sight this seems to be an argument in favour of R2P and humanitarian interventions it focuses on the fact that the people who fled; the refugees, may threaten regional peace and security. According to Dowty and Loescher (1996) refugees can thus be a danger to regional security and therefore a military intervention is justified.Not because they were persecuted and in need of help. There are also some that claim that because the UN Charter commits states to protect fundamental human rights it should be, and it is, customary law to intervene in case of mass human rights violations.8
Other scholars, however, dispute the notion that a refugee crisis provides any legal basis for military intervention. Beehner (2012) explains some of the different views. Some argue that the no-fly zones imposed in Northern Iraq in 1991 were illegal because the crisis did not sufficiently meet the criteria of posing ‘a threat to international peace and security in the region’, a view that was shared by the then UN-Secretary General Boutros Ghali. Others claim R2P is now used to justify any intervention because of refugee crises, leading to legitimate but illegal interventions (Beehner, 2012).
8 Customary law may be said to exist when there is sufficient state practice and opinio juris. Meaning that states
in fact do intervene to protect fundamental human rights and have stated that this is the right thing, the lawful thing, to do.
2. Possible justifications for the effect
In this thesis two possible reasons for an increasing willingness to militarily intervene to prevent refugee flows will be researched using two major IR paradigms. First, states may have humanitarian considerations for wanting to intervene. This will be explained using the idealist paradigm and two corresponding theories. Second, states may also act out of self-interest for security reasons or economic and other costs. This will be explained using realism.
2.1 Humanitarian considerations
In this paragraph the humanitarian consideration that may play a part in the wish to intervene will be examined. The two main theories on this matter are the R2P doctrine and the Just War theory. Both these theories can be placed under the idealism paradigm, which is why the paragraph will be started off explaining what idealism is about.
Idealism is a liberal tradition and explains international relations in terms of power, international law, morality and international organizations. The German philosopher Kant offered thee reasons why he thought lasting peace was possible, this is called liberal institutionalism. The first was that states could develop organizations and rules to facilitate cooperation, such as the present UN. The second depends on the internal character of the states; republics will be more peaceful than autocratic regime as the checks and balances of the trias politica help maintain the government in check,9 this idea has been expanded into the democratic peace theory and third, trade promotes peace. To Kant, international cooperation was a rational choice preferable to going to war. Neoliberalism adds to this theory that even in a world of unitary rational states, international cooperation may increase the possibilities for mutual gain and cooperation thus is possible (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009).
Idealism in particular explains state behaviour by looking at how things ‘should’ be and the focus is much more on morality than with realism, as will be seen in the following paragraph. Idealists believe that in principle human beings are good and will aim to do the right thing. Furthermore, it sees the things outside of our body as dependent on ideas and dependent on
9 Following this line of reasoning this would also apply for modern day monarchies as long as they have a clear
our consciousness that shape the world as it is. This is also known and developed by Kant in his ‘transcedental idealism’ (SEP, 2010).
In the 1990s various observations were made with regards to humanitarian crises. Thomas Weiss (2003, p. 84) summarizes them as including disregard for international humanitarian law, the direct targeting of civilians, use of foreign aid to fuel conflicts and the protracted nature of many ‘emergencies’. To answer the question of how civilians can be protected against their own state the International Commission on State Sovereignty (hereinafter: ICSS) was created in 2000.
The ICSS introduced the idea that with sovereignty comes responsibility. If a state does not take responsibility to protect its people it loses its right to sovereign reign within its territory and intervention may be justified (Cohen & Deng, 1998; Deng, 2004; Tesón, 2003). In the UN 2005 World Summit world leaders unanimously agreed that all states have the responsibility to protect their citizens and that the international community then must stand prepared to take collective action in cases where national authorities ‘are manifestly failing to protect their populations’ from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (A/60/L.1, para 139). In April 2006 the UN Security Council reaffirmed this principle by adopting Resolution 1674 on the 28th of April 2006 and indicated it would take appropriate measures where necessary.
DeLarringa and Doucet (2008) state this doctrine has introduced the explicit connection between human security and the issue of exceptionality giving the international community a justification to intervene in exceptional cases and violate a state’s sovereignty as a new form of international intervention. According to Rudolph (2013) ‘the “legitimation” of the use of force in the name of protection marks a pivotal turning point for the relationship between humanitarian aid and military intervention.’
However, R2P is not primarily about the use of force but ‘a normative and moral undertaking requiring a state to protect its own citizens’ (Pace & Deller, 2005:25), it thus is not necessarily a military intervention. Although the UN left the authority to decide on the use of force with the UN Security Council, Bannon (2006:1158) argues R2P has strengthened the legal justification for unilateral or regional action in case the UN fails to intervene. R2P is therefore
often referred to as ‘a new norm (…) to legalize humanitarian intervention’ (Stedman, 2007:933).
Slightly different from R2P is the Just War theory as explained by Michael Walzer (2006) that justifies war with either theoretical or historical elements without stating much about the problem of sovereignty. The theoretical justifications that may be used come down to ethical justifications of why and how a war should be fought. The historical tradition, also called the ‘just war tradition’ is about the rules and agreements that have applied in history. These include conventions that have ‘historically’ applied but then it is up to ethics to examine whether they should be upheld (IEP, 2014). Warfare should thus be analysed through a moral compass, and the morally right thing to do might be to offer help to those in need. Supporters of the just war theory believe that all human beings have the same human rights and duties to protect those of others (Caney, 1997). With this idea in mind, the duty to offer charity to those in need in universal, which may be done through humanitarian intervention (Ramsey, 2002: 35-6).
The Just War theory establishes two sets of rules, one is the jus ad bellum, the right to go to war and the other is jus in bello, the right conduct within war. Jus in bello mentions five principles by which combatants should act once they are involved in war. These are: distinction, proportionality, military necessity, fair treatment of prisoners of war and lastly, not using weapons for other uses than warfare. For the purposes of this research it is not necessary to expand upon these criteria. Jus ad bellum focuses on several criteria. First, there has to be a just cause and right intention for going to war and war cannot solely be legitimized by punishment or recapturing land. A just cause is to protect innocent lives and correct suffered wrong. The intention to maintain economies or material gains is not ‘right’. Second, the injustice of one party must significantly outweigh the injustice suffered by the other to justify a war. Third, only competent public authorities may wage a war. Thus, dictatorships or deceptive military actions will typically violate this criterion. Fourth, arms must be necessary and the use of force has to be proportional on a macro level. This means that the benefits of a war must outweigh the expected evils and harms. Finally, starting a war has to be the last resort possible after diplomatic negotiations and other measures have failed (Hubert, D., Weiss, T.G. et al, 2001).
2.2 Self-interest
The second motivation, based on neorealism, is self-interest. Within self-interest the main reason for military intervention would be security reasons but also economic and cultural reasons can play a part if this threatens the power capability of the state in question.
State’s behaviour based on self-interest is best explained by neorealism. Neorealism is based on a set of assumptions that explain international relations in terms of power, which has often been defined as the ability to get another actor to do what it otherwise would not have done. This capability is difficult to measure and, however interesting, for this research it is unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion about it. Realists claim that for states power is a predominant consideration, far more important than ideology, morality and other social factors of life.
Realism depends upon three important assumptions. First, according to realists, the international system exists in a state of anarchy without a central government that can enforce rules which causes states to have to rely on self-help which they sometimes add to by coalitions of allies and burden sharing. Realists thus do not place much trust in international institutions such as the UN, although they can be used to further their own interests and facilitate the burden sharing. Second, this structure of the system is a major determinant of actor behaviour and within anarchy; survival is the most important goal. All other states are seen as potential enemies and threats to their national security making. Although they are sometimes held in place by international institutions, they are still to be distrusted. Third, states are unitary actors that think as a single entity. Moreover, they think and behave as rational actors that can perform a cost-benefit analysis (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009). This might often be the reason why a state response in practice does not correspond to realist theory. After all, domestic political forces, knowledge deficiencies and bias for example also influence state’s decisions.
Realists would not support military intervention in a non-international armed conflict if it did not threaten their own power capabilities in some way. Refugee flows can be –in realist thought- seen as an indication of a failing state because a state is not behaving as a state when people are forced out. Then responding to these flows can be seen as protecting the international system of states since refugees are a system-induced threat. This threatens the
power equilibrium formerly present, causing realists to act not only in self-interest but also in self-defence (Keely, 1996).
In the field of security studies a further distinction within neorealism has to be made between offensive and defensive realists, which may be seen as more prescriptive than classic realists such as Waltz and Grieco (Jervis, 1999). Mearsheimer (1995), an offensive neo-realist, claims that relative power, not absolute power is most important to states. States should always seek to weaken their potential enemies while strengthening their own relative power. While the name of ‘offensive realism’ thus suggests a constant wish to secure the national security by offensive strategies this is only deemed necessary when their relative power comes into danger (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2011).
Defensive realists such as Jervis (1999) claim that leaders can understand that the costs of war clearly outweigh the benefits. Although they sympathize with the liberal thought that war can be avoided by creating institutions this is not seen as the most effective way of doing so as conflict is seen as unnecessary only in some situations (such as when economic relations exist). However, aggression moves by state leaders can, according to defensive realists, also be aimed at protecting their own security and do not necessarily have to be an expansionary act, which would justify a counter attack. Lastly, although similar to neoliberals, neo-realists remain sceptical about the ease with which converging national interests may be found and non-compliance and cheating remains an issue.
The idea that no other state can be trusted and anything might present a security threat to the own state against which it has to be protected fits in well with the securitization of refugees. This is a process that started well before the 1990s in which it gradually became accepted to discuss refugees not only as victims of conflicts but as a source of security concerns as well (Hammerstad, 2000). Some claim this is a negative development as it has introduced power politics into the treatment of refugee problems while others claim the securitization means that security now not only encompasses state security but also human security, such as that of refugees (Roberts, 2011). For the purposes and clarity of this research the approach of Hammerstad will be followed when speaking of the securitization of refugees. Roberts’ approach seems to fit in more with the humanitarian considerations already discussed and the security of refugees can indeed be a humanitarian reason to intervene and secure their security under either R2P or the Just War theory. The phenomenon of the securitization of refugees is
widely present in the discourse on refugees since 9/11 when a definitive shift was seen towards safety discourse that perceived refugees as possible terrorist threats (Isatolo, 2009). Although Boswell claims there have been no real policy changes aimed at ‘securitizing’ refugees in Europe since attempts to securitize migration have been constrained, she does acknowledge the discourse has changed and –when speaking about refugees- nowadays does include the possible security threat (Boswell, 2006).
Salehyan (2008) explains in what way refugees can present a direct security threat to the refugee receiving state and has found in a previous study with Gleditsch (2006) that refugee inflows significantly increase the risk of civil war. This is because not only ‘genuine’ refugees cross the border but also foreign fighters, arms and conflicting ideologies. ‘Refugee warrior’ communities can expand their network by establishing militant basis on external territories in, for example, refugee camps. From here the militants can then reach out to domestic opposition groups with similar ideologies or ethnicity and thus possibly contribute to the initiation of a conflict in the refugee receiving country.10
A direct security threat is not the only threat refugees can present to the receiving state. Refugees impose a significant economic burden on the receiving state as they require humanitarian assistance and public services while competing with locals for jobs, driving wages down and resources, that are often scarce already (Martin, 2005) and thereby create inflation (Dowty & Loescher, 1996). They are also less likely to contribute to productive economic activity than voluntary labour migrants as they do not necessarily possess relevant skills and often have suffered war traumas making employment a difficult task (Cortes, 2004). Research by Murdoch and Sandler (2004) that examines the impact of civil war in one country on GDP growth in neighbouring states found a negative impact. Although refugees are not tested explicitly, migration is offered as one possible causal factor.
Loescher and Milner (2005) expand on empirical examples from protracted refugee situations in the so-called failed states such as Liberia and Somalia to show how this has directly influenced the security in neighbouring states that host the refugees. In both cases armed groups have hid behind the refugee settlements meanwhile executing and supporting direct
10 This happened in 1970 when Jordan got involved in an armed conflict within its own territory with fighters of
the Palestinian Liberation Army that had resided inside the refugee camps in Jordan (Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2006).
attacks in the home country. Both Kenya and Tanzania have raised this as a major security concern for their own countries and Kenya in particular has expressed it feels particularly vulnerable to the spillover effect of the conflicts in neighbouring states. A combination of Islamic fundamentalism, a lack of central authority in Somalia and a history of irredentism with the Kenyan ethnic Somalis have caused Nairobi to view Somali refugees mostly as a security threat.
Refugees can also present a danger for public health and the environment in a number of ways. Like any other person, refugees need water, food, fuel and land, causing an environmental impact that may be devastating (Dowty & Loescher, 1996). Crowded refugee camps with little sanitation possibilities make them into breeding places for diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, cholera and other infectious diseases (Salehyan, 2008). Also, refugees are often in need of medication and appeal to the domestic medical resources and they will often present an overwhelming demand for treatment of war traumas. Research has shown that civil wars significantly increase the morbidity and mortality not only in the affected country but also in neighbouring states (Ghobarah, Huth & Russett, 2003)..
The last reason why it may be deemed necessary to prevent refugees from entering a state is because they may upset the ethnic, social and cultural balance. Immigrants in general may be perceived as unwelcome foreigners and a possible threat to the existing community (Weiner, 1978). By altering the composition of the host state this may undermine major societal values (Dowty & Loescher, 1996). In case the immigrants possess ethnic ties with groups that were already present in the host state this may particularly pronounce ethnic tensions. If the existing situation was a delicate ethnic balance, the massive influx of people of a certain ethnicity may change this former balance of power and spark a conflict (Brown, 1996). This concern was made explicit when Macedonia refused to accept Kosovar Albanian refugees in March 1999 when they stated this would ‘destabilize Macedonia’s ethnic balance’ (Loescher & Milner, 2005).
The root cause of these last so-called ‘local grievances’ often is the failure of international solidarity and the promised burden-sharing as almost all countries have committed to when
signing the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol.11 Because of this failure the already poor inhabitants of certain countries will have to ‘compete’ their already scarce resources and jobs with the refugees, as the international aid is insufficient. Often, this will turn refugees into scapegoats for breakdowns in the local law and order in both rural and urban areas (Loescher & Milner, 2005).
2.3 Changes since 9/11
‘There is now a bias in favour rather than against Wetsphalian norms; and that international humanitarian concerns now count for much less’ claims research fellow Carlton (2010). This chapter shortly summarizes his research on the waning enthusiasm of the West for humanitarian intervention since the 1990s. As was mentioned in the introduction a substantial part of the thesis will concern itself with the testing of this claim.
In the 1990s the West was optimistic about human rights and foresaw a liberal democratic future for the entire world. The Fukuyama book called ‘The End of History’ (1992) assuming there would be no new large conflicts in the foreseeable future illustrates this. When human rights were violated on a large scale in Somalia, the West intervened, for humanitarian reasons, says Carlton (2010). The fact that no intervention took place in Rwanda troubled the West deeply and eventually caused another humanitarian intervention in Serbia in 1999 with no narrow self-interest involved. The US then claimed that although their intervention was not ‘legal’ since it was without UN approval, the intervention was ‘legitimate’ because of the scale of human rights violations. Carlton sees the 1990s as moving away from the two central Westphalian norms mentioned chapter 1.2 in favour of humanitarian concerns. Non-intervention in internal affairs and the belief that sovereign states should have a monopoly on politically motivated armed violence had to make way for the upholding of human rights. After the turn of the millennium and after 9/11 these humanitarian concerns seemed absent in the big conflicts. Realists Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney who did not seem troubled at all by what would happen to the Iraqi people when they decided to invade Iraq. Carlton claims this is proven by the intended early withdrawal by Rumsfeld as soon as Saddam Hussein was overthrown, securing the interests of the West and leaving the Iraqi’s to fight for their human
11 On 1 April 2011 there were 147 States Parties to either the Convention (144), the Protocol (145) or both (142)
rights themselves. In conflicts where no Western interests are directly threatened there seems to be no willingness at all to intervene. To illustrate this Carlton points at the humanitarian catastrophes in Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and Myanmar where humanitarian intervention seems to be out of the question.
Furthermore, Carlton also analyses speeches by Blair and Obama. Blair –even after years of being out of office- presented himself as an idealist, doing the thing that was the ‘morally right’ thing to do and protecting human rights around the world, in spite of the principles of non-intervention and thereby contributing to the basis of the R2P doctrine. Obama can be seen struggling with on the one hand wanting to do ‘the right thing’ but on the other hand turning back to the ‘Westphalian norms’ Carlton speaks of: the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty.
2.4 Interim conclusion
Idealists act out of the notion that mankind is good and all people have human rights that have to be upheld. If a state fails to provide this protection against human rights violations or engages in the violations themselves this thus leads it to ‘lose’ its right to sovereignty and gives the international community the right to intervene. This is known as R2P; if the state concerned does not live up to its responsibility to protect, the international community has to. This complements to the idealist theory of the Just War theory that sees any war as ‘just’ if it the morally and ethically right thing to do.
Realism presents an intervention as necessary only when it is in the interest of the state and threatens the existing division of capabilities in power. Refugees may contribute to this necessity as they can present a security threat, direct or indirect as was seen in chapter 2.2. The phenomenon of ‘securitization’ of migration has developed in the 1990s but really took off after 9/11 and nowadays is often used as popular discourse.
This chapter has attempted to clarify two considerations that can be used to justify a military intervention in order to stop refugee flows. These two considerations have been connected to the two major IR paradigms: realism and idealism/liberalism. In practice these two considerations will often coincide or will be presented to coincide. After all, supporters of the ‘humanitarian’ considerations will not like going to war out of self-interest but might support
a humanitarian intervention to help the people. In turn, many people do not want to risk lives of their own population ‘just’ to help refugees but would want to risk them if it is in their own interest. The true motivation and driving IR theory will often remain hidden and be dependent on the current political tide present in the country.
3. Methodology
The aim is to examine and explain state behaviour on an interstate level. This will be done by a literature review, discourse analysis of specific cases and interviews. The methods used for this research will be outlined in this chapter. Lastly, the triangulation of the different methods and the limitations of the research will be discussed.
3.1 Literature review
Any research starts with a thorough review of literature and researches connected to the topic. In this research, the literature has been incorporated into the theory section or the specific cases where possible. This literature has been used mostly to examine what has already been written on the connection between refugee flows and military intervention and what the justification is or ‘should be’ according to various authors.
3.2 Case analysis
After the general examination of the topic some cases will be examined up close. Introducing the case and researching the discourse on the decision to intervene will do this.
No cases will be taken outside of the period 1989-2013. If earlier cases were included Cold War politics would be likely to have a strong effect on the decision to intervene. This way the research will include cases over the twelve years before and twelve years after 11-09-2001 making it a convenient time frame to examine the effect of the attack on the World Trade Centre. Out of practical concerns the research will focus on the discourse used by Dutch, Spanish and English speaking states. As a discourse analysis cannot be carried out for every intervention that has ever taken place this research will limit itself to three cases from before 11-09-2001 and three from after this date: Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Georgia, Libya and Mali. The cases have been selected for their variety in date, place and origin of the conflict and scale of the violence. The background of each of these cases is described primarily on the basis of a website called ‘conflictenteller’, which is supervised by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oxfam Novib, UEXchange, UR Turn, Moving out and UPact.
The documents used will be collected from UN statements, international press conferences, statements within the national parliaments and expert articles. Expert articles will be used if they present a view on what the motivation and/or justification of military interventions should be in a certain case as this will often present a thorough analysis and give more insight into why states use or have used a certain justification. When using mainstream media it will be attempted to find the original source and if not, only literal quotes will be used to minimize the influence of possible prejudiced journalists.
Each document will be analysed and it will be seen what considerations are given as the motivation to want to intervene. These will be subdivided into humanitarian considerations, security considerations and economic and cultural considerations. Of course it is possible all three are mentioned. It will then be argued, through contextual analysis what is presented as the most important reason.
The justification of the willingness to intervene will give a good indication of why refugee flows trigger states to intervene militarily but a shortcoming that will always be present when trying to examine why states act the way they do is that the discourse used can deliberately hide the true motivations. Discourse is therefore seen as the topic of enquiry itself, sometimes without revealing the social reality that lies behind it (Bryman, 2008).
3.3 Interviews
To complement the findings of the literature review and the case analysis the aim is to conduct some interviews with members of parliament, (field) experts and employees at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim is to get primary knowledge and experiences of how the discourse has changed from people who have worked in the area of research, thereby testing the findings of the thesis at hand.
The selection of respondents was first done by personal connections through which the (field) experts and employee at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs were approached and second by selecting members of parliament who are currently spokesman for foreign affairs for one of the five biggest political parties. These include: the Liberals12, Labour Party13, Socialist
12 VVD: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie . 13 PvdA: Partij van de Arbeid.
Party14, Christian Democrats15 and D66. The Freedom Party16 was not included because it is a relatively new party that would not be able to provide any reflections on historic changes. The approached respondents were as follows:
• Bommel, Harry van: Member of parliament for the Socialist Party since 1998.
• Briscoe, Ivan: senior research fellow at Clingendael institute. Specialities: conflict and fragility, security and justice and crisis and conflict analysis.
• Broeke, Han ten: Member of parliament for the Liberals since 2006
• Merks, Elke: coordinator of political matters and UN at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• Omtzigt, Pieter: Member of Parliament for the Christian Democrats since 2003.
• Ort, Caroline: field-expert working with refugees for UN and NGO’s in different African countries since 2000.
• Servaes, Michiel: Member of Parliament for the Labour party since 2012. Previously diplomat at the ministry of foreign affairs.
• Sjoerdsma, Sjoerd: Member of Parliament for D66 since 2012. Previously diplomat at the ministry of foreign affairs.
Although it was intended to conduct the interviews in person this was not possible in all cases. Ort is currently residing in Uganda and therefore she was interviewed through Skype. In the case of Merks the questions were sent through e-mail, which can be found in annex I. She decided answering through email would not do justice to the complexity of the problem and did not want to cooperate. Sjoerdsma and ten Broeke could not find the time to plan an interview. Omtzigt did not respond in spite of various attempts.
The other respondents were spoken with in person in talks ranging from 30 to 60 minutes. During these interviews it was attempted to give as much space as possible to the respondents by only pointing at the topics mentioned in annex I. The example of Timmermans’ discourse on the Mali intervention was mentioned during every interview. In conducting the interviews
14 SP: Socialistische Partij.
15 CDA: Christen Democratisch Appel. 16 PVV: Partij voor de Vrijheid.
attention will be paid to the fact that all respondents are speaking from ‘their function’, which -especially in the case of the members of parliaments -may give rise to coloured answers.
3.4 Triangulation and limitations
This research will use triangulation to increase the reliability of the research result. Therefore, the course of action chosen is to conduct a thorough literature review, a discourse analysis and conduct interviews. Although the focus lies on the cases used in the discourse analysis the other two forms of research will be used to complement and/or falsify the findings of the case studies in several ways. While conducting and preparing the interviews and searching for literature and discourse on specific cases statements of state leaders in general or aimed at other cases than the ones that will be examined in depth will be come across. As it is a shame not to include these valuable discourses these statements will be discussed in chapter 6. Also, this way statements on more than just the six cases that are explored into depth can be included in the research, adding to its reliability and the possibility to draw conclusions. The interviews have been planned mostly at the end of the research period thereby enabling the asking of specific questions about the research results.
Of course, any research has its limitations. The State will be looked at as one unit, a black box. This ignores the (political) forces within a country that would help to better explain why in some cases refugee flows trigger states to intervene. However, looking at the internal politics would go beyond the scope of this thesis and the final decision and the given explanation on the decision to intervene or not provides enough research material. Also, it may be assumed this final decision represents the most powerful internal political voice of a state. The practical limitation of language and availability of statements is another important limitation of the research. Since mostly Western media and official documents will be available online this may give rise to a coloured view of what the motivations of states are and although it will be attempted to include other documents it is likely the discourse analysis can only focus on Western motivations for military intervention. Lastly, the limited number of cases makes is hard to generalize the results.
Results and analysis
In the following chapters the six selected cases will each be presented by first shortly outlining the conflict and secondly by analysing the discourse used to justify the intervention. This will be complemented by the opinions of the interviewees. The cases have been subdivided into two chapters. One deals with the cases prior to 9/11, and one deals with the cases after 9/11. Each chapter will finalize with an interim conclusion on the discourse used in the cases. Chapter six is on discourse in general, providing a broader overview of the discourse used in various cases and sheds light on the changing discourse using the information gained from the interviews and a speech by Obama.
4. Cases before 9/11
4.1 Rwanda
4.1.1 Background
During the colonization by Belgium in Rwanda the Belgians had systematically favoured the Tutsi’s by giving them more and more power. After the last Tutsi king died in 1959 the Hutu’s took (helped by the Belgians) power. In 1990 the Tutsi rebel movement Rwandan Patriotic Front (hereinafter: RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda. After three years the UN had helped to mediate a peace agreement and stationed troops in Kigali to maintain peace. On the 6th of April 1994 the plane of Hutu president Habyarimana crashed and the army commanders took over control. The next day all political opponents of the Hutu regime were murdered and in cooperation with the extremist militias Interhamwe and Impuzamugambi and the Hutu population the ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi’s began.
Although there was a UN peacekeeping mission present in Rwanda at the time they did not intervene because they had not been given the mandate to do this. This was in spite of the multiple requests of Roméo Dallaire, the chief commander at the time. After it was clear a
genocide was taking place the United States refused to acknowledge this, leaving the UN in an impasse. Instead of sending extra troops the UN withdrew its troops at this critical time.17 Meanwhile the RPF launched a counter attack and took control of Kigali when the ethnic cleansing was already at its peak. At the same time, France, with UN permission, sent troops to Rwanda to protect the civilians and refugees under the name of Operation Turquoise. Responding to this many Hutu’s fled Rwanda to other countries and over two million of them ended in refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zaïre.18 After exactly 100 days the genocide ended, when the RPF had officially taken over control of Rwanda. During these 100 days 800.000 to one million Tutsi’s and moderate Hutu’s were murdered, amounting to approximately 20% of the total population. Before the genocide Rwanda inhabited 7.3 million people, after the genocide only 5 million were left (Conflictenteller, 2010).
4.1.2 Discourse
In the discourse relating to refugees resulting from the conflict in Rwanda refugees are not presented as dangerous to the international peace and security at all. Throughout all UN documents that were researched the focus lies upon the humanitarian catastrophe taking place and every state expresses its concern for the Rwandese and their suffering. However, as we know now this did not lead to an effective intervention by the international community. Shattuck (2003) explains that the Security Council was paralyzed, precisely because of this reason: no powerful state had a pressing security interest to intervene. This view is shared by Dunne and Wheeler (2004) who question whether it can really be argued that the genocide in Rwanda posed a threat to Western security interests that would justify sacrificing soldiers, lives and scarce resources. Dunne and Wheeler (2004) claim the powerful states have answered this question with a resounding ‘no’ and claim this is why, apart from condemning various actions, no effective action was taken.
17 In 1998 the UN acknowledged they had failed in its response to the Rwandan genocide (Clinton, 1998). 18 It is sometimes claimed France’s operation was meant to protect the Hutu’s, who could –because of the French
protection- flee the country. Also, some claim that most of the weapons used by the Hutu’s had been provided by France.
Typically, all of the resolutions passed by the Security Council during the conflict use words like ‘shocked’ and ‘appalled’ a lot and each resolution contains one sentence connecting this suffering to the international peace and security in the region. For example, in resolution 918 it states that the Council is ‘concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region’ (S/RES/918). Refugees and displaced persons are also typically mentioned just once, speaking of the security of the refugees and displaced persons, not about the threat to international security they themselves may pose (for example S/RES/909, S/RES/912, S/RES/918 and S/RES/929). This can also be seen in some of the speeches held in the meetings of the General Assembly, such as Zambia’s comment that ‘the civil wars in Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and the Sudan torment us all because of our aversion to fratricidal and ethnic violence and the serious humanitarian crises they have engendered’ (A/49/PV.26). Most speeches made in the Security Council do not differ much from this line of discourse (for example S/PV.3436, S/PV.3368, S/PV.3377, S/PV.3388 and S/PV.3392). Security for other countries, economic burdens or other ‘self-interest’ concerns are not mentioned. The –then- US president of the Security Council Madeleine even specifically stated that ‘we believe it important that the draft resolution clearly states that this action has the purely humanitarian goal of contributing to the security and protection of the civilian population.’ (S/PV.3392)
However, some statements concerning other interests than the humanitarian concerns were found. The Security Council has stressed ‘the responsibilities of neighbouring countries for ensuring that their territories, are not used to destabilize the situation inside Rwanda’. In the same meeting New Zealand stressed that security could not be restored to the camps unless the genuine refugees are separated from the influence of the political leaders and the military and paramilitary forces of the former Government (S/PV.3472).
Burundi, a direct neighbour of Rwanda and host to many refugees at the time of the conflict expressed their concerns about these refugees, who are –in their words- ‘a blend of armed killers, still in uniform, and the innocent population.’ Burundi continues by claiming that ‘the criminals enjoy support and are strengthened by international assistance directed to them almost blindly because of inconsistent politics and the violation of laws and rules (…) with regard to who is a refugee and who is not’ (S/PV.3481). Burundi emphasized this point again
in a General Assembly meeting several years later19 by naming the refugee problem as the cause of discord between neighbouring States and engendering mistrust between them as some see refugees as an economic and social burden, or a threat to their security (A/54/PV.5). Zaire had also expressed concerns about the huge numbers of refugees and mentioned, as an example, the city of Goma with a normal population of 200.000 that took in 10.000 refugees per hour on the 14th of June. The effects of the situation would be tragic, according to Zaire, ‘the swamping of infrastructures, the re-emergence of endemic disease, housing shortages, the devastation of crops, environmental destruction, disputes among people living in close quarters, insecurity, and countless other examples.’ As a result, it saw Rwanda as being the prime example for preventive intervention by the international community (A/49/PV.66). This clear statement of Zaire has led the international community to aid in the controlling of refugee camps (TK 1995-1996 24 713 nr.1), not to come to an effective action within Rwanda itself.
4.2 Former Yugoslavia: Bosnia
4.2.1 Background
The conflict in Bosnia is one of the best-known recent European conflicts. It is characterized by its complexity and ethnic cleansing. In the war there were three main religious/ethnic groups fighting each other: the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. The war can be subdivided into three parts: the Bosnian war in 1992, the Croatian-Bosnian war of 1992-1994 and the second Bosnian war in 1994-1995.
The first Bosnian war started after Croatia and Slovenia had proclaimed their independence in 1991. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats feared the Serbian predominance within Yugoslavia. Therefore, they too wanted independence for Bosnia Herzegovina. On the 5th of April 1992 Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims proclaimed this independence following a referendum. In response to this proclamation the Bosnian Serbs, who feared the Islamist predominance within Bosnia Herzegovina, proclaimed their own independence on the 7th of April 1992 under the name of Republika Srpska. From this moment mass murders and ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Croats and Muslims took place, especially within Republika Srpska. At the time the UN was already present in Croatia and in June 1992 the Security Council expanded the UN
