Amsterdam, the 27th of June 2014
The new wave of separatism in
Catalonia and Scotland. An
affair of the nation-state?
Name: Annemijn Dreesmann Address: Kerkstraat 117 1017 GE Amsterdam
Email: Annemijn.Dreesmann@student.uva.nl Registration number: 0451606
MA Europese studies, Studiepad Cultuur en Identiteit Supervisors: Dr. A. Drace-Francis
Index
Introduction……….………..……….4
1. Introduction to Nationalism and Identity in the EU and theoretical frame………...…...6
1.1 Nationalism and Identity in the EU…...6
1.2 Research Context………...………...7
1.3 Two visions on cultural identity in a globalizing world; Eisenstadt and Delanty……… 8 1.4 Recent projects of relevance………..12
1.5 Sources...………....14
2. History of Catalan and Scottish Identity and nationalism……….………..15
2.1 Short history of Catalan identity and nationalism………...15
2.2 Short history of Scottish identity and nationalism………....22
2.3 Comparing the Catalan and Scottish case………...29
3. The view of Europe in Catalonia and Scotland…...……..………..32
3.1.1 The view of Europe in Great Britain………..……….…………..………….33
3.1.2 The view of Europe in Scotland………...34
3.2.1 The view of Europe in Spain………...………...…………...38
3.2.2 The view of Europe in Catalonia………….….………...41
3.3 Comparing the Catalan and the Scottish view………...45
4. Separatism in political campaigns……….…..50
4.1 The Scottish independence bid in the press and party manifesto’s 2003-2014...51
4.2 The Catalan independence bid in the press and party manifesto’s 2003-2014…..60
4.3 Comparison Scotland and Catalonia………..67
Conclusion………...71
Introduction
Questions of sovereignty and democracy are alive today more than ever. Apart from the Arab spring and the ongoing South American revolutions, closer to home a trend of independence referenda (legal or non-legal) seems to have kicked off. After South Sudan and the very recent example of Crimea and Donetsk, Scotland and Catalonia are next in line due in the fall of 2014.1 A referendum on whether Scotland should be an independent country is planned for
the 18th of September this year. In November 2012, the elections to the Catalan parliament
resulted in 60 per cent of the votes cast to parties in favour of separation from Spain. In combination with the fact that an unprecedented number of voters turned up on election day was considered as a step towards the independence of Catalonia.2 A referendum is now
planned for November 2014 even if the Spanish government doesn’t support it.3
Europe nowadays is dealing with no fewer than fifteen active sub-state nationalist movements which are, in the eyes of many, a great concern. For example because the falling apart of the nation-states as we know them could cause a domino-effect which will create great political chaos and difficulties for the European continent as a whole. Furthermore it goes against the long on-going attempts to create a European identity that will make the gap between the EU-institutions and its citizens smaller.
The press speaks of ‘a new wave of separatism’ in regions like Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders.4 This is often associated with the consequences of the economic crisis.5 Many
of the EU’s richer countries feel their relative wealth and success is being drained to the EU’s poorest member-states. In a similar manner, richer regions within nation-states are unhappy about adding significantly more to the national treasury than they receive.6 Economic factors
now seem vital to understand and address the question of minority nationalisms. To what extend were the newly revived separatist movements really inspired by economic
circumstances? And what part does European identity play in the current independence bids of Scotland and Catalonia? In this research I will look closely into the developments in 1 Mick Krever, ‘Catalan leader encourages new Spanish king to mediate push for independence’,
http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/20/catalonia-spain-artur-mas/, retrieved on the 26th of June 2014. 2 Teona Srmava, A Problem of European Identity? Separatist Movements in the EU,
3 Mick Krever, ‘Catalan leader encourages new Spanish king to mediate push for independence’,
http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/20/catalonia-spain-artur-mas/, retrieved on the 26th of June 2014. 4 Steven Erlanger, ‘Europe’s richer regions want out’, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/sunday-review/a-european-union-of-more-nations.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, retrieved on the 7th of January 2013.
5 RT.com, Meeting a ‘democratic deficit’: Belgian separatists advancing to independence,
http://rt.com/news/belgium-elections-separatist-antwerp-430/, retrieved on the 4th of March 2014.
6 Steven Erlanger, ‘Europe’s richer regions want out’, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/sunday-review/a-european-union-of-more-nations.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, retrieved on the 7th of January 2013.
separatism in Catalonia and Scotland. As self-image and the image of others go hand in hand, this thesis will address the regional politics of Catalonia and Scotland against the light of state-politics as well as European politics.7
This thesis will move through the history of Catalan and Scottish nationalism, towards their relationship with Europe and finally arrive at the most recent developments, in order to understand the roots of both separatist demands and find the common or distinctive drives behind their rise in the last decade. The Research question for this thesis will be:
Which factors have influenced the current revival of Catalan and Scottish separatism?
1. Introduction to Nationalism and Identity in the EU and Theoretical frame 7 Beller, M., Leerssen, J., Imaglogy. The cultural construction and literary representation of national
This first chapter will start with a short introduction to the theme of Nationalism and Identity in the EU since 2008, to provide a broader context to the situation of Nationalism and identity in Catalonia and Scotland. In the following paragraph a theoretical frame will be set out, introducing two important relevant theories that will form the base of the research in this chapter. In the last paragraph two important publications will be introduced on the theme of Europe and Identity, both based on a recent research project, ‘Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME)’. These publications are ‘Europe, Nations and Modernity’ by Atsuko Ichijo and ‘The evolution of European identities. A Biographical approach’ coordinated by Robert Miller. These publications will provide an illustration of recent research and a starting point for the current thesis. By using a different angle and the addition of newly obtained
information this thesis will form a supplement to these previous publications. 1.1 Nationalism and Identity in the EU
In the light of the global crisis the link has often been made between the current economic circumstances of many nation-states and the revival of separatist claims by minority-nationalisms such as Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders.8 However, underneath the more
immediate economic causes, there is another important issue the EU has been dealing with from long before 2008; a democratic deficit. The more the union expands, the more it
becomes impossible to represent the interests of all citizens. The lack of social commitment, a ‘European Public Sphere’ or a European Identity is a subject often discussed. It is argued that the very idea the EU was built on, the idea that Europeans are one people with one common destiny, in the words of the 1957 Treaty of Rome an "ever closer union", is a myth. We are now discovering that regional and national differences are not dissolving and that Europeans think and act very differently from one another. The British view of the state’s role is very different from the French view. The Greek or Italian concept of law is very different from that of Sweden or Denmark. Latvians have a very different view of Russia from Germans. This lack of unity is Europe's third and most profound crisis, one that underlies the
continent's economic and political woes. Most Europeans have little idea what the EU stands for in the world, what binds its people together, where it has come from and where it is going in the future.9 Based on these visions, now would be the time to get more insight in what does
8 Steven Erlanger, ‘Europe’s richer regions want out’, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/sunday-review/a-european-union-of-more-nations.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, retrieved on the 7th of January 2013.
9 Gareth Harding, ‘The Myth of Europe. The euro crisis isn't really about money. It's about the fiction that Europeans ever existed at all’, Foreign Policy No. 191 (2012), p.75.
bind people in Europe, what is it they identify with, and what are the grounds and the influences of their attitude towards the EU. In order to add to this discussion, this thesis will make a close-up study of two specific regional identities. As mentioned previously, Scotland and Catalonia are two regions with a strong feeling for their own identity and that have lately been expressing separatist demands. With the goal to provide insights in what the incentives are for these regional identities, what their attitudes are towards Europe, and how the crisis has influenced this, Scotland and Catalonia will serve as example cases in this thesis. 1.2. Research Context
The scientific field, to which this thesis is of relevance, is the study of nationalism and identity as markers of modernization. In this case we focus specifically on the construction of national and European identity. Nation-states and Nationalism have been marking concepts of the modern age. The “classical” theories of modernization go back to the 1950’s, to the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim and Weber. All of them assumed, explicitly or more implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies. Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt is an important sociological analyst from after the time of Marx and Durkheim making nuances to their views.10 I will go into these differentiations in the next paragraph, and continuingly compare
this with an important shift in the debate on nationalism from the last decades, the move from nationalism to post-nationalism. Gerard Delanty sees post-nationalism as a way to enable a Europe where multiple layers of citizenship are possible. In his vision, national citizenship should be compatible with regional citizenship and European citizenship.11 All of these views
are often quoted in the contemporary debate. In many contemporary essays and researches, the question rises how nationalisms and nation-states within the European Union relate to each other and if a common European identity exists. A lack of connection between the apparatus of the EU and its civilians is still an important source of inspiration for research projects on the construction of identity and how these constructions are developing. In this thesis the aim is to look into the relationship between regional and European identity, and in particular the cases of Scotland and Catalonia. This will be done on the basis of a critical
10 S.N Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus, No. 1 (2000), p.1.
11 Gerard Delanty, ‘Models of Citizenship: Defining European Identity and Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, No. 3 (1997), p.285.
interpretation of the theories of Eisenstadt and Delanty, which will be further accounted for in the next paragraph.
1.3 Two visions on cultural identity in a globalizing world; Eisenstadt and Delanty The theoretical framework for this research will be the work of Eisenstadt and of Delanty. More specifically the titles: ‘Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospects of
Cosmopolitanism: a theory of cultural encounters’ (2011), by Delanty and Eisenstadts ‘Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization’ (1999). Both Eisenstadt and Delanty are authorities on identity and nationalism research, and are also cited in the aforementioned projects, ‘Europe, Nations and Modernity’ by Atsuko Ichijo and ‘The evolution of European identities. A Biographical approach’ coordinated by Robert Miller, which will be addressed in the next paragraph. This paragraph will now continue with a closer introduction of Eisenstadt and Delanty and their theories as far as relevant to this thesis.
Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt was an Israëli sociologist. He was appointed to a teaching post in the sociology department of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in1959. He was granted the title of professor emeritus in 1990 which he was until his death in September 2010. He held countless guest professorships, at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, the University of Zurich, the University of Vienna, the University of Bern, Stanford and the University of Heidelberg, among others. Eisenstadt received the Balzan prize and the Max-Planck research prize, and in 2006 he was the winner of the Holberg InternationalMemorial Prize, a prestigious prize for the stimulation ofthe fields of the arts and humanities, social sciences, law and theology, awarded annually for outstanding
scholarly work.12 Furthermore he was a member of many academies, including the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Advisory Editors Council of the Social Evolution & History Journal.13 Eisenstadts work is widely cited in works on nationalism and identity. His
work is also quoted multiple times by various researchers in Atsuko’s aforementioned book ‘Europe, nations and modernity’. This makes Eisenstadts work definitely to be taken in account for the current thesis. In the next paragraph I will give a short sketch of the relevant parts of Eisenstadts theory, and then proceed to compare it to Delanty’s work. I will use these two angles throughout the whole thesis.
12 Holbergprisen, ‘About Holberg prize’, http://www.holbergprisen.no/en, retrieved on the 17th of May 2013. 13 Shelfari, ‘S. N. Author page’, http://www.shelfari.com/authors/a312452/S-N-Eisenstadt/, retrieved on the 22nd of February 2013.
In his text ‘Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization’, Eisenstadt argues new visions of modernity have been emerging since the downfall of the Soviet Regime. Since the end of the ‘Bipolar World’ of the Cold War, the development of the contemporary world has been one of variety. The classical idea of Modernity and Modernization has been replaced by ‘Multiple Modernities’ coexisting and sometimes conflicting with each other.14
The new civilization emerged first in Europe and later expanded throughout the world, creating a series of international frameworks or systems, each based on some of the basic premises of civilization and each rooted in one of its basic institutional dimensions. The “original” modernity developed in the West consists of two closely interconnected
dimensions; 1. The structural, organizational dimension, which contains mainly the growing structural differentiation, industrialization, urbanization and growing communications, and
2. The institutional dimension, whose characteristics consist of the development of the new institutional formations, the modern nation-state, the modern national collectivities, new and capitalist-political economies, and a distinct cultural program, that is closely related to specific modes of structuring major arenas of social life.
In other parts of the world, these basic premises developed in their own manner because of the different environment and circumstances. But it’s not only societies in other parts of the world. At the same time there have developed new discourses in Western
societies themselves, greatly transforming the original model of modernity and undermining the original vision of modern and industrial society with its hegemonic and homogenizing vision.15
To sum up, the reality went far beyond the hegemonic and homogeneous vision of modernity once imagined in the 1950’s. The fundamentalist and the new communal and national movements constitute but one of the new developments in the unfolding of the potentialities and antinomies of modernity. It is possible that these developments may indeed give rise also to highly charged confrontation stances, especially in the West. But these stances are promulgated in continually changing modern idioms and they may entail a continual transformation of these indications and of the cultural programs of modernity. It is the combination of the growing diversity in the continuous reinterpretation of modernity and the development of multiple global trends and mutual reference points that is characteristic of the contemporary world.
14 S. N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization’, The Canadian Journal of Sociology, No. 2 (1999), p.283-295.
Gerard Delanty’s work corresponds in many ways to that of Eisenstadt, but gives us a slightly different angle, with more focus on multi-culturality within societies. Gerard Delanty is a Professor of Sociology and Social and Political Thought at the University of Sussex He refers to himself as an interdisciplinary sociologist and he has a special interest in social theory and the cultural analysis of social and political questions. More specifically in the comparative analysis of modernity in global perspective and in social change in Europe. Most of his work in some way or other has to do with the implications of globalization for the analysis of the social world. He has written eleven books many of which have been translated in other languages. Apart from this he has been editor for several books. He has published over a hundred papers on various issues in social and political theory, European identities, globalization, nationalism and the cultural and historical sociology of modernity. Furthermore he has lectured extensively throughout the world.16
Delanty’s work is relevant here because his observation of ‘the cosmopolitan turn’ in social science. His work illustrates that the link between culture and democracy has been a topic that has gained increased prominence in social and political science in recent years. The relation between culture and political community changed when the focus shifted from mainstream politics and processes of state formation to a new interest in minorities, identity, multiculturalism and post-national citizenship.17 In his essay ‘Cultural diversity, democracy
and the prospects of Cosmopolitanism: a theory of cultural encounters’, Delanty poses some questions that are very interesting in relation to this thesis, namely; what are the political implications of cultural difference? When does cultural difference enhance democracy and when does it undermine it? Delanty strongly associates the problems related to this question to the strong tendency of globalism and the rise of cosmopolitanism.
On the one side, cultural diversity appears to be both a desirable normative aspiration and an inevitable outcome of world-wide democratization; on the other, cultural diversity can entail a conception of difference that may be a challenge to democracy if the latter is
restricted in its assumptions about membership of political community or if the demands for the recognition of difference may be excessive or incompatible with other goals. For instance, the pursuit of difference may be at the cost of the pursuit of equality or may result in some kind of cultural segregation of social groups or atavistic nationalism.
16 University of Sussex, ‘Staff profiles; Gerard Delanty’, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/101974, retrieved on the 18th of February 2013.
17 Gerard Delanty, ‘Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospects of
The key underlying characteristic of cosmopolitanism is a reflexive condition in which the perspective of others is incorporated into one’s own identity. It is not so much a situation expressed in mobility, diversity and globalizing forces, the main concepts associated with internationalism and global culture. More than anything cosmopolitanism is about the interaction, exchange and dialogue between different parties within a society.18
Concluding, the feature of cosmopolitanism is one of the most important differences between the theories of Delanty and Eisenstadt. Where Eisenstadts ‘Multiple modernities’ focusses mainly on pluralization of different societies, cosmopolitanism goes beyond this and is mainly about the transformations of societies as a result of interaction of different groups. The main argument here is that of the underlying notion of a cultural encounter. The aim of the text is to develop an analysis of cultural encounters in order to identify the dominant cultural trends and prospects for cosmopolitanism. In the first section, Delanty creates a theory of culture that captures its relational and not only its plural character. Where the traditional accounts of culture stressed closure, the approach advocated here emphasizes the open-ended nature of culture, be it in identities, memories or artistic creations. Without a perspective of this kind, it would be impossible to understand cultural acts of claim-making such as those related to collective identity and citizenship.19
Because globalization leads to the increase of interaction and intermixing of cultures, Delanty tries to find an answer to the question what happens when one culture meets another.20 He states there are six generic kinds of cultural encounters. For the current thesis,
three of these types are relevant; First of all ‘Cultural divergence’, which takes place when different cultural orientations develop into self-conscious subcultures leading to confrontation with the original culture. Secondly ‘Cultural assimilation’, which means one culture
‘absorbing’ another one. Examples of this type are colonialism or the integration of
immigrants in their new culture.21 The third, ‘Cultural acceptance’, is a peaceful co-existence
between two cultures. Although the cultural relationship in this case is co-operative for the most part, conflict and different interests can still appear, for example because of economic competition. This type of encounter can apply to a relationship originated from trade, but also to political unions.22
18 Gerard Delanty, ‘Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospects of
Cosmopolitanism: a theory of cultural encounters’, The British Journal of Sociology, No. 4 (2011), p.634. 19 Ibidem, p.640.
20 Gerard Delanty, ‘Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospects of
Cosmopolitanism: a theory of cultural encounters’, The British Journal of Sociology, No. 4 (2011), p.634. 21 Ibidem, p.634.
The main results of these encounters Delanty observes, are ‘Cultural homogenization’, ‘Cultural polarization’, ‘Hybridization’ and ‘Unity in diversity’.
The combination of Eisenstadt’s and Delanty’s theories is interesting, because it should give us a good view on how interaction between different cultures works on different scales, both between different societies and within a society. By applying these theories to the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, we will get a better look at the relation between their separate cultural identities and their views on the European identity.
1.4 Recent projects of relevance
The current thesis, as mentioned before, stands in connection to recent books about identities in Europe, and primarily the works ‘Europe, Nations and Modernity’ (2011), edited by Atsuko Ichijo and ‘The evolution of European identities. A Biographical approach.’ (2012), by Robert Miller. These works each draw from findings of a recent research projects on Identities and modernity’s in Europe, which were part of the European Commission funding scheme FP7.23 The project ‘Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME)’ addresses three
major issues regarding European Identities: What they are, in what ways they have been formed and what trajectories they make take from now on. IME first investigates the path the diversity of European identities may take as the processes of European integration continue. It then examines the various ways in which these diverse self-definitions have been
formulated and maintained in different social, cultural and systemic settings and in which they have been interacting with various processes and forces. It then aims to identify
commonalities among diverse European identities in the nine cases as the basis of grounded projection of possible trajectories European identities may take as the processes of European integration continue. The project therefore has the following objectives:
“•to map the diversity of European identities across the cases studied in relation to four factors: type of state, type of religion, the strength of civil society and historical and geo-political background;
•to analyse in each case how European identities have evolved within the specific historical context in relation to other forms of identification, especially national identity;
23 European Commission, ‘IME - Identities and modernities in Europe: European and national identity construction programmes, politics, culture, history and religion’, http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/403_en.html, retrieved on the 11th of April 2013.
•to investigate the role of the EU integration processes in modifying the contemporary identities, especially in its relationship to national and religion-ethnic identities;
•to examine the extent to which religion-ethnic minorities influence identity construction programmes of the majority, and their unique contribution to the articulation of European identities;
•to seek commonalities in European identities across the cases by way of systematic comparisons;
•to test the validity of theory of multiple modernities as a sound basis for projecting the trajectory of the future of European identities.”24
In short, the project IME does research on a wide range of definitions about ‘us, the
Europeans’ in many different EU member states, looking to answer the question: ‘What is it to be a European now?’ IME sets out to look into this question with an assumption that ‘Europe’ (as shorthand for a collection of related concepts such as the idea of Europe, various processes of Europeanization and European identity) national identity and modernisation are intricately linked to each other.25 The IME project had its origins in the perception that the
bulk of previous empirical work on European identity had been driven by an elitist ‘top down’ political science perspective that mirrored the approach of Eurocentric institutions, most notably the EU itself, towards encouraging or depending upon one’s point of view, imposing Europeanization on reluctant populations.26
Atsuko’s book ‘Europe, Nations and Modernity’ shows nine case studies by intellectuals and political elites, which outline different ways to try and make sense of ‘Europe’. All of these case studies use the same angle of ‘Europe as modernity’. In this way the relation between national identity and European identity is approached. What calls the attention in this project is the focus on each countries individual path to modernity, nation- and state-formation and geopolitics.27 Millers book, ‘The evolution of European identities. A Biographical approach’,
takes a very different approach. Instead of sticking to the nationalities perspective, this project on European identity employed a minimally structured mode of data collection. In-24 European Commission, ‘IME - Identities and modernities in Europe: European and national identity construction programmes, politics, culture, history and religion’, http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/403_en.html, retrieved on the 11th of April 2013.
25 Atsuko Ichijo, Europe, Nations and Modernity, Basingstoke: Palgrave macmillan 2011, p.1.
26 Robert Miller, The evolution of European identities. A Biographical approach. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, p.1.
depth biographical narrative interviews in order to give its interviewees the maximum possible range to express their lives from their own perspective, that is, to promote the agency of the research subject. Both Ichijo’s and Millers projects have the goal to shine a light on how Europe could get in connection with its civilians. In Ichijo’s case, the power of speech is brought back from the European institutions to the individual nation-states. In Millers case, the turnaround of the top-down paradigm of the EU goes even further. Here the individual civilian of the European Union is put back at the core of the matter.
What I would like to add to these existing researches with this thesis, is to look at the subject from a regional point of view, and by interlinking two example cases. This could add to the aforementioned researches because these researches are mainly from a nation-state point of view, and the latter is focussed on cases of individuals. I would like make use of these examples of sociological research on the subject of identity to research sociological effects on identity as result of the Euro crisis, to add another point of view to political and economic approaches to the Euro crisis.
1.5 Sources
The sources used for the research in this thesis will exist of a selection of electoral programs, recent pro and against independence campaigns and relevant press articles. The selected material is from the beginning of the 21st Century until now, in order to create a view on the
evolution of the campaigning. The core material is election manifesto’s from Great Britain’s and Spain’s main unionist parties and Scotland’s and Catalonia’s nationalist parties from 2003 until now. As a secondary resource, press articles from main British and Spanish national newspapers on the subject of Scottish and Catalan independence will be used.
2. History of and Scottish and Catalan Identity and nationalism
The following chapter contains a sketch of the historical basis of Catalan and Scottish Identity. The interpretation of a shared historical past always forms an important part of
collective identity.28 For this reason and in order to capture and better understand the roots of
separatism into the present situation, historical developments and the framing here of is indispensable to this research.
Ichijo Atsuko in her book states the Scottish nation lacks clear demarcations, but there are three main elements on which the Scottish identity is build: Territory, shared history, and last but certainly not least important: there is a clear ‘other’ in the form of the English. Although no consensus exists under theorists about when the phenomenon ‘nation’ came into being, most of them will agree that nationalism is something of the modern age.29 Still ancient
history is often an important source of arguments for nationalists to give legitimacy and authenticity to their point of view. Often the partiality of historic interpretation and
manipulation of facts play an important role in the presentation of their vision. Much of the same is relevant to Catalan nationalism. An important fact for the understanding of Catalan identity is that Catalonia has a very high number of immigrants. Apart from this fact it would be mistaken to think of the native Catalans as a homogeneous group.30 In the last paragraph of
this chapter the similarities and differences between historical nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia will be further discussed.
2.1 Short history of Scottish identity and nationalism
Scotland was established as a kingdom in the Middle Ages with its own royal and parliamentary institutions. Right from the beginning it had to compete with the English crown, which had great interest of taking over power in Scotland. In 1603 James VI, who was both a Stuart and a Scot, for the first time combined the two crowns. A century later, in 1707, the parliaments of England and Scotland started cooperating and created a single state. There were many benefits to this union for both sides as it would strengthen their international positions in political, economic, religious and cultural matters as well as provide greater security.31
In the construction of the British identity war was an important factor. Fighting the common enemy France, between 1707 and 1837, helped the uniting of the Scottish, the Welsh and the English into one ‘umbrella’ identity. Religion also played an important part, 28 M. Beller and J. Leerssen, Imaglogy. The cultural construction and literary representation of national characters. A critical survey, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2007.
29 Astuko Ichijo, Scottish nationalism and the idea of Europe. Concepts of Europe and the nation. London: Routledge 2004, p.33.
30 Ibidem
31 Stéphane Paquin Globalization, European integration and the rise of neo‐nationalism in Scotland
they united as Protestants fighting the Catholics from the mainland of Europe.32 While the
Scottish parliament was never officially abolished when an official union was established in 1707, it still marked the end of a real Scottish parliament. In the meantime the Scottish civil society did continue to exist is the same way. The British state had enough power over the matters it considered important and it had no tendency at all to enforce cultural integration on Scotland and Wales. There was no separatist movement within Scottish nationalism in the 19th century, because there was hardly interference with civil society and no sense of
limitation in rights and freedom under nationalists. The base of nationalism in Scotland in this period was focussed on culture and for many the benefits of the union accomplished in 1707 gave a sense of pride and greater international significance.
It was when the central state further developed and gained influence, tensions between centre and periphery started to increase. The British government increasingly interfered with Scottish matters, including on the social affairs level and the Scottish nationalists were quick to respond. From the mid-19th century a growing number of
intellectuals argued Scotland should have some form of autonomy, which developed into a lobby for a new Scottish parliament. In the 1920’s a number of times a bill was put to a vote for the promotion of Scottish home rule but none of them passed. Eventually this led to the creation of the National Party of Scotland (NPS) in 1928. The NPS did not express a clear stance regarding the Scottish parliament, but soon opted for independence. In 1934 the NPS fused with the Scottish Party and formed together the Scottish National Party (SNP). The Scottish Party wasn’t in favour of independence but for home rule, and these two currents continue to exist in these two parties.33 The SNP did not succeed in having much impact until
the 1960’s. Around the same time the new welfare state system of the UK reinforced
homogeneity around the whole of the British isles, causing a growing divergence between the Central and the Scottish politics. With the transformation of the British welfare state, the Scots had less and less material interest in the union.34 These transformations were not limited
to Great Britain: all Western countries had begun to severely doubt the functioning of the welfare states they had built up in the post-war era. Like in many of the other western countries, the initial economic expansion in the decades after the war drew to a close. As a consequence, the existing economic problems became urgent. The government had more 32 France was an important Catholic power at the time. Stéphane Paquin Globalization, European integration and the rise of neo‐nationalism in Scotland , Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, No. 1 (2002), p.62.
33 Stéphane Paquin, ‘Globalization, European integration and the rise of neo‐nationalism in Scotland’,
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, No. 1 (2002), p.64.
crises on its hands than it could handle, which drove them to the conclusion the welfare state was failing and needed reform. The Scottish economy, which before had been disadvantaged compared to the English economy, now stayed stable while the overall British economy was declining. The end of universal social policy and the following crises of the nation-state, by the 1970’s was the definitive end to the belief of Scotland they needed the British Empire to have international influence.35
Furthermore, in contrast to England, in Scotland the social democratic ideology still had a very solid base, which was ground for more friction with the centre. In the mid-1970’s the Scottish economy had a great impulse from newly discovered oil reserves, which
increased its opportunity to function independently. This did not only stimulate support for independence in Scotland, but completely changed its political psychology. Not only did they no longer benefit from the English economy, the English now benefitted from their oil
incomes. A fast rise in popularity of the SNP in the 1974 election resulted in obtaining nearly 30 per cent of the votes. These votes were cast out of support for independence as well as out protest against the British government. This success greatly stimulated interest in the eventual creation of a Scottish parliament. In 1979 a referendum about the parliament was held, but even though a majority of the voters was in favour, the plan stranded because only 32, 9 per cent of the electorate expressed their vote while a majority of 40 per cent was required to make the outcome legally valid.36
During the 1980’s, the popularity of the SNP was reaffirmed, as a result of discontent about the policy of the Conservatives under the leadership of Margareth Thatcher. On the one hand going to war with Argentina over the Falkland Island was to show of the greatness of the British Empire and stimulate British pride, while on the other hand a mass-privatization policy was to make an end to the welfare state and reboot economic progress. Removing the adjective 'British' from coal, steel, gas and rail meant both that the same institutional systems no longer ran throughout the UK. It also meant that, symbolically, the delivery of many of these products and services was no longer 'British'. In Scotland, the ending of the very popular social programmes, created a unanimous opposition to the Conservatives. Labour immediately rose to the occasion by convincing the Scots that a Scottish parliament would have protected them against the imposed measures. Following the 1987 election, Labour
35 Ibidem, p.65.
36 Stéphane Paquin, ‘Globalization, European integration and the rise of neo‐nationalism in Scotland’,
joined with the Liberal Party and other political groups to put to paper a new proposal for Home Rule.37
The most important development for Scottish independence in the last decades, according to Paquin, is the growing globalization of the economy. During the early 1980’s Scotland became increasingly established as an exporter of whisky and computer products, and as a base and place for investment for multinationals.38 In the same period the SNP began
to change its view on Europe. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, the SNP had been known for its scepticism towards the EEC because it was perceived as a capitalist, elitist and centralist institution, and thus directly opposed the mainly socialist ideology of the party. Before the 1975 referendum on British membership of the EEC they campaigned for a ‘No’ vote, but finally the membership was endorsed. The SNP than began to re-examine their own policy towards the EEC and started seeing a more advantageous side.39
It was Jim Sillars, a former member of the Labour Party who decided to join the SNP after the collapse of the Scottish branch of Labour, who gave birth to the ‘Independence in Europe’ policy from the SNP. This policy was based on the thought that it was no longer possible for a state in the contemporary world to have absolute sovereignty given the geopolitical situation and the globalizing economy. Giving up some sovereignty for mutual international agreements was now unavoidable and ‘Playing it through Europe’ was
necessary to avoid isolation.40 At first, the pro-Europe stance in the ‘Independence in Europe’
policy was merely a realist and pragmatist strategy, and had nothing to do with a commitment to or believe in the fast developing cooperation between European States.41 This
policy-change came at a time when the European Community itself was also reforming rapidly with the new president of the European Commission Jacques Delors, the most important example being the establishment of the Single Market Act of 1986, which lifted the restrictions of free trade within the Union.42Meanwhile, the promotion of Scottish independence grew stronger.
In 1980, the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA, later known as the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament) was formed by those who had voted yes in the 1979 referendum and wanted to pick up the fight again after the defeat. In 1992 they we’re joined in their fight by
37 Stéphane Paquin, ‘Globalization, European integration and the rise of neo-nationalism in Scotland’,
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, No. 1 (2002), p.67.
38 Ibidem, p.68.
39 Astuko Ichijo, Scottish nationalism and the idea of Europe. Concepts of Europe and the nation. London: Routledge 2004, p.49.
40 Ibidem, p.48. 41 Ibidem, p.47. 42 Ibidem, p.49.
‘Common Cause’, an organization formed by lawyers, civil servants and academics to provide a new platform for discussion on the matter of a Scottish Parliament and democracy. By organizing meetings to discuss the subjects that a Scottish Parliament in their eyes should take care of, they wanted to keep the idea of the Parliament alive under the people and help them envisage what it could mean to them. Furthermore there was ‘Scotland United’, an association that organized marches demanding a Scottish Parliament first in Edinburgh and later in other places across Scotland and ‘Democracy for Scotland’, a protest group who set up camp to keep watch at the Parliament building in Edinburgh, which was thought of as the future home of the Scottish parliament. In 1993 the ‘Coalition for Scottish Democracy’ was formed to keep order in the up-popping groups and associations and optimize their use and cooperation.
All of these organizations recognised the need for Scotland to participate in Europe.43
The flourishing of the pro-independence movement in Scotland in 1992 and the years after had much connection with the deception of the General elections in April 1992. There was a great opportunity for the Labour party, which was favourable to Scottish devolution, to beat the Conservatives, who had been governing for over 13 years and were principally against devolution.44 The odds were very much against the sitting government since a long recession
was asking its toll and expectations were high for Labour; Nonetheless Conservatives easily won again.45 Following this deception the Labour Party reinvented itself by modernizing and
refining its policy and the party itself. 46 Five years later new opportunities arose for the Scot
nationalists when the general elections finally resulted in a win for Labour. Labour had pronounced itself in favour of devolution by arguing it would not only be favourable for Scotland and Wales, but also for Britain as a whole to guarantee the quality of democracy. On 26 June 1996, ‘New Labour’ (as the party now preferred to call itself) announced it would hold a referendum on devolution. The newly elected government kept its promise and the referendum was held on 11 September 1997, the seven hundredth anniversary of William Wallace’s victory over the English at the battle of Stirling Bridge. The devolution scheme was fully supported by the SNP, and as rarely seen before the SNP and the Labour Party 43 Astuko Ichijo, Scottish nationalism and the idea of Europe. Concepts of Europe and the nation. London: Routledge 2004, p.51-53.
44 Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice ‘How did Labour lose in '92?’,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/exclusive-how-did-labour-lose-in-92-the-most-authoritative-study-of- the-last-general-election-is-published-tomorrow-here-its-authors-present-their-conclusions-and-explode-the-myths-about-the-greatest-upset-since-1945-1439286.html, retrieved on the 10th of June 2013.
45 Ibidem.
46 Tom Gallagher, The illusion of freedom. Scotland under Nationalism, London: Hust and Company 2009, p.91.
worked closely together on the way towards the referendum.47 Two questions were presented
to the Scots in the referendum: 1. Should a Scottish Parliament be established and 2. Should the Parliament have tax-varying power. On the first question 74, 3 per cent of the voters said yes, on the second one 63, 5 per cent said yes. After this unambiguous endorsement the Scotland bill was introduced in December of the same year, and in 1999 the first elections to the Scottish Parliament were held.
Although participation in Europe was not a major issue during the referendum or the election campaign of the Parliament, the SNP continued to advocate independence in Europe. The theme of Europe did certainly not disappear from the Scottish political stage after devolution. 48 Atsuko in her book states: “Given that the sense of being Scottish shows little signs of weakening in contemporary Scotland, it’s association with the EU will linger on for a while, if not be further accentuated. The European dimension has therefore become an integrated feature of contemporary Scottish society and contemporary Scottish nationalism. It will not easily be discarded and it will continue to colour the path Scottish nationalism will take.”49
What did change since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament is the relationship between Scottish nationalism and Labour. In the course of its governing period, Labour soon shove involvement in devolution to the bottom of their priorities and lost touch with the SNP. Tony Blair was more concerned with international relations and with Northern Ireland, and did not even show up for the opening of the new parliament building in 2003. His successor Gordon Brown never saw any need to put any more effort in the question of devolution either. As he openly stated the financial powers given to Scotland by the 1998 Scotland Act were sufficient and there was no need to re-examine the Act.50 Despite having been
responsible for many important empowering changes for the Scots, when it came to
governing the Labour Party seemed unable to come up with a clear policy and new ideas that would reinforce their voters loyalty. Once in power the Party did not take a clear stance in any area and showed little coherence. The consequences of withdrawing their support to the devolution project and the failing to keep their old partners in Scotland happy after 2002 soon became clear. In 2007 the unexpected rise of the SNP lead to them taking over power from 47 Tom Gallagher, The illusion of freedom. Scotland under Nationalism, London: Hust and Company 2009, p.87.
48 Astuko Ichijo, Scottish nationalism and the idea of Europe. Concepts of Europe and the nation. London: Routledge 2004, p.54
49 Ibidem, p.56.
50 Tom Gallagher, The illusion of freedom. Scotland under Nationalism, London: Hust and Company 2009, p.112-115.
Labour in Scottish politics and was the beginning of a further downfall of Labour. In 2010 the hegemony of labour was officially over when they lost the UK-wide elections. Looking back on their legacy, even those sympathetic to Tony Blair and his men and women are critical of what ‘New Labour’ accomplished during their years in power. The party made a few very unpopular decisions such as the taking part in the war in Iraq, and failed to meet expectations concerning standing in for civil liberties, leftish ideals and fighting inequality.51
The fast-changing global circumstances, under which the emergence of the financial crisis, have played an important role in the course labour followed with its policies. For the invention of New Labour and matching ideology changes, economic prosperity was a precondition. The practice Labour during their last years of governing dealt with, was one that started drawing back on much more governmental intervention again when the expected tendency was the other way around.52
Since the downfall of Labour, Scottish nationalism has been on the rise. The question of Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom continues to be a pressing issue in British politics and increasingly generates concern in the EU. In the fall of 2014 a referendum is planned on whether or not Scotland should become a separate country.53
2.2 Short history of Catalan identity and nationalism
The Catalan Identity is based on the rise of Catalonia from the twelfth through the fourteenth century. During this period it became one of the most extensive and powerful mercantile empires of the Mediterranean. The prospering economy of Catalonia lead to a spontaneous collaboration between the ruling mercantile class and the king, and would ultimately give rise to its own representative system. To this day, Catalans are quite proud of their distinctive
51 Anthony Giddens, ‘The rise and fall of labour’, New statesman, No. 5001 (2010), p.25. 52 Ibidem, p.6-27.
53 Charles King,’The Scottish play: Edinburgh's quest for independence and the future of separatism’, Foreign
medieval democratic institutions.54 The Union of the crowns of Catalonia and Aragon dates
back to 1137.55
In the years of the thirty years’ war Castillian troops were present in Catalonia
generating great unrest in society. Not in the last place for wide usage of Catalan resources in their war with France.56 In 1640 a group of peasants revolted against the Castilian troops and
assassinated the Castilian viceroy. The rebellion was unsuccessful, but nested itself in collective memory as this first Catalan nationalist provocation.57 The relationship of the
crown of Aragon with the periphery could be looked at as essentially a constitutional issue, although the constitution in the modern sense of the word did not exist yet.58
In 1701 the War of the Spanish Succession broke out over the inheritance of the dominions of Carlos II. Catalonia resisted the advancing French-Castillian army of Felipe de Anjou for many months, but in September 1714 Barcelona was taken.59 The 11th of
September is still celebrated each year as a commemoration of Catalan independence. Throughout 2014 are held to commemorate the 300th anniversary of these facts, by the
Catalan leaders seen as a meaningful moment to provoke a debate on Catalonia’s present and future.60 The defeat in 1714 initialised the falling apart of Catalonia as a political entity. Many
of the bourgeois and urban intellectuals became strongly castilianised.61
In the early 1800’s, the poet Carlese Aribau was the first to express a nostalgia for the Catalan traditions and language. This was the start of the ‘Catalan Renaissance’, a period where the economy flourished again and the intellectuals took up the task to promote and protect the Catalan culture. This period is often considered as the base for ‘Catalanism’, or early Catalan nationalism.62 In the 1880’s, the nostalgia was replaced by a longing for
modernity and progress. The modernism wave had the goal to build a genuinely modern Catalan culture, that would not only take into account the conservation and the will of its own 54 Laura Desfor Edles, ‘A Culturalist Approach to Ethnic Nationalist Movements: Symbolization and Basque and Catalan Nationalism in Spain’, Social Science History, No. 3 (1999), p.317.
55 Thomas N. Bisson, ‘The Problem of Feudal Monarchy: Aragon, Catalonia, and France’, Speculum, No 3 (1978), p.463.
56Catalonia, Revolt of (1640–1652), http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404900180.html, retrieved on the 19th of June 2014.
57 Laura Desfor Edles, ‘A Culturalist Approach to Ethnic Nationalist Movements: Symbolization and Basque and Catalan Nationalism in Spain’, Social Science History, No. 3 (1999), p.317.
58 Joan-Pau Rubiés, Reason of State and Constitutional Thought in the Crown of Aragon, 1580-1640,
The Historical Journal, No. 1, p.3.
59 Raymond Carr, Historia de España, Barcelona: Oxford University press 2000, p.173-175.
60 Generalitat de Catalunya, Trenticenari, http://tricentenari.gencat.cat/en/eltricentenari/, retrieved on the 16th of June 2014.
61 Ibidem, p.317.
62 Luis Moreno, Ana Arriba and Araceli Serrano, ‘Multiple identities in decentralised Spain: The case of Catalonia’, Regional and federal studies, No. 3 (1998), p.80.
society, but also to keep up and be in a competitive position with the rest of Europe.63 The
highpoint of the Catalan national movement was at the end of the First World War, by late 1918, in the form of a strong campaign for self-government.64 Spain was not involved in the
war and the Catalan industry flourished during these years because it had little competition from other European countries. They dominated the Spanish and Latin-American markets and the orders of the French army. However the import of basic food products and fuel severely declined, and prices of materials increased, a combination that started an inflationary spiral. This had its effects on the wages, finally leading to increasing social unrest from 1916 on. Much like in the present time, this resulted in a campaign for autonomy, starting with a questionnaire sent to municipal councils. An overwhelming majority answered positive to Catalan self-government, which in the survey was presented as being linked to municipal autonomy.65 This questionnaire furthermore coincided with especially unsuccessful times for
the Spanish government.66 It was a very unstable and insecure period for the whole of Europe,
with the aftermath of the War, and the impact of the Russian revolution, which was widely regarded as the beginning of a socialist revolution that would get the whole continent under its spell.67
The first Catalan separatist organization, Federació Democràtica Nacionalista
(Nationalist Democratic Federation), was formed in January 1919. The repression of Catalan culture under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, who had ceased power in 1923, intensified the idea of radical Catalan nationalists that legal political methods of attaining independence under the Monarchy did not work and was proof to them a separatist insurrection was the only option for Catalonia to move forward.68 The establishment of the Second Republic in
1931 was the perfect opportunity for important reconsiderations of the form of the state and territorial organization. Between 1931 and 1939 many important constitutional changes were made to give the regions more freedom in decision-making. Instead of the Federalist model of the First Republic of 1873, the founders of the Second Republic introduced the ‘Integral State model’, that divided the state into autonomous regions. Catalonia was the first region to 63 Josep R. LLobera, Foundations of National Identity. From Catalonia to Europe. New York: Bergbahn books 2004, p.150.
64 Ibidem, p.75. 65 Ibidem, p.75.
66 The Monarchist coalition government of Miguel Maura had just collapsed, after a period of military unrest, political demonstrations (for example by the Assembly in Barcelona demanding constitutional changes) and strikes. María Jesús González, ‘Neither God Nor Monster: Antonio Maura
and the Failure of Conservative Reformism in Restoration Spain (1893–1923)’, European History Quarterly, No. 3 (2002), p.329-330.
67 Albert Balcells, Catalan nationalism, past and present. London: Macmillan press 1996, p.75. 68 Ibidem, p.87.
start the process by presenting a draft Statute of Autonomy to the Parliament. The “Statute of Nuria’ was approved in September 1932 giving the Catalan government major powers in the areas of public order, social services, economy, culture and language.69
When General Franco and his men won the Civil war, the newly obtained freedoms of the regions were soon undone. The Franco regime imposed a strict centralizing policy which meant the Catalan culture was severely repressed again. During the first few years there was a complete prohibition of public use of the Catalan language and cultural expressions. After the victory of the Allies in the Second World War, there was more pressure on Franco to making some minor concessions.70 In the 1960’s more and more movements came into being that
gradually revived the national awareness of the Catalan people and their opposition to the Franco régime.71 The subsequent development of Catalan society during the 1960s and 1970s
was quite a big headache for Franco and his companions.72 The opposition to the regime set
up a program for democratic rights and political decentralization of the Spanish State. Particularly in Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia a successful political discourse standing up against the lack of democracy and the attacking of their regional identities. In these areas democracy and self-government became two very closely related ideas. The ideology of autonomy and decentralization from here on were settled into the Spanish
democratic political consciousness.73
After Franco’s death in 1975 the Spanish State stood for the great challenge of transforming to democracy. The strong advocacy for Home rule for all nations and regions within the state of the previous years now had to be given a place in the renewed constitution, a complicated and sensitive matter as Spain new from previous experience in modern history. The outcome was a compromise between the two major visions of how Spain should be run. On the one hand the idea of a strong state of Unity, on the other hand the idea of a mozaique of diverse peoples, historic nationalities and regions. The 1978 Spanish Constitution made it possible for the Autonomous Communities to practise Self-government dependant on the will of the inhabitants or their representatives. This open model of uneven federalism however did imply that new forms of intergovernmental cooperation had to be agreed upon. Furthermore, even though the duality of identity is thus part of Spain, this 69 Julián Casanova, The Spanish Republic and Civil War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010, p.42-43.
70 Albert Balcells, Catalan nationalism, past and present. London: Macmillan press 1996, p.144. 71 Ibidem, p.148.
72 Ibidem, p.157.
73 Luis Moreno, Ana Arriba and Araceli Serrano, ‘Multiple identities in decentalised Spain: The case of Catalonia’, Regional and federal studies, No. 3 (1998), p.68.
doesn’t mean of course there is a stable balance between the two identities. Positively or negatively perceived actions by the central government will still have the same, either reinforcing respectively repelling, effect of the civilians’ attachment to the nation-state. The reinforcement of one identity upon another could still lead to an end to the relations as they now are.74 As shown in the research of Luis Moreno, Ana Arriba and Araceli Serrano, in all
seventeen autonomous communities a high proportion of citizens claim they identify with both Spanish nationality and their regional identity. Around 30 per cent of Spaniards have expressed they only identify to either being Spanish or an inhabitant of their autonomy. In Basque Country and Canary Islands the percentage of people that only identifies to their region is the highest, above 20 per cent. In Catalonia, the Balearics and Asturias this percentage is above 10 per cent. Catalonia is according to this research in the category of regions where there is an equal balance between those who only see themselves as Catalan and those who only see themselves as Spanish, and not in the category where the percentage of people exclusive of Spanish identity clearly beats the percentage of those who are
exclusive of regional identity.75
During the later years of the Franco-regime there had already been several Unitary and Cross-party organizations channelling the increasing popular pressure for the recovery of democracy and home rule in Catalonia. An important side note is the fact that the only two parties with a nationalist discourse, were both branches of Spanish political parties and for this reason could not claim the label national or nationalist. PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Cataluña) was integrated in the Spanish PSOE and PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Cataluña) was a brother organization of the Spanish Communist Party. Those two parties were the main catalysers in the achievement of self-government in
Catalonia.76 In the Catalan parliament, politics have for the first twenty years after the return
of democracy been characterized by the dominance of one nationalist party: the CiU (Convergence and Union).77 The CiU, as opposed to the PSC and the PSUC, was always
against secessionism. Their goal was to influence Spanish politics and they did not want to limit themselves to local politics. The CiU was very much concerned with the promotion of cultural traditions and the radio and TV broadcasting in Catalan to enforce linguistic and cultural identity. The results of the 2003 elections made it very clear that although still the 74 Luis Moreno, Ana Arriba and Araceli Serrano, ‘Multiple identities in decentalised Spain: The case of Catalonia’, Regional and federal studies, No. 3 (1998), p.70.
75 Ibidem, p.75. 76 Ibidem, p.75.
77 Joseph R. LLobera, Foundations of National Identity. From Catalonia to Europe. New York: Bergbahn books 2004, p.153.
biggest party, the CiU’s position was shifting. The Catalan Republican Left (ERC), a left-wing pro-independence party, almost doubled its vote. Neither the CiU nor the Socialists, who were the second biggest party, had a majority, so that they were dependant on the cooperation of the ERC. This power of the ERC caused some vigorousness from their side and great concerns in Madrid that now the moderating and pragmatic leader Pujol was out of the picture, Catalan nationalism might radicalize and go in the same direction as its Basque counterpart.78 The coalition-formation that resulted from these elections was one of great
historical impact. The PSC, under the leadership of Pasqual Maragall, formed a front with the ERC and the ICV–EUiA, a coalition of communist and green parties now functioning under the banner of eco-socialism. For the first time since the return of democracy the hegemony of the CiU was broken. This powershift to the left also had a great impact on the reformation of the constitution of Catalonia’s autonomy and the Catalans relations with the
Madrid-government.79
The defeat of the CiU was partly explicable by some choices made during the 1990’s to support minority governments at the state level that didn’t have the civilians’ approval as well as by Pujols retirement. Another factor was that the 2003 autonomous election was the first since the new Partido Popular-government at the national level. The PP had won an absolute majority and was free to take a harder and more restrictive stance against nationalist governments in the periphery. Meanwhile, the CiU was increasingly focussed on extending their power to the state- and international levels. Under the disguise of support, because the term ‘coalition partner’ would be too controversial, they took part in a coalition first with the PSOE and later with the PP, in both cases enabling a Minority government. Although this cooperation-strategy had a clear goal, many of their, especially the more nationalist supporters, weren’t open to it. Due to this combination of happenings, the support for the CiU had slowly declined since 1995.80 By the end of the first term of the
three party coalition, the political landscape looked completely different. On the state-level, the PP had lost the 2004 elections to the PSOE, after being suspected of purposely
misinforming the public about the Madrid-bombings on the 11th of March with the goal of
blaming ETA for the attack that in reality came from Al Qaida.81 On the Catalan level, the
change of course for the first time in 23 years had started a heated debate on the reform of the 78 The economist, ‘After Pujol’, http://www.economist.com/node/2235211, retrieved on the 23th of June. 79 Andrew Davis, ‘The November 2003 Elections in Catalonia: A Landmark Change in the Catalan Political Landscape’, South European Society and Politics, No.3 (2004), p.138.
80 Ibidem, p.138.
81 Cristina Flesher, ‘The Madrid bombings and popular protest: misinformation, counter-information, mobilisation and elections after 11-M’, Contemporary Social Science, No.3 (2011), p.290.
statute of Autonomy. The new Statute of 2005 initially received the majority support of both the Catalan and the Spanish governments. However, the PP went to court to fight the contents of the Statute and important parts of it were overruled, which was the start of a heavy
polemic.82
There were also many internal fights between the three parties and in 2006 after a particularly intense period of struggles, president Maragall called early elections.83 The elections were held on the first of November 2006 and resulted in
continuation of the three-party government. Although they lost some votes (especially the PSC, the ICV–EUiA was the only of the three to go up in votes)84 to the CiU and to blank
votes, together still had a convincing enough majority for another term.85 Maragall had been
forced by the PSC to retire. He was replaced by José Montilla, who became the first non-Catalan born president of the Parliament. The continuation of the ‘Tripartito’ disregarded numerous signs of public discontent. The turnout of people expressing their votes was the second lowest in percentage since 1980. Furthermore the level of blank votes was
outstandingly high. On top of this a new party made a sudden entrance into the scene by winning three parliament seats. Ciutans pel Canvi (CpC, Citizens for change), represented a clear distinct discourse from the longer existent parties, and out of the blue became the first new party in the Parliament since 1988.86
Maybe the most significant fact was that this remarkably low turnout came not only after the approval of a new legal instrument that was supposed to provide more autonomy and self-government to Catalonia, but also followed a very competitive election in which the CiU, as the main opposition party, harboured real hopes of becoming the government party.87 After
the polls showed good opportunities, they decided to focus their campaign on critiquing the tripartite coalition which made the possibility of the CiU and PSC as governing partners 82 Julio M. Lázaro, El Constitucional aprueba un recorte moderado que permite aplicar el Estatuto,
http://elpais.com/elpais/2010/06/28/actualidad/1277713023_850215.html, retrieved on the 25th of June 2014. 83 Ignacio Lago, José Ramon Montero, Mariano Torcal, ‘The 2006 Regional Election in Catalonia: Exit, Voice, and Electoral Market Failures’, South European Society and Politics, No. 2 (2007), p.226.
84 El pais, Elecciones Catalanas 2006,
http://www.elpais.com/comunes/2006/elecciones_catalunya/resultados_dinamico.html, retrieved on the 25th of June 2013.
85 El mundo, Vuelve el tripartito, http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2006/10/elecciones-cataluna/resultados_2006.html, retrieved on the 25th of June 2013.
86 CpC was a civic-political association of progressist, federal and republican character. It was initiative born from the idea that Catalan politics were in need of a profound reform and needed to be reconnected to the citizens. It was dissolved in 2011. La vanguardia.com, Ciutadans pel Canvi acuerda su disolución,
http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20111215/54241130584/ciutadans-pel-canvi-acuerda-su-disolucion.html, retrieved on the 25th of June 2013.
87 Ignacio Lago, José Ramon Montero and Mariano Torcal, ‘The 2006 Regional Election in Catalonia: Exit, Voice, and Electoral Market Failures’, South European Society and Politics, No. 2 (2007), p.226.
impossible. Although there was a great level of political discontent due to the fact that the parties neglected to act in the way the electorate expected of them, aiming for a great enough majority to govern alone, proved to be overconfident.88 This resulted in a new term for the
tripartite government and their new statute of Autonomy. The new statute and the controversy around it made the possibility of independence a very visible item on the political agenda.89
Internal disputes between the three parties on this matter continued to be a problem. Nonetheless the government made it through their second term.90
Towards the 2010 elections, developments on the national level further fuelled the Independence bid. Due to the increasingly serious consequences of the financial crisis, the governing PSOE imposed some very unpopular austerity measures. Furthermore, the main opposition party PP reinstated itself as a great asserter of national unity by limiting and pushing back some of the freedoms of Catalonia proclaimed in the 2006 Statute.91 The PP initiated a legal case against the Statute and when the long anticipated
verdict came in June 2010, some elements that were very important and meaningful to the Catalans had been damaged. This provoked a massive demonstration on the 10th of July in the
streets of Barcelona, supported by the CiU, PSC, ERC and ICV–EuiA.92
On the 19th of December 2012, the CiU and the ERC reached an agreement on a Referendum
on independence to be held in 2014.93
2.3 Comparing the Catalan and the Scottish case
This paragraph compares the previously sketched Catalan and Scottish historic identity by applying Eisenstadts and Delanty’s theories. The comparison of both cases will place them in the bigger picture of global tendencies and give insight in the influence of individual
environmental and circumstantial factors.
As described in the first chapter, Delanty sees post-nationalism as a way to enable a Europe where multiple layers of citizenship are possible. In his vision national citizenship 88 Francesc Pallare and Jordi Munoz, ‘The Autonomous Elections of 1 November 2006 in Catalonia’,
Regional and Federal Studies, No. 4 (2008), p.450.
89 Ivan Serrano, ‘Just a Matter of Identity? Support for Independence in Catalonia’, Regional and Federal
Studies, No. 5 (2013), p.19.
90 Guillem Rico, ‘The 2010 Regional Election in Catalonia: A Multilevel Account in an Age of Economic Crisis’, South European Society and Politics, No. 2 (2012), p.218.
91 Ibidem, p.218. 92 Ibidem, p.220.
93 Euronews.com, ‘Agreement in Catalonia on date of independence referendum’ ,
http://www.euronews.com/2012/12/19/agreement-in-catalonia-on-date-of-independence-referendum, retrieved on the 26th of June 2013.
