From nordic neutrality to NATO : the impact of alliance membership on convergence of military capability in Scandinavia

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From Nordic Neutrality to NATO

The impact of alliance membership on convergence of military capability in Scandinavia

University of Amsterdam

Master thesis Political Science: International Relations

Author: E.J. Runhaar

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. P.A. van Hooft Second Reader: Dr. L.J.M. Seymour

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Abstract

A technological revolution in military capabilities since the end of the Cold War, and a changing security environment with wars against non-state actors, has led to the adaptation of new tactics, operation methods, command structures and ways of thinking in armed forces of advanced states. NATO changed its structure to improve interoperability between member states for a new role in international campaigns, and the European Union developed a security and defence policy that increasingly added a more institutionalized military element to the EU. Europe’s larger military powers France, United Kingdom and Germany have been subject of research as to why and how they converged with US doctrines and methods, and whether their behaviour within the EU is either balancing against US hegemony, or bandwagoning (Cladi & Locatelli 2012; Dyson 2008; Posen 2006). Reasons for convergence can be simply technological progress, the invention of new technologies and the necessity to emulate them from your rival. How fast a state’s military adapts to it, may be driven by the structure of its executive power (Dyson 2011). This research however focuses on the role alliance membership plays as a driver for convergence. To do this, the military convergence of four Scandinavian countries in the 21st_{century is being compared. Similarities in geographical position, power,} culture, and historical cooperation, but differences in alliance membership, make Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland an interesting case. Taking a neoclassical realist approach and comparing NATO and EU as the alliances that possibly drive convergence within those states, we find that NATO does influence the convergence of not just its member states Denmark and Norway, but also partly that of Sweden. Swedish convergence is driven by the EU as well, through the Battlegroup framework. Finland still focuses mostly on territorial defence, and while it takes NATO and EU into account for interoperability, it does not follow the same path of denationalization of defence as its Scandinavian neighbours. While Denmark and Norway converged with NATO, non-ally Sweden wants to converge with NATO but runs into limitations, and Finland still prefers territorial defence capabilities with an eye on Russia. The EU has much less effect on the convergence of its member states.

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Introduction

Similarities in social, cultural and economic development, a similar geographical position, historical cooperation and the similar threats – the Scandinavian neighbours Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark seem to be natural allies. After World War II, in 1948, Sweden therefore proposed the Scandinavian Defence Union to its three neighbours, based upon neutrality. It would fail: Finland signed a pact with the Soviet Union, while Denmark and Norway decided to join NATO. Sweden remained neutral.

In 1973, Denmark joined the European Union’s predecessor, the EEC. In 1995 Sweden and Finland joined the EU, while Norway did not. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect on 1 December 2009, all EU member states except Denmark are bound to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which includes a mutual defence clause. Denmark negotiated to opt-out of the CSDP, and therefore is not part of the military alliance paragraph of the EU. These four Nordic states are very similar, but their alliance membership separates them, as shown in Table 1. Sweden is the framework nation of the Nordic Battlegroup, which includes Norway and Finland but does not include Danish contributions, there is a Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in place which focuses on military cooperation between these states, with the aim to pool and share wherever possible.

Norway Sweden Finland Denmark

NATO Yes No No Yes

CSDP No Yes Yes No

EU No Yes Yes Yes

EU Battle Group Yes Yes Yes No

Table 1: Scandinavian Alliance Memberships

Alliances matter, as a relatively cheap way of creating deterrence for small powers, and as a means of influence for great powers. An in-depth look at how the alliance choices of the four Scandinavian states – Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark – affects the outcomes in military convergence behaviour, could give us more insight in how alliance membership may or may not shape small power state behaviour.

Membership of either NATO or EU doesn’t seem to have much effect on the actual behaviour of the four Scandinavian states at first sight. Sweden and Finland joined in several NATO-missions in the past 25 years even though they are not a NATO ally. Norway is part of the CSDP Nordic Battle Group, even though it is not an EU member. Denmark, being an EU

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member, opted out of the ‘military’ chapter of the EU, and therefore cannot join in military cooperation within the EU framework, until the opt-out is lifted. And in the meantime Scandinavia is closely working together. These four similar small powers, with their reciprocal military cooperation but different alliance memberships, is then a chance to understand how being part of a formal alliance shapes the defence capability of a nation state. Does it for example matter to be a NATO member – and do we therefore see differences between the convergence of military capabilities of Norway/Denmark on one side, and Sweden/Finland on the other, in the 21st_{century? And if there is a an effect of the convergence, how does it look} like?

First we will discuss the necessity of small powers to join into alliances, and how realism explains that. The EU is being seen as an alliance in this research, mainly because of the mutual defence clause of the Common Security and Defence Policy that was adapted in the Lisbon treaty. There is debate on what the impact and role of the CSDP is, but that debate does not influence the potential the CSDP has to shape convergence of its member states through institutes like the European Defence Agency. Then we will assess the specifics of the relation between EU and NATO. Realists could either see the emergence of the CSDP as a way to balance the US, or as a form of bandwagoning. It is proposed that including Walt’s balance of threat theory (Walt 1985) and Dyson’s reformed bandwagoning (Dyson 2013) might be the best way of analysing the relation between European states, the hegemonic power of the US, the CSDP and NATO. The centrality of NATO to Europe’s security is acknowledged, and the inability of the Common Security and Defence Policy to take over that role is acknowledged as well. We should therefore not see the two alliances as competing, but rather as fulfilling different roles. Those different roles should be the main driver for differences in the way small powers that are member of either of those alliances, converge. The need for Defence Transformation is then being assessed as caused by both technological as strategic reasons, and defence transformation is operationalized as being a fundamental, rapid, mental and physical change to the defence system of a state. Adding alliances to the equation, we will follow Dyson’s dimensions of convergence – namely convergence in objective, instruments, institutional forums – to see how Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland converged in the 21st century. The preliminary hypothesis are that Norway and Denmark, as small power NATO members, will primarily converge with NATO criteria and –tasks, and have the alliance central to its security and defence. Sweden and Finland, as non-NATO members but with EU membership including CSDP, will converge according to CSDP criteria and tasks, and while

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having the EU central to its security and defence, it will keep a significant amount of self defence capability because CSDP does not include NATO deterrence. An analysis of government documents and research on those states will show that Denmark behaves as expected. Norway does so as well, although it actively tries to influence the way EU member states converge, too. Sweden does not fully behave as expected, it left territorial defence the same way as Denmark and Norway did, while it cannot rely on NATO’s mutual defence clause. Finland behaves as expected, while their convergence is still under way, it did not denationalize its defences because there is no real alliance backing them up against Russian threats.

Research Question

The similarities of the Scandinavian countries, and the changes in military thinking since the end of the Cold War, combined with the differences of alliance memberships within those Scandinavian states, leads to this question:

How did NATO and EU membership impact the convergence of military capabilities of the four Scandinavian states in the 21st century?

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Literature, Framework

The main aim of this research is to find influence of alliance membership on the convergence of a state’s military. Therefore it is necessary to make claims about how the international system works, why alliances happen, why states make their choices and how their military capabilities are important. Since it is safe to assume that Scandinavian states in this research – Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland – are all small powers (none of them have nuclear capabilities, they are relative small in population size, and they are respectively 43, 39, 29 and 49 on the Global Firepower Index1_{), the focus of the presumptions made will be on how} small states and small powers behave.

The end of the Cold War had many scholars of international relations declare realism dead because the system had changed and it had changed peacefully. However, as Waltz shows, it was not the system itself that changed, but there were changes within the system – and there is no reason to render a realist approach obsolete (Waltz 2000). The structure of the system, to realists, is important, because it is a main driver for state behaviour (Mearsheimer 1995). And when a realist explains or predicts alliance behaviour, polarity of the system and the security dilemma matter (Christensen & Snyder 1990). This research will not try to make claims about why the Scandinavian countries made different alliance choices. That has been done before (Reiter 1994). In this case, rather, the alliance choices are the starting point, the independent variable. So while alliances membership and everything that comes from it matters, the actual decision on why those memberships came to existence, is not going to be answered here. The EU as an alliance

It does matter if the EU can be seen as an alliance. There are scholars who would say that the reason EU has a military aspect, is not for real military reasons. Anderson and Seitz (2006) offer a constructivist view on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). They claim there is no military logic behind the CSDP, and that the EU defence program cannot be otherwise intended than to enhance a European identity. Because why would the EU try to compete with NATO, but fail to put in the necessary resources, is their question. They continue to point out that there is no real leader in the EU, except for the United States. EU member states are not afraid to use military force, and will intervene in places of their interest, as they

1_{According to the list as it was published on the 15}th_{of January 2015 on the website of the Global Firepower}

Index: http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. The choices made by the authors of the list may not be compatible with existing literature, and the listing should therefore be seen as indicative.

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did before – but only if they can. But the logic behind seeing the EU as an alliance is not there, they say, because the “ESDP does not indicate that Europe has become oblivious to its need for a unified and capable defense alliance. Nor does the ESDP indicate any European agenda to displace the United States from its key role in the defense of the continent” (Anderson & Seitz 2006: 38).

However unused to date (and thereby appearing to confirm the previous authors), there is a Battlegroup Concept as part of the CSDP. Chappell (2009) writes about the EU Battlegroup Concept and the difficulties it has because of the different strategy cultures of the different nation states. He compares the strategy cultures of Poland and Germany, and concludes that different strategic cultures could eventually effect the political willingness to deploy a Battlegroup. That is a weakness of the CSDP, even though international expectations or member states could override those constraining factors. Chappell explains the avoidance of duplicating NATO’s reaction force. He says, in compliance with Art (2004), that divisions between Europeanists and Atlanticists have not impacted upon the concept, and that Atlanticists are convinced the EU should be able to play an independent (though complementary) role to NATO (p. 434). The Battlegroup Concept might be in danger because of the lack of one strategic culture when it comes to deployment and action. The member states that have the turn (it’s a turn-based system) are basically deciding whether or not actual deployment of the Battlegroup happens. Rynning (2003) explains the same problem Chappell does, and comes to a similar conclusion that one strategic culture in EU will not develop, which is problematic for the military capabilities of the CSDP. He then proposes that the CSDP should allow for some member states to engage in their name, together. He puts it like this: “The EU does not have the capacity to become a ‘liberal power’. Instead it must encourage coalitions driven by great powers to cultivate their own type of transnational strategic culture – coalitions that can be ephemeral or deeply institutionalized, depending on the political affinities of the involved countries – and then trust that these coalitions will be driven to respect EU rules and principles by the potential of EU structural power as well as the dynamics of an integrated armaments market” (2003: 435). A very recent initiative by the European Parliament to reform (or simplify) the EU Battlegroup Concept is in line with this: according to that plan, Article 44 could be used by the European Commission to ask nations to perform a ‘task’ for them, clearing the way for

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ad-hoc coalitions of those member states who are willing and ready to intervene on a moment that the EC would ask them2_.

The starting point of seeing the EU as an alliance is the Western European Union (WEU). Conceived in 1954, the WEU was a military alliance between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the EU developed itself further and included more tasks, including foreign and security policies. But most notably with the adaptation of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty in 2011, the tasks of the WEU were fully integrated into the European Union through the CSDP. That included the agreement of solidarity: members of the European Union committed to a mutual defence clause, if any of the member states would see military conflict on its soil. While Denmark opted out of the CSDP (and its predecessors), it is officially not included in this clause, but any other member state is. That gives membership of the EU, at least on paper, a form of military deterrence: attacking an EU member state, even when that nation is not member of any other alliance, will result in military conflict with all EU member states.

Seeing the rise of the EU’s security and defence policy as an identity-shaping vehicle as Anderson and Seitz (2006) do, is not taking into account the significance of this mutual defence clause. However, it could be argued that the mutual defence clause of the EU means nothing, since most EU member states are also NATO member. And NATO’s article 5 says the same: an attack on any, is an attack on all of the Alliance’s members. In order to define the EU as an alliance on its own, apart from NATO, we should therefore look at the relation between the EU’s CSDP and NATO. Why did the CSDP come to life if NATO was already providing security?

EU, US, CSDP and NATO: balancing or bandwagoning?

Is the EU trying to become a global player, competing with the United States instead of cooperating? The most common realist explanations for the rise of the European security and defence agenda is either balancing (Posen 2006) or bandwagoning (Cladi & Locatelli 2012). Toje (2011) also advocates to move away from seeing the EU as a global superpower, since it fails to live up to those expectations time and time again. He concludes: "The small power perspective [...] captures the distinct flair of the EU’s CSDP – namely the strong interest in and

2_{“EU Plan Offered To Simplify Battle Group Deployment”, November 17}th_2014:

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141117/DEFREG01/311170011/EU-Plan-Offered-Simplify-Battle-Group-Deployment

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concern about an international system that it perceives to be full of threats – and the limited ability to actually do anything about these threats" (2011: 57).

A more neoclassical view to the balancing thesis would be that the EU is trying to stand on its own feet, apart from the United States. When comparing the 2002 National Security Strategy of the US with the 2003 European Security Strategy, Berenskoetter concludes “there are disagreements in preferences regarding the body providing the mandate for action, the scope of missions, and the character of means […] investment in CSDP is best understood as a consequence of enduring dissonance in all three areas with the United States in NATO, which motivated governments to build up CSDP as an alternative institution whose workings resonated better with German strategic culture and, hence, its identity as a security actor. As such, CSDP is best understood as a phenomenon of emancipation from American tutelage, not bandwagoning” (Berenskoetter 2013: 385). And the more refined neoclassical view to the bandwagoning thesis comes from Dyson. He states that the “CSDP is the central element of the ‘reform’ of Europe’s bandwagoning on the US. CSDP serves two purposes for the Europeans. Firstly it enables them to act autonomously (albeit in operations of limited scope and intensity) when the US is disinterested or opposed to European action. In this respect CSDP has the potential to emerge as a competitor to NATO. However, CSDP also functions as the ‘European pillar’ of the Atlantic Alliance. It is an institutional forum that facilitates the development of military capabilities which may also be of use to NATO. In addition, CSDP helps to augment the Europeans’ ability to carry a great share of the security burden in their geopolitical neighbourhood, thereby freeing the US to deal with security challenges in other parts of the globe” (Dyson 2013: 388). Within the traditional neorealist framework, the domestic features are often overlooked or deemed unimportant or irrelevant. Besides, the action of bandwagoning cannot be explained in a satisfactory way by defensive realists, because “siding with the strongest state in a unipolar international system is an irrational form of appeasement as it will exacerbate the power of the leading state” (ibid.: 389). While that changes if the world is or becomes multipolar, the world is not multipolar (yet) in terms of military power, since the military power of the US - certainly at face validity - make it the hegemon in the international system. For realists, traditionally, the world is an unsafe place because of the anarchic system of the international. Therefore, military power matters, in order to ensure a state’s survival. But even if the world would be multipolar right now, that was not the case in the ‘90s, and the European security and defence agenda did start to get real traction in that decade. However, there is another take on the problem with seeing CSDP as bandwagoning, also mentioned by

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Dyson (2013), and that is the balance of threat theory (Walt 1985). In Walt’s words: “Balancing and bandwagoning are usually framed solely in terms of power. Balancing is alignment with the weaker side; bandwagoning means to choose the stronger. This view is seriously flawed, however, because it ignores the other factors that statesmen will consider when identifying potential threats and prospective allies. Although power is an important factor in their calculations, it is not the only one. Rather than allying in response to power alone, it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most threatening power” (Walt 1985: 8-9). If Europe conceives its threats coming from a geographically close state, with offensive capabilities and a certain display of aggressive intent, it is therefore logical to side with the unipolar leader (Dyson 2013: 389). The events in Ukraine in 2014, including Russian annexation of the Crimea peninsula, should be seen in this light, with Russia being an example of such a threat to Europe. Dyson gives another reason why the balance of threat is useful: “European states are characterized by significant variation in their external vulnerability which derives from the balance of threat. Divergence in the extent to which European states are dependent on particular areas of the globe for energy security and nuanced variation in geographical position can lead to a significant level of intra-Alliance bargaining within both CSDP and NATO” (ibid.). Different characteristics of the different EU member states make for differentiation in their fear of being either abandoned or entrapped by the hegemon. The EU is not one actor, it is a group of very different states. Dyson prefers the term of reformed bandwagoning, and sees the CSDP as an institution that is designed primarily “to meet security challenges within Europe’s geopolitical neighbourhood that the US is unwilling or unable to tackle” (ibid.: 387).

Seeing the CSDP as Dyson’s form of reformed bandwagoning, and not as standard bandwagoning, soft balancing or standard balancing, might feel to be at odds with the idea of comparing NATO and CSDP membership and the outcomes that either membership has on the convergence of a state’s military. It might be easier to try to operationalize some sort of rivalry between the both alliances, where NATO is representing US and CSDP is representing EU. But that would be risking to ignore that NATO is the main and most important security provider for the European Union. The Alliance is at the heart of EU’s security, and with that, the US is at the heart of its security. But not every EU member state is NATO member. Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are the six EU states that are not also NATO member. They are officially depending on the CSDP alone, as a means to balance threat. And that specific

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difference between every nation state within the EU, and the domestic variables that are so valuable to explain those differences, are best served with a neoclassical realist view.

The relation between EU and US, and the interplay between NATO and CSDP, is best seen through the neoclassical realist eyes and Dyson’s reformed bandwagoning.

The need for Defence Transformation

The end of the Cold War had a great impact on military thinking. France, for example, had relied on itself rather than NATO, through its very own nuclear deterrence. However, when the Iron Curtain fell, they had their limited-range nuclear weapon pointed at countries that were not their enemy anymore. It was especially during the Operation Desert Storm though, that France realized it lost capabilities in conventional warfare by focusing their budget on nuclear deterrence: “the experience of the Gulf underlined the price France had paid in terms of its conventional capabilities by consistently prioritizing nuclear weapons in its defence budgets. A growing number of officials and experts were willing, in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict, to point out the deficiencies of French force projection capabilities, and the inadequacy of the French contribution to the allied war effort” (Menon 1995: 21). The difference between the French and US military capability was not a case on itself. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a school of thought towards military thinking that was sparked by the changes in demand for defence after the Cold War ended, and by Operation Desert Storm. Originally, there were three main features of RMA: expeditionary forces with joined command structures, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), and Effects Based Operations (EBO) (Dyson 2011: 245). The first Gulf War saw ‘surgical strikes’, precision bombing based on the new concept of Effects-Based Operations, executed by the United States. This meant that instead of mass-bombing some place, the mass-bombing would focus on strategic smaller targets in a certain order: first disable air defence systems, then disable –for example– power supply to a command centre, and so forth, rather than bombing only main targets. This proved very successful in the case of the First Gulf war, and brought Iraq to its knees within six weeks. So, weapons systems and the use of it, dramatically changed, forcing states to rethink their military capabilities (Biddle 1996; Reynolds 2006). Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 however showed some serious shortcomings of NCW and EBO when used in Counter-Insurgency operations. That led to the adaptation of a more cultural and anthropological approach and more emphasis on institution building in the US military (Dyson 2011: 245). While RMA in the ‘90s was seen as the sole cause of defence transformation, another cause that has been named is that the world changed and Armed Forces should be ready for new security challenges, especially after 9/11. It is safe

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to describe the causes for transformation as both strategic and technological (Petersson 2011: 703-704).

Many European countries saw their main threat disappear with the end of the Cold War, but they also saw a retreat of US military from the continent, and a consequent Balkan crisis which they were supposed to solve by themselves. The failure of the European community to deal with the Balkan crisis made a few things painfully clear: Europe was not ready to do anything by itself without the help of the United States, and NATO, although being enlarged with former Soviet states, had to reinvent itself (Kay 2005).

To sum it up: the need for defence transformation became clear after the Cold War and especially after Operation Desert Storm, and was sparked by new technology and changing security challenges. The wars after 9/11 made further changes to strategic thinking. This transformation was not just important for the US but for all European states as well.

The concept of defence transformation in this thesis means a fundamental, rapid, mental and physical change (Petersson 2011: 704). Rapid because it is not an incremental, evolutionary change – all military changes slightly over time, but with defence transformation we mean fast, non-evolutionary change. It is a mental change, because it requires a new way of thinking by military personnel, and a new culture within the military. And it is a physical change – because of advanced technology there are for example less combatants needed, while their capability and effectiveness increases (ibid.).

Convergence: adding alliances to the equation

Tom Dyson did an earlier research on causes for convergence in comparing the process in the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Dyson 2008). He distinguished four different dimensions of military convergence and divergence to compare those countries on: defence policy objectives, policy instruments, institutional forums within which defence policy is anchored, and the temporality (ibid.: 729). The defence policy objectives could be for example territorial defence or alliance defence, but also expeditionary crisis-management operations. The latter then could be distinguished between low, medium and high-intensity operations. Low/medium intensity would be peacekeeping, institution building, stability forces, while high intensity operations are those operations in the highest violence spectrum. The policy instruments are the military structures and capabilities. So, what command structure is being implemented, and which weapons systems are being acquired. The institutional forums could be a focus on national autonomy, or embedding the defence policy within EU and/or NATO. The temporality is, in this case, the moment that the reform started, the pace it had, and the

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sequence it followed (ibid.: 729-730). Dyson saw convergence in the Objectives, Instruments and Institutional Fora, but divergence in Temporality – especially Germany was late with converging, starting only in 2003. That being significantly different from France and the United Kingdom, he then found domestic explanations for the specific case of Germany (Dyson 2011). In this research we will follow most of those lines as well for comparison. So we will compare Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland’s defence transformation on Objectives, Instruments, Institutional Fora and Temporality. We want to know whether or not alliance membership leads to a certain form of military convergence behaviour of states, and we take the 21st_{century as our scope. It is important to state here that we compare similar countries in} geographical position, power, and, arguably, culture – but that they differ in alliance membership. With Institutional Forum we therefore do not mean alliance membership, because that’s a given, we mean the focus of the defence policy when it comes to which forum they incline. So, technically, a state with no membership of an alliance whatsoever, could still want to converge within NATO standards because it does not have the ability to innovate by itself, and is therefore fully dependent on the emulation of best practices of others. The emulation-innovation outcomes are a neorealist account of military reform (Dyson 2008: 738).

To take alliance membership as an independent variable and then look at the convergence along the dimensions of objectives, instruments, institutional fora and temporality, is exciting for a few reasons. First, it will give us insight if institutions actually change state behaviour or not. Mearsheimer, in response to institutionalist arguments that institutions cause peace, says that it will not. “The bottom line on institutions seems clear: despite all the rhetoric about their virtues, there is little evidence that they can alter state behavior and cause peace” (Mearsheimer 1995: 93). But at the same time, there has been a clear shift from national defence to internationalization of defence forces, not simply explained through bandwagoning or balance of power. Secondly, it seems so obvious and logical to converge in line with your alliance, but is that really the case? The Scandinavian situation with similar geographical and cultural background, but different alliance memberships, gives us the chance to find out.

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Scandinavian convergence

In order to understand the recent convergence of the Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish Armed Forces, and to explore links to their alliance memberships and the importance they give to them, it is useful to analyse the official documents that the political as well as executive power of their respective militaries have published on the topic. While we should keep in mind that some of these documents are visionary plans rather than actual outcomes, they clearly point out an aspect we want to look at when relating alliance membership to military convergence: the political will and executive planning of convergence. In this chapter the defence plans will first be analysed by country, with a special focus on convergence and alliances, along the dimensions of objectives, instruments, and institutional forums. We would expect the following outcomes on forehand:

Denmark and Norway

A small power with only NATO membership will converge closely to NATO standards and emulate those capabilities that will allow it to maintain (limited) capability to fight alongside the hegemon only, in order to be able to bandwagon the rest on the hegemon’s deterrence for its national defence. It would therefore have only NATO central to its security and defence policy.

Sweden and Finland

A small power with just EU membership will converge closely to CSDP criteria, and therefore also emulate those standards that the EU has taken from NATO. It will however maintain capability only suitable for peacekeeping or stabilization missions in the low or medium violence spectrum. Since it cannot bandwagon on NATO deterrence and CSDP deterrence is not as impressive, it will keep a relative significant amount of self defence capability compared to NATO small power members. However, the EU will be at the heart of its security and defence policy.

Denmark

Denmark is both a NATO member and an EU member, but has opted out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. It is therefore officially not a member of the military alliance of the EU, and not included in the CSDP’s mutual defence clause. The goals of the Danish government for the Danish military in 2004 were threefold: to counter threats against

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their security and that of their allies, to maintain their sovereignty and protect their citizens, and to work towards international peace and security. In their defence agreement, the major Danish political parties make clear that their defence forces should focus on strengthening their capacities for international deployment and the ability to counter acts of terror and their consequences (Danish Defence 2004). Five years later, they refer to the transformation of their military as well progressed according to international standards, and name it vital to continue the process (Danish Defence 2009). In 2012, they name it crucial that their military “is organized in order to be able to participate in short as well as protracted international operations” (Danish Defence 2012). All three Danish defence agreements of the last decade name NATO as a cornerstone to its security, and the UN charter as the legal basis for international operations. The agreements of 2004 and 2009 also name explicitly the CSDP and the importance of the Danish military to be able to operate within EU framework once they chose to leave their opt-out. That paragraph however has been removed from the most recent defence agreement of 2012, in which both Europe and EU are not mentioned. On the other hand, Nordic military cooperation is not mentioned in 2004, but it is first mentioned in the 2009 agreement and it gets a more prominent place in 2012. That is when Denmark points out that its defence capabilities should partly contribute “to NATO's smart defence initiatives, and actively take part in multinational cooperation, also in a Nordic context” (Danish Defence 2012: 7). Based on these three documents, the Danish defence has not only transformed its military towards one that can contribute to international missions under NATO flag, but it also seems that they move away from a possible inclusion under EU’s military flag, and start to focus more on Nordic cooperation instead.

The military objectives of Denmark were then countering threats to its security and that of their allies, protect its sovereignty, and reaching towards international peace and security. It is the latter which is significant in this respect. “Denmark has come to espouse a distinctively activist policy in regards to international security. It combines liberal aims such as democracy, human rights, and development with hard headed action, if needed” (Rynning 2013: 86). While it was a great power once, it had been a neutralist country for the largest part of the 20th_century, keeping reservations towards NATO, and opting out of the ESDP and later CSDP within the EU (ibid.: 85). In the beginning of the 21st_{century however, the neutralist stance turned into} international activism. One reason for this transformation was a fear that its defence structure would become irrelevant. “The Danish government and military leadership motivate the transformation of the armed forces mainly by political–strategic and ideological–cultural

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arguments. The end of the cold war shaped a new political–strategic environment and removed the threat against Denmark’s territory. The Danish defense structure, which was geared for territorial defense, had to transform to be relevant” (Petersson 2011: 707). However, the goals have been slightly altered since 2011, when a left wing government took office, and put focus away from military intervention and towards global poverty and injustice, democracy and human rights (Rynning 2013: 88).

The instrumental change in Denmark had the support of the majority of Danish political and military leaders, even when it came to abolishing whole branches within the services, like the submarine division. Criticism on the denationalization of the defence capabilities within NATO framework was more focused on the slow process (Petersson 2011: 715). While the conscription system has not been abolished, the vast majority of the conscripts is volunteer. There has been decided on a slight reduction in the total intake of conscripts, from 5,000 a year to 4,200 a year (Danish Defence 2012: 30). While the budget stays roughly the same over the years, there is a clear instruction to include international cooperation when procuring new equipment: “In relation to future procurement, the defence must take into account whether bilateral or multilateral cooperation regarding defence acquisition, running costs and maintenance is an option. As a starting point, cooperation should provide financial savings or strengthen the operational effect in relation to the task performance of the defence” (Danish Defence 2012: 32).

The institutional forums that Denmark wants to base itself in, are roughly spoken the UN, NATO and the Nordic Defence Cooperation when it comes to cost saving (Danish Defence 2012; Rynning 2013). Territorial defence is clearly not a priority whatsoever, and where UN has to deliver the mandate for operations, “NATO is the central forum for joint security – and defence cooperation. The collective defence remains strongly anchored within NATO. NATO is the framework of the transatlantic partnership and a guarantor of European security. Denmark will continue to contribute to NATO, including the NATO Response Force” (Danish Defence 2004: 2). Denmark has a clear focus on NATO, and has converged with it completely to a contributing country focus on international military cooperation – also for its own territorial defence.

Norway

Norway is a NATO member but not an EU member. However, in their 2001 long term defence plan – created before the 9/11 attacks – the Norwegian government says their armed forces should be able to contribute to initiatives under the supervision of the EU: “Allied and

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international cooperation in defence matters is also an essential prerequisite if the Norwegian Armed Forces are to be able to fulfil all their national commitments. At the same time our allies expect Norway to make a greater contribution to the defence of the NATO area as a whole, and the Armed Forces must thus be capable of contributing to other international initiatives under the auspices of the UN, NATO or the EU” (Norwegian Defence 2001). That document stresses furthermore the importance of converging their armed forces extensively, and recognizes multinational collaboration for procurement of capabilities, and alignment with NATO requirements (ibid.).

The goals of the Norwegian government for their military in 2005 were the prevention of war and threats to Norway and ‘collective security’, contributing to international peace, stability and rule of law, protecting Norwegian sovereignty, interests and freedom, defending Norway together with NATO, and protect society (Norwegian Defence 2005: 10). They recognize that they mainly depend on NATO for their security, but Norway thinks that the EU will “become a key institution for European security. […] It is important for Norway that the EU’s role in European and in international security develops in harmony with the role of NATO and with transatlantic cooperation, so that the EU and NATO will complement each other” (ibid.: 19). Norway therefore wants to participate in EU-led operations, and sees it as essential that the EU and NATO do not develop competing structures. They would like influence on the development of CSDP, and think that their contribution to NATO Response Force, command structure and development of military capabilities, in combination with close cooperation with EU member states through their North Sea strategy and the Nordic defence cooperation, will keep them close to the development of the CSDP (ibid.: 37).

The Norwegian Ministry of Defence emphasizes the importance of cooperation between EU and NATO, and the Berlin Plus agreement that lays at the roots of that cooperation, in their 2008 document. Norway at that moment had already decided to join in the Nordic Battlegroup with Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Ireland, by contributing 150 military personnel. But they give equal importance to the Nordic cooperation, because of common security interests and defence requirements between the Nordic countries. And more than that: “Based on a study of future possibilities carried out by the Chief of Defence and the Swedish Supreme Commander, work is in hand with a view to extending and strengthening the cooperation between the Nordic countries in the areas of force production and logistics. Such collaboration would yield substantial advantages and savings while still allowing the countries to retain the necessary sovereignty over their national operational capabilities” (Norwegian Defence 2008: 11).

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In the 2013 White Paper the Norwegian Ministry of Defence states that the “defence sector has been restructured from a mobilisation defence to a rapid reaction capability defence. This rapid reaction capability defence shall represent a war prevention threshold, based on NATO membership” (Norwegian Defence 2013: 13), but there are further changes in army personnel required to keep up with the advanced level of technology in new weapon systems, as well as keeping the job of working for Norwegian Armed Forces competitive for Norwegians entering the labour market (Norwegian Defence 2013).

Norway sees the NATO Alliance as their main insurance for security, and has according to their own publications converged its military with it in order to ensure continued NATO deterrence as well as advanced capabilities for international missions. The EU is for them an increasing important institution for security in their region, and they want to keep close ties, also to make sure military convergence within the CSDP happens in a NATO-compatible way. But besides that, they seem to give increasing importance to the Nordic cooperation, which also has to do with the convergence of their military: joining capabilities with their Nordic neighbours, is the idea, will increase effectiveness and save costs – in international missions as well as defending the homeland and Norwegian interests.

Sweden

Sweden became a NATO associate through the Partnership for Peace on the 9th_{of May} 1994, but (so far) never became an ally of NATO. Sweden has however been part of NATO’s PARP programme since its start in 1995. PARP stands for Planning And Review Process, aimed at improving interoperability of forces from non-NATO nations who wish to participate in joint international operation. It offers multinational training and exercises together with NATO forces. It also had observer status at the Western European Union, the mutual defence alliance that integrated into the European Union when the CSDP came into action as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. Sweden became an EU member state in 1995. With the adaptation of the CSDP, it is now full ally of the alliance of the EU as well. In 2004 they state that the three aims of their security policy are to preserve peace and national independence, promote stability and security in the immediate vicinity, and to strengthen international peace and security (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2004: 7)

Recognizing the need for a transformation of their defence capabilities for international missions, they say that the “[d]evelopment of a common European security and defence policy is changing the prerequisites of Sweden’s own defence policy. The European Union is central to Sweden’s security. […] To meet the different threats and challenges of today, the EU must

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be more active, however, and develop early and rapid reaction capabilities. […] The focus should now be on Sweden making a tangible contribution to the EU’s capability and making rapid reaction resources available for international crisis management operations” (ibid.: 8). About NATO they mention the importance of a strong bond between Europe and the USA, the Partnership for Peace initiative that Sweden uses to cooperate with NATO, and they explicitly leave open the option to “participate in international crisis management exercises with NATO outside the PFP initiative but within the framework of Swedish security policy” (ibid.: 9). In short, the EU changes the needs of Sweden’s defence policy, and is central to its security, while NATO is important for regional security and a possible framework for international crisis management. The 2004 document also orders the Swedish Armed Forces to produce detailed background information on how the military should converge, with a focus on contributions to international operations, contribution to a multinational rapid reaction force within the EU, and changing demands for units with low preparedness, military equipment and personnel (ibid.: 13). It also specifically refers to the newly created European Defence Agency, as a tool for joint ownership of materiel and pooling resources (ibid.: 20).

In a 2009 bill, the Swedish Government declared solidarity with all EU member states, and Norway and Iceland: if any would come under attack, Sweden would react (Swedish Defence 2010). In the same document, they name it vital to their operational capability to continue participation in training and exercises under EU and NATO command, as well as through bilateral and multilateral operations. They are “anxious to intensify cooperation with the Nordic countries” (ibid.).

By the end of 2013 Sweden felt the need to assess its current status in relation to its international defence cooperation and alliance memberships. The head of the Ministry of Defence ordered an inquiry, which led to a report in October 2014 (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2014). The most noticeable conclusion of the inquiry is that Sweden should investigate full membership of NATO. They see a growing need to cooperate, and a limitation in their current membership of alliances. In short it comes down to this: their participation within CSDP has delivered them the opportunity to be framework nation for the Nordic Battlegroup, which in turn greatly influenced the convergence of their army. “The two Nordic battle groups organized with Sweden as the framework nation have played a highly significant role in Sweden in driving the transformation of Swedish defence” (ibid.: 38). And while the European Defence Agency provides some options for pooling and sharing of capabilities, the actual significance of the CSDP has not proved to Sweden the amount of cooperation they would have desired.

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They notice that instead the NATO framework is being preferred by EU member states that are NATO member, and name the example of the Iceland Air Meet in February 2014, when units from Norway, Finland, Sweden and Iceland exercised supported by NATO, US and Dutch air-to-air refuelling assets. At that time it became clear to Sweden (and Finland) that NATO members are hesitant towards them. “There is resistance among certain NATO countries to letting non-allies perform common NATO functions, and Icelandic (and Baltic) Air Policing is one such function” (ibid.: 30). And with the “major operations in Afghanistan now coming to an end, 2015 will be the first time in 20 years when Sweden is not participating in any major NATO-led international operation. The interoperability that has been achieved, both between the allies and with partners, will have to be maintained by other means, principally through exercise activities in Europe. However, NATO’s partner countries have a less obvious place in these advanced exercises than in international operations, where they contribute tangible added value” (ibid.: 43). So Sweden is worried that it might lose its interoperability with the Alliance, and realises that it is not automatically welcome in close cooperation with some missions. This is being seen as a problem, even though they have entered a more special relationship with NATO since the Wales Summit of 2014. Finally, the Nordic cooperation (NORDEFCO) is being seen as reflecting the closeness and like-mindedness of the Nordic counties and useful for burden sharing, but not as effective as it could be because not all the members are part of NATO (ibid.: 27).

Finland

Finland, having the same alliance structure as Sweden, named three goals of their security and defence policy in 2001. First, the maintenance and development of a credible defence capability; second, remaining militarily non-allied; third, participation in international cooperation to strengthen security and stability (Finnish Defence 2001: 4). The history of Finland differs from that of Norway and Denmark (which were occupied by the Nazi’s during World War II, and were NATO member during the Cold War), and Sweden (which remained neutral during World War II and the Cold War). Finland actually fought against the Russians alongside the Nazi’s first, while it had its foreign policy more or less dictated by Russia during the Cold War. The latter situation has become known as Finlandization, when a small powers’ policies are being dictated by a neighbouring great power. “The Second World War, and the inability of the international community and especially the western powers to prevent the attack of the Soviet Union and assist Finland against it, showed the Finns that the world is not just and that the national interest should be about survival” (Seppo & Forsberg 2013: 114). Keeping

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good relationships with all the neighbours in order to survive, the idea of small state realism, has been at the heart of Finnish security policies since (ibid.) However, they did join the EU, and since the Lisbon treaty are officially therefore part of an alliance. They joined in the Nordic defence cooperation. However, the current Finnish Prime Minister, Alexander Stubb, said “European security and defense policy and Nordic defense cooperation are both important, but they are not sufficient substitutes for NATO membership”3_.

The military objectives of Finland are, as stated in the 2001 defence policy, primarily maintaining a credible defence capability (Finnish Defence 2001), or as they say in 2006: “Military defence must be able to maintain a credible capability to deter, and if deterrence fails, to prevent and repel military threats to Finland in the security environment of the 2020s” (Finnish Ministry of Defence 2006: 1). In that same document the MoD specifically names Russia as its main source of threat: “The probability of using military force against Finland may increase as part of an escalating global or European conflict and that probability may also rapidly grow. The consequences of a possible projection of military power against Finland, should it materialize, would be devastating. Therefore, the defence system must be maintained and developed in a long-term and anticipatory fashion […] The political and military development in our vicinity, especially in Russia, significantly influences Finland’s security” (ibid.: 11). The main objective of Finnish defence is not, like for example Denmark or Norway, focused on international peacekeeping, and much more focused on preventing military force being used against Finland (Finnish Defence 2009: 107). And while they have joined in on peacekeeping missions before, they have been contributing significantly less than they used to, and also less than their Nordic neighbours (Seppo & Forsberg 2013: 116-117).

The Finnish armed forces have been going through a process of instrumental change in the last decade. New technologies needed to be adapted: “the number of garrisons will be cut by six and the number of the members of reserve will be further diminished. These measures are more a consequence of the underlying material developments rather than an outcome of an evolving strategic culture” (Seppo & Forsberg 2013: 122). The main reason for convergence in Finnish military, then, is new technologies. In their 2006 long term strategy the Finnish MoD says the following: “Finland supports the development of the European Security and Defence Policy as well as improving the Union’s crisis management capabilities. Development of EU-NATO cooperation is an important dimension in the formation of the ESDP. Participation in

3_{In answer to the question “Should Finland and Sweden join NATO?” posted on the blog of Judy Dempsey;}

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the EU’s Rapid Response Force, and especially in the so-called battle groups, requires more rapid deployment than at present as well as both transport and logistic support capability even in challenging conditions” (Finnish Ministry of Defence 2006: 18). They acknowledge the dependence on European and international cooperation, and look at the European Defence Agency for procurement and security of supply. However, with the acknowledgement that new military systems should be procured with an eye on international cooperation, they emphasized that in their view, capabilities acquired for national defence tasks could also be used in the international (ibid.: 19-20). The Finns then seem to put their territorial defence central to the procurement of military instruments.

In a 2003 study, Finland investigated the possibility to join NATO. However, this was not a political research, but just a technical one, focused on costs and effects of joining the alliance, finding that it was possible, but considerable changes should be made to the structure of their security and defence administration (Finnish Alliance Report 2004). The Finns remained nonaligned, and tied their attitude towards NATO to that of Sweden. Their main institutional forum remains to be that of territorial defence, even though they actively have been participating in the development of the security and defence policy of the EU, and taking up a role as international security provider (Seppo & Forsberg 2013: 115-116). They continue to do so, and with international cooperation “Nordic countries, the key EU countries and nonaligned PfP countries, such as Ireland and Austria, are the most important partners” (Finnish Defence 2009: 112). Finland did join in specific NATO smart defence programmes, for example the one providing strategic airlift capability. But they use the same troops and materiel in national defence as in international crisis management, deploying mainly land forces, showing that their institutional forum for convergence is and remains national defence (ibid.: 113).

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Comparison and Analysis

While all states in the analysis speak in their national security policies about the importance of international crisis management, the differences in their military capabilities shapes their actual ability to contribute to it. Sweden and Finland, not being a NATO ally, do join in NATO missions, and do join in their sharing and pooling opportunities when they can. Norway, not being an EU member, does participate in the CSDP’s Nordic Battlegroup. Operating outside of alliance membership does however not necessarily say something about convergence. Notable here is that Denmark does not join into CSDP-missions or cooperation, a result of the opt-out. While Denmark at first deemed it necessary to leave the option open for its military to converge in a way that it was interoperable with the CSDP in case the opt-out was lifted, they didn’t seem to bother later on. That could mean either that lifting the opt-out became less likely, or that interoperability was guaranteed already. It is Norway that showed increasing interest in not just interoperability with the CSDP, but actually name it a priority to manage the convergence of EU’s defence in a way that it would fit with NATO standards. Both countries have swapped their national defence capabilities for rapid response capabilities, denationalizing their defence and preparing their military for international peacekeeping and crisis management situations. Their contribution to NATO missions is deemed important to stay relevant and to guarantee their own national defence through alliance deterrence. In that way they work similarly. Their convergence seems to be driven by their alliance membership, however it is more clearly the case for Denmark than for Norway. The latter also operates within the CSDP framework, and adaptation to Swedish, Finnish and Irish military (all non-aligned EU members) place it in a different position than Denmark, who has shut the door to the EU’s CSDP. Nonetheless, NATO seems to be the main driver for the convergence of their military, because they had the freedom to let go of national defence capabilities and focus on specialized units, developed in close cooperation with other NATO allies.

Sweden has put the EU at the centre of its security policy. Being the framework nation for the Nordic Battlegroup, a quick reaction force within the framework of the CSDP, has driven the transformation of their defence significantly. They however see limitations in what the EU can provide in terms of cooperation. Their military capabilities have been denationalized, and they operate like Finland in international operations under the auspices of not just EU and UN, but also NATO. Sweden recognize that their convergence and current alliance membership status limits them in both their national defence capabilities as in the ability to really share responsibility of each other in terms of defence. They would like to converge their military

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more with NATO than they have been able to do so far, and will consider membership of the alliance if the current special status doesn’t bring that. Finland has converged rather differently from Sweden, focusing its capabilities time and again on national defence. Their large shared border with Russia, and the historical events in the last century, have proved to be of more influence on their convergence than their EU alliance membership. Their focus on keeping their neighbours happy has prevented them so far from joining NATO, and we can say that of the four Scandinavian countries, Finland has converged the least with its alliance (the EU).

NATO provides small powers in Europe with the option to denationalize their defence, to specialize in a certain way and to apply new technologies while cutting their defence budgets. The small powers can then maintain their international relevance by joining in crisis management and peacekeeping missions together with larger powers. The EU does not provide that luxury to its small powers, because NATO already does so for the vast majority of its members. The non-aligned EU member states have therefore less options to denationalize their defence. If they do so, like Sweden did, they seek further multilateral cooperation to secure their safety. It is perhaps best understood as a different form of bandwagoning tactics. Sweden does not have to take Article 5 responsibility when Turkey or the United States is being attacked, but it tries to tie itself to NATO in a way that it will receive support when it gets attacked.

It seems then that NATO not only influences how its allied small powers converge, but also has the ability to create a spill-over effect on the convergence of closely linked non-aligned small powers. The EU does not provide that same spill-over effect, and does not provide the same ability for small powers to denationalize their defence. So does alliance membership lead to convergence? With NATO, yes. With the EU not so much.

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Conclusion

Comparing Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland on how their military capabilities converged in the last century as provided us with some insight on the influence of alliances on small powers. New technologies and new strategic thinking forced all states to rethink their capabilities (Biddle 1996; Reynolds 2006; Dyson 2008; Petersson 2011). While the transformation has been explained along the dimensions of RMA, strategic culture, and differences between EU and US, this research has tried to establish a link between alliance membership and small power military convergence. The results show us that the convergence of Norwegian and Danish military capabilities has been largely driven by their membership of NATO. Swedish convergence has been partly driven by its EU membership, most significantly through their role as a framework nation for the CSDP’s Nordic Battlegroup. Finnish convergence is not driven by its membership of the EU, but still by territorial defence. While Norway tries to actively be involved in the EU’s CSDP to ensure the EU’s convergence happens in compatibility with NATO standards, Sweden is realizing its limits of converging with NATO because it is not an ally. NATO then is not just a driving force for the convergence of its small power member states, but also has some sort of spill-over effect on small powers with closeness to the alliance. The European Union provides much less influence on the convergence of its small power member states’ military capabilities.

The most important factor how alliance membership influences small power military convergence is the ability for the state to denationalize and specialize its military capabilities, while having to worry less about the protection of its territory because of alliance deterrence. The deterrence provided by NATO is sufficient for small states to do so, but the deterrence provided by the EU is less sufficient to do so.

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From nordic neutrality to NATO : the impact of alliance membership on convergence of military capability in Scandinavia