UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
Maritime Order and
Disorder
The Case of Counter piracy
Jan Robin Wouter de Visser (10273468)Dedicated to Yana
Preface
The ancient cynics called for the defacement of the customs of society. Though these hobo philosophers of times gone by have a great deal of wisdom to impart us, it is not the intention of the author to break with the custom of expressing one’s gratitude for those who have helped and guided him in the crafting of a treatise like this one.
My gratitude goes out first and foremost to my parents, without their support and genes I would not have arrived at this point. Their support has allowed me to take this academic journey, though they might not have always understood this journey (like the author himself). My gratitude goes out to Dr Annette Freyberg-Inan without whose guidance, advice and motivational support I could not have finished this thesis. I would also like to thank my good friend Charles Battaglini for the endless discussions we have and continue to have about politics, society and the nature of neoliberalism. All missteps, mistakes and stupidities contained in these pages are of course my own.
Lastly, my eternal gratitude goes out to Dutch social democracy that besieged fortress of decency, for without which I would not have had the material means to pursue my studies these long years, wandering and slacking included.
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 1
Approach and structure ... 5
Relevance... 5
Chapter 1: On Theory ... 7
Public goods ... 8
Collective action problems and solutions ...10
Anarchy ...12
Hierarchy ...14
Hegemony ...15
Utility ...17
The paths to order ...21
Chapter 2: Maritime Order, Past and Present ...22
Piracy an ancient occupation...22
The early modern period ...27
Illustration: the Barbary protection racket ...29
The current maritime order ...30
UNCLOS ...31
The IMO ...34
The role of the United Nations Security Council ...35
Navies ...35
Conclusion ...36
Chapter 3: The Case of Somali Piracy ...38
Background ...38
Somali piracy ...41
International Response ...44
Conclusion and theoretical implications ...49
Conclusion ...51
Introduction
“He always thought of the sea as la mar which is what people call her in Spanish when
they love her. (…) Some of the younger fishermen (…) spoke of her as el mar which is
masculine. They spoke of her as a contestant or a place or even an enemy. But the old man always thought of her as feminine and as something that gave or withheld great favours, and if she did wild or wicked things it was because she could not help them.”1
The seas and the oceans are an important domain of human activity. La mar, as Hemingway put it, can
bestow great favors and has done so throughout history. Much of our earth is covered by seas and oceans and this provides us with nourishment and resources, as well as an unparalleled medium of transportation and communication. But this domain is also el mar, a place of contestation, of conflict. As medium of
domination and a domain that can be rife with maritime crime if not governed adequately. For “when the maritime Abel slipped his boat into the water for the first time Cain was close behind”.2 This thesis is concerned with these themes. Its subject is maritime order, especially the most basic level of order at sea: maritime security.
One of the most important developments in recent history is the process of globalization and this process has an important maritime dimension. Globalization, the process of intensifying and deepening of social relations over distance, is dependent on the global movement of resources, goods, people and ideas. Many of these movements traverse the maritime domain.3 The subject of this thesis is the creation and maintenance of maritime order within the international system. This thesis is especially interested in how the international community has responded to Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden in recent years.
Before we can link maritime order and globalization, these concepts need to be defined. There are a great many definitions of globalization. Marxist scholars focus on globalization’s connection with the global expansion of capitalism and the creation of a global division of labor.4 These scholars also tend to stress that the benefits and costs of this internationalization of production are deeply unequal, often in terms of a North-South divide.5 Other scholars and commentators, though generally more optimistic
1 Ernest Hemingway, The old man and the sea (Arrow Books, London 2004) pp. 19-20.
2 M.N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (Hurst & Company, London 2010) p. 1.
3 The maritime domain refers to “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances”, see: US Department of Homeland Security, National plan to achieve maritime domain awareness for the national strategy for maritime security (Washington D.C. 2005) p. i.
4 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the
Sixteenth Century (Academic Press, New Yor 1974).
5 Robert Cox, “Multilateralism and the Democratization of World Order”, cited in: J. A. Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics”, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.) The globalization of world politics. An introduction to international relations
about globalization, also define the process in economic terms, for example as “[t]he integration of the world economy”,6 the “development of global financial markets, growth of transnational corporations and their growing dominance over national economies”,7 and “the movement across international borders of goods and factors of production.”8
Though this thesis certainly does not reject the importance of the economic base in human societies, it does opt for a broader definition of globalization. Following Keohane (2002) globalization is defined here as the process of intensifying and deepening of social relations over distance, the trend of increasing transnational flows and increasingly thick networks of interdependence.9 In other words, globalization means that people, communities and polities interact and connect with each other increasingly more and more intensely. Thus the impact of events in one particular location are no longer contained to that locality, but are likely to have more ripple effects on other locations across the global.10
But how does the maritime domain fit into globalization? This can be illustrated by a simple example. One of the most striking features of (economic) globalization is the emergence of transnational corporations and their global value chains. As one scholar of globalization writes: “As soon as you stop to think about how cars are made, where your coffee has come from, or what goes into a computer, your mind immediately has to start a global journey”.11 For example, the coffee I am drinking while writing this introduction, is made of (Arabica) beans which are cultivated in Brazil and Colombia. The laptop I am using was produced by a Taiwanese company, which has production facilities in 32 countries. The simple fact is that transporting anything in great bulk from South America or Asia to the Netherlands requires traversing a great deal of water. This not only the case for coffee and laptops but also for a great many products. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in its most recent
Review of Maritime Transport (2016), has calculated that in 2015 80 percent of world merchandise trade was
transported by sea.12 The year 2015 was the first time in history that the volume of world seaborne trade surpassed 10 billion tons.13 This illustrates the importance of the domain and its connection with globalization.
Besides allowing for maritime transportation, and thus being “the backbone of globalization” and “the heart of cross-border transport networks that support supply chains and enable international trade” the maritime domain has other important qualities;14 the maritime domain is also a source of invaluable
6 Robert Gilpin, Global political economy (University Press, Princeton 2001) p. 364, 7 George Soros, On globalization (PublicAffairs, New York 2002) p. 13.
8 William Easterly, “Channels From globalization to inequality: Productivity world versus factor world”, as cited in S. M. Collins and C. Graham, “Editors’ Summary”, in S. M. Collins and C. Graham (eds.), Brookings trade forum, globalization, poverty and inequality (Brookings Institution, New York 2004), p. xiv.
9 Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (Routledge, London 2002), p. 15.
10 This definition is not to be taken as a cheery exaltation of globalization, the author is aware of negative consequence the process can have. Rather, globalization is conceived of as a process whose benefits and costs are unequally divided across people, communities and polities across our globe. Thus, globalization rather than being seen as an unstoppable force of nature, is seen here as a political issue, involving conflict and struggle.
11 Matthew Sparke, Introducing globalization. Ties, tensions and uneven integration (Wiley-Blackwell, New York 2013) p. 13. 12 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport (New York and Geneva, 2016) p. 6.
13 UNCTAD, Trade and development report, (New York and Geneva, 2016) p. 11. 14 UNCTAD, Review, p. 5.
resources, like fish stocks, natural gas and oil. The maritime domain is also very important for modern day telecommunications, as many of these are dependent on networks of oceanic cables that connect the different landmasses of our world and are the only infrastructure we have that “can transmit large amounts of bandwidths across bodies of water at low latencies (delays) and low costs.”15 Lastly, the maritime domain is also a domain of great power politics and imperialism. Dominance at sea, or as the ancient Greeks would say Thalassocracy, has been an important pillar of most imperial projects, from the
Athenians and the Romans with their Mare Nostrum, to the Iberians expansion into the New World and
the Far East, later followed and supplemented by the Dutch, English and French empires. A thing like the British Empire covering a quarter of the earth, could simply not be possible without the British Royal Navy backing the claim of Rule, Britannia!16
International maritime trade, European colonial expansion or the former British Empire have all required some form of maritime order to exist. That is some set of “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge” in maritime affairs, which provide for the functioning of maritime domain.17 The absence of order, disorder, el mar in Hemingway’s terms, is characterized by conflict and crime leading to a dysfunctional maritime domain. The most recent threat to maritime order is also one of the oldest: piracy.
An old history book on piracy (1932) assuredly states in its preface that the expansion of “national organization, backed by the steamship and the telegraph” had effectively brought an end to piracy.18 Piracy has existed as the scourge of the seas from the earliest days of civilization and maritime navigation. And at different times in history pirate organizations have developed to such an extent that they resembled independent states.19 The expansion of the European-American imperial power and their decision to abandon the practice of privateering, legalized piracy, seemed to have put an end to this phenomenon in the first half of 19th century. But like the plague bacillus in Camus’ La Peste (1942), “piracy has skulked behind cliffs and within coves for the past century, always present yet ever patient, biding its time before re-emerging with renewed fury.”20
In the mid-2000s piracy flared up again. Especially a flurry of spectacular hijackings by Somali pirates of big ships, the MV Fiana transporting arms to Kenya (including Russian-made tanks), the Saudi
oil tanker MV Sirius Star and many others garnered much media attention.21 The International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB) registered 111 pirate incidents in 2008, 218 in
15 Michael Sechrist, New threats, old technology. Vulnerabilities in undersea communications cable network management systems (Belfer Center, Cambridge Massachusetts 2012) p. 8.
16 Geoffrey Till, Seapower. A guide for the twenty-first century (Routledge, London and New York 2013) pp. 12-17.
17 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences. Regimes as intervening variables” International
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, spring 1982, p. 185.
18 Philip Gosse, The history of piracy (Dover Publications, New York 1932) p. vii. 19 Gosse, The history of piracy, pp. 2-3.
20 Michael Bahar, “Attaining optimal deterrence at sea. A legal and strategic theory for naval anti-piracy operations”
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnationl Law, Vol. 40, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 3-4.
21 Eugene Kontorovich and Steven Art, “An empirical examination of universal jurisdiction of piracy”, Northwestern
2009 and 219 in 2010. 22 The majority of these incidents took place in the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and the Indian Ocean. The Somali piracy threat which peaked in 2011, with 237 recorded attacks, has for the moment abated (see chapter 3). It is the task of the international community to protect the maritime domain and the maritime system from these threats.
The topic of this thesis is maritime order. It examines how the global community (made up of states and international organizations) ensures and protects good order at sea. Maritime security, or good order at sea, entails that all nations can access the seas as a global commons, a vital transport system. The smooth functioning of this system is a crucial factor in the global economy and society. As one writer travelling on a containership put it: “These ships and boxes belong to a business that feeds, clothes, warms, and supplies us. They have fueled if not created globalization. They are the reason behind your cheap T-shirt and reasonably priced television”.23
Human activity in general, and economic activity in particular, is dependent on security. Without some level of security each of us would only be concerned with our personal safety. In such a situation each of us would barricade him- or herself in our houses, locking our doors, stocking up on food and weapons to be able to repulse possible aggressors. This bleak situation was described most poignantly by the philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In his book Leviathan (1651) he discusses the state of nature, a situation
in which there is no state to provide security. This situation, he wrote, is like
a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man (…) In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.24
Hobbes’ solution was government, the creation of a Leviathan that stood above men. A power that could compel men to obey, so as to establish order and security for all. The problem Hobbes confronted was similar to the one faced within the maritime domain. Though the problems confronting the maritime domain are of an inter- and supra-national character. Instead of one government, one dominating Leviathan, the issue area of maritime security involves a legion of bigger and smaller states, as well as international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).25 Thus, currently at least the issue-area of maritime security is thus more characterized by governance, than government.
22 International Maritime Bureau, Annual report. Piracy and armed robbery against ships (ICC, London 2016, 2011, 2008). 23 Rose George, Ninety percent of everything. Inside shipping, the invisible industry that puts clothes on your back, gas in your car, food
on your plate (Macmillan, London 2013) p. 2.
24 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Meridian Books, Cleveland and New York 1963) p. 143. 25 Here NGO is defined as all nongovernmental organization, including companies.
Governance can be defined as: “the reflexive self-organization of independent actors involved in complex relations of reciprocal interdependence, with such self-organization being based on continuing dialogue and resource-sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint projects and to manage the contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations.”26 In our case the main “independent actors” are states, who are in different ways connected to and dependent on the maritime domain, as a transportation medium for their imports and export and as a source of resources. Threats to the maritime order, say piracy, emanating from one specific region affect the world economy, value chains and states in a differential manner. Maintaining the maritime order requires interaction and cooperation of many states, who more often than not are concerned about giving up their sovereignty to any international scheme, see for example the debates and problems concerning territorial waters.
Approach and structure
This thesis tries to answer the question: How is order created and maintained within the maritime domain? The research question is first approached theoretically in chapter 1, wherein different theories on public goods, collective action and international cooperation are discussed, with the purpose of answering the question: how can maritime order and maritime security be created within world politics? Out of these theories propositions are distilled on the paths to order, or how we can theoretically imagine states, as rational actors, interacting within world politics to establish maritime orders. Chapter 2 answers two questions: (1) what sort of maritime orders have existed historically? And (2) what are the main actors, institutions and principles of the current (global) maritime order? Chapter 3 will contain our case study and trace how the international community and the instruments of global governance reacted and performed against the Somali pirates. The Somali case is taken here as a successful case of global governance, in the way that several actors were able to come together and ensure the continued functioning of the maritime domain. By examining this specific case we can trace the structures and mechanisms that went in to action and examine if this was a case of hegemonic or cooperative maritime order that produced maritime security around the Horn of Africa. Afterwards the conclusion follows, in which the research question is answered and implications are drawn from the case study.
Relevance
It is easy to give in to sea blindness, forgetting that so many of the daily goods we consume are transported over sea. Or to give in to romantic conceptions of pirates, created and replicated by Hollywood. One can get lost in statistics on trade or doubt the costs of piracy claimed by shipping companies, but one cannot miss the human cost involved in piracy, the suffering endured by those seafarers who are attacked and taken hostage. For example, in October 2016, 26 Asian sailors of the
26 Bob Jessop, “Governance and metagovernance. On reflexivity, requisite variety, and requisite irony” in Henrik Bang, ed., Governance as Social and Political Communication (University Press, Manchester 2003) pp. 101-116.
Omani flagged FV Naham 3 were released after being held captive by Somali pirates for nearly 5 years.27 Though their captivity was especially long, there fate has been shared by hundreds of seafarers, many of them from poor countries.
Order and security are the basis that allows for the creation of complex human societies. This thesis adds to our understanding how order is created and maintained on the earth’s seas and oceans, an immensely important domain for human civilization that connects the different landmasses to one another. The issue of (counter) piracy around Somalia, as a military-security problem, is also a very interesting one from an International Relations perspective, as a whole range of actors were able to effectively cooperate and counter the pirates.
27 Aljazeera, “Somali pirates free hostages held for nearly five years” see: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/somali-pirates-free-hostages-held-years-161022185101017.html [7-1-2017]
Chapter 1: On Theory
And he asked him, What is thy name? And he answered, saying, My name is Legion: for we are many.28
Now that our purpose is set and we know the question that needs an answer, we can set upon the construction of a theoretical framework to guide us in our journey.29 Theory is inescapable. As the economist John Maynard Keynes said, even the most empirically minded of us are often the prisoners of “academic scribblers”.30 These scribbles thus serve to expose the mindset from which this author approaches the subject matter. They provide (hopefully) useful maxims and propositions that will inform and guide the rest of this thesis.31 The purpose of this chapter is, thus, to answer the question how can maritime order and maritime security be created within world politics? To answer this we will examine the International Relations literature and beyond, that can help explain why different states would come together to battle piracy and establish some form of maritime order. To this end we will explore the concept of a (global) public good and examine in what sense that maritime order can be conceived as a public good. Afterwards we will examine how realist and liberal theorists have puzzled with the question of public goods and collective action (problems) in world politics.
From this discussion several theoretical propositions will be distilled which draw paths to maritime order. The first proposition is that collective action within world politics can be explained by the existence of a dominant or hegemonic state. A state that can act like a quasi-Leviathan and structures world politics. This is a state that can mobilize other states to engage in collective action, or individually provide public goods that are in the interest of its hegemony. The second proposition is that states are strategic actors that seek to maximize their utility or gain; thus states can choose to cooperate and produce collective action and public goods to maximize their utility. These propositions will guide us in the next two chapters.
28King James Bible, Mark 5, verse 9.
29 A note on prose, the American philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler writes: “The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power.” This is of course totally incomprehensible for every person not able or willing to engage in many long and dreary hours of puzzling with obscure concepts and needlessly complex definitions. Butler quite rightly won the 1998 Bad Writing Contest organized by the journal Philosophy and Literature. For more on the prose of
Butler see: Cathy Birkenstein, “We got the wrong gal. Rethinking the ‘bad’ academic writing of Judith Butler” College English, vol. 72, no. 3, January 2010, pp. 269-271. This thesis consciously tries to avoid this type of writing in favour
of a style nearer to the vernacular, though this might come at a cost of intellectual pretence. For if academia is to be a force for progress (i.e. expanding the boundaries of human understanding of reality) it has to avoid falling for this Neo-Scholasticism. The prose of this thesis is thus structured in a way to avoid needless and intimidating sophistry. 30 John Maynard Keynes, The general theory of employment, interest and money (University Press, Cambridge 1936) pp. 383-384.
31 Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, neorealism and the study of world politics” in Robert. O. Keohane, Neorealism and
Public goods
The first question that must be answered is what is a public good? It is not the same as the public good.
That vague label that politicians put on their preferred policies, or the thing pro bono lawyers struggle for.
Rather when we speak of a public good or, the plural, goods, it refers to a specific concept from the
“dismal science” of economics.32 The concept of public goods goes back to the works of David Hume and Adam Smith in the 18th century.33 A public good has two features that distinguish it from a private good. Firstly, the benefits of a public good are non-rivalrous in consumption, and secondly, a public good is non-excludable.
Non-rivalry, sometimes called jointness, entails that consumption of a good does not diminish its
utility for others. For example, think of a traffic light that regulates a busy crossroad. If a person crosses the road safely thanks to the traffic light this does not impact the utility of the light for others. Another person can still safely cross the street thanks to the traffic light after the first person has safely crossed.
Non-excludable means that it is extremely difficult in political and social terms, and costly in economic terms, to exclude a person from consuming it.34 For example, levees and dykes protect large parts of the Netherlands from floods. Once a system of levees is put in place it is impossible to exclude individuals residing in the Netherlands from consuming the benefits produced by the dykes (i.e. not drowning). It is simply not possible to exclude one individual from flood protection (i.e. it is not possible to selectively flood those individual who do not contribute to the levee system).
The opposite of a public good is a private good. These goods are excludable and rival. Consumption by one individual automatically reduces the possible consumption of other individuals by an equal amount. For example, a pint of beer, once consumed, cannot be enjoyed by others. The amount of private goods produced is usually determined by the market mechanism. Their usage—to consume, lease or trade—is determined by their owners.35
The distinction between public and private goods should not be seen as absolute. Few goods truly fall completely within one of these categories, if secondary effects are taken into account. There are for example so-called impure public goods. These are goods that only partly meet either or both of the criteria (non-rivalry and non-excludability). There are two kinds of impure goods; club goods, which are
non-rivalrous but excludable, and common goods (also known as common pool resources), which are mostly
non-excludable but rivalrous in consumption.36 An example of a club good would be a swimming pool which is only accessible for people who buy a subscription. It is an excludable good, but individual consumption will not decrease the utility of the good for another person (that is as long as the pool is not
32 The term dismal science was first coined by the historian Thomas Carlyle.
33 Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, “Defining global public goods” in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern (eds.) Global public goods. International cooperation in the 21st century (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1999) p. 3; Duncan Snidal, “The limits of hegemonic stability theory”, International Organization, vol.
39, no. 4, autumn 1985, pp. 590-592.
34 Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, “Defining global public goods”, p. 4.
35 James Buchanan, “An economic theory of clubs”, Economics, vol. 3, no 124, February 1965, p 3; Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, “Defining global public goods”, p. 3.
overcrowded).37 An example of a common good would be the fish stocks in the North Sea. Excluding fishermen access is difficult (though not impossible) but the fish stocks are finite (i.e. a fish caught by one trawler cannot be caught by another).38
Excludable Non-excludable
Rivalrous Private goods: food, clothes, television sets
Common goods/ common pool resources: fish stocks
Non-rivalrous Club goods: swimming pools, satellite television
Public goods: security, air, freedom of the seas
Table 1: Types of Goods
As the example of fish stocks in the North Sea indicated, public goods are not confined to the national level. The world has an increasing need for global public goods due to growing interdependencies and increasing globalization. This development has led to the emergence of major structural gaps in the world economy between the need for public goods (e.g. regimes governing the global political economy) and the structures and mechanisms of global governance needed to produce these public goods.39 In other words we have created, expanded and intensified social interactions on the global level, but have in general failed to follow up in providing public goods that have a global scope. Public goods that are not confined to the local or national level but are truly global in that they affect humanity as a whole.
Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1991) formulate three requirements for a public good to be global, relating to its publicum. The first requirement of a global public good is that it covers more than one group
of countries. This means e.g. that a public good that exclusively affects Europe would not count as global, but would count only as a regional public good.40 The second requirement is that the benefits of a global public good must reach a broad spectrum of the global population. If a public good e.g. exclusively affects the higher echelons of society, it does not count as a global public good. The last requirement Kaul, Grunberg and Stern formulate, following the environmental movement, is that the public goods meets the needs of the present generation without endangering those of future generations.41
This is a demanding definition and should be seen as an ideal type of a global public good. Kaul, Grunberg and Stern write: “A pure global public good is marked by universality—that is, it benefits all countries, people and generations.” An impure global public good on the other hand would tend towards
37 For an insightful and somewhat alarming discussion of the influence of population growth on common goods see: Garrett Hardin, “The tragedy of the commons”, Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859, December 1968, pp. 1243-1248.
38 See: Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker, Rules, games & common-pool resources (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1994).
39 Philip G. Cerny, “Globalization and the changing logic of collective action” in: Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, International political economy. Perspectives on global power and wealth (London and New York, Routledge 2000) pp.
446-460.
40 A regional public good would be more akin to a common stock resource, in that its benefits are excludable from countries outside of the region.
universality in that it would benefit more than one set of countries. It would also not discriminate against any population segment or set of generations.42
We have now sketched out a clear picture of what a public good is, latter on the problems
associated with these goods will be discussed. Now the question must be asked whether maritime security or the freedom (to make use) of the seas by legitimate actors us a public good, and if so what kind of public good? The freedom of the sea is often referred to as a public good, though it is not always clearly argued why.43
To be a public good the freedom of the seas needs to be non-excludable and non-rivalrous. The legal principle of the freedom of the high seas as formulated by the Dutch jurist Hugo de Groot, also known as Grotius, in 1633 suggests that (part of) the maritime domain is non-excludable. In an English translation of his Latin dissertation The Freedom of the Seas, we find a conceptualization of the freedom of
the seas as a public good. Grotius first establishes that “there are some things which every man enjoys in common with all other men” (non-exclusion) in contrast to things that are owned by private individuals. And these common goods are to be used “without prejudice to any one else”.44 After establishing the existence of common goods, Grotius argues that “the boundless sea” cannot be “the appanage of one kingdom alone”.45
The size of the earth’s seas and oceans is also simply too huge to be excludable. Almost 71% of the surface of the earth is covered by water. This amounts to some 361,419,000 square kilometers of space covered by water. Of the United Nations’ 193 member states, 149 have direct access to a sea or ocean. However, massive differences in infrastructure and seafaring capacities exist, which makes access to the maritime domain unequally distributed. Some countries are blessed by their geography with direct access to important sea lines of communication (SLOCs), others control valuable chokepoints like canals and waterways (e.g. Egypt and Turkey). Yet exclusion would entail massive social, political and economic costs, making it very difficult. The difficulty of excluding access to the maritime domain is, for example, illustrated by difficulty of the European Union in countering the activities of human traffickers in the Mediterranean.46 We can thus conclude that maritime security and the freedom of the seas can be conceived as a public good.
Collective action problems and solutions
The provision of public goods is often very problematic. We can think of domestic society as consisting of groups, and we can think of international society as consisting of (mainly) states. These have certain
42 Ibidem, pp. 11.
43 Garrett Hardin, “The tragedy of the commons”, Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859, December 1968, p. 1245; Charles P. Kindleberger, “International public goods without government”, The American Economic Review, vol. 77, no. 1, March
1986, p. 7.
44 Hugo Grotius, The freedom of the seas. Or the right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian trade. A
dissertation (New York, Oxford University Press 1916) p. 8.
45 The kingdom Grotius refers to is Spain. The Dutch Republic was in a conflict with Spain regard the navigation to and trade with the East Indies.
46 Ferruccio Pastore, Poala Monzini and Giuseppe Sciortino, “Schengen’s Soft Underbelly? Irregular Migration and Human Smuggling across Land and Sea Borders to Italy”, International Migration, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2006, pp. 1-25.
interests and preferences, and concomitantly certain resources and capabilities to pursue and satisfy them. On the domestic level many groups will be interested in the creation of public goods: traffic lights, infrastructure, economic growth and the like. On the international level many states have an interest in world peace, financial stability, countering climate change, et cetera. If we assume that domestic groups and
state are rational, should these public goods not already have been achieved?
Quite the opposite seems to be case, and this can be explained by what the economist Mancur Olson coined the logic of collective action. He argued that “rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”.47 Rather, each individual actor, if he was rational, would decide to free ride, that is not to contribute to the creation of a public good. As these goods are non-excludable, the optimal situation for an individual actor would be not to contribute while others do contribute enough for the provision of a public good. In Olson’s words “all the members of the group therefore have a common interest in obtaining this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good”.48 We all have an interest in public goods, but each one of us also has an interest in somebody else paying for them.
These collective action problems occur especially in large groups. A small cabal is easier to organize than a large mass of people. According to Olson, it is easier for a small group to organize and act collectively because in small groups individual contributions are more noticeable. Free riding is thus also more noticeable and punishable. In some situations as a consequence “some quantity of a collective good that can be obtained at a cost sufficiently low in relationship to its benefit that some one person in the relevant group would gain from providing that good all by himself, then there is some presumption that the collective good will be provided.”49 Collective action is thus more likely to occur when there is a small group of likeminded actors.
On the domestic level the state can often produce public goods. Olson pointed to the coercive power of the state to extract resources from its population to produce public goods (infrastructure, public health, education). Often the state does not need to use its coercive machinery, rather it can rely on its authority to extract resources. Its authority is based on a social contract between the ruler and ruled based on reciprocal rights and obligations (i.e. we pay taxes and in return the government ensures public security and welfare).50
The role of government was not lost on the classical political economists. For example, David Hume wrote:
Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences [freeriding]. Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects. They need consult no body but themselves to form any scheme for the promoting of that interest. And
47 Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press 1965) p. 2.
48 Olson, The logic, pp. 1-21. 49 Ibidem, p. 22.
as the failure of any one piece in the execution is connected, though not immediately, with the failure of the whole, they prevent that failure, because they find no interest in it, either immediate or remote. Thus bridges are built; harbors opened; ramparts raised; canals formed; fleets equipped; and armies disciplined; everywhere, by the care of government, which, though composed of men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtle inventions imaginable, a composition, which is, in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities.51
The same sentiment can be found in the work of Adam Smith, who argued that states should be tasked with three main roles, the first two revolving around the maintenance of a military to protect the country from external invasion and the maintenance of an impartial legal and judicial system. The third and last duty of a state was, according to Smith: “…that of erecting or maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, although they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could not repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain.”52
Though this might solve a collective action problem, it does not always ensure an optimal result. The supply of public goods can suffer from various kinds of state failures: rent seeking behavior of policy makers (corruption), public expenditure biases (clientalism) or political stalemate.53 One characteristic of human beings is that they favor their kin and friends. In modern day western political society favoring one’s kin and friends for public office is usually seen as corruption. Corruption, according Samuel Huntington, might be an ‘illegitimate means of making demands upon the system’ yet is also ‘an illegitimate means of satisfying those demands’.54 This corruption is thus likely to produce a sub-optimal amount of public goods.
Anarchy
The state might step in on the national level, using its authority and coercive power to organize collective action and produce public goods and thus solving free rider dilemmas. States might act as domestic Leviathans but in world politics they are but individual components of a Legion of states. Each capable of inflicting at least some harm on other states.55 This leads us to the question, how can public goods be produced in the anarchic system of world politics?
According to realists anarchy is the ordering principle of world politics. That entails the lack of hierarchy in the international system, that there is no level of authority above states (i.e. there is no world
51 David Hume, A treatise on human nature (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1896) pp. 275-6.
52 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and cause of the wealth of nations (MetaLibri, Amsterdam 2007) p. 559.
53 Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, “Defining global public goods”, pp. 8-9; see also Mancur Olson, The rise and decline of
nations. Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities (Yale University Press, 1984).
54 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political development and decay”, World Politics, (1965) Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 64.
55 John Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics (New York & London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001) pp. 30-31.
government). There is no higher authority or common government in world politics that sits above states, which could mediate disputes and protect states when they get into trouble (Mearsheimer’s “‘911’ problem”), though as we will see hierarchies do exist within the anarchical system.56 The international system thus is anarchic in the sense that there is no higher authority above states, no supreme Leviathan that can govern the system and provide global public goods, especially military-security issues display more of the characteristics associated with anarchy than do political-economic ones.57
Thus anarchy does not mean chaotic or riven by disorder. Nor does this imply a Hobbesian world of ‘continual fear, and danger of violent death’ where life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.58 Anarchy however does imply that states will be concerned about their survival and generally distrustful of one another.
According to the realist John Mearsheimer this leads to three kinds of general patterns in states’ behavior: fear, self-help and power maximization. First, because every state possesses at least some offensive
capabilities, states view each other with suspicion. The reason for this is that one can never ascertain with any certainty the intentions of other states. But as every state has some capabilities to inflict harm and the cumulative harm of several states working in concert might be fatal. States tend to think in worst case scenarios.59 Second, as there is no higher authority in the international system states practice self-help. That is states act according to their self-interest. As Mearsheimer writes “God helps those who help themselves”.60 Third, fearful of the intentions of other states and aware that they operate within a self-help system, states realize that the best way to ensure their survival is to become as powerful as possible. Powerful states do not have to worry about their neighbours attacking them. The ideal situation for a state, according to Mearsheimer, is to become a hegemon in the system.61 As Immanuel Kant wrote: “It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace conquering the whole world, if that were possible”.62
Thus realism, in its Mearsheimerian form, would suggest a world of continuous struggle and security competition between states. Or as one critic summarized it: “Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests.”63 It is not hard to point to real world examples of these patterns. For example, the war in Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimean
56 Kenneth N. Waltz, “A response to my critics” in: Keohane, Neorealism and its critics, p. 323; Mearsheimer, Great
power politics, p. 32; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving cooperation under anarchy. Strategies and
institutions”, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985, p. 226.
57 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving cooperation under anarchy”, pp. 226-7. 58 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 143.
59 Mearsheimer, Great power politics, p. 32-33. 60 Ibidem, p. 33.
61 Mearsheimer, Great power politics, p. 33-34.
62 Cited in: ibidem, p. 34. Original German text: “Indessen ist dieses das Verlangen jedes Staats (oder seines Oberhaupts), auf diese Art sich in den dauernden Friedenszustand zu versetzen, daß er, wo möglich, die ganze Welt beherrscht.”
63 Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining cooperation under anarchy. Hypotheses and strategies”, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985, p. 1.
peninsula by Russia.64 Or in Asia, where China is expanding its military capabilities and consolidating its claims in the disputed South China Sea.65
Yet besides this kind of great power politics there is a whole range of activity within the international system which is not exclusively determined by fear, self-help and power maximisation. If the French Republic and the United Kingdom truly fear a united Germany, as Mearsheimer argues, why do they continue to work with one another within NATO?66 As Mearsheimer argued himself, following the end of the Cold War it was likely that the United States would abandon Europe and that NATO would disintegrate.67 Yet the Atlantic alliance proved itself more than a marriage of convenience, a balancing coalition directed at a common threat (i.e. the Soviet Union). After the dissolution of this threat the alliance persisted. And to this day France and the United Kingdom continue to work, practice and share military knowledge with the German Federal Forces.
If cooperation within an anarchic system is possible, this would suggest that it possible for states to cooperate, overcoming collective action problems and producing global public goods. The questions is how this can come to pass from the starting position of anarchy?
Hierarchy
Is world politics as tragic as Mearsheimer would have us believe? Probably not, the multinational and national efforts to secure the waters around Somalia against piracy suggest that states can coordinate, at least somewhat, to secure their common interests.
Though the idea of an anarchic system is analytically seductive, the existence of an anarchic system does not imply that hierarchical relations are absent from world politics. The problem with the realist paradigm is the conceptualization of states. Waltz writes: “Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralised and anarchic.” Though differences in the distribution of states’ capabilities entail that “[s]ome are entitled to command; others are required to obey.” 68
Accepting the formal equality of states as basically similar units is a gross simplification. Though our world lacks a world government, there are certainly international hierarchies in world politics. Both in the present and in the past states have partly or wholeheartedly subordinated themselves to the authority of other states.69 Be this in the form of spheres of influence, informal empires, residual European colonies, the relation between Russia and its near abroad or between the United States and its formal
64 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine crisis is the west’s fault. The liberal delusions that provoked Putin”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 77, September/October 2014, pp. 1-12.
65 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s strategy in the South China Sea”, Contemporary South East Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2011, pp. 292-319.
66 Mearsheimer, Great power politics, p. 32.
67 John Mearsheimer, “Back to the future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, summer 1990, p. 52.
68 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of international politics (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading Massachusetts 1979) p. 88.
dependencies.70 Realists might parry this critique by pointing out that their focus is on great powers, which are more or less equal. This would however limit political analysis to only a few powers that are assumed to matter and consequently excludes a large range or world politics relating to small and medium powers and international organisations.71 As Measheimer pointed out himself, all states have so capabilities to inflict harm and these do add up.72
David Lake challenges the concept of indivisible state sovereignty that underlies realist thinking. He writes that, rather, when we look at the historical record and modern day politics we can see plenty of cases of divisible sovereignty. Lake gives the example of the relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Exploring how the United States has assumed and continues to assume part of Dominican sovereignty, today largely restricted to ensuring that the Dominican Republic retains favourable foreign, economic and security policies. This relationship though unequal has been, according to Lake, beneficial to both parties. Ensuring a compliant neighbour for the United States, but also protecting the Dominican Republic (or at least its elites) from internal and external threats as well as providing support for Dominican institutions and development.73
Thus we can conceptualize a dominant state providing public goods, like security from external threats or good order at sea, in exchange for the compliance of subordinate states to dominant states’ political order. Dominance according to Lake is based on relational authority, which he defines as a source
of power based on a social contract between the dominant state and its subordinate. The dominant state provides a certain political order, “’a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary, or universal goals of social life,’ including security against violence […], an assurance that property will not be subject to challenges that are constant or without limit, and an expectation that promises and agreements […] will be kept.” In other words a dominant state offers its subordinates the “the protection of persons, property, and promises” in exchange for their compliance.74 So we can expect that a dominant state will sometimes provide common stock goods and public goods.
Hegemony
Lake’s theory on hierarchy is similar to hegemonic stability theory, which scales up to the systemic level. This theory claims that the presence of a single, dominant state in its region or in the international system as a whole, can produce collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the system. In other words, this hegemon ensures the smooth working of the system by organizing cooperation and producing public goods.
70 If, for example, the Dutch Freedom Party gets its way and the European Union is abolished and the euro abandoned, it is not likely that the Netherlands will regain true independence in monetary affairs. Rather Dutch monetary policy will be informally decided upon in Frankfurt due to the dependency of the Dutch economy on the German one, like it was before 2002. In other words this fictive situation is more characterised by hierarchy than by anarchy. Are these kinds of hierarchies fair? “Hardly,” writes Lake, “but life in the state of nature might be far worse.” Lake, Hierarchy in international relations, p. 7.
71 For the writer as someone from a non-great power this is a particular unacceptable assumption. 72 Mearsheimer, Great power politics, p. 32-33.
73 Lake, Hierarchy in international relations, pp. 6-7. 74 Ibidem, p. 8.
Hegemonic stability theory has its roots in the politics of international economics and especially in free trade. It is most closely associated with the work of Charles Kindleberger, an economic historian. According to Kindleberger, free trade requires a “benevolent despot” to provide certain institutional goods.75 Kindleberger writes:
Realists maintain that international public goods are produced, if at all, by the leading power, a so-called ‘hegemon,’ that is willing to bear an undue part of the short-run costs of these goods, either because it regards itself as gaining in the long run, because it is paid in a different coin such as prestige, glory, immortality, or some combination of the two.76
Hegemonic stability theory is thus premised on the idea that a hegemonic state will provide public goods because of its privileged position, because the hegemon will also capture a share of the benefit of the public good that is larger than the cost of producing it. The hegemon benefits from this situation but smaller states can gain even more as they can free ride, gain the utility of the public good without having to
bear the cost for producing it.77 The hegemonic state creates a certain hierarchical political order, this order is reflecting the particular interests and biases of the hegemon.78 Yet the hegemon is not free to structure the political order every way it please, for the hegemon’s rules are constrained in that they must be accepted by a sufficient number of subordinate states.79 For the power of the few, however strong and mighty, cannot possibly stand against union of the many, no matter how feeble they are as individuals. The Leviathan cannot reign without the acquiescence of a Legion of subordinates.
Subordinate states will not only comply with the commands of their hegemon but they will also perform symbolic acts of obeisance. For example, following their hegemon into war. Even though the military contribution of the subordinate state is negligible, the costs for the subordinate state (i.e. getting involved in wars) might be substantial.80 These acts signal deference to the hegemon’s authority and can be taken as an indicator of the legitimacy of the hegemon’s political order. Subordinate states may also be disciplined as part of the construction and maintenance of a political order.81
75 This argument can be expanded to other issue areas besides free trade. For example environmental questions or the freedom of the seas can both be seen as issue areas in need of certain institutional public goods to function in a correct and sustainable manner or at least halt the spread of public bads, those negative impacts that are both non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
76 Charles P. Kindleberger, “International public goods without government”, The American Economic Review, vol. 77, no. 1, March 1986, p. 8.
77 Duncan Snidal, “The limits of hegemonic stability theory”, International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4, October 1985, p. 581.
78 Lake, Hierarchy in international relations, p. 33-34. 79 Ibidem, p. 9.
80 For example, the Domincan Republic contributed 600 soldiers to the war in Iraq. See: Lake, Hierarchy in international
relations, p. 6-7; on symbolic acts of obeisance see: pp. 12-13.
81 For example, after the Netherlands ended its contribution to ISAF in the Afghan province of Uruzgan in 2010 it was consequently excluded from several NATO research programs, thus losing access to valuable research: Correspondence with Dutch defence specialists. Another example: Dutch officers imbedded in the American armed forces have noted that access to facilities and access to meetings was dependent on Dutch contribution to joint missions (i.e. these officer would get more access and voice when the Netherlands followed policies in line with the interests and goals of the United States).
Hegemonic stability theory can either be defined in a deterministic manner or in a more probabilistic manner. A deterministic formulation would be that hegemony (meaning “control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control of markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods”) is a requirement and a sufficient factor for cooperation and the
production of public goods.82 The existence of a hegemon would thus imply that cooperation will take place in the international system, the lack of one would imply non-cooperation.
Robert Keohane has pointed out the empirical and logical problems of using such a deterministic definition. He points out that in the late period of the Pax Britannica (1900-1913), while British power was
in decline, a concomitant rise in commercial conflicts did not materialize. Rather the opposite happened and the amount of trade conflict decreased. After the First World War the strongest state within the international system (the United States) did not take up the mantle of hegemon and provide for public goods. The crucial factor was not weakness on the part of the United States but rather its domestic politics that prevented it from playing the part of hegemon in the interbellum period.83
It is thus more useful to adopt a probabilistic definition of hegemonic stability, e.g. a hegemonic power will likely provide public goods benefitting all states in the region or in the system. A hegemonic state can fail in providing this leadership if its national elites or institutions refuse to take up this responsibility. In such a situation it requires a coalition of states in system to cooperate in such a way to produce the required public goods. In the next section this form of cooperation will be explored on the basis of the concept of utility.
The position that a hegemon is required to establish a maritime order is for example taken Martin Murphy. Who argues “where order has been present it has been kept by a hegemon” on the basis of “self-interest of an imperial or global power” but he also adds “or powers to enforce it, whether alone or with the help of regional allies. In the absence of such a power or powers, seafarers have generally been subject to the depredations of criminal pirates or state-sponsored privateers.”84 As we will see in chapter 3 this was not the case regarding counter piracy of the coast of Somalia.
Utility
Both the hierarchy and hegemony paths to cooperation are based on a certain power asymmetry, one actor in the international system having an advantage in relational authority or power, and thus being able to organize collective action and produce public goods. Liberal International Relations theorists have pointed out that a cooperative path to order is possible, that is not reliant on one state’s overwhelming power, but rather on the utility maximizing nature of states. This path from the utility maximizing nature of states to cooperation can be strengthened by international institutions that improve the exchange of information between states.
82 Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony. Cooperation and discord in the world economy (Princeton University Press 2005) pp. 37-38.
83 Keohane, After hegemony, p. 34.
84 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism. The threat to international security (Routledge, London 2007) p. 74.
Utility is the main principle of utilitarianism.85 Jeremy Bentham defined the principle of utility as “that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness.”86 According to Bentham humankind has “two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.”87 We should pursue the second and avoid the first. Utility is thus the sum of pleasure minus pain. Every rational actor (individuals or states) is likely to pursue its utility, even though defining what produces either pain or pleasure might be up for discussion and interpretation.
So it makes sense that states, as strategic utility maximizing actors, can cooperate with one another when this increases their utility, even though there is no power coordinating or forcing them. They can also choose to come together in international organizations for collective action, in a way similar to how John Locke argued political societies came in to being. Human beings can agree “to unite into a community, so as to live together comfortably, safely, and peaceably, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against outsiders.”88 We are able to estimate the utility of cooperation and organization and are thus able as rational actors to come together in political societies. Locke envisioned political society as organized on a majoritarian basis, decisions being based on majority support of the populace. Under such a constitution the “mighty Leviathan [has] a shorter life than the feeblest creatures; it wouldn’t live beyond the day it was born.”89 This liberal theory thus breaks with the realist focus on mutual fear in favor of focusing on mutual gain.
Another factor influencing the likelihood of cooperation is the history between states and if they will have to deal with each other in the future. This is an insight from game theory, the theory that analyses individual and collective social outcomes in “terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints.”90 One way game theorists have modelled cooperation is with the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. In this model there are two actors (A and B) that have two choices, to cooperate or to defect. This creates four possible options with different amounts of total utility achieved and different divisions of utility (this is modelled in figure 1).
85 Utilitarianism is a consequentialist philosophy (i.e. a philosophy that privileges the consequences of actions above the intentions of said actions). It has been shaped by, among others, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and more recently Peter Singer.
86 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation ((London 1823), p. 18. 87 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 1.
88 John Locke, Second Treatise, p. 32. 89 Locke, Second Treatise, p. 32.
90 Duncan Snidal, “Rational choice and international relations” in Handbook of international relations (Sage Publications, London 2006) pp. 85-111.
In this model the total amount of utility possible, the Pareto optimum,91 would be achieved if both parties cooperated (mutual cooperation in our figure, producing a total utility score of 6). If this game is only played once the likely choice of both players will be to defect (mutual punishment, producing a total utility score of 2). The preference order for each player is: DC > CC > DD > CD.
However if the game is repeatedly played or, in other words, the shadow of the future is extended, cooperation can emerge on the basis of reciprocity. If I was confronted with another person in the state of nature I might overpower and rob him of his possessions and gain a onetime payoff. But as Hobbes wrote no real industry or cultivation of the earth can take place in the state of nature.92 So my ill-gotten spoils will be rather meagre. If on the other hand I would join my fellow human in commerce and industry, work together and divide tasks, my initial payoff might be humble but over time it might add up to a higher payoff. Within game theory it has been discovered that a tit-for-tat strategy (if you cooperate, I will cooperate) in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma leads to a higher payoff than selfish defection.93 Cooperation, however, needs not be harmonious. Rather cooperation takes place in situations where conflicting and complementary interests interact. It occurs when actors change their behavior to the preference (actual and perceived) of others.94 In other words, actors try to achieve their preferences but these can sometimes (seem to) overlap, thus allowing for cooperative arrangements.
91 The Pareto optimum is a state of resource allocation in which no change in allocation can be made without lowering the utility for another individual.
92 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 143.
93 Robert Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation (Basic Books, New York 1984) pp. 12-16. 94 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving cooperation under anarchy”, p. 226.
Player B
Cooperate
Defect
Player
A
Cooperate
3, 3
(Mutual cooperation)
0, 4
(Sucker’s payoff and
the temptation to
defect)
Defect
4,0
(Temptation to defect and
the sucker’s payoff)
1, 1
(Mutual
punishment)
Within game theory it is well established that the payoff structure for a game affects the level of cooperation.95 The payoff structure in the real world is not based simply upon objective factors, but is based on actors’ perceptions of their own interests and those of others. Axelrod and Keohane argue that ‘to understand the degree of mutuality of interests (or to enhance this mutuality) we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined.’96
Interactions between states do not necessarily have to fit in the prisoner’s dilemma. Different situations or games have very different payoff structures. For example, an interaction between states can resemble a so-called Stag Hunt game. This a situation wherein the total gain and relative gain can be
achieved by cooperation. Unlike the Prisoners’ Dilemma where the highest utility can be achieved by
cheating the other player (i.e. defecting while the other player cooperates), in a Stag Hunt the highest gain
for each individual player is achieved by cooperating. The preference order in this game thus becomes: CC > DC/DD.97 In this situation one can expect, if states only take into account the pay offs structure, they will cooperate.
Axelrod and Keohane also point out that “effective reciprocity depends on three conditions: (i) players can identify defectors; (2) they are able to focus retaliation on defectors; and (3) they have sufficient long run incentives to punish defectors.”98 International institutions stimulate this kind of reciprocity as they improve the information states have about each other. Institutions promote cooperation among states because they improve the information on other states’ interests, perceptions and capabilities. As Mearsheimer argued, states have the possibility to inflict harm on each other and thus fear
95 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving cooperation under anarchy”, p. 227. 96 Ibidem, p. 229.
97 Oye, “Explaining cooperation under anarchy”, p. 8.
98 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving cooperation under anarchy”, p. 235.
Player B
Cooperate
Defect
Player
A
Cooperate
4, 4
(The stag is trapped)
0, 2
(B catches a rabbit
but the stag escapes)
Defect
2,0
(A catches a rabbit but
the stag escapes)
2, 2 (A and B catch
rabbits but the stag
escapes)
each other.99 This is also a problem in organizing collective action, as Olson argued. In large groups it is hard to discern individual contribution, thus incentivizing individual actors to free ride.100
The paths to order
In this theoretical framework two paths to maritime order have been distinguished that make it possible for states to traverse the obstacles to cooperation created by anarchy and providing (global) public goods within an anarchic system. Both hierarchy and hegemony entail a dominant or hegemonic state rising to the occasion, which is powerful enough to compel other states to engage in collective action to produce public goods. These goods may be regional or common pool resources in the case of a dominant state, or global public goods in the case of a truly globally hegemonic state. The second path to order has focused on the principle of utility coupled with institutions that improve information flows and disincentivize free riding or defecting.
In the next chapter the different paths to maritime order and schemes to ensure the freedom of the seas, characterizing the current regime of mechanisms and institutions governing the seas will be discussed. Thus we will look what kind of real world schemes to ensure maritime security these paths to cooperation have produced. The propositions of this chapter will be used as an analytical framework to aid us in the interpretation of the data in our next two chapters.
Paths to order
Proposition 1: Hegemony Proposition 2: Utility
A hegemonic power uses its naval force to produce maritime order and security, other states free ride and benefit from this order.
The hegemon is the organizer of
collective action, it produces global public goods.
States are strategically rational actors, institutions facilitate cooperation and this leads to
cooperation, which can overcome collective action problems when interests sufficiently align (e.g. when payoff structure incentivizes cooperation above defection).
Table 2: Paths to Order
99 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of great power politics, pp. 32-33. 100 Olson, The logic of collective action, pp. 1-21.
