INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF IMAGINATION
IN EARLY MODERN KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION:
THE ARTISANAL PRACTICES OF ISAAC BEECKMAN
MIRRORED TO RENÉ DESCARTES’ RHETORIC
Drawing of a mechanical system of gears by Beeckman in 1624 (Waard, 1942: p. 286)
Research Master Thesis by Ruben Duinmeijer (5686024) Arts & Culture: Art Studies
Graduate School of Humanities University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Prof. dr. Jan Lazardzig
Content
Introduction ... 3
Theoretical Framework ... 6
Methodology ... 9
1. Developments in knowledge-acquisition of the early modern period: the function of
imagination and the education of Isaac Beeckman and René Descartes ... 11
1.1 Imagination and its instrumentalization in the seventeenth century ... 11
1.2 Artisanal practice and scholarly theory in the youth and education of Beeckman ... 15
1.3 Rhetorical Practices in education of René Descartes ... 20
2. Perceptual Cognition and Imagination ... 23
2.1 Beeckman’s mechanistic account of perceptual cognition ... 23
2.2 Artisanal practices: repetition and proportionality ... 26
2.3 Descartes mechanistic and symbolical account of imagination ... 30
3. Instrumentalization of Imagination ... 35
3.1 Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination: artisanal intuition... 35
3.2 Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination: transition of wonder ... 40
3.3 Descartes’ instrumentalization of imagination: rhetorical practices ... 42
Conclusion ... 47
Bibliography ... 51
Introduction
In the summer of 1626 there was a breeze of tense expectancy to be sensed in the city of Rotterdam. A greatly improved horse-driven mill was to be created, ordered by one of the larger beer-brewers in town. The new mill was expected to grind three to four times as much malt as an ordinary mill. The mechanism behind it was said to rest on the principle of perpetual motion. When Isaac Beeckman, assistant-rector of the Latin school in Rotterdam, heard of this, he instantly refuted the idea. He claimed that ‘only God makes living gears or perpetual motion’ and warned the investing parties involved.1 Still, the project continued and on the day the machine
would be tested, a large crowd had gathered to witness the spectacle. As Beeckman predicted, the new mill did not work, and was allegedly demolished the day after.2
Although Isaac Beeckman had a modest position as assistant rector at that time, he was a respected natural philosopher of his time. While being scholarly educated at the University of Leiden and earning his doctorate in medicine in 1618, Beeckman was also a craftsman, immersed in the production of candles, water circuits and lenses.3 The abovementioned episode
of Beeckman’s reveals both the acquaintance with the laws of mechanics, as well as experience with the practical application of these laws: against the inventor’s stark claims, Beeckman was able to predict the erroneousness in these claims.. The combination of his artisanal background and scholarly education allows Beeckman to rightfully imagine whether a machine will work or not. Because of this distinctive feature, he was sought after for advice by regents and burgomasters on many occasions.4
In the discourse of knowledge making, Beeckman was equally imaginative, for example in his account of motion. Whereas the still dominant Aristotelian notion pleaded that motion occurs because of intrinsic motivation, Beeckman simply asked why an object, if brought into motion, ever stops moving.5 Similarly imaginative, Beeckman advanced in mathematical
explanations of physical phenomena, which he called physico mathematico. Scholars acquainted with the development of natural philosophy or imagination in the early seventeenth century, will immediately recognize the novelties that Beeckman displays here.6 The imaginative
qualities present in Beeckman and his double identity as both craftsman and natural
1 De Waard (II), 1942: pp. 358-359. 2 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 36. 3
Though secondary literature is insightful, in order to get a grasp of what practices Isaac Beeckman was involved in, his own diary is an obligatory point of departure: Waard, de C. Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1939-1953).
4
Van Berkel, 2013: p. 136 An example of such an occasions Beeckman is his involvement in devising a mechanism for dredging the harbor of Middelburg.
5
Van Berkel, 1983: p. 188. Dijksterhuis, 1950: p. 24.
6
The refusal of the Aristotelian idea of motion is a clear, but also the combination of physics and mathematics is a novelty: it goes against Aristotle’s classification of knowledge, which separates the realms of physics and mathematics and consequently did not allow for intermingling of its principles.
philosopher, evoke questions about how imagination is affected by the entanglement of artisanal and scholarly practices with regard to the production of knowledge.
These questions become more pressing when one knows that Beeckman closely collaborated with Rene Descartes, the philosopher that is said to have gone beyond anyone else in his understanding and cultivation of imagination.7 This collaboration, which happened in
1618, and the consequential relationship between Isaac Beeckman and Rene Descartes have been discussed plenty.8 One of the more explicit similarities of their methodologies is the
demand for a vividness of explanations given to natural phenomena. Indeed, Descartes is known for his ‘clear and vivid ideas’ and Beeckman allowed nothing in philosophy that could not be represented to the imagination.9 In fact, this was one of Beeckman’s two main principles –the
other being the combination of mathematics and physics in explaining natural phenomena – and it gives imagination a very significant position in his thinking.
With imagination at the core of his scholarly work, Beeckman –and Descartes as well! - fits into the image of the early modern knowledge making. Indeed, it has been claimed that the most distinctive feature of early modern science is the absence of Aristotle from the philosophical scene.10 This has in turn sparked many interpretations of how this epistemological
vacuum was filled. Besides the general accounts on perception and imagination, and their the scientific endeavors in the early seventeenth century, various scholars have attempted to create an image of this period by discussing the relation of concepts as instruments, artisanal practices, methodology, to name but a few.11 Whereas Descartes is merely present in all of these
interpretations, Beeckman is only now and then discussed briefly.
In fact, until the early 20th century Beeckman was by and large known through the
biographies on Descartes. The reason for this is Beeckman’s lack of publications: only
7
Sepper, 1996: p.289
8
See: Arthur, R. ‘Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion’. Journal of the History of Philosophy. Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2007): pp. 1-28. Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1983. Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion. Mechanical philosophy in the making. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013. Cole, J. The Olympian Dreams and Youthful Rebellion of Rene Descartes. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1992. Gaukroger, S. Descartes. An Intellectual Biography. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Hatfield, G., "René Descartes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Zalta E.N. ed. Sepper, D. Descartes’
Imagination: proportion, images and the activity of thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
9
Van Berkel, 2013: p. 81
10
Kenny, 2007: p. 501.
11
See, for example: Brann, E.T. The World of the Imagination. Savage: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991. Bundy, M.W.
The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1928. Cocking, J.M. Imagination. A Study in the History of Ideas. London: Routledge, 1991. Funkenstein, A. Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Hankins, T.L,
Silverman, R.J. Instruments and the Imagination. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Lipking, L. What Galileo Saw.
Imagining the Scientific Revolution. New York: Cornel Press University, 2014. Ronzeaud, P. ed. L’imagination au XVIIe siècle.
Paris: Honoré Chamption, 2002. Schramm, H., Schwarte, L. and Lazardzig, J., eds. Instruments in Art and Science. On the
Architectonics of Cultural Boundaries in the 17th Century. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008.
Sennett, R. The Craftsman. New Haven: Yale University Press,2008. Smith, P. The Body of the Artisan. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.
posthumously a short excerpt of his diary was published by Beeckman’s brother.12 The larger
bulk of Beeckman’s notes vanished into oblivion and was long thought to be lost, until it was rediscovered in 1905 by historian Cornelis de Waard.13 His transcription of Beeckman’s
voluminous diary or Journal resulted in four books, which were published between 1939 and 1953. Since the first of these books was published, Beeckman’s role within the early modern discourse of knowledge has been analyzes, interpreted and debated with increasing frequency.14
The scholar that has examined Beeckman in greatest detail is historian Klaas van Berkel. His Dutch dissertation Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld (1983) and its recent English translation Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion (2013), are required readings for any scholar that examines the life of this Dutch natural philosopher.15 The
central these of Van Berkel is that Beeckman, conducting research in a time where there was no common ground for those who sought alternatives to Aristotelian or scholastic notions, contributed to a rise of mechanical philosophy that would dominate the seventeenth century scientia.16 Though his dissertation is thorough, van Berkel does not deal with Beeckman’s conceptualization and use of imagination extensively. With Beeckman’s principle – in philosophy I allow nothing that cannot represented to the imagination – and his imaginative force in explaining natural phenomena in mind, this appears to be a lacuna in van Berkel’s account.
Given the fact that in Beeckman both the philosophical and artisanal practices reside and taking into account that some of his ideas are very imaginative, it is worthwhile to analyze what Beeckman’s notion of imagination is and how his speculations become imagined in his mind. The aim of this thesis is therefore to clarify how Beeckman relates his ideas of the natural world to the nature of perception and imagination, and how in turn imagination functions his the process of knowledge acquisition. There are a number of questions that need to be answered, which enable an analysis of Beeckman’s description and use of imagination. These questions are as follows. First, how is imagination conceptualized by Beeckman and what function does it hold in his ideas of natural world and human perception? Second, how does Beeckman instrumentalize his imagination for the purposes of knowledge production? Third, how do the notions and uses
12
D. Isaaci Beeckmanni Medici et Rectoris apud Dordracenos Mathematico-physicarum Meditationum, Questionum,
Solutionum Centuria (1644).
13 See: Waard, de C. Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939-1955. De Waard
has published four annotated volumes, in which Beeckman’s noted thoughts between 1604 and 1634 are described (Volumes I, II and III). Complementary to this, De Waard has transcribed many of the letters that were exchanged by Beeckman with, Marin Mersenn, Pierre Gassendi and Rene Descartes, among others. (vol. IV)
14
See for example: Koyré, A. Galileo Studies. Transl. Mepham, J. Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1978. Dijksterhuis, E.J.
De Mechanisering van het Wereldbeeld. Nijmegen: G.J. Thieme, 1950. Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1983. Arthur, R. ‘Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion’. Journal of the History of Philosophy. Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2007): pp. 1-28. A special mention is: Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion. Mechanical philosophy in the making. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013. In
this book, a literary survey is to be found, which is helpful to any scholar interested in Beeckman.
15
Literal translation of Isaac Beeckman en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld is Isaac Beeckman and the mechanizing of
the worldview.
16
of imagination in Beeckman and Descartes differ? Given the clear division between conceptualization of imagination and the instrumentalization of imagination, these topics will be discussed separately in chapter 2 and 3. These chapters will be preceded by a chapter that mainly focusses on contextualizing imagination, as well as both of their education.
Theoretical Framework
When writing about a topic within early modern Europe, which I will date from roughly 1500 to 1800, there are a few pitfalls to be avoided. There are plenty of metaphors that all suit the early modern period in Europe well, but once applied, these metaphors have a tendency to stick and limit further inquiry. The ‘scientific revolution’, the ‘mathematization of nature’, the ‘disenchantment of the world’ and the ‘mechanization of the worldview’ are such metaphors. Their formulation creates clear imaginations which instantly come to mind, but which are equally persistent in their coloring of the early modern period.17 Indeed, when analyzing the
function and use of imagination in Beeckman and Descartes, these metaphors can easily and unconsciously steer one’s mind to a specific direction.
An eye-opener in this sense, is a sentence I came across in a book by Lorraine Daston and Kathryn Park called Wonder and the order of Nature: 1150-1750 (1998). In their introduction, they state: “The history of science looks different when organized around ontology and affects rather than around disciplines and institutions.”18 What I read here is: if you take a clear concept
and use it as a central focus which you are consciously reading and writing towards, you create a different perspective. In doing so, the standard metaphors and events are only to be used if necessary, and do not stick and limit or steer your findings. Daston and Park have done this with the concept of wonder in a very large context, I will do the same with imagination, but restricted to its features that are present in Beeckman and Descartes.
Though the center of this analysis is Beeckman’s and Descartes’ conceptualization and use of imagination, Beeckman’s familiarity with artisanal practices demands a theoretical framework that gives a general understanding how artisanal practices and knowledge production in the seventeenth century are related. In addition, this framework also has to aid in answering the question to what extent an affinity with craftsmanship structures one’s use of imagination. The theory I will use for this framework consists of two notions: instrumentalization and tacit knowledge. The rest of this section seeks to explain these two notions in more detail. In Descartes, the artisanal practices are not present, which enables me distinguish more starkly the differences between Beeckman and Descartes.
17
For general accounts of the early modern period and its metaphors see: Clarke (2011), Daston (1998), Dear (2001), Lipking (2014) and Ronzeaud (2002).
18
In his article ‘The Anatomy of the Brain as Instrumentalization of Reason’, part of the book Instruments in Art and Science (2008), the philosopher Ludger Schwarte demonstrates how early modern visualizations of the brain and its activities are important for the understanding of cognition. The anatomical representation of the brain in the body is used as an instrument to understand cognition: the body model provides a material equivalent of one’s understanding of the brain’s activity. It organizes visually a range of operations, by relating cognitive abilities to cognitive organs.19 Here, the visualization of the brain is instrumentalized, it functions in
determining the qualitative unity of a quantity of material. Schwarte then defines instrumentalization as follows:
“Instrumentalization assumes the ability to recognize possible applications. […] We must understand the manipulative behavior directed towards objects, and the symbolization that makes something (an aspect, a goal) visible in relation to an object as preparation for controlled making. Instrumentalization is the organization of operative possibilities, which can be mobilized for an anticipated goal.”20
It becomes clear that the instrumentalization is foremost a manipulative force, which structures thoughts on a subject or process in terms of productiveness. The product of imagination is the image. Therefore, instrumentalization of imagination shows how these images, or rather imaginings, are constituted and developed; it is the organization of operative possibilities in the imagination. With regard to the episode that opened this thesis, it is clear that Beeckman relies on his experience in artisanal practices and his scholarly knowledge of mechanics. The idea of perpetual motion is not compatible with the imaginings that present in Beeckman and thus he correctly refutes to proper working of the new mill. Throughout this thesis, this instrumentalization will remain an important element. In the first chapter, I will make this notion clearer within early modern discourse of knowledge and in the third and final chapter this notion will be used to analyze Beeckman and Descartes’ use of their imagination.
Though instrumentalization, I believe, will help me in analyzing imagination, there is in this thesis a strong focus on the craftsmanship in Beeckman. Let me therefore introduce how artisanal practices can and do affect knowledge production in the seventeenth century. In her book, Body of the Artisan (2004), historian Pamela Smith dwells upon the rise of synthesis between practice and theory as sources for knowledge. Based on her claim that “knowledge is active and knowing is doing” Smith portrays the change in the relation of theoretical knowledge of scholars and the practical knowledge of artisans, which is an opposition of intellectual and bodily knowing.21 In the early modern period, the hierarchy is initially clear: head over hand.
19 Schwarte, 2008: p. 179. 20 Schwarte, 2008: p. 177. 21 Smith, 2004: p. 149.
However, according to Smith, this is gradually changing. Smith develops an argument for the sake of the artes as autonomously towards the linguistic, scholastic way of knowledge. In a story of the mathematician Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) visiting Nurnberg, the painter Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528), when criticized upon his work, had said that his art did not need the words of critics. This example inspired Ramus to see the artes as something equally valuable for the purpose of knowledge acquisition, and subsequently also the knowledge of craftsmen.22 In the
first chapter, the idea of scholarly knowledge and artisanal practices will be related to Beeckman and Descartes.
Another book that is of major importance for the relation between knowledge production and artisanal practices, is Richard Sennett’s The Craftsman (2008). His central claim is that there is in craftsmanship an element of material awareness. This is created by the metamorphosis that is central to artisanal practices. In turn this awareness enables intuitive leaps, as Sennett calls them: inventions that come intuitively in the production process.23 Sennett
furthermore emphasizes two elements which are key to this consciousness: the internal evolution of a prototype and the judgement about mixture and synthesis.24 Especially in chapter
3, this notion will be of use, for it is here that the instrumentalization of imagination and its relation to craftsmanship is discussed.
In their appreciation for artisanal practices in relation to knowledge acquisition, both Smith and Sennett base themselves on Michael Polanyi’s The Tacit Dimension (1966). The motto of this book is: we know more than we can tell.25 There are in humans, thoughts or actions that
cannot be expressed in words, for the understanding of it would lessen. There is, according to Polanyi, a tacit dimension where we have an intuitive grasp of things, which is more profound than the explicated version of it. When one says the word ‘table’ many times, it loses all connotations to our concept of table; the meaning of the uttered sound fades away. And yet, within us, the concept of table is still present. The knowledge that is not explicated – that is tacit – is an intuitive understanding of nature, that precedes an explicatory structure, whether this structure is visual, linguistic, mathematical, or otherwise.
A nuance to the term tacit knowledge is postulated by scientist Harry Collins in his book Tacit and Explicit Knowledge (2010). He distinguishes between three types of tacit knowledge:
22 Smith, 2004: p. 67. 23 Sennett, 2008: p. 213. 24 Sennett, 2008: p. 129. 25
Polanyi, 1966: p. 4. The chemists and philosopher Michael Polanyi wrote this short book as a reaction to the aim of what he calls the modern sciences – the sciences of the 1960’s - which is detached, objective knowledge. Against this scientific goal, Polanyi formulates the following: “But suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge, then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would, in effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge”. Though the book is dated, its ideas are applicable still specifically when relating ‘science’ and artisanal practices.
somatic, relational and collective tacit knowledge.26 For this thesis, I will focus primarily on the
first form, which is essentially the knowledge embodied in the human body and brain. With regard to this somatic tacit knowledge, Collins claims that this knowledge is not so tacit after all; we are in fact able to explicate it. Because if humans perform acts in knowledge acquisition for example, they are ‘just a complicated set of mechanisms’.27 Knowledge that follows from this act
is not tacit and neither mysterious, rather human experience that is involved in the acquisition is. Here, Collins touches upon a weak spot in the usage of terms as tacit knowledge, namely the hint of mysteriousness that is involved in knowledge that cannot be expressed. However, I still prefer to side with Polanyi when he claims that knowledge arises from the personal (and not from a set of complicate mechanisms) and that excluding human experience of the process of knowledge acquisition would destruct all knowledge.28 For my these, Collins’ structuring and
explication will be of use predominantly by his separation of somatic tacit knowledge, as opposed to the other kinds of tacit knowledge.
In sum, my theoretical framework consists of two notions, namely instrumentalization and somatic tacit knowledge. The former is a manipulative force, which structures the comprehension of things, thoughts or processes in terms of productiveness. Therefore, the instrumentalization of imagination in Beeckman and Descartes is a way of structuring the process of their knowledge acquisition, from their forging of and image or imagining to the explication and communication of this image. In doing so, the notion of somatic tacit knowledge is the theoretical component that will allow me to distinguish the differences in this process in Beeckman and Descartes. Whereas Schwarte, Polanyi and Collins have provided the theoretical notions, Sennett and Smith will be of great use when transferring these notions to the domain of artisanal practices in the early modern period.
Methodology
The elaborative nature of Beeckman’s Journal allows for a thorough examination of its content: the four volumes that De Waard has published comprise such a variety of texts that it enables scholars to tell different stories about the scientific work of Beeckman, depending on their perspective. In addition, the fact that Beeckman was not only a scholar but also a craftsman – he made candles, constructed fountains and grinded lenses – gives him a fundamentally different outlook on what can be pictured in the imagination, than a scholar who is mostly interested in and familiar with theoretical matters would have Taking up this assumption as a central these throughout this thesis, I will make use of Descartes as Beeckman’s theoretical and
26
Collins, 2010: p. 2. In addition: relational tacit knowledge has to do with knowledge that tacitly exists in social life, and collective tacit knowledge is knowledge that is embodied in society.
27
Collins, 2010: p. 105.
28
methodological mirror. Though their work in physico mathematico gives insight in their methodological sameness, Descartes’ theories on the mental capacities of humans will show where he and Beeckman differ.
Before engaging in the process mentioned above, there is one more thing that needs to be addressed here: the inequality between Beeckman and Descartes with regard to media. Beeckman’s Journal is a voluminous gathering of short scribbles and oddly juxtaposed theories. Thoughts on a specific topic are not neatly organized into an elegant textual argument, as is the case with Descartes. Rather they are scattered throughout the Journal, which troubles the quest for a coherent explanation of imagination. My methodology will therefore consist of a thorough reading of the Journal, after which I will make a selection of sections that are important to either the function of imagination within Beeckman’s worldview, or when a section reveals an instrumentalization of Beeckman’s imagination. This selection is found in the appendix of this thesis. As I have mentioned, for Descartes this is rather different: to determine his concept and use of imagination I will use secondary literature. I will do this without keeping a specific chronology or order. Within this thesis, I organize the comparative analysis around the concept of imagination, not around the development of either Beeckman or Descartes.
1. Developments in knowledge-acquisition of the early modern
period: the function of imagination and the education of Isaac
Beeckman and René Descartes
This chapter deals with the general features of imagination in early modern period and the education of both Isaac Beeckman and René Descartes. As such it is divided into two parts. The first part will describe the position of imagination within developments that center around artisanal and scholarly ways of knowledge production. Positioning imagination as such, a uniform definition of imagination cannot be given: its uses and conceptualizations are numerous in the early modern period. Still, the general tendencies will be explained. Thus, the first part creates a general context of imagination, in which the imagination in education and youth of Beeckman and Descartes can be embedded. This will consume the second part, which is separated into paragraphs on Beeckman’s education and on Descartes education. In turn, they provide the necessary context for understanding the ideas of both philosophers and the presence and instrumentalization of imagination in them. Though this chapter is predominantly aimed at giving a general context, its focus is clearly on the relation between artisanal practices and the function of imagination.
1.1 Imagination and its instrumentalization in the seventeenth century
Before describing the conceptualization of imagination in the seventeenth century, let me introduce a well-known image of the early modern discourse of knowledge. The frontispiece of Francis Bacon’s publication Novum Organum (1620) portrays the Atlantic Ocean, seen through the mythical pillars of Hercules. Two ships are returning from open sea, entering Europe through the street of Gibraltar. In the time of seafaring towards new lands across ill mapped oceans, the ships returned safely by their use of instruments such as the compass. With regard to science, the metaphor is clear: the limitless sea of the known and unknown things and phenomena can only successfully be sailed if we use instruments to guide us in quests for knowledge. Only then, we can return safely to the realm of the known, bringing back previously unseen, unknown or even unimagined things.
There are in this metaphor two levels of analysis possible with regard to the making of knowledge. The first is to interpret the instrument as a physical entity. A reinforcement of interpreting the use of instruments in this way is given by Bacon himself, when he claims that real knowledge was not to be found in the hands of the philosopher, but in those of craftsman.29
Bacon thus fits right into Pamela Smith’s image of the early modern discourse of knowledge
29
making, which is characterized by an increasing mixture of artisanal and scholarly practices.30 As
a consequence of this mixture, artisanal instruments become increasingly used by scholars in the process of unraveling nature. The repositioning of the scalpel from the butcher’s hands into the hand of the doctor for a dissection, is but one example of this phenomenon.31 In general,
from the sixteenth century onwards, the tools of the artisan, initially used to create objects, become instrumentalized for the creation of knowledge.
One such an example is the development in seventeenth century visual theory. In 1604, Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) created a new anatomical perspective of the eye. By making observations of a moon eclipse through a camera obscura and by eye, Kepler discovered that the process taking place in the eye is similar to the mechanical workings of the camera obscura.32
Much like this observational instrument, which was devised as a tool for painters, the lens of the eye functions as a projector that imprints the retina with images, or picturae, as Kepler called them.33 By equating the eye with the camera obscura, Kepler not only altered its anatomical
workings and rejected the medieval chain of visual theory, he also allowed for the process of visual abstraction to be understood in purely geometrical and quantitative principles.
Kepler’s discovery exemplifies how artisanal instruments could be used not only for making, but also for knowing. However, Kepler’s example also problematizes human perception and in its footsteps, human cognition. If the human eye is similar in construction as the camera obscura, it is just as liable to error as instruments are. Indeed, the early seventeenth century is marked as a period where it becomes clear that ‘what the eye sees, is as much deception as it is truth.’34 As a consequence, human perception needed to be structured, in order to distinguish
between reality and distortion. The set of rules for the inquiry of knowledge that Bacon proposed in The Advancement of Learning (1605) – and here is the second level of the interpretation of his metaphor – is an instrumentalization of human experience.35 In other words: the instrument can be a scientific method.
Bacon’s metaphor thus provides a clear understanding of instrumentalization in the early modern period: by instrumentalizing artisanal tools knowledge was gained. In turn, this knowledge sometimes contrasted human experience in such a way, that questions upon the nature of perception were raised. Within this development, questions arise around the human imagination as well. As the mental faculty that makes images of the world, its functioning is
30
Smith, 2004: p. 149.
31
Sennett, 2008: p. 198. In the middle of the sixteenth century Vesalius, a doctor in Brussels, started operate himself. Prior, it was always the butcher that provided the cutting.
32
Smith, 1990: p. 740.
33
Alpers, 1989: p. 57.
34
Vogl, 2008: p. 18. In his essay, Vogl denotes that Galileo, in discovering that the moon was not of quintessence material but showed similar ruptures and shadows as the earth did, the revolution of the instrument is twofold: first, by seeing further new images came to scientists, whereas it also became clear that the human vision is not, essentially, giving the truth.
35
extensively discussed.36 Whereas some heralded imagination as a creative force, others opposed
it to reason because of its distorting effect on perception.37 Thus, when speaking of imagination
in the seventeenth century, one has to accept the fact that a unified definition cannot be given. Still, when accepting the multifaceted character of imagination, some general remarks can be made.
First, imagination can mean perception, it is a mental representation of input from sense data.38 In other words: there is a natural world which we perceive by our senses, whose
information is processed by our imagination. Although Plato was the first to devise a theory of imagination that is still known, Aristotle provides us with an idea that is hard to argue against: there is no thought without a phantasm.39 The question of how we become in possession of this phantasm and whether it is material or immaterial is, still in the seventeenth century, an ongoing debate. The early atomist thinker Democritus formulated the most concrete and materialistic answer, by claiming that “images” or “idols” flew off from physical objects and thus caused impressions in the human mind.40
Second, the word imagination can also be also linked with intellect when it represents an idea or the reformulation of an image or idea stored in memory.41 Plato regards the
imagination as an intermediary between the world of material objects and the world of ideas, which is infused with divinity.42 This explanation of imagination and its closeness to both
memory and intellect is further exemplified by the ars memoriae; the art of memorizing, for example, a speech by linking the structure of the speech to spacious elements such as the rooms of a known building. In this context, imagination is used by Beeckman as the recollection of ideas and sentences.43 Imagination and intellect also coincide when it comes to seventeenth century
scientia: Pascal, for instance, humbled by the large cosmos, stated that testing the world also requires testing the limits of what he can imagine.44
This idea of Pascal stretching to the outer limits of his imagination also relates to the third conception of imagination, which has to do with creation: the combination, metamorphosis, distortion or invention of images.45 For Kepler, for example, imagination and
calculation joined in mighty acts of creation.46 Related to this conception, imagination is also
36
See: note 12.
37
Kepler and Pascal. Lipking, 2014: p. 8 and p. 16.
38 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 39 Sepper, 1996: p. 8. 40 Bundy, 1928: p. 14. 41 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 42 Bundy, 1928: p. 271. 43 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 35. 44 Lipking, 2014: p. 15. 45 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 46 Lipking, 2014: p. 16.
viewed as intertwined with ideas that are not real per se.47 Illusory, unreal, monstrous
imaginations and fantasies are all devoid of reality-based experience. Phantasm was supplied by Plato with a decent amount of negativity: imagination could be peculiarly subjective and therefore illusory.48 The main reason for a wariness towards imagination is exemplified in the
so-called placebo-effect: to some extent the mind is helpless to resist whatever ideas are planted in it.49 Because of this feature of imagination, the medieval usage of imagination was, on the
whole, unfavorable to any recognition of the creative capacity of imagination. Fantasy implied freedom, but at the same time liability to error.50
Though the first two notions of imagination – as mediator and as assisting reason- are more closely related to the discourse of knowledge, the latter is linked to the magical beliefs that were still present in the early seventeenth century. A fierce example of this is the maternal imagination. The maternal imagination is to be understood as the power attributed to the mind of a pregnant woman; it was believed that by thinking specific thoughts or seeing specific things, deformities in the baby’s mental or physical health could be caused.51 A critical stance towards
this example as insightful for the conceptualization of imagination in the seventeenth century is easily taken. It concerns a layman’s beliefs instead of ‘scientific’ knowledge, the primary sources are largely subjective and the maternal imagination concerns thoughts of women instead of man; the seventeenth century stamp of hysteria could easily be given.
Still, the maternal imagination was more than just a superstition believed in out of fear of mysterious events such as pregnancy and delivery. Indeed, it formed part of a general pattern of cultural concepts; the body as open to all kinds of impressions.52 For Beeckman, the maternal
imagination was very real: his cousin was also born with deformities and he mentions this as an example of physical changes influenced by thought.53 Imagination here is regarded as
incontrollable, as the portal of the mother’s body that mysteriously transported images to the baby, who’s growth in turn would be influenced by this. What is key here, is the uncontrollability and yet powerfulness of the imagination. Seventeenth century solutions for fearful pregnant women were not sought in imagination itself, but rather by restructuring and augmenting the
47 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 48 Bundy, 1928: p. 257. 49 Lipking, 2014: p. 7. 50 Bundy, 1928: p. 266. 51 See Roodenburg (1988). 52 Roodenburg, 1988: p. 711. 53
De Waard (II), 1942: p. 121: “Men is verwondert, dat een vroue die swaer gaet, deur haer gedachten soo een groote
veranderinge in het kint brengen kan, als by exempel, dat het wel somtyts gebeurt, dat het kint daerdeur syn handeken verliest, of lyncken daerin krijgt, gelyck ick selve geseien hebbe in myn nichten kind.” Unclear is what the words of lyncken daerin krijgt mean and if this is what happened to Beeckman’s cousin. Clear is, however, that the deformity, for Beeckman,
physical surrounding that entered a woman’s sight.54 Thus, whereas imagination could be hailed
by scholars for its creative capacities, many variations of its conception existed simultaneously. In sum, Bacon’s metaphor thus reveals the period of Beeckman and Descartes to be one where the fundaments of epistemological thought where shaken to its core. Not only did artisanal practices provide new ways of knowledge, they also revealed truths about human experience which kindled questions on the perception of reality. To extend Bacon’s metaphor of the limitless sea: its waters now also entered the cognitive capabilities of humans. Therefore, it is by no means wondrous that the faculty of imagination, central in translating images of the external world into internal representations, held a pivotal position in early modern knowledge acquisition.55 In addition, the fact that artisanal practices increasingly informs scholarly
knowledge, means a revaluation of both imaginations creating- and deforming capacities
This general introduction to imagination in the seventeenth century started with Bacon and it ends with him as well, when he claims that ‘both instruments and the imagination were essential for creativity in natural science, but both could distort as well as create.’56 It is
worthwhile to let this constant intellectual calibration of imagination be a reminder of the more general developments in the early seventeenth century. Also, turning towards Beeckman and Descartes, it has to be kept in mind that besides the encounters with imagination in a scholarly context, also the wondrous and mysterious powers such as the maternal imagination also play a role in seventeenth century society.
1.2 Artisanal practice and scholarly theory in the youth and education of
Beeckman
As stated in the introduction Isaac Beeckman is not known through his publications, but rather by his voluminous diary that was rediscovered in 1905. There is however one exception. A short excerpt of the Journal was posthumously published by Beeckman’s brother Abraham, who also added a short characterization of his brother: ‘he was always busy speculating.’57 Any scholar
that reads through the Journal will immediately recognize the adequateness of this characterization. Beeckman’s diary consists of numerous scribbles, observations and theories – in sum: speculations- shifting from Latin to Dutch back and forth. In his dissertation, Klaas van Berkel has added that the speculations of Beeckman can be viewed as guided by two principles. First, a combination of mathematics and physics is the best way to analyze nature, and second,
54 Roodenburg, 1988: p. 712. 55 Brann, 1991: p. 3 56 Hankins, 1995 p. 6. 57
The small publication is known under the name D. Isaaci Beeckmanni Medici et Rectoris apud Dordracenos
only explanations which can be represented in the imagination clearly and visually, should be allowed in natural philosophy.58
In rounding out the definition of Beeckman given by others, John Schuster has come up with the most elaborate and, for this thesis, most fruitful version of Beeckman. In his publication, Descartes and the Scientific Revolution (1977) he characterizes Beeckman as follows:
“No mechanic would appeal to teleological processes, occult virtues or immaterial causes to account for the functioning of a simple mechanical device. Explanations in the mechanical arts rested on the appeal to a clear picture of the structure and interaction of the constitutive parts of the apparatus. As simple mechanical and hydro-dynamical devices showed, only motion or pressure can produce the re-arrangement of parts and hence produce work, and, for theoretical purposes, the causes of motions and pressures are other motions and pressures. What Beeckman demanded in natural philosophy was the application of criteria of meaningful communication between mechanical artisans – the appeal to a picturable or imaginable structure of parts whose motions are controlled within a theory of mechanics. His central contention was that there is no point in talking about effects if you cannot imagine how they are produced, and the exemplar of imaginatively controlled efficacy is the mechanical arts where men do command nature at the macroscopic level.”59
Schuster’s emphasis on the mechanical, the practical and the picturable as the explanatory forces behind Beeckman’s production of knowledge are confirmed by Beeckman’s worldview, which can be explained in similar terms.
In short, at the base of Beeckman´s universe there is God. As Beeckman conceives the natural world to function as a mechanical structure, God is its primal mover. According to Beeckman, he is not necessarily the creator of men, animal and natural phenomenon, but rather he has shaped the fundamentals or primordia that constitute all creatures, animate or inanimate.60 Beeckman’s atomist perspective is revealed. Taken from Democritus and
predominantly Lucretius, Beeckman believes the world to consist of tiny particles, that are mechanistically linked.61 Similarly taken from Lucretius, Beeckman believes these primordia to
be a limited in number. However, by the recombination of various fundamentals an infinite number of possibilities arise, and as such, Beeckman is able to account for the many forms that are present in the world. Before explaining the function and position of imagination in this world in chapter 2, the youth and education of Beeckman provides us with fundamental insights in the development of this worldview.
58 Van Berkel, 1983: p. 77. 59 Schuster, 1977: pp. 59-60 60 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 90. 61 Van Berkel: p. 132.
Growing up as the child of a craftsman, Beeckman learnt accustomed himself with artisanal practices quite early in his life. Beeckman’s father was a candle maker in Middelburg in the province of Zeeland. Besides this craft, he also constructed and repaired water pipes of either private houses or breweries.62 Here, the basis for Isaac Beeckman’s involvement in artes
mechanicae can be seen. Indeed, Beeckman opened up his own candle shop in Zierikzee in 1611 and assisted his father with the negotia mechanica., the mechanical operations focused on water pipes.63 In addition, Isaac Beeckman not only constructed water pipes for breweries or houses,
he also started to work water circuits for fountains. These systems needed some form of pumping, which inspired Beeckman to devise in the Journal– his diary, which he had started by then – various theoretical explanations of how the pumps of solidly functioning fountains work.64 Not only was Beeckman involved in artisanal practices from an early age onwards, he
also learnt to align theory and practice coherently.
The importance of this artisanal upbringing and familiarization and reworking of material is important in two ways. As we shall see, Beeckman has the habit of using analogies when precise explications of certain problems are absent. Artisanal knowledge appears for Beeckman to be a rich source for drawing out these analogies. For example, in explaining a problem of Galen concerning the simultaneous supply of nutrients and discharge of waste in the human body, Beeckman points out that a lighter liquid can rise up while heavier ones will fall to the bottom of an ordinary water pipe.65 The thorough understanding of practical workings of
fountains, thus provides Beeckman with images to explain more abstract phenomena such as the bloodstreams in the human body.
Another importance of Beeckman’s artisanal upbringing lies in the tacit knowledge that is embedded in craftsmanship. The familiarity that comes from repeated interaction with matter, seems to have given young Beeckman a decent amount of confidence in foretelling the way this matter would behave upon manual manipulations. Beeckman did not allow anything in philosophy unless it could be clearly presented visually to the imagination; it was one of his main principle. This can be complemented by the fact that in the more practical sciences, such as physics, Beeckman did not allow anything that was in contradiction with his intuitive understanding of nature. Hence, Van Berkel characterizes the artisanal influences to be most clearly present when resentment is shown by Beeckman, resentment aimed at the abstract, ungraspable and impenetrable explanations for natural phenomena.66 The exact relation
between the tacit knowledge or intuitive understanding derived from craftsmanship and the function of imagination in Beeckman’s thinking will be further spun in chapter 3. Sufficient for 62 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 10. 63 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 16. 64 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 17. 65 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 137. 66 Ibidem.
now is the fact that Beeckman, during his studies, was drawn towards scholars such as Simon Stevin and Petrus Ramus indicates a practically oriented preference, rooted in his artisanal upbringing.
Klaas van Berkel has pointed out that Beeckman, immersed in the world of craftsmen, also understood the limitations of artisanal knowledge in the sense that he believed that crafts could only be raised to a higher level by theoretical education.67 Besides the artisanal, the other
pillar of Beeckman’s education are his formal studies at the University of Leiden. Though Beeckman had shown strong interest in mathematics prior, he enrolled the university as a student in theology, which was besides law and medicine the third of the three main faculties. As preparation for the higher faculties, Beeckman spent his first two years partaking in courses on the seven free arts (grammar, dialectics, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy), philosophy or mathematics.68 This structure was a very common one; Leiden university did not
stand out in this respect. In terms of content however, the university sought to offer various interpretations: classical thought and contemporary ideas were juxtaposed. Aristotle and Ramus were compared, and so were Galen and Fernel. In theology, protestant Calvinistic teaching dominated, and yet the ideas of Francisco Suarez, one of the leading catholic Jesuit scholars, were taught as well.69 In this respect the university was a standout: it allowed different schools
of thought, often polemically opposed content wise, to -most of the time- peacefully co-exist between the walls of the university.70
Besides following the official curriculum at Leiden University, Beeckman also familiarized himself with mathematics. Having showed prior interest in this rather new discipline, Beeckman did not wait long after his arrival in Leiden to visit rector and professor Rudolph Snellius (1546-1613) to become acquainted with the literature on mathematics.71 The
list of books that Beeckman received from Rudolph Snellius was comprised of works by Euclid, Ptolemy and some early modern commentaries by Flemish mathematician, physicist and military engineer Simon Stevin (1548-1620) and Copernicus, amongst others.72 The list also
included works by the French educational reformer and mathematician Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) who was a protestant educational reformer, who advocated art and craftsmanship as models for knowledge production. Of these authors, Stevin and Ramus appear to have inspired Beeckman the most. A closer examination of these two scholars is needed.
Upon visiting workshops in Nuremberg, Ramus found an ideal mixture between practice 67 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 139. 68 Van Berkel, 2014: p. 14. 69 Otterspeer, 2008: p. 59. 70
For Jesuit colleges, contentious texts were often kept from students to avoid quarrels. Large parts of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics were not taught, for example.
71
Van Berkel, 2014: p. 15.
72
and theory; practical mathematical and artistic activity as instruments for representing the natural world.73 From this idea, Ramus developed the thought that the transferal of knowledge
should gain a more prominent place, at the cost of the actual knowledge itself; form over content. Ramus pleaded that the abstract needed to be made visual – his principle of picturability – and that theory could only be explained by the possibilities of applying the theory: practicality.74 The ideas of Ramus must have interested any student with a background in crafts,
and for the young Beeckman this was no different.75 The application of the Ramist perspective
by Beeckman can foremost be detected in his mechanistic approach in physics: the calculation and theorizing of movement –of air, water and bodies- is directly related to Beeckman’s construction of water-circuits (fountains) and air-flows (fireplaces). In the Journal, most of the time, these theories based on practical knowledge, are accompanied by drawings of the posed problem; practicality and picturability.76
Another important source for Beeckman’s scientific thinking is to be found in a slightly older contemporary of Beeckman: the engineer Simon Stevin. Though the topics of his publications vary widely, the primary feature of his works is dominant throughout his oeuvre: the close connection between theory and practice. According to Stevin, theory existed solely because it mirrored the natural world; he conceived the act of purely theorizing without a practical application as a meaningless endeavor.77 After Stevin’s’ death in 1620, Isaac Beeckman
was allowed to take along Stevin’s works so he could examine them intensely. If we compare the mottos of both natural scientists, a striking comparison can be seen. Where Stevin used the phrase Wonder en is gheen wonder (wonder is no wonder), Beeckman slightly altered Stevin’s motto: Van wonder tot gheen wonder (from wonder to no wonder). Even though the catchphrases are almost similar, the subtle difference is a deliberate decision which is informative with regard to Beeckman’s instrumentalization of with imagination. In chapter 3 this alteration will be discussed more extensively.
What remains of Beeckman’s early life and education with regard to imagination, however, is predominantly his artisanal infused upbringing, the broad curriculum at the University of Leiden and Beeckman self-study, in whom he focused on the more practically informed scholars. The dissertation that Beeckman wrote and successfully defended in 1618,
73
Smith, 2004: p. 66. Dürer had his workshops in Nuremberg; linked to Ramus.
74
Van Berkel, 1983: p. 261. Van Berkel cites a dated, but extensive study on Ramus by J. Verdonk: Petrus Ramus en de
Wiskunde (Petrus Ramus and mathematics).
75
Van Berkel, 2014: pp. 156-162. These pages give a clear overview of Ramist perspectives in Beeckman’s thinking. Also, the 1637 auction catalog of Beeckman’s books include various titles by, and commentaries on Ramus.
76
De Waard (I), 1939: p. 70 Here, Beeckman has drawn a large pump and devised an explanation of is functioning.
77
Van Berkel, 1985: p. 19. A side note on this image: Stevin was not completely opposed against pure theoretical knowledge. He believed that theory without practical application could be fruitful: some theoretical ideas could actually be useful if they were picked up by a craftsman or technician. Pure theory, as it were, could open up possibilities the theoretician would or could not have foreseen; then, through a collaborative effort with practice, pure theory could be useful, according to Stevin.
can be seen as the close of this period. The dissertation was of medical nature, since medicine was, at that time, the only way to gain a doctoral degree. However, Beeckman was not at all aiming for the position of doctor. His interest in the human body was infused by the will to understand its mechanical workings rather than to cure people. His dissertation consisted of twenty theses on Tertian fever, but was furthermore comprised of propositions on vacuums, light, motion and, some of which were considered rather bold at that time.78 How imagination
came to function in Beeckman’s ideas is largely based on the intersection of artisanal knowledge and scholarship that resided in Beeckman: the intuitive understanding of nature was complemented by the knowledge gained from books. The tacit images of nature present in Beeckman from an early age onwards, have continued to guide him throughout his scientific career.
1.3 Rhetorical Practices in education of René Descartes
When Isaac Beeckman met René Descartes in the fall of 1618, he recognized in the young Frenchman a mathematical genius lacking the scientific maturity that Beeckman, being eight years older, had already established. Reversely, Descartes found in Beeckman a mentor who provided him ears and eyes that could witness Descartes ingenuity with regard to the mathematical, musical and physical problems they encountered together. This image of their relationship arises very clearly from the letters between the two natural philosophers that followed their cooperation in 1619.79 In them, Descartes repeatedly professes his feelings of
connection towards Beeckman, both scientific and personal. In turn, through his letters to Descartes, Beeckman portrays a less warm version of their relationship, neatly fulfilling the role of a mentor that praises the cleverness of his student, while distancing himself from personal affection. Although this difference in attitude was plausibly the cause of a soon-to-be, long-lasting quarrel, their joined imaginative force in 1618 was exceptionally for the early seventeenth century discourse of knowledge.80 The mathematical ingenuity of Descartes
complemented the physical imagination of Isaac Beeckman and his phyisico-mathematico understanding of nature. Beeckman showed Descartes how to tame his wild, uncontrolled ideas; he showed Descartes how to make to instrumentalize his imagination. Descartes in turn, would show the possibilities that lie in endless imagination.
78
Van Berkel, 2014: p. 21. Van Berkel refers to a rough notion of inertia, which Beeckman held more likely to be true than the widely-accepted impetus theory of Aristotle.
79
Cole, 1992: p. 118.
80
Descartes’ education is located at one place: the Jesuit College at La Fleche, France, which he attended from the age of ten.81 The Jesuit college was an institute that was built upon the
principles of the Society of Jesus, founded in 1534 and originating in Spain. This catholic order advocated the educational aspects of Christs’ life. Hence, one of their key activities consisted of the founding of schools or colleges, in which students where taught in theology and classical languages. The Jesuits furthermore believed in conversion of the individuals’ heart as the center of the reforms that were needed within the Catholic Church.82 Through personal and spiritual
meditations under guidance by spiritual directors, the individual was guided to the undiluted messages of God. Having spent more than eight years, between the ages of ten and eighteen, the college will have marked René Descartes’ conception and use of imagination in a significant way. The curriculum of La Fleche at the time Descartes was a student there, was comprised of five or six years of predominantly Latin and Greek grammar, learnt through classical poets and Cicero. The three years of philosophy included logic, morals, physics, metaphysics and followed Aristotle and the scholastic commentaries on Aristotle. The last three years also included mathematics.83 However, not only the commonplaces of medieval scholasticism were to be
found amongst Jesuit education. The Jesuits have been called ‘supreme cultural gatherers’ of their day: in their ambition to spread evangelization, they built up a large collection of both artifacts and information, rounding out the existing order of knowledge. The idea that Descartes encountered amidst this broad educational network has come across several notions of imagination at La Fleche can be regarded as a near certainty.84
Since the Jesuit college was founded on military fundaments, order was a main pillar of the education. Hence, in the philosophical curriculum a restriction in the range of authors taught was kept, for in this realm some texts were contentious of nature. This is the reason why a large part Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the discussion of the nature and divinity, was not taught at all.85
Another text of Aristotle however was: de Anima. Though brought to Jesuit scholars by wat has been called the Coimbra Commentaries, the discussions in it are insightful with regard to the conceptualization of imagination.86 The result of these discussion is plain: for all practical and
theoretical purposes, there can be no thinking and knowing without the internal senses and their phantasms, except when the human being passes beyond the natural into the supernatural realm.87
81
Descartes also studied one year of law and possibly medicine in 1615/1616, but Gaukroger calls this ‘a little more than a formality’, and does not ascribe any importance to it. Therefore: the Jesuit college can be regarded as his only education.
82 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 39. 83 See: Hatfield (2016). 84 Sepper, 1996: p. 27. 85 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 52. 86 Sepper, 1996: p. 27. 87 Sepper, 1996: p. 28.
It has been pointed out that a curiously theatrical element is to be found in Jesuit education.88 Burials for example, were conducted with a great feel for ceremony and grandeur.
Also in the menstruae disputationes the ceremony of exchanging arguments among teachers and students was informed with military guidelines, referencing constantly to the sport of jousting.89
Also the rhetorical tradition at La Fleche was infused with a sense of theatricality, in balancing between short sentences in simple vocabulary combined with emotionally charged forms of communication, resembling Cicero.90 Another trait of rhetoric at La Fleche was to be found in the
use emblems and symbols. Though clearly rooted in the military tradition, it has been claimed that Descartes took from these preoccupations with physical imagery, the theory of clear and distinct ideas.91
If Beeckman education is characterized in terms of artisanal practices, it’s counterpart is a rhetorical theatricality that can be view in Descartes education. One has to have at least a little amount of theatrical imagination to aim at reforming the base of all knowledge.92 However, there
is an important element in Descartes thinking to discern here. At some point in a discussion with Balzac, Descartes argues for the sake of eloquence in writing or speaking, which gives the words of the speaker or writer a sense of truth.93 Descartes was from an early age onwards very fond of
poetry, and thus it is not strange that he saw in the virtuous expressions a form of truthfulness:
“It can seem amazing, why pregnant meanings [are] in the writings of poets more than of philosophers. The reason is that poets write through enthusiasm and the force of imagination: there are particles [or seeds] of science in us, as in flint stone, that are educed by philosophers through reason, [but] that through imagination are shaken loose by poets and shine out more.”94
This phrase reveals the importance of communicating an idea over the content of this idea. This has implications for how Descartes makes use of his imagination. In the third chapter, the effect of rhetorical practices in Descartes’ education on his instrumentalization of imagination will further be discussed, after we have seen how he locates imagination in the perceptual cognition of humans in the second chapter. Indeed, to see how Descartes’ emphasis on the theatrical rhetoric coincides with the practically informed ideas of Beeckman, we now turn to the conceptualization of imagination of both scholars.
88 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 43. 89 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 44. 90 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 50. 91 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 51. 92
See: Jones et al (1979). Here, the three consecutive dreams that Descartes allegedly had in 1618 and which he himself explained, are under examination. This is one moment in Descartes life where he seeks – indeed, is instructed! – to reform the existing orders of nature.
93
Gaukroger, 1995: p. 182.
94
2. Perceptual Cognition and Imagination
Having established the general features of imagination and the characterization of Beeckman and Descartes’ education and principles, this chapter seeks to clarify how both philosophers describe and apprehend imagination. It’s location in the process of perceptual cognition is of essential importance here. With the early modern realization ‘that human perception is as much deception as it is truth’ in mind, a clear understanding of imagination seems to be a necessity to anyone that is involved in knowledge production. The artisanal practices that are present in Beeckman and the more rhetorically informed education of Descartes, have create a fundamental difference in their apprehension of imagination. Because of their close collaboration in 1618, this is not distinguishable right away. It takes an elaborative analysis of how imagination is located in perceptual cognition, which relates the principles of the natural world to the inner workings of the human mind, to distill Beeckman’s and Descartes’ differences their conceptualizations of the imagination.
2.1 Beeckman’s mechanistic account of perceptual cognition
Isaac Beeckman’s most important contribution to the history of science is his definition of motion. With a relatively simple question he defied the teleological explanation of motion, a persistent idea postulated by Aristotle. This explanation holds that every object and phenomenon has a natural resting place in the hierarchy of nature, in the order of the world. Motion occurs because of the intrinsic need of an object to be at its natural place; everything that is not in place will move.95 Though the plausibility of this these had been criticized often, around
1600 a satisfactory alternative had not been found. Beeckman however imagined a different universe, one where motion is not a change, but a continuity instead. He did not seek to explain the occurrence of motion but rather asked: ‘why does an object, if brought into motion, ever stop?’96 With this question, Beeckman altered the essence of motion to a state of being, instead of
change.
Beeckman formulated this question already in 1614 and it essentially remains the basic principle of his physics.97 More generally speaking, the idea of motion as a continuity also
buttresses the mechanistic perspective that Beeckman advanced: change in motion only occurs because of external sources and not because of intrinsic motivation, as Aristotle had pleaded. According to Beeckman, the structure of nature is materially linked by mechanical contact, as
95 Kenny, 2007: p. 518. 96 De Waard (I), 1939: pp. 24-25. 97 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 106
