Master’s Thesis
Power Politics in the Information Age
Contemporary Influence Operations & the Cold War Strategy of Political Warfare
A Case Study of Russian Interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election
Author: M.J.R Ivancic, Bsc Msc Crisis and Security Management Leiden University, FGGA The Hague, The Netherlands Supervisor: Mr.drs. W.J.M. Aerdts Second Reader: Dr. S.D. Willmetts
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2
2. Theoretical Framework 5
2.1 Defining Political Warfare 5
2.2 Political Warfare During the Cold War 7
2.3 Theory on Covert Political Operations and Assessing Active Measures 10
3. The Theory of Political Warfare 12
3.1 Penetration and Infiltration 12
3.2 Disintegration and Atomization 13
3.3 Subversion and Defection 15
4. Research Design and Methodology 17
4.1 Operationalisation 18
4.2 Case Selection & Data 20
4.3 Limitations 20
5. Case Study: the Russian Interference with the 2016 US Presidential Election 22
5.1 Penetration and Infiltration 22
5.1.1 Legal Residency 22
5.1.2 Illegal Residency 27
5.2 Disintegration and Atomization 28
5.2.1 White Propaganda 28
5.2.2 Grey Propaganda 29
5.2.3 Black Propaganda 30
5.2.4 Supporting Measures 32
5.3 Subversion and Defection 33
5.3.1 General Public 34
5.3.2 Counter-Elite (Agents of Influence) 35
5.3.3 Covert Control 35
6. Discussion 36
7. Conclusion 37
1. Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), it was believed that liberal democracy brought an end to great power politics and the realist perspective on international relations would end up on the scrapheap of history (Mearsheimer, 2018). Thus, disputes would be peacefully dealt with through the rules of a US led liberal world order. However, realists argued that this vision was misguided and we are now suffering the consequences (Mearsheimer, 2018). The standard bearer of democracy, the United States (US), is no longer universally viewed as the same benevolent force as during the 1990s and we have witnessed a resurgence of strategic competition, nationalism, and authoritarianism (Mearsheimer, 2018; McInnis & Weiss, 2019). Almost 75 years after the end of World War 2, Washington is struggling with “sharp power” and how to deal with rising challengers to its hegemony. So much so, that even some liberalists now agree we have not yet arrived at the “the end of history” (Nye, 2018; Fukuyama, 2018).
Thus, as we are moving towards a multipolar world, realist power politics are making a comeback. The Russian government targeted Western democracies with disinformation campaigns to undermine their democratic processes and societal coherence, and has managed to successfully interfere with the 2016 US Presidential election (De Jong, Sweijs, Kertysova & Bos, 2017; Mueller, 2019). Moreover, the Chinese government is also ramping up its “sharp” power efforts as they are trying to shape the global narrative by boosting international development programs, disseminating propaganda, and influencing foreign politicians, (Brady, 2017; Kurlantzick, 2018). While the 21st century has yet to witness a conventional great power war, “political warfare” is on the rise and seems to be the preferred method of engagement.
Following the hype surrounding the “Gerasimov Doctrine”, which emphasized the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals, this has largely been framed as a “new” generation of warfare, categorized under “hybrid” or “non-linear” warfare (Galeotti, 2018). Yet, it has also simply been referred to as subversion, influence operations, and psychological-, asymmetrical- or-information warfare (Rid, 2012; Bentzen; 2018; Galeotti, 2018; Robinson et al, 2018). Unfortunately, while it is known under many names, and both strategists and researchers have produced excellent work on individual elements of this “new” type of warfare, in the grand scheme of things, these still seem to constitute more of a loose collection of facts than an explanatory theory of the phenomenon at hand. In addition, one can easily question if such a strategy is truly “new” as some have noted that these activities have been around as long as politics itself (Blackstock, 1964). Especially during the Cold War, both the US and Soviet Union were actively engaged in “political warfare” or what the Soviets called “active measures” (Kennan; 1948; Blackstock, 1964; Codevilla, 1989; Heuer, 1990; Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999; Mitrokhin 2002). Furthermore, in those days, these kinds of activities seem to have been a constant rather than an exception in international relations, and have therefore already been studied by a number of scholars in the past.
What is unmistakably new is that cyberspace has revolutionized our ways of communication and social media now offers “new electronic means of dissemination, enabling (potentially disruptive) messages to spread instantaneously” (Bentzen; 2018, p. 1). Initially, some downplayed the potential effects of this shift and assumed that online subversive activities would largely be limited to niche groups and specific issues (Rid, 2012). Yet, the developments in the communications infrastructure have made it possible for fringe ideas to pass more easily into the mainstream and it has become evident that authoritarian state actors like Russia can systematically exploited this technological revolution as well (Barkun, 2017; De Jong, Sweijs, Kertysova & Bos, 2018; Mueller, 2019).
Therefore, since this type of “political warfare” has already been studied during the Cold War, but the information environment has drastically changed, this paper set out to discover if a theory on political warfare could be derived from Cold War literature and if this could still apply today. It does this by testing the theory in a case study of Russian interference during the 2016 US Presidential election and by answering the following research question; to what extent, if at all, does Cold War theory on political warfare apply to political warfare in the early 21st Century?
The societal relevance of answering the central research question resides in the threat that these types of activities pose to democracies around the world. “Democracy in the era of Trump and Putin is in retreat and has been targeted for extinction”, only “with the right amount of public awareness, determination, and dedication to the principles we hold dear and love, it can be stopped” (Nance, 2018, p. 3). It is not just the United States, “under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government has reinvigorated its efforts to influence European politics and policy” as well (Polyakova, Laruelle, Meister, Barnett, 2016, p. 11). Moreover, a 2019 report on computational propaganda shows “evidence of organized social media manipulation campaigns which have taken place in 70 countries, up from 48 countries in 2018 and 28 countries in 2017” (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019, p.1). Thus, if the very foundations of democracy are under threat, every democratic citizens’ freedom and security are inherently at stake. Regardless of political affiliation, it seems the responsibility of citizens and policymakers alike to take this threat seriously, and come to the defense of democratic principles and the rule of law. The author of this paper simply aims to pay a small contribution to this defense by answering the central research question, and thereby increase public awareness and insight into the phenomenon. As Sun Tzu (p.37) said, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.''.
In regard to the academic relevance, a number of things have already been mentioned. There have been various studies on the different elements of “political warfare”, but rarely do they deal with it in the grand scheme of international politics. Furthermore, there are few comprehensive analysis that deal with it in the context of the whole range of foreign policy instruments and there are even less attempts to formulate a theory on the causal processes behind it. Therefore, the author aims to contribute to the literature by first investigating if a theory of political warfare can be deduced from previous works on the matter and test if it
can be applied to explain the phenomenon today. Yet, "as with any theory, it does not pretend to be a complete and accurate representation of the real world. In this case the object of theory is to bind together facts and phenomena which would otherwise be loose or detached" (Blackstock, 1964, pp. 41). Additionally, by testing to what extent the underlying mechanisms of political warfare during the Cold War are similar to those of today, it also contributes to the understanding of continuities and discontinuities in strategy, international politics, the work of intelligence agencies, and history in general.
Before expanding on the theory of political warfare and diving into the actual analysis, the research paper will first define political warfare and briefly summarize its application during the Cold War. After this, to actually answer the central research question, the investigation takes the form of a within-case, single case study analysis of the Russian government’s interference in the 2016 US presidential elections (2012-present). By using process-tracing, it tests a “Theory of Political Warfare” that was derived from a variety of sources that deal with both Western political warfare and Soviet active measures during the Cold War (Kennan; 1948; Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1982; 1990; Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999; Mitrokhin, 2002). The data used during the analysis of Russian interference with the 2016 US election was collected from a variety of first and second hand open sources such as news articles, court documents and previously conducted investigations, including the “Mueller” report (2019). In the end, in order to determine if the theory would hold, the abstract elements or “building blocks” of the causal process had to be observed. However, the specific methodology also allowed for an expansion of the theory if any slight deviations were found and these did not disprove the theory in its entirety.
2. Theoretical Framework
This first chapter starts off by defining the concept of political warfare and its application during the Cold War, which will be followed by the chapter on the actual theory of political warfare that is tested in the analysis. As explained in the introduction, this theory of political warfare was derived from a variety of sources that deal with both Western political warfare and Soviet active measures during the Cold War, and boils down to a three-staged process: (1) penetration, (2) disintegration, and finally (3) subversion (Kennan; 1948; Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1982; 1990; Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999; Mitrokhin, 2002). However, its foundations are primarily drawn from Blackstock’s (1964) theory of covert political operations and Heuer’s (1990) assessment of Soviet influence operations.
2.1 Defining Political Warfare
“Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In the broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives, to further its influence and authority, and to weaken those of its adversaries” (Kennan, 1948, p. 1).
As we are moving towards a multipolar international system, it is likely that assurances of security will decrease and states will have more incentives to look for opportunities to increase their power and security (Waltz, 1993; 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001). In general, statesmen and citizens may seek prosperity, freedom, security, or even power for its own sake, and they might frame these aims through certain religious, philosophical, economic or social ideals (Morgenthau, 1948). However, if one actually strives to achieve these goals through international politics, they can only do so by striving for power, ”man’s control over the minds and actions of other men” (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 13). Although one can never rule it out completely, neither a nuclear or conventional war seems to be a “rational” option to attain this goal (Freedman, 1986). Thus, it seems the concept of “political warfare” offers a viable alternative that compensates for these ‘limitations’ and allows great powers to maintain, increase or display their states’ power in relation to its supposed competitors, without the irrational cost and consequences of a full-scale kinetic war.
Although, it should be mentioned that some strategists might argue against the use of this concept of “political warfare”. First of all, according to Clausewitz (1989), all warfare constitutes the continuation of politics by other means and thus any strategy should be guided by a political goal. Therefore, all wars are already “political”. Secondly, “war” would always require a physical act of force to be interpreted as such, but is not a necessary requirement in the application of political warfare (Blackstock, 1964; Mitrokhin, 2002).
Yet, this critique might be less obvious than it first appears to be. The “political” in political warfare simply refers to the means used to wage warfare, similarly to how “economic” warfare refers to its own capabilities. Furthermore, during the early 19th century Clausewitz could not have possibly imagined that nuclear weapons, the ultimate use of force, would limit the de facto use of force to this extent. In addition, Clausewitz (1989) also mentions a number of non-physical and more abstract factors in war. “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity” (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 89). In this sense, warfare can also be interpreted as the degree of hostility behind a certain state’s actions towards another state. The violence, damage and hostile intent behind political warfare are, in most cases, simply expressed politically and psychologically (Blackstock, 1964).
Another argument in favor of the concept of “Political Warfare” is that Clausewitz (1989) explains that the behaviour and capacity of a state to engage in any type of conflict primarily depends on the three groups that make up the “Nature of War”: the people, the military, and the government (Handel, 2014). When considering the people, one should look at their motivation, dedication, and support for their government. When looking at the military, one should examine the quality of their leaders, whether they obey the government, develop suitable doctrines, and the quality of their organization. Lastly, when analyzing the government, one should investigate how rational and realistic their policies are and how effective it could mobilise its population for a prolonged war (Handel, 2014). What will become more clear later on is that, regardless of the absence of physical violence, political warfare specifically targets these elements of Clausewitz’s trinity and thus constitutes warfare against the capacity to engage in a conventional war or behaviour that conflicts with the aggressors national interest.
2.2 Political Warfare During the Cold War
In 1948, former US diplomat John F. Kennan argued that Lenin's “clever” synthesis of both Marx and the previously mentioned Clausewitzian principles were exactly what made the Kremlin's conduct of political warfare the most refined and effective in history. Furthermore, to him it seemed that the creation and long term survival of the British empire had, in part, also been due to its understanding of these same principles (Kennan, 1948). Thus, while recognizing that political warfare is inherently more alien to democracies than it is to dictatorial regimes, Kennan (1948) proposed that the US should follow the basic principles of British and Soviet political warfare if their democratic principles were to survive.
With Clausewitz in mind, a sound strategy of political warfare was to utilize the entire DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) spectrum at a state’s disposal, constituting both overt and covert operations. Kennan (1948) argued that overt measures should include forming certain political alliances, employing economic means (like the ‘European Recovery Plan’), and the dissemination of 'white' propaganda; while covert operations should include actively supporting 'friendly' foreign elements, encouraging underground resistance, and the use of 'black propaganda’ or 'psychological warfare'. General direction and financial support was ideally provided by the government, but to be remotely controlled and deeply covert in order to deny any responsibility. Intelligence agencies and private organizations would then be able to establish underground contact with various national representatives in neutral and allied countries, and through them, assist resistance movements in the entire Soviet Union (Kennan, 1948).
As can be deduced from Kennan's fervour, after the Second World War, the United States was quickly made aware of the potential of political warfare in times of peace. Still fearing the nationalist sentiments amongst the conquered Germans, the US first instigated a psychological re-education programme to eliminate totalitarianism and militarism, and even produced a propaganda film to warn their own soldiers not to fraternize with “the hand that heiled Hitler” (Taylor, 2003, p. 249). Furthermore, with the rapid deterioration of the wartime alliance between the US and USSR, a Cold War of words, ideologies, espionage, intrigue and nuclear deterrence emerged (Taylor, 2003). The arrival of nuclear weapons had meant that full-scale wars were too risky to launch, thereby limited the great powers to ‘smaller’ proxy and political wars. Yet, even though no conventional great power war would break out, for the coming decades Soviet-American relations were the bipolar focal point around which the world and public opinion came to revolve (Taylor, 2003). The Truman Doctrine had already already portrayed Soviet-American relations in obvious black and white terms, describing the ideological battle between the two as the nation of freedom and liberty versus that of tyranny and oppression, but the divide between these two states was forever symbolised by the physical construction of Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ in 1961 (Taylor, 2003).
On the other side of the iron curtain, the authoritarian USSR and its state-controlled media apparatus had a greater capacity to shape public perceptions, especially in the beginning (Taylor, 2003). Within the Soviet controlled regions, the flow of information was firmly controlled in an almost hermetically sealed environment, while simultaneously the Soviets were able to exploit the relatively free flow of information in the West and its independent media (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999; Taylor, 2003). Both at home and abroad, every Soviet media outlet was utilized in a propaganda onslaught launched by Agitprop (the Administration of Agitation and Propaganda of the Communist Party Central Committee) and cominform (the Information Bureau of the Communist party)(Taylor, 2003). Using books, pamphlets, radio, and film they increasingly tried to shape global perceptions and ultimately the grand narrative in favor of the USSR. However, overt “white” propaganda was not the only element of the Soviet’s strategy of political warfare, and it was certainly not reserved to these two organisations.
Throughout the Cold War the US was the ‘main adversary’ of the KGB and its predecessor, the NKVD (both successors to lenin’s loyalist Cheka)(Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999; Taylor, 2003). “In addition to collecting intelligence and producing politically correct assessments of it, the KGB also sought to influence the course of world events by a variety of “active measures” ( aktivinyye meroprintia) ranging from media manipulation to “special actions” involving various degrees of violence” (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999, p. 224). While violence could be part of these active measures campaigns, most operations were comprised of non-violent “influence” operations (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999). The targets of these active measures could range from a single individual, to social circles, state agencies, or even an entire government (Mitrokhin, 2001). The essence of this strategy was to gradually expose the weaknesses of “American Imperialism”, but often came down to disinformation instead. Because of former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokin, who defected and translated a vast collection KGB files, including the KGB intelligence and counterintelligence dictionary, it is now known that the KGB officially defined and described these “active
measures” as:
“Agent-operational measures aimed at exerting useful influence on aspects of the political life of a target country [...] active measures taken by state security agencies include steps to create agent positions within the enemy camp [...] confidential and official contacts, operational devices and money [..] conversations of influence, inspiring public speeches, press conferences, the publication of articles in newspapers, and periodicals, the publication of books, the preparation and dissemination of leaflets, the passing of slanted information [...] the organization of public meetings and demonstrations [..] disinformation, exposure, discrediting, compromising, special positive action and other clandestine means used by intelligence in order to exert influence on social processes in international relations or in a target country” (Mitrokhin, 2002, p. 13-251).
While these operations were deemed an important task, Service A, the department in charge, was not very popular one (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999). Only half of its staff was actually specialised in psychological warfare, and the other half was comprised of rejects from other departments. This was also reflected in the quality of their work, as “Many Service A officers [...] had little, if any, experience of living in the West and relied on crude conspiracy theories about the capitalist and Zionist plotters who supposedly operated a secret “command center” in the United states” (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999, p. 224). Unfortunately, regardless of its quality, their influence operations were successful in a number of cases.
The Soviet union managed to convince a substantial segment of the population, both in and outside of the US, of a number of conspiracy theories that persist to this day. Among others, the Soviet Union successfully created and disseminated conspiracy theories surrounding the murder of John F. Kennedy and
the alleged creation of the AIDS virus by the CIA (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999) Yet, they also recruited a significant number of defectors, including members of the intelligence community. The most infamous cases are probably those of the “Cambridge Five” in the UK, and Aldridge Ames and Robert Hansen in the US, but there were far more instances in which the Soviet Union managed to recruit insiders. For example, Philip Agee, an embittered former CIA operations officer in Latin America, who was recruited and wrote “an uncompromisingly hostile memoir of his career in the CIA [...] which identified approximately 250 Agency officers and agents and claimed that “millions of people all over the world had been killed or had their lives destroyed by the CIA and the institutions it supports” (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999, p. 230).
Fortunately, as mentioned, the US was very much aware of the Soviet threat. Back in 1948 the Smith-Mundt Act first “revitalized the American post-war information services ‘to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding’” (Taylor, 2003, p. 256). Thus, the US fought on two closely connected fronts, both the domestic and the international. Initiatives like the Marshall plan in Europe, the export of typical American brands like Mcdonalds, and Hollywood movies being broadcast to “115 countries around the world where 72 percent of the films being shown were of American origin”, were in essence all a part of the strategy of political warfare (Taylor, 2003, p. p.256). To counter communist propaganda, US’ activities also took place in close collaboration with NATO and particularly their british allies, as the BBC and NATO information service played an active role in the ongoing propaganda war (Risso, 2014). However, only with the rise of new communications technologies during the 80s was the US able to penetrate the ‘Iron Curtain’ and really change perceptions of the Soviet regime within its own bloc. Paradoxically, the US was able to sway public perception by emphasizing the very restrictions emplaced by the soviets against their own population in order to prevent this. The US was ultimately successful by exposing Soviet lies and painting them off as undesirably totalitarian, with as its pinnacle, Reagan’s description of the USSR as an evil empire (Taylor, 2003).
2.3 Theory on Covert Political Operations and Assessing Active Measures
At the height of the Cold War between the US and USSR, former intelligence officer and political science professor Paul W. Blackstock (1964) already observed that political scientists often defined the above mentioned principles of political warfare as strategic or political communication when speaking of interactions with friendly states, and the same applied to the use of 'propaganda' and ‘information’ (Blackstock, 1964). Therefore, one should acknowledge that these concepts roughly incorporate the same phenomenon, but one is simply less offensive in nature than the other. In addition, Blackstock (1964, pp. 22-24) also remarked in 1964, that ”in spite of voluminous literature dealing with 'psychological warfare' or propaganda in general”, there were few comprehensive analyses that dealt with it from a holistic point of view. Thus, with the aim “to bind together facts and phenomena which would otherwise be loose or detached", he formulated his own theory of covert political operations (Blackstock, 1964, pp. 41).
Based on case studies of the operational principles of political warfare used by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, Blackstock (1964) described political warfare as a causal process comprised of three steps: (1) penetration, (2) disintegration, and finally (3) subversion. Blackstock explains that this distinct non-combatant intervention by an aggressor state in the internal affairs of another employs a variety of overt, covert and occasionally clandestine measures, and ideally results in the concept of treason losing its meaning and with the victim state in open collaboration with the intervening power (Blackstock, 1964; Mitrokhin, 2002). However, these activities can also result in an intermediate stage of transfer that still meet state A’s set out objectives. This means that politically significant individuals or groups within the victimized state have managed to re-evaluate the traditional foreign and/or domestic policy goals towards those aligned with, or parallel to, those of the aggressor state. In turn, when the victimized state has entered a period of covert control over its political actions, this can affect its relative power position in the international system, the power positions within the victimized state, and/or positively impact the vital interests of the aggressor state without the need for open collaboration (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer; 1990; Mitrokhin, 2002).
However, there are a number of points of critique on Blackstock’s work that have to be mentioned as well. First of all, many things that are now known were likely unbeknownst to Blackstock at the time. Secondly, although his book “The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations” was received positively, it also received criticism from his contemporaries about the redundant use of examples from the Russian Empire’s intervention in Bulgaria, whilst not actually including it as a case. In addition, "this reader could not escape the feeling that the author should have written a briefer, modern handbook along the lines of Machiavelli's ‘The Prince’”, a classic piece of literature to which even Blackstock himself refers to in his book (Raymond, 1965, para. 5). All in all, these issues can result in the occasionally vague description and lack of support for some of his claims. Furthermore, while Blackstock does not condone the use of covert political operations, he was personally disgruntled about the CIA’s operational security and “unprofessional” behaviour at the time, as more of their covert activities became publicly known. As a result, Blackstock (1964) doubted the effectiveness of political warfare as a means of sustainable “control”.
Yet, at the end of the Cold War, in his own study of Soviet influence operations - public diplomacy, propaganda, and active measures, Heuer (1990) found that these types of campaigns can in fact be effective. “Influence operations may mobilize already existing opinion, define the terms of political debate, provide significant ammunition used in that debate, or deposit an ideological residue that eases the path for subsequent influence operations [...] influence on policy decisions might be indirect, through the role of public opinion in the political process, or the influence might be exercised directly on the thinking of key decision makers [...] a small change in public attitudes may have a large impact on government policy; a swing of several percentage points may change a government” (Heuer, 1990, pp. 4-5).
In this study, Heuer (1990) also stresses that influence operations are a diverse lot, and therefore builds his own abstract model of the influence process which does roughly correspond with that of Blackstock. Although, Heuer (1990) approaches this from two different angles, namely by looking at both the “program model” (figure 1) as well as how this actually affects the “individual level”. First of all, the “program model” illustrates the different types of activities that might be included in an influence campaign, and breaks down into four elements: the initiator, the channel, the target, and the goal. Secondly, Heuer (1990, p.8) looks at the effects of an influence operation on the individual level and identifies four more steps: “perception or receipt of the message; understanding and evaluation of the message; a change in attitudes, opinions or judgements as a result of the message; and the effect of this change on actual behavior” (Heuer, 1990, p. 8). However, his focus seems to be more on the psychological aspects of the second and third phase in Blackstock’s model, and he does not venture into the methods of penetration, nor does he go in depth on the recruitment and use of agents of influence.
Therefore, the theory of political warfare presented in the following chapter will largely be based on the three staged process in Blackstock’s (1964) theory of covert political operations, but compensates for the previously mentioned critique by supplementing this framework with elements from Heuer’s (1981; 1990) works on soviet influence operations and the psychology of deception. Furthermore, in order to clarify specific areas which might have otherwise remained unclear, it also borrows definitions from the “The Mitrokhin Archive”, “KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook” (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999; Mitrokhin, 2002), and on one ocasion the US’ “Terms & Definitions of Interest for Counterintelligence Professionals” (DoD, 2014).
3. The Theory of Political Warfare
In this chapter, the actual theory of political warfare, as deduced from the work of Blackstock (1964), Heuer (1990), and Mithrokhin (2001), will be elaborated on. Furthermore, the three staged process of (1) Penetration, (2) Disintegration, and (3) Subversion that is described, will also function as the foundation of its operationalisation. Meaning, its different elements serve as the framework through which the case of Russian interference will be investigated during the actual analysis.
While political warfare is hostile in nature and can occasionally include armed conflict, it comprises a distinct non-combatant intervention by an aggressor state (State A) in the internal affairs of another state (State B). The process of political warfare consists of the three previously mentioned stages and employs a variety of overt, covert and occasionally clandestine measures (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1990).
Overt activities “are openly acknowledged by or readily attributable to” the aggressor state, but covert activities involve “a method of conducting operations that hides the true intent, affiliation or relationship of its participants” which “differs from clandestine in that covert conceals the identity of the sponsor, whereas clandestine conceals the identity of the operation” (DoD, 2014, pp. 80-247).
3.1 Penetration and Infiltration
The first phase in political warfare is the penetration and infiltration of state B by the intelligence agencies and associates of state A, which is not very different from the modus operandi in more traditional intelligence gathering operations (Blackstock, 1964; Mitrokhin, 2002). The biggest distinction between penetration and membership or affiliation lies in the aggressive or manipulative purpose involved. “Infiltration is the deliberate or planned penetration of political and social groups within a given state by agents of an intervening power for manipulative purposes, i.e., to extend the influence and control of the aggressor state over its victim” (Blackstock, 1964, p. 44). However, this does not always entail a physical presence within the territory of state B, but can also be accomplished through third party states. According to the KGB Lexicon, the penetration target for active measures can be an individual, organisation, party, state agency, or government of a country in which state A seeks to achieve the desired effect and/or influence (Mitrokhin, 2002).
Penetration is accomplished through both legal- and illegal residencies. In a “legal” position, intelligence officers or agents of state A do not attempt to hide their association with state A, but camouflage their intelligence activities by assuming a diplomatic, journalistic, business, academic, or religious cover to enter state B (Blackstock, 1964; Mitrokhin, 2002). These officers are typically housed in government departments and organizations from state A that have official and justifiable relations with state B in order to not arouse any suspicion. In an “illegal” position an individual, group or an organisation from state A, for the purposes of concealing any illegal activities and their affiliation with state A, will take on a false identity or conceal their presence in state B entirely (Blackstock, 1964; Mitrokhin, 2002).
3.2 Disintegration and Atomization
Following penetration, the second phase is the disintegration and atomization of state B’s political and social institutions. This disintegration is achieved by splitting the target state’s political and social structure until the fabric of national morale slowly disintegrates, and B is no longer able to resist subversion by state A. Citing Dostoyevsky, Blackstock (1964) explains the objective is to throw everyone into a state of despair and confusion until a society feels sick, depressed, and cynical about its future and political system, but with a need for a guiding idea and self-preservation. Thus, after state B is plunged into a political and social crisis, state A and/or its political system and institutions appear more appealing. Most of this is achieved through white, grey and black propaganda that targets the general public, a specific group of activists, opinion makers, or government decision makers, similar to what the Soviets described as “Active Measures” (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1990).
In democratic societies the competition for power and inherent differences between political, class, ethnic, religious, and other groups create some natural tension, but can be exploited by an aggressor state through framing these groups in hostile, uncompromising opposition (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1990). The assumption behind the operational principles of disintegration is “that political and social institutions are sound and/or viable only if the political and social tensions that are normal to any society are held in check, either through control mechanisms based on democratic consensus, or by more authoritarian techniques ” (Blackstock, 1964, p. 50). Therefore, the bigger the differences between these groups are to begin with, the easier it will be to pit them against each other. Furthermore, the fanaticism of extremist groups that can be found in almost all democratic societies are especially susceptible to this kind of manipulation and are therefore easy targets for political warfare operations (Blackstock, 1964).
Exposure to propaganda over a period of time can have a significant effect on citizens’ perceptions of the world around them, and can eventually start to influence their decisions (Heuer, 1990). This “softening up” through continued propaganda activities is what eventually weakens the fabric of a state’s national morale, and disintegrates its citizens faith in its current political institutions and social structures. The deliberate manipulation of psychological and sociological factors is accomplished through the dissemination of targeted (dis)information, slogans, and discrediting material by making use of a variety of white-, grey-, and black propaganda channels (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer; 1990; Mitrokhin, 2002). The
KGB Lexicon roughly defines these three types of propaganda as:
● “White” propaganda: overt, official propaganda emanating from state A, which employs the full spectrum of available media to reach both domestic and foreign audiences with its message and ideology. White propaganda is overt, but can have subversive characteristics, occasionally resembling “ideological sabotage“ (Mitrokhin, 2002). This can include “leadership statements, media, exchange visits, and policy decisions or concrete actions” (Heuer, 1990, p. 3).
● “Grey” Propaganda:semi-covert, subversive propaganda actively carried out by non-governmental organisations and private citizens that spread the message of state A. However, while state A aims to camouflage its involvement in “Grey Propaganda”, these can still be directly or indirectly financed and/or directed by state A´s intelligence services or other government agencies (Mitrokhin, 2002).
● “Black” Propaganda: covert propaganda activities directly carried out by state A whilst falsely claiming to be a resistance group, opposition element, or citizen of state B. By assuming a false identity, State A aims to deceive the target audience and completely conceal its involvement (Mitrokhin, 2002). “Black” propaganda can be disseminated through leaflets, radio-broadcasts, forged documents, letters, covert press placements, etc. (Mitrokhin, 2002).
By employing a combination of white, grey, and black propaganda, state A can affect how it is perceived, discredit the status-quo andexploit the social cleavages between different political, class, ethnic, religious, and other groups in state B (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1990). The latter is achieved by continuously framing these groups in hostile and uncompromising opposition, until the fabric of state B’s national morale starts to disintegrate (Blackstock, 1964). Propaganda successfully brings this about by influencing what people see, think, and feel through factual or fabricated information, arguments, slogans and symbols that seek to implant the target's consciousness, thereby shaping the perceived narrative (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1990). Once an individual forms an impression about an object, event, or situation, they are likely biased toward continuing to perceive it the same way.
Yet, if the message is not perceived, it has no influence at all. Therefore, effective distribution of propaganda is a crucial element and one has to keep in mind that no single channel reaches all potential targets (Heuer, 1990). Furthermore, for a message to be effective, it has to be understood and evaluated in the manner intended by state A. The extent to which a target changes his or her opinion or attitude in response to these communications can be envisaged as a combination of the following elements: the “combined function of (a) the individual’s initial position, (b) his attention to the communicator and the message, (c) comprehension of its arguments, examples, appeals and conclusion, (d) general and specific motivation for accepting its position” (Zimbardo, Philip & Ebbesen, as cited in Heuer, 1990, p. 13). Lastly, opinions are often not translated into action, so it concrete actions are the key to evaluating the actual effectiveness of an influence operation. This can include voting, joining a demonstration, or signing a petition. Yet, it is sometimes hard, if not impossible, to distinguish the specific influence from a political warfare campaign from many other political developments and social influences (Heuer, 1990).
What is clear is that opinions are at least easier to shape “during periods of crisis or unsettling events, or periods of rapid change when people have not yet formulated their views” (Heuer, 1990, p. 20). In addition, “with respect to deception, one overwhelming conclusion stands out: It is far easier to lead-a target astray by reinforcing the target's existing belief, thus causing the target to ignore the contrary evidence of one's true intent, than to persuade a target to change his or her mind" (Heuer, 1981, p. 298). Therefore, messages are most effective when they tap into an existing narrative and address the wants of the target audience.
However, this second phase can also be supported with additional overt measures such as diplomatic- and economic pressure, and the use of semi-covert organizational weapons such as the formation of political parties, trade unions,and social activist groups. Furthermore, State A might organize and/or support the second phase by covert (or clandestine) measures such as the theft of compromising material, assassinations, and the arming and/or training of paramilitary forces (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer; 1990; Mitrokhin, 2002).
3.3 Subversion and Defection
The third phase, subversion and/or defection, is the combined result of the first and second phase. At this point, individuals and social groups from state B can be transferred to the political or ideological cause of state A (Blackstock, 1864) . Once a counter-elite has been successfully established and a significant amount of the general public has been ideologically transferred, state A can use them to gain covert control over state B (Blackstock, 1964). The ultimate goal is to extend state A’s power by seizing state B through a controlled internal faction, or ‘liberation’ of state B by an invading force loyal to state A. However, this can only be achieved with the eventual, passive acceptance of the masses and support of a ‘counter-elite’ (Blackstock, 1964).
In the general public, this is usually the result of a change in public opinion and voting behaviour due to continued propaganda activities and a discredited status-quo .As public opinion shifts, state A or its desired outcome will gradually appear to be an appealing alternative. Yet, a counter-elite is assembled through the careful study of potential agents of influence, who through personal openings and/or weaknesses are either deceived intounwitting cooperation or eventually recruited through MICE (Money, Ideology, Compromise and Ego) (Blackstock, 1964; Mitrokhin, 2002; Mendez & Mendez, 2019).
Money is the most cited motive among Americans who were willing to betray their country, as it was the predominant motivator in over half of all espionage cases that were prosecuted in the US (Mendez & Mendez, 2019). However, Ideology can also play a crucial role. For example, after the Great Depression, many Americans took a positive stance towards communism, which also created a rich base for KGB cultivation (Mendez & Mendez, 2019). Thirdly, Compromise, or coercion, is a negative stimulant for cooperation by which an agency gaines leverage on a target individual and forces him or her through the
fear of punishment/retribution. However, this is the least common method as the validity of cooperation is considered unreliable. Lastly, Ego, which is also referred to as revenge or disgruntlement, can be viewed as another prime motivator. At least, one-fifth of all prosecuted “spies” cited revenge or disgruntlement as their primary motive for betraying their country or government (Mendez & Mendez, 2019).
As mentioned, after this counter-elite has been established and enough of the general public has been affected by the propaganda activities of state A, the ideal outcome for the aggressor state would be that the concept of treason loses its meaning and the victim state is in open collaboration with the intervening power (Blackstock, 1964; Mitrokhin, 2002). However, these activities can also result in an intermediate stage that still meet state A’s set out objectives. This means that politically significant individuals or groups within the victimized state re-evaluate the traditional foreign and/or domestic policy goals towards those aligned with or parallel to those of the aggressor state. In turn, his can affect its relative power position in the international system, power positions within the victimized state, and/or positively impact the vital interests of the aggressor state without the need for open collaboration (Blackstock, 1964; Heuer; 1990; Mitrokhin, 2002).
It should now be clear as to how political warfare is waged, what elements make up its process, and how it can affect a victimized state. Therefore, it can now be tested in the case study of Russian interference during the 2016 US Presidential election. Yet, in the following chapter, an overview of the theory’s operationalisation will be presented and the actual research design will be elaborated upon first.
4. Research Design and Methodology
In this chapter will elaborate upon the research design that is used to answer the central research question. This means that it will address both its possibilities and its limitations, why the specific case of Russian interference during the 2016 presidential election was selected, and how the theory is operationalised.
The theory of political warfare that is tested during the analysis has already been explained and is operationalised below. Yet, to actually answer the central research question, the investigation takes the form of a within-case, single case study analysis of the Russian government’s interference in the 2016 US presidential elections (2012-present). By using process-tracing, it tests a “Theory of Political Warfare” that was derived from a variety of sources that deal with both Western political warfare and Soviet active measures during the Cold War (Kennan; 1948; Blackstock, 1964; Heuer, 1982; 1990; Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999; Mitrokhin, 2002). In the end, in order to determine if the theory would hold, the abstract elements or “building blocks” of the causal process as presented in the operationalisation of the theory had to be observed. However, the specific methodology also allowed for an expansion of the theory if any slight deviations were found and these did not disprove the theory in its entirety.
According to Rohlfing (2012), a within-case case study should be an appropriate method to investigate this theory of political warfare as it involves investigating a complex process that is not easily quantified. “A within-case analysis can be used initially to develop [...] familiarity with a particular case in order to discern how the processes or patterns that are revealed in that case support, refute, or expand [...] a theory” (Paterson, 2012, p.1). Furthermore, “Process tracing is a research method for tracing causal mechanisms using detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case. Process tracing can be used both for case studies that aim to gain a greater understanding of the causal dynamics that produced the outcome of a particular historical case and to shed light on generalizable causal mechanisms linking causes and outcomes within a population of causally similar cases” (Beach, 2017, p. 1) Although, according to Beach (2017) two distinct takes on process-tracing can be identified, the minimalist and systems understandings of mechanisms. In this case, the latter approach applies. From the three staged causal mechanism described in the previous chapter, one should be able to deduce that the investigation attempts to understand political warfare by unpacking the process, and by studying its individual parts and the entities involved. This same approach will be applied to the analysis itself. Thus, “in a systems understanding of mechanisms, the ambition is to unpack explicitly the causal process that occurs in between a cause (or set of causes) and an outcome and trace each of its constituent parts empirically [...] the goal is to dig deeper into how things works, [...] by tracing each part of the mechanism empirically using mechanistic evidence and in particular observing the empirical fingerprints left by the activities of entities in each part of the process” (Beach, 2017, p.4). Even though only one case is investigated, this does allow for stronger causal inferences about how the causal process actually works in real-world scenarios.
4.1 Operationalisation
The theory is in essence operationalised as in the chapter on “The Theory of Political Warfare” where the different elements, such as white-, grey-, and black propaganda have already been defined. Thus, even though the research design does allow for an adjustment of the framework afterwards, the analysis will initially test the theory by measuring the presence of the three staged process and its elements as listed below:
The Theory of Political Warfare (1) Penetration and Infiltration
● Legal Residency ➔ Diplomatic Cover ➔ Journalistic Cover ➔ Business Cover ➔ Academic Cover ➔ Religious Cover ● Illegal Residency ➔ False Identity ➔ Concealment of Presence (2) Disintegration and Atomization
● Propaganda Activities ➔ White Propaganda ➔ Grey Propaganda ➔ Black Propaganda ➢ Target ★ General Public ★ Activist Groups ★ Opinion makers
★ Government Decision Makers
➢ Goal
★ Affect Perceptions of State A
★ Discredit Status-quo of State B
● Supporting Measures ➔ Overt: ★ Diplomatic Pressure ★ Economic Pressure ➔ Semi-Covert: ★ Political Parties ★ Trade Unions
★ Social Activist Groups
➔ Covert:
★ Theft of Compromising Material
★ Assassination
★ Arming and/or Training of Paramilitary Forces (3) Subversion and Defection
● General Public
➔ Change in Public Opinion
➔ Voting Behaviour
● Counter-Elite (Agents of Influence)
➔ Unwitting Cooperation
➔ Recruitment Through MICE ● Covert Control
➔ Open Collaboration
➔ Re-evaluation of Traditional Foreign and/or Domestic Policy Goals
4.2 Case Selection & Data
The case of Russian interference during the 2016 Presidential election was primarily selected because, at first glance, it seems like a typical case of active measures and political warfare. Namely, “the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives, to further its influence and authority, and to weaken those of its adversaries” (Kennan, 1948, p. 1)”. The Russian government targeted Western democracies with disinformation campaigns and agents of influence in an attempt to undermine their democratic processes and societal coherence, and there is enough evidence that shows they will do so again (Mueller, 2019). Furthermore, as a former great power that does not hide its attempts to regain its prestige and influence on the world stage, Russia still fits the criteria of key player in any multipolar system to come.
Alternatively, Chinese interference might have been selected as well. There is substantial evidence that the Chinese government is engaged in its own elaborate political warfare campaigns by influencing media, key figures in foreign governments, and Chinese emigres abroad (Brady, 2017; Kurlantzick, 2018). Indeed, China seems far more likely to influence the course of the 21st century than Russia. Yet, as mentioned in the introduction, in 2018 at least 48 states engaged in organised social media manipulation campaigns, meaning there is actually a diverse range of actors that engage in these types of influence operations (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019, p.1). For example, one could have also selected Iranian influence operations or Israel’s cognitive campaigns in its “campaigns between wars” (FireEye, 2018; Kupperswasser & Siman-Tov, 2019). Although, with the release of the Mueller report and the amount of public attention it has received, the data available on the Russian case is not just exceptionally high for an influence operation, but high for intelligence operations in general. Thus, for the sake of validity, the Russian case is far more suited to test the theory’s applicability while simultaneously it is still relevant.
The analysis itself is in large parts constructed by evidence provided in the Mueller (2019) report. Yet, in the attempt to cross-validate the data and capture different dimensions, this is supplemented wherever possible by observations from court documents, news articles, and previously conducted research as well (Dawisha, 2014; Alperovich, 2016; US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2017; DNI, 2017; Modderkolk, 2018; Nance, 2018; Unger; 2018).
4.3 Limitations
The current research design will allow for theory testing and an in depth analysis, but there are a number of limitations that need to be addressed. The first problem that arises when investigating the world of intelligence is the availability of credible information. One can observe blatant propaganda and retrieve some facts from released intelligence reports, but it is likely it will take decades for most of the information to become public. Furthermore, the author of this paper is a political scientist specialised in international relations and possesses knowledge on strategy, security, crisis management and intelligence, but does not possess insider knowledge on the day to day operations of the intelligence community.
Secondly, one can question the relevance of the theory itself. On one hand, the foundations of the theory of political warfare or “covert political operations” were originally developed by a former US military intelligence officer. This could indicate that he possessed more insider knowledge than the author of this research paper. Yet, this also means Blackstock could have possessed biases in favour of the US and its intelligence community, affecting his objectivity. This also applies to Heuer, who was closely tied to the US intelligence community. Furthermore, even though Heuer’s framework was developed in the 1990’s, Blackstock’s theory was developed over half a century ago and was likely constructed under very different circumstances than those of the 21st century, especially with regard to our technological advancements and changes to our social structures.
Thirdly, although, analysing and understanding the interactions and relationships within our ‘strategic environment’ is what might ultimately offer crucial insight into what might come next, when attempting to extract military lessons from the past, one should always take into consideration that the environment is composed of both continuity and change (Yarger, 2006; Fuller, 2014). While this study does not involve itself specifically with traditional military operations, they will likely show similar characteristics. Both play out in an environment that is characterized by instability and aperiodic behavior. Thus, it possesses both linear and nonlinear attributes. Furthermore, the environment is deterministic as change is bound by a variety of factors, including by what has occurred before. While it will likely have continuities, it is not necessarily predictable and situations do not repeat exactly. (Yarger, 2006; Fuller, 2014). Therefore, making credible predictions based on the analysed events will be hard, if not impossible.
Lastly, with regard to the research design itself, a single within-case case study will allow for an in depth analysis and appreciation of context, which can give policymakers and academics more insight into the workings of political warfare. Unfortunately, the limited amount of cases do restrict the generalisability of any findings. At best, this type of research will be able to draw conclusions about the applicability of the theory of political warfare to the political warfare waged by Russia in the early 21st century, and perhaps, even be updated to fit our time. Furthermore, it might be able to offer an indication of the modus operandi of other actors during this same time period. However, regardless of the method, it will be far less able to judge any actor’s modus operandihalf a century from now. In addition, while it occasionally touches upon the psychological aspects of these types of influence operations, the scope of this research largely limits its to a strategic perspective on the ways, means and ends.
5. Case Study: the Russian Interference with the 2016 US Presidential Election
In this chapter, the theory of political warfare laid out in the previous sections will be tested. It will do so through a case study analysis of the Russian interference during the 2016 US presidential election. According to former naval intelligence officer Malcolm Nance (2018, p. 1), on the 8th of November 2016, the American Presidential elections concluded in “the greatest intelligence operation in the history of the world” as it seems that a strategic adversary of the incumbent global hegemon managed to influence enough voters to get their preferred candidate elected into its highest office. Yet, if so, how did the Russian government manage to achieve this and what implications did this have? Furthermore, to what extent, if at all, does Cold War theory on political warfare apply to political warfare in the early 21st Century? In order to answer these questions, the case study will look at the ways, means and ends of penetration, disintegration and eventual subversion.
5.1 Penetration and Infiltration
As the theory on political warfare states, the first phase in a political warfare campaign is the penetration and infiltration of state B by the intelligence agencies and associates of state A. Therefore, one can expect Russian intelligence officers and/or agents in a “legal” position under a diplomatic, journalistic, business, academic, or religious cover, or in an “illegal” capacity under a false identity or operating while concealing their presence entirely.
5.1.1 Legal Residency
First of all, there is evidence that diplomatic covers were used to attempt to establish connections with individuals linked to the Trump campaign. Former Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak reached out to senior Trump Campaign advisors Jeffrey Gordon, who later became a national security advisor to President Trump, and Senator Jeff Sessions, who became Trump’s Attorney General (Mueller, 2019). The first contact took place at the “Global Partners in Diplomacy” conference during the Republican National Convention in July 2016, where Kisyak, Gordon and Sessions discussed improving US-Russia relations. After this encounter, former ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with members of the Campaign as Kislyak invited Gordon to have breakfast at the Ambassador’s residence, but Gordon declined (Mueller, 2019). Kislyak did set up another meeting with Sessions, and the two met in Session’s Senate office. Yet, the Mueller report states that, even though Sessions ”recalled Kislyak saying that the Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign”, “None of the attendees [...] remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any request that Sessions convey information from the Russian government” (Mueller, 2019, p. 129). Furthermore, after this meeting, one of Sessions’ staff members advised him to refrain from any further meetings with the former ambassador, “whom she assessed to be an “old school KGB guy”” (Mueller, 2019, p. 129).
Kislyak did set up meetings with Michael T. Flynn and Jared Kushner, who were both Trump advisors on the campaign as well as after the election. The three men met for approximately 30 minutes at Trump tower on the 30th of November 2016. In this meeting, they discussed a fresh start for US-Russia relations and US policy in Syria. Furthermore, Kislyak suggested that Russian generals could brief the transition team on the conflict in Syria through a secure line, but since the team did not have a secure line, did this not come to fruition. When Kushner suggested using a secure communications line at the Russian embassy, Kislyak quickly rejected this idea (Mueller, 2019). However, Kislyak did have multiple phone calls with Flynn during which they discussed US sanctions.
Additionally, Kislyak met with Carter page, who joined the Trump campaign in January 2016 and had himself worked and lived in Russia for a number of years. During this encounter at the RNC, it is stated in the Mueller (2019) report that Kislyak expressed his concern about candidate Clinton’s world views, which Page communicated to other members of the campaign. Furthermore, back in 2013, “Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page” as well (Mueller, 2019, p. 96). Carter page admitted that he was aware that Podobnyy was a Russian intelligence officer. However, these contacts ended before Page joined the campaign, as Podobnyy and two other intelligence officers were charged with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government in 2015.
Secondly, there is evidence that multiple business covers were used in an attempt to establish connections and/or influence individuals related to the Trump campaign. Although, this should not come as a surprise since, under Putin’s kleptocratic system, Russian’ business and its oligarchs serve at the pleasure of the President (Dawisha, 2014). In this case, most of the Russian business connections originated from President Trump’s own business dealings, such as the Trump Tower Moscow project (Mueller, 2019).
Shortly after the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow, attended by Trump, negotiations on a real estate project in Moscow began. These negotiations were held with the Crocus Group, a Russian company owned by Azerbaijani-Russian billionaire Aras Agalarov, who has known connections to Putin and the Russian government (Mueller, 2019). Yet, during the negotiations, Crocus group was represented by Aras his son Emin Agalarov and Irakli Kaveladze. The Trump Organization was represented by Donald Trump jr. and Ivanka Trump, who agreed to an arrangement with the Crocus Group and negotiated a letter of intent. Yet, communications about the project between the Trump Organization and the Crocus Group ended on November 14th, 2014, and the project did not continue beyond the planning stage. Regardless, there were repeated contacts between Aras Agalarov and President Trump after the failed project, as they continued to exchange gifts and letters in 2016. In one letter, Aras Agalarov congratulated President Trump for winning the Republican primary and expressed interest in Trump’s campaign. Furthermore, the Crocus Group connections were used by Emin Agalarov, through Robert Goldstone, to suggest a meeting between the Trump campaign and Russian attorney Natalia Veselnitskaya (Mueller, 2019).
On the 9th of June, 2016, Russian attorney Natalia Veselnitskaya met with Trump jr., Paul Manafort (Trump’s campaign manager), and Kushner at Trump Tower. She was accompanied by Rinat Akhmetshin (Soviet-born US lobbyist), Irakly "Ike" Kaveladze (Georgian-American businessman and senior vice president at Crocus Group), Anatoli Samochornov (Russian-born translator), and Robert Goldstone (representing Emin Agalarov)(Mueller, 2019). Initially, the impression was created that the meeting would be about compromising material on then Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton, which Trump Jr. was very excited about. However, Veselnitskaya did not produce this material, and the 20 minute meeting was mostly about the removal of sanctions imposed on Russia through the “Magnitsky Act”.
Besides the Crocus Group, more connections were established between Russia and the Trump campaign under a business cover. In the summer of 2015, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry on a Trump Tower project in Moscow. Felix Sater, a Soviet born Russian-American mobster who had worked with the Trump Organization before, contacted Michael Cohen (formerly Trump’s personal lawyer and vice-president of the Trump Organization) on behalf of the Russian real-estate development company I.C. Expert Investment Company, owned by Russian businessman Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov. Cohen, who was granted permission from Trump to negotiate on his behalf, completed a letter of intent somewhere in either October or November 2015. This letter was subsequently signed both by Trump and Rozov. The day after this letter was sent, Sater contacted Cohen with the message, “that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate Trump’s chances at being elected” (Mueller, 2019, p. 71).
About a month after the letter had been signed, Ivanka Trump received a message from Lana Echova on behalf of her husband, Dimitry Klokov, who was then the Director of External Communication for PJSC, a large Russian electricity company. In november 2015, Klokov and Cohen had at least one phone call and exchanged multiple emails. Klokov offered Cohen assistance with the campaign and “political synergy [...] on a government level” (Mueller, 2019, p. 73). Furthermore, Klokov invited Cohen to Russia for talks, with the promise that these could culminate in a meeting between Russian President Putin and then candidate Trump, regardless of any existing business track. However, Cohen did not pursue this invitation as “he was already working on the Moscow Project with Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government” (Mueller, 2019, p. 74).
Although, at one point Cohen did grow impatient with Sater and also made his own attempts to contact Dmitry Peskov (the Russian government press secretary) in order to establish contact with Sergei Ivanov (Putin’s chief of staff)(Mueller, 2019). In response, Cohen received an email and subsequently had a phone call for 20 minutes with Elena Poliakova (Perkov’s personal assistant). Two days after this phone call, Cohen received a text message from Sater and a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow. He did not hear from Peskov or his assistant again.
