Participatory democracy in England : an assessment of local government influence on democratic engagement

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Participatory Democracy in England: An Assessment of Local

Government Influence on Democratic Engagement

Master thesis Political Science, Public Policy and Governance

Research Project: Politics of Inequality

June 2017

David Stoker [11408987]

Supervisor: Franca van Hooren

Second Reader: John Grin

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1 Introduction

1.1 Topic

In 2014 it was estimated that up to 7.5 million eligible British voters were missing from the electoral register (Bite The Ballot, 2016: 2) and the UK had lower turnout than many other European countries in 2015 (UK Data Service, 2016: 14). My topic is how to improve citizen participation in democratic processes in English local government. It is not an easy time for local government. The grant from 1 central to local government will be phased out entirely by 2020, leaving local authorities to fend for themselves and generate their own income (Publicfinance.co.uk, 2016). Scarce resources make the conditions far from ideal to rebuild engagement and relationships in citizens

Democracy can be called a “myth,” or “arguably one of the vaguest terms in common usage” (Emerson, 2014: xi). There are various interpretations of the word “democracy” that envisage different structures of government; today’s democracies cover a wide spectrum of practice with but the one thread common to many of them: somewhere, at some stage or other, people cast a vote, and something, or someone, gains a majority (Ibid). In the West this can include a mixture of: general elections, either for a presidential or parliamentary form of national government; decentralisation of power to regions, for example through elected councils; referenda on specific issues; citizen panels, and more.

Theories of democracy that developed before the late nineteenth century - republicanism, liberalism, and utilitarianism - dealt with the tension between equal consideration of collective decision making by linking individuals and the community in various ways (Morrell, 2010: 3). Republicans eliminate the tension by recasting equal consideration in terms of the common good. They delineate between private interests, the sum of which Jean-Jacques Rousseau calls the “will of all,” and the public interest, Rousseau’s “general will” ([1762] 1988, 96, 100-101). Each citizen has an equal voice, but if some disagree with the final decision, they have either misperceived the common good or followed their own private interest (Morrell, 2010: 3). Democratic theory since the middle of the twentieth century has consisted largely in attempts to develop an explanation of democracy’s ability to allow both equal consideration and legitimate collective decisions that is more nuanced and less elitist (Ibid: 5).

To take democracy seriously, we must know what we are talking about. Developing a precise definition of democracy is particularly important when trying to describe and explain variation and change in the extent and character of democracy. Tilly (2007: 7) describes four models of democracy: constitutional, substantive, procedural and process-oriented. A _{constitutional} approach concentrates

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on laws that a regime enacts concerning political activity (Ibid). _{Substantive approaches}focus on the conditions of life and politics a given regime promotes: does this regime promote (as a list of possible topics to emphasize) “human welfare, individual freedom, security, equity, social equality, public deliberation, and peaceful conflict resolution” (Ibid)? Most_proceduralobservers center their attention on elections, asking whether genuinely competitive elections engaging large numbers of citizens regularly produce changes in governmental personnel and policy (Ibid: 8). Process-oriented approaches to democracy differ significantly from constitutional, substantive and procedural accounts. They identify some minimum set of processes that must be continuously in motion for a situation to qualify as democratic (Ibid: 9).

Contemporary challenges to democracy, as discussed in chapter 1.4 could if unchecked, lead to undemocratic movements, such as nationalism and from there, authoritarianism (Burston, 2017), as evidenced by the rise of populist right-wing figures in Western democracies: Trump, UKIP, Front Nationale, Alternativ für Deutschland and more. Moreover, the consequences of complacency in local government democracy could mean further political disengagement and disaffection from citizens, which could in turn eventually destabilise government through populist movements, or public disorder, as seen in the 2011 riots that started in London and spread to other English cities. Citizen engagement, citizen participation and co-production are rapidly becoming catch-all concepts, buzzwords continuously recurring in public policy discourses but that quite often point more to the rhetoric of participation than to its reality (Castelnovo 2015). My research seeks to improve our understanding of methods that improve the quality of public debate and empower people to influence decisions that affect their lives. My objective is to discover how municipality officials and citizens interpret the purpose and effectiveness of one particular local government citizen engagement initiative. I look specifically at processes of active engagement. My motivation is to find out what is and isn’t working in citizen engagement practice, the meanings behind this and to find barriers to and opportunities for better engagement. What are the effects of efforts to engage citizens? Consequently, the following two research questions are formulated:

“What principles, processes and procedures can we take away from the Kirklees Democracy Commission to build into a model of participatory democracy best practice?”

“How and to what extent has the Kirklees Democracy Commission contributed to the promotion of democratic goods?”

This study is structured in three parts. The first part, Chapters 2 and 3, consists of the theoretical framework and the methodological approach. In the theoretical framework the concept of participatory democracy and its alternative deliberative democracy are discussed, as well as existing

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literature on how to judge the quality of a democracy. In the second chapter a research design is formulated. The second part, Chapter 4, contains the empirical findings, starting with judging what the evidence reveals about the principles, processes and procedures of the KDC case. The third part, Chapter 5 includes the conclusion and discussion of the findings.

1.2 Academic contribution

Academically, I hope to shed light on three things. Firstly, my intention is to add to the third generation of deliberative democracy (as specified by Elstub, 2010) which concerns institutions, and the challenges of doing democracy in reality (compared to the idealised settings of earlier theorists).

Second I wish to add the theory around e-democracy, defined as the process of using telecommunications technology by democratic actors, including governments, elected representatives, civic organizations, communities, political groups, and activists to improve the political process and political institutions (Khosrowpour, 2013: 311). Examples of e-democracy include online discussion groups, blogs, government websites, and other forms of networked participation and civic engagement. (Cruz, 2009). Specifically I wish to add to the theory of e-democracy in institutional settings, which is a small niche in the literature and is under-represented in more general democratic literature considering the rate of change. The literature suggests there is a lack of innovation in e-democracy. I seek to fill gaps and add insights to the theory regarding the ways digital tools can in principle help improve the overall health of a democracy.

Thirdly and finally, I aim to add to the theory regarding emotions in political and specifically democratic practice. We see that emotions have been increasingly studied in politics, particularly with regards to the rise in nationalism in western liberal democracies. However it is remarkable to me that emotions clearly drive political campaigns but are omitted from consideration in policy formation processes.

1.3 Societal relevance

The findings of this study are relevant in various ways. Socially, the findings may shed light on ways councils can improve the legitimacy of and alleviate disaffection with their democratic institutions. It could be the starting point for cross-country learning between local authorities seeking to refresh their relationship with citizens. Like other studies, this study has its limitations. In order to guarantee the validity and reliability, several methodological choices were made. What I discover will not become a simple ‘recipe’ for citizen engagement policy worldwide or indeed in England. _{In answer to the} question, “How could the contribution of research to policy making be improved?” Burnham et al reflect that “the pursuit of best practice is important, but it should also be remembered that informing

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government policy is not the sole or even the primary function of social research” (2008: 324). _My findings will be tied to the geographical context in which I conduct my I research. Nonetheless I am quite hopeful that readers will gain valuable insights to understand the nature and use of citizen engagement strategies in local government settings.

1.4 Contemporary challenges to democracy

In this section I will consider some contemporary challenges to democracy: austerity, devolution, social divisions, group isolation, citizen ignorance, crisis in legitimacy. This is not to engage in what Schmitter calls “ambulance chasing” (2008: 268). There has been a degree of alarmism and haste in diagnosing ills in the state of Western democracies following the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote. Instead, I wish to posit the case in its specific contexts. There is a greater possibility of being able to generalize from my findings (if I have some positive ones) by considering how and where the positive lessons can be utilized in situations with similar circumstances.

Austerity

In local government in England, the context of austerity is omnipresent in the day to day operations and shapes strategic decisions. Powerful forces outside localities are imposing an economic agenda that seriously limits their ability to manoeuvre. If local democracy is full of freely moving agents, then austerity, at least for the time being, is the iron-bound case they can move within. To paraphrase an old quote, you can wear any colour you like, so long as it is austerity. New notches will be punched in ever-tightening belts. Figure 1.1 illustrates that local authorities’ spending power is in steady decline.

Figure 1.1: Spending Power Reductions from 2010/11 by Deprivation Band and Year (all purpose authorities

(Hastings et al 2013: 14)

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damage of bureaucratic and distant government discourse to undo. Government ‘objective,’ impersonal language treats people as abstractions (Chickering and Turner, 2017: 15). This discourse distances policy decisions from the social effects of cuts. One team of social researchers reports that interviews with senior staff described how a “differential financial envelope” was applied to expenditure within the various “workstreams” underpinning the process of budgetary decision making. Thus, within each workstream the first priority was to make cuts to ‘support services’” (Hastings et al, 2013). This language can be expected to alienate citizens. Former Chancellor George Osborne called benefit cuts “tough love” (The Guardian, 2013). Local government officials are aware of the problem: “concern about [community] dissent is palpable” (Durose and Lowndes 2010: 355). The high likelihood of increased fiscal austerity and budgetary uncertainty following the shock of Brexit mean that this is an issue that will need to be addressed.

Devolution

Secondly, increased localism and devolution makes renewed participatory democracy especially relevant. In previous governments we saw the beginning of the localism and devolution agendas. The 2003 Local Government Act promoted devolution to the lowest possible level (Gov.uk 2008: 12). ._Old political structures are fracturing: in March 2017 Article 50 was triggered in a House of Commons vote, starting the process for Britain’s exit from the European Union (The Guardian, 2017a). In the same month, Scotland voted for a second independence referendum under Nicola Sturgeon’s popular leadership of the Scottish National Party (The Guardian, 2017b). In May 2017 Manchester elected Andy Burnham as its first mayor (The Guardian, 2017c) with significant spending power. At the same time we see a power-grab from local government to central government. Local government is increasingly reduced in scope as central government seeks to “cut out the middleman” - for example, schools when academised become removed from local authority control and responsible only to the Department of Education.

Social divisions

Thirdly, cultural division has always existed in England via the class system, but in recent years we see increased ethnic division. Mass immigration diversified working-class Britain – indeed, it is working-class communities that tend to be the most ethnically mixed – but also led to unchecked resentment (The Guardian, 2016a). Once fringe far-right nativist sentiment, fueled by a migrant-hostile tabloid press and increased TV media presence of UKIP’s Nigel Farage, has gone mainstream and been a strong contributing factor behind Brexit. Hate crime has increased post-Brexit (Independent, 2016). Poorer communities, notably white working class, perceive an existential threat from a high rate of migration into England over the past decade from recently joined European countries, notably Poland. This group express patriotism a desire to ‘Make England English again”. Two terror attacks in short succession in May-June 2017 will be a challenge for fending off

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Islamophobia. Moments of national joy and togetherness such as the 2012 Olympics turned out to be fleeting.

Socio-economic divisions are increasing. The Conservative government has sought to polarise the deserving and undeserving poor into “skivers and strivers”. Regionally, both Londoners and non-Londoners speak of the city as ‘like another country’: voices from many parts of England protest that government only cares about London and the south east and neglect the rest of the country.

Generational divisions also exist in England. Older people voted more for Brexit. Under-45s voted more to stay, with a lower turnout. By most conventional metrics today’s younger generation are the first that will lead a lower quality of life than their parents’. The economic divide exists generationally, notably with most over 40s owning a home and scarce few under-30s. This sign outside a Bristol pub went viral:

‘Remember when we cried as children & our parents said “we’ll give you something to cry about”? – We thought we were getting a smack – instead, instead they destroyed the housing market, quadrupled uni fees, melted the ice caps & voted Brexit.’ (The Poke, 2017).

It would be a mistake to joke over all the divisions. Outright pessimism is unjustified, however: Luskin et al _{show that civil, constructive discussion between communities is not only possible but fruitful} (2012: 133).

Group isolation

Personalization is pushing us into advertiser-driven "tunnels" of information online that “can limit the unexpected encounters that spark innovation and the democratic exchange of ideas” (PublishersWeekly.com, 2011). The public sphere of political deliberation has diminished: social media algorithms create “echo chambers” (Del Vicario et al., 2016) of ideologically insulated individuals. Citizens increasing exist in a “filter bubble” (Pariser, 2014). Social media is reducing the likelihood of interacting with people who disagree with us. It is possible municipality-led citizen engagement can bridge this divide. Factually, in terms of current levels of citizenship, we see a mixed picture: a recent national survey of British social attitudes showed that political engagement increased, but not turnout (Bsa.natcen.ac.uk, 2016). Those without a strong sense of political commitment were particularly likely to stay at home at the 2015 general election (Ibid). Social isolation is a problem in general, and encouraging people to participate in democracy by community discussion and by exercising their vote is one way of reducing social isolation (Gov.uk, 2015).

Crisis in legitimacy

Fifthly, the crisis in political legitimacy makes citizen engagement timely. Over half of Britons say none of the political parties represent their views (Natcen.ac.uk, 2017). The voter turnout in the June 2017

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General election was the highest on record, but with a hung parliament (BBC News, 2017) and no clear winner, there is a challenge to the traditional notion of a single strong leader. The world is widely acknowledged to be in a phase of “democratic recession” - a phrase coined by political scientist Larry Diamond (Diamond, 2015). Mistrust of politicians has grown in the UK, notably post-Iraq war with Blair’s misrepresentation of the evidence (he has since admitted he “would have invaded Iraq anyway” (The Guardian, 2009b). More recently the perception that the British government has not handled the issue of immigration effectively has significantly affected political trust (McLaren, 2011: 163). The public are right to have a degree of skepticism about politicians brandishing facts, but this doesn’t explain why trustworthy sources remain unable to debunk misinformation effectively. This would suggest an erosion of what Pielke would call “honest brokers” (2007).

Citizen ignorance of politics, or ‘Post Truth’

Finally, citizen education is a common feature of citizen engagement. Education is rather akin to power (Sztompka 1999: 129). This factor “plays multiple roles in the generation and deployment of trust: making decisions on the trustworthiness of others, confidence at not falling into the trap of blind trust, or obsessive distrust” (Ibid). There must be education for trust through everyday experience (Ibid: 138). Lack of education (and therein ability to access and process the facts) was cited in many post EU-referendum analyses. For example, the Google search “What is the EU?” was trending immediately after voting to leave it (Collins, 2016). Is it possible a significant section of people didn’t understand what they were leaving? The evidence is that university-educated people voted to remain, as illustrated in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2: Education Level and Vote in the EU Referendum

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One hypothesis for British citizen ignorance is misinformation from the media. Hajer and Uitermark (2008) cited media-derived authority. Politicians who use the media well are rewarded. Rein and Schön explain how stubborn policy controversies hold an epistemological predicament: “what can possibly be the basis for resolving conflicts of frames when the frames themselves determine what counts as evidence and how evidence is interpreted? ”(1993: 145). ‘Solution aversion’ (Campbell and Kay, 2014) can lead to motivated disbelief, for example climate change for Republicans. Politicians have been known to cherry picking their facts (Channel 4 News, 2011) and it can be difficult to get an objective answer. In this new era of “post-factual politics” (Stoker, 2016) one hypothesis is that emotions are more important than facts in preference formation.

Conclusion

In this section I have shown that there are a number of challenges to democracy that explain why Kirklees (and Britain) can be considered a “least likely case” for improving democracy.

1.5 Research questions

My general question is what good practices can be learned from a selected case of local democracy that can be picked up and practised elsewhere. I chose a specific example in which to investigate this, which had relevant characteristics. Kirklees is a fairly typical municipality in the UK, but it is more proactive than most, which makes it a likely area in which to identify adaptable practices. Therefore I have two research questions that are equally important:

1.“How and to what extent has the Kirklees Democracy Commission contributed to the promotion of democratic goods?”

2_{. “What principles, processes and procedures can we take away from the Kirklees Democracy} Commission to build into a model of participatory democracy best practice?”

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2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Concepts

There are three main concepts I wish to discuss: two types of democracy (participatory and deliberative especially) and democratic ‘goods.’ As Collier and Adcock (1999: 546) suggest, “scholars should be cautious in claiming to have come up with a definitive definition of a concept’s meaning” and it is more productive to justify concepts based on the research goals and “the specific research tradition within which they are working” (in Mair, 2008: 196). With the correct dose of caution regarding how definitive my meanings of these concepts are, here I consider the debates around the concepts, specify the definitions I adopt and justify these choices. _{In terms of Sartori’s ladder of} abstraction (1970: 1044) I seek to use deliberative democracy as a ‘middle-range theory’ that are “neither too general or too unique, and can make comparisons among relatively homogenous contexts” (Mair, 2008: 184).

Over recent years a range of theoretical perspectives have emerged that emphasise increasing and deepening citizen participation in political decision-_{making. Examples include participatory} democracy (Pateman 1970), deliberative democracy (Bohman 1998), direct democracy (Saward 1998), difference democracy (Young 1990) and cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995) (in Smith 2009: 8). There are important differences in emphasis and, on occasion, substance among these theoretical streams. Participatory democracy involves _{non-elected inhabitants with de facto decision-making} powers, although the final decision making remains in the hands of the elected representatives (Sintomer et al 2012: 19). Deliberative democrats pay particular attention to the process by which decisions are made. In contrast, direct democrats emphasise the moment of decision making. Finally, cosmopolitan democracy is unashamedly global in its pretensions, questioning the legitimacy of transnational institutions. Of all of these variants, deliberative democracy dominates the current academic literature. By 2007 John Dryzek could write that “deliberative democracy now constitutes the most active area of political theory in its entirety (not just democratic theory)” (Pateman 2012:7).

Distinguishing participatory from deliberative democracy is not easy. _{Participatory democrats such as} Carole Pateman tend to emphasise the intrinsic value of participation – its educative and developmental effect on citizens (Smith, 2009: 8). Pateman writes of “ _{current fashion” for deliberative} democracy _{as a core concept and argues that deliberative democrats have shown little interest in the} last thirty years of participation promotion (2012: 14).

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Notwithstanding Dennis Thompson’s belief that “the turn toward deliberative theory has not displaced participatory theory,” the prevalent view, albeit not always made explicit, seems to be that deliberative democracy has now overtaken and subsumed its predecessor (Ibid: 15).

Smith in contrast writes that _{the dominant current within democratic theory is one that tends to} valorise participation (2009: 17).Pateman says that the meaning of deliberative democracy is hard to pin down, but highlights the central claim of deliberative democratic theorists:

“that individuals should always be prepared to defend their moral and political arguments and claims with reasons, and be prepared to deliberate with others about the reasons they provide” (Ibid).

Some authors such as Diana Mutz argue that “the theories of participatory democracy are in important ways inconsistent with theories of deliberative democracy” (2006: 16) because for one, the tone as well as the context associated with deliberation, given its insistence on cross-cutting political conversation, seems completely inappropriate for most participatory settings - perhaps informal deliberation exists at serious dinner parties, maybe at work, in the neighbourhood, or in meetings, but the calm, rational exchange (‘in monotone voices’) idealised in formal deliberation less so (Ibid: 17). I disagree. Firstly, I believe deliberation is the “juicy” part of participation; it is where issues get thrashed out, where people meet and engage, rather than just vote, for example. Other models of participatory democracy (e.g. mini publics and participatory budgets) all include deliberation within them. Participation without deliberation would be an empty shell. The_{style of deliberation that Mutz} finds fault with is open to reform.

We must place the potentially overly-abstract participatory/deliberative democratic debate within the context of concrete democratic institutions. Institutionalised forms of participation in political decision making are at what Smith calls “strategic levels” – democratic devices that provide citizens with a formal role in policy, legislative or constitutional decision making (2009: 6). Nonetheless, I see it as a particular positive that the deliberative democracy theory started with ideals - one could imagine Plato’s “forms” - of deliberative democracy before getting into the practical implementation (to start with the practical implementation and then seek ideals would, I believe, muddy the waters with the contextual underpinnings of the case in question). We can also place these concrete institutions in the context of wider political processes of change, such as decentralisation: Patsias et al argue that “creating participatory democracy implies decentralization, which is both a particular feature of democracy and a process in its own right” (2012: 2214). Moreover, participatory democracy “has a particular appeal within the contemporary context of increasing multilevel governance” (Ibid). Therefore, we can agree that improving the democracy within institutions will involve, as at least one factor, a process of increasing participation.

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literature (deliberative democracy), whilst I don't fully agree with it. In order to integrate the concerns of a number of different positions in democratic theory, I think it is better to settle on an inclusive or what Smith calls an “ecumenical” approach (2009: 15). Schmitter advises, when designing research, to "try to reach back as far as possible in social and political theory to find grounds for the relevance of your topic and avoid being manipulated by academic fad and fashion" (2008: 267). But as a social researcher it’s necessary to engage meaningfully with the current debates. So in this paper I will speak of “deliberative democratic theorists” and create a framework for “assessing the quality of deliberative democracy” when engaging with the theory that speaks in these terms, and switch to speaking in terms such as “participatory democratic practices” or more generally improving the “quality of democracy” confident in generating no major contradictions.

Finally, ‘democratic goods’ I mean _{“desirable qualities or goods that we expect of democratic} institutions” (Smith 2009: 16). Smith justifies his choice of four ‘basic democratic goods’ - inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgement and transparency - on the grounds that we cannot imagine satisfactory democratic institutions without them (Ibid). On the deliberation2 /participation question, the democratic goods of inclusion and popular control imply greater participation. Smith is clear that these four democratic goods are not exhaustive, nor are they the only ways to assess the quality of a democratic institution. So to avoid the fallacy of arbitrariness, I settled on this combination of concepts only after discovering a precedent for bridging mainstream deliberative democracy theory and Smith’s four democratic goods’. 3

2.2 Theories

This section outlines the key theories used in this research. Firstly I trace the history of deliberative democratic theory through four generations (Elstub 2010, 2016). Secondly I engage in a thematic discussion and critical reflection of Smith’s four democratic goods. Thirdly I discuss the role of emotions in democratic theory, defining my contribution in this area. Finally I define a model of assessing the quality of democratic participation of citizens, in relation to the research questions.

i) Locating the case in deliberative democratic theory

Stephen Elstub describes three generations of deliberative democracy theory (2010) and he has recently added a fourth generation (2016). He explains that these ‘generations’ can be viewed as “analogous to feminism’s ‘waves’: explanatory groupings of varied bodies of thought, not strict, time-bound entities of coherent parentage or lineage” (2016: 148) Here I will explain the generations and how I intend to add to this theory. For ease of understanding I begin with Table 2.1, of my own design.

2_{Occasionally adding two more - efficiency and transferability (Ibid: 17).}

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Table 2.1: The history of deliberative democracy (interpreted from Elstub 2010, 2016)

Generation Decade Authors Contribution

1G 1960s Habermas, Rawls Wrote about idealised deliberation conditions.

2G 1990s Bohman, Gutmann,

Thompson

Added social complexity (realised ideal outcomes unlikely). But wrote nothing about institutions.

3G 2000s Baber and Bartlett,

O’Flynn, Parkinson

Wrote about institutions. Includes transnational / racially divided societies.

4G 2010s (with

earlier roots)

Mansbridge,

Chambers, Parkinson.

Getting into the nitty-gritty of specific micro processes. Systems design.

In the first generation, Habermas and Rawls debated the normative justifications of deliberative democracy, as well as the interpretations and necessary components of the theory. Most famously of the two, Habermas (1996) “outlines his vision of deliberation in the public sphere as opinion former and agenda setter” (Elstub 2010: 298). The second generation theorists James Bohman (1996), Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) “fused the first-generation deliberative democracy of Habermas and Rawls with practical requirements” (Elstub 2010: 291) The dominant view in these theorists is that “preferences will adapt to public reason and new information, but not in a uniform manner” (Ibid). There will be no ultimate consensus formed (reason is not not a pure enough faculty, you might say, to reach universal conclusions). They argue that forms of communication other than reasoned exchange can, will and should be included. The third generation contended that their forbears offered little substantive detail in terms of the type of institution required to ensure that deliberative democracy could be actualized in complex societies (Ibid, 291-2). In short, _{these claims} are made without an institutional typology. So in a sprouting of _{institutional innovations, Baber and} Bartlett (2005), O’Flynn (2006) and Parkinson (2006) provide many interesting ideas on the changes that could enable deliberative democracy needs to become a theoretically robust, sustainable and the dominant model of democracy in practice. (Elstub 2010: 292).

The three authors of the third generation of deliberative democratic theorists are very different from one another. For Baber and Bartlett the issue is deliberative democracy across borders, for Parkinson it is deliberative agenda setting and for O’Flynn it is constructing an inclusive national identity. (Elstub

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2010: 303). They theorise in very different contexts (Ibid: 302). Consequently they also address distinct issues, particular to the context. Baber and Bartlett's across-borders approach is outside the scope and purpose of my research. I focus on local government institutions. The remaining two are worthy of individual attention because they address issues that are relevant to contemporary democracy - the social divisions I mentioned before, and multi-level governance.

Parkinson (2006) makes suggestions for a democratic agenda-setting process. He considers original empirical evidence from_{real-life approximations of micro instances of deliberative democracy such as} a citizens’ jury in Belfast, held in relation to planning and delivery of health services. There is also a case study that combined macro and micro deliberation in consultation processes used to form the NHS plan. He proposes a formal public model based on this plan:

1. Specialists and interest groups’ representatives deliberate in workshops.

2. Facilitators present this information small citizen panels, resulting in citizen recommendations (all covered by the media and overseen by parliamentary committees). 3. The remaining proposals would then be voted on by elected representatives (presumably

parliament, but this is not clarified) or a referendum (2016: 171).

What is strong about this process is its multiple stages which allows a variety of voices and actors to participate without degenerating into a free-for-all. It would be interesting to judge this using Smith (2009)’s criteria for democracy, but there is sadly little space to do so. I would expect to see a multi-stage process such as Parkinson’s Belfast NHS case in the case I select for this research. I am curious whether this particular combination of specialists’ workshops and citizens’ panels is transferable, what the weaknesses are, and what contextual factors limit it to the setting.

O’Flynn (2007) argues that within comparative politics scholars, there is an ongoing debate about the kinds of institutions that are best suited to the task of fostering political stability in societies deeply divided along ethnic lines. Scholars generally agree that 1) democratic institutions represent the best hope for such societies and, 2) that those institutions must provide for power sharing between conflicting ethnic groups. But beyond those two points of agreement, there is much disagreement. O’Flynn says the main disagreement is whether the choice of democratic institutions should principally be driven by a concern for the value of inclusion or for the value of moderation (2007). He concludes we need both. He asserts that for divided societies, we must “take questions of institutional design extremely seriously, no matter how difficult these questions prove in practice” (2007: 733).

O’Flynn states that the dominant (and perhaps only) model of democracy employed in ethnically divided societiessuch as Northern Ireland is “consociational” democracy (2006: 101) which means in layman’s speak, ‘government by elite cartel’. In this consociational (elite cartel) model, different ethnic leaders reach compromises through bargaining and then justify these bargains to their ethnic groups.

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It is a private process that is not dependent upon the exchange of reasons, and therefore does not resemble deliberative democracy (Ibid, 101–2). O’Flynn goes on to ask whether deliberative and consociational democracy can be combined to facilitate the inclusion of more citizen voices (Ibid: 104). He argues that it can, and that such a combination would make the transition from conflict to democracy more sustainable (Elstub 2010: 300). There is a caveat: consociational decision making “must be reformed” to meet the deliberative requirements of publicity and reciprocity, by replacing bargaining with deliberation. The presence of an opposition, and proportional representation electoral systems, are proposed to facilitate this. I find O’Flynn’s analysis interesting for challenging the assumptions of western liberal democracy; in the consociational model O’Flynn shows a model such democracies could revert to if ethnic divisions are exacerbated. Regarding the third generation, Elstub concludes in a more cautious tone, as if to ward us off cold political realism: “In the main, a more practically relevant version of deliberative democracy is welcomed, but we must also guard against jettisoning its normative ideals in the process” (2010, 291). This is a relevant warning today in regards to the rise in populism, nationalism and nativism in Western democracies.

The fourth generation of thought within deliberative democracy scholarship is characterised by Elstub et al as a ‘systemic turn’ (2016: 143). Its character is the most participatory, yet it is an attempt to “secure the norms of deliberative democracy on a mass scale” (Ibid: 144). In the fourth generation the notion of what constitutes deliberation is broadened and its criteria relaxed (Ibid: 145). Third generation authors envisioned a division of labour in deliberative democracy. Accordingly, “the criterion for good deliberation should not be that every interaction in the system exhibit [all desirable democratic traits] but that the larger system reflect those goals” (Mansbridge, 1999: 224). For example, Parkinson (2006) claims that different sites and different moments offer diverse contributions to public deliberation (Elstub et al, 2016: 144). But fourth generation deliberative scholars suggest that only a systemic approach to deliberative democracy can ensure mass democracy. The dangers of widening our definition of ‘deliberative democracy’ too far - beyond the formal sphere and into the informal sphere - is discussed earlier in the Conceptual framework.

So far in this chapter I have outlined the four generations of theory in deliberative democracy. _{In my} research I wish to add to this theory, by taking seriously the institutional settings of deliberation, and judging the case I find against the theoretical ideals. In this respect, I will be bridging the empirical and normative aspects of deliberation. To do this, I will now engage a pragmatic topics that is underrepresented in the deliberative literature, namely digital tools for democratic participation.

ii) E-Democracy

There are important gaps in the discourse of public administration when it comes to the effectiveness of citizen participation and e-participation programs in various countries (Kim & Lee, 2012: 826).

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Nonetheless, digital methods will inevitably be utilized in democratic processes. Some of the more commonly used tool functions include crowdsourcing citizen ideas, conducting citizen polling, and collecting citizen f_{eedback on specific plans. Moss and Coleman evaluate the UK Government’s} e-democracy policy and argue that policy experimentation in the area has been disappointing overall (2014: 410). Their analysis emphasizes the ongoing importance of online deliberation in achieving inclusive, informed and negotiated policy formation and political decision making (Ibid). Chickering and Turner suggest that “harnessing the transpartisan power of social media offers the possibility of aiding creative political evolution, especially of a leader’s highlighting (with media support) successful experiments in self-governance” (2017: 13). Therefore, given the increasing take-up of digital tools in democratic practice, I will add to the theory by studying an empirical case of e-democracy practice and analysing the effectiveness of theory,

My research has revealed a cornucopia of methods. Rose and Saebo (2005) outline five different ‘genres’ of digital democracy each with three-five features /sites of activity, which I have adapted into Table 2.2:

Table 2.2: Opportunities for development of Democracy based on known web technology features Genre name Web-features

The Challenge and Riposte

Chat rooms, E-docket/Dialogue system, Anti-campaign sites, Virtual petitions, On-line voting.

The Political Manifesto

Party websites, Inquiring information, Super-sites, Voter Compasses, Campaign sites, Web logging, Politicians corner, Broadcast opportunity, City Halls

The Rational Issue Debate

Round table discussions, Broadcast meetings,

The Respectful Question and Answer

Develop Netiquette/ User agreements, E-debates via mail and online posting, Citizen Panel, Contact Information for Politicians, Web-meetings with politicians.

The Unanswered Question

Directory for further action, Identify who is responsible for responding

(adapted from Rose and Saebo, 2005: 162-3)

Experimentation in the UK Government’s e-democracy policy has been disappointing overall (Moss and Coleman, 2014: 410). _{There are nonetheless many potential innovations in e-democracy. Two} next-gen digital tool ideas with promise are the Delphi technique, and Collaborative policy annotation. Firstly, the Delphi technique is currently used for policy development and perhaps it can be trialled online. The Delphi technique’s stages can be compared to Parkinson’s use of expert panels: t_his method uses external referees to reach consensus instead of the expert panel. In principle it could inform people and provide a new way for them to provide constructive feedback. _{Secondly, in}

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Collaborative policy annotation, experts (or genuinely interested and knowledgeable lay people) collaboratively annotate policy documents is one practical tool (Google Documents makes this quite easy)

The literature paints a mixed picture of E-Democracy. Some see it as a potential way to increase government responsiveness (Kim and Lee, 2012), others emphasise the potential of the Internet as a space of direct power and control (Moss and Coleman, 2014: 423). As in all _{effective systems, it needs} analysis to accommodate evolving political issues and opinions, and thus its design must be an iterative process,

In this section I have traced my theoretical framework, starting with a genealogy of deliberative democracy theory, before engaging with e-democracy. In the next section I will outline a framework for evaluating democratic practice.

iii) Evaluating democratic practises: a framework

We require a more robust analytic framework for systematic approaches to deliberative democracy that attends to real-life policymaking (Ankeny, 2016: 21). In assessing democratic innovations I will consider the extent to which they realise four explicitly democratic goods, namely _{inclusiveness,} popular control, considered judgement transparency (Smith 2009: 16).

These four goods are particularly apposite for evaluating the democratic qualities of innovations because, arguably, they are fundamental to _any theoretical account of the democratic legitimacy of institutions (Smith 2009: 16). However they are interpreted and weighted, it is difficult to conceive of a reasonable account of democratic institutions that did not consider these goods (Ibid). In other words, a democratic theory that overlooked any one of these goods would likely be deemed severely deficient (Ibid). We are not making any claims as to whether these goods are intrinsic or instrumental to democracy (Ibid): different theories of democracy will offer different accounts as to which of these goods (and others) are intrinsic and which are instrumental and the relative significance given to each of these goods (Ibid). Our approach avoids making any such claims beyond the perspective that the democratic status of institutions that fail to realise these goods in a compelling combination is likely to be challenged (Ibid).

For Smith, a key question is: can democratic innovations buck the trend and institutionalise effective incentives for participation by citizens from across different social groups (Ibid: 24)? In addition to considering the wider literature beyond Smith for each democratic good and raising my own questions, I will consider the role of _e-democracy in realising (promoting or hindering) each good.

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Inclusiveness

Our understanding of inclusiveness must be reconnected with the “very basic measure of social justice: how many people are able to participate?” (Rushkoff, 2004: 65) Inclusiveness “turns our attention to the way in which political equality is realised in at least two aspects of participation: presence and voice” (Smith, 2009: 16). Smith writes that “the first challenge offered by critics and sceptics is that inclusiveness cannot be realised because of differential rates of participation across social groups” (Ibid: 18). With regards to presence, ‘getting people to the table’ is a challenge highlighted in much participatory democratic theory. In many Western democracies we see low turnouts at elections. Opting out “amounts to a political statement - a third choice that, in effect says ‘No!’ to both options on the table” (Chickering and Turner, 2017: 16). With regards to local participatory democracy we find that “entreaties to participate promised on gaining social recognition have no effect” (Arceneaux and Butler, 2015). People are shy to turn up: when engaging people with democracy, the “highest drop out occurs when the prospect of having to attend an actual debate/deliberative event is raised” (Karjalainen and Rapeli, 2014). People are not “motivated by democracy as a concept unless things are going seriously wrong” (Demsoc.org, 2013). The people who do attend tend to be more confrontational and have higher political efficacy (Niemeyer, Felicetti and Ruggero, 2012: 10). Those who are less educated lack the skills and thus confidence to volunteer (Arceneaux and Butler, 2015: 131). It seems reasonable that full participation or even majority participation is an unrealistic ideal. Smith writes that “in practice inclusiveness will not, or even cannot, be realised” (2009: 19).

Partisanship and political divisions are a growing problem for democratic processes. Inclusion is also a question of ‘reasonable politics’, the ability to meet in discussion - to physically meet to deliberate with a variety of people and accept the other side as legitimate. In today’s world we face challenges to intergroup relations in pluralistic contexts: increased political polarization ( Haidt 2013); a diminished willingness to compromise with outgroups (Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2012). Increasing numbers of Americans only marry within their party affiliation (_{Hersh, 2016) suggesting polarisation into tribes} on partisan lines could become entrenched. There exist risks of living and learning in silos (Hetrick, 2014). Several authors naturalise out-group excluding behaviours due to the rewards of bonding inclusion of tribal behaviour and the formation of two groups: “insiders” and “outsiders”. Duyvendak defines the emotional sphere of home with some exclusivity: a "symbolic space with one's own people and activities" (Ibid). Putnam’s “Bowling Alone” (2007) describes the alienation of individuals in the USA, which like most trends originating from that country, is followed by the UK in a slightly more moderate form. From reading a wide range of literature, there are several questions arising; in my own words: does trust-building within an in-group necessitate an out-group? Does cosmopolitan theory neglect this emotional/social need unrealistically? Potentially, expanding in-group inclusion can reduce out-group rejection: racism, tribalism, factionalism, political partisanship; demonization of people of the opposing party.

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To realise inclusiveness, if we want to realise fuller democratic participation, perhaps we need to utilise the power of positive emotions such as _{hope to get people to the table, and certain types of love} to keep them there. Positive emotions are rarely if ever explicitly discussed in deliberation or policy formation processes, at least in design. I find this odd, as emotions such as hope drives political engagement, such as in Obama’s famous campaign, but democratic designs take a cold, unemotional approach to what attracts people to participate in the first place. I argue this rational-actor approach leads to democratic disengagement. In contrast, Martha Nussbaum argues for ‘love’ in politics (2015).

The literature is equivocal about the benefits of the internet to inclusiveness in democracy. On the positive, the fact participation is virtual rather than face-to-face, “may in principle empower engagement by citizens who are often excluded from traditional forms of participation” (Smith 2009: 152). Because citizens and other actors are not actually required to gather at a single physical location, then in principle very large scale conversations are possible (Ibid: 156). This can easily happen across borders, facilitating a transnational politics more inclusive than previously imaginable before the internet. Rushkoff emphasises the power of internet to extend collective autonomy, in contrast to the passive consumer model:

This population [of internet users] is made up not of customers to whom you must sell, or even constituents to whom you must pander, but of partners on whom you can rely and with whom you can act. Treat them as such, and you might be surprised by how much you can get done together. (Rushkoff, 2004: 65)

Less positively, low ICT proficiency could impact the level of engagement by participants (Smith 2009: 160); trolling can intimidate, marginalise and exclude people with abusive language (Coles and West, 2016). Worcman (2002) challenges the idea that the internet is analogous to ‘real-world’ society: “Digital division is cultural exclusion. But is digital inclusion cultural inclusion?”

Popular Control

Popular control “requires consideration of the degree that participants are able to influence different aspects of the decision making process” (Smith 2009: 16). An influential model for assessing the level of popular control is Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder of Citizen Participation with ‘manipulation’ at the bottom, ‘consultation’ in the middle and ‘citizen control’ at the top. Smith explains that popular control gets a lesser weighting by most strains of democratic theory:

“_{Much more attention is given to inclusiveness in both democratic theory and practice compared} to realising popular control (direct democrats aside). What is often missing from the design of most democratic institutions is any sense that citizens have effective control over significant elements of decision making” (2009: 26).

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Smith goes on to ask, “Are there procedures that can be put in place that ensure that outputs are given due consideration and weight in future political decisions” (Ibid: 27)? Moreover, through participative democratic initiatives, the social basis of the citizen-government relationship can change for the better. According to Fung and Wright (2003: 18), participative experiments “establish new channels for those most directly affected by targeted problems... to apply their knowledge, intelligence and interest to the formulation of solutions” (Bifulco, 2013: 178). Accountability is also a factor. If the deliberative democratic process fails to take into account citizens’ views, is there recourse? Accountability culture in politics can be a problem if it leads to blame and defensiveness (which actively encourages hiding of failure). The media encourages outrage, through sensationalization (Schlosberg, 2013).

Digital democracy has the potential to empower citizens. “Access to media technology empowers people to discuss how they might want to change the status quo” (Rushkoff, 2004: 63). Understandably, “E-participants’ satisfaction with government responsiveness is positively associated with their perceptions of influencing government decision making” (Kim and Lee, 2012: 819). Networking technologies allow for online collaboration in the implementation of new models, and the very real-world organisation of social activism and relief efforts (Ibid). “The internet is ungovernable and is made up of intelligent and autonomous nodes” argues Padilla (2013, in Moreno-Callabud, 2015: 141). In Spain, the ‘copyleft’ movement has effectively de-legitimised copyright since the nineties, partly due to the rise in _hacklabs(laboratories experimenting with new technologies to serve political ends) (Zapata, in Moreno Caballud, 2015: 150). “Post-media” voices in the digital sphere can recount their own versions of events and circumvent traditional media (Moreno Caballud, 2015: 215).

Not all are so optimistic about the power of the internet to empower. British filmmaker Adam Curtis argues that since the 1970s, governments, financiers, and technology utopians have given up on the complex "real world" and built a simple "fake world" that is run by corporations and kept stable by politicians (Hypernormalisation, 2016). In 2016 the British government passed the Investigatory Powers Bill, known as the ‘Snooper’s Charter’; it claimed to 'take the fight to the terrorists' but has been criticised for removing privacy for citizens’ sensitive data (Telegraph, 2016). Marinez argues that the internet constrains ways of doing things that influence the collective ways of communicating and producing, ‘creating feedback cycles between users and technology’ (2014a, in Moreno-Callabud, 2015: 143). Using the internet to challenge neoliberalism contains a contradiction because “technology for democracy comes itself from neoliberalism” (Moreno-Callabud, 2015: 141). So we must see the internet as an opportunity for democracy because of its openness and accessibility, whilst simultaneously being critical and reflexive in our evaluation of its workings, choice architecture, and elite control structures.

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Considered Judgment

“Learning without thought is labour lost; Thought without learning is perilous.” —Confucius, 551–479 b.c.

In this section I will consider Smith’s (2009) account of considered judgment, the facilitator role in deliberation designs, and finally, the impact of the internet on considered judgment.

Firstly, Smith argues that the “legitimacy of citizen participation in political decision making arguably rests on the capacity of citizens to make thoughtful and reflective judgements” (2009: 27-28).

My second point on considered judgment is that deliberation facilitators are a key element of many deliberative designs, but remain understudied in the literature thus far. Deliberative designs speak in general terms about informing citizens and guiding the conversation. This is in stark comparison to the literature on conflict mediation (Laws and Forester, 2007) which elaborates on best mediation practice in precise detail. The two most obvious roles of effective facilitator (that even casual facilitators would know instinctively) are to keep the discussion focused on a topic, and to keep a level of order, to calm down participants if things get too heated. Even the inexperienced facilitator may have to engage with the tangled emotions and conflicting thoughts that we all carry with us to varying degrees. More skilled facilitators would offer timely interjections in discussions for, to encourage ‘frame reflective discourse’ (Rein and Schön, 1993). There is evidence that suggests pondering your internal conflicts may help you stereotype others less. (Stern and Kleiman, 2015).

Thirdly and finally, with regards to digital democracy, Smith is cautious:

“The various designs indicate that while there is some potential to enhance the realisation of inclusiveness, transparency, efficiency and transferability, democratic and institutional gains cannot be taken for granted” (2009: 164).

As discussed in the ‘challenges to democracy’ section, a fragmented audience online in “filter bubbles” risks an equally fragmented knowledge base, with different sections of the population making judgements by only considering partial information (tailored by algorithms to confirm and reinforce their existing beliefs). On the positive, the internet has undeniably improved the access to information. Kim and Lee suggest that a sense of shared activity between citizens and representatives matters:

“[E-participation practices] rehearse and reinforce a key weakness of actually-existing democracies: the lack of meaningful opportunities for citizens to compare and contrast their reasons for holding views and to engage in such activity in the knowledge that public authorities

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and political representatives are similarly engaged” (2012: 819_).

So we are right to be equivocal about the role of the internet in considered judgement in democratic practice.

Transparency

In this section I will discuss: 1) the pitfalls of accountability culture, 2) a significant evidence base for adopting a more forgiving model of transparency, and 3) the impact of the internet on transparency in democracy.

When something is transparent, you can see through it, like glass. Transparency “consists of accuracy, clarity and openness or visibility” (Hargreaves, 2016: 124). In the social rather than physical world we think of transparency as being a way to hold the powerful to account, or accountability. In participatory democracy, this means the process needs to be open to scrutiny “not only to the participants, but also to the wider public” (Smith, 2009: 29). But accountability in Britain is often associated with mob justice, spearheaded by the tabloid press.

There are other models of transparency than the current popular conception of accountability. In The Six Secrets of Change, Michael Fullan (2011) advocates combining transparency with a non-judgmental culture that refrains from being punitive. In other words, “inquiry, not inquisition, is the key to transparency” (Hargreaves, 2016: 124). For Fullan, “positive pressure” is not punitive pressure; rather than punitive accountability, increased transparency “promotes openness, inquiry, better communication and a shared responsibility for improvement” (Hargreaves, 2016: 125). Evidence for this can be found in the medical world: in one hospital’s pediatric ward, implementation of the anonymous reporting system with training was associated with a statistically significant increase in the rate of reported medical errors (Taylor et al, 2007).

To take a whole-systems approach, democracies can learn from scrupulous learning from mistakes that happens in the airline industry that makes them “antifragile” (Taleb, 2003): they “[convert] disorder, error, mistakes, variability into fuel for improvement" and “with every single crash, airlines become safer, more reliable and more secure” (Pedersen, 2016). Likewise in basic research, when incidents are recorded anonymously, analyzed, discussed, and communicated so that a recurrence can be prevented and harm avoided by learning from past mistakes (Dirnagl et al, 2016). Through reporting without punitivity, we create a “mature error culture” and ultimately a “safer and more communicative environment” (Ibid). In democracy, transparency “centres reflection on the openness of proceedings” to both participants and the wider public (Smith 2009: 16). The question that follows is: can we apply the lessons of Fullan’s positive pressure, Dirnagl et al’s anonymously reported errors and and Taleb’s antifragile airlines to local government? Could municipalities become transparent in

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a way that helps democracy? It will be interesting to see how open or defensive the case’s representatives are.

Thirdly and finally, the internet offers opportunities to make democracy transparent. Transparency in media makes information available to those who never had access to it before (Rushkoff 2004: 63). However, the internet can also undermine transparency: accusations that Russian hackers were able to “breach” of the 2016 American elections “threatens future US elections” (Bloomberg, 2017). “Leaks” of official documents are hailed by activists as creating transparency, but condemned by governments as undermining national security. While the US government actively supports free internet and social media use abroad, their criticisms of the Wikileaks disclosures “reveal the bias in relation to transparency and democracy,” writes Pieterse (2012).

Developing an assessment tool

To develop a practical assessment tool, Elstub uses the same criteria as Smith and in his analysis table (2014: 405, recreated in table 2.3) adds a rather helpful division of steps in the process of democratic models. He does this to allow a comparative analysis of institutional devices and how effectively they can enact democratic goods across different decision-making stages, namely Agenda setting, Debate, Decision making, Implementation and Review (Ibid). He calls this the DePER (Deliberative Pragmatic Equilibrium Review) framework, and says it can be adapted to any political context, but here is specifically adapted to the UK. This DePER framework will result in a deeper understanding of “what different institutions can really achieve” in relation to enacting deliberative democracy (Elstub, 2014: 406).

Exactly how one judges what is ‘low’ or ‘high’ is difficult to determine specifically here: “As there is no absolute standard to judge by, it is necessarily a relative comparison” (Ibid: 404). Elstub simply says that a judgment will draw on a range of quantitative and qualitative empirical data, which “is not easy to combine and reconcile” (Ibid). Elstub addresses the subjectivity of the judgment head on, saying that “normative judgement is also being applied” which brings the danger of “complete relativism:, and concludes the framework’s users are responsible for justifying their judgements (Ibid: 404).

When applying this framework, I will justify my judgments based on the evidence before me throughout (both one at a time, and in summary). My reasoning will inevitably be at least partially subjective, so to avoid relativism I will explain my judgments each time. It is noteworthy that Elstub chooses comparison as the benchmark of a standard, because this has the strength of real-world applicability, but the weakness of abandoning ambition by setting the benchmark based on what is currently available. I am aware the five stages of the process will be applicable to the case as they are features of any democratic program.

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Table 2.3: Elstub’s (2014) democratic assessment tool 4 Case

Inclusiveness Popular Control Considered judgment

Transparency

Agenda setting low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high Debate low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high Decision making low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high Implementation low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high Review low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high low/moderate/high

Conclusion

There are obviously more ways to assess the quality of democratic practices than the Smith’s (2009) four democratic goods that I have laid out here. Smith includes two further criteria that I have chosen to leave out of my main assessment tool and consign to later discussion: efficiency and transferability (2009: 29-30). I have done this for two reasons. First, efficiency is a double-edged sword with democratic processes, especially deliberative processes: it takes time to deliberate, and you cannot have the same quality discussion in five minutes that you could in an hour. So I prefer to reflect on this question in my analysis of this case and concluding comments, to avoid locking in the presumption that faster is better (of course blatant inefficiency is unhelpful but this is about defining the quality of a process and not merely its speed). Second, transferability is a nebulous criterion that cannot be easily judged given the array of local, and national contexts. The third sub-question of this paper is precisely to what extent the realisation of the four main democratic goods ( inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment and transparency) can be transferred to other contexts. If a process does not rank highly in these four criteria, we would not wish to transfer it to other settings. So again I defer this question. There is no shortage of possible criteria: ‘procedural independence of civil society’ and ‘top-down or bottom-up’ (Sintomer et al, 2012: 28) are just two, so discretion is required.

4_{Elstub produces a second set of the five left-hand labels, for comparison of two systems. For my case} and the scope of this paper as a single case study, one will suffice.

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iv) Emotions and democracy

This section will involve a critique of pure reason (to quote Kant); an argument for adding emotion to our conception of deliberation, a consideration of empathy as the most important emotion, an evaluation of the paradoxes of trust, a plea for emotional facilitation, and a query into the lack of other positive emotions.

Firstly, whilst deliberative democracy prioritises rationality, growing body of psychological r esearch shows that we are very imperfect reasoners: Nyhan and Reifler found in their study that when watching news coverage that covers two points of view, people actively stopped listening to information that contradicts their opinion (2010: 304). They called this the _{backfire effect and is} ‘consistent with a wide array of research ’ (Ibid). Another name for the backfire effect is confirmation bias.This means that “_{when people would like a certain idea/concept to be true, they end up believing} it to be true” (Heshmat, 2015) and “once we have formed a view, we embrace information that confirms that view while ignoring, or rejecting, information that casts doubt on it” (Ibid). Thus, we may become prisoners of our assumptions. I interviewed participation scholar Martin Carcasson (who also runs public deliberation events, and trains his college students to become facilitators) in a call from Amsterdam to his office in Colorado, and he told me that confirmation bias is the_{single worst}cognitive bias that he encounters, and the one he sees most often (2017).

Secondly and relatedly, the omission of the affective element of deliberation strikes me as a major gap in the literature. Richards (2007) claims that ‘emotional governance’ is greatly needed. Trump, “even if he’s wrong on the economics, he’s telling people he has heard them and will be responsive to their grievances and fears. And they are starved for that” (Chickering and Turner, 2017: 15). “Journalists have a major role to play in shaping the profile of feelings which define a national emotional public sphere, as do celebrities and other public figures” (Richards, 2013: 126). With headlines such as “this tidal wave of migrants could be the biggest threat to Europe since the war” (Daily Mail, 2015) tabloids have spread fear of migration persistently. British society offers very few outlets for this backlog of fear and frustration. Sheff claims “repression of emotions is a key institution in modern societies,” and that it “underlies both interpersonal and intergroup violence” (2013: 84). What is more, “emotional expressions are contagious if groups carry a backlog of unexpressed emotions”” (Ibid: 91). Sheff’s claim is supported by the fact that hate crimes in the UK ‘surged by 42%’ post-referendum (Independent, 2016). Therefore I argue that we need to design deliberative systems that take emotions seriously and that emotions should be included in Smith’s (2009) criterion of considered judgement.

My third point is that, if we agree that a participatory democratic system promoting considered judgment in deliberation requires an appreciation of emotion, a strong contender for the priority

Participatory democracy in England : an assessment of local government influence on democratic engagement