EU Security Governance

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Modern security challenges and the impact on European diplomacy: an

inter-institutional analysis of NATO, CSDP and the EEAS

MA THESIS IN EUROPEAN STUDIES Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: Valdano Hoogwout Student number: 10247777

Main Supervisor: dhr. dr. C.W.C. Reijnen Second Supervisor: dhr. prof. dr. M.J. Wintle

Email address: valdano.hoogwout@student.uva.nl

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INTRODUCTION

The security challenges of today's world are transcending the divide between internal and external or domestic and international security matters. This linkage between internal and external security threats may very well be one of the driving forces behind the transformation of the European security order. Terrorism, organized crime and weak states present problems for security both within and outside state borders, which makes 'security governance' a pressing matter for the European Union as well. The globalization of security threats is affecting the organizational structure of security governance in such a way that internal and external security agencies are unable to oversee the vast and increasingly complex security environment as purely individual institutions. Therefore, in an effort to keep security matters manageable, various European leaders and policy makers have called for increased cooperation between Member States in the EU.1_{This resolution was backed in 2003 when the EU presented its} European Security Strategy, mentioning the need for an increasingly overarching and more all-encompassing approach in Europe to properly manage internal and external security issues.

The overlap of internal and external security matters necessitated a response from the EU as a whole, because they exposed the shortcomings of purely nationally oriented responses. This is why initiatives for a more multilaterally organized, horizontally integrated security policy have started to take off since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In a sense, these initiatives for a more comprehensive European security order seem to indicate a move away from the classic state-centred Westphalian model of security organization.2_{Traditionally, security was predominantly perceived as a} matter to be handled by each state individually. In the Westphalian model it is the state which possesses the only lawful right to the use of force, which it applies only after making a clear distinction between issues of national security and issues of external security. Now, with the calls for a more EU-wide approach to security governance, it is interesting to assess in this context whether a true shift from Westphalian state diplomacy to a post-Westphalian model of multi-stakeholder diplomacy can be identified. Westphalian state diplomacy and multi-stakeholder diplomacy will be further outlined and discussed in the first chapter, which contains the theoretical framework of this thesis.

In essence, the aim of this thesis is to investigate to what extent the globalization of security challenges gives an incentive for a shift within EU Security Governance from 'classic' Westphalian state diplomacy to a new post-Westphalian multi-stakeholder network diplomacy. The main purpose

1 Ursula C. Schroeder, The Organization of European Security Governance: Internal and external security in transition, Abingdon: Routledge 2011, p. 1.

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will be to examine how modern security challenges and hybrid threats affect the way in which diplomacy is conducted in the CSDP, NATO and EEAS. The state of affairs between NATO and the European member states in the CSDP may become problematic. The United States demand more effort from European member states and their national defence operations, for instance by urging European governments to increase their defence budget to match 2% of the GDP, the agreed NATO budget contribution rule. Furthermore, the challenges of a changing global environment led to the EU decision of creating the EEAS. The EEAS as an institution stands for a more ''joined-up'' approach to European foreign and security policy, which corresponds with a 21st_{century shift from the nationally oriented} Westphalian state diplomacy to a more interconnected and globalized multi-stakeholder type diplomacy.

Arguably, a substantial part of European security governance is shaped by the path set out by NATO. For Europe, NATO is the institution that provides collective defence – usually through the means of military missions or crisis management operations. Since the NATO assumes control over the execution of these operations, it remains the most important source of security provision for Europe. However, in recent decades the European security architecture has become more fragmented with the introduction of a separate EU based Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP was established to gain more independence from the USA in security and defence matters relevant for Europe, which also altered the relationship between NATO and the EU. While the introduction of the CSDP has arguably led to more military cooperation between the NATO and the EU, it is still a source of tension between various NATO member states and the EU. The shifts and fragmentations in

European security governance caused by the introduction of new policies such as the CSDP in the 1990s can be important for the workings of diplomacy:

Since the mid-1990s, crisis management diplomacy in Europe has seldom been the sole responsibility of one institution, rather two or more institutions often work together

cooperatively. In 2001 NATO and the EU worked in tandem at the diplomatic level to diffuse a brewing internal crisis in Macedonia, with each bringing different sets of possible pressures and incentives to the resolution of the crisis.3

Therefore, the complexities in the relationship between NATO and the EU/CSDP are discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. It will include an analysis of contemporary security and defence

challenges and their effects on the diplomatic relations between the EU and the US.

Also, since the formal enactment of the EEAS, this diplomatic body should not be overlooked

3 M. Webber, S. Croft, J. Howorth, T. Terriff and E. Krahmann, 'The governance of European security', Review of

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whenever European diplomacy is discussed. Even though it was established fairly recently in 2009, the EEAS is an important actor in European diplomacy because it serves as the main diplomatic body of the EU. Therefore, it is necessary to examine what the diplomatic competences of the EEAS are in the realm of security governance. The functioning of the EEAS and its role in multi-stakeholder diplomacy will be analyzed in the third chapter, as well as its goal to bridge the gap between the intergovernmental and the supranational in the CSDP.

The fourth chapter will contain an analysis in the context of inter-institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU in the realm of European security governance. Making use of interview sources, it will feature an assessment of the diplomatic dynamics, organizational practices and conflict regulation between the two institutions in light of modern security threats—as well as an examination of the prospects for their future relationship in terms of security provision.

The concluding section will assess whether emerging security challenges and their influence on institutions such as the NATO and the EEAS have indeed contributed to a diplomacy shift in European security governance from a state-centred Westphalian model to a post-Westphalian multi-stakeholder model.

METHODOLOGY

The selection of sources for this thesis is mixed. It consists of primary sources in the form of strategy and policy documents issued by both NATO and the EU. This primary source material provides an insight in the ambitions and desires of NATO and EU institutions such as the EEAS, especially on the subject of Europe's security provision and the plans for cooperation in this respect. Furthermore, secondary source material is used frequently in the form of academic articles, as well as a number of policy briefs and diplomacy papers on European security and the relationship between the EU and NATO in this field. Additionally, as a primary source and qualitative method of acquiring information, a number of structured interviews were conducted in order to gain a more in-depth view on the

diplomatic dynamics in European security governance. For this thesis three interviews were used, starting with the Deputy Assistant Secretary General at NATO, followed by the Doctoral Researcher Daniel Fiott from the Institute for European Studies (IES) and lastly an EU official working at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). This particular selection of interviewees provided a useful source of information for the subject matter of this work, mainly due to their different professional backgrounds which in turn led to a better understanding of the many diverging institutional and research perspectives.

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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of this thesis will include a focus on Westphalian state diplomacy, the possibility of a move towards post-Westphalia, and the ingredients of multi-stakeholder diplomacy. This section discusses the theoretical components of these three concepts and explores whether a shift to a post-Westphalian world order can be identified and what elements it might consist of. The goal is to discuss what could be the main components of this transformation and how current expressions of diplomacy are in turn affected by this.

1.1. WESTPHALIAN STATE DIPLOMACY

The term 'Westphalia' is ambiguous in the sense that it refers to an event, an idea, a process and a normative score sheet.4_{The event it refers to is the Peace of Westphalia, established at the end of the} Thirty Years War, which spanned the period from 1618 to 1648. This Peace is commonly regarded as the starting point for the structuring of the world order that has encompassed multiple centuries and is still active at present, albeit with a number of adjustments over time. The idea that came forth from the negotiation of the Peace of Westphalia was the idea of Westphalian state diplomacy. This type of diplomacy is based on a world order in which membership can only be claimed by sovereign states with their own delineated territories.5_{International Relations (IR) academics have based many of their} international diplomacy theories on the foundational principles that were formed during the Peace of Westphalia. One can say that it truly takes up a central role in the academic study of international relations. Even more so after the Cold War, when an increasing number of articles were published which did not only refer to the Peace, but also to the 'Westphalian model' or 'Westphalian order'. For a better understanding of diplomatic development and its theorization throughout the decades, it is important to identify why the Peace of Westphalia has become so ingrained in IR theory and how this has influenced the thinking of academics involved in this field of study.6

In the first stages of IR academic literature, in the 1930s and 1940s, the Peace of Westphalia was generally regarded as a historic event which spawned a set of general guidelines designed to ensure collective security amongst states. The dominant view of scholars in this period was that the Peace created a degree of order in the way states would interact and cooperate amongst each other. One

4 R. Falk, 'Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia', The Journal of Ethics (2002), Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 312. 5 Ibid.

6 S. Schmidt., 'To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International Relations Literature', International Studies Quarterly (2011), 55, p. 602.

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significant proponent of this view was the German scholar Heinrich von Treitschke, who first coined the term Realpolitik. With this term Von Treitschke explained his vision on international politics, which for him consisted of continuous struggle for existence between states, often through the violent means of war. According to him, no authority could exist above the state since states possessed absolute sovereignty. Nevertheless, when discussing the Peace of Westphalia Von Treitschke mentioned that this event could be beneficial for the establishment of international law and a 'society of states'.7_{For him,} the guidelines of the Peace could not direct the nature of the relationship between states—as would be the case in a Westphalian system—since states were completely independent and absolutely sovereign. However, Von Treitschke did propose a role for the Peace in establishing a manner for states to interact with a degree of order. With this statement, Von Treitschke fit in with much of the international law literature from this period, which featured discussions about the Peace of Westphalia and the ordering function it could potentially fulfill in international affairs.8

Thus, the Peace would not merely signify a historic event, or even an instrument in ordering international affairs, as its meaning also became strongly attached to the analytical concept of the 'Westphalian international order'. This conceptual transformation meant that the focus shifted from the general set of guidelines created during the Peace, to a few core elements. Two of them, the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention, have remained at the heart of IR theory and Westphalian state diplomacy. In the case of state sovereignty, a number of scholars from the field of international law stressed the importance of sovereign power and state independence in the first half of the twentieth century. In doing so, a few of them found themselves opposed to the establishment of an international community or society of states after the Peace of Westphalia. International lawmen like Sterling Edmunds and Tor Hugo Wistrand stated that if state sovereignty remained the highest form of power, no state had to obey to the rules of an international community of states unless it was willing to do so.9

The principle of nonintervention, and its development after the Peace, formed a strong component of the works of Quincy Wright and John Herz, who wrote influential articles on

international relations in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Wright, the Peace gave rise to the norms of nonintervention because it set out to free international politics from religion and ideology. In order to successfully establish this, a ruler or sovereign would be enabled to choose a faith for his people independently without intervention from any other power. Similarly, John Herz viewed the Peace of

7 Ibid., p. 605. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., p. 607.

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1648 as a schism between a Medieval Europe where political units lacked territorial sovereignty, and a 'modern era' where the same political units were suddenly autonomous and freed from outside

interference. Scholars Doris Graber and David Mitrany subscribed to this argument, emphasizing that the Peace was central to rise of the state as an individual sovereign political unit—with no obligation to conform to the rules of a possible international society:

The themes of sovereignty, territoriality, and especially nonintervention are central to the arguments of these writers and are identified by them as the principal legacies of the Peace of Westphalia, suggesting a relative narrowing in the 1950s and 1960s of the discourse of the Peace’s impact on the international system.10

From the 1950s onwards the general discourse mentioned the Peace as a foundation of sovereignty, territoriality and nonintervention. In this light, the Peace can in fact be regarded as the starting point of a modern international 'Westphalian' system consisting of autonomous states with undisputed authority over their own territory. This assumption is certainly logical, since a Westphalian model based on these principles provides policy-makers with a clear world view through which international relations can easily be studied and examined. The Westphalian world view is an analytical cornerstone for

proponents of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, who claim that each state can be viewed as rational, unified and autonomous in nature.11_{This claim is central to numerous sociological and} constructivist theories of international politics. Furthermore it is often used as a framework by

academics and other observers who believe that the sovereignty of states is challenged by elements of a possible post-Westphalian order.

However, according to the scholar Krasner this is a flawed line of reasoning. He states that the Westphalian model is controversial because it proves to be an inaccurate framework for the description of states. Krasner argues that states do not always behave rationally, for instance when those in power have been influenced by external forces, leading to loss of their autonomy. Such territorial violations of the sovereign state model occur when authority is not solely exercised within defined geographical borders. An important example of a territorial violation of the sovereign state system is the European Union, which exerts authority over its sovereign member states through the use of supranational institutions and the legislative formulation and implementation of European Union law.12_Nonetheless, Krasner believes it is incorrect to argue that contemporary states are only losing sovereignty due to violations of the principles of the Westphalian system. According to Krasner, violations of Westphalia

10 Ibid., p. 612.

11 S.D. Krasner, 'Compromising Westphalia', International Security, (1995/96), Vol. 20, No. 3., p. 115. 12 S.D. Krasner, 'Rethinking the sovereign state model', Review of International Studies (2001), Vol. 27, p. 18.

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can be identified throughout history, since there existed no measures in international politics that could have prevented them from happening. Over the course of history rulers therefore turned to other separate principles as well, such as human rights, minority rights, democracy, communism and fiscal responsibility. For Krasner, this reinforces his idea that Westphalia was never the exclusive system that many believe has become so inseparable from international affairs.13

Westphalia was mainly challenged through four political methods: conventions, contracting, coercion and imposition. In the case of conventions, rulers subscribe to an overall agreement—e.g. human rights legislation—with the expectation that all agreeing parties will reap benefits from it. Conventions imply that the rulers who subscribe to them can still, optionally, operate independently without depending on other parties. Contracting also features an overall agreement, but with certain terms stating that rulers accept a violation of their own state's sovereignty under the condition that the others who are part of the deal also fulfill their promises. The method of coercion involves a

relationship between stronger and weaker states, where the stronger states often uses a range of threats or even aggressive tactics to force obedience from the weaker state. In addition, the stronger state can also impose harmful economic or trade measures, which often prove detrimental to the position of the weaker states. The weaker state is then either forced into compliance, or into a position of resistance. When it comes to imposition, the stronger state is so powerful that the weaker state it targets can do nothing other than to comply with its demands.14_{The bottom line of Krasner's argument is that there} has been room for more principles besides those of Westphalia, it is important to note that it was still possible for rulers to act outside of the confines of the Westphalian model.

1.2. POST-WESTPHALIAN ORDER

A Westphalian type of world order can be discerned if one is focused on the principles of complete sovereignty, territoriality and nonintervention.15_{These principles have certainly exerted influence on} the international political arena. Thus, on the one hand the Westphalian model so frequently referred to as the holy grail of IR is indeed important, though on the other it can also be by-passed. In the

contemporary world, this by-pass of the Westphalian system may not solely occur through instances like international conventions, contracting, coercion and imposition. Rather, a number of academics have identified the ongoing process of globalization and the 9/11 terrorist attacks as two seemingly

13 S.D. Krasner, 'Compromising Westphalia', p. 115.

14 S.D. Krasner, 'Rethinking the sovereign state model', p. 18.

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separate events that have nevertheless altered the practice of geopolitics. Both events have contributed substantially to the rise of more security oriented geopolitics. The world order characterized by

predominantly Westphalian type diplomatic relations between sovereign states may be in transition as a consequence:

Both [globalization and the 9/11 terror attacks] challenge in complementary ways the regulative capabilities of states in the face of profound challenges associated with the rise of the non-territorial potency of networked forms of information-based organization.16

Therefore, the diplomatic system of sovereign states which would normally rely on self-regulation when confronted with a variety of challenges, has now possibly become something questionable.

For a better understanding of these complexities, it is helpful to place the development of the Westphalian framework in a historical context. The height of the Westphalian world order came after World War II, when decolonization brought an expansion of the state system to Asia and Africa. Moreover, the decades of Cold War were characterized by a bipolar bloc of two big states—the USSR and the United States—which controlled global economic policy as well as war, peace and security issues together with their own bloc of allied states. Juridically, this order was written in international law through principles as the equality of states, sovereign immunity and nonintervention.17_{In juridical} terms, this ordering of the international community has also provided the rules for membership and participation in all of the important international institutions. States need to be fully sovereign to be eligible for participation in these international bodies. The United Nations for instance, is composed of sovereign states and deals with matters of human rights, civil struggle and governing ideologies in its Charter. However, this Charter states that all of the aforementioned matters fall under ''domestic jurisdiction'', which means states can disregard the UN propositions. This dependence on sovereign states in a Westphalian type of world order in turn signifies the limited power of the UN.18

The sovereign state order also accommodated significant differences between states in terms of size, wealth, power and international influence. As a result of these differences a certain form of nineteenth and twentieth century 'global governance' came to be, which relied heavily on the actions of colonial and imperial Great Powers like the United Kingdom and France. This was later deemed a form of 'hegemonic geopolitics' that was founded on Eurocentrism and imperialism. Hegemonic geopolitics was challenged by the rise of the US and the Soviet Union, who claimed the roles of two opposing

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

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superpowers, created their own alliances, and divided the international world into a bipolar order during the Cold War. On top of this, the development of nuclear weaponry and other weapons of mass destruction meant that no state would be immune to such an attack. As the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union disintegrated, IR scholars who were proponents of Westphalian realism viewed the new hegemonic power of the US as a defining moment in the history of the sovereign state model. In their vision, the end of the Cold War created a shift towards a contemporary 'unipolar' international society which is currently still active because it is supported through economic, technological, diplomatic, cultural, and military instruments of influence.19_{This marked a moving away from the traditional} Westphalian system characterized by the search for balance of power between states, to a system which was led predominantly by the US as a single state seeking to control and sustain its leading position.20

A shift to a post-Westphalian structure for world order would mean a gradual abandonment of the unipolar model based on the predominance of the US. Such an abandonment could be caused by a number of transformative processes that have gained momentum in contemporary times. The

international law and IR scholar Richard Falk identifies two main groups of actors who currently represent the driving forces behind a move towards post-Westphalian consciousness and perception. Firstly, banks and major global corporations operate on a transnational scale and view the whole world as an interconnected economic system of production, consumption and investment. Secondly, there are transnational actors linked to civil society who perceive the world as a connected human community where every person's basic human rights and needs should be respected. Both groups of transnational actors strive to create partnerships with governments, with globally operating multinationals often receiving support from national governments to fulfill their aims.21

Thus, an anchor of a transition towards a 21st_{century post-Westphalian world could be the} dynamic force of globalization. According to Falk, a truly post-Westphalian order has not yet been brought into existence, but 'Westphalian frames for international reality no longer generate confidence, [although] globalization as another framing is too vague and uncrystalyzed to be a serious candidate for replacement.'22_{Certainly though, some doubts have been expressed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks} regarding the feasibility of 'old school' resource-based international diplomacy and foreign policy practices. In addition to this, the 21st_{century is characterized by a stronger belief in the notion that} threats to both national and international security can originate from failing or weak states and a variety

19 Ibid., p. 314. 20 Ibid., pp. 314-315. 21 Ibid., p. 321. 22 Ibid., p. 322.

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of non-state actors. This challenges the classic Westphalian system of international relations, which is based on the principle of non-intervention but nevertheless includes cooperation as well as conflict between lawfully independent sovereign states. In this format, threats to international security are caused mainly by aggressive states whose actions disrupt the previous power balance status quo.23

The 'failed states' theory focuses on the presence of inherently weak states where the respective central governments are unable to maintain control over public order, lack the means to ensure

continuous border control, and have difficulty keeping public institutions and services functioning properly. The reasons as to why a state might 'fail' in this regard may be attributed to a poorly

functioning economy in terms of performance and distribution, a low standard of human welfare and relatively frequent occasions of conflict within and beyond its borders. When these factors are present, it is likely that a government will experience trouble maintaining central control and authority over its territory. This situation is perceived by a number of scholars as a strong indicator of state failure, which suggests that central state authority and control are not fixed and can in fact crumble under pressure.24

The debate surrounding the failed states concept is roughly divided into three main lines of thought. The first group of scholars agrees wholeheartedly with the idea that weak or failed states are responsible for a shift in international politics which has the potential to give rise to a new post-Westphalian world order. For them, weak and failing states have become the largest challenge for international order—in turn posing enormous consequences for contemporary thought on general security and insecurity. The second group of scholars and analysts is more critical of the failed states theory, since according to them it is not possible to define and analyze failed states in a clearly

objective and methodological manner. The last body of scholars believes the idea of failed states should be rejected altogether because in their eyes the concept is politicized, ethnocentric, hegemonic and interventionist in nature.25

All in all, a number of transformative and predominantly transnational forces are active on the contemporary world stage. These include globally operating corporations and civil society groups that in the wake of globalization are actively looking for alignment with governments. Furthermore, the heightened threat and fear of international terrorism marked by the aftermath of the 9/11 attack and subsequent attacks on European and American soil, have sparked an increase in security oriented

23 E. Newman, 'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World', Contemporary Security

Policy (2009), 30:3, p. 422.

24 Ibid.

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geopolitics.26_{Additionally, 'failed states' may also contribute to a feeling of insecurity in the}

international community. Without a doubt, ill-governed and aggressive states who look to start conflicts either within or outside their borders will always be potentially hazardous to global stability. To

characterize these states as having 'failed' in my opinion is a bridge too far, because this perspective of failure largely originates from a political subjectivity of us versus them. This makes it hard to verify with methodological and objective standards at what point exactly a state has 'failed'. Nevertheless, taking all this complex matter into account, some analysts are convinced that the composition of the international system is changing:

[…] sovereignty is dramatically eroding; domestic and international politics cannot be

distinguished; rulers cannot unilaterally govern critical state functions such as monetary policy; multilateralism is coming to dominate other forms of diplomacy.27

A possible example of such a multilateralism that has began to impact other forms of diplomacy is the growth of multi-stakeholder diplomacy, which will be discussed in the following section.

1.3. MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

The constant and dynamic process of globalization is tightly linked to the emergence of multi-stakeholder diplomacy. In this sense, globalization has made an obvious impact on the conduct and content of diplomacy. Faster means of transportation and more advanced information and

telecommunication technologies (ICT) have opened up more possibilities for direct interaction between states, markets, non-governmental sectors, and academia. This increased interaction has created tighter connections between world regions, which in turn also heightened the levels of global interdependence. Traditionally bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activities are now said to be supplemented by a growing polylateral, multistakeholder diplomacy.28

Multistakeholder diplomacy can be defined as a diplomatic method with the goal to provide an environment of equal participation for all parties included in discussions and debates on particular issues. Its proponents state that it is a new form of diplomacy based on the principles of mutual recognition and trust and on shared expertise and information. The multistakeholder approach to diplomacy seeks a synergy between state and non-state actors so they can effectively cooperate on finding solutions to current problems of global development, human resources, and environment,

26 R. Falk, 'Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia', p. 311. 27 S.D. Krasner, 'Compromising Westphalia', p. 150.

28 Jordan Kurbalija and Valentin Katrandjiev eds., Multi-stakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities, Genève: DiploFoundation 2006, p. vii.

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amongst others. Multistakeholder diplomacy is based on the concept that state bureaucracies alone cannot solve the challenges of today, regardless of the power a state may possess. Some academics indeed argue that diplomacy today is less state-centric and more multistakeholder in substance. To support their arguments they refer to UN-led multilateral summits on sustainable development, gender and human rights issues, world trade, the information society, and internet governance.29_{All of these} are perceived as illustrations marking the increase of non-state actor contributions in the preparatory processes and outcomes of diplomatic negotiations. Additionally, various international governmental organizations have enabled non-state actors to participate in their conferences. Allowing for increased cooperation between non-state actors and the international community of states may result in broader support for the implementation of certain international projects and actions.30

Westphalian state diplomacy is often viewed by scholars in IR as the most predominant

discourse of diplomacy from roughly the 16th to the 20th century. Westphalian type diplomacy has its roots in the system of sovereign states, and it is important to assess how multistakeholder diplomacy relates to this. Is it responsible for a fundamental shift in the character of diplomacy, or just a minor change in ways of communication that have existed in international politics for several centuries?31

29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 15.

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2. NATO VERSUS CSDP

The initial purpose of this chapter is to give a historical overview of the forces and events that have impacted the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, the changing state of affairs between the NATO and the CSDP will be discussed in light of European security governance, assessing to what extent NATO remains Europe's key collective security provider. In order to gain further insight in the nature of diplomatic cooperation between the NATO and the EU, this section features an examination of the main actors involved herein and at what level they operate.

2.1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The historical development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has not remained free from contradiction. In the early 1950s at the start of the Cold War period, efforts by member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) to establish a European Defence Community (EDC) were not successful. As a consequence, the NATO attained more and more strength and importance. Eventually, NATO assumed its role as the core institution for the handling of EEC member states' foreign and security policies. Despite harsh criticism of NATO during De Gaulle's French presidency in the 1950s and '60s, the institution still remained at the heart of Western European countries' foreign policies. This situation also allowed for a further deepening of the historically tight bond between EEC member states and the US. The connection between the EEC and the US determined the direction of the debate about European security, East-West relations and the global balance in general.32

The strong link between Europe and the US in terms of security and defence has largely been created by a concept of burden-sharing that was transatlantic in scope. For some decades after the 1950s, this transatlantic connection was tightly embedded in the NATO framework. Nevertheless, the idea of burden-sharing sometimes formed a significant source of tension between NATO members. It even led to multiple instances of serious debate on whether Europe should assume responsibility for its own security and defence matters. This debate often appeared at times when the state of global security or the perception thereof was changing rapidly.33_{For instance, in the early 1990s after the end of the}

32 M. Smith, 'The framing of European foreign and security policy', Journal of European Public Policy (2003), 10:4, p. 559.

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Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a sudden transformation in the international division of powers. The stable bipolar bloc consisting of the US and its allies on one side and the Soviet Union with its satellite states on the other had structured the international arena for decades. The end of the Cold War disrupted this status quo and made the question whether Europe should provide for its own protection very relevant, since it was no longer necessary for the US to shield its European allies from Soviet influence.

Despite the changing global situation, NATO remained the most important institution for collective defence purposes, even though the need for continued collective defence seemed to decrease after the Cold War. Still, the assurance of protection by all other NATO members under Article V of The Washington Treaty remains an essential and powerful mechanism which even led to further expansion of NATO in the 1990s and 2000s, due to numerous requests for membership. While Article V remains at the heart of NATO, as an institution it has also assumed an active role in the changing European security environment. With the presentation of its 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO announced a shifting away from the central focus on territorial defence. In 1999, NATO issued another Strategic Concept which contained goals for a broader approach to security next to the traditional approach which concentrated mainly on territorial defence and security matters.34_{This gradual shift of focus by} NATO has shaped the increasingly more complex contents of European security governance.

Furthermore, even though NATO occupies a central position when it comes to providing collective and mainly military security for Europe, it is not the only institution with these interests at heart. An example of this is the fact that NATO tasks itself with specific parts of collective security, such as leading new military missions and performing crisis management operations consisting of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. What is exemplary for the gradual transformation of the

European security governance realm into a multi-stakeholder-type environment, is the fact that in 1992 NATO stated it wanted to conduct global military crisis management operations if either the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the United Nations (UN) asked for it. In 1991, NATO issued a statement saying the two collective security organizations OSCE and the UN, including others, were essential in maintaining security in Europe in the growingly complex situation.35 In its 1991 Rome Declaration, NATO worded this approach as follows:

The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one

34 M. Webber, S. Croft, J. Howorth, T. Terriff and E. Krahmann, 'The governance of European security', Review of

International Studies (2004), Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 9.

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institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other.36

The further division of security matters in Europe was also propelled by NATO since it assisted in the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which set out to increase the level of Europeanness in NATO. This would in turn enable European states to conduct military missions without full dependency on the US. The continued support for the ESDI initiative ultimately led to the development of the CSDP from 1999 onwards. In the late 1990s, it seemed that the move from

European political cooperation (EPC) towards deeper cooperation within the CFSP was indeed fully in progress, as member states developed plans for increased defence cooperation with the inclusion of 'hard' military capabilities for each EU member state through the CSDP. As a result, dependence on US military interference would be limited greatly. This transformation was spurred on by negative

outcomes of EU military missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the installment of additional capabilities for the CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty. At the time a strengthening of common European foreign policy looked plausible. Still, the actual commitments towards this goal remained vague and the continued dependency on the United States for many foreign policy efforts meant that the direction of a shared European foreign policy still lacked some clarity.37

2.2. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN THE 21

st

_CENTURY

The sequence of events following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, such as the declaration of the 'war on terror' by US President George W. Bush and the imminent war with Iraq, exposed divisions between leading EU member states like Germany, France and Britain. As a result, the member states failed to formulate a clear and strong collective response to these crises. Analysts and academics such as C. Hill and A. Lieven viewed this failure as a substantial setback for the development of a European foreign policy, and there were great doubts as to whether unified European diplomacy and coordinated defence operations would even have a future.38 _{However, others argue that the war on terror actually led to more} cooperation in European security, due to an increase in the amount of different participating actors in

36 NATO, ‘Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (''The Rome Declaration'')', Rome, 8 November 1991, para 3,

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23846.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 03-05-2017. 37 M. Smith, 'The framing of European foreign and security policy', pp. 556-557.

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the field. Those agreeing with this argument would state that this rise in the number of different actors has led to the emergence of the multi-stakeholder model in European security governance. For instance, the war on terrorism brought forth deeper communication and intelligence sharing between NATO and numerous national intelligence officials, national ministry officials, national police forces, and financial sector officials. Furthermore, on the institutional level, NATO believed it was best to cooperate with former enemies on the basis of a policy of political outreach. Political outreach would give NATO the ability to communicate with former enemies and non-members on security matters. Consequentially, in order to maintain this policy, NATO has enacted within its organization a variety of connected bilateral and multilateral committees and meetings.39_{These are set up with the aim to properly handle security} and protective issues with non-member states. The most important committee created as a result of political outreach policy is the European Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which is multilateral in nature and includes meetings on political and security related themes between NATO's 19 member states and 27 other non-member partner countries.40

Decisive in NATO's continued leading role as Europe's primary security provider in the 21st century has been its idea and policy of enlargement. This enlargement policy was strongly backed by the US and eventually led to three new members joining the organization in 1999. Also, in 2002 as much as seven states were invited to join an important NATO summit in Prague, and later on possible reasons for membership were discussed in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Sweden and Austria. The ongoing interest in NATO membership by European countries has affirmed NATO's position as Europe's most important institution in terms of security provision. NATO enlargement throughout Europe naturally strengthens commitment to the organization on the continent, while at the same time making the core of the organization more European. The US will still remain the most influential NATO member state for some time, but the addition of more European states will most likely slowly develop NATO's focus from traditionally transatlantic to more regional and Europe-oriented.41

The shift in orientation from transatlantic to European has often been identified as a process of 'Europeanisation'. Authors such as R. Ladrech, C. Radaell and V.A. Schmidt apply the term to describe changes in domestic policy under the influence of supranational developments, while others such as S.S. Andersen and K.A. Eliassen use the term to refer to the shift of a certain policy field to the European level.42_{The process of Europeanisation is suggested to have been spurred on in the} mid-39 M. Webber, S. Croft, J. Howorth, T. Terriff and E. Krahmann, 'The governance of European security', p. 11. 40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 13. 42 Ibid., p. 14.

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1990s by the US, where those with political power in Washington felt an urgency to hand over more responsibility to Europe to decide on its own security matters. While the US indeed wanted for Europe to gain more authority over its own security provision, Washington insisted the majority of decisive influence should remain in the hands of the US. Against this background the steps were taken to create ESDI within NATO. Although the development of ESDI turned out to progress slowly, the commitment to its foundation meant a political breakthrough because it signaled that the US desired to give the EU more authority over Europe's security environment, while at the same time it showed that the European states were also determined to gain more control over their own security and defence issues.

Nevertheless, the ESDI proved to be insufficient in reaching the goal of increased European security responsibility. Therefore, it was necessary to build in substantial military and institutional competences in the CFSP that was launched earlier in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. This is why France and Great-Britain issued a joint statement on European defence in 1998, which contained a strong intention to move towards an ESDP (now CSDP) under the umbrella of the EU.43

All these organizational and institutional developments point to an increasingly complex task when it comes to managing the European security environment. Ofcourse, ultimately the national governments retain the most decisive influence through meetings in the European Council, but the process of policy making in the security realm becomes increasingly layered since it is partially shaped by a variety of additional actors and stakeholders. In this sense there does seem to be a shift in the direction of a post-Westphalian order with a multi-stakeholder type of diplomacy.

NATO and the EU publicly announced they established a deeper strategic partnership in their EU-NATO Declaration on European security and defence policy in 2002.44_{Said declaration, later also} extended to the 'Berlin Plus agreement', outlines the 'continued important role of NATO in crisis

management and conflict prevention, and reaffirms that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members.' Moreover, it states that the purpose of the ESDP is to 'add to the range of instruments already at the European Union’s disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention', in order to provide extra support for the CFSP. Both organizations express their desire that crisis

management activities should be 'mutually reinforcing'. However, the document says there still needs to be room to recognize that 'the European Union and NATO are organizations of a different nature'. In support of this last statement, the declaration states that the relationship between the EU and NATO

43 Ibid., p. 15.

44 NATO, 'NATO–EU Declaration on ESDP. Press release 142, 16 December' (2002),

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will be founded on the principle of equality with proper concern for each organization's decision-making autonomy and interests.45

NATO's former Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented on EU-NATO relations in a keynote speech in 2007 and remarked that the working terrain of both organizations is not

characterized by some sort of competition or zero-sum game. On the contrary, in his view it was surprising the cooperation between the two has not expanded more rapidly in response to the

increasingly complex challenges for European and global security. De Hoop Scheffer felt two reasons were at the heart of this lack of co-operational expansion. The first reason he locates in the differences of opinion that arise from the asymmetries in membership between NATO and the EU. On the formal level this leads to disputes over security agreements, the exchange of information or the format of meetings. On these disagreements De Hoop Scheffer states: 'We have been able to circumvent many of these hurdles through informal procedures. But if those who put up these hurdles do not display more responsibility and flexibility, it will continue to place a heavy burden on NATO-EU relations.'46_De Hoop Scheffer spots the second underlying reason for the weaknesses in NATO-EU relations in

deliberate efforts to keep the EU and NATO separate. Those who subscribe to these efforts are skeptical of closer cooperation between the two organizations because in their eyes this could give the USA excessive influence. Moreover, they present the argument that the partnership is likely to fail because the EU as an institution is much more developed than the NATO which acts solely on

intergovernmental grounds. To these skeptics De Hoop Scheffer responds:

Of course NATO and the EU are not twins. NATO is not an all-encompassing integration project. Its members do not relinquish any sovereignty. NATO does not integrate, it coordinates. And it coordinates rather well – above all in a framework that includes the USA, without which security in our world is unthinkable. This fact makes NATO a unique forum. I do not share European instinctive fears about undue influence of the USA in European affairs anyhow. Europe is sufficiently self-aware – and they know it in Washington too.47

Despite his faith in proper future NATO-EU cooperation, De Hoop Scheffer does not deny that both organizations differ from each other in certain aspects. Since the EU and NATO already agreed in their 2002 joint Declaration on ESDP that they are organizations of a different nature, it is interesting to examine what these differences consist of in practice and what they might mean for future EU-NATO

45 S. Duke, 'The Future of EU–NATO Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?', Journal of

European Integration (2008), 30:1, p. 28.

46. J. de Hoop Scheffer, 'NATO and the EU: time for a new chapter. Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General' (2007), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html, accessed 05-05-2017

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initiatives. Firstly, there is indeed the issue of differences in membership which De Hoop Scheffer addressed in his keynote speech. Twenty-one states are members of both NATO and the EU, while six EU member states do not take part in NATO. Conversely, NATO has five non-EU members of which three are European countries. Furthermore, within the EU there existed further complexities regarding NATO relations, as France refused membership of the Integrated Military Command and therefore had not been fully integrated in NATO. Also, Denmark opted-out of any defence related matters that were drawn up in the Treaty on European Union in 2007. The six EU member states who are not NATO members—Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Ireland and Sweden—have all been of value in a large number of EU and international peacekeeping operations. The non-EU members of NATO—Turkey, Iceland and Norway—have sometimes challenged the EU-NATO relationship, but have also produced positives. For instance, Iceland often remains inactive when it comes to delivering practical assistance to the EU, while Norway on the other hand has frequently proven to be a loyal actor willing to offer its contributions to a range of ESDP operations.48

Secondly, there exists a fundamental, though not necessarily incommensurable difference at the strategic level between both organizations. The EU works towards its strategic goal of tighter political union, which is not similar to NATO's goals and working approaches. Furthermore, the increase in the EU's defence and security competences cannot be seen as independent from the articulation of general EU aspirations and aims in the field of external relations. However, it is still unclear how the

CFSP/CSDP elements exactly fit in with these external relations goals, mainly due to the absence of a clear definition of what the EU represents on the international stage. Factors that play a role in this lack of clarity could be the internal division between communitarian principles and intergovernmentalism,

the lack of a strong legal identity, and various people apparently representing the interests of the EU.49 Already in 1992, a set of military and security priorities now known as the Petersberg Tasks were formulated to be included in the ESDP. In its Petersberg Declaration, the Western European Union Council of Ministers agreed that it would hand over a set of military and security tasks to the WEU. The WEU itself was predated by the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which consisted of five participating Western European countries—France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom —and their shared intentions to provide for their own collective defence. However, the NATO was created shortly after in 1949 and began to serve as the main political and military collective defence organization in Europe. Therefore, when the WEU was established in 1954 to ensure a secure and

48 S. Duke., 'The Future of EU–NATO Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?', p. 29. 49 Ibid., pp. 29-30.

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fitting German membership of both the WEU and NATO, Article IV was included which stated that:

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information on military matters.50

In other words, strict measures were taken to ensure that there was no overlap of military competences between the WEU and NATO, and thus as a result the WEU did not possess a military staff of its own in the period before 1993.51

Despite these regulations, the end of the Cold War and its effects on the European security environment called for quick reorientations of the objectives and priorities for foreign and security policies. In addition, the institutional framework for these policies needed to be readjusted as well. This led to difficulties in the working relationship between the WEU and NATO. For example, even though the WEU stated in 1954 in its Article IV that it would strictly obtain its military advice from NATO, it was only in 1996 that NATO and the WEU issued a Security Agreement which granted permission for classified documents and information to be exchanged between both organizations.52_{Nonetheless, the} Maastricht Treaty of 1992 already included a declaration on behalf of the WEU members, who agreed that the WEU would serve as 'the defence component of the European Union and as a means to

strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.'53_{What followed from this declaration was the formulation of the Petersberg} Tasks in June 1992.

The Petersberg Tasks were later officially included in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 2007. The tasks involved a primary mandate for the ESDP to conduct, among others, 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including

peacemaking.'54 _{A further important line in the TEU is that the policy of the EU shall 'respect the} obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and

50 J. Roper, 'The Working Relationships between the EU, WEU and NATO', Afers Internacionals (1997), Vol. 38-39, p. 78. 51 Ibid., p. 78.

52 Ibid., p. 80. 53 Ibid., p. 81.

54 TEU, 'Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community',

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defence policy established within that framework'.55_{This line represents the effort made in the treaty to} keep the territorial defence competences of NATO separate from the generally more humanitarian and peacekeeping oriented Petersberg Tasks associated with the ESDP. As such, from these lines in TEU it can be interpreted that the EU is not planning to heavily interfere with NATO's collective defence provision competences for Europe. Based on this observation, both organizations might be able to break new ground in the future and adjust their strategies in order to properly accommodate differences and similarities in their security and defence activities.56

The fact that there has been no formal political agreement on strategies between the EU and NATO since the Berlin Plus agreement package in 2002, leaves ambiguity regarding the extent and contents of future relations between the organizations. Apart from Berlin Plus, cooperation between NATO and the EU has been largely based on informal and case-specific arrangements. If these

initiatives are not followed up by a new formal document outlining the main areas of synergy between the two organizations, there is a possibility future joint missions will become more challenging.57

2.2.1. Actors within the NATO-EU cooperation framework

In order to gain an understanding of the type of diplomacy at work in the context of NATO-EU cooperation, it is vital to define which actors are involved and at what level they operate. At the top level, naturally, stand the state actors. Besides their activities in the NATO and EU institutions, these state-based actors work for the ministries of defence and the ministries of foreign affairs in the national capitals. NATO is built up of the national delegations of all 28 member states which are each headed by an ambassador or permanent representative to the organization. For the EU, the 28 member states are each represented in the European Council by a permanent representative under the head of an

ambassador. As of now, the ambassador level is the highest level at which these state-based actors meet, predominantly through so-called NAC-PSC meetings. Remarkably, the national ministers of foreign affairs have not formally met on the subject of NATO-EU cooperation since 2003, although certain Transatlantic Events are sometimes held where foreign ministers can informally discuss with each other on the subject. Still, this does not suggest an active degree of participation on account of the states and their representatives. This political inactivity may indicate why NATO-EU cooperation has been progressing so slowly, the quality and intensity of coordination between the institutions in the

55 Ibid., Art. 17 (1).

56 S. Duke., 'The Future of EU–NATO Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?', p. 30. 57 S.J. Smith, 'EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue?', European Security (2011), 20:2, p. 244.

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areas of strategic mutual interest is simply not optimal.58

Below the state actors the second set of actors can be located at the international staff level. International staff contacts between the EU and NATO take place within administrative units of both military and civilian nature. NATO hires its international staff from its member states and endows them with the following tasks and responsibilities:

The International Staff supports the process of consensus-building and decision-making between member and Partner countries and is responsible for the preparation and follow-up of the

meetings and decisions of NATO committees, as well as those of the institutions created to manage the different forms of bilateral and multilateral partnership with non-member countries established since the end of the Cold War.59

In the case of the EU, the relevant administrative and secretarial units have been reformed under the Lisbon Treaty which came into effect in 2009. As a result, the military and civilian directorates general (DG 8 and 9 respectively) have been merged into a single new directorate named the Crisis

Management Planning Directorate. In general, communication between EU and NATO staff is conducted with openness. The intensity of their connections remains limited however, due to the political stagnation at the top level.

A direct and notable effect of this lack of political participation is exemplified by complications in the procedures regarding the exchanging of documents between the organizations. A NATO

document that is labeled as classified can only be sent to those EU member states that have signed formal security agreements with NATO. What follows is that any time a restricted NATO document needs to find its way to the EU, the staff of NATO face two options. The first option, if the documents fit in with the Berlin Plus agreements, is to send them to the EU where it will reach all member states except Cyprus. The second option entails that the NATO staff will not pass on materials to the EU at all, especially those that do not fit in with the Berlin Plus agreements, such as terrorism and energy security related issues. The NATO staff decides not to pass on documents dealing with these issues because it expects that these matters have already come to the attention of all EU member states. Since most documents deal with cases outside of the Berlin Plus framework, in practice a very limited amount of documents is officially exchanged between NATO and EU staff.60

58 Ibid.

59 NATO, 'NATO handbook', NATO Public Diplomacy Division (2006), http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf, accessed 08-05-2017.

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Therefore, the most efficient degree of cooperation between NATO and the EU on the military level seems to exist when the joint operations are conducted on the foundation of the Berlin Plus agreements. In the event of non-Berlin Plus operations it often seems that the further they become removed from the centre of both organizations in Brussels, the more likely it is that cooperation will remain informal. This means that military commanders of NATO and the EU do still work together in non-Berlin Plus missions, only in a less regulated and official way. Furthermore, NATO has its own autonomous headquarters based in Brussels under the name of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In comparison, the EU does not possess a similar type of autonomous headquarters. Notably, the EU has its military headquarters within SHAPE, and calls this its Operational

Headquarters. The extremely close proximity of both headquarters could prove helpful in stimulating an open and transparent environment for diplomacy and cooperation between NATO and the EU in the future.61

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3. THE EEAS AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

In this section the functioning of the EU's main diplomatic body, the European External Action Service (EEAS), will be examined. The first segment of this chapter discusses the initial reasons for founding the EEAS and the process of its further development, including on the staff level. The next segment initially focuses on how the EEAS positions itself in the contemporary dynamic European and global (security) environment based on its particular set of strategic goals. Additionally, it will feature an examination of the EEAS' contributions to a transformation of diplomatic conduct from a Westphalian state-oriented model towards an increasingly interconnected multi-stakeholder system, which may allow for tighter cooperation between governments, civil society NGOs and various businesses.

3.1. ESTABLISHING THE EEAS

The Treaty of Lisbon brought forth two important innovations in the area of EU diplomacy. It formally established the EEAS and introduced its head's position as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Through these specific innovations in the area of external relations, the Lisbon Treaty aimed to enhance and give more weight to the EU's activities on the global stage. The formal enactment of the EEAS meant there was a completely new addition to the institutional framework of the EU. As the EU's diplomatic service, the EEAS is also inherently different in nature compared to the other institutions. It is not an institutional actor that operates on the supranational level, contrary to the European

Commission and European Parliament. However, it is also not an institution that operates in an

intergovernmental manner, unlike the European Council. Instead, the EEAS has to find a decent middle ground between the two by maintaining strong contacts with both the intergovernmental 'community' of European member states and the supranational Commission and Parliament.62

The development of the EEAS into a formal EU body started at the European Convention in 2002, spanning approximately eight years before the Council officially decided to enact it in 2010. According to researchers from the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), this time window was marked by intense debate at the Constitutional Convention in 2002, the Intergovernmental Conferences in 2003-04 and 2007, and the 'Quadrilogue' meetings where the final structure of the EEAS was discussed. The researchers Helwig, Ivan and Kostanyan state in their CEPS report that 'The EEAS

62 N. Helwig, P. Ivan, H. Kostanyan, The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies 2013, p. 6.

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emerged as the result of a classic EU compromise yet with an unusual outcome.'63_{In their view, the} majority of the member states believed it was necessary to implement a more coordinated EU foreign policy. Nevertheless, member states still disagreed on how such a common foreign policy should be managed. Some member states indeed supported a move towards more integrated external action of the EU, whereas others expressed doubts about a deeper integration of external activities:

[…] especially the [integration of] Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within the Commission. The Commission aimed to protect its ‘turf’ and the European Parliament aimed to increase its competences. Consequently, the EEAS has a long job description. It is supposed to fulfill functions of a Presidency, diplomatic service, ministry of development and defence, as well as coordinating overall coherence of external action. Another example of its kind is hard to find in the international system.'64

The Lisbon Treaty's diplomatic innovations of the EEAS and the corresponding HR/VR position elicited negative reactions from some Commission officials, who feared that the placement of the EEAS as an institution operating separately from the existing EU institutions threatened to derail supranationalism and the 'Community Method'. These particular officials believed that a new independent diplomatic service operating outside the Commission would create problems.65_Thus, as mentioned in the citation above, the Commission in some ways did set out to 'protect its turf' in a response to the newly envisioned role of the EEAS.

Nevertheless, the act of initiating a proposal for the establishment of the EEAS alone may have served as a sign that the EU recognized it urgently needed to set up its own diplomatic service in order to respond properly to the complexities and challenges of the post-Westphalian world. Even though this necessitated the formulation of a new set of diplomatic norms and values, which would prove to be contested by existing EU officials from the institutions and member states, it seemed that on the political level the EU decided that 'more attention would need to be given to collective European diplomacy rather than individual national diplomacy.'66_{Diplomacy itself, according to author G.A.} Pigman, is based on the processes of representation and communication. Here, representation covers the general behaviour between actors in the international system, and communication is applied as a way to influence other actors while advocating own interests.67

Changes in these diplomatic activities are frequently the result of events related to globalization,

63 Ibid., p. 7. 64 Ibid., p. 7.

65 D. Spence, 'The Early Days of the External Action Service: A Practicioner's View', The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (2012), Vol. 7, p. 115.

66 Ibid., p. 117.

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regionalization and localization. These all stimulate a form of governance which involves stronger social connections in a variety of locations and on multiple levels. This challenges the traditional state-based diplomacy, simply because a more modern network-style interconnection between different levels of diplomatic activity arises. In turn, greater interconnectedness of diplomatic activity also leads to greater diplomatic interdependence, which can potentially add to the global complexities: 'In this sense, networks interlink various actors in institutional or social structures and thereby generate new relationships between them, facilitating collective action in order to deal with resulting multilevel problems.'68_{As such, the Lisbon Treaty's provisions regarding diplomacy were likely conceived in an} attempt to respond properly to a constantly changing global environment.

Thus, it is probable that through the Lisbon Treaty the EU accepted that global processes were powering a gradual shift from state diplomacy to multi-stakeholder network diplomacy. The researcher Schmidt from the European Policy Centre argues that since multi-stakeholder

diplomacy functions primarily on the basis of networks, it provides more opportunities for new actors to play a role in international relations.69_{The EU felt that one of the key players in this} domain would have to be an institution like the EEAS. As a new institution the EEAS would have to navigate the move from the traditionally hierarchical top-down system of Westphalian state diplomacy, towards a networked and multi-directional approach. In theory, the multi-stakeholder model causes information to be shared in a quick and more transparent way between various actors—including but not limited to—civil society, media, experts, business, and government. As a result this may trigger a growth in connectivity and the general amount of expertise. According to Schmidt, for such a network-based model to function properly a predominant actor is needed at the centre to coordinate all stakeholders. In her view, the EEAS does not occupy the position of a ministry of foreign affairs on the EU level. However, she believes the EEAS 'is most suitably located within the EU system to coordinate all stakeholders of EU external action and develop a "joined-up approach", for which effective communication is absolutely crucial.'70

Despite arguments that the EEAS is perhaps the most suitable institution to link stakeholders together in a modern system of diplomacy, skepticism remained on the national political level of the member states. It was a skepticism that arose especially due to the lack of

68 J. Schmidt, 'Between Irrelevance and Integration? New Challenges to Diplomacy in the 21st Century and the Role of the EEAS', College of Europe (2014), EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2014, p. 7.

69 J. Schmidt, 'Joining up or falling apart: towards a networked communication model for EU foreign policy', European

Policy Centre (2015), Policy Brief 1 October 2015, p. 1.

EU Security Governance - Modern security challenges and the impact on European diplomacy: an inter-institutional analysis of NATO, CSDP and the EEAS