A frame analysis of EU democracy promotion policies before and after the 2011 Dignity Revolution in Tunisia

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A frame analysis of EU

democracy promotion

policies before and after the

2011 Dignity Revolution in

Tunisia

Author: Nieves Turégano Muñoz

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

Second reader: Dr. Rosa Sánchez Salgado

June 22

nd

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Dimitris Bouris, for his indispensable guidance during this long research process but mostly for having taught me how to be an unbiased Political Scientist. Secondly, I would like to thank my second reader Dr. Rosa Sánchez Salgado for her time and efforts in the grading process of this thesis. Last but not least, I would like to dedicate this research to my parents, for supporting me in my international academic adventure while fiercely confronting the Spanish economic crisis from Madrid’s periphery. Your daily efforts gave me the opportunity to acknowledge the inaccuracies of human interpretations and consequently helped me to question this world’s political logic.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis unit of analysis is European Union (EU) democracy promotion policies in Tunisia before and after the 2011 Dignity Revolution. A social interaction concept known as ‘frame’ will be used to understand how the EU interacts with its southern neighbour when promoting democracy. Frames or interpretations of reality explain how actors make sense of the events they are surrounded by and how these interpretations shape their consecutive actions. Accordingly, when the European Union intends to enhance democracy in Tunisia, its policies are being driven by particular frames interpreting the events occurring in the Mediterranean country. Therefore, this thesis main objective is to analyse EU policies to enhance democracy in Tunisia before and after the 2011 Dignity Revolution from a ‘frame analysis’ perspective, in order to discuss the research question: which are the frames prevailing in EU democracy

promotion initiatives towards Tunisia?

By providing a response to this research question this thesis aims (1) at identifying which frames are shaping EU’s interpretation of Tunisia’s reality when promoting democracy, (2) at shedding light on the reasons behind EU’s particular democratisation approach and thus (3) at identifying potential misinterpretations driving EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA Association Agreement AP Action Plan

CPR Congress for the Republic CSO Civil Society Organisations EC European Commission

EEAS European External Action Service

EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument EOMs European Observation Missions

EP European Parliament EU European Union

FEMIP Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Partnership MENA Middle East and North Africa

MPCs Mediterranean Partner Countries MS Member States

NIP National Indicative Programme TEU Treaty of the Union

UGTT Tunisian General Labour Union

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2.3) EU financial instruments to enhance democracy in the Southern Mediterranean ... 42 3. A frame analysis of EU democracy promotion policies in Tunisia ... 47 3.1) National context ... 47 3.2) Analysing EU initiatives to promote democracy in Tunisia before and after the Dignity Revolution: financial and political aspects ... 52 3.3) Discussion: which are the frames prevailing in EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia? ... 67 CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION ... 72 BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 74

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INTRODUCTION

Many references have been made to Tunisia with regards to its democratic condition. In fact, it is frequently conceived as North Africa’s beacon of hope since the 2011 Arab Uprisings forced Ben Ali (Tunisia’s former dictator) to flee from the country (IEMED, 2018; Fraihat, 2016:59). If compared to other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries that embraced the revolution claims (i.e. Syria, Libya, Egypt), Tunisia is probably the southern Mediterranean country where most democratic transition prerequisites have been fulfilled (i.e. legalisation of political parties and associations, celebration of free elections etc). Nevertheless, so much work is yet to be done in order to completely remove the authoritarian sequels of the country because, as pointed out by Fraihat ‘the past is an integral part of the transition process itself, and it will appear

forcefully in different phases’ (Fraihat, 2016:121).

States and institutions that have declared its eagerness to assist third parties in their transition towards democracy such as the EU, have found in Tunisia a convenient atmosphere for the promotion of democracy. Tunisia’s small population, its low

regional strategic value in terms of natural resources and the absence of a strong radical Islamist threat, have been identified as factors facilitating EU democracy promotion (Durac & Cavatorta, 2009:13). Thus, the EU embraced its assistance to Tunisia’s consolidation of democracy under the framework of the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) among others. EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia, have been driven by Brussels particular recipe to enhance democratic change in which political transformation goes hand in hand with economic prosperity (Youngs, 2003; Seeberg, 2008; Cavatorta & Durac, 2009; Cavatorta & Pace 2010; Hollis, 2012; Mouhib, 2014; Abdalla, 2016 etc). Thus, the EU nowadays represents Tunisia’s largest trading partner (78’5% of Tunisia’s exports went to the EU, and 54% of Tunisia’s imports came from the EU), Tunisia’s key financial investor, and hence a main ally for the consolidation of its democracy (EU Delegation to Tunisia, 2016; European Commission, 2018).

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Tunisia’s 2011 Dignity Revolution culminated in Ben Ali’s repressive regime retrial. However, the socio-economic grievances that mobilised the Tunisian people back then are still latent since unemployment, corruption and social inequality have not been efficiently tackled (Youngs, 2003; Pace, 2004,2009; Seeberg, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Cavatorta & Durac, 2009; Cavatorta & Pace 2010; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011; Hollis, 2012; Tömmel, 2013; Khalifa, 2013; Bicchi, 2014ab; Mouhib, 2014; Abdalla, 2016; Fontana, 2017; Bouris & Schumacher, 2017, Roccu & Voltolini, 2018ab; Pace & Wolff, 2018). Academia has thus associated the upheavals’ socio-economic frustrations with the preceding decades of market liberalisation prompted by Ben Ali’s partnerships with the Union (Youngs, 2003; Seeberg, 2008; Cavatorta & Durac, 2009; Cavatorta & Pace 2010; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011; Hollis, 2012; Tömmel, 2013; Mouhib, 2014; Abdalla, 2016; Bouris & Schumacher, 2017). If EU’s partnerships with its southern neighbour were meant to bring prosperity while

supporting democracy and human rights, why did these initiatives lead to such an outcome? How has the EU defined Tunisia’s problems before and after 2011 revolution to enhance democracy through such approach?

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CHAPTER I: METHODOLOGY

This thesis will conduct a frame analysis of EU democracy promotion policies in Tunisia before and after the 2011 Dignity Revolution. The discussion intends to raise awareness regarding the importance of frames or interpretations of reality within political actors’ decisions. Making use of frames conceptual methodology, this thesis will drive the attention to the ‘backstage’1of EU democracy promotion policies in order to understand the rationale behind Brussels’ initiatives and simultaneously find potential misinterpretations that may be obstructing Tunisia’s consolidation of democracy .

1. Method of analysis: Frames and Frame Analysis

The method of analysis employed to examine the data collected is frame analysis. An understanding of frames as a concept is crucial to follow this thesis reflective

background. For this reason, before driving the attention to frame analysis this section will first provide an overview of the concept of frames.

1.1) Frames and types of frames

The concept of frames and frame analysis were first introduced by Erving Goffman in 1974. Goffman argued that individuals inevitably engage in a framing process every time they attempt to make sense of uncertainty. Even if it is an unintentional process, these frames are crucial for an individual to understand what is befalling in its

environment because they allow the subject to allocate, to identify and to label an infinite number of events (Goffman, 1975:23-42). Just like there are infinite ways of interpreting the events we are surrounded by, Goffman concluded that frames are also infinite, since every experience or social reality could be contemplated from a myriad of frames. Therefore, frames have the tendency to be ephemeral, because they are subject to changes in perceptions. For this reason, an individual may make use of several frames simultaneously (Goffman, 1975:27).

1_{The term ‘backstage’ is used here intending to make a graphical representation of an}

analysis from what is behind the stage. The reader should place EU democracy

promotion policies as the play performed at the stage, and EU frames or interpretations of Tunisia’s reality at the backstage where the play is being planned and rehearsed.

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Inspired by Goffman, Lisa V. Bardwell (1991) introduced the term to Conflict

Management. Driving the attention to problem definitions, she argued that how an actor defines and constructs a problem will determine the consequent reaction towards this problem. Since there are a myriad ways to interpret a problem (Bardwell, 1991:603) like frames, ‘problem-framing’ is infinite, because every subject may structure the

problem’s information in different ways (Bardwell, 1991:603). For this reason, Bardwell portrayed environmental problems as grounded on cultural and political matters (1991:604), since frames are reflections of an actor’s social values and priorities. Therefore, when an actor interprets a problem, it is simultaneously taking a myriad of other unaware decisions (i.e. drawing expectations, accepting risks) that will be shaping its reaction towards that particular problem (1991:604). Hence, Bardwell arrives to the following conclusion: “knowing how people perceive and use information

is central to understanding how they solve problems” (1991: 604).

Frames and framing processes also inspired some EU Foreign Policy experts like Benedetta Voltolini, to put frames and framing processes at the core of their studies. Thus, Voltolini used the frames analytical framework in order to analyse how the EU perceives the world as a political actor, and additionally examine the basis on which it acts (Voltolini, 2016: 33). According to the scholar, ‘frames represent the perspective

from which political actors make sense of the world’ (2016:16). Paraphrasing her, the

process of framing would then follow an evaluative criterion that encourages the

selection and emphasis of only certain aspects of a problem (2016:17). Just as Bardwell (1991) explained, Voltolini argues that the simplification of information created when framing, is directly related to the definition of the problem (Voltolini, 2016:21). In other words, when framing, a political actor is following a simplified roadmap that

highlights/minimise certain aspects of an issue, and therefore it is defining the reality in a very personal and particular way (2016:21).

In 2003, Barara Gray pointed out that “the first step of frame analysis has to be the

identification of frames”. This reflection resulted in Gray’s contribution to frames

conceptual framework with the creation of several generic frames that facilitate the understanding of how political actors, interpret different environmental disputes. The expert provided a long list of (identity frames, characterization frames, conflict

management frames, whole story frames, social control frames, power frames, risk frames, gain vs loss frames) (Gray, 2003:23).

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However, conflict management frames and whole story frames will be excluded from the discussion since their focus on conflict since these frames expect an analysis of the roots a ‘conflict’ that exceeds this thesis’ unit of analysis. After having justified the selective exclusion within Gray’s generic frames, we will now look at these five generic frames: identity frames, characterization frames, power frames, risk frames and gain vs

loss frames.

Identity and characterization frames2

Barbara Gray (2003) argues that an actor will be using an identity frame if it interprets the environment by answering the question ‘Who am I? Consequently, the actor will compare itself with second actors and thus it will also wonder ‘Who they are?’ (2003:21-24). The comparison between ‘us’ and ‘them’ will, according to the author, follow a ‘fundamental attribution error process’ through which the ‘us’ will be defined positively, and the ‘them’ will be blamed for the negative events (2003:21-24). In this case, Gray argues that the attribution of prejudices and discrimination is due to the challenges posed by a different identity, which mostly question the legitimacy of an actor’s normative basis (2003:21-24). For this reason, ‘groups develop reflexive frames

that depict the way disputants feel about themselves and projective identity frames that carry disputants’’ characterizations of others in the conflict’ (2003: 21).

Power frames

Additionally, Barbara Gray (2003) provides an extensive list of power frames in different ‘clothes’. Among these, it is noteworthy to mention authority power frame,

resources power frame, moral power frame since they are considered the most relevant

frames for this thesis’ approach. As stated in Gray’s work, an actor would be taking action through an authority frame when its ability to interpret the reality rests in its formal role (2003:28). For instance, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would be performing through an authority power frame when applying sanctions to other states because its interpretation of reality it is based in a formal role created by the United Nations Organisation.

2_{The author presents these two frames (identity frame & characterisation frame)}

separately (Gray, 2003:21-24). However, as they clearly complement each other it has been found convenient to introduce them simultaneously.

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The scholar also make reference to what she entitles as resources power frame. A perfect illustration of a resources power frame could be exemplified through the 1973 Oil Crisis. After Yom Kippur War 1973, the Arab States punished European States’ pro-Israel behaviour with an Oil Embargo. The Arab coalition action against the Europeans may be explained with the Arab interpretation of the events through a

resource power frame that allow them to exercise such an action. The Arabs’ perception of reality, immediately raised some aims and expectations that could be facilitated through an exercise of power. Barbara Gray also included moral power frames in her list of power frames. In this case, the power comes from an ‘arguably’ morally higher position that allows the actor to assume that its position is ethically right (2003:29). For instance, when the French Republic, prohibited the veil in public spaces could be exercising a moral power frame. France’s interpretation of the Muslim veil as unethical towards women’s condition has driven an ethically convinced French government to ban the veil in the public sphere.

Risk frames and Gain vs loss frames3

In addition, Gray also drives her attention to risk frames, which are related to the level of danger perceived by political actors when interpreting a particular event. At the same time, an actor may interpret the information of particular event through a gain/loss

frame. If so, the focus will be on the benefits or costs that an actor’s particular action

would potentially produce (Gray 2003:31-32). Therefore, gains/loss frames and risk frames are interrelated, because they both measure the degree of risk of a potential decision towards a particular event bearing in mind what could be either achieved or lost in that particular situation. As explained by Gray, ‘these methods attempt to

quantify and weigh all of the possible consequences and then make trade-offs to come up with a final determination of the best approach to select’ (2003:31). Furthermore,

Gray also argues that actors tend to interpret events wondering whether other actors’ performances will either create a loss or a gain for themselves (2003:31).

3_{The author presents these two frames (risk frames & gain vs loss frames) separately}

(Gray, 2003:31-32). However, they are much related to each other; for this reason it has been found convenient to explain them together.

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For instance, it could be argued that the EU may had been interpreting the Refugee Crisis through a risk / gain vs loss frame, since restrictions to refugees (‘to protect the

economic, cultural and political interests of European citizens’) were developed in spite

of working against the moral considerations of international humanitarian law (Gibney, 2017: 171).

While analysing non-state actors’ lobbying in EU Foreign Policy, Benedetta Voltolini (2016) suggests three types of frames prevailing in the Union’s external policies:

technical frames, political frames, mixed frames (2016:22). She defines technical

frames as those with a focus on technical, scientific, economic, or legal arguments (2016:22). Thus, these frames will not drive the EU’s attention to ‘dichotomies on

good/bad, winner/looser’, reference would only be made to plain scientific questions

(2016:23). Voltolini also identifies a frame at the opposite extreme; political frames do regard to values and cultural commonalities. To put it differently, ‘they evoke an

already present belief or myth’, hence when the EU interprets the reality through a

political frame, it will not be seeking to find evidence but follow its culturally-made preconception of reality (2016:23). In between technical and political frames, Voltolini (2016) proposes what she calls mixed frames. In this case, she argues that when the EU interpret events beyond its borders there is a possibility of it making reference to its norms and values while at the same time bringing political claims with a technical dimension (2016:24). This way, the EU will bring again the debate on morality seeking for responsibility. However, Voltolini argues that ‘by doing so, they identify a problem,

but they do not propose any alternative view of the issue at stake, nor do they offer alternative solutions to the mainstream views based on the benefit/drawback leverage’

(2016:24).

Once the frames have been identified, Voltolini proceeds to discuss the different frames prevailing in each of the EU institutions involved in EU Foreign Policy. Portraying the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) as ‘the

guardians of the treaties’ (2016:24), she argues that technical frames are the ones

prevailing within the interpretations of these two bodies. On the other hand, since she perceives the European Parliament (EP) as a politicised institution due to its electoral mandate nature (2016:24), Voltolini explains that EP is expected to shape the

uncertainty beyond EU borders through a combination of technical and political arguments (i.e. mixed frames).

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1.2) Frame analysis applied to EU democracy promotion

In 1974 Erving Goffman coined the concept of ‘frame analysis’ through the publication of his book ‘Frame analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience’, however it was in the following decades when frame analysis was transferred to other fields within Social Sciences. Barbara Gray (2003) brought the term to the field of Environmental Disputes highlighting the role of frames in environmental conflicts (Gray, 2003:15) and Lisa V. Bardwell (1991) introduced the concept of frames to individuals’ understanding and definition of problems. Nevertheless, taking into account that this thesis unit of analysis is EU democracy promotion policies (a Political Science research) Voltolini’s (2016) work framing EU Foreign Policy was found to be the most influential.

After being familiarised with the literature on ‘frames’ from different fields of Social Sciences, it was concluded that from a political science perspective, framing could be understood as an interpretative process through which actors provide understanding to unknown political encounters (Goffman, 1974; Bardwell, 1991; Entman, 1993; Gray, 2003; Voltolini, 2016). Since frames are in essence cognitive interpretative structures, an analysis of frames was considered the most convenient methodology to engage in an examination of EU interpretations of reality. An analysis of the frames determining EU definitions of the problems beyond its borders would make the identification of

misinterpretations and inaccuracies within EU’s understanding of problems possible. This would help to acknowledge the inefficiencies of the consequent policies that are accountable for addressing citizens’ problems nowadays.

As pointed out by Entman (1993), ‘frames highlight some bits of information about an

item that is the subject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience’

(Entman, 1993: 53). Hence, by identifying which frames are prevailing in EU

democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia, it will be possible to acknowledge what Brussels is highlighting in its diagnosis of Tunisia’s problems. Therefore, a frame analysis of EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia will first help to

understand how the European Union is defining Tunisia’s lack of democracy. Secondly, an analysis of frames within EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia will also identify potential misinterpretations within EU’s definition of Tunisia’s reality. Lastly, it will facilitate the recognition of potential counter-productivities within Brussels’ approach to consolidate democracy in Tunisia.

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2. Research Questions and main objectives

The central research question this thesis seeks to answer is, which are the frames

prevailing in EU democracy promotion initiatives towards Tunisia? The identification

of frames within EU initiatives to promote democracy in Tunisia will provide an explanation of the rationale behind Brussels’ approach to consolidate democracy in the country (i.e. ‘Why is the EU executing these policies? Because the EU is understanding

Tunisia’s problems through frame X’). Furthermore, a response to this question will

lead to a discussion on potential misunderstandings on behalf of the Union on Tunisia’s reality and the consequent inefficiencies of the executed policies.

In conclusion, by providing a response to this research question this thesis aims (1) at identifying which frames are prevailing in EU’s interpretation of Tunisia’s reality when promoting democracy, (2) at shedding light on the reasons behind EU’s particular democratisation approach and thus (3) at identifying potential misinterpretations driving EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia.

3. Research design: limitations, clarifications and justifications

This thesis’ main objectives, (to identify which frames are prevailing in EU’s interpretation of Tunisia’s reality when promoting democracy, to shed light to the reasons behind EU’s particular democratisation approach and to discuss the potential misinterpretations driving EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia), could have certainly be addressed from different angles. Nevertheless, this thesis will analyse EU democracy promotion initiatives in Tunisia through a qualitative and case-oriented study. Accordingly, a qualitative analysis of EU official documents and declarations that appeared to be relevant for the promotion of democracy in Tunisia has been conducted.

There are several reasons why Tunisia has been selected as this thesis’ exploratory case study. Firstly, Tunisia has been considered a regional icon due to its pioneering and success in the transition towards democracy after the victory of the 2011 Dignity

Revolution. A second reason is that in the last decades Tunisia has demonstrated to have sufficient regional influence to inspire MENA’s loudest characters, Libya, Egypt and Syria in their quests for political transformation in spite of its small size.

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Thirdly, taking into account that Tunisia has become a privileged partner of the 28 EU MS (i.e. Tunisia is the main beneficiary of EU financial assistance in the southern neighbourhood (European Commission, 2016); a reflection on EU’s interpretations of the Tunisian context in particular could be promising, since it will contribute to an understanding of the reasons why only Tunisia has shown solid results (with regards to the consolidation of democracy) among all the Arab countries that embraced the cause of the 2011 revolts. Lastly, it could be argued that a study of EU democracy promotion initiatives in Tunisia is key to understanding EU’s new tendency of updating its

democratisation approach towards its neighbours, because it was precisely Tunisia’s national context that questioned the efficiency of EU efforts to democratise its southern neighbourhood. With regards to the time framework selected, before and after the 2011 revolution; it is necessary to clarify that by analysing how the EU has enhanced

Tunisia’s democracy before and after the revolution, this thesis will observe whether there is continuity or change in EU policies to promote democracy in its southern neighbour and it will also demonstrate that frames are unfixed and ephemeral, because political actors interpretations are affected by contextual changes.

On the other hand, this thesis has some limitations which are important to point out. First, the discussion is limited by a Eurocentric framework, because its unit of analysis is only focusing on the frames shaping EU’s definition of Tunisia’s problems. This might make the analysis incomplete, because an analysis of other national actors’ (from the Tunisian authorities to the population) diagnosis of the Tunisian context would have provided a more solid discussion. Furthermore, the analysis has been mostly focused on the political and financial aspects of EU democracy promotion initiatives in Tunisia. Even if these aspects are still considered of great significance, a more comprehensive discussion could have been provided by including other aspects such as geopolitical or energy related aspects.

It is important to mention that the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) policies for dialogue and cooperation have been excluded from the main debate, due to its little bilateral focus and the similarities found with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Additionally, even if considered decisive, the particular aspects guiding the bilateral relations between Tunisia and individual EU Member States have been excluded from the analysis because this thesis only intended to examine the EU as a solid institution.

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To conclude, it is key to remark that this thesis could have certainly been strengthened if another case study had been included, especially to demonstrate that political actors can be determined by numerous frames simultaneously depending on the encountered reality. Nevertheless, in spite of the limitations, by only focusing in one case study, there was more time and more space to conduct an in depth frame analysis of EU democracy promotion policies in Tunisia.

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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

This section aims at reviewing the academic debate on this thesis unit of analysis, EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. Moreover, it will attempt to contribute to the academic world by bringing together researches with reputation on the topic. There will be two interconnected sections: (1) the first section will discuss the academics contributions analysing EU democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); (2) the second section will put the recently discussed ’frames’ concept together with the current academic debate analysing EU efforts to promote democracy in the southern neighbourhood. Based on the academic work, frames that seem to be prevailing in EU democracy promotion will be constructed intending to guide the reader towards the central research question of this thesis: which are the frames prevailing in

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1. The EU and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: a

literature review

There is an extensive academic work analysing the Union policies to promote

democracy beyond its borders. Therefore, it has been considered important to present the debate in a structured way. For this reason, a rationalist-constructivist line has been drawn up in the debate. This way, the scholars’ perspectives will be organised into (1) those portraying the EU as a rationalist actor and, on the other hand, (2) those providing a constructivist reading of the European Union.

1.1) A rationalist picture of the European Union

It could be argued that some academics have a rationalist reading of the European Union because they treat the organisation as a materialistically driven institution whose main aim is to maximise its own interests. Scholars like Peter Seeberg, Vincent Durac, Francesco Cavatorta, Richard Youngs or Rosemary Hollis portray a Union that, when promoting democracy in the Mediterranean, it prioritises its own interests before meeting the democratisation objectives. This prioritisation creates, according to the academics, a rhetoric-practice gap in the institution, since there is a tangible distance between the Union’s agenda and its practices.

As Seeberg (2008) argues, EU practices demonstrate a more pragmatic and realist turn within EU Foreign Policy agenda (2008:94). Therefore, this group of scholars finds it crucial to pay attention to EU practices in the southern neighbourhood in order to

understand which mechanisms, values, and interests prevail; at what time; and which EU sub-actors are involved in pursuing such policies’ (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010:583).

The main argument of this rationalist picture of the EU hence is that if EU democracy promotion policies are failing to succeed is partly because of EU’s realist interests in the region (Youngs, 2003, 2003a, 2008; Seeberg 2008, Durac & Cavatorta 2009, Hollis 2012).

Rosemary Hollis (2012) illustrates an EU with rationalist manners by looking at the role of its policies in the genesis of the Arab ‘Spring’. According to the author, democracy promotion is usually presented as the main character in EU policies towards the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) (2012:81).

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However, her research argues that the democratisation character was precisely the one missing during the decades preceding the Uprisings.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), created in 1995 had three main ambitions: (1) to establish a common area of peace and stability, (2) to create an area of shared prosperity, (3) to enhance social and cultural ties and promote interaction and

understanding (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Nevertheless, it was only ambition (2) the one tangible in EU efforts being encouraged through a market liberalisation process (Hollis, 2012: 83). Noteworthy is to mention that, from Hollis’ perspective, these liberal policies mostly favoured EU Member States (MS) and the Arab elite, since (in the national context) the latter was the only society’s strata having the capability to adapt to market liberalisation standards (Hollis, 2012:85).

Similarly, with regards to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (created in 2003-2004), Hollis argues that it served EU bureaucrats’ disengaged way of understanding the needs of the majority of the MENA society (2012:85). This is why, from Hollis’ perspective, the Arab Uprisings were a symbol of the failure of EU democracy

promotion policies (2012:81). In other words, the EMP and the ENP helped to ‘trigger

the Arab revolts, but by default rather than design’ (2012: 94). Therefore, Hollis

concludes that by prioritising ‘European prosperity and stability’ over the majority of the Arab society, the European Union failed to promote democracy in MENA. Durac and Cavatorta (2009) discuss EU strategies to promote democracy in North Africa in a like manner, they highlight two essential aspects that are necessary bear in mind in order to understand how the Union promotes democracy in the southern

Mediterranean. Firstly, they argue that democracy promotion and Human Rights are ‘at

the heart of (EU’s) Foreign Policy’; however, Brussels’ way to enhance them is through

economic development (Cavatorta & Durac, 2009:10, also in Youngs 2003, 2003a, 2008). Secondly, they point at the democracy-security dilemma asserting that European Union initiatives in the Mediterranean aim at enhancing EU’s security (Cavatorta & Durac, 2009:11). This is why, they portray an organisation that resembles to the United States (US) as, according to authors, their objectives in the region are addressed

similarly because they depart from the same ideological assumptions (2009:4).

Therefore, both the EU and the US show the same paradoxes and contradictions when promoting democracy as their efforts contribute to the persistence of authoritarianism in the region (2009:11).

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Durac and Cavatorta (2009), also criticise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) for having a tendency to build partnership with authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, both Durac et al (2009) and Youngs (2003) describe EU’s model for the support of a ‘bottom up’ political change, as one which only backs Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that look like the Union in normative aspects and/or are approved by the national regime. In other words, the EU support for bottom up political transformation is limited, since it only enhances secular and liberal groups’ conceptions of change (Youngs, 2003:129; Cavatorta & Durac, 2009:12). These reflections lead the authors to paraphrase Emma Murphy (2001) and Stephen King (2003) both arguing that ‘the lack of political

democratization can be related to the hijacking of economic liberalization which strengthens authoritarianism rather than weakening it” (Cavatorta & Durac 2009:14).

A democracy promotion model based on an economic integration logic, which does not integrate the agricultural sector (a large source of employment in North African

countries), will not make significant improvements in the economic situation of the majority of the southern Mediterranean citizens (Youngs, 2003a:416). If goods’ standards improve but on the other hand economic conditions do not improve, the majority of the Arab society will be led to ‘heavy personal levels of debt’ (Cavatorta & Durac, 2009:16). On the contrary, as it was also pointed out by Hollis (2012), this way of promoting democracy in southern neighbourhood will ensure the profit of European businesses (Hollis, 2012; also in Youngs, 2003a; Cavatorta & Durac 2009:16). This approach to the Mediterranean is, according to (Pace, et al., 2008), prompting a loss of credibility of the European Union since when the EU promotes ‘a liberal-democratic

and capitalist type of governance […] it is also willing to compromise on what can be achieved in the region” (2008:4).

In conclusion, scholars portraying a rationalist European Union argue that if promoting good governance puts at risk the European Union’s security and other material interests, Brussels has the tendency to preserve the 28’s security; even if that results in the

contradiction of its agenda goals (Youngs,2003, 2003a, 2008; Seeberg 2008, Durac & Cavatorta 2009, Cavatorta & Pace 2010, Hollis 2012, Abdalla, 2016). Therefore, this rationalist picture of the Union concludes that if EU democracy promotion policies are failing to succeed is partly because of EU’s realist priorities in the region (Youngs, 2003, 2003a, 2008; Seeberg 2008, Durac & Cavatorta 2009, Cavatorta & Pace 2010, Hollis 2012, Abdalla, 2016).

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1.2) A constructivist picture of the European Union

As introduced above, there is another group of scholars providing a constructivist reading of the Union while examining EU democracy promotion. They draw up a more constructivist picture of the EU because they bring the focus of attention to identity, norms, social values and perceptions. This focus of attention does not reject the

rationalist portrait of the Union as an organisation driven by material interests. Instead, they argue that the European Union is an organisation driven by interests which are determined by socially, culturally and politically constructed cognitive filters that allow the Union to interpret the environment (Roccu & Voltolini 2018, Colombo & Voltolini 2017, Pace & Wolff 2017)

Roccu and Voltolini (2018a) point out that a purely rationalist analysis would make sense if the rationality of the actor could be verified. From the authors’ perspective, the European Union cannot be considered a purely rational actor because the information that it receives (about its environment) is not perfectly accurate (2018a:4). This is why the authors highlight the importance of perception in political actors’ decision-making:

“actors cannot but act on the basis of established cognitive filters and paradigms, functioning as lenses through which they interpret the surrounding environment”

(2018a:4). Therefore, it could be argued that from a constructivist perspective, interests are products resulting of material and ideational factors. In fact, Roccu and Voltolini, reaffirm that EU interests are socially constructed rather than naturally ordered (2018a:4). Noteworthy is to mention that, the EU aims at securing a plurality of interests that may even clash with each other. This reflection, leads to academics’ common observation that there is a gap between EU’s policy agenda and practice. As also argued by Roccu et al (2018b), the Union is capable of giving up on democracy, rule of law and human rights if EU’s security is at risk (2018b:183).

Likewise, Roccu and Voltolini (2018b) argue that “the EU keeps preaching the

importance of democracy, rule of law and human rights but it is ready to turn its back to these principles when it comes to protecting its security” (2018b: 183).

Even if the scholars do identify a subtle degree of variation in EU’s conceptualisation of problems in the region when examining particular policies (financial reforms, energy market, relations with Islamists, agricultural sector) (2018b:185), they state that the tendency of securitising issues through a security-stability frame should still be

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considered as EU’s master frame in the promotion of democracy (2018b:183). Accordingly, they highlight two types of the Union’s security interests. On one hand, Roccu and Voltolini argue that the EU has investment interests that they aim to protect (rationalist security); on the other hand, they put notice on Brussels having the priority of securing its secular-liberal identity (constructivist security) (2018b:184).

Following the latter constructivist unit of analysis, Michelle Pace (2007, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2018) sheds light on EU democracy promotion contradictions by examining the relations of the Union with Political Islam. Her work facilitates the understanding of how the EU conceives its role in the MENA region. Additionally, Pace also provides a detailed analysis on Brussels’ conception of Islamist actors in diverse countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Palestine.

“The EU like other liberal-secular Western powers, has tended to see ‘Islamism’ or

‘Political Islam’, either through traditionalist orientalist views or through realist notions of regional security’ (Pace, 2018:509)

As explained by Pace (2009), EU-Political Islam relations have been influenced by the 1992 Algerian context (Pace, 2009:41). After the electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the national army intervened and brutally attacked FIS’ militants. The Algerian state reaction to the Islamists victory, nourished the Islamists’ extremist rhetoric that enhance the justification of terrorism. The terrorist attacks then ‘fed the worst stereotypes of the Islamic world in the West’ (2009:41). The scholar demonstrates Brussels’ conservative logics when supporting electoral results (as a basis for promoting democracy) through an analysis of European Union’s response to 2006 victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), won 76 seats in a 132 parliamentary Chamber. Hamas took over Fatah’s Palestinian Authority (PA), a party that was considered by the majority of the Palestinians to be highly corrupted (Brenner, 2017:2). Hamas became the first Arab Islamist group hitherto gaining power by democratic means. Nevertheless, even if Fatah had lost the support of the Palestinian citizens and Hamas had won free and fully democratic elections, it did not stop the European Union to actively participate in an international financial boycott against Hamas’ government. This decision helped to prolong an undemocratic government ruling the Palestinian Territories.

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Authoritarian rule thus persisted, and the Union failed to promote democracy in Palestine (Pace, 2013:54).

Pace & Wolff (2018) state that ‘since 9/11 event and the US-led ‘war on terror’, Islam

had become the new securitised object in EU discourse on the Middle East’ (Pace &

Wolff, 2018:511). The scholars point out to EU’s misperceptions of Political Islam as the determinants of the failed promotion of democracy in the southern Mediterranean. They criticise Brussels’ premise regarding the incompatibility of Islamism with democracy (2018:512) and consequently counter EU’s assumption through a thorough analysis of MENA’s Islamists. According to Pace et al. (2018), Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) old anti-colonialist violent ideologue is still present in the Union’s interpretation of Islamism. This explains why the Brotherhood’s condemnation of all forms of

violence seems to be neglected by Brussels when in 2013 Mursi’s (the leader of the MB and first Egyptian President democratically elected) organisation is declared a terrorist group by the Egyptian government that also put an end to democracy in the Arab Republic. It could then be argued that the Palestinian and the Egyptian example

illustrate how imperfect the information provided to the Union about MENA’s Islamist actors can be. Furthermore, Pace and Wolff’s work also contribute to the debate on how the EU interprets its environment and other actors. Therefore, the EU may not be succeeding in the promotion of democracy in the southern neighbourhood because its interests are being polluted by inaccurate information about Islamist actors.

Other scholars like Haller (2003) explain the misperceptions between the European Union and the Arab-Islamic world through an extended analysis of identity theories. He thus uses social identity basics to understand political actors’ interactions.

Consequently, he argues that a political actor will interpret positively/negatively a neighbouring country depending on the degree of similarities between each other. Therefore, it is more likely to upgrade a country with similar social values, similar political system and equal or higher level of development than to upgrade a completely different state. As might be expected, Haller identifies the socio-cultural and religious differences and the deep socio-economic gap between the European Union and MENA as the main misperceptions’ drivers between these actors (2003:245-246). From his perspective, the Union perceives the Arab Islamic countries as “a backward of

crisis-laden region, continually shattered by religious fundamentalism, recurring violent internal conflicts and authoritarian and aggressive political actors” (2003:245).

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In effect, Haller’s words can be linked to Münevver Cebeci (2012) work. In an attempt to deconstruct Ian Manners concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (through which the Union is represented as a force for good that has both the power and the responsibility to shape what counts as normal in international politics) (Manners, 2002), Cebeci also argues that Foreign Policy is the exercise of the construction of ‘insiders´ and

‘outsiders’ (2012:565). Accordingly, she remarks that identity plays a crucial role in EU policies because: “Identities and policies […] are ontologically bound to each other” (2012:565)

As noted above there is sufficient academic work reflecting upon the importance of norms, values and identities in EU Foreign Policy and more particularly within EU democracy promotion initiatives. In support of this arguments, some scholars like Pace have provided several examples shedding light on how EU conservative identity negatively affects the promotion of democracy in the southern neighbourhood. Even if this reflection has not been rejected by the scholars, Pace and Wolff (2018) put on notice a slight change of Brussels’ conception of Islamism since the Arab Uprisings (2018:512).

Based on an examination of EU development aid policies, prerequisites to EU funding and taking into account the ‘overwhelming focus on security interests in the region’, the scholars argue that no strategic role was given to Political Islam before the revolts (2018:512). On the other hand, Pace and Wolff (2018) bring back EU’s rationalist spirit showing how the often characterisation of Islamism could have been put away in the anti-radicalisation cooperation. In other words, from the academics’ perspective it could be argued that the Union has left aside its clash of values with Political Islam by

cooperating with moderate Islamists (e.g. in Jordan) to combat radicalisation and extremism (2018:512). This could once again show the prioritisation of EU interests over EU values: if for the Union’s interests, Islamists may be a potential ally even if their values are (arguably) incompatible with Europe’s.

Colombo and Voltolini (2017) also identified a slight change in EU- moderate Political Islam relations, more particularly examining the case of the Union’s relations with Ennahda in Tunisia after the Arab Uprisings. Firstly, they explain why the EU has responded in such a way to Islamist political actors:

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Due to the EU’s monolithic view and the perception of an identity threat, Islamist actor were thus not engaged with (2017:14).

As other scholars, Colombo and Voltolini identify the lack of understanding of

Islamism on behalf of the Union as the main reason why Political Islam is framed as an ‘existential threat’ (2017:13). Colombo et al. root this misunderstanding as one

prompted by the liberal character of European Union’s model of promoting democracy (e.g: exclusion of religion outside politics). Moreover, the authors’ state that if the European Union has progressively engaged with Ennahda is mostly because it did not suppose a threat to European identity and its secular-liberal values (2017:7).

In conclusion, scholars portraying a more constructivist European Union argue that the organisation cannot be considered solely a rational actor, as interpretations and

perceptions of other actors play a major role in its decision-making. (Roccu & Voltolini, 2018a:4). Thus, as demonstrated by Pace (2009, 2013) and Pace & Wolff (2018)

through an examination of EU relations with Islamist actors, the Union interests are determined by ideational factors that may drive the Union into deep misunderstandings of reality. Therefore, if EU’s interpretation of events are being conquered by

misperceptions, and EU interests have contradictory aims, a rhetoric-practice gap between EU policy agenda goals and policy in practice is likely to emerge, leading to a failure of democracy promotion in the southern Mediterranean.

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2. Constructing frames in the context of EU democracy promotion

in the MENA region

As explained in the beginning of this chapter, this section aims at constructing several frames bearing in mind the latter academic discussion. This way, this thesis’

methodology will be merged with the literature on EU efforts to promote democracy in the southern neighbourhood. Thus, this thesis the central research question

understanding (which are the frames prevailing in EU democracy promotion initiatives

towards Tunisia?) will be enhanced.

The literature review presented two perspectives within the academic debate analysing how the European Union promotes democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). On the one hand, there is a section of the academia arguing that the EU when promoting democracy in the Mediterranean follows a rationalist logic that prioritises its own interests before the democratisation objectives, thus creating a gap between what the EU says it is willing to do and what it really does in practice. From a realist

perspective, the creation of an area of shared prosperity through the EMP and ENP, can be translated into a securitisation of the 28 EU Member States’ and Arab elites’

interests, since the rest of the MENA society’s strata had already proven unable to adapt to market liberalisations standards (Hollis, 2012:85). The choice of not integrating the agricultural sector (a very large source of employment in North African countries), the improvement of good’s standards while maintaining the poor economic conditions of society (unemployment rates, low salaries etc) (Cavatorta & Durac 2009:16), could then be understood as a business way of democratising the region. In other words, from this rationalist perspective, the EU would be acting as a businessman that is looking for profit (of different natures) and avoiding to take any kind of risk.

Therefore, based on this rationalist academic reading of the Union, in an attempt to link the literature with the ‘frames’ theoretical framework, one could argue that Gray’s (2003) risk/gain vs loss frame fits in this particular portrait of EU democratisation policies in its southern neighbourhood. As described by Gray, when an actor interprets the reality through these type of frames, the information is filtered with reference to the potential benefits/risks that will be produced by an actor’s particular reaction to the received information (Gray, 2003:31-32).

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Hence, if EU democracy promotion policies are portrayed as rationalist, then a first

frame could be drawn suggesting that EU democracy promotion policies in the MENA

region may be determined by a cognitive filter that measures the potential degree of profit/risk the Union can experienced if enhancing democracy in the region.

The rationalist argument can also lead us to construct a second frame, suggesting that the European Union may be promoting democracy in the southern Mediterranean through a resources power frame. As discussed before, according to the rationalists, EU-Mediterranean countries relations are based on an unequal partnership due to the contrast between the 28’s level of economic and political integration and their partners on the shores of the Mediterranean. In Hollis words, ‘what emerged was a ‘hub and

spokes’ arrangement with the EU setting the pace and the Southern states responding bilaterally’ (Hollis, 2012:83). The Mediterranean Partner Countries’ (MPCs) economic

development depends on their expansion to EU internal market (2012:83), therefore the Union has the resource power to set the pace and to a certain extent, to enhance the economic growth of the majority of the North African citizens (like the non-inclusion of the agricultural sector in the EMP has demonstrated) (Durac & Cavatorta, 2009:16). If linking Pace perspective (2009) to Voltolini’s frames, a third frame arguing that the EU promotes democracy through technical frames could be drawn. As explained by Pace, ‘Europeans opt to look at the ‘problem’ in the MENA region as a set of technical

issues […] that skew the intended outcome towards Western interests’ (2009:50).

Voltolini presented technical frames in opposition to political frames since the former only engages with plain scientific questions and neglects the good/bad dichotomies (Voltolini, 2016:23). For this reason, it could be the case that technical frames are determining EU promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean if bearing in mind Cavatorta & Pace (2010) work, because they make continuous references to the lack of the Union’s commitment to the region because key political aspects are not taken into account (Cavatorta & Pace 2010: 583-586).

On the other hand, as discussed in the literature review, there is a groups of scholars with a constructivist understanding of the European Union arguing that the

organisation’s external actions are utterly determined by its own perceptions and interpretations of a particular context (Roccu & Voltolini 2018a: 4).

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In alike manner, Barbara Gray (2003) presents two frames, identity and characterisation

frames, through which an actor while interpreting its environment, it seeks for

similarities and fundamental differences to guide its actions (Gray, 2003: 21-24). This roadmap of prejudices, and comparisons between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ has, according to Pace, Wolff, Colombo, Voltolini and Haller, driven EU relations with Political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, a fourth frame could be drawn (out of these academic evidence) suggesting that the European Union when promoting democracy in its southern neighbourhood, may be interpreting the events through an identity/characterisation filter. This frame could be useful to explain Brussels’ decision to prolong an undemocratic government ruling the Occupied

Palestinian Territories (OPT), and hence the failure of democratisation of the area (Pace, 2013:54). Additionally, this reflection could be linked to Colombo & Voltolini’s (2017) work, since they also pointed out that the Union’s relations with the Islamist party of Tunisia, Ennahda, has followed a ‘monolithic view and a perception of an identity

threat’ (Colombo & Voltolini, 2017:14). So could it be related to EU’s overlook of Al

Sisi’s coup de état in Egypt, the further imprisonment of the democratically elected president Mohammed Mursi and the following declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group (Pace & Wolff, 2018). Thus, this frame suggests that EU democracy promotion policies are driven by self-responded answers to the questions ‘who am I?’ and ‘who are they?’, resulting in a positively defined ‘I’, and a blamed for the negative events ‘them’ (Gray, 2003:21-24).

The constructivist emphasis on identity somehow embeds an engagement with normative values and moral dichotomies on behalf of the EU, this is why it could be easily linked to Voltolini’s political frames, thus leading us to a fifth frame suggesting that EU democratisation policies towards the MENA region are driven by a political interpretation of the context that relies on an analysis of cultural commonalities. As argued by Voltolini, these types of frames do not stimulate the Union to seek evidences, but to follow a value laden preconception of reality instead (Voltolini, 2016:23).

However, for some scholars like Cavatorta and Pace (2010), there is a very thin line between EU values and EU interests because from their perspective, its normative basis has been ‘downgraded to mere rules-of-thumb about how best to achieve a ‘good’ life

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This section has presented five frames based (only) on academic works. Frame 1 suggests that EU democracy promotion policies in the MENA region may be

determined by a risk/gain vs loss frame that measures the potential degree of profit/risk the Union can experienced if enhancing democracy in the region. Frame 2 argues that the European Union may be promoting democracy in the southern Mediterranean through a resources power frame as EU-MENA relations are based on an unequal partnership in which the Union sets the pace and the southern countries follow. Furthermore, frame 3 proposes that since the EU understands MENA problems as ‘technical issues’, Brussels’ may be promoting democracy through a technical frame. If looking at the Union as a constructivist institution that is utterly determined by its value laden perceptions, then frame 4 suggests that the European Union might be furthering its democratisation policies through an identity/characterisation frame. Lastly, frame 5 puts the focus of attention on EU’s engagement with moral dichotomies, explaining that the European Union could be promoting democracy in the Mediterranean through

political frames since it interprets MENA events through a very political filter is guided

by EU normative basis.

Now that this thesis methodology and the literature review have merged together, an examination of EU policies to promote democracy in Tunisia will follow attempting to find which are the frames prevailing in EU democracy promotion initiatives towards

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CHAPTER III: EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

POLICIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE CASE OF

TUNISIA FROM A FRAME ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVE

Before driving the reader’s attention to the specific case of Tunisia this chapter will first briefly introduce how EU foreign Policy and EU-MENA relations were constructed. Afterwards a critical overview of EU democracy promotion policies in the

Mediterranean will be provided in order to clarify the legal basis through which the EU interacts with its southern partners when attempting to promote democracy. Once a general understanding of EU democracy promotion policies have been promoted, the last section will proceed to analyse Brussels’ policies to enhance democracy in Tunisia. Therefore, this Chapter’s last section will address this thesis research question (which

are the frames prevailing in EU democracy promotion initiatives towards Tunisia?) and

while discussing this thesis main objectives: (1) to identify which frames are prevailing in EU’s interpretation of Tunisia’s reality when promoting democracy, (2) shed light on the reasons behind EU’s particular democratisation approach and thus (3) at identifying potential misinterpretations driving EU democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia.

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1. The construction of EU Foreign Policy and EU-MENA relations

overview

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 prompted a new scene in World politics’ leadership. The antagonistic bipolar system that had been driving the international community since 1945 was interrupted by the collapse of the Communist bloc and its further disintegration. Such a political spectrum gathered the attention of some Political Scientists in an attempt to address a simple question of universal interest: ‘so now

what?’.

Influenced by such a political panorama, Christopher Hill (1993) presented a nuanced conceptualisation of the European Community’s (EC) potential international role. Could the EC fill up the vacuum caused by the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)? According to Hill, ‘the Community’s capabilities had been talked up, to the

point where a significant capability-expectations gap exists’ (Hill, 1993:306). This is

why he organised his debate distinguishing the functions the EC had been able to develop in the international system until that time, and other functions that it could perform in the future (1993:310).

Hill argued that the EC could be conceived as the expected candidate to become a ‘replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power’ (1993:312), because the history of international politics has always witnessed a tendency towards balancing the most powerful states’ influence (1993:312). Following this potential presence in the international community, Hill proposed the roles of ‘global intervener’, ‘mediator of

conflicts’, ‘bridge between rich and poor’, and ‘joint supervisor of the world economy’

(1993:312-315) as the potential functions the EC could fulfil as an international actor. However, Christopher Hill (1993) did not only reflect about the future functions of EC Foreign Policy because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but his work was also influenced by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992-1993) (the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which established the capabilities of the Community to perform ‘united’ beyond its borders. Maastricht itself was created in a context

determined by the consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia that resulted in a brutal war (militarily intervened by the United States of America) in the Western Balkans (Christiansen, et al., 2012) that also precipitated a wave of refugee movements across Europe.

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This is why one could argue that the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its consequent European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was a direct response to the challenges posed by the continental context that urge EC foreign policy capabilities. In 1993 Hill concluded that there was ‘undoubted potential for a

single European foreign policy’ but that a ‘coherent system and full actorness (were) still far from realization’ (Hill, 1993:318).

More than two decades after, EU Foreign Policy has developed significantly, to the extent that several theories and conceptualisations reflecting on EU’s international role and power flourished within the academic debate i.e. Normative Power Europe

(Manners, 2002), Ethical Power Europe (Aggestam, 2008), Europe as an Empire (Zielonka, 2008), Market Power Europe (Damro, 2012), Ideal Power Europe (Cebeci, 2012). Institutionally, EU Foreign Policy was particularly strengthened with the

ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, as it provided the EU with diplomatic corps, a European External Action Service (EEAS), and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who also fulfils the role of Vice-President of the European Commission. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the years before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty were crucial for the construction of EU Foreign Policy in general, and more particularly for the construction of EU Foreign Policy towards the southern

Mediterranean since EU-MENA relations were finally settled with the 1995 ratification of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and the consecutive 2003 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Before looking into the main initiatives through which the EU is promoting democracy in the southern Mediterranean, a brief look into European States’ bilateral relations with the MENA countries is necessary, since as Fraihat (2016) puts it: ‘the past is an integral

part of the transition process itself, and it will appear forcefully in different phases’

(Fraihat, 2016:121). Therefore, it has been found important to bring the foundations of the relations between these two regions during the era of colonialism because in the end, not too long has passed since the decolonisation process culminated and the consequent independence of most of the southern Mediterranean countries took place.

It was only in 1956 when Tunisia achieved its independence from France in after the nowadays considered dictator, Habib Bourguiba, suppressed both the French forces and the rest of his Tunisian rivals (2016:31).

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The case of Tunisia is quite representative for Fraihat’s (2016) quote, since it would be Bourguiba (the leader of the movement which contributed to the evacuation of the French forces) who would establish a hermetic autocratic regime in 1957 that lasted until January 14th 2011, when his successor Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia intimidated by the Tunisian people’s message in the streets ‘the people

want the fall of the regime!’.

It could thus be argued, that a reference to the decolonisation of MENA in general, and in Tunisia in particular by some European nations, is important to be made when

analysing EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, since transition to democracy is still facing the sequela of the State’s autocratic structures that were created during the decolonisation years.

Thus, now that the European footprint on the region has been introduced, and that the young life of Tunisia as a State and the generational closeness of Tunisians to the decolonisation years has been emphasised (Fraihat, 2016; Roberts et al., 2016), the next section will offer an overview of the main initiatives through which the EU is enhancing democracy in the southern Mediterranean nowadays.

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2. An overview of EU democracy promotion policies: the main

initiatives towards the Mediterranean

This section aims at providing a comprehensive overview of the main and widest initiatives through which the EU is conducting the promotion of democracy in the southern Mediterranean. Therefore, the examination of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the financial instruments enhancing EU democratisation initiatives will be presented with a critical and informative focus. Once EU democracy promotion basics have been explained, the consecutive sections will proceed to explore the case of Tunisia through a qualitative examination of the financial aspects and political aspects of EU policies to promote democracy in Tunisia from 1998-2017; to consequently discuss this thesis’ central research question: which are the frames prevailing in EU democracy promotion

initiatives towards Tunisia?

2.1) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 1995

As mentioned before, the 1990s were crucial for the construction of EU Foreign Policy, and even more important for setting the relations between the EU and the neighbours from the southern Mediterranean.

In fact, it was in 1995 when the framework guiding the relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) was established. This legal basis was agreed during the Barcelona process that concluded with the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). As pointed out by Bicchi (2014b), ‘the EMP

set out to ‘construct’ the Mediterranean (Bicchi 2014b:28), in fact the meetings were

attended by the authorities of the fifteen European Union Member States and the eleven States with sharing the Mediterranean shores: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt,

Palestinian Authorities (PA), Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey; with the exception of Libya which had been condemned by the United Nations since 1992 with an embargo as a response to their accountability for the 1988 attacks in Lockerbie (UK) (González del Miño, 2008:1233).

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As already introduced in other sections, the EU and the Mediterranean Partner

Countries (MPC) organised their cooperation in three policy baskets: (1) a political and security dialogue that planned to establish a common area of peace and stability, (2) an economic and financial partnership aiming at the creation of an area of shared

prosperity, (3) and a partnership to enhance social, cultural and human understanding and interaction between the two regions (Barcelona Declaration, 1995; Youngs, 2003; Pace, 2004; Adler & Crawford, 2006; González del Miño, 2008; Cavatorta & Durac, 2009; Pace, 2009; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011; Hollis, 2012). These three initiatives will later be developed into more ambitious Association Agreements (AA) through which the bilateral cooperation between the EU and the particular Mediterranean Partner is organised. In conclusion, “the EMP adopted a model that combines

establishing bilateral association agreements between the EU and individual MPCs with various forms of cooperation on political, economic and cultural levels (Cavatorta

& Durac, 2009:10).

According to the Barcelona Declaration (1995) ‘political and security partnership’, EMP parties are fully committed to support the development of rule of law and democracy in the MPCs (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Nevertheless, despite the strength of both the intent and set-up of the EMP, in practice the partnership has proven ineffective (Youngs, 2003; Pace, 2004; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008; González del Miño, 2008; Cavatorta & Durac, 2009; Pace, 2009; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011; Hollis, 2012; Roccu & Voltolini, 2018ab). This gap between theory and practice is, according to academics with a rationalist understanding of the EU, a consequence of Brussels’ prioritisation of material interests over the democratisation agenda goals (Seeberg 2008, Durac & Cavatorta 2009, Hollis 2012). Therefore, EU hierarchical interests have indirectly prolonged authoritarian persistence in MENA and thus it could be argued that the Union by putting in practice its policies, it contributed to trigger the 2011 Arab Uprisings (Seeberg 2008, Durac & Cavatorta 2009, Hollis 2012). In fact, there are some academics pointing out that the outcome of the political and security partnership is negative because in most of the MENA countries ‘the most that has been

achieved is the ‘modernisation of authoritarianism’ or the development of authoritarian pluralism’ (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008:276).

A frame analysis of EU democracy promotion policies before and after the 2011 Dignity Revolution in Tunisia