Side-effects of Conditionality: The Case of the European Union

(1)

Name: Grammenos Marios

Email: marios.grammenos@gmail.com Student ID: s1909924

Dissertation

Side-effects of Conditionality: The Case of the European

Union

Leiden University

MA International Relations, track International Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Eugenio Cusumano

(2)

i

Abstract

This paper aims to examine EU’s power as an influencer against revisionist actors in its immediate proximity, especially through conditionality and socialization and their possible side effects, an idea which has not been examined adequately in academia thus far. Initially the concept of power in IR will be introduced with a special mention to its European form. Afterwards, the EU’s relationship with two revisionist regional actors (Turkey and Russia) is explored. The first case, examines the EU’s handling of Turkey during the displacement crisis and the latter’s shift towards authoritarianism. It will be shown that despite the fact that the EU has managed to dramatically decrease the influx of people in its territory, it has paid a steep political cost domestically and internationally. The second case shows how Russian preferential treatment to certain member-states impeded a unified approach from the EU. Only after the events in Ukraine a unilateral approach was agreed. Both cases show that the European understanding and usage of power is limited and prohibits the development of an ambitious policy mainly due to the current level of European integration and member-states will. Such results are important as they not only show current limitations of the EU’s policy-making, but also highlight some of the areas that require amelioration in order to enhance the EU’s capabilities in todays’ challenges.

(3)

ii

Chapter 1 – Introduction: The European Union in a New Global Order

Currently, the world is changing with unprecedented speed. States may remain the primary driving force of the international scene, but they are not enjoying that privilege by themselves anymore. On the contrary, new forces are ascertaining their place in the global chessboard. The status quo is being tested by those new emerging forces who wish for its redefinition. In that regard, its maintenance is proving to be increasingly more daunting. In such a world, the European Union (EU) is called to find a new place for itself. And although it seems as an influential and stable actor, sometimes appearances can be deceiving.

The EU has always played an important role in the field of International Relations (IR) as it forms a conundrum with its longevity, evolution and flexibility, constituting its exact role in the global order since its establishment nebulous (Carta and Morin 2014). During its evolutionary trek the EU has created a wide variety of tools to pursue its goals, continuously honing them in order to overcome possible obstacles. Adhering to its humanitarian past which originates back to the Enlightenment period and in conjunction with the fact that most member-states are unwilling to consent to the existence of an authority that would transcend their sovereign rights, those tools are limited but nevertheless considered somewhat effective (Richard and van Hamme 2013). This unwillingness of the member-states makes any new step towards further integration an arduous challenge (Bildt 2017). Such fragmentations make the EU only as strong as its weakest link, while creating fertile ground for its exploitation. Lately, they have led to recent incidents of secession and dissent inside the Union.

The aim of this paper is to explore the extent to which EU’s power through foreign policy affects major state actors, primarily through the concept of conditionality and their socialization. It will argue that compared to weaker states which are more likely to be dependent on the EU, stronger states with economies that can withstand its pressure are less affected. It will be presented – au contraire – that in such cases, these actors are able to utilize Brussels’ efforts to woo or pressure them to their benefit instead, towards the adoption of a new modus vivendi. Thus, an effect of “reverse conditionality” can be observed.

These power relations will be further highlighted by showing the present limitations of EU’s power capabilities as, currently, the majority of its defense and security tends to be outsourced. If the EU wants to escape this predicament, it must evolve in a way that will be able

(6)

2

to project its power credibly without external aid. For that to happen, a radical reorientation of its policies is needed as well as deeper integration. Nevertheless, nowadays, under continuous economic and political challenges such changes seem rather distant.

The case studies strikingly show this issue. The first case study will examine the EU-Turkish relations. Turkey has been an important neighbor of Europe throughout the years, playing a major role in European politics. Even now, it is involved in accession negotiations, albeit it seems rather unlikely that it will end up joining as a member-state. Also, Turkey is a member of NATO which prompts even closer cooperation with the EU. Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has been under the microscope by Brussels primarily due to the displacement-migration crisis and its position on the European South-Eastern border. Throughout those years, their relationship has changed drastically in favor of Turkey.

The second case study assesses the EU-Russian relations. Russia has also been an important neighbor and trade partner of Europe due to their long historical, cultural and economic ties. Today, this relationship seems to be at its lowest point since the Cold War (Casier 2018). Russia is a regional power with its own ambitious geopolitical agenda, something which has been made evident in several cases, the most recent one being Ukraine. Russia has tried mainly to enforce its agenda on the post-Soviet space. Only after its perception as a common enemy by all the member-states, the EU managed to coalesce to a certain extent against Russia (Schmidt-Felzmann 2014, 46-52). But collective action by the former has not deterred the latter.

Afterwards, the paper will present its findings which confirm the complexity regarding the concept of European power, showing its levels of dependency on several external factors and the existence of a “reverse conditionality”. Thereupon, it will try to make some suggestions to ameliorate these problems. These aspects will determine EU’s place in a G-Zero world.

Hence the following research question will be examined:

RQ: Are the EU’s tools of power by themselves capable of deterring or constraining adversarial

agendas of revisionist actors in the region and, more importantly, safeguarding it from their influence?

This scholarly thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter one is the Introduction. Chapter two discusses the methodology that will be followed. The third chapter is dedicated to the concept

(7)

3

of power, specifying on its European aspect. It also includes an analysis of the power tools that EU policy-makers have at their disposal. The fourth and fifth chapters will examine the two case studies, EU-Turkish relations and EU-Russian relations respectively. Chapter six will present the paper’s findings, followed by chapter seven which is the conclusion.

In a world that is wavering between the ideals of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, understanding the ways of power in the field of IR is more important than ever. The Union has been studied extensively in its ability to act as an influencer of norms, but to the author’s knowledge, there have been no studies examining the phenomenon of “reverse conditionality” that occurs in the fields of foreign policy and security. This work aspires to light a spark and encourage further scholarly discussion towards that direction.

(8)

4

Chapter 2 – Methodology

According to Kothari (2004, 1), “research is an art of scientific investigation”.

The goal of this paper is to examine how an actor, whose power projection capacities predominantly rely on non-military means, affects or is affected by other actors who do not face similar constraints. Due to space limitations, only major actors in its close geographical proximity will be analyzed. For the purposes of this research, the EU will be considered as the constrained actor and its relations with its two main revisionist neighbors, namely Turkey and the Russian Federation will be explored. More specifically, this dissertation will examine the EU’s effectiveness as an influencer against the main revisionist regional actors in its close proximity in addition to its openness to their influence.

Considering the fact that the EU is an actor that relies primarily on its economic power, the contraction of its economy would have affected its interactions with other states and lessened its influence. This would also have profound effects in its decision-making capabilities prohibiting a more concise approach, rendering it more likely to succumb to external influences.

Furthermore EU-American relations are of outmost importance in shaping European security and defense. American interests in the region are closely aligned with the Europeans’. Thus, the relationship that another actor has with US – and to a lesser degree NATO, plays a vital role for someone to comprehend Brussels’ attitude towards that actor.

Which leads to the following Hypotheses:

H1: A political crisis constricts the area of influence that an actor has, creating a power-vacuum

that needs to be filled.

H2: Irrespective of its level of integration, when a group of states is dependent on an external actor

for its security, it cannot conduct an effective security or foreign policy without that actor’s consent and contribution.

(9)

5

H3: Conflicts of interest between members of the same military alliance tend to be very complex,

especially when the main power in the alliance refuses to act as an arbiter.

Regarding the variables of the cases studies, NATO membership or non-membership of the external actors will be acting as the Independent Variable while the EU’s decision making will be the Dependent Variable. Foreign policy here is to be understood as the actions that a political entity takes (in our case the EU) in the course of its interaction with other members of the international community.

To examine the external power of the EU and its ability to influence other international actors, this research will be based on empirical evidence such as official reports, documents and data, starting from the beginning of the European financial and political crisis of 2008 up to 2018. The main agencies where those reports will be procured from are the European Commission, the European Council and the European External Action Service (EEAS). But, due to the author’s limited access to certain primary sources, this research will focus mostly on secondary sources (books and journal articles).

As power has been proven to be very challenging to measure quantitatively, the paper will follow a qualitative research approach and will try through specific cases to substantiate the magnitudes of power relations between the actors represented. In order to understand the relative EU power, the research will follow an exploratory approach. Furthermore, in order to discern the fluctuations of influence in those relationships, an inductive approach will be used. During the inductive approach the author focuses on “Immersion in the details and specifics of the data to

discover important categories, dimensions, and interrelationships” (Durrheim 2006, 48).

The research method that will be utilized in this research will be process-tracing, in order to search, estimate and assess causal relations by empirically connecting different events with each other, ultimately proving the accuracy of the theory (George and Bennett 2005). For such a complex issue it is cardinal to distinguish a causal chain of events from a sizeable amount of literature. A good way to pinpoint the effectiveness of power in this case would be the implementation level of important agreements between the EU and the aforementioned actors.

To the author’s knowledge, the two cases chosen represent in the most effective way that contrast, with Turkey being a member of NATO, while Russia is not. Both of those states have a key place in European foreign policy. The pair has had more-or-less orderly relations with Europe

(10)

6

in the past, but recently it has started to show (neo)revisionist signs and a willingness to redefine its relationship with the EU.

Other reasons for their selection are their proximity to the EU, and their size (territorial and market) as it makes them much more capable of withstanding the Brussels’ power compared to other states which are more dependent. Being able to withstand the EU’s “stick” while reaping the benefits of the “carrot” will further underline their ability to affect European politics to their benefit and highlight the necessity of the American presence to make the European repertoire of power much more effective than it would otherwise be. Another factor behind the rationale of their preference is their revisionist nature, highlighting a struggle between the EU’s inertia and the Turkish and Russian disrupting actions towards the present state of affairs.

Τhe American factor is going to be taken under constant consideration as it constitutes a fundamental factor which guides the EU’s policy-making not least in terms of defense and security (Kagan 2003). Its predominant role as a security benefactor of Europe in the particular case can be considered as an important intervening variable as it, in one way, encourages European complacency in those matters, while on the other hand, undermines the EU, thrusting it into a satellite role. So far, European efforts to act without American support or consent have produced arguably ambivalent results. Besides, the US geographical disconnection sometimes can cause a political detachment from the region as well. Libya, Syria, and Ukraine for example are located much closer to Europe than to the US and the former has been experiencing their consequences more vividly than the latter.

But before we talk about the effects of power, we must first understand it. On the following chapter, a brief explanation of power is given along with several theories about EU’s peculiar case. Last but not least, Brussels’ mechanisms of power will be presented and discussed.

(11)

7

Chapter 3 – The Concept of Power in International Relations

3.1 The meaning of Power

Since its conceptualization, the concept of power has always been an enigma in the field of IR. Multiple scholars have tried to solve it, with some having more success than others. However, academia has still to agree on a universal definition of a term that defines its core foundations. There is a widespread belief that power for an IR theorist holds the same value as money does for an economist, while for others, though there may be a correlation between the two, distinctive differences remain (Baldwin 1971). Specifically, the biggest differentiation between money and power is the fact that money can – for the most part – be easily calculated contrary to power (ibid., 578-579). Power is considered as something “fluid”, making its quantification very difficult, complicating not only its estimation but also its appropriate use (ibid.; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Williams 2004, 638). Regarding power, a plus b does not always equal x, but by taking different variables into account it could also lead to y or z (Dahl 1957, 294-205). Thus, the measurement and operationalization of power has been causing multiple headaches to policy-makers, where in most cases they cannot factor out the necessary amount of power needed and its appropriate utilization in each situation.

Power is also relational, as it stems from the connection between actor A and actor B, along with their capability to influence each other (Dahl 1957). For Barnett and Duvall (2005, 45)

“Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their fate”. The common denominator between different opinions is that power

has to do with the influence that A can exert on B (Baldwin 1971, 585-586). But relationships are more complex than usually perceived and it is in their intricacies where the finer workings of power can be observed. Power could be complex enough that even if someone manages to make another to act according to the former’s interests, there is also the possibility him or her being influenced vice-versa, making it extremely exacting to gauge. Of similar importance is the social perspective of power which stems from the interaction between actors (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). The more increased their interplay, the more sophisticated the relationship.

The above claim is associated with the fact that power has many forms. A basic division of those forms distinguishes between “hard power” and “soft power” (Nye 2004). The first

(12)

8

focuses on ways to force – or coerce – someone to do something (usually unwillingly), while the second emphasizes on ways to persuade someone to willingly follow another’s will (ibid., 5-11). Both of them are of equal importance, otherwise an actor cannot bring out his full capabilities.

Insights on power impact policy-making by outlining new options and pathways or, at other times, limiting them (Guzzini 2005). The abovementioned distinction between forms of power, may be helpful, but can prove burdensome to its comprehension, as it focuses more on its separate forms than in its entirety. As previously mentioned, it is focal to understand this concept in its totality, otherwise we risk misunderstanding its full magnitude. It could be argued that every relation is a power relation, extending from our own personal lives to states’ relations and even relations transcending them. Those relationships in turn, determine the structure of every Global Order.

But this relative pecking order has been very difficult to pinpoint because, as previously stated, no precise way to measure power exists. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances it can be claimed – not without important detriments – that power can actually be assessed to an acceptable extent (Dahl 1957, Baldwin 1971). In order to do that, universality has to be renounced to create an effective measuring toolset. Moreover, if wrong estimations have been taken or there is insufficient understanding, there is a great likelihood that the results would be misleading (Dahl 1957, 209-214). Thus, power could be calculated with reasonable coherence only in very simplified cases and in particular on cases where there is an abundance of data.

Since power can be subjective, without having access to the actors themselves in order to rationalize their actions, most of the time speculation is our only choice and as good as that may be, it could also prove inaccurate (Baldwin 1971, 596). Still, an overall estimation of the balance of power is possible if the research scrutinizes enough the evidence at hand (Dahl 1957, 214; Hart 1976). Considering all of the above factors, power measurement cannot be absolute, but if done well, it can be sufficient for the needs of a specific research.

Power has many forms and it is only natural that there are also many theories about it. The paper will now proceed to examine some of those theories which focus on the Europeans’ and chiefly the EU’s grasp and employment of power.

(13)

9

3.2.1 Normative Power Europe (NPE)

The world has been constantly evolving and along with it our understanding of power. Currently, there is a heated scholarly debate about the elements which constitute an actor as an ‘influential player’ in the international scene. In this debate, a prominent concept has emerged, that of “Normative Power Europe” (NPE), by Manners (2002). Normative power actors like the EU should act on the international scene as establishers of norms by the power of attraction, setting themselves as an example to be followed by others, stating that the bases of this concept are the crystallization and blooming of the European dream, as well as the EU’s Constitution and progress through the years (ibid.). The fact that the EU lacks any significant military capabilities only strengthens this argument.

As in every power relation, there is a constant battle between every party involved, NPE proves to be no exception to this rule. meaning that there is no altruistic way to exercise power in the Global scene no matter how sometimes policy-makes try to sugar-coat their intents and actions. Manners (2013) considers this theory viable today without being affected by its criticism. The idea that Europe acts based on specific values and principles and not on its interests, has prompted several responses, some of which are briefly explained below.

3.2.2 A (neo-)Realist approach to NPE

Hyde-Price (2006) has offered a neo-realist critique to that concept, claiming that the EU actually operates on its own interests and only spreads its norms on limited areas. He distinguishes between primary concerns and second-order concerns where the first are detrimental to an actor’s security while the latter can only be pursued when they are not conflicting with the previous (Hyde-Price 2006, 222-223). Thus, normative goals should be pursued only when they are not in danger of harming the actor’s safety, otherwise it entails the risk of compromising its security or the self-floundering of its foreign policy. In a more recent article, Hyde-Price (2008, 43-44) considers that following a strictly normative/ethical policy could be counter-productive.

3.2.3 Europe as a Hegemonic Power

Diez (2013) argues among others that one should approach the EU’s actions similarly to the actions of a regional hegemon and that NPE was made mainly for internal consumption. Diez (ibid., 202-203) argues that today’s multipolar world has no specific universal values, but there is

(14)

10

a contest between several different perceptions and beliefs. Norms and interests are indistinguishable from each other most of the time (ibid., 201). That way, whenever the EU advocates a specific norm, it is done not only because it wants to act as a force of good but also because there are underlying interests and aims. Also, the power of norms depicts a clash for internal and external supremacy (ibid., 203).

3.2.4 Pragmatic Power Europe

Wood (2011, 245) adopts another approach which characterizes the EU as a pragmatic power, claiming that EU’s progress has been characterized by practicality and adaptability, even if idealism was the primary reason for its initial creation. According to Wood (ibid.), practicality has been the driving force of EU’s domestic and foreign policy, disregarding – to a great extent – the idea that the EU acts as a force of “good” and the successful diffusion of norms is usually something secondary.

This line of thought, though, posits the EU in a reactive position to events as it stresses the factor of adaptability. This is no doubt important, yet, if someone aspires to be considered noteworthy and to lead, they need to be proactive too.

3.2.5 Imperialist Power Europe

A more critical approach to the way that the EU operates was made by Sepos (2013) who categorizes EU as an imperial power based on the way that it interacts with smaller actors, not being able to escape its imperialistic past.

Several cases reaffirm this position, especially with the manner that the EU treats the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) due to the power asymmetry between them (Sepos 2013; Conceição-Heldt 2014).1_{Even if non-military means are used, coercion is still} possible, signifying its importance in the European handbook of power.

3.2.6 Idiot Power Europe

Carta (2014, 349) depicts the EU as an idiot power, an “atypical foreign policy actor, with

limited resources, but with the ambition to be a global player”. There are three different noted

1_{For EU-ACP relations – especially with Africa, see Woods 2008; van Seters and Klavert 2011;} Lirong 2011; Hurt 2003; Dalleau and van Seters 2011; Carbone 2008

(15)

11

ways of discourse-making, each of them depicting the ambivalent images that the EU is projecting, which ultimately impede policy making as they diffuse to all agential levels resulting in internal instability (ibid.). NPE also forebodes a sense of European superiority which has a duty to enlighten other ‘lesser actors’, contradicting other ways of exercising normative power (Carta 2014; Sepos 2013; Kavalski 2013).

It is clear that the EU has a set of normative values which is aiming to export, but the bigger question is whether it has the potential to do so. Carta (2014, 349-350) concludes that the persistence on normative discourses could be a double-edged sword. The aforementioned inconsistencies need to be eliminated if the EU wants to step up to its aspirations of becoming a global power.

3.2.7 European Power in a Global Context

There is a widespread belief by many scholars that normative power has Eurocentric origins, but that does not mean that it cannot be observed outside Europe (see Kavalski 2013; Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis 2013; Pu 2013). Efforts in this direction can be seen by other actors around the world, the most noteworthy one being China (Kavalski 2013; Manners 2013). This has been a part of a greater effort to de-Westernize IR concepts and export them to other ‘markets’. But every state (and every market) interprets normative power differently as it is evident on Kavalski’s (2013, 249) article which compares the normative power of Europe to the normative power of China (with the former being based on the logic of appropriateness and the latter on the

logic of relationships. This proves that normative power as any form of power has its own

intricacies and differences in implementation, reaffirming that power is fluid.

The title of normative power is bestowed by others and not by the actor itself (Kavalski 2013, 249). This is questionable as sometimes the term Great power is also bestowed by others. In our international system, it is more important for someone to be considered powerful, rather than having actual power, but without recognition. This is emphasized even more in todays’ progressively multipolar world. A person’s perception of power could be very different of another’s. In the EU’s case, many consider it powerful due to its sheer market size while others due to its lack of military capabilities do not. By its very nature then, power, its attribution and understanding can be very delicate and controversial.

(16)

12

Harpaz and Shamiz (2010, 583) claim that the EU’s reliance on normative power is the only way of shaping its foreign policy in the absence of any effective hard (military) power in its arsenal – except the enforcement of sanctions, which produces dubious results. As previously mentioned, EU’s ambiguous image and approach in the international scene creates ambivalent reactions from other actors, essentially hurting its legitimization, while failing to produce the intended results (ibid.). As it seems, other external actors view mostly the economic power of the EU and ignore everything else (Lucarelli 2007, 264).

People notice mostly the overt exercise of power due to its rapid and eye-catching effects. Subtler forms of power require time for their results to be registered and sometimes they fall under harsh scrutiny for that reason. Last but not least, pursuing its normative agenda could more often than not alienate international players from the EU, au lieu to attracting them (Harpaz and Shamiz 2010).

As it can be seen, the complex nature of the EU is a poisoned chalice. The future character of the EU’s power will directly be related to the future of European integration.

3.3 European Tools of Power

After examining various theories on EU power, its power projection tools will be examined.

The European Security Strategy (ESS), drafted on the 12th_{December of 2003, titled “A}

Secure Europe in a Better World” laid the foundations for the EU’s past Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP) (European Council 2003). Deeply influenced by a series of monumental events, it posited Brussels’ approach to a “new” world. The relative longevity of this document was proportionate to its lack of precision. However, despite its longevity, its vagueness prevented significant results.

Yet, in 2016 things changed. External challenges (turbulence in its borders, evolution of new and old threats and the questionable efficacy of other agents in the international system), as well as internal crises (financial and displacement crises, tendencies of secession and populism) led to CFSP’s recalibration. The fruit of those efforts was a new Global Strategy titled: “Shared

Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (European Union 2016). The new strategy shows that the EU is becoming

(17)

13

more rational as an international actor, providing a good foundation for the future, despite some cloudiness on critical concepts and definitions.

In order to achieve those aims, the EU has several tools of power at its disposal and depending on their use, it can exercise its power overtly, covertly or latently. This apparatus is examined bellow.

3.3.1 Military Power

The indecisiveness of the EU to play a greater role in the world has led some to characterize it as a small power (Toje 2008; Kagan 2003). There are several reasons for that characterization. First of all, the lack of common identity between its member-states, impedes it from generating a coherent strategic identity (Toje 2008, 205). Another issue is its ineffective leadership on sensitive issues since no one assumes that burden (Howorth 2014, 12-14). This could prove to be a great obstacle to surpass as in an entity focused on liberal values such as democracy and equality, the clear-cut domination of some states in detriment of others would only increase internal tensions and impede integration. An additional challenge would be the ‘democratic deficit’ that the Europeanization of the defense causes (Wagner 2006; Koenig-Archibugi 2004).

So far, the CFSP has not been successful. For Brussels, developing a military capability clashes with its image as normative power (Howorth 2014; Toje 2008; Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon 2011). It should not come as a surprise that most European efforts to adopt a protector’s identity regarding the norms it exports, have either floundered or been redefined less ambitiously, increasing the preexisting capabilities-expectations gap (ex. European Rapid Reaction Force) (ibid.). For the foreseeable future, the current situation does not seem that it will change, as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is still largely dependent on the US (Toje 2008; Howorth 2014; Rynning 2011; Kagan 2003). This leads to the conclusion that the European notion of power is still severely limited as it lacks the oldest and arguably the most important and respected form of ‘hard power’. If it wants to substantially magnify its potential, the EU should start to mature its military capacities. For this to happen, deeper integration in sensitive areas is needed.

3.3.2 Deterrence

(18)

14

[…] the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses the target would incur. […] policies of deterrence in international politics can include both military and non-military threats that are intended to prevent both military and non-military courses of action by other states. (Huth 1999, 26)

While there are numerous forms of deterrence, its most well-known form, ‘nuclear

deterrence’, emerged during the Cold War (Schelling 1966). The European project was also

eventuated by the logic of deterrence. Namely, if the European states came together, they would be able to claim a better place in the international arena than by pursuing that aim separately. The fact that some member-states had nuclear capabilities only increases the rationality of European deterrence.

Yet, the most important aspect of deterrence for the EU is not its military capabilities, which as mentioned above are – at least at the present moment – nugatory, but the European Common Market which consists the pinnacle of EU’s power, leading to its recognition as a Market

Power (Damro 2012). Due to its size, many external actors covet to have access to it. On account

of that want, they are willing to make numerous concessions. In the economic facet the EU is going strong and the integration process, despite its shortfalls, continues. There is hope that closer successful economic integration could also have spillover effects on European security and defense (Howorth 2014, 25). Nonetheless, there has been little evidence of that being the case.

3.3.3 Sanctions

Sanctions should be considered as the ‘stick’ in this toolset. Sanctions are usually a policy decision which has a coercive nature. Moreover, the effects of sanctions are questionable as both parties are usually affected by them and sometimes the enforcer is hurt more than the recipient (Drezner 2015; Morgan 2015). Giumelli (2013, 18-20), argues that sanctions are more complex than initially thought distinguishing between three categories of sanctions: (i) coercive sanctions (ii) restrictive sanctions and (iii) signaling sanctions, emphasizing that all of those forms constitute only a part of a more comprehensive strategy to make someone to submit to another’s will. While it is true that sanctions should be considered as part of a bigger picture (ibid.; Vines 2012), the initial coercive nature of sanctions remains as they are intended to cause some discomfort – no

(19)

15

matter how small – to another party. Besides, sanctions can be used to legitimize NPE (Erickson 2011). Sanctions tend to be more effective if they are utilized multilaterally, but differentiation in legislation between the enforcing parties hamper their smooth application, leaving them open to exploitation (Vines 2012).

The EU has had relative success on employing sanctions to force states or authorities within states to submit to its will, especially on underdeveloped or developing countries, as well as to gain internal legitimization (Erickson 2011; Giumelli 2013, 36-37). On the other hand, against actors with strong market who are able to withstand Brussels’ pressure, it has had limited success (Dreyer and Popescu 2014; Giumelli 2015; Vines 2012; Conceição-Heldt 2014). Another problematic case is when the EU wants to impose sanctions on violent non-state actors or persons that considers as terrorists (Keohane 2008; Eckes 2012). Legislation too, needs to become more effective in order for sanctions and restrictions to be better implemented. (Eckes 2012, 131-132). As one of its primary power tools, the EU’s sanctions capabilities should be honed to the biggest possible extent. Only in that way can Brussels utilize effectively the whole gamut of its power in that area.

3.3.4 Aid

Moving on to the aspects of European power that constitute the “carrot” in the equation, aid plays a prominent role. In order for a country to be able to benefit from the EU’s aid programs, usually it has to adhere to certain requirements such as the liberalization of its economy and democratization. Those steps are not always in the country’s best interests (Hurt 2003). Principally, with developing countries, the Union has used its programs to effectively exert pressure on those countries to adjust to its demands (Sepos 2013, 271-274).

This approach to aid has been challenged in recent years by new international players who are more willing to provide aid themselves, without having such demands from their beneficiaries, limiting the appeal of Brussels (Lirong 2011; Woods 2008). The EU has actively been trying to address such issues, but the steps taken so far have been inadequate (Carbone 2008, 227-228). Even if after the ratification of the Lisbon treaty great potential on paper exists, the fact remains that there seems to be a discordance between the will of the EU’s institutions and that of its member-states, hindering a successful shaping of foreign policy in the area (van Seters and Klavert

(20)

16

2011, 16-17). Moreover, aid programs cannot reach their full potential unless a strengthening of the EEAS is made.

3.3.5 Trade

As previously stated, trade with the EU is considered an asset. However, for states to have access to it, they have to abide by certain rules. On their side, EU’s policy-makers try to capitalize on this “need” (Damro 2012, 692). This constitutes a major factor for the effectiveness of the EU as an influencer in the international scene. Nevertheless, European policy-makers are keen to protect both their producers and their consumers in some cases (Eliasson 2014). This stance limits its potency. Moreover, several third parties have found ways to capitalize on current deficiencies of European market (Dür 2011).

Surprisingly, conflicting positions between member-states tend to lead to a better bargaining capability of the Union as a whole (Elgström and Frennhoff Larsén 2010). Yet, with market size being a more significant factor, no matter the state of its internal cohesion, against powerful economic actors the EU has not been as effective as previously thought (Conceição-Heldt 2014; Dür and Elsig 2011). In addition, despite being termed as a “market power”, evidence reveals that it remains a “norm adopter”, overshadowed by other states such as the US and China, with the differences between member-states proving to be a liability (Posner and N. Véron 2010). This can be precarious for the future of the EU as emerging economic powers with different agendas are further destabilizing its capacities (Young 2011).

3.3.6 (Accession) Conditionality

According to Stokke (2013, 277), conditionality can be termed as a prerequisite in an agreement which serves to ensure its smooth pursuance by those involved. A further distinction is made between two generations of conditionality, the first being economic while the second – and more recent – being political (ibid., 277). The EU uses both those forms to a great extent and especially towards states that could be prospective members of the Union. Ergo, its foreign policy is greatly reliant on conditionality (European Union 2016). Its usage is diffused to all the mechanisms of EU power, predominantly in its usage of sanctions, aid programs and trade agreements.

(21)

17

However, European conditionality has varying degrees of questionable effectiveness (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012). Contrary to previous beliefs, conditionality’s success might actually be dependent on the proximity of a state to the EU as well as the adoption of EU norms and legislation by its neighbors (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2015). Compared to other actors who use conditionality as an effective policy tool, the EU has not proven as apt in its application, with disastrous results (Langbein 2014).

For all that, conditionality has helped the EU to increase its size and area of influence, following the same path as NATO did after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

3.3.7 Socialization

Socialization is another important power tool. According to Beyers (2010, 909) it plays a focal part in European politics. Socialization amounts to the influence that is generated between actors during their interactions through time (ibid.; Alderson 2001; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Due to its normative character, the EU is deeply involved in socialization processes. As such, socialization is a very appealing instrument.

The more the technology advances, the more intense this process becomes (Alderson 2001, 425). It can be seen that the EU believes in the potency of its norms through its endeavors to export them. The logic behind this is that the more frequently other countries interact with the EU, the more they will be influenced by European ideals. The more they are influenced by those ideals, the more the European values will expand, along with EU’s influence. Here it is important to note that socialization takes place also inside the EU leading to further integration.

Through socialization norms can emerge or disappear creating a modus operandi for the legitimacy of actions that an actor has at his disposal, effectively increasing or limiting its options (ibid.; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). By definition then, socialization can give but also deny access to the aforementioned toolkit. Considering the importance of consensus in Union politics and particularly in foreign policy decisions, socialization is of pronounced importance. However, it is a time-consuming process and depends a lot on the quality of the interaction (Beyers 2010, 913-917). In light of that fact, one should not expect miracles from socialization at least in the short-run. Besides, as power is relational and social, socialization does not escape the rule that every party involved is affected (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 290).

(22)

18

Having examined the critical theories on EU power and its tools, the complexity behind its understanding and usage of its power can be seen. In the following case studies, the EU’s competence in power projection will be empirically assessed.

(23)

19

Chapter 4 – Case Study no. 1 (EU–Turkish Relations)

4.1 EU-Turkish relations – Historical Overview

Since the first talks of a possible EU membership, Turkey’s road has been a long one characterized by many delays and stalling (European Commission 2016a). Its NATO membership also helped as it allowed a level of cooperation between the parties which would have otherwise been far more difficult to achieve. The EU has constantly been using its soft power over Turkey. Today, Turkey is a beneficiary of around €4,5 billion in financial assistance from the EU for the period 2014-2020 (European Commission 2016b)2_{. However, the possibility of accession of a} country with important ethical and cultural differences has proven to be challenging and more recent events make a future Turkish accession seem highly unlikely.

In 2005, a survey showed that European opposition to a Turkish membership was steadily increasing (Barysch 2007). Today, this viewpoint does not seem to have changed. Since the rise in power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, an initial rapprochement was seen in the EU-Turkish relationship, but after a recent turn to authoritarianism the relationship has turned sour, bringing Turkey into a direct ideological clash with the EU who is a vocal advocate of liberal democracy and a strong critic of authoritarianism and human rights violations (Ferguson 2016). The recent Turkish constitutional referendum which sought to bring important changes to the Turkish Constitution, one of which would be the reinstitution of capital punishment, is such an example. Its previous abolishment by the Turkish government was considered by many as result and a testament of the European influence (Manners 2002, 250). Some believe that this is the official institutionalization of the underlying authoritarianism preexisting in Turkey’s politics (Esen and Gumuscu 2017). This change also denotes the withdrawal of Turkey from EU’s sphere of influence.

A principal reason for this change is the excessive centralization of power in the hands of the ruling party and especially of the Turkish President. For the first time in its modern history, Turkey managed to avoid a military coup on the 15th_{of July 2016. Then, the Turkish leader Recep} Tayyip Erdoğan ingeniously capitalized this chance to bolster his position in detriment of the democratic institutions. According to Lavenex (2011, 381) and her “Theory of Concentric Circles

2_{Not to be confused with the Cross-border Cooperation Agreement which was signed after the} beginning of the displacement crisis.

(24)

20

of flexible European integration” the integration of Turkey follows the same pattern as the

Western Balkan states, meaning that it incorporates part-bilateral and part-regional agreements without having an actual membership on the European system. Thus, if the EU uses its power, it can slowly establish new norms, directing states in their close neighborhood to share similar values and resulting in a more normalized relationship. But Öniş and Kutlay (2016) convincingly argue of the difficulties that the EU faces both internally and externally to affect powerful and – at least – internally legitimized leaders who have revisionist aspirations. In the instance of Turkey, their theory seems more credible. Initially, it may have followed to a certain level the European acquis, but when their interests started to differentiate, the effect of EU’s policies on Turkey lessened significantly. Predominantly domestically, Turkey has made radical steps which are distancing it from Brussels.

Even though Erdogan’s continuously aggressive rhetoric should be taken with some reservations, the EU in its current state can only follow a strategy of appeasement as during the past few years, it has become increasingly dependent on Turkey for the stabilization of its South-Eastern borders. Brussels, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War has not found an effective alternative to tackle the displacement crisis, leading to an external reliance on Turkey to manage the influx of people that are trying to enter into its territory.

For this reason, an EU-Turkish agreement has been reached, where the Union will support Turkish efforts to regulate more effectively the migration flows in the region chiefly by offering monetary support. (Council of the European Union 2016; Seufert 2016). Other important tradeoffs that Turkish officials managed to acquire were the restart of accession negotiations and the prospect of visa liberalization for Turkish nationals who wish to travel to the EU (ibid.). However, unless Turkey satisfies the necessary Copenhagen criteria first, any advancement seems difficult.

4.2 Political Crisis and EU-Turkish Agreement (Migration Flows)

The financial crisis of 2008 was only the visible part of a bigger political predicament that the EU was facing and, even today, not all member-states have managed to fully overcome it, creating divisions between them. However, nothing could have prepared them for the stream of people who crossed the European borders after the escalation of the Syrian Civil War, which ultimately resulted in the overload of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). As Niemann and Zaun (2018, 4) state, the integration of the member-states in this area and the Dublin

(25)

21

agreements were not sufficient. Due to the difficulty of finding common ground on this issue and following the floundering of CEAS, some member-states unilaterally reintroduced border controls inside the Schengen area (ibid., 4). Previously, in early March of 2016, other European countries proceeded to shut off their borders which led to the closure of the “Balkan Route”. This created a lot of internal tension as many states – members or not – opted in favor of their national interests in place of the acquis.

A few days later, on the 18th_{of March 2016, the EU-Turkey statement was produced as an} effort to solve the issue. After its signing, it is indeed true that migration flows decreased by 97% (European Commission 2018a; UNHCR 2018). On the one hand, this can be considered as a remarkable success of the EU’s influence over an external actor, overcoming an insurmountable challenge. On the other hand, it has created several problems which may be less immediate or overt, but no less important.

First of all, the different stance of member-states on the critical issue of migration has affected European cohesion. This is evident through the Emergency Relocation Mechanism (ERM) where several countries refused to participate or have underperformed towards their commitments as seen in official data (European Commission 2017a). Despite claims that the total number of relocations through the ERM is proving to be less than it was agreed (ibid.), the failure of the member-states to fulfill their legal quotas is another example where they refuse to follow the EU acquis. The political disharmony between the EU on this issue is clear and other actors can exploit it in order to pressure Brussels.

Despite the thorny implementation of the ERM, difficulties have also been encountered on the 1:1 return policy. Even though, the influx of people has dropped significantly after the enactment of the agreement, the number of people who are being sent back to Turkey remains much lower compared to the total arrivals, causing congestion in Greek facilities and highlighting, some of the pathogenies of this agreement (European Commission 2017b, 4-7). Member-states who are located at specific EU borders are overburdened by their responsibilities to manage its frontiers. With the escalation of the displacement crisis the situation became unmanageable. The initial belief that those countries would be able to modulate it only with increased monetary support, proved to be unrealistic.

Another result from this massive influx of people into the EU and its failure to effectively tackle the issue, resulted in the rise of populism. From the start of the displacement crisis, several

(26)

22

elections in many member-states have shown this political tilt. As such, in order to appease their citizens’ sentiments, EU policy-makers tried to fortify the EU externally with the EU-Turkey agreement (Dagi 2018, 14). It is probable that the EU resorted to such an action because it lacked the means to address the root of the cause itself. This lack of political cooperation led to the dependence on Turkey. In essence, these disagreements have lessened the potency of Brussels to acquire its goals by its own means.

Despite the many ups and downs of the EU-Turkey relationship, the reality is that the agreement has held strong. Nevertheless, the argument that Turkey was simply influenced to handle more effectively the migration flows remains problematic. While the benefit for the EU is obvious, Turkey has also benefitted greatly. Despite the fact that the latter does not fulfill the criteria as a safe country of origin, by sending people back to Turkey, the European authorities implicitly recognize it as one (Niemann and Zaun 2018, 9-10). Thus, the first benefit is its indirect legitimacy granted by the EU, as tolerance can also be considered as a form of acceptance. For the Union, the continuation of the agreement is more important than challenging the political affairs of Turkey.

The second advantage is the monetary aid offered to handle the increasing number of displaced people that are located in its territory. This financial support ameliorates the conditions of the humanitarian crisis in the region and lowers their tendencies to continue their migratory journey (European Commission 2017b, 14). In order for the EU to adhere to its values and to promote stability in the region, funding should be continued (European Commission 2016d). Another potential benefit is the promotion of security in the region as a spill-over effect. Turkey could also be affected by it for as long as it needs assistance. Nevertheless, one should not expect any radical changes in its political life. Stronger efforts of cooperation in the area are also needed to yield the desired results.

The third benefit is the dependency of Brussels on Turkey on migration. This reliance has been taken advantage of by the latter, who managed to take some bold unilateral actions, without suffering almost any repercussions from its western allies. To the interior, they mainly consist of actions towards absolutism. To the exterior, it has managed to intervene actively in the Syrian conflict with two operations (Operation Euphrates Shield – past, Operation Olive Branch – present) in order to fulfil its geopolitical agenda. Moreover, despite being a NATO member, it has pursued a rapprochement with Russia in a period where tensions are high between it and the

(27)

23

alliance. Past animosities between the two states are being put to the side, evident by the signing of a bilateral agreement about the armament of Turkish forces with Russian equipment, creating tensions within the alliance (Gall and Higgins 2017). So far, though, there have not been important repercussions for Turkey due to its importance to both the EU and NATO. Its funding, for example, remains unperturbed. In essence, Turkey has had the power to pursue its own agenda without major setbacks even in cases where its interests differed from its Western allies.

By taking a closer look to the situation, it can be observed that the liberty to pursue its own agenda is owed to the fact that Turkey has been able to influence other actors to cope with its behavior. The EU-Turkish relationship has leaned in favor of the latter due to its newfound role as a migratory “bastion” of the EU, which consists a very strong diplomatic tool. It is a fact that relevant statements have been made in the past from Turkish policy-makers in order to procure concessions from the EU (Kroet 2016; BBC News 2017; Ekathimerini.com 2018). Heretofore, the agreement has held without any major changes. Yet, what will happen in the future remains to be seen.

4.3 Power Changes in EU-Turkish Relations

As previously stated, the EU’s political crisis has prohibited a comprehensive approach to migration. Its inability to tackle the matter effectively led it to become vulnerable to the influence of Turkey which is one of the main transit countries to reach its borders. Turkey, through a series of actions chose to put pressure on the EU. The whole process resulted in the EU-Turkey statement where, in order to lower the migration flows, the EU offered to Turkey three vital things. The first is legitimacy to the actions of the Turkish government. The second is monetary aid. The last, is acceptance through tolerance to Turkish actions even in cases where they are contradicting the EU interests and norms.

A question that bears asking is why Turkey has not been able to effectively manage the migration flows before the 2016 agreement as there was similar arrangement since 2015 which, nevertheless, clearly proved to be deficient. Why was it unsuccessful? Some even question the effectiveness of the new agreement, arguing that the actual reason for the decline of migration inflows was the closing of the Balkan Route instead (Spijkerboer 2016). Following the line of past Turkish rhetoric and actions, a plausible explanation could be that migration flows were left intentionally uncontrolled – to an extent – in order to plunge the EU into further dissonance and

(28)

24

obtain a better deal at a later time. If this was the goal, it has been achieved based on the aforementioned events. Turkey since the signing of those agreements has managed to mold the EU according to its needs. In the end, in spite of conditioning Turkey in the matter of migration, the EU has been reversely conditioned to accept the internal and external changes that the former has evoked since the initial signing of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in 2015.

It should also be added that being a NATO member has worked in favor of Turkey in this case, offering increased cooperation with its European members, while relieving it from their pressure. Equally, the fact that cooperation between Turkey and the EU is happening mainly on the sea border instead of its coastline, complicates cooperation and effectiveness. By the same token, its importance in the Syrian conflict because of its geopolitical location is also a boon, as currently the US considers cooperation with Turkey essential to their interests in the area. Despite current differences, neither the EU nor the US nor NATO can effectively press Turkey. The deal with Russia shows that Turkey is choosing a more confrontational and unilateral stance towards its Western allies. Be that as it may, its role in the alliance has let it get away with it. And since NATO cannot solve the issue, the EU cannot too.

Brussels ineptitude to combat the root of the problem enlarged the issue. The inability between the member states to find common ground prevented them from taking the necessary steps to effectively resolve the issue in the long-term (Niemann and Zaun 2018; Dagi 2018, 10). In order for the EU to solve the displacement crisis it needed to cultivate stability in the region and to focus on the de-escalation of surrounding conflicts. Even now, by adopting a more intense approach towards conflict resolution, the influence of Turkey will wane proportionately to its results. Limiting its options was a result of the ongoing political crisis, in addition to past failures (ex. Libya). Still, the more reactive someone is in international affairs, the less capable of exercising its power becomes. Contrary to the EU, Turkey seems to understand this. By initially letting itself to bandwagon into a European scheme, through its proactive behavior it has managed to garner a series of benefits realizing to an extent its revisionist aspirations.

The tools of the EU were no doubt sufficient to foster an agreement with Turkey. However, its implementation, especially internally has been problematic. On top of that, the accord fostered the audacity of a revisionist actor in the area, who proceeded to further destabilize an already sensitive region, contrarily to Brussels’ interests.

(29)

25

Chapter 5 – Case Study no. 2 (EU–Russian Relations)

5.1 EU-Russian relations – Historical Overview

Throughout history, Russia has had a very complex relationship with Europe based on interdependence. Not unlike the previous case, the EU has spent time and effort to make Russia to adhere to European ideals (Manners 2002, 250). In spite of past progress, after the Eastern Enlargement of the EU, there have been clouds in the horizon, characterized by cases of Russian aggression mainly in the post-Soviet space (ex. Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2013). Equally, during the last few years, Russia has been trying to take advantage of the European demand for energy resources, with mixed results (Smith Stegen 2011). These actions have made the EU well-aware of the reemergence of the Russian threat.

The basis of those fears is Russia’s geographical proximity to the EU and past recollections from their relationship. Since the Yugoslav wars, these Russian actions of aggression could be considered as the most important crises in European soil and where the degree of the EU’s involvement has also been the most significant (Karolewski and Davis Cross 2017, 144). The aforementioned conflicts remain unresolved and depending on someone’s understanding of the international system, their causation could be interpreted differently (ibid.). Russia has always envisioned its reemergence as a superpower. The expansion of western institutions in the post-Soviet space led Russia to feel threatened and embrace a (neo)revisionist policy as an answer. This policy has been pursued mainly by soft means of power, but when those are not enough, Russian policy-makers have not shied away from the usage of harder means. Contrarily, the European reaction has been insufficient, even if measures such as the reverse gas flows to assist Ukraine as well as financial aid measures were taken (ibid., 138). No possible solutions seem imminent.

Nonetheless, EU actions in the event should be considered as testament of EU’s integration progress and, more importantly, of its power projection capabilities when faced with a strong adversary that can threaten its vital interests. The ability to unilaterally impose, enforce and maintain the sanctions to Russia, despite the several internal dissenting voices, shows that the Union’s cohesion is sturdier than many people give it credit for. Additionally, the core states of the EU are proving to have created a strong nucleus which could effectively lobby their interests to the other member-states and pursue a common agenda – inimical that may sometimes be – depending on each member’s interests. At least in this issue, distrust in the Union, which is by no

(30)

26

means eliminated, has been abated in favor of a common perceived threat. However, to achieve this cohesion the extent of its possible abilities was renounced. The principal tools of the EU’s “hard power” have been economic sanctions and other restrictive measures, which, even though, they are successful at pressuring someone, if he or she is determined to bear the economic cost, they would not deter him from pursuing its goals (Howorth 2017a, 131-133).

Another reason for the West to be alarmed, is the looming shadow of a new Cold War. Georgia and Ukraine, even Syria, should be considered as cases of proxy wars between the West and Russia. And while NATO has evolved after the end of the Cold War, its primary position as a security benefactor of Europe has not changed (Duke and Gebhard 2017). This is evident by the fact that many European members do not meet the expenditure quotas agreed for military expenses (NATO 2017). This reaffirms that the US remains the powerhouse of NATO and without it its capabilities would be nonexistent. Likewise, it shows the dependence of EU member-states to NATO for their security. Τhe absence of NATO, or the prospect of a NATO without the US render the notion of European defense void (Howorth 2017b). Be that as it may, there is a discernible increase in military spending after 2015 of almost every member-state (NATO 2017). This surge underlines Western fears of Russia’s (neo)revisionism.

In spite of internal turbulences, a perceived external threat of such a magnitude has managed to unify the EU’s member-states. Due to the nature of the threat, soft power is not effective by itself. And owing to the lack of EU integration on the matter of defense, NATO is perceived by many as the only current viable countermeasure. This does not mean that the EU has been idle during these events. On the contrary, it has extensively used its power, especially through restrictive measures. Nevertheless, their results have been questionable (Giumelli 2013; Giumelli 2015).

5.2 EU Political Crisis and Russian Aggression

The long socialization between actors creates a general outlook on each one’s conduct by the other (Alderson 2001, 422). This is why many did not foresee the acts of Russian aggression during the past decade, believing that their long socialization with not only the West but the international community in general and its institutions had minimized those risks. There is also the counter argument that both sides knew what was going to happen but chose to be willfully blind to the other’s actions (Nitoiu 2016, 376). And while the EU tried to fulfil its role as an actor who

(31)

27

promoted regional stability, its internal political turmoil – among other things – did not let it to establish long-term solutions in the region. Russia, on the other hand, acted as a counterweight to those activities (Tolstrup 2009). Compared to the previous case study, one different way of exerting pressure was energy resources, whose effectiveness, depending on the circumstances, can be toned down or increase (ex. their price) (Howorth 2017a, 132). That is why both sides are taking actions to better position themselves on the energy market (Smith Stegen 2011).

Another observation is that Russian aggression has acted as catalyst for Georgia and more recently Ukraine to adopt the EU’s values. At the cost of parts of their territory, they became fervent proponents of European ideals. On a similar line of thought, it can be observed that the EU has become more invested in those countries afterwards (EEAS 2017a; EEAS 2016). Particularly, the events in Crimea can be considered as a turning point in the EU-Russian relations, as they consolidated the ingrained European fear of the reemergence of the Russian threat. Georgia may had been an outlier case. Crimea refuted that notion. The event that eliminated any remaining doubts was the shootdown of flight MH17 on the 17th_{of July 2014 (Schmidt-Felzmann 2014,} 43-44). Having no doubts about Russia’s actions, Brussels’ reaction while long overdue, was concise. Both Georgia’s and Ukraine’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and Association Agreements (ΑΑ) after the events in Crimea are efforts to subsume them in the EU’s sphere of influence (European Commission 2018b; European Commission 2018c). These actions by both sides show that there is an ongoing war for influence in the post-Soviet sphere in Europe between the two actors.

Correspondingly to the events transpired in Georgia, Brussels condemned Russian actions in Crimea and refused to recognize its annexation, considering it illegal. A French-German initiative, managed to bring the conflict to a relative standstill after the signing of the Minsk agreements. Their implementation has proved to be problematic, despite the fact that their continuation is directly correlated with the sanctions imposed by the EU to the Russian Federation (Russell 2018). Additionally, the continued enforcement of sanctions has had ambivalent results on both parties and its effectiveness so far has been questionable (Giumelli 2017). For this reason, many member-states have questioned the rationale behind the continuous enforcement of those sanctions despite the fact the EU’s trading state has improved overall (ibid., 1067-1068). It is a possibility that the most vocal against them are not the ones who were hurt the most, but the ones who have low growth or recessive economies. Another possibility is the divide-and-conquer

(32)

28

strategy that Russia utilizes against the EU member-states (Nitoiu 2016, 376-377; Schmidt-Felzmann 2014, 40).

The EU’s uniform stance towards Russia in this occasion was in total alignment with the stance that its security benefactor had. The active participation of NATO’s secretary general in many of its meetings supports this hypothesis. Additionally, the member-states’ common approach should not be regarded as given, had the US chosen not to be so confrontational (Kaplan 2014). NATO’s summit in Warsaw between the 8th_-9th_{of July was an effort to give a new impetus to the} alliance. Its main goal was the modernization of the alliance by fortifying the participants towards new forms of threats and challenges, largely hybrid threats (EU-NATO 2016). The coordination of the CSDP is much easier when it is in accordance with NATO aims. However, the strengthening of NATO’s presence in European affairs reintroduces a security dilemma in the region, creating a contradiction in its purpose, where instead of acting as a factor of stability, it enhances uncertainty (Duke and Gebhard 2017, 379). As long as there are member differences between the two actors, there are always going to be a certain differentiation of interests, no matter how small (ibid., 381-382). Yet others see NATO as a necessary element for European defense (Howorth 2017b). Current incidents and scholarship to a large degree support the latter opinion. The dependence on NATO however only perpetuates the preexisting problems.

According to an EU parliament briefing, the situation in Crimea is understood as a proxy war between Russia and the West (Bentzen 2016, 4). Another thing of importance is the hybrid substance of the conflict (ibid., 2). “Hybrid” is a relative recent term that emerged in 2002 and can be encountered with other names as well (Andersson and Tardy 2015, 2). There has been no exact definition of the term “hybrid” in warfare that is generally accepted, due to its nascent and fluid form. In the present moment, hybrid threats, due to their many forms, comprise a majority of the dangers which threaten the contemporary stability of the international system (Pawlak 2017, 2). Some consider them as an evolved form of warfare (especially due to the development of technology), while others think of the concept as a return to warfare’s traditional roots (van Puyvelde 2016). Ukraine is considered as typical case hybrid warfare and it has greatly contributed to the recent prominence of the term. The EU places hybrid threats as one of the most important dangers that it faces (European Union 2016, 9). Due to their complex nature, the necessary measurement, type and amount of power to combat them is even more difficult to be identified. The EU’s approach has not managed to yield the desired results in this case. It does not help that