processes of implementation and enforcement from Finland
and the Netherlands
Eero Nyman June 2016 Master’s thesis Political Science, specialization International Relations
University of Amsterdam Supervisor, first reader: Prof. Jonathan Zeitlin, University of Amsterdam Second reader: Dr. Georg Winkel, European Forest Institute
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Literature review (state of knowledge) ... 3
EUTR implementation ... 3
Illegal logging and the EUTR ... 6
The role of risk assessment in providing discretion to the implementation and enforcement in the EUTR ... 7 3. Theoretical framework ... 10 Experimentalist governance ... 11 Street-level bureaucracy ... 13 4. Methodology ... 16 Case study ... 16
Interviews and data collection ... 18
Data collection method and sampling ... 18
Data collection process ... 21
Data analysis ... 22
5. Results ... 23
5.1. The discourse on illegal logging and forestry - observations about the national contexts in Finland and the Netherlands prior to and after the EUTR ... 23
Priorities in the implementation and changes to the national governance ... 26
Finland: Changes to authorities’ information-sharing ... 26
Finland: Domestic timber a key issue ... 27
The Netherlands: Specialized timber trade federations with the goal of European harmonization .... 28
The Netherlands: Active NGOs with globalized goals ... 29
The important steps in the implementation in Finland and the Netherlands ... 32
Drafting the implementing law in Finland ... 32
Implementation in the Netherlands – comparisons ... 33
5.2. Strategies of the authorities and firms to implement and comply to the EUTR - a street-level bureaucracy approach ... 37
Inspections and the authorities’ risk-based approach ... 38
Authorities strategies ... 39
5.3. The role of knowledge sharing and third-party participation the implementation of the EUTR ... 46
6. Conclusions ... 57 7. Bibliography ... 61
CA competent authority, the agency responsible for national enforcement
ETTF European Timber Trade Federation
EC European Commission
EU European Union
MS member state of the European Union
Mavi Agency of Rural Affairs, Maaseutuvirasto (Finland)
MO monitoring organization
NGO non-governmental organization
NVWA the Netherlands Food and Consumer product safety authority, Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit
SLB street-level bureaucracy
VVNH the Netherlands Timber Trade Association, Koninklijke Vereniging van Nederlandse Houtondernemingen
1. Introduction
This thesis will study the implementation of the European Timber Regulation (EUTR) in Finland and the Netherlands. The EUTR (Regulation 995/2010/EU (2010), hereafter EUTR) is a regulation adopted in 2010 which came into force in March 2013 (European Commission, 2016b). It forbids the entry of illegal timber into the EU common market and obliges those companies who import timber from outside of the common market to exercise “due diligence” (European Commission 2016b), which means that they have to minimize the risk of importing illegal timber. Studying the implementation is important because , if enforcement is lax in some member states (MS), this result in a situation in which illegal timber could enter the common market through some of the MS, which can make the policy ineffective. This thesis will study the implementation process, and the different perceptions among experts about the national implementation in Finland and the Netherlands. Special attention will be on the ways in which the authorities co-operate with other authorities from other MS, and how they make use of third-party participation into the process in order to make their work and the overall implementation more efficient and effective.
This study, on one hand, approaches the EUTR as a policy which gives member states some degree of discretion on how to implement the EUTR. The study discusses the practical implementation done by the authorities to inspect timber coming into the EU. The study will contribute to the literature about the strategies that national implementers use to make efficient use of their resources when complying with EU regulations. Furthermore, it looks into the co-operation between member states in harmonizing their approaches and making the implementation harmonized in all MS.
Even though illegal logging is considered a problem by a range of the actors involved, not all stakeholders see that the EUTR is a perfect policy to combat illegal logging. Some stakeholders see problems in the bureaucracy, enforcement and ambiguity of the Regulation as well as view that it can add a transaction cost to trade (Giurca and Jonsson 2015). Another key problematique
to be addressed in this thesis is that even though the EUTR is a regulation which is directly applicable in all member states, there are concerns about whether it is implemented and enforced equally in all countries (Neslen 2016; Nepcon 2015). The member states face a challenge to implement the regulation in a similar manner than other countries, even though there are national differences in administrative networks and business contexts. The aim of this thesis will be to increase knowledge about how experts in Finland and the Netherlands see the EUTR and what they consider important in the implementation in their national contexts.
The EUTR is an interesting case to study implementation. Sotirov, Winkel and Stelter (forthcoming), citing Schrew and Sotirov, argued that the EUTR is a difficult case for authorities and companies because it “requires the identification of timber commodities in regards to production methods [...] and not visible characteristics[...]“ (Sotirov, Winkel and Stelter, forthcoming). This means that authorities have to have knowledge about timber trade and supply chains in order to judge whether documents are valid and whether there are sufficient processes in place, and cannot merely decide on the basis of the characteristics of the products under inspection. Similarly, because the Article 10(2) of the EUTR obliges member states to inspect timber based on risk (Regulation 995/2010/EU 2010), the authorities can be argued to require sufficient information about timber trade in order to assess risks effectively.
The research questions in this thesis are as follows:
1. How is the EUTR implemented in practice in Finland and the Netherlands?
2. Which factors explain the differences in the implementation practice and the strategies employed to implement the European Timber Regulation in Finland and the Netherlands? 3. What is the role of information exchange between different national and European actors
in the implementation?
This thesis is based on interviews of 13 experts, 6 from Finland and 7 from the Netherlands, who have followed the EUTR implementation or are in a position to contribute to the effectiveness of the implementation.
This thesis will begin with a literature review about the EUTR implementation (Chapter 2), in which some of the major theories of implementation will be presented in order to show how implementation literature has acknowledged the importance, or the impact, of the national context on the implementation process. The chapter will also include some inferences about the state of implementation of the EUTR. In Chapter 3, the theoretical framework will be presented. The theoretical framework combines elements from literature on experimentalist governance, on street-level bureaucracy and on public sector workers discretion on policy outcome. In Chapter 4, the rationale behind the selection of the case study and the method of semi-structured interview will be discussed. In Chapter 5 (5.1.-5.3.), the results will be combined with an analysis of the findings in light of the research questions. The results are divided into sections based on themes. The themes are (5.1.) national context and implementation process, (5.2.) the strategies of implementation and (5.3.) the use of knowledge in improving the EUTR implementation and enforcement. Chapter 6 will further discuss some of the findings by providing conclusions of the thesis as well as discuss some implications for policy.
2. Literature review (state of knowledge)
EUTR implementation
Before looking at the implementation of the EUTR, we can distinguish some typologies in the literature which show from which angles implementation has been traditionally studied. Conceptually, we can distinguish between formal (legal) and practical implementation. In this typology, legal and formal refer to the process in which the requirements of the policy are transposed into regulatory rules, whereas practical implementation refers to the actual practice of making the policy work (Weale et al. 2000, p.297; Knill and Liefferink 2007, p. 149). Practical implementation refers to not only the regulatory style which enforcement takes, but also the particularities of the organizational hierarchies and networks in which the implementation takes place (Knill and Liefferink 2007, p.149).
There are different levels of progress in formal implementation among the MS. For example, as of October 2015, all member states except for Spain had appointed the competent authority responsible for enforcement, and all member states except for Romania, Greece and Hungary had formally implemented penalties and checks (Global Timber Forum, 2015).
From theories that look at European implementation, perhaps the most well-known theories are the approaches of regulatory and institutional fit (e.g. Knill and Lenschow 1998; Börzel 1999). According to this hypothesis, the countries, whose pre-existing regulatory and administrative arrangements are similar or otherwise relatively easily adapted to the requirements of an EU regulation, face lower costs of adaptation and implementation (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Börzel, 1999). These views have later been amended by that the interaction between actors should be included in the analysis (Knill & Lenschow, cited in Falkner, Treib, and Holzleithner 2008, p.9).
Fit or misfit
Arguably, a regulation which requirements bear similarity to the ones already in place in the MS, is – intuitively speaking – likely to face less resistance because it causes fewer change in the national rules, institutional setting or current practices. For example, in the case of EUTR and institutional fit, Jonsson et al. noted that “pace-setters” (2015, p. 24) during the policy-making can influence European policies to become similar to their national ones which results in an easier adaptation for them. For example, Jonsson et al. (2015, p. 23) argue that some countries, such as those who have a relatively longer history of setting standards for timber supply chain verification among domestic firms, might face an easier adaptation process of the EUTR. In addition, Jonsson et al. (2015) explain that timeliness of the implementation can be explained by different powers of competent authorities in each MS, or different practice regarding the conduct of checks and other controls (Jonsson et al 2015, p. 24). Other studies look into the preparedness of the forest companies in certain member states. EUTR is assumed to cause lower costs of adaptation for big companies (Trishkin, Lopatin, and Karjalainen 2015), and those companies which already employ certifications (Brown and Bird, cited in Holopainen, Toppinen, and Perttula 2015, p.2881) and those who import whole logs rather than processed products
(European Forest Institute, University of Padua and Indufor 2011). Cashore and Stone (2012) have argued that policies such as the EUTR and Lacey Act in the United States would result in higher adoption rate of certifications. Gavrilut et al (2015) studied the relationship between EUTR implementation and FSC certification in Romania and argued that certifications have been one tool which has assisted companies to meet the obligations regarding risk mitigation and risk assessment set in the EUTR. In Finland, EUTR has not resulted in noticeably more demand among end customers for legal timber, but whether or not a supplier is seen as meeting the requirements of the EUTR has an important impact on the continuity of “supplier-client relations” (Holopainen, Toppinen, Perttula 2015, p.2888). Giurca and Jonsson (2015) studied the global attitudes towards the EUTR and found that forest industries in the North, which have already high level of certification, see EUTR as favourable, whereas that EUTR is seen negatively by some small non-EU countries especially in the South which are not so prepared in tracing their supply chains. On the basis of these findings one could hypothesize that companies and countries that have already high adoption of practices towards ensuring the supply of legal timber might have lower adaptation costs, and the industry in these countries might feel less resistance towards the implementation of the EUTR.
Worlds of compliance
Another main theory in EU implementation studies focuses more on the culture of politics and the administration as well as the capacity to implement. One example is the ‘Worlds of Compliance’ theory by Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib (2007; See also Falkner and Treib 2008). They suggest the concept of worlds of compliance, and divide member states into different groups, namely those of “law observance”, “domestic politics” and “neglect” (Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib 2007, p. 406), or “dead letters” (Falkner and Treib 2008, p. 293), which are different “national culture[s] of appraising and processing adaptation requirements” (Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib 2007, p. 404). These theories explain implementation by the characteristics of the national polity and administration. In this view of Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib (2007) the EU consists of different member states with different administrative capacities and different attitudes towards EU policies and in how much pedantic and timely manner regulations should be implemented. These attitudinal factors affect the number of resources which the member states
or its agencies are willing and capable of dedicating to enforcement and monitoring (Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib 2007). These type of theories would fit more into the practical implementation category.
Versluis studied the enforcement of EU directives in some member states, and argued that the “issue salience” (Versluis 2007, p. 63), how high local enforcers place the importance of the issue, affects positively the implementation of a policy. EU is a political system consisting of member states with different political cultures, administrative cultures, different capacities, and different attitudes among implementers. The EU is dependent on the MS on enforcement, which retain powers to enforce in a way that they see fit (Versluis 2003, p. 10). And for this reason enforcement varies between countries in areas such as the severity of sanctions and the competencies of the inspectors, and inspectors might have different styles in enforcing the rules or guiding and steering their subjects (Versluis 2003, p. 10).
The literature also distinguishes between top-down and bottom-up implementation (See Knill and Liefferink 2007, p. 153). In the top-down approaches, implementation is seen as being successful when it reaches down the regulated subjects and is implemented in conformity with rules. It is close to the formal and legal implementation perspective. It gives little value to local actors apart from their role in transposing and enforcing the regulation. Bottom-up view of implementation, in turn, refers to situations in which there is flexibility to accommodate for local conditions and across time, meaning that policy can be adapted to changes in information or significant changes in the external conditions (Knill and Liefferink, 2007, p. 153). In this approach bargaining at the local level is important and it acknowledges that national units and both public and private stakeholders have different powers, hierarchies and interests (Knill and Liefferink, 2007, p. 153). It will be argued in this thesis that actor networks matter for the implementation of regulation, depending on the amount of discretion given in their enforcement.
Illegal logging and the EUTR
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit voiced concern over the world’s forests and the problem of deforestation, and was an important event for the emergence of forests into the international agenda (Bisschop 2012, p. 191). The G8 meeting in 1998 emphasized illegal logging as an issue
to be addressed (Brack 2012, p. 211). Illegal logging causes loss of revenue to, among others, the government and the legal owners of the forests. It is also a driver of climate change, deforestation and biodiversity loss, which has significant global effects as well as effects for the local communities which depend on forest for their income or to whom it has a rich symbolic or ecological importance. On the social and political front, illegal logging is often associated with conflict, organized crime, and other criminal activities including corruption (European Commission, 2016a; Bisschop 2012, p. 192-193; Levashova, 2011, p.291). Illegal logging can also be seen as harming the businesses that adhere to rules and laws, by giving a competitive advantage to those taking part in illegal business.
Despite efforts, there has not been success in establishing an international binding treaty to tackle illegal logging (Dimitrov 2005). The difficulties to assemble international conventions for legal or sustainable forest management lead to non-governmental organisations establishing their own verification systems by the end of 1990s (Cashore 2002; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). Certifications emerged as non-governmental regulatory initiatives supported by environmental NGOs and some of the forest industry (Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). Certifications were to prove that forest products have been sustainably and legally sourced. These were adopted by firms in response to customers’ demands, but sometimes also after NGO pressure as well as driven by public procurement policies in many Western countries (Cashore 2002; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). In the 2000s, there was a shift towards binding laws in Western societies, when the USA, Australia and the EU adopted all prohibitory laws against the import of illegally harvested wood (Sotirov, Winkel and Stelter, forthcoming, p.4). For example, the Lacey Act was lobbied by environmental NGOs and US companies who wanted to protect their businesses from foreign illegally harvested imports (Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014).
The role of risk assessment in providing discretion to the implementation and enforcement in the EUTR
The private developments in the field of illegal logging prior to the EUTR are important to acknowledge. This is because the European Timber Regulation emerged in a policy field where attempts to create a conventional international treaty had failed, but there was still willingness
among the some of the industry in particular in the Western countries to voluntarily take part in private certification schemes. For this reason it would seem logical that in this situation much of the industry in Europe would have favored self-regulation as opposed to binding regulation. During the negotiation process of the EUTR, some coalitions favored a binding prohibitory clause which would forbid illegal timber from entering the market, while some favored industry self- regulation (Sotirov, Winkel, Stelter, forthcoming). The Finnish forest owners and the industry, for example, initially favored self-regulation instead of a prohibitory clause (Sotirov, Winkel, Stelter forthcoming, p.23). A prohibitory clause, supported by the European Parliament, however, was adopted (Sotirov, Winkel, Stelter, forthcoming). It would be possible to see that due diligence requirement would reflect the situation in which many companies already had legality assurance systems in place. By not setting detailed criteria for how to ensure legal timber, the EUTR retained the companies’ freedom to choose the methods to a large extent. This was logical because checking every stock of timber arriving at the EU border would add a very high transaction cost to trade. Instead, the enforcement would be based on risk-based inspection and sanctions on noncompliant behavior. The EUTR could benefit from the existing private certification schemes. Overdevest and Zeitlin (2015) have analyzed how the EUTR has to a certain extent made private schemes under a “public oversight” (p.149) by referring to schemes as a possible method to meet the requirements in the implementing regulation. Kistenkas (2013) has analyzed the overlap of the EUTR and private schemes and the supportive role that the private schemes have on the EUTR.
The EUTR sets obligations to six actors: The Commission, the MS, the competent authorities, the operators, traders and the monitoring organizations (ClientEarth 2011; Giurca and Jonsson 2015). Regarding companies, first, it forbids the placement of illegal timber on the European market. Second, any company trading timber, also within the common market, should have the sufficient documentation about its suppliers and clients for five years (PEFC International, 2016). Third, it obliges timber operators – those companies that import or harvest timber into the European market for the first time – to exercise due diligence and to have a due diligence system (DDS) in place. DDS means that company should have all information about the timber products, countries of origin, tree species, information about the supplier and information about whether it was harvested legally (PEFC International 2016). The company should assess its risk
of placing high-risk timber into the market and not receive timber for which the illegality risk is “non-negligible” (Regulation 995/2010/EU, cited in PEFC International 2016. The operator should have risk mitigation plan for the cases of “non-negligible” risk (Regulation 995/2010/EU, cited in PEFC International, 2016). In case of the competent authority, the regulation obliges them to do a risk-based approach and an inspection plan (Levashova 2011, p. 292) and to employ set types of sanctions, provided these are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (Regulation 995/2010/EU (2010), cited in Levashova 2011, p.293). Even though the guidance document (European Commission 2013) clarifies some issues, the Regulation overall leaves it open for interpretation what could be considered a sufficient due diligence system. Blum found in her case study about Germany and Spain, that a sufficient due diligence system was considered to vary on a case-to-case basis (2014). The Regulation can be for this reason seen as giving a large role for authorities in deciding what would be due diligence. Legal timber is defined in Article 4 of the EUTR as one being in compliance with the country of harvest (995/2010/EU). This is likely to mean that the authorities need to have knowledge about various producer countries in order to judge the risk of illegality.
The Regulation, it is argued in this thesis, gives the authorities and companies discretion in assessing the risk in each context. First, because the regulation allows for multiple ways to ensure legality, in which different chain of custody certifications might help, companies are required to assess their risk and decide on whether they build their own DDS or rely on external help. For example, the European Commission recognizes certain organizations as monitoring organizations. These provide EUTR-compliant DDS systems (European Commission 2016a). One can also argue that because the competent authorities inspect only a limited number of companies and hence the companies operate under a threat of inspection, a company can, theoretically, take the risk of not complying. Second, because the EUTR obliges the authorities to do risk-based inspections, the authorities they have discretion regarding the risk factors and also the practical enforcement: one could imagine that these could be, among others, which companies to inspect, under which criteria these are selected, how they guide and educate companies about the law and compliance, and how monitoring is enforced. Authorities operate under resource constraint, but have to report to their principals about their progress, and in this
situation the street-level bureaucrats, the people working with the practical implementation of the EUTR, have to be creative and rely on information about good practices.
3. Theoretical framework
This thesis draws from the work on experimentalist governance by Sabel and Zeitlin (e.g. Sabel & Zeitlin 2008; 2012) and Overdevest and Zeitlin (2014; 2015), as well as by Piore (2011) on street-level bureaucracy. For the purpose of this thesis, of particular relevance is Sabel’s response to Piore about how street-level bureaucracy can be seen as fitting to the model of experimentalist governance (Sabel 2012). Street-level bureaucracy is a theory which draws from the work of Lipsky (1980) on street-level bureaucrats.
As a policy-making system, the EU is a unique combination of supranational and intergovernmental elements (Bölzer 2012, 380). The EU cannot be seen as a traditional form of government that consists of hierarchical relationships of policy-making and implementation. Instead, the EU political system can be seen as “multi-level governance” (Jachtenfuchs 2007, 160). In the governance system of the EU, member states have to implement EU regulations in their societies. Even though certain legal instruments, such as regulations, have direct effect and are as such applicable in the member states, each member state has to make sure that these regulations are implemented in practice (Jachtenfuchs 2007, 163). Especially in those sectors where more technical knowledge and participation of private actors is required, there has emerged many new forms of governance that usually, but not necessarily all the time are sectorally bounded, meaning that these regulations govern specifically particular sectors (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). EU regulates many sectors of policy by non-hierarchical relationships and the participation of non-public actors (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006, p. 28). Sometimes this means that the EU acts as more of an “enabler” (p. 14) and that other public agencies either at the EU level or at the national level have more competences regarding many aspects (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008).
Experimentalist governance
Zeitlin and Sabel (2008, 2010) argue that experimentalist governance is emerging as one of the major regulatory modes in the EU. Overdevest and Zeitlin characterize experimentalist governance as “a recursive process of provisional goal-setting and revision based on learning from comparison of alternative approaches to their advancement in different contexts” (Overdevest & Zeitlin 2014, p. 25). Experimentalist regulation sets framework goals that are very broadly defined, but the concrete goals and to some extent the methods to attain these goals are to be both defined and refined during learning from practices on the local level (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012, p. 169-170). Experimentalist governance is characterized by a degree of discretion given to the local level. Different practices and experiences are collected and stakeholders are being consulted periodically on the effectiveness of the policy and this knowledge on different practices in different contexts is used to revise policy or its target goals accordingly (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012, p. 169-170). According to Börzel, citing Newman 2008, experimentalist governance as a policy-making model can be said to "appear to be biased towards administrative agents linked up in transgovernmental networks (Newman 2008), emphasizing the role of lower-level units, such as national ministries and regulatory authorities” (Börzel 2012, p. 379). This observation might have much analytical value, considering the emphasis of experimentalist governance on information pooling between actors, the use of knowledge from different contexts and application of discretion at the level of local units.
Overdevest and Zeitlin (2015) see EUTR as one part of a larger experimentalist regime and have analyzed EUTR as a “penalty default” (p. 151) which induces non-EU countries to take part in the EU FLEGT Action Plan by negotiating a Voluntary Partnership Agreement. The aim of this thesis is not to argue that EUTR would be an ideal type of experimentalism. However, it tries to take advantage of some of its analytical underpinnings of experimentalism. One of this is that some tightly sectoral regulatory policies can be seen as being deliberately not very clear apart
from the broader objectives and the core obligations and to require periodic assessment and learning from different contexts to improve the effectiveness of the regulation.
Also, because the competent authorities in each MS have the obligation to supervise the due diligence systems of firms operating in their jurisdiction, the authorities also have discretion as to what is considered a sufficient DDS. The authorities thus are working towards a broad framework goal of the EUTR, which is that no illegal timber enters the country, but they are given a certain freedom in the practical organization of monitoring and enforcement as well as judging on the sufficiency of each company’s DDS. Because the due diligence system can take very different forms in different companies, it can be argued that the policy accommodates for different compliance strategies. Borrowing from Sabel (2012), what makes the authorities effective is that they have to prioritize, apply rules in a generally uniform manner, but to be able to be interpretive of the rules in difficult and special cases.
Second, because due diligence is so broadly defined in the EUTR and because authorities need knowledge to assess risks, it can be seen important that the authorities would learn about good practices. The Commission provided a guidance document (European Commission 2013), which is not binding but has been likely to have guided the interpretation. The policy was reviewed in 2015 every two years regarding MS application and every six years regarding effectiveness, as set by Article 20 (995/2010/EU). But, in particular, there exist official expert groups and informal groups which take place during the year, where competent authorities share practices and knowledge (European Commission 2013). As such, the policy relies highly on learning from different contexts. The policy allows for civil society to participate in monitoring and enforcement, for example, through substantiated concerns (ClientEarth, no date). Meyers & Vorsanger (2003) argued that policies which are targeted at a certain sector and not to the whole population can be argued to have more technical requirements because the target groups of the policy can be seen as having a level of expertise. One could say that a policy such as the EUTR is regulating only timber operators and traders as well as government officials behavior, so there are justifications of the policy to be technical and to some-extent open-ended because the target
population is expected to be equipped with a certain level of expertise about timber supply chains.
Street-level bureaucracy
This thesis approaches the authorities implementing the EUTR from the perspective of street-level bureaucracy. Largely influenced by Sabel’s (2012) and Piore’s (2011) work, it is argued in this thesis that sometimes discretion can be a tool to be able to adapt to the needs of the client in different contexts, but there has to be sharing of practices in order for the policy-makers and other authorities to review others work and learn from best approaches. Piore studied the work of labor inspectors and argued that they have a significant possibility to accommodate for different client needs. The inspectors have discretion as to how to address different cases, and they frequently meet cases the kinds they have not encountered before, but they are bounded by organization culture. There are tacit rules and other tacit knowledge among the organizations which set the boundaries for discretion (Piore, 2011). The organizational culture in which the bureaucrats are embedded guides their discretion, and forms, according to Sabel, a “cultural collective nature of decision-making” (Sabel 2012, p. 4). Sabel argues that that the bureaucracy – the administration above the street-level bureaucrats – “cannot adapt and learn” (Sabel 2012, p.3) without the street-level bureaucrats to providing information about their experiences and practices. Sabel is critiquing that, in Piore’s model, discretion is seen as a constraint for organizational learning because it knowledge of the SLB are tacit and not visible. According to Sabel, new revised approaches are needed which encourage making the knowledge explicit by frequent sharing it with peers and administrators in a peer review manner (Sabel 2012).
Barrett (2014) explains that in many sectors authorities have much discretion and this is because of often unclear policy objectives which the implementers can interpret in many ways, because there are many actors involved which causes the need for coordination, and because there are different values and beliefs or because agencies are deliberately given discretion. According to Hill (2003), similarly, the implementers have to face uncertainty because in many cases the legal text alone does give clear guidance regarding the practical steps, and for this reason the
“understanding, practices, and skills” (Hill 2003, p.269) of the implementer play a key role. Hill (2003) emphasized the policy environment, meaning the relationships and networks relevant to the street-level bureaucrat. For Hill (2003), the ability to rely on some knowledge sources, possibly external to the organization, is an important resource. Hill’s view helps us understand the potential role of civil society in implementation through their contribution to the knowledge that implementers apply especially in cases of uncertainty, and that policy can have in certain cases different outcomes based on the skills of the street-level bureaucrats as well as on the knowledge available to them.
Street-level bureaucrats’ accountability is an important discussion point. For Piore, it is likely to come from organization culture, which sets the boundaries. Barrett (2004, p. 255) argued that in some policy areas, such as safety standards, strict compliance is required, but in many policy areas the strict compliance to the regulation is not the only measure of good performance, because in these areas good compliance is difficult to measure. In these areas, there exists framework goals which set desired targets, but these targets might be difficult to set in the beginning for an indefinite time, and might be needed to be adjusted as the authorities and the governed actors learn about best practices (Barrett 2004, p.255). Sabel (2012) for example argued in the case of the Finnish Special Education teachers that:
“The front-line worker is accountable when, in the judgment of her peers, she can justify her actions as in the best interest of the client, given the overarching purposes of the public organization providing the service, and given the range of results obtainable in similar cases” (p. 10).
For many policy areas, such as in special education, performance is thus hard to quantify and measure because the point of the service is to accommodate to different needs. This thesis will for this reason look into how discretion is viewed among experts in the context of the EUTR. A central question according to Barrett is how discretion is valued in that policy area and among the actors (Bacharach and Lawlor; Lipsky; Prottas, cited in Barrett 2004, p.256). Similarly, Tummers and Bekkers (2014) viewed that attitude towards discretion matters and whether it is viewed positively or negatively. This might differ from the policy area and between organization. As mentioned above, certain policies, such as safety standards, might require the implementers to not have discretion at all in order for the policy to be effective (Barrett 2004,
Tummers and Bekkers, 2014). In other fields, where the policy can or should adapt to the specific needs of the client and the context, discretion can be embraced (Tummers and Bekkers, 2014). For this reason, we could hypothesize that the attitude and perception about the role of discretion for the implementer itself might influence whether they take consciously advantage of the discretion, and what their attitude is towards learning new practices as opposed to merely employing standard-operating procedures. Following Hill, also, we can hypothesize that different knowledge and willingness of implementers among the CA’s to improve their expertise via learning from different sources can potentially also play some role influencing uneven implementation of the EUTR.
In conclusion, this thesis approaches the research questions from the abovementioned framework. It draws from the work of Sabel (2012), who argued that SLB are in key position considering the ability for a bureaucracy to learn. Accountability in certain cases, comes from how the performance can be justified to peers as serving the client in a best possible way (see quote above by Sabel, 2012). Borrowing from Barrett (2004), discretion comes often from unclear policy objectives, and in many sectors goals are difficult to set for undetermined time and for this reason the goals need to be adapted to learning from the progress so far. One important determinant in the application of discretion is how it is valued by the actors and how it is valued in the policy area in general as contributing to the effectiveness (Barrett 2014, Tummers and Bekkers 2014). The use of knowledge from external sources can be an adaptation strategy for a street-level bureaucrat and a way to make the work more effective, and for this reason knowledge networks can play a role in the administration’s work as well as giving and an opportunity for the civil society to influence implementation via the provision of information (Hill 2003).
4. Methodology
Case study
The aim of the study was to explore the EUTR is implemented in practice and whether there are differences in implementation in two member states, namely Finland and the Netherlands. Important focus was paid on the actors which carry out the policy in the national contexts, namely local authorities and inspectors. The local authorities, whether they belong to the CA or the supervising ministry, are referred in this thesis as street-level bureaucracy (SLB). The goal of this study was to explore the ways in which these administrators cope with limited resources and how they employ information from other sources to make EUTR enforcement better.
The aim of the thesis was not to provide a detailed account of an individual inspectors work, but rather about the general assumptions and observations about the authorities’ work of planning and executing inspections. Of similar importance was how the experts view the different dimensions in the national context, such as the discussion around the national legal transposition and discussion about illegal logging as an issue in each respective country. It was acknowledge that, in order to make a study generalizable to all inspectors and to understand their personal, individual perceptions and strategies, one would need to interview many inspectors. However, because much of the information related to prioritization of the authorities is secret, nor would revealing it serve a an important enough purpose in improving the EUTR, this was seemed as unnecessary.
This study is, in other words, a case study about the Finnish and Dutch national contexts of the EUTR implementation. Case study was used in order to understand the role of national context, the use of information exchange and how its importance is perceived by actors in each case context. With reference to Flyvbjerg’s (2011, p. 314) classification of strengths and weaknesses of a case study, case study was chosen for the depth of the understanding into the processes and the environment in which the actors operate. This was done acknowledging the possible weakness of selection bias which might influence the ability to generalize the findings into other
cases and with other respondents (Flyvbjerg 314: della Porta, 2008, p.207). A two-case study was preferred, the cases can be, with the words of Flyvbjerg, “contrasted on several dimensions” (2011, p.314). The focus was less on generalizability of the findings but rather to provide in-depth analysis of the process of implementation as witnesses by key informants and independent expert observers in each country and all the dimensions they consider important.
As the study was case-oriented, the study required certain level of comparison between an “ideal type” (della Porta, 2008, p.206) and how the experts view the actual implementation process (della Porta, 2008, p.206). The interview questions were created based on reading of some of the publicly available presentations and minutes, as well as attendee lists of some of the information exchange events to hypothesize certain pathways through which authorities make their work efficient through the use of information and the use of involving the third-party actors in the timber sector. In consultation with the thesis supervisor, the sampling was decided to be non-probabilistic. This was partly influenced by the decision to follow a method of process tracing, which has the strength, according to Tansey, to “obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes” (Tansey 2007, p. 1). For this reason, the choice was to interview those who have closely followed or have been part of the implementing process (Tansey 2007). This has the advantage of having in-depth information into the process of implementation and authorities work. According to Tansey, elite interviews serve the purpose to collect information to clarify or explain, for example, information from official sources (Tansey 2007, p.766). Also, even though the aim of the thesis was not to generalize on all actors in each stakeholder group, interviews can be used, according to Tansey (2007, p.766), “to make inferences about the beliefs or actions of a wider group without interviewing everyone”. Because of the choice of qualitative method, as opposed to, for example, a quantitative survey, this non-probabilistic sampling was used so that experts who follow the timber sector developments can comment on their assumptions about the general perceptions in the industry, common frames and patterns that they observe as experts. It is to be noted that while some respondents were personally involved in implementation, some of the respondents were independent observers who do not play a large individual role in the national implementation networks, but are working in organizations which are closely involved in at least some part of the implementation process.
This study was made during a research internship at the European Forest Institute. The case countries for this study were decided in consultation with the second reader of this thesis. The members states of Finland and the Netherlands were chosen for the familiarity of the author, but also because a forthcoming study by Sotirov, Stelter and Winkel suggests, among others, that Finland and the Netherlands had different stances towards the EU prohibition clause during negotiations, and because the Finnish forest owners and the industries favored more of an industry self-regulatory approach (Sotirov, Winkel and Stelter, forthcoming). These cases were selected for this study to see whether there are observable differences in the national implementation. Considering that Finland is a member state with an abundance of forest, and the Netherlands highly import-dependent, it was seen as interesting to study how experts in these countries view implementation of the regulation. It is important to note that similarities were seen to be equally important than differences, because the study looked into how authorities try to harmonize their approaches.
Interviews and data collection
Data collection method and sampling
Interview was chosen as a method because in order to understand participation to networks as a tool to reduce the number of unclear points regarding interpretation, it is important to study what kind of meanings participants give to the participation. It is the aim of this thesis to explore what the actors consider important regarding the national context, and what they see as the added value of information exchange.
In preparation for the semi-structured interviews (Bryman 2008), a semi-systematic content analysis was conducted. There were twelve main questions asked everyone, and five additional questions for the authorities. The documents in the content analysis consisted of a gathering of relevant information provided by the relevant competent authorities and ministries and the European Union, and websites or reports of consultant firms, industry associations and environmental NGOs. Many documents were also publicly available Powerpoint presentations
from stakeholder meetings. The content analysis was used to identify some key challenges that implementers and companies face with the EUTR, key processes in which knowledge is distributed between authorities and all stakeholders, as well as between stakeholders, and to gain both factual information as well as opinionated perspectives about the practice of implementation of the EUTR that are not reflected upon in the official documents. Three themes was identified, first, formal implementation and changes to national framework, second, authorities and companies strategies to enforce and comply with the EUTR, and third, information exchange between authorities and between authorities and third parties.
The sampling was purposive to the goal. The participants were selected using the key informant approach (See, e.g. Tansey 2006), meaning that stakeholders in key positions, such as those in active roles in industry associations, consultancy work and NGO (Tansey 2006, p. 765). All respondents had been in personal contact with the authorities in the context of the EUTR, apart from one in Finland (N1), and most have been in contact, or are in frequent direct contact, with the Commission. The respondent representing the European Timber Trade Federation, even though the organization does not represent a Dutch interest, was chosen due to the knowledgeability of the respondent with the Dutch timber sector.
Anonymity was given as an option to all to guarantee fairness in that regard. Anonymity was given as a choice so that the respondents would be able to speak their own opinion and not represent their organization’s view. However, the first two questions emphasized that the responded should talk from the point of their organization and this might have guided them to take a professional role in the following questions. There was interpersonal variance in this regard, some people referred to their organization during most of the questions while some used language which emphasized that they are talking from their own opinion. The respondents represented the following groups and are coded under the following codes:
Finland Netherlands Ministry or authority (G1)
Ministry or authority (G2)
Industry association/trade association (B1)
Netherlands Timber Trade Association, VVNH (B2) European Timber Trade Federation, ETTF (B3) A trade association whose members process wood but do not import (B4)
Monitoring organization (M1) Monitoring organization (M2) Forest certification expert (C1) Forest certification expert (C3)
Forestry consultant (C2) Forestry consultant (C4)
Non-governmental organization/civil society (N1)
Greenpeace Netherlands (N2)
The research question affected the choice of sampling. Because the Regulation under study is a relatively new European regulation, a trade-off was made between high degree of generalizability and the possibility to gain in-depth understanding about stakeholders’ perceptions. The sampling was nevertheless done in a way as to give an equal voice to stakeholders from the following three groups: authorities (G1, G2), industry associations or companies (B1-B4), outside observers/experts (C1-C4, M1, M2) and civil society (N1, N2). The aim of the thesis was to explore the perspectives of those people that are directly involved in providing or analyzing information about the functioning of the EUTR, who have been involved in the policy-making process or are involved in the implementation, or who have an otherwise
relevant connection to the EUTR implementation. Because of this, not all civil society or industry associations were approached, but rather those who have publicly shown interest in the EUTR. Some (between five and fifteen) import companies were also approached in each country, but they were more difficult to reach. Because of the chosen sampling, it must be acknowledged that those people who responded might either have a disproportionately positive view about the EUTR or are in a position to speak favorably about it. A larger sample size, or a quantitative, anonymous survey about the EUTR could give more findings about the possibly negative views about the regulation.
Data collection process
The data was collected via face-to-face interviews with some of the Finnish stakeholders. The expert interviews with respondents in the Netherlands, as well as some Finnish interviews were conducted via Skype or phone. The interviews were collected in April and May 2016.
Interviews took approximately 60 minutes with the exception of three interviews which lasted 30 to 35 minutes (B2, B3, B4). Interviews were semi-structured (Bryman 2008). Every respondent was asked the same main questions. Most questions were open-ended, but some questions were leading. For example, in one question, the respondent was asked to elaborate on whether they follow hard of soft approach. In another question, they were given some examples about transnational information exchange events, such as the expert groups and informal events by the Chatham House and by Forest Trends. This was a deliberative choice done in order to demonstrate what is meant by information exchange events.
Dutch authorities were not available for an interview, as they declined the request due to time constraints. Because representatives of the Dutch authorities were not available for an interview, two documents were used to make some inferences about some of the factual information that the Dutch Competent Authority has published. These documents are the the Annex 2 of the
independent evaluation of the FLEGT Action Plan which contains the mission Aide Memoires of Finland and the Netherlands (EU FLEGT Facility 2016a, EU FLEGT Facility 2016b), and the 2015 Biennial report which the Dutch authorities had filed for the Commission to report about their implementation and which is publicly available from the Dutch government website (Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Netherlands, 2015). However, due to the availability of the Finnish authorities to the interview, it was decided as justified that the Finnish accounts would be presented and analyzed in further detail in the results as far as authorities strategies and participation into networks are concerned.
Data analysis
The interviews were transcribed into text files. The responses were cross-analyzed on a question per question basis. This means that answers to certain questions were compared to each other. The respondents, overall, mentioned very similar issues and arguments, but they mentioned these arguments and observations in response to different questions. By analyzing the content as question per question basis, this research was able to capture what the respondents viewed as important with related to each question. For example, many respondents mentioned the importance of level playing field. It was important in this thesis whether it was mentioned in response to the question about the effectiveness about the EUTR, in response to CA implementation strategies, or in response to a question about information exchange and harmonization. This data analysis approach was used in order to find these kinds of variances in what the respondents think of most relevant to each question. Each question was placed into a group of one of the three themes together with other questions concerning that theme. The questions in each theme were also analyzed together, in order to trace the process of implementation or to explore the attitudes towards the issues in that theme. In the first theme, national implementation context, importance was paid on descriptive answers in order to be able to describe the process according to the interviewees. In the second and third themes regarding authorities and companies strategies and the exchange of information, attention was paid more on the perceptions about what they consider important.
While analyzing the data, attention was paid to the position of the interviewee. For example, NGOs presented various anecdotes about problematic situations, but these were not generalized to the whole industry. However, most illustrative anecdotes to the issues at hand were chosen. Similarly, care was taken to acknowledge when the respondent talks from the organization’s point of view, and when there are individual reasoning and observations. In the reporting of the results, the aim was to report the findings in such a manner that it would be possible to distinguish between whether, for example an industry association respondent makes a remark about their members or whether they make a general observation about all companies. Similarly, special attention was paid on whether the respondent referred to Finnish or Dutch context-dependent observations, or referred to the EUTR implementation in all member states as a whole.
5. Results
5.1. The discourse on illegal logging and forestry - observations
about the national contexts in Finland and the Netherlands prior to
and after the EUTR
Finland is among the few member states of the EU which export more timber and wood products than import (EU FLEFT Facility 2016a, p.3). Russia is by far the most important source for imports, and all Finnish respondents viewed Russian timber as a most important case and the one which requires most attention when talking about the Finnish timber imports (G1, C1, C2, N1). One respondent illustrated how Russian trade was seen as important during the negotiations: “I remember that when this EUTR was being negotiated, it was objected here quite much on the grounds that no additional red tape was wanted, no additional regulation towards Russian timber trade” (N1). This is not to say that the companies do not guarantee legality in the Russian trade. Rather, it was believed that companies have acknowledged the risk and there have been
mitigating measures, such as the adoption of certifications, since the 1990s (G2, C1). However, the respondents’ general attitude in Finland towards the Russian timber was not that it is necessary the most difficult case, but the most significant case because of relatively high risk and extremely high volume relative to imports from other countries. Woodchips from Russia, however, was seen by the authorities as a key product in terms of difficulty of proving legality because of its characteristics (G1, G2).
In comparison, many Dutch respondents viewed that in the Netherlands one challenge for the authorities is that there are many companies that trade from regions from all over the world, including places where it is relatively difficult to prove the sourcing or to buy certified wood (C4, M1, C3). When asking about regions where the risk is higher or about which otherwise special expertise is needed to mitigate risk in the Dutch context, Dutch respondents mention regions such as Brazil, Cameroon, Congo Basin, Sarawak (Malaysia), Java (Indonesia) (C4, C3, M1, B4). NGOs have been filing cases at least regarding certain suppliers in Brazil and Cameroon (N2). Three respondents also mentioned China (B4, N2, M2). The prevalence of mentioning tropical regions from different continents in the conversations with the Dutch consultants might be influenced by that tropical timber has been high on the agenda of the Netherlands. There has been media coverage about tropical timber due to substantiated concerns by the Greenpeace (N2, C3). Also, in the Netherlands the timber boycotts in the 1990s got some attention. In the Netherlands, boycott campaigns launched by NGOs against illegal timber influenced the reduction of 50% of timber imports in the between 1990 and 1995 (Keck and Sikkink, 2015, p.516). Similarly, many respondents made reference to the Netherlands being a trading nation (M1, C4, N2).
Most Finnish respondents said that the largest companies had already since the 1990s taken significant steps towards verification of their timber supplies or are more prepared because of expertise and capacity (C1, B1, G2, G1, C2). The industry has also adapted certifications for their own reasons. According to an industry association respondent, Finnish companies have viewed the legality of timber as a very important part of their business, and the companies view legality and sustainability of timber as vital for the forest sector in the long term (B1). Another reason for certification adoption in the 1990s was market demand for certified timber from
important trading partners, such as the Netherlands and the UK (C1). In turn, all respondents saw smaller companies as having the most adaptation challenges. According to the government source, the small companies are a “totally different world” because the different practices are more diverging and there are many more different situations (G1) (translation by the author). It is seen as one of the key challenges for the authorities to reach all the smallest companies in their communications (G2). In the Netherlands, some said that there is anecdotal evidence that some smaller companies have quit importing themselves and decided to buy wood from larger importers (B3), or that there is lower level of awareness among them (C3).
One Dutch consultant argued that there were “several” companies with “moves towards huge volumes of certified timber” (C4), partly motivated by willingness to have a good reputation among the business and to also not catch ENGO attention. According to this respondent, if illegalities existed it was result of some individual companies’ differences in their awareness and ethics (C4). In the Netherlands however, there was concerted action lead by the timber agents association. The National Timber Trade Association (VVNH), already ten years ago, established a code of conduct which was compulsory for its members, with the first article being about not importing illegal wood (B2, B3). NTTA represents 259 importers as of 2016 (EU FLEFT Facility. 2016b, p. 4).
Prior to the EUTR, no national laws existed particularly about timber legality in the Netherlands (B3, M2, M1, C3). One respondent illustrated this: “A company could purchase illegal timber if they wished and not be penalized for it” (M1). However, the Netherlands were seen as one of the forerunners in Europe on having a public procurement policy which recognizes the common certifications of FSC and PEFC (M1, C4). When talking about the public procurement policy, one respondent said that sustainable timber “always used to be in focus of the Dutch government” (M1). A Finnish consultant respondent also noted that countries like United Kingdom, and the Netherlands there has been strategically critical NGOs, “more progressive policies” and green public procurement policies (C2) which might have set example to other countries as well.
In both countries most companies did not start to prepare for the EUTR immediately in 2010. It was only close to 2013 when the majority of companies took action (C2). Similarly, it was in 2012 when most companies started to request information from consultancy and certification companies (M1). It was not what the Commission had anticipated about the review, according to a consultant: “It was hoped for that the evaluation of 2015 would mirror the developments five years, but in practice, if development has occurred, it has been in this timeframe of two years [between 2013 and 2015]” (C2) (translation by the author).
Priorities in the implementation and changes to the national governance
Finland: Changes to authorities’ information-sharing
In Finland, one of the most important goals of the national implementation process was the having the possibility to nationally take advantage of the existing legislation with regarding to domestic production. Many were of the opinion that the implementation has been a success in this regard (C1, B1, G2) A government source said that existing laws, forestry and environmental laws are seen in Finland as supportive and not a challenge for implementation (G2)., suggesting institutional fit. Many respondents were of the opinion that in Finland it is generally viewed as particularly positive that the domestic bureaucratic burden has not too much regarding domestic timber (C2, C1, B1, N1). One change to domestic timber for the authorities was that the EUTR brought inspections to the domestic timber sector as well. The legality of domestic timber had been checked via other means prior to the EUTR (G2).
Interestingly, four Finnish respondents mentioned the exchange of information between different authorities (G1, C1, C2, G2). In the Netherlands, the CA gets information from customs but the thesis did not reveal whether this was a change that came with the EUTR (EU FLEFT Facility. 2016b, p.4). In Finland, the authorities emphasized it as a major change that the customs and the
Mavi were made to begin to exchange information, which did not exist before the EUTR at least in timber sector (G2, G1). Customs can co-operate with the Mavi with inspections and provides the Mavi with info about flows, and information about importing companies. A consultant respondent illustrated this by saying that “Mavi would completely lack the means to do inspections if this would exist, if it would not be the case that they receive at least information what timber is coming” (C2). One government respondent viewed that it would be practically impossible to get enough information about operators without this information exchange (G1). One respondent emphasized that “surprisingly many actors” have been affected by the EUTR (C1) (translation by the author). The respondent emphasized that “there are interests of different agencies that want to remain in their zone of influence and responsibilities” (C1) (translation by the author). It does not illustrate that actors wanted to get influence but rather that actors wanted that all responsibilities were clearly defined and coordinated.
Finland: Domestic timber a key issue
According to the Finnish respondents, the most commonly expressed concern in Finland prior to the EUTR during the first steps of preparing the national implementing legislation was how it will affect domestic legal framework and whether it will add additional administrative burden for forest owners or forest producers (G2, C1). In Finland, there were two separate working groups for to discuss the implementing law, one for meeting the requirements of the EUTR for domestic timber, and one for imported timber (G2). When asked about the changes that EUTR brought into the national forest governance framework, most respondents first reacted by asking to clarify whether the question concerns domestic or imported timber (G2, G1, B1, C1, C2). The impact of the EUTR to domestic and imported timber were seen as “two clearly differing ways” (B1) “two totally different ways” (G1) and in Finland questions of EUTR “must be divided into two parts” (G1), “of course two parts” (C1) or that legality of domestic timber and imports are seen as “totally different things” (C2) (translations by the author). The government source, however, specified that even though the impact of the EUTR on domestic and imported timber can be seen in two separate ways, it does not mean that the effects of the EUTR on imported timber can be seen as one single way. The effects of the EUTR on imported timber have been different for trade from each country of origin individually (G1). No Dutch respondents made any reference
to any existing Dutch forest law or regulation, apart from that no laws regarding timber import existed (M2, M1, C4, B3). It is not surprising, because of the relative importance of forestry sector for Finland, and the fact that the Netherlands largely depends on imported wood. But it is very interesting that all of the respondents in Finland did not view the EUTR merely as a trade law but also as having potentially, or it was a concern for many, also impact on the whole forest sector.
One respondent said that, in addition, that Finland’s own forest interest affects all discussion in the sector (N1). According to the same respondent, the Netherlands is a trader nation with a more globalized history and more historical as well as contemporary linkages to global South and for this reason the industry as well as the NGO’s are more internationalized, also in terms of their goals (N1). Another respondent, however, emphasized Finnish large industries ability to create change in the exporting non-EU countries. Because the Finnish industry is very centralized to a number of very large corporations, the largest actors can bring forward change in the practices in the supplier side as well, “as in having the muscles to achieve change” (C1) (translation by the author).
The Netherlands: Specialized timber trade federations with the goal of European harmonization
It is important to note that, in the following, Dutch industry, to large part, refers to the import industry. In the Netherlands, the Netherlands Timber Trade Association (VVNH) is an important stakeholder which also has an important European agenda (B2, B3). They want to work on illegal logging at the European level (B2). The Dutch importers and their associations have been active supporters of the policy to be tackled at the EU-level instead of national level from the beginning (B3, B2). They see that it is better for the industry globally and in particular in the European common market if all companies are under the same regulation (B3 B2). The industry’s proactive position to European-level governance is motivated by not only for reasons of reputation but for “fair trade, fair business, for level playing field” (B3). A level playing field was also mentioned by the respondent from a smaller association: ”like 70 per cent for the Dutch market [in the sector of the association] is cheap stuff from China. And for us the EUTR is not so
bad, it's good, because we want them to apply to the same rules to all” (B4). The industry respondents in the Netherlands did not see anything which would make implementation challenging (B2, B3, B4). One source responded that it implementation is not likely to be more difficult than in Belgium, France or Germany (M1).
It can be concluded that because there exists a strong branch organization particularly for timber importers, the Dutch timber industry can lobby for the timber import business more effectively. This is illustrated by another finding which is that that the relationship of the VVNH and the European Timber Trade Federation is very strong. The ETTF and VVNH operate, as of 2016, in the same premises in the Netherlands, although as separate organizations (B2). The VVNH sees the ETTF as a body through which they want to influence European policy and achieve harmonization of the EUTR: “we are a member of ETTF. By being that we are much well informed about what we want to achieve within the ETTF” (B2). In the Netherlands many respondents said that associations are an important source of information (B2, M2, C3, B3), while this was not the case in Finland.
In the Netherlands, timber importing itself can be seen as having as being in a larger focus in the timber sector because the Netherlands is largely import-dependent due to having little forest resources. This might explain why the importers have a centralized union. The EU decision-making that led to EUTR was to a large extent supported by Dutch pressure groups of the industry and environmental NGOs, and for this reason the continuity of harmonization and achieving European, if not global, effects can be seen as a logical continuation of their agenda. In Finland, the import of wood is seen more as a business activity of an individual company and there has not emerged strong groups to favor global illegal logging action or to facilitate European harmonization.
The Netherlands: Active NGOs with globalized goals
The NGOs large role in the Netherlands is an important difference to Finland. In 2004 Milieudefencie (FoE), WWF and Greenpeace made a joint statement on illegal logging with the Dutch Timber Trade Association and the development organizations ICCO (Sotirov, Winkel and
