Legitimation showdown : how is the Russian online media framing the Ukrainian crisis in front of a global audience? : the case of the English-service RT

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Mark Wittfoth 11129204

June 24, 2016

Legitimation Showdown

How is the Russian online media framing the Ukrainian Crisis in front of a global audience? The case of the English-service RT.

Master thesis Political Science, International Relations track Word count: 15,672

Graduate School of Social Sciences Authoritarianism in a Global Age

First reader: Adele Del Sordi Second reader: Andrey Demidov

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5. Analysis ... 37 5.1. Qualitative analysis ... 38 5.1.1. Anti-Ukraine ... 39 5.1.2. Anti-West ... 42 5.1.3. Moral Obligation ... 45 5.1.4. Nationalism ... 47 5.1.5. Other ... 49 5.2. Frequency of frames ... 50 5.2.1. Sub-frames ... 52 5.2.2. Events ... 56 5.3. Discussion of findings ... 60 5.4. Theoretical implications ... 62 6. Conclusion ... 64 7. Bibliography ... 66 8. RT Articles ... 72

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List of tables

Table 1: Overview over main frames and their construction. ... 34

Table 2: Amount of articles per event. ... 50

Table 3: Amount of quotes per frame. ... 50

Table 4: Amount of quotes per Anti-Ukraine sub-frame. ... 52

Table 5: Amount of quotes per Anti-West sub-frame. ... 53

Table 6: Amount of quotes per Nationalism sub-frame. ... 54

Table 7: Amount of quotes per Moral Obligation sub-frame. ... 55

Table 8: Amount of frames per event. ... 56

Table 9: Amount of articles on first and last day of event.. ... 59

List of figures

Figure 1: Distribution of frames. ... 51

Figure 2: Distribution of Anti-Ukraine sub-frames. ... 53

Figure 3: Distribution of Anti-West sub-frames. ... 54

Figure 4: Distribution of Nationalism sub-frames. ... 55

Figure 5: Distribution of Moral Obligation sub-frames. ... 56

Figure 6: Distribution of frames for each event. ... 58

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List of abbreviations

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation CNN – Cable News Network

EU – European Union

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe PRC – People’s Republic of China

RT – Russia Today US – United States

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Abstract

Since the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the Russian government has spent increasing resources on the expansion of its pro-Kremlin media outlets. Moreover, following the outbreak of the Ukrainian Crisis near the end of 2013, a new Russian strategy has become increasingly prominent among observers of Russian foreign policy: the infor-mation warfare. This thesis discusses how pro-Kremlin media is framing the Ukraine crisis and justifying the Russian government’s actions in front of a global audience. The theoretical framework is based on the concept of external legitimation for au-thoritarian regimes and their use of media to achieve it. Hereby, especially the target-ing of foreign audiences for such purposes is identified as a gap in the literature. Ustarget-ing framing analysis and applying it to the case study of the English-language version of Russian government-owned news outlet RT, eight events, with a total of 70 articles and 276 frames are used for the analysis. The outcome confirms and expands upon previous findings: anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian frames are most prevalent, whereas this thesis adds several sub-categories to the larger, more general frame pack-ages.

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1. Introduction – War in Ukraine and Media Framing

In early 2014, just a few months after the outbreak of the Maidan rev-olution in Kiev, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted from of-fice, the Crimean Peninsula was annexed by the Russian Federation and Rus-sian soldiers were spotted fighting alongside pro-RusRus-sian separatists among deteriorating violence in the east of the country. A few months later still, the newly-elected Ukrainian government issued a statement saying it is in a state of war. These drastic developments coincided with increased mentioning of a so-called Russian “hybrid war” against Ukraine in both, mainstream media and the academic discourse. One of the main roles in this type of warfare is being played by the online media, which has taken to represent, share and push a Russian narrative of the events in question. This research project aims to examine how exactly this framing process works and how the Russian gov-ernment uses online media outlets to justify the Federation’s involvement in eastern Ukraine. For this purpose, qualitative content and framing analysis have been applied to articles published by Russian-owned media outlet RT, formerly known as Russia Today, to examine them for dominant narratives.

In times of globalisation in an increasingly interconnected world, au-thoritarian regimes face an increasing struggle to maintain their monopoly over the domestic information space. In turn, it has become easier for author-itarian regimes to spread their own views and influence public opinion far be-yond the state’s borders. As such, Russia has drastically increased its budget for foreign-language media such as Sputnik and RT, which are publishing Kremlin-friendly news all over the world. RT, especially, has enjoyed signifi-cant funding and is considered the flagship of the pro-Russian media world. Accordingly, the media outlet has been very active in covering the Ukrainian

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Crisis. What were some of the most popular narratives used in the coverage? How was the Crisis framed and which frames were used most often?

This research project aims at providing answers to these questions and to explore further the gap in the literature that is the use of online media by authoritarian regimes to target foreign audiences. First, an introductory liter-ature review will explain the difference between the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation, elaborate on strategies of external legitimation and discuss how online media can be used as a tool of legitimation. Finally, the targeting of foreign audiences by authoritarian regimes for external legitimation is identi-fied as a gap in the literature. The following section provides background in-formation on the Ukraine Crisis since 2013, Russian Inin-formation Warfare and existing work on the framing by Russian state-owned media. Following that, the research design will elaborate the methodology consisting of content and framing analysis, explain the source, data selection and coding process. Sub-sequently, the frames will be discussed qualitatively and with regards to their respective occurrence, before drawing some theoretical implications. Finally, a conclusion is going to summarise the findings and answer the overarching question: How is RT framing the Ukrainian Crisis in front of a global audience?

2. Literature Review

2.1. Legitimacy vs. legitimation

The academic discourse has repeatedly pointed out and stressed the im-portance of legitimacy for the consolidation of authoritarian regimes (Easton, 1965; Wintrobe, 1998; Geddes, 1999, p. 125; Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004;

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Burnell, 2006, p. 551; Brady, 2009). Legitimacy guarantees active consent, pas-sive obedience, toleration or indifference and makes governing for authoritar-ian states more manageable since lower levels of repression are needed (Holmes, 2016, p. 242). Externally, high legitimacy pays off as well, since for-eign investors are more likely to invest in a legitimate and, thus, more stable country. As Gerschweski (2013) stated, autocracies can no longer rely on abuse of power, so that every political order needs to be supported by a “legit-imacy idea” (p. 18). In a global age, such regimes are faced with increasing difficulty when it comes to maintaining their respective ideologies and isolat-ing their population from external influences over extended periods of time: “the indoctrination mechanism reaches its limits” (ibid., p. 19).

Throughout the academic discourse regarding the concept of regime le-gitimacy, several definitions have been brought forward to define the term. Much of the literature is based on the definition given by Max Weber, who argued that “legitimation seeks to guarantee active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience or mere toleration within the population” (ibid., p. 18). Weber’s notion of ‘legitimacy belief’ entails the idea that legitimacy is based on followers’, subjects’ or citizens’ belief that authority is morally valid or rightful (Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004; Hoffmann, 2011, p. 5; Merkel et al., 2012). According to Beetham (1999), “for power to be fully legitimate […], three conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the justifia-bility of the rules by reference to shared beliefs, the express consent of the subordinate, or of the most significant among them, to the particular relations of power” (p.19). Schaar (1989) offers a minimalist definition and states that legitimacy can be understood as the population’s empirically verifiable ac-ceptance of their government (p. 20). All of these definitions, however, share a principal drawback: tying levels of legitimacy to a population’s belief,

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ceptance or support, makes it extremely challenging to measure. This draw-back, in part, is due to methodological problems and the tendency of authori-tarian regimes to restrict independent research on such topic (Hoffmann, 2011, p. 6). It is, for this reason, much more feasible to focus on the process and strategies through which states hope to seek legitimacy.

2.2. External legitimation

Legitimation is understood to be the strategy of seeking legitimacy, whereas legitimacy concerns the extent to which the citizens of a regime ac-cept said legitimation strategies (Gerschewski, 2013, pp. 20-21). If legitimacy focuses on the status quo, the earlier mentioned levels of belief, acceptance and support; legitimation stresses the process and the characteristics aiming to ensure them (Ansell, 2001; Hoffmann, 2011, p. 6). Despite it playing merely a secondary role in the academic debate about the demise of totalitarianism, legitimation is an important causal factor in explaining the stability of autoc-racies (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 18). Gerschewski follows a recent development in the literature whereby a renewed focus has been shifted towards the relation between legitimacy, legitimation and the stability of authoritarian regimes (Gilley, 2009; Holbig, 2011; Schlumberger 2010; Sedgwick 2010; Hoffmann, 2011).

Heike Holbig (2011) describes an alternative to the above outlined methodological, empirical challenges and proposes a normative approach to ‘non-democratic legitimation (p. 166). Normative legitimation describes a process with which authoritarian regimes seek to create a facade of legitimacy by the means of using propaganda and symbol politics to manipulate public opinion, as well as to award privileges to certain groups of society. Albrecht

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and Schlumberger (2004) distinguish between internal and external legiti-macy, stating that external legitimacy is defined by the degree to which leading external powers, such as Western governments or international organisations, consider the regime in question legitimate (p. 376). External legitimation con-sists of maximising international legal recognition, as well as the support of material or symbolic nature and is of high importance since it can, in turn, contribute to domestic legitimacy (Burnell, 2006, p. 549). Bert Hoffmann (2011) distinguishes defensive and expensive external legitimation strategies: a defensive strategy is most often used by regimes with strong nationalist or anti-hegemonic claims, seeking confrontation with an external “other”. Ex-pansive legitimation, on the other hand, seeks a broader type of international support and is based on ”foreign policy instruments, alliances, military ven-tures, different sorts of power deployment, ideological or religious affinities, or on a charismatic leadership appeal that stretches beyond the nation’s do-mestic boundaries” (p. 5). Most authoritarian regimes draw their legitimacy from both internal, as well as external legitimation strategies and often link them closely to one another (Hoffmann, 2011, p. 5).

Martin Brusis (2016) succinctly summarises the academic discourse on various types of legitimation strategies in his work on legitimation in Post-Soviet Eurasian states and points out that the comparison between different modes of legitimation is a recent development (p. 7). A significant contribu-tion has been made by Leslie Holmes (2016) who draws upon Weber’s original modes of legitimation – traditional, charismatic, legal-rational – as well as Rigby’s (1982) contribution of the goal-rationality category; and suggests eu-daemonic legitimation, official nationalism, and three different modes of ex-ternal legitimation. These include international recognition, support from for-eign leaders and the emulation of external role models. Other authors have distinguished more (Schneider et al. 2010, p. 111) or fewer categories and

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patterns of legitimation (Burnell 2006; Holbig, 2011; von Soest & Grauvogel, 2016). Due to the relatively young age of the debate, as well as the difficulty that comes with measuring levels of legitimacy, scholars have been unable to agree on the number or extent of legitimation modes. The debate around the concept, however, has made clear that external legitimation plays an important role for authoritarian regimes.

2.3. The media as a tool of legitimation

As outlined above, authoritarian regimes have several legitimation strategies at their disposal. One of them, as identified by Brusis (2016), aims at overcoming informational uncertainties regarding the mixed or unclear na-ture of popular preferences (p. 10). Authoritarian regimes restrict the demo-cratic formation and aggregation of such preferences – for instance through fair elections or unbiased mass media – and attempt to overcome this problem by seeking to demonstrate broad support for a decision, often through the or-chestration of manifestations aiming to convince citizens that there is such broad support. However, the internet and the rise of online media outlets have “facilitated the growth of power-scrutinising organisations and mechanisms” and led to authoritarian regimes having to justify their actions through such media. (Peregudov, 2012, p. 65). This development is, partly, a reaction to the way media has been used to undermine an authoritarian regime’s legitimacy and attack it from outside its borders (Burnell, 2006, p. 545).

Svea Gunitsky (2013) made an important contribution to this debate when discussing the use of social media by authoritarian regimes. While ini-tially, the use of social has been considered a tool for spreading anti-regime information, as well as to mobilise collective action, authoritarian regimes

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have quickly learned how to adapt and use the technology to their advantage (ibid., p. 42). Gunitsky identifies a shift from social media suppression to so-cial media co-optation that has turned soso-cial media into a tool of legitimation and, ultimately, regime stability. By shaping the public discourse, authoritarian regimes are thus able to increase their legitimacy through discourse framing and preference divulgence. Co-optation then, in this sense, is a way for non-democratic regimes to overcome the so-called “Dictator’s Dilemma”. In this dilemma, autocrats are faced with a trade-off between allowing increased avail-ability of technology to increase economic development and global integration on the one hand, and the threat of unprecedented flows of information to the regime’s stability on the other (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Howard et al., 2011). Using new information technologies through the means of co-optation is, thus, a way for such regimes to solve this puzzle. Gunitsky, however, fo-cuses solely on the domestic use of social media and neglects the importance of other online media – despite the vast amount of money authoritarian states invest in such channels.

The role of the media in the process of globalisation and its effect on authoritarian regimes has received increasing attention in recent years (Deibert, 2015, p. 64). Assessments of said role go as far as stating that West-ern media significantly contributed to the end of the Cold War and the down-fall of communism in Eastern Europe (Giddens, 2000; Nye, 2004). Foreign mass media are, thus, widely considered as a cause of democratisation (Parta, 2007). Considering the aforementioned reliance of authoritarian regimes on dominating the public discourse, as well as on suppressing the emergence of critical and oppositional ideas, the transnational nature of globalisation poses a significant threat to the consolidated rule in such political systems (Holger Lutz, 2009, p. 378).

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Foreign media can serve a major role in undermining authoritarian re-gimes by exposing propaganda, discrediting news reports from within author-itarian regimes and by pointing out the injustices suffered by the respective population, especially so in contrast to more liberal and democratic countries (Diamond, 1980). Krishna Kumar (2006) points out the consolidating effect state-controlled media can have on authoritarian rule when talking about the importance of Western building and strengthening of independent media in countries with an authoritarian background (p. 653). In what she calls “public diplomacy”, media can be used to promote a country’s foreign policy interests through the means of targeting a foreign audience and aiming to inform and influence it. This instrument is used to generate a positive attitude towards the respective government’s policies and is a tool complementary to traditional diplomacy (ibid., p. 654). Public diplomacy strategies include, among others, broadcasting in foreign languages and providing favourable news stories to foreign media, using both traditional and online media. Kumar’s work, how-ever, merely focuses on Western public diplomacy and ignores the way author-itarian regimes engage in the same strategy for their own purposes in order to defend themselves from such foreign influences.

Anne-Marie Brady (2015) goes further and analyses the Chinese gov-ernment’s goals and strategies for targeting a foreign audience. When talking about China’s foreign propaganda activities, she distinguishes two target au-diences, namely overseas Chinese and non-Chinese foreigners (ibid., p. 52). The targeting of these groups is done to neutralise antagonism towards the regime, to increase antipathy towards China’s opponents and to encourage foreign investment in China. She concludes that this strategy has been highly successful as in recent years the internet has become increasingly important for the country for the purpose of building support among overseas Chinese,

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to the point where PRC-based websites are now the principal source of Chi-nese-language and China-related news for Overseas Chinese (ibid., p. 53).

Taking these concepts a step further, one arrives at the use of media as a means of warfare. Alexander Fokin distinguishes between information war-fare and psychological warwar-fare (Fokin, 2016, p. 7). The former has two distinc-tive goals: first, it is aimed at gaining support among the population within the combat zones, as well as the home front and the international community for the actions of the respective parties engaging in a crisis, conflict or war. Second of all, it seeks to sow confusion and erode support for the opponents’ values, goals and strategies, by spreading disinformation, lies and propaganda (Lucas & Nimmo, 2015, p. 1). Psychological warfare, on the other hand, im-plies “influencing the target audience’s values and belief system, their percep-tions, emopercep-tions, motives, reasoning, and ideally, their behaviour. It is […] aimed at maintaining the support of the loyal; convincing the uncommitted and undermining the opposition” (Nissen, 2015, p. 84). Main instruments in-clude the tapping into existing narratives and the “playing on emotional and logical arguments drawn from conversations and history” (ibid.). The key ob-jectives are the influencing of the audience’s perception of what is happening around them, and of their on- and offline behaviour. A major concept of both information and psychological warfare is the “weaponisation of online media”, ensuring that this strategy is not only continuously on-going but also very hard to detect (Fokin, 2016, p. 8). The latter is due to the often-found plurality of sources, which increases the difficulty of identifying the origin of information. The major advantage of the use of online media for “warfare” purposes is that it is able to reach all levels of society at minimum cost (ibid.). According to Nissen (2015), political conflicts are increasingly about identity claims and the “control over populations, decision-making and the political space”, than about a certain geographical area (p. 32).

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2.4. Targeting of foreign audiences for authoritarian legitimation – a gap in the literature

The goal of this research project is to analyse, how the Russian govern-ment is targeting a foreign audience to justify its actions in Ukraine since the outbreak of the crisis there since the end of 2013. As demonstrated above, varying degrees of thought have been put the questions of external legitimacy, legitimation and the use of media for the consolidation of authoritarian rule – however; there is little existing research combining these theoretic branches. This lack of research is, in part, due to the relatively young nature of the debate surrounding the links between globalisation, online media, and authoritarian regimes. Overall, the questions of legitimacy, legitimation and the effect of globalisation on these concepts have been receiving more and more attention (Holbig, 2011, p. 161; Hoffmann, 2011, p. 4).

As Gerschewski (2013) succinctly puts it, “only anecdotal evidence is available as to why legitimation matters”, while pointing out that governments cannot shield their population from external influences forever. The growing availability and access to the internet have led to an increasing necessity for those regimes to legitimate their rule due to increasing problems with regards to informational monopoly (p. 19). Martin Brusis (2016) argues that much of the literature neglects to acknowledge the importance of legitimacy and legit-imation for the stability of authoritarian regimes (p. 2). Leslie Holmes (2016) points out that despite recent advances in our understanding of legitimacy, there is still a long way to go (p. 243). As Kern and Hainmueller (2009) acknowledge, almost no research has been done on the impact of foreign mass media on the stability of authoritarian regimes (p. 378). As such, the works discussed above do not go far enough in explaining the importance of external

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legitimation for authoritarian regimes and even less so in meaningfully as-sessing the role of online media for such external legitimation purposes. This thesis shall, therefore, be considered as a first step towards filling this gap in the literature. By understanding how exactly Russian state-run media frame the country’s actions in Ukraine, it is possible to get a clearer picture of au-thoritarian states’ external legitimation strategies and how they are carried out through online media.

3. Background

3.1. The Ukraine Crisis since 2013

The impeachment of Viktor Yanukovych in late February 2014 was fol-lowed by a covert invasion of Crimea by military forces with alleged Russian backing, which led to open conflict and political unrest all over Ukraine (Yuhas, 2015). What started as a peaceful demonstration in favour of Ukraine’s pro-European policies by civilians on Kiev’s Maidan Square turned into a violent confrontation dividing the nation. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of refugees have been displaced as a result of the conflict, with thousands killed and tens of thousands injured in Donbass (UNHCR 2015).

The Ukraine Crisis starting in 2013 was preceded by the failed Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. Following a series of corruption scandals and Viktor Yushchenko’s attempts to rig the presidential election that year, the protests were fuelled by optimism for change, as well as a fight against en-demic corruption and economic hardship (Wilson 2014a, p. 38). Five years later Yushchenko was replaced by Russia-friendly Viktor Yanukovych, whose policies set about dismantling the achievements of the Orange Revolution

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(ibid., p. 39). Fast-forwarding a decade, the origin of the latest unrest in the country lies in the Maidan protests beginning near the end of 2013. When acting President Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign the EU’s Association Agreement that would have strengthened ties between Ukraine and Europe, protesters occupied the Maidan Square in Kiev to demand an end to corruption and lobby for human rights, freedom and democracy (Smith, 2015, p. 530). These protests turned violent in February 2014 and led to the ousting of Yanu-kovych by the Ukrainian parliament (Hofmann, 2015, p. 38). The then-Ukrain-ian president had the opportunity to unite a large part of the population be-hind him but, instead, inadvertently fuelled the Maidan movement that would be his downfall by rejecting the agreement (Motyl, 2013). The interim regime that was put in place instead consisted of opposition forces and enjoyed the support and legitimation by the West on the one hand, and criticism, as well as non-recognition by Russia (Smith 2015, p. 530).

In March pro-Russian separatists took advantage of the political unrest in the country and initiated demonstrations and protests on the Crimean Pen-insula that led to the covert invasion of Russian-backed military forces (Yuhas, 2015). Following a referendum that initially called for the autonomy of Crimea from Ukraine and which was later changed to one about joining the Russian Federation, Crimea and Sevastopol were formally annexed by Russia on March 18. Deemed illegitimate and violating international law by Western states and international organisations, severe economic and political sanctions were im-posed upon Russia in the following months (CSIS, 2015). The annexation of Crimea was followed by open conflict in the South and East of Ukraine, the Donbass region, which features a large minority of ethnic Russians and is mostly Russian-speaking. An uprising of pro-Russian rebels and the subse-quent deployment of the Ukrainian army in the region led to an armed struggle over the territories in the area. This conflict was further exacerbated by the

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self-proclamation of autonomous entities such as the “Donetsk People’s Re-public” and referendums in Donetsk and Lugansk (Wilson 2014a, p. 131). The covert involvement of Russian forces in the conflict and their backing of pro-Russian separatist forces has led the West and Ukraine openly Russia for con-tributing to the deterioration of the conflict and the invasion of a sovereign neighbouring country.

The Russian take-over of Crimea undoubtedly came as a surprise to policymakers in the US and EU. (Hofmann, 2015, p. 38). Nevertheless, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and EU enlargements towards the East, Ukraine has been in a position prone to becoming a “venue for open contest” between the West and Russia. Being situated between the European Union and the Russian Federation, Ukraine has increasingly struggled with formu-lating a clear preference for either following its independence (Smith, 2015, p. 528). This indeterminateness is in part due to the country’s ambiguous orien-tation, but also due to it being one of the largest states in the region, its natural resources, economic development, agricultural industry and its geopolitical importance as a transit state for gas. In addition, ethnolinguistic divisions in the East of Ukraine, where there is a large Russian-speaking minority, make the country more vulnerable to Russian influence and increase the struggle with balancing Ukrainian orientation between Brussels and Moscow (ibid.).

Andrew Wilson identifies five fears that led to Russia intervening in Ukraine: first, he states that Russia fears that states of the Eastern Partnership would abandon Russia and associate themselves more closely with the EU (Wilson, 2014b, p. 68). Next, he outlines a Russian foreign policy of dominat-ing smaller states for protection from external threats as a so-called “buffer zone” and thirdly describes Russia’s fear of a potential democratic spillover effect of the Maidan Revolution from Kiev to the Red Square. Fourth, he iden-tifies anti-Russian nationalism as a threat to the Federation and finally argues

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that Vladimir Putin relies on a “conservative values project” to remain in power, whereby identifying an “other” unites the country and rallies the pop-ulation behind a common threat (ibid., p. 69). The invasion of Crimea and subsequently increased propaganda efforts can, thus, be seen as a policy in-strument to divert from a faltering Russian economy and increasing corruption in the Russian energy sector (ibid., p. 70).

The future of the Ukrainian Crisis is challenging to predict. The con-flict in Donbas has dragged on for over two years, although fighting has de-creased after an internationally agreed ceasefire and stalemate across the front-lines. A reclaiming of territories in the East would likely cost Ukraine local support as the war turned an initially negligible support into a complex situa-tion for all involved (Wilson, 2014a, p. 143). Both Russia and Ukraine are fac-ing increasfac-ing economic deterioration, not least due to warfare and interna-tional economic and political sanctions, with both having no incentive of back-ing down in the near future (ibid., p. 207). Havback-ing outlined the Ukrainian Crisis since 2013, it is now possible to take a closer look at what constitutes the foundation of this research project: The Russian information warfare and its framing of the conflict.

3.2. The Russian Information Warfare

Russia’s involvement in Ukraine since the outbreak of the crisis has often been analysed as being part of Vladimir Putin’s “hybrid war”. The term “hybrid” thereby refers to a combination of conventional, irregular, political or information warfare (Kofmann & Rojansky, 2015, p. 2). Russia first made use of the “information warfare” aspect in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the first instance of the country combining conventional military operations with cyber

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warfare (NATO, 2014, p. 1). Recently, Russia has pushed this strategy even further, prioritising information-based activities over conventional military forces – with the latter taking up a more supporting role. Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss of the Institute of Modern Russia argue that the “Kremlin exploits the idea of freedom of information to inject disinformation into soci-ety” (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 6). While traditionally, the goal of classic public diplomacy has been to achieve credibility and persuasion, this new type of communications policy aims at sowing confusion by spreading propaganda, disinformation and proliferate falsehoods. This approach has been described as “nihilistic”, as Russian disinformation does not seek to provide answers but to “provoke doubt, disagreement and, ultimately, paralysis” (Lucas & Nimmo, 2015, p. 1). Ultimately, it aims at eroding support for pro-Western values, as well as functioning like a wrench that is thrown into the works of U.S. and European decision-making (ibid., p. 2). Furthermore, it is aimed at gaining support within the zone of combat and among its indigenous population, as well as the population at home and the international community (McCuen, 2008, p. 108). As part of Russia’s Security Council, the country’s official mil-itary strategy involves creating a new response strategy incorporating non-mil-itary measures and new, non-traditional methods, outlining the importance of information operations in contemporary conflicts (Darczewska, 2015, p. 9).

Russia most notably engaged in information warfare as part of the Fed-eration’s involvement in Ukraine since the outbreak of the crisis. After the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, a number of noteworthy devel-opments occurred. Trolls on Social Media, Russian-friendly and state-owned media outlets accused the Ukrainian government of human rights breaches against ethnic Russians in the region. They spread disinformation about the actual levels of support for the referendum, justified the government’s actions

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and, thus, made the de-facto involvement of the Russian state and its author-ities extremely hard to prove (Fokin, 2016, p. 14). The significance of this recent shift to prioritise the use of media and propaganda is well-illustrated by Russian journalism professor Igor Yakovenko’s claiming that, whereas Sta-lin was “80 percent violence and 20 percent propaganda”, Putin is “80 percent propaganda and 20 percent violence” (Pomerantsev, 2015, p. 40). As Pomer-antsev concludes: The Kremlin provides guidance to each and every narrative, “allowing it to frame any argument in the way that best suits its needs at any given time, for any situation (ibid., p. 42). This total control over the mass media has been a crucial component to the effective execution of Russia’s in-formation campaign against Ukraine. In what NATO’s Strategic Communica-tions Centre of Excellence describes as “concurrent messaging”, Russian me-dia have been actively involved in the influencing of opinions through framing from the start of the crisis (NATO, 2014, p. 1). This active involvement is considered as contributing to the difficulty of countering Russian communica-tion strategies because “the control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronised messaging of the Russian government” (ibid.).

3.3. The Russian media and their framing of the Ukrainian Crisis

Although commonly adapting messages with regards to the respective target audience, Russia’s information campaign and propaganda frequently features reoccurring narratives and frames. Martin Brusis argues that Russia has increasingly resorted to mobilising nationalist sentiment to make up for a struggling economy and international criticism (Brusis, 2016, p. 4). Leslie Holmes presents similar findings and points out Russian exceptionalism – the

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notion that Russia is different from the West – and the narrative of Russia as a great power (Holmes, 2016, p. 6). Alexander Cooley brings forward the ar-gument of Russia defending “traditional values”: neo-Eurasianist thinking is fueled by Russia’s stand against what is perceived as Western encroachment and the view that Western individualism has led to crisis and moral decay. In turn, this is resulting in a shift towards national culture, heritage and religion (Cooley, 2015, p. 52).

With regards to the case of Ukraine, several scholars have identified common frames specifically related to the crisis. Especially Russian national-ism is “the one factor constantly mentioned by Russia in its caricature of what is happening in Ukraine” (Wilson, 2014b, p. 68). Ukraine is seen as a tradi-tional foreign enemy, in line with the Chechens at the turn of the century, followed by the Oligarchs in the early 2000’s and the West shortly after that. Thus, it is being framed as “the mythical Ukraine, full of fascists and disorder, backed, once again, by Russia’s enemies in the West” (ibid., p. 69). Fokin’s analysis of pro-Russian trolling outlines the pro-Russian narrative against Ukraine: the Maidan revolution was, in fact, a “coup d’état” that was carried out by Neo-Nazi extremists. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian “junta” was about to perform a genocide against ethnic Russian separatists in the country’s East, morally obliging Russia to help and protect them (Fokin, 2016, p. 17). Furthermore, Russia “had to accept” the will of the people and “could not pre-vent” patriotic volunteers and military-intelligence officers going into Ukraine to “aid their Russian World brethren in their civil war against Ukrainian ex-tremists”. Russia itself has been framed as an “innocent bystander rooting for peace” (ibid.). This notion is echoed by Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, pointing out that one narrative frequently found in Russia’s justification for the annexation of Crimea was that the Federation had no option but to show support for Russian speakers and to protect them from anti-Russian radicals

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(Vieira, 2014, p. 102). The Center for European Policy Analysis’ Infowar paper on Russian information warfare identifies a targeting mechanism that gears the information campaign’s messages towards the respective audiences. With regards to Ukraine, common narratives frame the country as a failure “blighted by disorder, emigration and poverty” that is run by a “sinister elite of Western puppets with ill-disguised fascist sympathies” (Lucas & Nimmo, 2015, p. 6). NATO’s StratCom Centre identifies various dominant themes, includ-ing a contrastinclud-ing of the Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization to the “decadent” Europe, underlining the importance of Ukraine for Eurasianism and the Eur-asian Economic Union, as well as the promotion of a “Russian World” uniting all Eastern Slavs. It further features the implication that Ukrainians and Rus-sians are part of the same nation, the recognition of Russian supremacy and the portrayal of Ukraine as a “pseudo-nation which is unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood" (NATO, 2014, p. 1). Other narratives relate Nazism and Fascism to the Euromaidan protesters and iden-tifying them as a threat to ethnic Russians in Ukraine, point out the division of the West by utilizing the respective EU member states interest and “posi-tioning the USA in opposition to the EU”, as well as giving legal and historical justifications for Russian actions in Ukraine (ibid.).

To conclude, albeit subject to minor differences, most scholars have identified similar narratives employed by the Russian information campaign in Ukraine. These involve anti-Western sentiments, the framing of Ukraine as a failed, corrupt and fascist-led state, the threat to ethnic Russians in Ukraine and the moral obligation for Russia to intervene, as well as Russian national-ism underlining the exceptionalnational-ism and greatness of the country. Keeping in mind the aforementioned tailoring of messages to specific audiences, this re-search paper attempts to observe to what degree these messages change, if

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patterns can be detected, if those frames are in fact present and if new narra-tives can be found and added.

4. Research Design

The research project aims at analysing how the Russian online media is justifying the actions of the Russian government in Ukraine since the outbreak of the crisis there near the end of 2013. The example of Russia Today and its English service outlet will be used in order to get a better understanding of how exactly the actions are framed, what their importance is and how those frames are structured. In this document, I am going to outline the research design, including methodology, data selection and collection, as well as analy-sis.

4.1. Methodology 4.1.1. Content analysis

The basis for this research consists of content analysis. Content analysis can be described as a systematic examination and interpretation of a certain source with the goal of identifying patterns, themes, biases and meanings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). It is typically performed on different types of human communications. These human communications are analysed as part of a cod-ing operation, and data interpretcod-ing process (Morse & Richards, 2002). Miles and Huberman (1994) identify three major approaches to qualitative data

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analysis: interpretive, social anthropological and collaborative. While the lat-ter two emphasise the assumption of a special perspective through field work or interaction with the subjects, the interpretive approach is fitting for this research since it allows for the treatment of social action and human activity as text. In this context, data is condensed or framed through sorting or coding operations (Berg, 2007, p. 304). This process provides a way of discovering practical understandings of meanings and actions and is useful when looking at frames constructed by the English service RT.

There has been an on-going debate among scholars of content analysis with regards to whether or not analysis is exclusively quantitative or if it can be qualitative as well (ibid., p.307). Berg counters concern that quantitative content analysis is the only way to analyse content in an objective and systemic way with the argument that only qualitative content analysis can truly bring out and assess the character of the data. Furthermore, some data may be arbi-trarily limited by merely focusing on the quantitative analysis and loses its meaning when reduced to numeric form. For this thesis, however, both aspects are of great interest to this research project, which is why a mixed approach will be employed. As put by Smith (1975, p. 218), “qualitative analysis deals with the forms and antecedent-consequent patterns of form, while quantita-tive analysis deals with the duration and frequency of form”. As will be ex-plained later on, the frequency with which for instance a certain theme appears in the data set can give an idea of the importance of this particular observation and, thus, make arguments more convincing (Berg, 2007, p. 309). However, these observations do not sufficiently reflect the character of the data and will only be used to supplement the overall analysis. This overall analysis is going to be of a qualitative nature, resulting in a mixed methodological approach with a heavy focus on the qualitative side.

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4.1.2. Framing analysis

Framing involves the selection of particular aspects of a text to “pro-mote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). This process commonly involves diagnosis, evaluation and prescription; frames assess certain events as problems, identify their source and offer moral judgements. In the case of Ukraine, this could look as follows: the on-going conflict in the country with severe violence among the combatant parties is seen as a problem, pro-Ukrainian activists seen as the source and the suppos-edly undemocratic, oppressing or fascist character of such activists is embed-ded in moral judgement. Occasionally, a fourth step involves the suggestion of remedies – an offer of and justification for treatments for this identified prob-lem (ibid.). In the Ukraine example given above, this often involves the inter-vention of (pro-)Russian forces. Journalists and the news media prominently find themselves in the middle of this meaning-constructing process since they “present additional layers of interpretation of issues and events in the form of a news story” (van Gorp, 2009, p. 84). As such, meanings are imposed upon the story elements reported on in the media. According to van Gorp, frames can be seen as cultural phenomena reflecting upon the limited set of predom-inant values in a given society. Frames, then, are limited in the way that frame-building in the media is a process reproducing those cultural values and norms (ibid., p. 88). As a consequence, common frames differ among cultures with different values.

One of the most common criticisms of framing analysis regards its re-liability and validity (Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Tankard, 2001). This debate is mostly concerned with the difficulties of demonstrating a relationship be-tween an abstract frame and the elements capable of evoking a frame; as well

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as the question of how many frame elements need to be present in a text to generate a frame (van Gorp, 2009, p. 88). One such way to increase validity is to use a deductive strategy, aiming to confirm the presence of previously iden-tified frames, taken from the literature for instance, in the analysed texts (ibid., p. 91). An inductive framing analysis, on the other hand, aims to reconstruct the frames that are useful for defining certain issues. Following van Grop’s approach of framing analysis, three steps are taken to identify the frames for this analysis: first of all, an open coding of the texts without a predefined cod-ing instrument. Different elements of the texts are compared to construct em-pirical indicators of common themes. The focus here is not on what the story is about, but on how the story is told. The second step involves arranging the codes around “axes” of meaning (ibid., p. 95). Analysing similarities, differ-ences and contrasts between the devices leads to a number of identifiable frames. The final step employs selective coding: frame packages and framing devices are connected to one another by summarising framing function, the definition of the issue, identification of the source and – if applicable – offered solution (ibid, p. 96). Naming the framing package then creates an additional difficulty to the researcher, since giving a name to a frame involves its own kind of framing (Tankard, 2001, p. 89).

4.2. RT in English

The source of the data will be articles published online by the English service version of RT, formerly known as Russia Today. It was founded as a soft-power tool with the goal of improving Russia’s image in the world, as well as to counter anti-Russian bias in the Western media and is now the most influential media channel in Russia (Ioffe, 2010). Seen as a counterpart to the

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American CNN, RT’s budget has increased tenfold since 2005, to around 300$ million (Bidder, 2013). Being largely ignored at the time of its foundation, the channel found a “sense of mission” during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 when framing the conflict to produce a pro-Russian narrative (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 15). After changing the editorial priorities, Russia Today was rebranded “RT” and focuses on framing the West negatively, often using West-ern voices to underline arguments (ibid.). RT has since been described as “much more sophisticated than Soviet propaganda”, and dubbed a “propa-ganda machine” (ibid., p. 14). The target audience of RT is the English- speak-ing population of the West, as well as of English-speakspeak-ing Russians both from within, as well as outside Russia. According to its website, RT is now available to more than 700 million people in over 100 countries worldwide, out of which 70 million watch it weekly and 35 million daily (RT 2016). Its YouTube chan-nel is the most watched TV news network with over 3 billion views. RT covers a variety of topics of international interest and particularly those that allow for the channel to foster anti-Western sentiments, display Russian superiority or justify the Russian government’s actions (Orttung et al. 2015).

According to RT’s website, its goal is to provide “an alternative perspec-tive on major global events” and to acquaint “an international audience with the Russian viewpoint”. Due to its vast funding and immense popularity, RT has established itself as a go-to source for news about Russia, as well as build a reputation among its followers for critical and alternative views in contrast to the Western mainstream media (Yablokov 2015). As RT is owned by the Russian government, it has close links to the state’s political structure. This relationship, combined with the significant influence and reach of the media outlet across various media, as well as its easily accessible archive of articles and videos published online on a variety of topics, qualifies RT as an idea pool from which to draw the relevant data. The events that will be analysed, as well

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as the codebook that will be used for this purpose, are going to be discussed in the following section.

4.3. Data selection

As outlined above, the type of analysed data will consist of articles pub-lished by RT online. In order to assess justifications given by RT for the actions of the Russian government in Ukraine, this research project is going to look at several events taking place over the course of the crisis. The criteria for their selection is fourfold: first, the events need to have media coverage building up to them so that enough time has passed for a narrative to develop. Secondly, there must be a sufficient amount of articles for the day of the event; the threshold was set to a minimum of four articles. Thirdly, the events are of central importance for the Ukrainian Crisis; there is considerable evidence for the involvement of and importance to the Russian government, and they were highly controversial – resulting in an international debate with an incentive for the Russian government to justify its actions. Finally, the events cover a time frame of about a year and reach a natural conclusion with the Minsk II agreement. This makes it possible to identify long-term justification frame pat-terns and increase the validity of the findings. The justification frames for one event only might be subject to a certain, fluctuating context. Several events make it possible to see whether or not frames change over time, which ones stay the same and which ones might be added as the conflict goes on.

According to these criteria, eight events were chosen from various time-lines featuring main occurrences of the Ukrainian Crisis: Al Jazeera (2014), BBC (2014) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (2016). The

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chosen events include the ousting of Viktor Yanukovich, the annexation of Cri-mea and Sevastopol, the Odessa fire, the Donetsk and Luhansk referendums, the elections of a new Ukrainian president, the renewed sanctions imposed upon Russia, the Gas deal and the Minsk II agreement. The data set for this research consists of a large N study with a constructed sample. For each article, the period considered for the analysis will include the first day of the event, as well as the seventh. This makes it possible to construct beginning and end of an artificial week and take into account changing content at different times of day since each and every article published on that specific day will be taken into consideration. Although it could be argued that this approach leaves out significant developments of narrative following the initial event day, this is accounted for by the fact that the seventh day is analysed. Furthermore, all of the chosen events have a narrative leading up to them – be it the protests prior to Yanukovych's ousting or repeated fighting in the Eastern parts of Ukraine. Since RT’s English archive does not yield the full extent of the articles pub-lished including a certain keyword, Google’s search engine will be used in-stead. To find the relevant articles, the keywords consist of [Yanukovich; Cri-mea; Donetsk, Luhansk, etc.]. The search query for the annexation of Crimea, for instance, looks as follows: [site:www.rt.com crimea referendum], selecting the period from 18.03.2014 – 18.03.2014. Only articles whose main theme concerns the events in question will be considered.

4.4. Coding process

The purpose of this analysis is to identify patterns of frames used by RT English to justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine for the four events outlined above. In order to do so, a codebook involving several categories will be used

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to capture relevant data on those frames. The frames can be determined both, inductively, as well as deductively (Strauss, 1987). For this research, both will be used. An inductive determination of frames involves immersing oneself in the documents to find out which frames are prevalent. This process will then result in a number of categories that will be used to collect relevant quotes backing up the findings. The deductive determination of frames will consist of reviewing the literature to identify frames that that will likely be encountered during the analysis process. This so-called grounded theory approach helps systematise and thus validate the findings since the frames can be linked back to the theory (Berg, 2007, p. 312). This way, these hypotheses of frames likely to be found will be tested by the analysis and thus critically review and add to the existing theory. Are the frames suggested by the literature actually used? In what way? Are there any new frames to be found that are not covered by the literature? These are some of the questions this research project is aiming to answer. Frames are used to organise data and to identify findings that emerge from the coding process (ibid., p. 320). An axial coding or sorting pro-cess involves the creation of subsequent sub-categories to refine the analysed frames further and to identify more specific patterns. For example, in the case of Russia, it turned out to make sense to distinguish between different types of Anti-Western sentiments. Therefore, one main category can be named ‘Anti-West, while sub-categories further specify the specific narratives.

To analyse frames, it is critical to very clearly define the units of analysis and requirements for coding. These clarifications add to the validity and relia-bility of the findings since the approach will be more systematic and likely result in the same findings if conducted by the same coder repeatedly, or an-other coder altogether. Since the identification of frames largely depends on assessing and interpreting the context within which a certain argument is em-bedded, there is going to be a certain margin of error accounting for varying

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interpretations. Nevertheless, this can be taken into consideration and re-duced to a minimum by specifying very clearly how frames are understood. In order to locate the respective frames, three questions were defined:

1) What problem is defined in the text?

2) What is identified as the source of the problem?

3) What kind of moral judgement is given? 4) If available, what solution is being offered?

4.5. Description of main and sub-frames

Following an application of the three questions to an initial screening of the data including about 10% of the overall sample size, the following main frames were located: Anti-Ukraine, Anti-West, Moral Obligation, and Nationalism. Each of these main frames was then split up into several sub-categories. The frames found across the sample size are listed and briefly summarised below.

Anti-Ukraine: The Anti-Ukraine frame identified the Ukraine as a, if not the

main contributor to the outbreak and deterioration of the crisis. Sub-frames

include Illegitimate Ukrainian government, questioning the regime change brought

about as a result of the Maidan Revolution; Fascist/radical Ukrainians, pointing out right-wing extremists among Ukrainian pro-government protesters and within the government; Ukrainian violence, condemning Ukrainian-led violence in the country; as well as Ukrainian inability, an “other” category of sorts, col-lecting general anti-Ukrainian statements.

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Anti-West: The Anti-West frame targeted the West – mainly Europe and the

United States, as forces perpetuating violence and conflict in the country. Sub-frames include Moralism, claiming that the West attempts to expand towards the East; Anti-Russian politics, interpreting the West’s actions as motivated by anti-Russian sentiments; Negative influence, identifying Western actions as generally adverse to the political situation in Ukraine and elsewhere; as well as Hypocrisy, criticising Western actions by pointing out double standards with which these are associated.

Moral Obligation: The Moral Obligation frame is a general framing of the crisis

in a way that increases legitimacy for a Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine. Sub-frames include Protection of the people, mainly from Ukrainian

vio-lence, and Popular support, pointing out that a majority of the population in the

region supports Russia and wants to be independent of Kiev.

Nationalism: Nationalism aims at a nationalist narrative, tying the Ukraine

cri-sis to Russia directly. Sub-frames include Russians in Ukraine, making reference to the Russian minority in the East of Ukraine; Threat to Russia, whereby the Crisis is framed as a security concern for Russia; and Russian superiority, which points out the strengths and values of the Russian Federation, often in direct comparison to “others” – either Ukraine, or the West with a focus on the US.

Table 1: Overview over main frames and their construction.

Frames Problem Source Judgement Solution

Anti-Ukraine Ukrainian Crisis Ukrainian govern-ment, Ukrainians Undemo-cratic, fascist, Various

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As the above table illustrates, the judgement section largely correlates with the sub-frames that were identified in this analysis. The table shall serve as an overview over how the main frames are constructed, as well as a basis for further discussion in the following findings section. The final codebook

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consists of these frames, sub-frames, as well as of the date of the article, the title of the article, a link to the article and the respective frames. For instances that did not fit any of the previously established frames, an "Other" category was included. In the subsequent analysis section, the findings with regards to these frames will be discussed and elaborated on in more detail.

4.6. Inter-coder reliability check

Content analysis involves the systematic examination and interpreta-tion of a certain source with the goal of identifying patterns, themes, biases and meanings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Despite a systematic approach, con-tent analysis always involves some interpretation on the part of the respective coder. For this reason, a reliable measurement of the accuracy of the coding is crucial (Riffe et al. 2005). Reliability is largely dependent upon transparency and duplication: while the former has been touched upon in the previous sec-tion, an inter-coder reliability test shall give an idea of the extent to which the findings of this research can be replicated by other researchers. For this inter-coder reliability check, two other inter-coders with a comparable academic back-ground were familiarised with content and framing analysis in general, as well as the process outlined in this chapter. Following that, they were presented with a sample of the overall data and given the task to conduct the analysis. In agreement with Lombard et al. (2004), a 10% sample was chosen.

This inter-coder reliability check assesses two measures: sensitivity and

precision. The former, also called true positive rate (TPR), measures the extent

to which frames that have been identified in this research were correctly iden-tified by the other two coders. It is defined by dividing the amount of ideniden-tified

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positives by the overall amount of positives. It can also be calculated by divid-ing the true positives by the sum of true positives and false negatives (frames that should have been coded according to the research design, but which were not identified by the two other coders).

!"# =!"

" = !"/(!" + ())

The TPR came to 92% for coder 1 and 89% for coder 2. Precision (also known as positive predictive value, or PPV), on the other hand, measures the overall amount of coded frames and includes true positives, as well as false positives (elements of the text that were falsely identified as frames). It is cal-culated as follows:

""+ = !"/(!" + (")

The PPV came to 93% for coder 1 and 88% for coder 2. Overall, the inter-coder reliability check resulted in high rates for both, sensitivity and precision. For the purpose of this study, these results are more than acceptable and gives additional validity to the coded data of this research project. These findings of the analysis are going to be illustrated and discussed in more detail in the following section.

5. Analysis

The following analysis consists of all eight events for which the data has been collected. These events include the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych,

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the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Odessa fire, the Donetsk and Luhansk referendums, the Ukrainian elections, the renewed Western sanctions against Russia, the resolution of the Gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the Minsk II agreement. The total number of analysed articles amounts to 70, from which a total of 276 quotes were counted as frames. In the following sections, the various frames will be examined with the relevant quotes used to illustrate the findings. This chapter is further divided into a qualitative anal-ysis, elaborating the frequency of frames, and a subsequent discussion of the findings: the qualitative section is going to discuss the frames that were found in the articles and underline them with some exemplary quotes. The frequency of frames section is going to supplement these findings by taking a closer look at how many times which frame occurred, and the discussion section is going to link the findings back to the literature and draw some general conclusion about the data.

5.1. Qualitative analysis

As outlined in the research design, the discussed frames that are taken into consideration for this analysis are the result of an inductive look at the literature, as well as a deduction from the articles themselves. As outlined above, the deductive approach led to a total of five main frames. These have been named Anti-Ukraine (sub-frames illegitimacy, Ukrainian violence, fascism,

Ukrainian inability), Anti-West (Moralism, negative influence, hypocrisy), Moral Obli-gation (protection of the people, popular support), and Nationalism (Russian superior-ity, Russians in Ukraine). In the following sub-sections, these will be discussed

in more detail. Prior to that, however, this section shall reflect on some general findings from the analysed data pool. RT articles seek to frame the Ukrainian

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Crisis, not through blatant and obvious lies, but more so through a combina-tion of biased reporting, narrative-friendly comments and a lack of balancing opinions.

5.1.1. Anti-Ukraine

The Anti-Ukraine frame is characterised by RT’s description of the cri-sis on several delegitimating grounds. This delegitimation strategy of fram-ing the actions of the Ukrainian side in a negative way can be split up into four different sub-frames: the illegitimacy of the new government, the

Ukrainian-led violence against the opposition, fascism, and Ukrainian inability. The respective sub-frames thereby greatly depend on the event in question, as different narratives were found dependent on the subject.

The first of the four sub-frames refers to the events leading up to and following the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych as a result of the Maidan Revolution. The illegitimacy of the new Ukrainian interim government is re-peatedly underlined by stating that Yanukovych did not want to leave and was forced out of office and by stressing his status as a legitimately elected presi-dent1_{. The parliament’s decision to impeach him is considered “illegitimate”}

and the Maidan Revolution leading to the stepping down of Yanukovych are frequently described as a “violent coup d’état” or “opposition enforced” 2 3 4.

The legitimacy of the new Ukrainian government is further questioned by pointing out mass protests and public resistance to the Maidan Revolution,

1 RT. (2014a). ‘I’m not leaving’

2 RT. (2014b). Ukrainian parliament votes to strip Yanukovich of powers as president leaves Kiev.

3 RT. (2014c). Treaty to accept Crimea, Sevastopol to Russian Federation signed.

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further implying that the Maidan movement does “not represent the interests of the Ukrainian people”5_.

The second sub-frame with regards to an Anti-Ukrainian narrative fo-cuses on the notion that Ukrainian protesters, opposition forces and later gov-ernment members consist of radicals, fascists, nationalists and Nazis. As such, Ukrainian opposition forces are labelled as “nationalists” pledging to take up the fight against “communists, Jews and Russians”6. The interim government

in Kiev, too, is made up of “radical nationalists”, while pro-Maidan activists are frequently described as wearing radical right-wing insignia7_{. The narrative}

depicting Ukrainians as radical nationalists goes as far as drawing comparisons between the people’s revolution in Kiev to the “the rise of the Nazis in the 1930s” when “the Nazis came to power” to “ban the party, stalk, beat the people, burn down offices”. The Nazi comparisons are repeated at the event of the Odessa fire, where “radicals set fire to the Trade Unions House”, actions that are “reminiscent of the Nazis from whom the Ukrainian ultra-nationalists derive their ideological inspiration”8_.

The third common Anti-Ukrainian sub-frame found in RT articles about the crisis was Ukrainian violence. This variation of Anti-Ukrainian narrative frames the tragedy of warfare and violence in the country as being the sole fault of the pro-Ukrainian side. “Armed extremists and thugs” driving forward the deterioration of the armed conflict9. Ukrainian forces are blamed for

sev-eral incidents of violence where the focus is on the disproportionality of ac-tions: As such, the Ukrainian National Guard “started shooting at protesters

5_{RT. (2014e). 6 dead in Ukraine’s Odessa as pro- and anti-Maidan rallies clash.} 6_{RT. (2014f). 'I'll be fighting Jews and Russians till I die': Ukrainian right-wing militants} aiming for power.

7_{RT. (2014g). 41 people die after radicals set Trade Unions House on fire in Ukraine's} Odessa.

8_{RT. (2014h). US, EU’s support of Kiev’s tactics blocks peaceful resolution of Ukraine} crisis – Russia.

9_{RT. (2014a). ‘I’m not leaving’: Yanukovich accuses opposition of coup d’etat, calls on} EU to fulfill obligations.

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and voters”, killing “peaceful” civilians “for nothing” while “many are in shock” at the violence the population is facing from the pro-Ukrainian side10_.

Events such as the Odessa fire or Maidan protests are used to exemplify this violence, with the latter ending in numerous casualties due to a calculated “provocation” with the goal of turning a peaceful movement into a violent conflict11 12. This pattern of framing Ukrainians as violent is not limited to

individual incidents, however, but stretches to the narrative whereby Ukrain-ian forces are strategically launching missiles against “peaceful cities” and, thereby, violating international law13_.

The fourth and final Anti-Ukrainian sub-frame refers to a general

Ukrainian inability. This inability category can be understood as a general

criti-cism frame, whereby Russian-perceived Ukrainian failures are used to frame the country in a negative way. For instance, the failure of the April 17 Geneva agreement is attributed to “Kiev’s inability and unwillingness to fulfil these obligations”14_{. This and other cases of Russian criticism of Ukraine – another}

example being the “targeting” of journalists and Ukraine’s “denying access to events and information” – are used to present the country in a bad light, often in a context coinciding with major events, such as the Donetsk and Luhansk referendums15_{. During the gas crisis, Ukraine was accused of “trying just to}

run up a larger and larger gas bill every month and every year and finally de-fault” with the goal to “simply avoid paying Russia the money that it owed”16.

Since Ukraine is “broken” and its export industry collapsing, the government

10_{RT. (2014i). Fatalities, injuries in Ukraine's Krasnoarmeysk as national guards open} fire.

11_{RT. (2014j). 2 killed in shooting near Crimea military research center.}

12_{RT. (2014k). 39 people die after radicals set Trade Unions House on fire in Ukraine's} Odessa.

13_{RT. (2014l). Moscow: US will feel ‘tangible losses’ from ‘destructive, myopic’} sanctions.

14_{RT. (2014h). US, EU’s support of Kiev’s tactics blocks peaceful resolution of Ukraine crisis –} Rus-sia.

15_{RT. (2014m). Confirmed: Italian journalist killed in Eastern Ukraine.} 16_{RT. (2014n). ‘Europe to pay for the whole mess in Ukraine’.}

Legitimation showdown : how is the Russian online media framing the Ukrainian crisis in front of a global audience? : the case of the English-service RT