The Multiplied Character - Narrative Possible Worlds and Viewer Interpretation

University Van Amsterdam

The Multiplied Character

Narrative Possible Worlds and Viewer Interpretation

Benjamin Collier Thesis © 15th _{June 2016}

Contents Introduction – p.3 Chapter One – p.10 Chapter Two – p.21 Chapter Three – p.32 Conclusion – p.43

● An Introduction To The Multiplied Character: Historical Context and Possible Worlds ◦ The Individual Being or The Multiplied One?

In the closing act of the 2006 Christopher Nolan mystery-thriller film, The Prestige, the character Robert Angier utters a revelation before dying. Speaking of a cloning device he has used on himself multiple times, he says: “It took courage to climb into that machine every night... not knowing... if I'd be the man in the box... or the prestige.” After his death the camera slowly pans out to reveal one hundred glass illusionist magic boxes, each containing one of his drowned clones. In the grand scheme of the film, and this thesis, Angier’s final words are paramount, as they implicitly set up both an ominous truth and a paradoxical challenge: that of how an individual being might also exist in a multiplied form.

This issue of multiple states of being specifically in narrative characters is central to this thesis. However, to discuss the historical context of this challenge, I must first explore the broader philosophical position of communality of individual beings. States of being have been examined by many disciplines, including, but not limited to, philosophy, sociology, narratology, etc., with different branches of theory often arguing that either an individual or collective (specifically communal) form of being is predominant over the other. The historical context of this contention between the individual and communal state of being might be identified from metaphysical philosophical arguments, e.g. Confucianism, which places harmony of the community above the individual need (Chan and Chan 2), or, in contrast, Libertarianism, which places the individual person before the collective community (Mack 1).

Both these philosophies rely on striking a balance between states of communal or individual being, as though they were opposites. Neither challenge the presumption that the states are in conflict, or question either states' existence: they merely argue that either one or the other is more important (McGowan “The Presence of Phenomenology” 1). As Todd McGowan says of

metaphysical debate: “The very possibility of metaphysical speculation – speculation about foundations – depends on the acceptance of a division within being” (“The Presence of

Phenomenology” 1). In other words, metaphysical analysis expects a division between these two states of being – the individual and communal state – to exist in order to establish its arguments. Were the individual and communal state not divided in this way it becomes possible to consider the states as not necessarily conflicting. Rather, through a concurrent viewing they might also be regarded as one and the same – the individual and communal being becoming inseparable. Now,

there is an issue with the theory here in so-much-as the metaphysical discussions thus far have been wholly concerned with the communal individual, not the multiplied individual. The difference is the communal's failure to address the part that make the whole – the individual, while the “multiplied” recognises the divisions of the individual that might take place. Deconstruction is needed to realise this difference, and helps us understand why the sum of the individual's states of being might not yet have been fully analysed. However, deconstruction alone cannot propagate the problem of what a multiplied being might be as it also requires the metaphysical to establish the issue. This makes both metaphysical discussion, and the deconstruction of metaphysics, paramount when considering the multiplicity of being, or, in regards to this thesis, when considering the multiplicity of character being.

To put this dual use of metaphysics and deconstruction into practice, we might analyse the metaphysical positions of communality of individual beings presented earlier through

deconstruction and expose a multiplied state of being in the process. Namely, the historical context of the multiplied being, and examples used so far in this respect, might be deconstructed through the phenomenological and analysed against one another to support the argument that the individual and multiplied state of being are both one and the same, and also separate entities, at once.

◦ Breaking Down The Historical Context of The Multiplied Character It might be argued that metaphysical philosophies, such as Libertarianism and Confucianism, use the notion of absolute knowledge to tackle the communal state of being. “Absolute knowledge”, as defined here by a reliance on, and acceptance of, ideas that are presupposed and remain undisputed (McGowan “The Presence of Phenomenology” 1), may be challenged through deconstruction. “Deconstruction”, a branch of phenomenology pioneered by Derrida, is the radical critique of fundamental categories of Western thought through exploration of their construction in and by discourses (Dombrowski 5, Culler 927). Therefore, in this thesis, in terms of the historical context of the individual and multiplied being challenge, the notion that individual and multiplied forms of being are in conflict might be considered both absolute

knowledge and part of a metaphysical discourse, and might be broken down. As such, I return to the examples of Confucianism and Libertarianism to challenge this absolute knowledge form. Both philosophies regard the individual and collective (grouped individual beings, or multiplied individuals) to exist, however each places emphasis on one or the other. I will now explain, beginning with Confucianism.

Confucianism focuses on the collective harmony of a community (Chan and Chan 1). In regards to the philosophy's tension between the collective and the individual, Chan and Chan note that “authority to lead is not merely externally justified but also internally constituted by a mutual commitment from both sides – the ruler’s commitment to care for the people and the people’s willing acceptance” (Chan and Chan 2). While the collective community is paramount here, this philosophy also relies on the individual will of the leader. When it is taken into account that the leader, or leaders, are also part of the community, a duality of states between the individual leader and the collective community comes to the fore. A point which lends weight to the argument that Confucianism accepts divisions within being as an absolute form of knowledge (McGowan “The Presence of Phenomenology” 1). This is not too different from the individualist argument, where the issue is tackled from the opposite side.

Libertarianism presupposes that “individuals have strong moral claims to the peaceful enjoyment of their own person and their own legitimate extra-personal possessions along with similarly strong claims to the fulfilment of their voluntary agreements with others” (Mack 1). The individual, and liberty of the individual here, is paramount. Nonetheless, by holding the individual as a structural foundation to its argument, Libertarianism allows individuals to interact and

voluntarily enter into contracts with other individuals when it so mutually benefits them (Mack 1); theoretically forming a collective by consensus. What this shows once more is the somewhat paradoxical argument of the individual both operating alone and as part of a multiple form at once, and another example of a metaphysical philosophy relying on a presupposed divide between the individual and a form of collective, when in fact they are one and the same.

While these two metaphysical philosophies display a presupposed balance of conflicting states internal to themselves, when analysed in unison, the paradoxical equal importance of the individual and communal being might be exposed. It is the very contrasting nature of the two philosophies that allows for such a multiplied state of being to exist between them. When the philosophies are observed as being true in unison, neither the individual or communal being might exist as a derivative of the other, and can only be considered as equally valid states of being which exist at once, occupying the same space – a somewhat paradoxical argument. How can two, seemingly opposing states of being occupy the same space of existence at once? With only the metaphysical to answer, there indeed remains a gap. The metaphysical here becomes hampered by its observance of absolute knowledge – there always being contradiction given its acceptance of the presupposed belief that the two states are opposing. Both examples above adhere to an absolute

understanding in their acceptance of these divisions of being, without question – they cannot answer this problem.

To analyse the paradox we must step outside metaphysics and employ a different

philosophical branch, phenomenological deconstruction, as has been done above. Deconstructing the philosophies together exposes the paradox of the individual and communal states' simultaneous existence, allowing it to be tackled (Fuchs and Ward 508). In support of the argument for the use of phenomenology, McGowan argues, “phenomenology takes as its point of departure the

metaphysical failure to address the priority of experience in its understanding of being. Metaphysics begins with questions of knowledge about being and never questions how being arises as a possible object of knowledge” (“The Presence of Phenomenology” 2). According to McGowan, metaphysics is flawed through its failure to understand the importance of the questions it asks about states of being, instead jumping to analyse the being itself. However, the presence of the question might be engaged by phenomenological deconstruction – giving us an understanding of the paradox's existence, if not an understanding of the paradox itself.

With an employment of both metaphysics and phenomenological deconstruction in mind, I can now discuss the conditions of the paradox of seemingly opposite states of individual and multiplied character being occupying the same theoretical space in unison. I might then question the structure of such a multiplied state, and how it arises in the context of narrative characters.

◦ Using Possible Worlds to Establish Multiplied States of Being in Narrative Characters

As a means to help us further analyse how a multiplied state of individual character

existence might occur, I now turn to Umberto Eco's narratological “possible worlds” (Eco 246). Eco has claimed that narrative texts act as “machine[s] for producing possible worlds” (246). Narrative “possible worlds” are liminal spaces that are contained and created by human imagination, and drawn into being through all the possible developments in narratives that might take place (Ryan “From Parallel Universes” 644). They can be broken down into three types, as follows:

1. The possible worlds imagined and asserted by the author. These worlds correspond to all the states of the fabula [fabula being the narrative construct].

2. The possible subworlds that are imagined, believed, wished, and so on by the characters of the fabula.

3. The possible worlds that, at every disjunction of probability, the Model Reader imagines, believes, wishes, and so on, and that further states of the fabula must either approve or disapprove. (Ryan “Possible Worlds” 19-22)

By definition then, these possible worlds would contain all and every narrative conceivable. This is the case when the space inhabited by any narrative becomes a possible world once drawn into existence by one of the three rules stated above. Bringing this to point, Marie-Laurie Ryan writes that “a fiction is not just a non actual possible world; it is a complete modal system centered around its own actual world” (“From Parallel Universes” 646). In essence, every narrative possible world becomes a peripheral world to every other, all existing in unison. Any fictional world acts as center to a periphery; it is never peripheral to its own possible world, however might be peripheral to other possible worlds. This allows for narratives to be universalized, given they might all exist peripherally to other narratives: an argument that makes any narrative eligible to display instances of multiplicity. To support this, Ryan adds: “the foundation of PW [possible world] theory is the idea that reality—now conceived as the sum of the imaginable rather than as the sum of what exists —is a universe composed of a plurality of distinct worlds” (“From Parallel Universes” 644). The universalizing of narrative possible worlds allows for Eco's three theoretical “narrative possible world” points to be enacted across all narratives.

Narrative possible worlds that exhibit duplicated aspects – i.e. possible worlds from the same stimulus but displaying divergence in interpretation (for example: a story written by an author and interpreted differently by a reader) complicates the narrative universe, as they paradoxically occupy the same possible world space at once. The second part of Ryan's quote goes some way to answer this paradox, as she argues for a “plurality of distinct worlds” existing at the same time. Ryan's argument here perhaps contradicts her proposal of a narrative “universe” existing, instead it suggests a narrative “multiverse.” The difference between the multiverse and the universe being that the narrative universe allows binary possible worlds to exist alongside one another, while the multiverse encompasses infinite possible worlds as entwined. The space inhabited by possible worlds in a narrative universe might not be the same, even if these worlds are carbon copies of one another, while in a multiverse, the worlds might be the same and also inhabit the same space, using multiple iterations of the same universe to achieve this. This is an important point when analysing contrary states of character being existing in unison, as opposing arguments – like that of the individualist and collectivist type – seek to occupy the same theoretical space at once, not similar

spaces side-by-side.

To argue in favour of the proposition of this narrative multiverse, we might examine what happens when pluralized possible worlds inhabiting the same space interact with other versions of themselves. To explain this, I now turn to a quantum physics problem: the Schrödinger's cat

paradox. The cat paradox entails a cat being secured in a crate along with a uranium atom that has a 50% probability of decaying within a certain time span. The unstable nature of the quantum

phenomenon makes it impossible to predict the decay. If the decay were to take place a mechanism would be triggered to kill the cat. The multiple states of being paradox comes into existence here as, before observation by a third party, the atom will exist in both a state of decay and a state of non-decay – thus, the cat would both be alive and dead at the same time (Ryan “From Parallel

Universes” 639). Only once observed would the cat's state of existence be fixed as either dead or alive. The paradox may be understood through the realization that the atom, or quantum particle, can exist in multiple states across multiple iterations of the same universe – a multiverse. It may decay in one universe but not in another – the cat is dead in one world but not the other. Only once observed in either world does the particle (and the cat) take on one state or the other: while up until that point it exists across the two planes in both states simultaneously (Ryan “From Parallel

Universes” 639). Observance behaves as a key arbitrator to the cat's finally determined state, with viewer participation playing a vital role in shifting the state of being one way or the other.

In the context of this thesis, the narrative character takes the place of the cat prior to observance, and therein is able to exist in multiple states at once. The viewer, or observer, of a narrative becomes key to understanding the state that a narrative cements itself in. For some

narratives and narrative genres, this cemented state is easy to determine, while for others – ones that intentionally skew the form of observance that can take place – this is not so simple. This thesis aims to focus on the latter type of narrative, exploring what happens when observance is unclear and/or altered with intent. A triptych of narrative mediums will be used to this effect: film, text and game. To specify, I will consider what the effects of possible world analogy are on a character's constructed consciousness when they meet their “other self” or selves from multiplied narrative possible worlds: a concept that, for the purposes of this thesis, shall be defined as the “multiplied character.”

The first chapter of this thesis will analyse the film The Prestige, deconstructing the use of mirrored characters, and use of non-linear narratives to create characters that might exist in transient forms of being. It will be argued that the film viewer's observation, as in Schrödinger's cat paradox,

alters character's states of being, and that through partial observance there might only be a partially set state of being. I will explore in depth the character Robert Angier, looking at how Angier exists as a multiplied being and how he might be considered, even after-death, as both a singular being and a multiplied one at once.

The second chapter will analyse the game BioShock Infinite and the effects of what happens when a multiplied character understands their own multiple state of being, and is aware of the possible worlds in the narrative fabula. Here too, I will examine how the viewer (player) becomes embroiled within the game world – the outcomes of player observations and choices leading to altered interpretations of the world that they interact with. The constants and variables between the differing possible worlds will be important for interpretation here, with a study of what differences between the various tangents of the narrative fabula entail and how certain things remain the same while others change, effecting the player's choices, or lack thereof, and their further interpretations of the world.

The third chapter will analyse the play Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, arguing that the characters within the play act as mirrors both to one another and to the play, Hamlet, as a result forming multiplied beings both between characters and between the two plays. I will also argue that, given that no character can realize their own death, no character can actually die within the confines of the narrative, it becoming impossible for a character to end their multiplied state of being. The only form of death the narrative allows is representative death, with characters merely being able to observe other characters portraying dying through performance, discussion, narration, etc. but unable to actually die, giving way to a situation where, once again, the narrative characters of the play always exist in a multiplied form. Now, to begin, I turn to The Prestige, and to transient states of being, arguing that a character might exist in multiplied states beyond the confines of the narrative fabula constructed by the author.

1 Transient States of Being in The Prestige

1.1 The Mirrors and Sacrifices of Angier's Multiplied State

The Prestige, a 2006 Christopher Nolan film, tells the tale of two stage illusionists, Robert

Angier and Alfred Borden, caught in a battle of one-upmanship to create the greater magic trick through whatever means necessary. As a part of this battle both have duplicates of themselves. Borden having a twin, with whom he trades places, and Angier discovering a means by which to clone himself. Bhatnager expands on this, saying that,

[…] duality is a recurring theme in the narrative. Angier and Borden were two sides of the same coin. Borden’s working class origins contrasted to Angier’s privileged upbringing. The movie describes a magician as comprising two parts, the technician and the showman. Borden, talented at understanding the gimmicks behind the tricks, is clearly the technician. Angier, lacking intuition, is gifted with pizazz and flair.” (Bhatnagar 276-277)

Angier and Borden also have mirrors in the narrative world around them, from the women they love, to the magic tricks they choose to display. The struggle between the two is mirrored in the enigmatic character Nikola Tesla, who is presented as being in the midst of a (near magical) battle of electricity with his own rival, Thomas Edison (Bhatnagar 276-277). Given this mirroring between Angier and Tesla, the latter actually provides a key to understanding Angier, albeit easily missed, within their discussion of obsessions:

Angier: Hasn't good come of your obsessions?

Tesla: Well, at first. But I followed them too long. I'm their slave... and one day they'll choose to destroy me.

Angier: If you understand an obsession, then you know you won't change my mind. (The

Prestige)

In this short exchange everything that might be known about Angier, and the feud between Borden and him, is revealed. Tesla shows willingness to sacrifice his reputation and his comforts, a great portion of who he is, for the sake of his obsessions – a point Angier picks up on and echoes to the extreme. As Bhatnager suggests the “characters’ obsessions eventually lead to their demise as

they sacrifice everything” (276). The characters are drawn into a loop of repeated obsessive

sacrifice, and to this respect, the film's use of sacrifice entrenches a multiplied gesture in the eyes of the viewer. The viewer literally observes recurrent sacrifice and so it stacks up as something that cannot be taken singularly, without intention. To name but a few sacrificial moments: Borden's accidental sacrifice of Angier's wife for the sake of a magic trick, the sacrifice of freedom undertaken by Borden in his subservience to living a half life with his twin, or the final, most terrible scene of the film, where Angier reveals the truth of his The Real Transported Man magic trick. Namely, that Angier was not transporting himself in a spatial sense, but was actually cloning himself, with the clones appearing across the space, and then killing his clones (or himself) in the process so that only one of him remained. We are reminded many times what these characters are willing to sacrifice to meet their goals, and by the final scene of the film sacrifice has become a gesture so broad that it is impossible to ascribe to one single meaning.

This pervasive theme of sacrifice, along with the non-linear elements of the narrative structure, manipulates the viewer's observance of the characters, potentially allowing them to appear in multiple states of being throughout the film and even after its end. To argue for multiplied states of character being in the film I will discuss sacrifice and its repetitions, exploring the use and manipulation of time in the narrative. This will be expanded through analysis of flashbacks, flash forwards, and non-contextual elements of the narrative (scenes that don't fit in with what else is shown to the viewer at that moment, i.e. the use of top hat visuals to engage meaning), and will be concluded with a study of drowning and the narrative divide. The character of Angier becomes specifically of interest because of how he is doubly multiplied both by the clones he creates and the film's manipulation of the narrative structure. As such, I now turn to focus on him, and argue for his multiplied state of being, both within and without the film's narrative.

1.2 Is Angier Ever Truly A Singular Being?

Angier's use of clones convolutes the film's multiplying effect on him, so-much-so that it becomes impossible to pin him to any one particular interpretation. By the end of the film, the film's viewers, while presented with a visual “prestige” – the moment when a magic trick climaxes, are left guessing as to whether Angier truly has met his end. Whether he dies is an important question if his multiplicity of being might be confirmed, given that, were he set to one form of interpretation (that of death), he might become fixed to a singular state of being. The final scene of the film, as

discussed in this thesis's introduction, shows this moment of “prestige”. The scene begins with Borden confronting Angier and shooting him. However, Angier does not die instantly, giving the men a chance to talk. The conversation goes as follows, with Borden revealing his secret twin and the life they shared, and ends with Angier's death, after which the camera pulls out to reveal his dead clones:

Borden: Sacrifice, Robert - that's the price of a good trick. But you wouldn't know anything about that, would you?

Angier: I've - I've made sacrifices. Yes.

Borden: It takes nothing to steal another man's work. Angier: It takes everything.

(we see a flashback of Angier killing the clone of himself while doing The Real Transported

Man trick)

Angier: It took courage... it took courage to climb into that machine every night... not knowing... if I'd be the man in the box... or the prestige. Do you want - want to see. What it cost me? Y-you didn't see where you are, did you? Look. Look.

Borden: Look here... you went halfway around the world. You spent a fortune. You did terrible things... really terrible things, Robert. And all for nothing.

Angier: For nothing? Borden: Yeah.

Angier: You never understood... why we did this? The audience knows the truth - the world is simple... miserable... solid all the way through. But if you could fool them, even for a second, then you can make them wonder. And then you... then you got to see something very special. You really don't know? It was... it was the look on their faces.

(The Prestige)

Angier, by the end of this scene is observed by the viewer as dead, however, this is not where his character ends. He still exists in multiple states of being, brought about by the narrative manipulations and the possible worlds that spring into existence at every turn. To break down some of these states: there is the present state of being – the Angier who converses with Borden in the narrative present. There are the dead Angier clones, which exist within the present space but are passive. There is Angier's mirror in Borden, who lives on after Angier's finally viewed death. And there is the mirror of Tesla, who's character is not present, yet has prefigured the scene in his own

life and words. Then there are transient states of being, beings that exist in parallel times, spaces, and metaphoric spaces to the scene, and which are dictated by flashbacks, possible worlds, and flash forwards. These transient states are innumerable, and are existent, at least in part, because of the sacrifices made by the present beings of Angier, and also because of his clones' existence (Bhatnagar 276). In cloning himself Angier extends traditional notions of self and other, and complicates his state of being. By the end of the film it has become impossible to know whether there is yet another Angier/clone alive – one who potentially sacrificed the man shot by Borden in the closing scene so he might live on instead.

To explain Angier's multiplied state of being, I return to Schrödinger's cat paradox. First, to draw parallels between the cat paradox and The Prestige, it might be noted that all Angier's on-screen clones exist in glass boxes (save for the first clone he makes, which is killed by Angier's gunfire immediately). This might be comparable to the cat's transient existence within a box, especially since the only other living object cloned by Angier's machine is a cat. In the film's fabula both the cat and boxed Angier exist to be observed – with discovery of the cat cloned by Tesla signalling to Angier, and the film's audience, that the cloning device works, and a boxed Angier discovered and observed by Borden setting up what is, conversely, both the beginning and end scenes of the film – Angier's death, in one form or another. Observance is key here. Only once Schrödinger's cat was observed did its state of being settle into a singular form: that of death. In the same sense, when Borden finds Angier's clones in boxes – when he observes them – the film's audience does so as well. For all intent and purpose, to both the film's viewers and the other

characters, the dead Angiers that Borden observes are the only present Angier left. However, due to the narrative's non-linear elements, the act is repeated – the dead Angier is brought back to life multiple times to remain in a transient state of being.

Angier remains transient throughout the film, right up to the final scene, where the present Angier (the final known version of Angier to exist) becomes the last to be seen alive by the film's audience or the other characters. After Borden and the audience observe him, he dies. This is echoed in his dying words, where he says, “the audience knows the truth – the world is simple... miserable... solid all the way through.” In this, he speaks both of his stage audience and the film's audience. Once he is observed by them, once the trick is complete, he potentially returns to one present state – that of death. One cannot help but wonder as a viewer though whether you have seen the whole trick, or whether some things still remain unobserved. The film's non-linear elements, and Angier's use of clones, leaves significant doubt as to whether the final Angier observed really was

the last one living – the audience is never given the whole story. So, how can they be sure of his death, and consequently his singular state of being? It is specifically the knowledge gained through observance, or lack thereof, that defines the states that remain. As McGowan says, “The

accumulation of knowledge […] does not lead to the mastery of death, but rather to the ultimate confrontation with it” (“The Presence of Phenomenology” 8). The audience, through gaining knowledge from what they do observe, realise they might never master what they can't observe, that is “death”, or Angier's possible deaths, and come to understand they might only confront it.

Through observing observance, as the audience does when they watch Borden's discoveries of the boxed Angiers, they realise that that might never observe Angier's true death, given his multiplied form of being. Instead, the viewer is forced to confront Angiers' final viewed death as multiple and realise that they can never know for certain whether all cloned versions of him have died or not. This uncertainty in observance raises questions as to whether the after-death state of being might regarded as a multiplied form, when including Angier's transient states of being, or potentially as a singular one, if they are excluded. The after-death state of being, and variable states it might hold, will now be discussed.

1.3 Non-Linear Top Hats, and The After-Death State as Both a Singular and Multiplied Being

Duplicated Top hats - The Prestige

Angier's state of existence after-death has been described in the previous section as

be possible, I look to the film's three repeated camera shots of top hats. The shot of the top hats appear at the beginning and end of the film, and shows a panning shot of a pile of black top hats scattered in a woodland. There is also a third shot of the hats seen in the middle of the film, where Angier discovers them – this is the only shot of the hats seen in the narrative's present, the other two shots are a flash forward and flash back. We shall return to this middle shot, but first I will discuss those at the beginning and end.

The beginning shot of the hats is narrated by a single sentence: “Are you watching closely?” While at the end, the shot is blended with the dead Angiers in the glass boxes, and is narrated with a longer phrase: “Now you're looking for the secret. But you're not going to find it, because of course, you're not really looking. You don't really want to work it out. You want to be fooled.” The

difference between the shots, and their narration, is the knowledge gained through the viewer's observance of the film. The audience can ascribe little meaning to the first set of hats seen. However, in retrospect, when they are shown the final hat shot, the importance of their first

observation becomes clear – they have known all along that the hats, and therefore the clones, exist. It is only through observance, and a willingness to interpret, that the connection is made. This is made clear in the narration of the end shot. The narrative expects the viewer to make the link between the hats and the dead Angiers, but it also knows the viewer wants to avoid making this connection as it bring the viewer into confrontation with, rather than a mastery of, Angier's death (McGowan “The Presence of Phenomenology” 8). By ignoring the presence of the hats the audience is able to envisage Angier's singular state of being – they observe him dead, and so he must be dead. However, to do so disregards the transient nature of the hat shot. A point which allows Angier's being to work contrary to the single state after-death, as I shall explain.

What the hat shots show is the manipulation of time in the narrative. The hats exist in the present, in the middle of the narrative, where they are discovered by Angier during the testing of the cloning device. However, the presence of the hats at the beginning and end of the narrative

contradict the plot's timeline, making it non-linear. This alters the way in which the hats might be regarded by a viewer, as they can be considered to sit outside of time in the traditional sense. If we read Angier's final death through the narrative's timeline, rather than as a single presence, it

becomes clear that potential transient states of being he might exist in remain relevant. In this scenario, the deathly state of being works contrary to reason – Angier is not simply dead in a singular sense, he remains alive in a multiplied form, like the hats do, across the narrative. What the hats do here is instil doubt on the part of the viewer, opening up questions as to the certainty they

have in what they are observing. Doubt defines audience interpretation. While the film offers the single state of death to the audience as a potential possible world, it does not allow for a single state of being reading to be wholly acceptable, due to the presence of the hats. This is the case as, in death, Angier might be singular in the present, but remain transient in the narrative, as the hats do – we see him killed multiple times, but he repeatedly returns. The presence of the hats at the end suggests he continues to exist in one form or another, whether that be a living clone, as a transient audience imagined possible world character, or as both. The states themselves are split between the singular and the multiplied form – he dies and he does not die. In a sense, he remains partly

unobserved. To further support this I return to the theme of sacrifice.

As already discussed, Angier, in sacrificing his clones every single time one appears, makes his death an event seen over and over, both by the film's audience and the other characters. By the end of the film, where the film's viewers observe all the dead Angiers in their glass boxes, they are mentally returned to the acts of killing – they see Angier drowning as Borden saw him drowning. The viewer observes, and sees the consequences of observance, at once: they see the dead Angiers, but also create a new possible world each time they imagine, believe, etc. a divergence in the narrative (Ryan “Possible Worlds” 19-22). The very acts of partial observance and audience

interpretation, when put together, develop a multiplied state of being. The partial observance sets in a partial absolute – the film's viewer sees Angier dead. However, the interpretation they make of it, along with what they do not observe, cancels the absolute out, and allows him to also remain alive. As McGowan says:

According to the logic set forth by The Prestige, the idea of time as linear forward motion is the effect of an illusion – or of illusion as such – and it serves to disguise the role that sacrifice or work plays in the process of creation. A genuinely new creation is possible, but the source of this creation is not, as we tend to think, the forward motion of time. Instead, The

Prestige makes clear that the source of the new is the repetition of sacrifice. Rather than

lifting us beyond sacrifice and loss, the genuinely new creation always has the ultimate effect of returning us to the experience of loss. (“The Fictional Christopher Nolan” 104)

Through the repeated act of sacrifice there is always something new created by the film. However, rather than shifting the viewer to realise a new singular state beyond Angier's death, it always draws them back to a new form of the same death – a new possible world. There is no escape from

sacrificial acts draws them into the ultimate confrontation with his death, as they both see him die, and imagine otherwise (McGowan “The Presence of Phenomenology” 8). In this, it can be seen that time, and the manipulation of time in the narrative, are fundamental to the idea that Angier might exist after-death both as a singular present state and also as a transient multiplied one.

From a reading of the after-death Angier as transient, the prospect of multiplied states of being becomes clearer, as the character might exist in multiple instances of himself across both time and space. This is certainly the case in The Prestige, where time is not always linear, and the characters exist in multiplied states, both in a single moment and across multiple moments in time. How this non-linear narrative state brings about its effect, this chapter shall now explore in closer detail.

1.4 The Narrative Divide in The Prestige and The Divergence of Audience Interpretation The non-linear structure of The Prestige might be broken down by an understanding of the narrative divide that takes place within the film. This divide allows the film's viewers to observe and interpret the film in separate spheres from each other, giving them the ability to formulate possible worlds that are transient to the narrative presented by the author. To explain the divide I turn to the film's use of drowning.

The act of drowning plays a significant role throughout the film, alongside the theme of sacrifice. Drowning is seen at the film's opening, in a flash forward, where Angier is found by Borden, drowning in the glass magic box. The act is repeated, almost instantly, in the narrative present of the story, with Angier's wife, Julia, accidentally drowning when a magic trick goes wrong. These two scenes, viewed separately, make little in the way of concrete sense to the film's viewer, compelling them to interpret the scenes together. This is the case because the opening shot of Angier drowning appears non-contextually to the viewer – there is no way for a new audience member to watch the film and know the man drowning in the box is the husband of the woman who will drown a minute later. Only after seeing the context of Julia dying in the next scene, with Angier attempting to revive her, can it be understood that the drownings are linked. Nonetheless, even after seeing the scenes together, the question still remains as to how Angier ended up drowning in a glass magic box the same way as his wife did. This is the point in the narrative when the viewer's

Angier Drowning while Borden Watches – The Prestige

The film's non-linear elements force the viewer to consider things out of context through a use of partial observance – the audience must then interpret to make sense of the narrative world they are given. For example, the viewer is led to believe that, intentionally or otherwise, Borden killed Angier's wife by tying the wrong magic knot so she could not escape the water filled magic box. Through this, the audience might make a connection to Angier's death, which Borden watches (seen by the viewer moments before Julia's death). Borden is summarily put on trial for just that crime, confirming the audience's possible world. However, this is an interpretive path the audience is intentionally led down by the author. Angier being killed by Borden remains a tangent world to the author's narrative, as is exposed as the film progresses, and it is shown that Borden did not kill the Angier in the magic box – the divergence comes from the narrative double bluff: the partial observance.

To bring the narrative divide back to possible worlds, I return to Eco's theory. The first (possible worlds created by the author) and third (possible worlds created by the viewer) rules come into play here, and they tangle with each other. The author of the film, Nolan, intentionally pushes the viewer to initiate the third rule, when he offers disjunctures through partial observance. It is impossible for the viewer to watch the opening shot of the hats, then the first Angier drowning, and then Angier's wife drowning, without a train of interpretation evolving in their mind. These

interpretive divergences have potential to work contrary to what comes later in the narrative constructed by Nolan, as the viewer has already inadvertently created a tangent possible world to the one that will be asserted by the author – setting up the possibility for possible worlds to form. If the film's narrative was linear, this would likely still happen, but in the case of non-linearity it is

virtually impossible for the viewer not to realise their own possible worlds.

On one side of the narrative divide then, we might see a diegetic narrative form – that which originates with the author, while on the other we might see a deconstructive narrative form – that undertaken by the viewer through interpretation. This might be seen in the same way as

metaphysics and phenomenology are divided, as discussed in this thesis's introduction. With rule one – the author's diegetic narrative, acting as an absolute metaphysical form of analysis, and rule three – the deconstructive narrative, acting as a phenomenological form of analysis that might break the former down. This is true in so far as the metaphysical (rule one) form only answers a question it poses, while the phenomenological (rule three) form can ask what the question means, as

McGowan has also suggested about the difference between metaphysics and phenomenology. The two narrative rules, though coming from the same narrative, are essentially

incompatible, as the viewer's possible worlds will always be branching contrary threads to the one instilled by an author's diegetic narrative. This is a position that allows the Angier at the end of the film to exist in a multiplied form – he is observed as dead, but the audience, through forced

interpretation earlier in the film, might not be able to accept this as fact. The viewer is compelled by the narrative divide – the difference between rule one and rule three – to realise multiple arguments as to Angier's state of being. As explained before, the very fact that the film creates the web of non-linear narratives around Angier's clones, makes it impossible to know if the viewer's observation of his deaths is complete – it is impossible to know if the final Angier seen is the final Angier killed – in no way is his state of being fixed: he remains a multiplied character. The fact that audience interpretation and observation can diverge makes it clear that the film's narrative characters might be regarded by their viewers in a multitude of states of being at once. The sacrificial element of the narrative observed in The Prestige, and the way in which this tangles with the non-linear narrative and Angier's use of clones, makes Angier a perfect candidate to show that a character might exist in a multiplied state of being.

To conclude this chapter then, the argument for Angier's multiplied state of being has been seen in the analysis of mirroring between Angier and Tesla, among others, and the repeated acts of sacrifice committed across the film – from Angier's repeated deaths, to those of the wider narrative world. It being shown, through the use of repeated flash-forwards and flash-backs with a shot of top hats, and drownings, that doubt instilled in the audience's observation of the film allows for

narrative tangents and possible worlds to bloom in their interpretations of the film, setting in motion undeniable multiple states in which the characters, especially Angier, might exist in.

Audience observation, partial-observation and interpretation complicates characters existing post-death. As has been seen with Angier, that is certainly the case, whereby he might be argued to exist both in a singular and multiplied state at once. Challenges might be raised through this

“singular and multiplied state of being” contention, as to how an after-death character may actually live on, both in the mind of the viewer and within the narrative fabula. As such, this thesis now turns to its second object, the game Bioshock Infinite and it's characters, the Lutece twins, extending the after-death complication through exploration of the game mechanics and player participation.

2 Character's Aware of Their Multiplied Being and Possible World Construction Through Player Interaction in BioShock Infinite

2.1 The Lutece Twins and Existing Across Time

The Lutece Twins – BioShock Infinite

Halfway through the 2013 video game, BioShock Infinite, the main character of the game, Booker Dewitt, who the player controls, stumbles across the Lutece twins digging their own graves. The pair are dead, having been murdered before the game's observable narrative began, but they are also alive, digging their graves. They exist in both states at once, while also existing as neither. In this scene, Booker asks his companion, Elizabeth, whether Lady Comstock, the antagonist's wife, is dead or alive. The Lutece twins interrupt, and provide this paradoxical answer:

Booker: What is she, alive or dead? Robert Lutece: Why do you ask “what?”

Rosalind Lutece: When the delicious question is “when?” Robert: The only difference between past and present... Rosalind: ...is semantics.

Robert: Lives, lived, will live. Rosalind: Dies, died, will die.

Robert: If we could perceive time as it truly was...

Rosalind: ...what reason would grammar professors have to get out of bed? Robert: Like us all, Lady Comstock lives across time.

Rosalind: She's both alive and dead. Robert: She perceives being both.

Rosalind: She finds this condition... disagreeable. Robert: Perception without comprehension... Rosalind: ...is a dangerous combination. (BioShock Infinite)

The character the Lutece twins refer to, Lady Comstock, is dead in the present game world. However, another version of her has been brought through from a different possible world, utilizing a tear (a doorway) between worlds in the narrative's fabula. The Lutece twins themselves failed to be killed because of a similar effect: the result of a cross-world machine scattering them in, what Rosalind Lutece calls, “the possibility space.” What is of particular interest here is what Robert Lutece says, namely that Lady Comstock “lives across time,” rather than simply in a present state of it. Importantly, like in The Prestige, it is the perception and comprehension of time on the part of the viewer (player) that matters in BioShock Infinite, with time's manipulation leading to multiplied states of being becoming possible at once. Knowledge of the manipulation by the game's characters means that within the narrative world of the game, one version of a character might be pulled from another possible world and drawn into the present game space. To explain, I turn to rule two of Eco's possible world theory:

2. The possible subworlds that are imagined, believed, wished, and so on by the characters of the fabula. (Ryan “Possible Worlds” 19-22)

The narrative world of BioShock Infinite hosts multiple possible worlds as a part of its fabula – its fabula being constructed by the author through rule one of the possible world theory. Rule two allows the characters of that fabula to develop, imagine, or know about other possible worlds within that narrative space (Ryan “Possible Worlds” 19-22). The game's characters then might spawn possible worlds in the narrative in the same way the viewer might spawn them in The Prestige. However, there is a significant difference in the effect of character-created possible worlds on characters than viewer-created ones, since if the characters themselves create possible worlds, they

have the potential to be aware of the multiplied beings paradox. This is the case in BioShock

Infinite. Nonetheless, they cannot alter the author's intended fabula, which remains fixed – making

possible problems for Eco's second rule. In the same way observance in The Prestige provides knowledge to the film's viewer and influences their interpretation of the narrative, the characters of

BioShock Infinite gain knowledge through their observance of “the possibility space.” The narrative,

though still fixed in place by the author, accommodates this knowledge in its original structure. In this sense, further new possible world creation beyond the author's original intent still remains with the game's viewer – the player. Nonetheless, how does a character's knowledge of the possibility space – the sum of the narrative world's possible worlds, alter observations and interpretive possible worlds made by the player, and how is this relayed back into the game? This chapter will now expand on the implications of the character's knowledge, and player's observance, of such possible worlds and multiplied states, and discuss the altered interpretations made as a result.

BioShock Infinite, directed by Ken Levine and released by Irrational Games, is set in a turn

of the twentieth century floating city, which plays host to a race and class war that the player's character, Booker Dewitt, is dropped into through an exploitation of a quantum mechanics, parallel world paradox – he is brought there from another possible world in the narrative fabula's

multiverse. The narrative is highly reliant on the possible world construct, whereby characters might slip between alternate versions of the universe for one reason or another (Ryan 653-654). Use of possible worlds allows for narrative inconsistencies, and the main thread of the story depends on these multiple paradoxical constructs to function.

The Lutece twins, Robert and Rosalind, are a pair of characters that are fundamental to, but detached from, this main narrative, and hold a unique position of being able to guide the main characters while remaining removed from them. The twins are the only other characters, besides Booker and Elizabeth, that are able to traverse the boundaries between worlds, allowing them to follow the characters around with a consistent knowledge of their being. This contrasts to other characters that Booker and Elizabeth come across, who are unaware of their parallel world others and to the mobility of the main characters between worlds. What makes the Lutece twins unique in their ability to world-hop is also what makes them of particular interest to this thesis, as shall now be explained.

The Lutece twins are, in actual fact, not twins. Rather, they are instances of the same person from different universes, with variables between those worlds altering such things as gender or personality. The pair are quantum physicists who have found a way to open doorways between

worlds. What this means in practice is that Robert was able to leave his universe and join Rosalind in hers. The two have similar, yet distinct personalities, which might be read through their differing responses to the same situations. Rosalind's in-game audio diaries give examples of disagreements the pair have had. In one diary Rosalind reflects on their decision to return Elizabeth to Booker. This is the fallout from a major precursor to the plot, in which Elizabeth, Booker's daughter, was forcibly taken from him by the Luteces and given to her adopted father, Comstock. Robert wishes to make amends, however Rosalind is not so certain: “My brother has presented me with an

ultimatum: if we do not send the girl back from where we brought her, he and I must part. Where he sees an empty page, I see King Lear. But he is my brother, so I shall play my part, knowing it shall all end in tears.” As can be seen, their attitudes towards the decision are quite contrary, with Rosalind decidedly against it and Robert emphatically for. Their differences keep them separate. The pair exist in the same space and time, and are always seen together, yet they are never fully aligned, in so much as they never become one single person. This is the case even after Comstock, the game's main antagonist, kills them by destroying their inter-world machine (an event that occurs before the player's narrative begins). Their bodies exist after the point of death by being “scattered amongst the possibility space” as Rosalind Lutece says. In-game, the two exist in this state of post-death being – a state that allows them to traverse the multiverse at their own discretion (Phillips 194).

Next to the twins' ability to traverse the multiverse, they are also able to traverse the

boundaries of linear time. This is the case, as discussed before, when a character might be perceived to exist both across the continuum of space and time at once. In clearer terms, the Lutece twins' deaths catapult them into a multiple state of being by unhinging them from a single material existence. Instead of killing them, the multiverse scattered the pair, as some part of them did not belong in the space-times where they were supposedly killed. To explain, I return to the cat paradox. The Lutece twins' deaths might be the same as bringing both instances of the quantum particle into the same universe and then observing them together. The observance would be impossible to perceive given it was paradoxical, and thus the particles would, instead of being observed, cease to be observable in those universes at all. In this sense then, the Lutece twins might be considered to not exist within one single universe at all after their death – a theory supported in the narrative by the inability of the player (or any other in-game character) to kill the pair, their flickering appearance and disappearance from scenes, and their understanding of time, as Rosalind Lutece says, as “more an ocean than a river.”

The Lutece twins provide a complex view of characters that are aware of their own

multiplied being, through which they bring yet more possible worlds and multiplied characters into existence. Nonetheless, their awareness remains fixed by the author of the game. An argument that would suggest the pair exists in a multiplied state that does not fluctuate, and also wholly breaks Eco's second rule. Conversely, player interactions might make fluctuation in states possible. This suggests that character's multiple states exist between Eco's rule one and rule three, with rule two effectively becoming nil-and-void. The viewer of The Prestige might make interpretations of what they observe, but they can never directly influence the narrative world as it progresses, given the film is a fixed medium. Games potentially offer the opposite, as the player might be directly influential over the game world, at least to some degree. Active player interpretation might then define a thread of possible worlds that could come into existence, or not, within the game itself. I will now argue for this proposition.

2.2 Multiplied Being and Free Choice Altering Player In-game Interpretations

Characters like the Lutece twins, who are aware of the possible world space, can be seen to exist in a state of multiplied being. However, this state is contained by the narrative fabula of the author. Player interaction in the narrative world may change this, increasing the potential possible worlds that the characters can exist across. Direct interaction with BioShock Infinite's narrative world is different from viewership of films like The Prestige, as consequences of player

interpretation might actually be played out within the game's narrative world, whereas the film's viewers might only imagine their possible worlds outside of the film's narrative field. Player interaction in the game's narrative world operates in unison with others' choices, including, but not limited to, those made by: the game characters, the game's wider narrative world, the designers' programming, and the author's narrative fabula (Tulloch “The Construction of Play” 345). Following this, character multiplicity within the game itself might be altered if different players make a different choice. Nonetheless, this is dependent on the variety of choices offered to the player, choices that BioShock Infinite manipulates.

The game intentionally offers choices, and then reveals the insignificance of these choices to the player once they have been made, potentially compelling the player to realise the constraints of the narrative world and develop their own interpretive possible worlds instead. For example, at one point in the game two neck chokers are offered to the character Elizabeth, one with an image of a cage on it and the other with a bird. The player's character chooses one or the other for her to wear.

The only difference between the choice's outcomes is superficial visuals – Elizabeth wears one choker or the other for the rest of the game. The altering of the game world through these superficial choices defines the player's interpretive possible worlds, both in-game and out, potentially closing down possible worlds in the former, while opening them up in the latter.

How far then might the in-game possible worlds be altered because of player interaction? The narrative construct of the in-game choices, and the way in which they are presented as binary choices – pick the bird or the cage – simplifies the choice, and contains it. It potentially becomes a variable possible world, but also remains constrained by the game's narrative construct, never able to escape the binary. To explain this problem of player choice, and the freedom, or lack thereof, of these choices, I turn to the argument of morality in Ryan's possible world analogy:

What is the point in trying to act morally if, for every path I choose, another me takes the opposite fork. [...] Ethical behaviour presupposes free will, but if all possibilities must be realized at least once, I am predetermined to act one way or another, and my free will is an illusion. (“From Parallel Universes” 668)

As Ryan explains, the multiverse theory throws up a contention in regards to “moral free will.” Namely, that if an infinite number of instances of an action might occur, then what is the purpose of picking the “morally” right one – the opposite will just happen somewhere else. In this scenario, player choice and effect on the narrative game world become non-existent, as for every choice made in-game an opposite choice will be made instead by another player. Picking the bird or the cage becomes redundant, as another player will always pick the other one – the in-game possible worlds are not altered. Furthermore, the author has prepared for the difference – it is a binary possible world that was in existence prior to the player's choice. In regards to the Lutece twins, making a binary choice, programmed into the system, does not alter their multiplied state of being within the game.

From this perspective, choice on the part of the player is non-existent – the effects that the player might make on the in-game possible worlds remain constrained. As Nyman and Teten say, “In these games, the player is asked to think on these utopian fantasies, but then the mechanism of the game prevents them from choosing their own answer” (11). The only interpretations the player might make remain outside the game world, the same as in films like The Prestige. The player cannot alter something in-game when the physical design stops them from doing so. Nonetheless, there is caveat in the binary choice system that potentially allows player choice to be enacted, at

least in part. I return to Ryan, who states that “choice can only exist in a multiverse where each possibility can be realized a random number of times, including zero. Then by acting ethically, I increase both the total good of the multiverse and the quality of life in my own world, without dooming one of my counterparts to criminal action” (“From Parallel Universes” 668). From this perspective, making one choice in a multiverse does not necessarily mean the opposite choice will be made by another. To transfer this to the player: a player picking one option might not necessarily guarantee another player picks the opposing option. More players may naturally turn to picking either the cage or the bird, altering the overall (all versions of the game played) in-game possible world. However, this is still restrained to the binary, so the amount of in-game influence a player can actually make on the narrative world remains small.

Following Ryan, the player who makes a decision is indeed relevant, but only in so far as the choices others make allow them to be: this includes the game's narrative world, author's narrative, designer's programming, etc.. This is important for the Luteces too, as it alters the multiplied states they might exist in in-game. Small variables in player choice only alter their possible worlds a small amount. On the one hand, these variables might be seen as broad and, at least in part, unobservable, with choices from single points resulting in any number of outcomes, and any number of possible worlds. While, on the other hand, there are constants in the game's narrative world – decisions that are certain, resulting in a far more contained pool of results. In this sense, the choices offered to the player gives them an element of control over the narrative possible world, while taking it away at the same time (Tulloch “The Construction of Play” 338). To discuss constraints on the player more closely I now turn to a single point in the game narrative where a constant might be recorded. This is a scene with the Lutece twins, where they provide the illusion of choice to the player.

2.3 The Coin Toss and the Outcomes of Making Choices

The coin toss scene appears early in the game, and is what might be considered a “non-choice” – a conditional decision to either press a single button to continue the narrative, or run up against a brick wall and stop playing. What makes this non-choice, as presented by the Lutece twins, so interesting is the probable outcomes. To describe the layout of the scene: the player's character enters through a gate and is confronted by the Lutece twins, one holding a plate with a coin on it, and the other wearing a clapper-blackboard separated into two columns and chalked with “Heads” and “Tails.” The “Heads” side of the board is full of tally marks, while the “Tails” side of

the board remains empty. The coin is offered – forced – on the player's character, and they have no choice but to throw the coin and call which side it will fall on. Invariably the coin lands on “Heads”, and another tally is added to the relevant column.

“Heads or Tails?” - BioShock Infinite

What is important in this scene is the interplay between what might happen, what is

predicted to happen, and what does happen. There are several decisions and consequences that can be played out. The scene contains various constants and variables, where the constants define tighter outcomes, while the variables might have many. The coin might be tossed, or not tossed. Not tossing the coin results in the game stalling, while tossing the coin results in a scripted cut scene and the player continuing on in the game. The cut scene can follow one of two paths – a variable. Either the player's character calls “Heads,” or, less often, he calls “Tails.” The coin is tossed, and the result, regardless of which he calls, is heads every time – a constant. Leaving aside the decision not to toss the coin, which opens up another level of complexity to the ludic logic of the game, the constant is the outcome of “Heads,” while the variable is the call of “Heads” or “Tails” that Booker, the player's character, makes. To explain, I return once again to the Schrödinger's cat paradox:

The cat goes in the box, the atom decays, and draws the cat into a variable state of being in which it is both alive and dead. The box is duly observed, and the cat is revealed to be dead – a constant. What this does for player choice is teach us that the individual – Booker, and the player in this case – might be able to make variable decisions, but cannot influence the constants. The Lutece

twins remain the same whether the player's character chooses “Heads” or “Tails,” and their in-game possible world does not change. Where the degree to which the individual might influence the effects of the outcome becomes relevant is within the variable element of the decision. If the player decides not to toss the coin, then the constant is superseded in that scenario and a new in-game possible world might be born. What this decision presents is one outside the logic of the game, thereby altering the narrative possible world – the same could be simulated by hacking the game – in a way this might be argued to enable a true player interpreted in-game possible world. This is also the case in other narrative mediums. However, the gaming medium offers a stark example in the bluntness of its interaction: don't press the button and you don't continue down the prescribed route. True, this possible world is not necessarily enthralling, given it finishes at the point at which the button is not pressed, nonetheless, it is still a possible world.

This dead-end possible world has ramifications for the narrative characters as it alters the state of their world, and any conclusion that might be drawn about it by the player. The number of outcomes is thus increased exponentially, given that, while the coin, if tossed by the player's

character, will always be heads, there is an infinite number of other possible outcomes were the coin not to be tossed. The game potentially alludes to this in character dialogue between the Lutece twins upon completion of the coin toss:

Robert Lutece: I never find that as satisfying as I'd imagine. Rosalind Lutece: Chin Up. There's always next time. (BioShock Infinite)

What this shows us is a certain adherence to the multiverse theory. Every time the coin is tossed the result is the same, but were the coin not to be tossed “next time” as Rosalind suggests, the outcome would be different. This statement might also be read in a different way, in which the pair are testing a theory of constants between the worlds. Nevertheless, regardless of interpretation, each time the coin is tossed they are looking for the disproving of their theory that the coin will constantly turn up heads. As yet, it seems the game has not once turned up tails, it being likely that a tails result was never programmed into the outcomes by the developer. By the reasoning of the game's ludic logic, it stands to be true that within the game's multiverse construct the coin will always turn up heads. Nonetheless, choosing not to toss the coin relays a wider possibility for possible worlds to come into existence.

increasing possible world creation, and thereby allowing for further multiplied characters to come into being, I now turn to an argument made by Lars Konzack on gaming's dual space – that of the player's physical world and that of the virtual:

A computer game consists of two different levels: a) the virtual space, and b) the playground. These two levels may under special conditions combine, but normally they are kept apart. We find the same conditions in a game of chess. The board and the pieces represent the virtual space with its own intrinsic logic. The board, pieces and the two players situated in the surrounding space are all part of the playground. These two levels of course interact, but still they are in fact kept apart from one another…they are indeed both sides of the same coin (Konzack 90)

It can be seen from Konzack's analysis that the two levels of play space are fundamentally tied, in so far as the player might make choices in the game, but remain bound by the logic of the game space. The final line here is the most interesting, as a fundamental connection is drawn between player choice and the multiplied character, each existing on one side of the game space coin. The Lutece twins cannot exist in anything more than a fixed multiplied form unless the player engages with the game – specifically, if the player breaks the ludic logic of the game, as in choosing not to toss the coin, they alter the parameters for engagement – the in-game possible worlds change.

To return to the scene including the Lutece twins and the coin toss, the single action of pushing the button to enable progression of the scene, or not doing so, can be seen as doubly

complex when considered in terms of game breaking mechanics, in so far as the player is implicated into the development of the multiplied character by what choice they make or don't make. If the player makes the choice not to toss the coin then the Lutece twins' state of multiplied being expands beyond the worlds set down by the author, or anything the characters themselves might know because of it. In essence, it is precisely the third rule of Eco's narrative possible world theory that determines how far a pre-established narrative might stretch into new possible worlds.

To conclude this chapter, it has been argued that a character aware of their narrative possible worlds becomes emboldened by them and might become aware of their own multiplied form. However, such a development alone is not enough for the characters to operate and bring into being new possible worlds by themselves. It has been argued that because of this Eco's second possible worlds rule is potentially ineffectual, given that characters are unable to produce anything beyond

that of the author's original intent in the work. The viewer, or player, remains the key to unlocking further possible worlds through their interpretations of narrative characters, and they are responsible for drawing into being new multiplied forms of narrative characters. The gaming medium has been seen to alter the possibilities that this allows, with a player who breaks the game's ludic logic being able to enable in-game possible worlds that go beyond that developed or expected by the author. Thus, the strongest possible world development remains in the mind of the viewer, and they have final arbitration over the breadth a multiplied character might stretch to. The final chapter will deal specifically with a narrative play, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, that relies on

observance by a viewer, and I will argue that observance and interpretation together wholly define a narrative character's multiplied being.