Bachelor’s Thesis
Securitization & Europeanization of
Migration Policies and the Effect on
Borders
The Case of the Bulgarian Refugee Crisis
at the Bulgarian-Turkish Border
Name: _______________________________ Sybrig Simkje Smit Student number: _______________________ 10536418 E-mail address: ________________________ sybrigsmit@gmail.com Telephone number: ____________________ 00316-11829299 Tutor: _______________________________ Dhr. Dr. D. L. (Dennis) Arnold Bachelor Thesis: _______________________ Human Geography Theme: ______________________________ Political Geography Date: ________________________________ January 16, 2017 Word count: __________________________ 11,637 Number of pages: ______________________ 34 University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioral ScienceAbstract
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, immigrants are more often framed as a risk or danger to political, economic and social security. Several laws and regulations have been assembled to overcome these (mythical) risks. This framing and acting upon the framing is defined as securitization of migration. One way of securitizing from a EU perspective, is the creation of fuzzy border regions. This development is defined as Europeanization. The other definition of Europeanization is concerned with how EU policies emanate in local policies of member-states, in this case immigration policies. Both securitization and Europeanization are therefore related to EU control and security of immigration. This case-study research examines how securitization and Europeanization have affected the Bulgarian-Turkish border in the Syrian refugee crisis, 2013-2016. The territorial border has been securitized substantially, under the process of Europeanization. The main indicators are enhanced border control and the construction of a razor-edged fence. Also the organizational and conceptual borders have been securitized; in the Bulgarian politics and media coverage refugees are often framed as threats and risks to society. However, a dichotomy is visible in both the politics and among the inhabitants. The question whether this dichotomy is also part of the European immigration policies should be examined in further research in order to answer whether the organizational and conceptual borders in Bulgaria are Europeanized.
Index
Abstract ... 2Introduction ... 4
1.
Methodology ... 7
2.
Bulgaria and the Refugee Crisis ... 8
Bulgarian History and the Bulgarian-Turkish Border ... 8
The Bulgarian Refugee Crisis ... 9
3.
Theoretical Framework ... 12
Securitization of migration ... 13
Europeanization ... 16
Sub-Conclusion ... 20
4.
Securitization and Europeanization of Migration at the Bulgarian-Turkish Border (Case-Study) .. 22
Territorial borders ... 22
Organizational borders ... 23
Conceptual borders ... 25
Sub-Conclusion ... 26
Conclusion and Discussion ... 27
Conclusion ... 27
Discussion and further research ... 29
References ... 31
Literature ... 31
Interviews ... 34
Introduction
"The current refugee crisis is a challenge of global dimensions. We have to work hand in hand with our partners and neighbouring countries beyond EU borders which are most affected”. This is a quote from Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (European Commission, 2016). The European Union (EU) is coping with the biggest immigration flows since the end of the second World War (Peters, 2015), due to the civil war in, among others, Syria which started in 2011 with the Arab Spring (CNN, 2016). A handful of children wrote critical notes about the Syrian government on the board of their classroom, which set off the civil war in Syria and the millions of people fleeing the country (Fargues, 2014). Since 2013, about 2.5 million refugees arrived in Europe, mostly Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi (International Organization for Migration, 2016 & Eurostat, 2016). Famous quotes from EU policymakers have dominated the public discussion on refugee crisis – both negatively and positively. Probably the most famous one is made by the German chancellor Angela Merkel, on August 31st, 2015: “Wir schaffen das” (we will cope), referring to the refugees entering the European Union (Bundesregierung.de, 2015). The EU and its policymakers attempt to provide a grip on the issue through assembling complex, sometimes conflicting, laws and regulations. Subsequently, these laws and regulations need to be implemented on a local level. The EU is trying to control the current immigration flows by this, but according to many, failing to do so (Nancheva, 2016).
Countless media sources have reported about boat refugees and the corresponding thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea (Deanden, 2016). In September 2015, a picture of a stranded boy on the coast of Bodrum, Turkey became global news (Withnall, 2015) (figure 1). This
Figure 1 A young Syrian boy lies in the surf near Bodrum, Turkey Reuters (Withnall, 2015)
horrifying image that sparked much public attention is in sheer contrast with the less-known disaster occurring in Bulgaria. The mostly Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi refugees who find the risk of crossing the Mediterranean Sea too high, attempt to cross the Bulgarian-Turkish border in order to reach the EU via land (UNHCR, 2015). This route costs the refugees considerably more than the deadly route via the Mediterranean Sea, but the sea route took only in 2015 at least 3,135 lives (ibid.).
As a response to the influx of refugees, the 240 kilometers long Bulgarian-Turkish border (Nancheva, 2016) has developed into one of the best-guarded external borders of the EU since 2013. The border now consists of a 146 kilometers wide, razor-edged, high fence, supplemented with (infra-red) camera surveillance and border control (BBC, 2016 & Nieuwsuur, 2015). The EU and Bulgaria invested 160 million euros in tightening the border and border control, although Bulgaria is only a member-state since 2007 (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). Almost 3,000 refugees were caught at the border and another 6,000 in other parts of Bulgaria (Thorpe, 2015: a & Sedee, 2016). Bulgaria embraced its responsibilities to protect the external EU-border, as maybe expected of one of the poorest and youngest members of the EU.
It may have become clear that also the land-route via Turkey and Bulgaria to the EU had been severely impeded, after the sea-route via Greece was already cut off. Besides this territorial bordering, non-governmental, organizational and conceptual borders are apparent as well in Bulgaria. Civilian militia have been raised to guard the border, which were responsible of several refugees’ arrests (Kooijman, 2015). These right-wing and Soviet-sympathizing Bulgarian men patrol in the woods at the Bulgarian-Turkish border (Brandpunt, 2016) and protest against the ‘strangers’ – as they like to refer to the refugees (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). The Bulgarian under-minister of foreign affairs Philip Ganev calls refugees ‘intruders’ as they cross the border and is not afraid to treat them that way as well (Nieuwsuur, 2015). Additionally, Bulgaria is accused by the UN of inhumane treatment of refugees (Cockburn, 2016). In the public debate, refugees are often seen as threat to social, economic and health security. On the contrary, also organizations in favor of the refugees have been founded in Bulgaria, for example the internet platform “Friends of the Refugees” (Aleksandrova, 2014: a).
The local aversion and push-backs and the contrasting acceptance and welcoming, may be signs of European movements. Since the 9/11-terrorist attacks in 2001 migration has increasingly been positioned as a threat to economic, social and political security (Buonfino, 2004 & Ehrkamp, 2016). Immigrants are often framed as dangers to national identity, labor market stability and public order (Huysmans, 2000). This concept is called securitization of migration (Ehrkamp, 2016 &Huysmans, 2000). The European Union is a leading factor in the process of securitization of
migration, both as a policy maker – laws and regulations - and actors – e.g. Frontex (Huysmans, 2000; Casas-Cortes et al., 2013 & Ehrkamp, 2016).
The laws and regulations concerning the process of securitization of migration need to be implemented on a local level, for example in Bulgaria. This implementation depends on interpretation of the urgency and meaning of laws and regulations. To what degree EU policy acts as a core instrument in local politics, is defined as the process of Europeanization (Mannin, 2013). The morality behind EU-laws and therefore the local interpretation play a key role in Europeanization, but also differences across time and space affect it. One may expect that in countries which differ greatly – culturally, economically etc. – from Brussels due to e.g. long distances and a different historical background, Europeanization is less apparent (Mannin, 2013 & Nancheva, 2016).
This definition of Europeanization is therefore closely related to the definition of Casas-Cortes et al. (2013), which describes the attempt of the EU to politically influence areas beyond its territory. Re-bordering mechanisms and fuzzy borders are results of this. The European Neighbourhood Policy is a clear example of this, but also the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey is a sign of Europeanization. Bulgaria may be greatly affected by this, since it is both geographically and perhaps culturally in the middle of these two powers (Kooijman, 2006).
The responses of the EU and its policymakers on the refugee inflows, strict border regimes, regulations and agreements that transcend territories, influence the local Bulgarian refugee crisis substantially and are interconnected. However, not much analytical attention has been paid to the subject yet (Nancheva, 2016). In addition, Bulgaria’s geographical location and its diverse historical and cultural characteristics make the country an interesting subject for a case-study concerning immigration of refugees. In addition, the combination of short-term solutions to the crisis with the coming and going of international interventions make it in exemplary case for research (Roberts, 2016). Therefore, the following research question will be assessed in this thesis project: How have securitization of migration and Europeanization affected the Bulgarian-Turkish border in the 2013-2016 refugee crisis? This main research question will be approached through four main chapters. First, the methodology of the research will be described. After that, a more extensive overview about Bulgaria, the Bulgarian-Turkish border and the refugee crisis will be provided. Subsequently, in the theoretical framework the theories of securitization of migration and Europeanization will be defined and characterized. The most important elements of these concepts will be presented in the conclusion of the theoretical framework. These findings will form the basis for the Bulgarian case-study concerning the 2013-2016 refugee crisis, which will be examined in the fourth chapter. Here, the devolution from an EU-perspective to a local, Bulgarian perspective will be addressed, in particular. This will be
based upon three different kinds of borders, as defined by Nancheva (2016): the territorial border, the organizational border and the conceptual border – different multi-dimensional interaction zones between refugees and the state of refuge. An overview of the most important findings and shortcomings of this research will be provided in the conclusion and discussion.
1. Methodology
This paper is a desk-based study, supplemented with two interviews. It is a case-study, based on qualitative research methods. A qualitative research design has been chosen in order to fully understand the subject matter. There are several power relations, ethical issues and interpretations of concepts which require a qualitative approach. For chapter 2 “Bulgaria and its Refugee Crisis” I have made usage of the book In Bulgarije (In Bulgaria) by Hellen Kooijman, newspaper articles and other media sources, documentaries, essays and academic literature. The theoretical framework, chapter 3, is based on an extensive literature study. Academic sources have been found via the websites Google Scholar and Web of Science, recommendations of experts and snowball-effect (through citations). The case-study is both an exemplifying and revelatory kind. The latter because the refugee crisis emerged only a few years ago and thus the topic has not been researched intensively. It is also exemplifying, because the situation and developments in Bulgaria may also be applicable to other refugee sites in Europe (Bryman, 2015). Furthermore, the case-study thrives to examine the complexity, specific interpretations, effects of interventions and cultural dependence within the refugee crisis (Roberts, 2016). For the results and analysis of the case-study, chapter 4, qualitative research methods have been applied. Language-orientated approaches, mostly a discourse analysis, have been used for the analysis of media sources and were apparent in the article by Aleksandrova (2014: a) (Ktichin & Tate, 2000). This research method was used for the case-study chapter on Bulgaria. It has been supplemented by two interviews with experts. The first interview I had was with a researcher (Anne Ruth van Leeuwen), the second with a journalist, specialized in the Balkan region (Mitra Nazar). Through interviews with experts from the research field more day-to-day inside information could be obtained. The researcher and journalist have both been to the border region in Bulgaria and did (extensive) research about the area. The interviews were informal and semi-structured. The sampling method for finding both the articles and experts was convenience sampling, followed with some snowball-sampling (Bryman, 2015).
2. Bulgaria and the Refugee Crisis
As touched upon in the introduction, the Bulgarian refugee crisis is a severe problem but analytics have not paid sufficiently attention to the issue yet. In addition, the history and culture of Bulgaria are not common knowledge, let alone the characteristics of the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Therefore, this chapter will provide in an overview on essential elements of the Bulgarian culture, politics and economics. There will be a focus on the Bulgarian-Turkish border – its history, important cultural implications and characteristics will be discussed. Finally, a summary of the most important events in the Bulgarian refugee crisis will be presented.Bulgarian History and the Bulgarian-Turkish Border
The Bulgarian history that is relevant to the current refugee crisis starts with the Ottoman oppression which began in the 14th century. By the end of the 14th century, the Ottoman Turks had conquered all of Bulgaria and imposed the Islam. The Ottoman domination lasted for nearly five centuries and the goal of it was to isolate Bulgaria from the other (Christian) parts of Europe. The Bulgarians who did not want to convert to the Islam, fled to the mountains or were killed. There are several gruesome stories from eye witnesses about massive slaughters of (Christian) Bulgarians. The Bulgarian people who did convert to the Islam are known as Pomaks. From 1877 several protests were organized, but cruelly suppressed by the Ottomans. These atrocities were noticed by Western-Europe and Russia and the latter decided to free Bulgaria from the Turks. This resulted in a bloody war that lasted one year. Thousands of Russians, Bulgarians and Turks were killed, but eventually the Russians defeated the Ottoman domination in Bulgaria (Crampton, 1989 & Kooijman, 2006). Several conventions about land possession and borders followed. This resulted in six other wars in the Balkan region, including the conflicts in the border regions of Bulgaria (Lonely Planet, 2017). Because of the atrocious domination of the Ottoman Turks, the Pomaks were long seen as betrayers and actively loathed (Crampton, 1989 & Kooijman, 2006). There is still a part of the Bulgarians who despise the Islam and Turks because of this history. Additionally, in nationalist propaganda Bulgarians are programmed to see every Muslim as a potential rapist or terrorist. This image is exacerbated by the terrorist attacks in for example Istanbul and Paris (Brunwasser, 2016).
In the first half of the 20th century, when World War I and II took place, Bulgaria was on miscellaneous sides, e.g. neutral, allied, central powers. It may have become clear that Bulgaria’s political and geographical position varied quite often, without having political power, really. After the Second World War, Bulgaria elected a communist leader and this resulted in Soviet protection from 1954 to 1989 (BBC News, 2016). Hence, the Bulgarian-Turkish border became an external
border for the Soviet bloc. In 1984, the government under leadership of the communist president Todor Zhivkov attempted to force Slavic names upon Pomaks, Turks and Roma. If they resisted, ethnic Turks were given the chance to flee the country into Turkey. A mass exodus of 300,000 Turkish people was apparent, but after three months, under the surprise and worries about these great numbers, Turkey shut the border with Bulgaria (Kooijman, 2006; BBC News, 2016 & Lonely Planet, 2016).
In the 1990s, different governments from the Socialist party – the former communist party – and the Union of Democratic Forces were elected. Bulgaria was and still is a poor country and the unemployment rates are high (BBC News, 2016). In 2001, the former king Simeon II won the parliamentary elections, but after a hundred days Bulgarians protested against him for not improving the poor living conditions. Georgi Parvanov of the Socialist party promised improvement and was elected: he wanted to speed up the process of accession to the Nato and eventually the EU. In 2004, Bulgaria entered the Nato and in 2007 its accession the European Union was made official. However, there was still a lot of corruption and organized crime. Hence, France and Germany neglected Bulgaria to enter the Schengen zone up and until today (ibid.). Bulgaria is however thriving to be involved in the Schengen agreement, which is for example visible in (the framing of) the treatment of refugees (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). Nowadays, Bulgaria is the poorest country of the European Union. It is still struggling with the transition from a planned economy originating from the Communist era to the free market of the EU (Hristova et al., 2015). The most important goal of Bulgaria to enter the EU was to improve its economy, but the average monthly income is still about 400 Euros. There is a substantial amount of corruption in Bulgaria, which frustrates the citizens and is not beneficial to the refugee crisis (Nazar, 2016). The country is on the Balkan peninsula and borders with Romania in the North, Macedonia and Serbia in the West, Greece and Turkey in the South and with the Balkan Sea in the East. It has nearly 7.5 million inhabitants, of more than one and a half million live in Bulgaria’s capital Sofia (National Statistics Institute, 2015).
The Bulgarian Refugee Crisis
As shortly stated in the introduction, the refugee crisis in Bulgaria started in the summer of 2013, when the first great numbers of refugees crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border in order to find refuge in Europe, after the emerging unrest in the Middle-East relating to the Arab Spring. The influx of refugees into Bulgaria came as a great surprise (Aleksandrova, 2014: b). The surprise of the event is hence seen as the main reason Bulgaria offered insufficient shelter at first (Hirstova, 2015 & Roberts, 2016). Between the January 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014 9,175 people applied for international protection in Bulgaria (UNHCR, 2014: a). This may not seem as a lot compared to the
total number of refugees in Europe, but it is a heavy burden for the one of the poorest countries of Europe (Hunin, 2013). In addition, before the summer of 2013, Bulgaria had a yearly influx of immigrants of maximum thousand people (Hristova et al., 2015). Figure 2 shows the exact route of the refugees, aiming for Western Europe. Although several stories of insufficient shelter came up in the media, analytics lacked paying attention to this immigration route for Syrian refugees (Termote, 2016). As Nancheva (2016, p. 7) clearly states: “Against the background of migrant-boat tragedies in the Mediterranean, comparatively little analytical attention was paid to the flow of migrants through the dry-land points of entry along the southern European Union border until well into the summer of 2015. This is especially true for the 240-kilometre-long segment of the border between Bulgaria and Turkey, from Kapitan Andreevo to Rezovo on the European Union side, which, for a brief period between the summer of 2013 and the spring of 2014, became the preferred land route into the European Union of asylum seekers from Syria and beyond.” In November 2013, after the first summer of many asylum applicants in Bulgaria, the media started to pay attention to the Bulgarian crisis. The combination of the relatively great numbers of Syrian refugees and the incapability of the Bulgarian institutions to handle the issue, made a media-worthy story. The crisis came to a halt in the first half of the year 2014 because of collaborations between different European, local and non-governmental institutions and mostly the construction of a razor-edged fence, as touched upon in the introduction (Nancheva, 2016). The number of refugees
Figure 2 Migrant route to Western Europe and the borders. Via http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36435420
applying for asylum decreased immensely (Aleksandrova, 2014: a & Nancheva, 2016). The Bulgarian Minister of Interior stated on national television that only 99 refugees entered Bulgaria in the first five weeks of 2014 (Nancheva, 2016) and the total number of refugees in Bulgaria decreased as well. The latter is due to the halt of returns in correlation with the Dublin law, which was applied for by the UNHCR. The UNHCR experienced that Bulgaria was not capable of accepting the returns under power of the Dublin agreement in combination with the still incoming refugees via the Bulgarian-Turkish border (Histrova et al., 2015). Between the 1st of January and the 31st of March in 2014 only about 400 refugees entered Bulgaria via the Bulgarian-Turkish border: a substantial decrease was visible (UNHCR, 2014: a). On March 5, 2014, also the head of Frontex Ilka Laitinen reported the conclusion that the situation at the Bulgarian-Turkish border was under control, after a successful land operation called Poseidon and its extension Focal Land Points 2014 (Nancheva, 2016). Paradoxically, this low number compared to half a year earlier made Europe concerned of push-backs at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Europe suspected that the refugees’ right to apply for asylum was denied (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). This can be affirmed by other messages from the UNHCR that border guards were commanded to violently obstruct refugees from entering Bulgaria (UNHCR, 2013: b).
On the 18th of March, 2016, Turkey and the European Union made a deal concerning illegal immigration into the EU. Every refugee who illegally entered the EU from the 20th of March can be sent back. Syrians almost automatically achieve a refugee status in Turkey, so they would be – almost – certain of a refuge after return (Alonso, 2016). Iraqi and Afghani refugees, however, have less chance of getting a refugee status. Therefore, the refugees entering Bulgaria are for 80 percent Afghan and 10 percent Iraqi and consist of almost no Syrians anymore. However, in Austria and Hungary there are still refugees discovered who have not been registered in Europe before. Macedonia and Bulgaria are blaming each other for this (Thorpe, 2016).
During the heat of the refugee crisis in Bulgaria, there were several media reports on insufficient shelter, riots and other negative illustrations. Predominantly NGO’s reported about bad living conditions in the refugee camps near the Bulgarian capital Sofia and that there was a lack of the required personal attention to refugees (UNHCR 2013: b & UNHCR, 2014: a) For example, reports from the United Nations state that refugees are not safe in Bulgarian camps. Additionally, they are pushed back at the border (Thorpe, 2015: b) and nationalist migrant “hunters” are active in the border region, as stated before in the introduction (Brunwasser, 2016).
3. Theoretical Framework
On the 11th of September in 2001 (9/11), the industrialized Global North was hit in its capitalist center. The terrorist attacks on, among others, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York had great impact on many nations in the world. A total of 2,977 people died because of the attacks, which were performed by members of the terrorist non-state organization Al Qaeda (CNN Library, 2016). A political discussion arose concerning the relationship between safety and migration. Since the terrorist attacks, the borders between security, terrorism, immigration and social fear have become quite thin (Buonfino 2004). In other words, immigrants were explicitly and implicitly seen as threats. Migration policies have been altered substantially over the past couple of years: they became securitized. Although securitization of migration has been evident quite some years before the 9/11-attacks, it has had a clear uplift since. Different effects on different aspects of migration linked to securitization of migration can be designated. The European Union installed regulations and laws to securitize the migration process. This is evident in for example statistics and treatment of migrants and in border development.
Europeanization is a concept closely linked to the process of securitization of migration. This is because of two different definitions of Europeanization. The first addresses the way how EU regulations and laws are implemented in the different regions of the European Union (Nancheva, 2016). The interpretation of laws and the spatial differentiation around Europe are important aspects of this definition. Secondly, Europeanization can be described as the process of what falls under European power, in what regions European and non-European laws and regulations are still influential and how the European power transcends the EU-borders. Hence, Europeanization process is also important to (re-)bordering processes. The specific implementation of policies, the European influence outside the EU and the (re-)bordering processes are the three aspects of Europeanization which matter the most in the field of migration. In other words, Europeanization is the concept under which securitization of migration is spread through Europe, but also across its borders. This chapter will elaborate on how securitization of migration has been defined by different academics, who the actors are, what the history is behind the concept and what the current developments are. After that, more extensive descriptions and definitions of Europeanization will be provided, followed with some general examples and elements or characteristics. In the conclusion, a summary of the most relevant characteristics of the two theories will be provided. Subsequently, these will form the common thread for the Bulgarian case-study.
Securitization of migration
As stated before, securitization of migration was a concept already analyzed and practiced quite intensively before 9/11. According to Ehrkamp (2016, p. 3): “Over the past two decades, state discourses have increasingly framed migrants as ‘security threats’ that threaten the safety of citizens and undermine the power of nation-states to decide who enters their territory and who does not”. In these discourses, migrants are also framed as dangers to national identity, labor market stability and public order, but also to national tradition and societal homogeneity (Huysmans, 2000). This framing of migrants as safety risks and threats, combined with how regulations and laws can overcome these risks is defined securitization of migration (Huysmans, 2000 & Ehrkamp, 2016). It consists of a powerful dynamic of both political and social factors and originates from fear and the wish to maintain the status quo of the society. This is because the community is defined through identification, under the thought of ‘what belongs here is safe’. By this argumentation, external influxes, such as immigrants, are immediately framed as unsafe. However, this statement is based on a mythical discourse that there was once a homogeneous society, which can be restored by refusing or sending away immigrants. Thus, securitization of migration is framing migration as a risk to security, in which migrants are (mythical) ‘cultural aliens’ (Huysmans, 2000).
The characteristic of securitization in which migrants are framed as social, economic and political threats, is also evident in media coverage. Whenever immigrants are involved in, for example, riots or problems in urban ghettos, they are extensively noted in the media (ibid.). This is also the case for political parties who accuse immigrants of problems in the society. However, securitization of migration is not only carried out by (right wing) politicians or media institutions. The concept has multiple actors: national governments, grass-roots civil society, police networks et cetera. Securitization of migration is conducted by a structure of multiple actors and practices (ibid.). But the process of securitizing also exceeds the regular structures of politics and jurisdiction. As stated by Simeonova (2004, p. 2): “The process of securitization itself means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues”. In addition, securitization of migration constructs a security continuum, which is a way of policy making, institutionalized by the diverse actors described above, that enables a transfer of criminalities such as terrorism, drugs traffic and money-laundering to the issue of migration (Huysmans, 2000). Migration therefore forms the connection between policy regarding security and the professional security in the field. It is both evident in regulations and laws, as well as border control and social appreciation of immigrants, but is also framed as an overarching theme of great concern
(Simeonova, 2004). This framing – a key element for the theory securitization migration – is generated by different actors of governmental institutions, the media and public discussions.
Migration and the general stance towards immigration has had a long history (Huysmans, 2000). In the 1950s and 1960s immigrants were mostly seen as helpful extra workforce in Western Europe. In the late 60s and during the 1970s, immigration became a subject of concern. Although immigrants were still seen as necessary extra workforce in the 70s, the immigration policies became more controlling. There is a shift visible from a permissive immigration policy towards a control-oriented, restrictive policy. In the 70s, there came a halt to labor immigration in Western Europe, but the share of immigrants in society still rose due to family reunion arrangements and guest workers who became permanent inhabitants in Western Europe. This increase of the immigrant population carried out public awareness around the subject. Immigration became increasingly politicized, partially due to the confusion between asylum and immigration. Asylum stood and still stands in a negative light, due to the emergence economic immigrants. In addition, migration has become a meta-issue, since it is posed as the core of many contemporary problems in society in the struggle over power, knowledge and resources (Huysmans, 2000). In 1999, migration moved from the third to first pillar in the EU, which meant that the EU became the first responsible for several migration matters (ibid.). The European concern about migration also grew in the 21st century. As Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias & Pickles (2013, p. 42) state: “As the numbers of illegal migrants and asylum-seekers from West-Africa increased, migration gained in salience in the process becoming one of the four main areas of concern at the Euro-Med Heads of State meeting in Barcelona, 2005”. Since then, several EU laws and regulations can be related to securitization of migration. Many laws implemented in the 21st century have emphasized the need to reduce immigration flows towards Western Europe (Ehrkamp, 2016).
In these modern laws and regulations, two developments of securitization of migration can be designated (Ehrkamp, 2016). First, an emergence of new migration management regimes is visible. Securitization of migration has gone hand in hand with the rise of migration management. The use of the word “management” itself says a lot (ibid.). By framing border and immigration control as “migrant management”, it gets a more technical character, rather than political. Ehrkamp (2016, p. 4) describes it as “the work done by international and inter-governmental organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on behalf of sovereign states of the European Union”. The security logics, which stand at the base of migration management, often undermine human rights. Militarization of migration management, at the border but also in immigrants’ transit or destination areas and offshore detention hinder migrants from safely crossing oceans and land borders. The IOM and Frontex, the European border control agency, are connected
in order to exclude asylum seekers and refugees from the territory of potentially safe spaces of refuge and resettlement. The aim to manage threats of migration and the routes towards and in Europe result in a trans-nationalization of migration management (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014). In addition, conventions such as the Dublin convention and their outcomes have resulted in laws and regulations to decrease the amount of migration towards the EU (Huysmans, 2000). These characteristics of the current European migration policy are all closely related to securitization of migration (Ehrkamp, 2016).
The second modern development of securitization of migration, besides militarized management, is the reworking and reconfiguration of borders (ibid.). Three different kinds of borders can be designated which are being affected under the dynamics of securitization of migration. These three borders are: territorial boundaries, organizational borders (visible through laws and regulations and push and pull factors for migrants) and conceptual borders (visible through the social acceptance and images attached to migrants). These borders are multi-dimensional zones of interactions between immigrants and the countries of arrival (Nancheva, 2016). Borders are being rescaled and in a process of devolution in migration contexts. In addition, they shifted outwards the territories of nation-states, which engenders a border region or zone rather than a strict, linear border (Ehrkamp, 2016). This is demonstrated by Casas-Cortes et al. (2013, p. 44) as follows: “Since 9/11, this process has been complemented by an increasingly strong focus on security. The concept of safe ‘neighbourhood’ was included as an important element in the strategic objectives set out in the December 2003 European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003), and a much more central and important role was accorded to the Directorate of Justice and Home Affairs (two separate Directorates since the Lisbon Treaty)”. The combination of this safe neighborhood progress, which will be elaborated on in the next chapter, internal less strict borders and external stricter borders, have resulted in a “Fortress Europe” (Huysmans, 2000 & Casas-Cortes et al., 2013). As illustrated by Huysmans (2000, p. 759), the reasoning behind this is as follows: “if we diminish internal border controls then we must harmonize and strengthen the control at the external borders of the European Community to guarantee a sufficient level of control of who and what can legitimately enter the space of free movement”. He illustrates this with Art. 7 of the Schengen Agreement of 1985: “The parties shall endeavor to approximate as soon as possible their visa policies in order to avoid any adverse consequences that may result from the easing of controls at the common frontiers in the field of immigration and security” (p. 759).
The earlier stated devolution of borders can be seen in how the borders are controlled at the moment. The execution of securitization of migration has been replaced from extensive border
control, to surveillance of migration routes in particular. This is done by the i-map project, among others (Casas-Cortes et al., 2013). “The i-Map project is an interactive cartography that traces out the multiple and overlapping ‘irregular’ migration routes into the EU” (Casas-Cortes et al., 2013, p. 50). This shift from regular strict border control to finding leaks and threats to security, is yet another sign of increased securitization of migration.
As stated before, the role of Frontex in migration policies increased the last couple of years substantially. The European Union border control agency was established in 2005 to manage the cooperation between national border agencies and to secure EU’s outer border. Frontex is based in Warsaw and its name originates from the French for external borders: “Frontières extérieures”. Its efforts are concentrated on upgrading customs and border policing capacities in member and partner states and on conducting risks analyses of border security (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014). Frontex is a leading force in for example the i-Map project, since it notices the porosity of linear, hardened borders. Together with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and other migration-related organizations, it rethinks the spatial logics of migration control and hence the border (ibid.). Frontex proposes a new structure for border control: 1. Exchange of information and external cooperation between member states 2. Border and customs control 3. Cooperation with border guards, customs and police authorities in neighboring countries 4. Cooperation with non-adjacent third countries on migration management.
These elements of the new structure entail more focus on threats and thus securitization. Furthermore, they entail two main movements of borders. The first and second entail a development in borders from ‘edges’ to ‘regions’. The last two describe a movement from national border control to supra-national border control. The latter will be elaborated on in the next section on Europeanization.
Europeanization
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, there are two different definitions for Europeanization, which are both linked to securitization of migration. First, it entails the conceptual process which describes how and to what extent laws and regulations from an EU-level form the basis of local governance and secondly, it describes the process of European influence beyond European borders. This section will elaborate on these two definitions, the implications and effects of Europeanization. Subsequently, a conclusion with the most important findings for the common thread for the case-study will be listed.
Michael Mannin (2013, p. 15) defines Europeanization in his book “The Europeanization of European Politics” as follows: “Europeanization is a process of ideational, institutional and policy change within EU-member and other European states, whose major force emanates from the EU as a centre of political discourse, policy creation/dissemination and transition, directed towards the achievement of EU core values and instrumental objectives.” This definition of Europeanization is relevant to the Bulgarian refugee crisis because it describes how EU-politics, economics and discourses are a leading force for member states’ policy. Additionally, it is dependent on the interpretation of local parties. Leading forces from Brussels with morally disputable intentions in laws and regulations may lead to different interpretations among member states and thus to weak Europeanization.
Europeanization and immigration are connected by the two major, challenging tasks for the EU at the start of the refugee crisis (Nancheva, 2016). First, the EU had to find a balance in securitizing migration while still honoring human rights. The EU attempts to find this balance through on the one hand formulating standards for the reception of refugees, but on the other hand repulsing refugees at the borders. A somewhat confusing immigration environment is attained by this (Aleksandrova, 2014: a & Nancheva, 2016). Secondly, the EU had to host thousands of refugees in the outer regions of the EU – often regions which are not wealthy. These challenges have resulted in two notable effects concerning migration and asylum. First, the definition of the human rights as part of asylum has been adjusted so that the EU created an exemption to securitize migration. Secondly, the refugees were excluded from the political discussions concerning themselves, since they were put away as ‘others’. This otherness has led to (more) xenophobia, racism, nationalism segregation (ibid.).
As stated by several academics, the above-mentioned nationalism is a sign of weak Europeanization. However, Nancheva (2016) demonstrates that nationalism is imbedded in Europeanization due to an implicit promoting of (re-)bordering. Within EU-policies concerning immigration, e.g. the Dublin Law, the EU promotes weak Europeanization. In other words, it promotes nationalism and a focus on the country and its own inhabitants. This and other securitization regulations, generate spatial differences around Europe (Huysmans, 2000; Nancheva, 2016 & Ehrkamp, 2016). Regulations such as the Dublin Law put a high burden on the outer countries of the EU – thus also on Bulgaria. In addition, the spatial differences are increased by the spatial location of member-states. The borders of countries on the outer regions of the EU are under bigger stress compared to the countries which only have EU-member-states as neighbors (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2013). The external border of Bulgaria in particular has been under
substantial stress through several centuries, as explained in the previous chapter (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). As a consequence of this unequal spatial burden-sharing in the EU, more regulations related to migration are implemented, to compensate for wrong interpretations and miscommunication. These new regulations are, additionally, often related to securitization. The whole process of the asylum procedure, acceptance, hosting of migrants et cetera costs probably more money and effort than enhancing the outer-border control. Thus, with the current policies concerning migration, securitization of migration and Europeanization form a positive feedback loop.
The second definition of Europeanization designated in this research, is focused on safety and EU-control as well. Casas-Cortes et al. (2013) define Europeanization as the integration of non-EU countries into an EU-led model of decentered governance in political, social and economic interaction and processes. Hence, this definition is about in what way the European Union tries to involve non-European countries into their policies, resulting in fuzzy border-regions. This definition of Europeanization is relevant in the context of migration because it alters the meaning of border, territoriality and it changes “long-standing practices of sovereignty” (Casas-Cortes et al. 2014, p. 233). In addition, “… off-shoring and out-sourcing of border work reformulates the spaces, jurisdictions, and authorities traditionally associated with migration control and border management, creating distinct extra-territorial institutions, policies, and practices” (ibid.). These policies aim to manage the flows of goods and people in increasingly complex and differentiated economic and social environments alongside the EU border – mostly within the Eastern and Southern states. The linear model of the European border – as already demonstrated in the section on securitization of migration – is replaced by a far more complex border region in which the Europeanization mainly takes place (Casas-Cortes et al., 2013). A consequence of this, is that in a growing number of EU-applicant or sometimes non-applicant countries EU-policies are visible (Christiansen et al., 2000). EU-policies are not aimed particularly at inside or outside Europe, but are aimed at the near-abroad. Near-abroad is defined as: “a group of states which are accepted (at least formally) as independent neighbours but taken for granted as not quite foreign, in which [one has] … tangible interests [and] economies are inextricably linked to the … centre” (Christiansen et al., 2000, p. 393). The start of the creation of the near-abroad or fuzzy borders can be traced back to the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 (Casas-Cortes et al., 2013). This opening of internal Europe in combination with the big-bang expansion of the EU in 2004 and again a replacement of the outer border in 2007 (when Bulgaria and Romania became member-states), put great stress on the outer border. As explained in the previous chapter, Europe was on the one hand handling free movement internally, but felt the urge to protect this from external threats on the other hand. Therefore, the fall of the
iron curtain is seen as a ghost that is hunting European border politics up and until today (ibid.). Pre-accession regulations for Central and Eastern European candidates entailed a series of policy alterations and programs, which were a lot like the EU laws and regulations. Two of the main focusses of these alterations was migration and border control. This can be seen as the two main developments of the start of the externalization of the EU border and the creation of fuzzy borders (ibid.). As an example of a relationship with neither inclusion nor exclusion – fuzzy borders – is the one of the EU and Turkey (Christiansen et al., 2000). The refugee deal between Turkey and the EU illustrates this. The deal states that the EU can return illegal immigrants to Turkey in exchange for liberalization of visa regulations and more legal immigration, given the right circumstances, as stated before (Alonso, 2016). In addition, already quite some years before its application, Bulgaria was involved in several EU-policies. Later in this section, the European Neighbourhood Policy will be examined – which is part of the creation of a near-abroad.
An example of externalization of the border and its management is the Seahorse project (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014). Within this project, migration routes are identified and extensively controlled with different methods and materials. It is an international project; the EU collaborates with Western-African countries. The objective of Seahorse is to catch migrants along their way to the EU and send them back to the country of origin, under specific, yet informal “Memorandums of Understanding” with the corresponding non-EU states. Organizations such as Frontex are part of externalized border management as well, for example under the project of HERA. Within both projects there are strong collaborations with the police and sometimes military forces of the third countries. These collaborations are crucial to successful projects such as Seahorse and HERA (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014). Where the International Organization for Migration, as elaborated on in the first chapter is part of an outsourcing of policies, acting and responsibility, Seahorse is part of Europeanization or externalization since the EU is still the working force behind the project. In addition, both projects are closely related to security, because they are “focusing on intersection of irregular migrants to return them back to countries of origin or transit” (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014, p. 245). Hence, the projects concerning Europeanization are also implications of securitized migration. An important characteristic of the definition of Europeanization discussed in this paragraph is that it focusses on matters that concern Europe only. Therefore, migration routes within for example Africa which do not end up in Europe are not paid attention to (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014). In addition, the last two aspects of modern border control proposed by Frontex, as listed in the previous section, contribute to new geographies of collaboration between EU members and non-EU countries, to control migration before migrants arrive at the border. These aspects address
cooperation with border guards, customs and police authorities in neighboring countries and cooperation with non-adjacent third countries on migration management (ibid.). The geography of borders is thus altered through transnational cooperation within the field of border control. This characteristic can be linked to both securitization of migration and Europeanization.
An important element of Europeanization and a direct effect of the creation of fuzzy border regions, as stated before, is the emergence and development of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Casas-Cortes et al. (2013, p. 41) state that since the emergence in 2004, the ENP operated… “as a central mechanism for reshaping the political and economic geographies of Europe and its neighbourhood. The ENP is a key instrument in the EU’s geopolitical vision and a key policy tool to integrate new member states, secure the external border and selectively ‘stretch’ European space and the reach of EU institutions” The ENP was initiated after the ‘big-bang’ enlargement of the EU in 2004. The strategy paper of the ENP, dated May 2004, states a few key-points for its existence. The main objective for the ENP is to avoid geographical divisions between the enlarged EU and its neighboring states. ENP focusses on shaping conditions for improved prosperity, stability and security in neighboring states, through deeper forms of political and economic integrations (ibid.). These integrations are however distinct from accession procedures. As a counteraction to compensate for the creation of a Fortress Europe, trade facilitations and economic integration with neighboring countries are crucial (ibid.). A remarkable or even paradoxical combination of explicit and implicit goals of the ENP can be noted. On the one hand, ENP thrives to achieve deeper levels of economic and political integration across and beyond the European territory, but on the other hand, implicitly, the external borders are hardened (ibid.). The focus on security has been increased significantly during last couple of years (ibid.) and therefore the European Neighborhood Policy can also be seen as an implication of securitization.
Sub-Conclusion
As shown in the previous two sections, both securitization and Europeanization are related to the increasing the EU influence on mainly security policy across space and time. It tries to generate a perhaps paradoxical political environment in which it thrives to equalize (migration and security) policies within and outside its territory while actively shutting off borders and migration routes. This may be seen as a counter effect on globalization. Aleksandrova (2014: a, p. 235-236) demonstrates the link between Europeanization, globalization and security-thinking in the following way: “(…) what we are witnessing, simultaneously or apart, are processes of re-nationalization and, in the same self-defensive tone, transnationalization (regionalization) of politics of security – in opposition to
the pressures of globalization threatening to blur the (ideological) inside/outside, economic, political, and cultural distinctions in the Westphalian world.”
Now that the connection between Europeanization and security-thinking has been designated, an overview of the previous two sections will be provided. This overview will function as the common thread in the next chapter on the case-study in Bulgaria, chapter 4. The process of securitization is the framing or presenting something as a threat to security. In securitization of migration, migrants are framed as a risk to economic, social and political stability. This stability is subsequently protected with laws and regulations. Securitization of migration is both the framing of immigrants as a security threat and the act to contest this. As a result, immigrants are illustrated as cultural aliens and ‘others’ and they are under substantial control of policies. Securitization of migration therefore generates a connection between policy on security and the security in the field. Two important developments in the field of securitization of migration can be designated. One, there is an increasing demand to manage migration. This results in a more technical character of migration policies, rather than a political. Secondly, the territorial, organizational and conceptual borders concerning migration are being altered. Processes of devolution and rescaling are apparent. These processes result in a Fortress Europe and the control of migration routes, instead of borders. In addition, border regions are developed: the wish to control regions of borders rather than linear borders is visible in contemporary EU policies.
The creation of border regions and the aspiration of intense control on migration in these regions are closely linked to the process of Europeanization. Europeanization can be defined in two ways. One, it is in what way European policies form the basis of local policy. Important characteristics of this development is how EU policy is retrieved and what the interpretations of it are. Within migration policy, the EU provides in directives on the quality of reception of immigrants, but also creates implicit or explicit ‘otherness’ for immigrants. Through strict border-control regimes and other security regulations, nationalism maybe promoted. Hence, encouragement of nationalism is, paradoxically, part of Europeanization. The external borders of the EU and the regulations connected to these, have resulted in unequal burden sharing in the outer regions of the EU, for example Bulgaria. This is however partially overcome by the process which is the second, different definition of Europeanization. This definition entails that the EU attempts to influence regions with its policies beyond its territory. As a consequence, fuzzy border regions are constructed. This may result in substantial stress on the external borders, e.g. the Bulgarian-Turkish border.
4. Securitization and Europeanization of Migration at the Bulgarian-Turkish
Border (Case-Study)
As stated before, the EU created or imposed upon itself two main tasks at the start of the refugee crisis. First, a balance between retaining human rights and securitizing migration had to be found. Secondly, thousands of mostly Syrian refugees had to be received in the countries within the outside regions of the EU (Nancheva, 2016). Because of the Dublin law the first country of arrival in the EU must register the immigrants and take care of the according asylum procedure, which may put substantial stressed on external borders of the EU, as stated before.As examined in the previous chapter, processes of securitization were influential for the development and completion of migration policies. Subsequently, these EU policies need to be implemented on a local level under the practice of Europeanization. Both processes affect borders, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. In this chapter, the Bulgarian-Turkish border and the influence of securitization of migration and Europeanization will be researched. The chapter is divided into three sections, based on the kinds of borders as defined by Nancheva (2016). First, the effects on the territorial border between Bulgaria and Turkey will be assessed. Subsequently, the organizational borders in Bulgaria will be examined. Finally, the conceptual borders in Bulgaria will be brought under attention, regarding securitization and Europeanization.
Territorial borders
As already explained in the previous chapter, a common counter action to great influxes of refugees is closing borders. Whereas the Bulgarian-Turkish border was quite permeable before 2014, Bulgaria enhanced its border control and increased the physical impermeability significantly by building a fence, installing high-tech camera surveillance and other border control facilities. In total, 160 million euros of mainly EU money was invested in improved border control and the establishment of fences and camera surveillance (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). The border control is of great importance to the Bulgarian government, since it attempts to show the EU its capability of guarding the external border – which shows its potential to enter the Schengen agreement. Additionally, as explained in the chapter on the Bulgarian history, the border has been under great stress for several centuries and therefore the border has just gone under a new process of identification for the Bulgarian people (Aleksandrova, 2014: b). The establishment of strict border control and the razor-edged fence are signs of enhanced securitization of migration.
Besides the physical improvement of the border, established with the fence and camera surveillance, the Bulgarian border police has been intensively assisted by Frontex (Nancheva,
2016). Additionally, 1,500 policemen were commanded to patrol in the border region (UNHCR, 2013: b). Also, at least 519 people were apprehended at the Bulgarian-Turkish border and Human Rights Watch published an article in which 177 refugees were interviewed. In these interviews, 44 push-back incidents were designated. However, Bulgarian officials deny that violent push-backs have occurred and claim that the article is untrue (Aleksandrova, 2014: b). More-over, push-backs were explained away by high officials in Bulgaria by the statement that Bulgaria is not able to take care of them. It was framed as if it were in the best interest for the refugees (Nancheva, 2016). Apart from the Frontex assistance and increased amounts of border police, also civilian militia patrolled in the Bulgarian-Turkish border region, as already mentioned in the introduction (Brandpunt, 2016). The physical border is thus highly securitized. In addition, the EU created a near-abroad region and influenced the immigration flows outside Europe with the deal with Turkey (Christiansen et al., 2000 & Alonso, 2016).
Organizational borders
As stated before, organizational borders entail the push and pull factors for migrants, but also the laws and regulations concerning their procedures, acceptance et cetera. This kind of borders may be seen as the hardest to overcome (Van Leeuwen, 2016). The organizational borders can be divided into two groups. First, how the immigrants are received and second, what their prospects are after acceptance in Bulgaria. The reception of the refugees in Bulgaria already starts before they physically try to enter the country. This is because they are described in the National Strategy in the Area of Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011-2020) as undesired immigrants. The strategy plan makes a division between desired and undesired immigrants which can often be translated to legal and illegal immigrants. Refugees belong to the second group (Aleksandrova, 2014: a & Aleksandrova, 2014: b). In the summer of 2013, the general idea in Bulgaria was that the traditional (national) and the regional (European) aspirations about safety had to be instigated at the same time. Labelling and lumping the immigrants in correspondence with the strategy plan may be seen as a form of securitization. In addition, the State Agency for National Security has listed five national security considerations about refugees. These include financial threats, risks of terrorism, social tensions, the chance and negative effects of more criminal activities and the proliferation of infections and epidemics (ibid.). One can say that security thinking, also evident in these considerations, has overhauled the human rights of refugees (Nancheva, 2016).Additional to the National Strategy, in the Multi-Year National Program for the Use of the European Return Fund a connection between immigrants and threats is clearly evident in the discourse as well (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). Also in the ‘Report on the Activities Undertaken by the
Institutions of the State Power Regarding the Management of the Crisis Evolving from the Increased Migration Pressure’, composed by the Minister of the Interior in February 2014, the discourse is clearly relating to threat, fear and risks (Aleksandrova, 2014: a, p. 238): “… the word “risk” (риск) was used 10 times, the word “crisis” (криза) 14 times, the word “security” (сигурност) 14 times, the word combination “migration or refugee pressure” (миграционен/бежански натиск) 19 times, the words “threat” (заплаха) and “refugee wave” (бежанска вълна) each 5 times, and the “illegality” of immigrants was equalized with crossing the border (of a de jure state party to the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of the Refugees (1951)) without permission (MoI 2014).” The danger of immigrants designated by the above used words was also complemented with the use of a particular kind of words in policy statements stating the solutions. Words such as ‘action’, ‘countermeasure’ and ‘overcome/arrange’ are used regularly (ibid.).
Although the considerations entail powerful words, the politics remain dichotomous on migration topics. The progressive parties are behind the European migration policies, but the conservatives are quite critical and negative. Hence, the positive stance towards migration policies is visible through faster procedures once the refugees have crossed the border and less corruption, but not in the common stance towards the immigrants (Hristova et al., 2015). Both camps however agree on the idea that the European Union should do more than money transfers and appointing Frontex agents (Van Leeuwen, 2016). Noteworthy, European money still tends to disappear because of corruption, which also frustrates the Bulgarian citizens, as stated before (Nazar, 2016).
After the refugees have entered Bulgaria, they are housed in refugee camps. Due to the immediate required action and the fact that the refugees came in by surprise, the camps were long of insufficient quality (UNHCR, 2013: a & Nazar, 2016). Under the process of Europeanization and the requirements linked to the potential Schengen agreement accession, the shelters have been improved, although they are short term solutions (Aleksandrova 2014: b; UNHCR, 2014: a & Roberts, 2016). The facilities have been improved significantly, but the lack of personal attention to the refugees is still apparent (Roberts, 2016). Moreover, the requirements to eventually enter the Schengen agreement have generated more nationalism and xenophobia in Bulgaria, since it felt the urge to protect the border more intensively and implemented the EU regulations on migration security with more belief than may be necessary (Aleksandrova, 2014: b). However, as stated before, nationalism is implicitly promoted within the process Europeanization (Nancheva, 2016).
During the acceptance procedures, which took sometimes three to four months of waiting for some refugees, there is no access to health institutions nor financial aid (UNHCR, 2014: b). After the procedures, the prospects for the refugees are not adequate either. There is a lack of integration
programs: accepted refugees need to leave the camps within fourteen days, do not get language lessons and it is almost impossible for them to find employment (Van Leeuwen, 2016; Roberts, 2016 & Aleksandrova, 2014: b). There may be a lack of sufficient Europeanization, but EU guidelines and directives will not overcome these problems due to the Bulgarian culture which is too xenophobic and nationalistic (Roberts, 2016), or due to a lack of resources in the country (Van Leeuwen, 2016 & Nancheva, 2016).
Conceptual borders
The extent of securitization of migration and Europeanization in Bulgaria may also be evident in how refugees are illustrated or conceptualized. Nancheva (2016) calls this conceptual borders, as stated before. The fear against refugees and the urge to protect Bulgaria as a nation, were visible in several protests, the common stances towards refugees and the media coverage. As shown in the previous section, migration was perceived as a risk in the Bulgarian politics. In addition, 23 percent of the Bulgarian people saw immigration as a problem on a national level, but only one percent saw terrorism as a realistic threat. Both immigration and terrorism were not seen as a threat on a personal level (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). However, there were several nationalistic and xenophobic protests in Sofia by the political party Ataka. They protested against the arrival of the ‘others’ – referring to the refugees (Aleksandrova, 2014: a; Hristova et al, 2015 & Van Leeuwen, 2016). The Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO) and the Neo-Nazis (National Resistance) also held a protest march in the streets of Sofia against the so-called ‘immigrants terror’. Inhabitants of Sofia responded negatively to the plans to build refugee centers in the capital. On top of this, plans to open centers near the Bulgarian-Turkish border resulted in road blockages, life-chains and threats to kill refugees (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). Nancheva (2016) reports a protest in which three accepted Syrian families with in total six little children were dislodged from a small town in Bulgaria. This action was supported by the mayor under the statement to protect the local ethnic homogeneity. This negative stance towards refugees can be related to the history of Bulgaria concerning the Ottoman domination and thus the negative connotation with the Islam.Although these protests illustrate a negative stance, there were also people who felt the desire to assist the refugees during the crisis in Bulgaria. These people organized clothes collection events for the refugees and organizations as “Council of Refugee Women in Bulgaria” and “Friends with Refugees” emerged (Aleksandrova, 2014: a). In line with the responses from the Bulgarian politics and with the above information, the responses of the people in Bulgaria can also be characterized as dichotomous. The Bulgarians were either strongly opposed to or accepting about the arrival of refugees (Van Leeuwen, 2016 & Nazar, 2016). The positive responses mainly came
from the poor Bulgarians, probably because they were able to relate with the refugees on a socio-economic level (Van Leeuwen, 2016& Nazar, 2016). However, this is also an argument of the people who were opposed to the arrival of refugees. ‘We already have nothing, why should we help them?’ was a common thought (Nazar, 2016). This dichotomy in stances is visible in the media coverage during the refugee crisis, too. The most influential Bulgarian newspaper ‘Capital’ published an opinion series on the refugee crisis and whether or not European standards should be the directives in coping with it. The implicit goal of the series was to show the contrast between conservative and liberal Bulgaria. Eventually, the most votes on how to cope with the crisis went to the voice of ‘saving the refugees’, but also a substantial part of the voters saw the convenience and logic of nationalism (Hristova et al., 2015). Over all, the media repeated the common opinion of the politicians and therefore the refugee influx was presented as disastrous and a risk to national security (Van Leeuwen, 2016 & Nazar, 2016). The media in Bulgaria are focused on sensation and both private companies and the government have a big influence on what and how news is reported (Nazar, 2016). To discourage the unfair coverage and populism, the UNHCR organized a day program for journalists and news institutions in which the European press code was, among others, elaborated on (Van Leeuwen, 2016). It is noteworthy that after the Bulgarian government and NGO’s managed to overcome the first disasters of the surprising refugee crisis, the media coverage on refugees decreased significantly, which fits the sensationalism of the Bulgarian media. This meant however, that the less evident crisis of the refugees spreading across Bulgaria barely was noted in media reports (Hirstova et al., 2015 & Nazar, 2016).
Sub-Conclusion
Bulgaria’s initial response to the sudden great influx of refugees was to close the borders. 160 million euros has been invested in fences, camera surveillance et cetera. Additionally, the border control was enhanced with extra manpower from Frontex and Bulgarian policemen. Also, civilian militia were raised and patrolled in the woods of the border region. Hence, the territorial Bulgarian-Turkish border has been less permeable significantly.
The organizational borders of laws and regulations concerning immigration in Bulgaria impeded the refugees from coming in and settling as well. In official documents of the Bulgarian government, refugees were lumped with forms of illegal immigration and illustrated as ‘undesired’. Additionally, immigration and especially refugees were linked to risk and danger. These risks, according to the reports, needed to be reduced with ‘countermeasures’. Although these reports entail strong, negative words, there is still a dichotomy visible in the Bulgarian migration politics. The two biggest parties are either in favor of or opposed to refugee immigration. The positive stance is translated into faster procedures. In addition, international pressure from NGO’s and the European Union have resulted in better procedures and quality of refugee camps. Since Bulgaria is a potential
