Institutional fallacies in public debate. On unnecessary excuses when discussing political matters publicly.

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Institutional fallacies in public debate

On unnecessary excuses when discussing political matters publicly

Menno H. Reijven

Master’s thesis, 12-06-2015

MA Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy

Supervisor: dr. J.H.M. Wagemans Second reader: dr. A.F. Snoeck Henkemans

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Institutional fallacies in public debate

Abstract One of the most important aims argumentation theorists pursue is improving argumentative practice. This means that they should focus on improving individuals’ argumentative skills. This is, however, not sufficient. They should also try to improve argumentative institutions as these might encourage discussants to advance unreasonable argumentation. In this study, I address the institutionalisation of public debate. In order to be able to point to deficient conventions, it is necessary to be able to identify fallacies which are relevant from a contextual perspective. To address this problem, I will formulate a principle which can guide pragma-dialecticians to evaluate argumentative discourse in context while at the same time respecting that the institution should realise particular societal demands (like, for example, legal courts should aim at realising justice). In order to find deficiencies in the institutionalisation, I will compare the argumentative moves which are currently encouraged by conventions in public debate to the ones which should be encouraged given the fact that argumentative discourse in public debate should aim at as much critical testing of standpoints possible while respecting the democratic function it needs to fulfil. The dissimilarities are the relevant fallacies to mention in order to improve public debate.

Keywords “Institutional fallacies”, “Public debate”, Pragma-dialectics”, “Optimal critical

testing”, “Argumentation”

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Introduction

A representative democracy cannot function properly without a public debate: as citizens are not able to participate directly in decision-making, it is important that they can do so indirectly. Public debate constitutes in this respect a fundamental interaction between the governed and the governing. On the one hand, it allows citizens to freely discuss political matters in order to determine who would be a suitable representative in parliament to make decisions on one’s behalf. On the other hand, public debate enables citizens and politicians to continuously interact. Citizens may always raise their concerns and mobilise fellows to support or prevent certain policy proposals. This may affect politicians’ decisions in parliament, because to consolidate the power necessary to pursue their political agendas, they need to get votes through elections. Hence, citizens may argue in public debate to mobilise others in order to influence decision-making. They may as well try to directly convince politicians to change their standpoint. In both cases politicians may respond to citizens by advancing an argument which supports their own position.

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As public debate clearly has an argumentative dimension, theories of argumentation may be employed to analyse, evaluate and ultimately improve the institution’s argumentative discourse. The main rationale – from a democratic perspective – of public debate is, however, to grant everyone the freedom and equality necessary to participate politically. Hence, argumentation in public debate may primarily be aimed at effectively pursuing a particular political agenda and not at advancing good argumentation. Moreover, as politicians need citizens to consolidate their power, citizens do not need to advance a sophisticated argument to pressure them. Consequently, public debate offers citizens an opportunity to influence members of parliament’s voting by simply raising their voice. Politicians can, of course, exploit these voiced gut feelings for their own political projects as well.

Nevertheless, I believe it is not desirable to oblige citizens to improve their argumentation and force them to have sophisticated positions. In a democracy, citizens should be free. Moreover, their gut feelings, even though citizens might not be able to defend them by argumentation, matter: politicians should deal with such civil dissatisfactions. Yet, I also do not believe that it is desirable that a democratic society becomes dominated by “populism”: representatives should not simply do whatever the electorate demands, but should try to make good decisions given the preferences of the citizenry. Still, they should ensure that the citizens – who are not devoting their days to political decision-making – understand that the decisions made are relevant solutions to existing problems. This means that argumentation in public debate should in principle be aimed at arriving at better decisions albeit one should also be reluctant to blame participants when they are not – provided, of course, that democratic rights are relevant to the evaluation of the argumentative discourse.

In order to be able to improve public debate’s argumentative discourse, one should be able to determine which argumentative moves are good and which are bad. In argumentation theory, it is, however, still debated to what extent contextual considerations like democratic values should be acknowledged when evaluating argumentation.

On the one hand, there are scholars who argue that argumentation should be evaluated by norms which are instrumental to realise a certain argumentation theoretical ideal, like validity or reasonableness. Context may only play a role in the evaluation as long as it does not interfere with the predefined argumentative norms. These theories can be called argumentation-focused theories.

On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that argumentation should be evaluated by norms which are instrumental to realise a certain non-argumentation theoretical ideal, like justice or other specific societal demands. Since argumentation is supposed to be used instrumentally to realise such goals, it should be evaluated by whether it indeed efficiently realises those aims. For these scholars, contextual considerations are therefore most important to the evaluation. One may call such positions context-focused.

As I am concerned with evaluating argumentative discourse in public debate such that it can be improved for attaining democratic ideals, it is necessary to approach the discourse from a context-focused perspective. I want to primarily respect individuals’ political rights while evaluating the

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argumentative discourse. Consequently, because it is important in politics to arrive at good decisions, I want to be able to assess the argumentation by argumentation theoretical standards as long as these are not conflicting with democratic values.

The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (e.g. Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 2004; Van Eemeren, 2010) is with respect to this debate an interesting theory because both argumentation theoretical and institutional goals are acknowledged and studied independently. Yet, pragma-dialecticians generally defend an argumentation-focused perspective: argumentation should first and foremost be aimed at critically testing standpoints. The set of rules used to evaluate argumentation should therefore be problem valid for realising this goal. The role of context is limited to specifying an interpretation of these rules for argumentation in context (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 104). However, as both dimensions are recognised independently, it is possible to employ the theory as well in a context-focused manner by reversing the hierarchical relation. Then, the argumentation theoretical norms would play a subservient role to contextual demands.

As pragma-dialectics can be employed in both ways, the theory can address a greater number of problems which argumentation theorists may encounter than theories which can only be employed from one perspective. A context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics is, however, not yet developed. Without this it will not be possible to employ the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation to identify how the institutionalisation of public debate should be changed in order to improve its argumentative discourse such that the functioning of a democratic society will be enhanced. This will only be possible if one is able to identify fallacies which are relevant to mention in such a respect – that is, to identify fallacies from a context-focused perspective. The research question of this project is therefore: when is it relevant from a democratic perspective to highlight a deficient move in argumentative discourse in public debate as fallacious?

In order to answer this question, I will first, in section 2, discuss the debate between argumentation-focused and context-focused approaches to evaluation. Then, I will discuss the general theoretical starting points of pragma-dialectics and how the current argumentation-focused approach of pragma-dialecticians embraces these starting points. Lastly, I will try to define a ground for a context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics which should allow me to deal with the research question.

In section 3, I will first specify public debate as a democratic institution in order to be able to characterise public debate’s current argumentative organisation. As institutional conventions guide individuals’ argumentative behaviour in context, I believe that a good characterisation of an institution’s argumentative dimension consists of providing a comprehensive analysis of the context-specific norms for argumentation: hence, I will specify each pragma-dialectical rule of the “code of conduct for reasonable discussants” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 187-196) within the current institutionalisation of public debate. This will show which argumentative moves are encouraged by the institution. In this section, I will, however, only describe the institution.

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Lastly, in section 4, I will try to identify relevant fallacies in public debate from a context-focused perspective. I will employ the principles for a context-context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics as formulated in section 2 to specify what the argumentative discourse should be aimed at. Then, I will determine whether the rules as formulated in section 3 are instrumental to realise this goal. The argumentative moves which obstruct this goal and are encouraged by the conventions of the institution will be the relevant fallacies to mention from a context-focused perspective.

In the conclusion, I will situate my findings in the context of the debate on how to evaluate public debate and – more generally – argumentation in context. Moreover, I will discuss how the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation can benefit from these insights. Lastly, I will show how the findings can help to suggest improvements for the institutionalisation of public debate.

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Pragma-dialectical evaluation in context

2.1 The role of context in evaluation

In argumentation theory, there is a debate on to what extent contextual considerations should be included in an evaluation of argumentative discourse. It is possible to describe the debate by sketching two basic positions with regard to the question how argumentative and contextual demands should be balanced in order to determine whether a particular argumentative move is fallacious. Of course, there might be many disagreements within each position, but this distinction suffices to highlight each side’s basic assumption.

On the one hand, it is possible to categorise theories by their having an argumentation-focused perspective on the evaluation of argumentative discourse. This concretely means that within these theories argumentation theoretical demands are prioritised over contextual demands. As a result, the evaluation is guided by a normative argumentative ideal which should be aimed at when someone advances argumentation. These theories evaluate argumentative discourse by means of norms which are instrumental to realising the predefined theoretical aim. Concretely, this means that such general rules are employed to determine whether an argument is good or bad: if a discussant breaks such a rule, the argumentative move is fallacious.

Still, theories within this category may differ to a large extent. Although, in principle, in every context argumentation should be evaluated by the same normative argumentation theoretical principles, some theories grant a role to contextual considerations. Yet, the role context may play in evaluation cannot be but rather limited: it may define a common ground arguers have, but the general rules for evaluation should remain untouched by the context. All theories within this category have in common that for evaluation, an argumentation theoretical standard should principally be used.

On the other hand, theories might approach the evaluation of argumentative discourse as well from a context-focused perspective. Such theories share the presupposition that argumentation should be evaluated by the goal it is supposed to aim at given the institutional demands. This means that

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contextual demands are prioritised over argumentation theoretical ones. Then, context is the primary standard for determining whether a move is fallacious. The basic idea behind such positions is that fallacy judgments differ in different contexts – e.g. there are moves which are fallacious in a court of justice, but perfectly acceptable in a parliamentary debate – because the argumentation is supposed to realise a different goal as it is part of a different institution. Yet, in this category, theories differ as well. That one primarily cares about realising institutional goals instead of argumentative goals does not necessarily mean that an argumentative ideal is not desirable at all. In order to realise institutional goals, it might be necessary to aim at argumentation theoretical goals to some extent.

Although I need to take a context-focused perspective in order to identify relevant fallacies in public debate from a democratic perspective, I believe that, in order to establish a normative judgment on the institutionalisation of public debate with respect to the argumentative moves it encourages discussants to make, it is necessary to include argumentation theoretical considerations as well. To understand why, consider the context-focused approach of Walton (1992). He does not acknowledge an argumentative dimension independently from argumentative practice (e.g. Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007, p. 64). He argues that argumentation is always part of some “type of dialogue” which is aimed at realising a particular collective goal (Walton, 1992, p. 133). Walton therefore integrates these argumentative dimensions into the description of various types of dialogue in which it is instrumental to advance argumentation to realise the goal of the dialogue. According to him, this is the only normative standard available to evaluate argumentation: it should simply be instrumental to realise such contextual aims.

The main problem with positions such as Walton’s (1992) is that they cannot account for a fundamental intuition with regards to argumentation: there are general argumentative norms which determine fallaciousness (see e.g. Van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels, 2011). Is it not the case that in a quarrel many moves would (and should) be qualified as fallacious – not because these are obstructing the goal of a quarrel, but because these moves are bad argumentation in general? When something is a fallacy, something is going wrong in an argumentative sense – not with respect to some other goal. In order to account for these intuitions, a context-focused approach needs to employ general argumentative norms at least to some extent.

I believe that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; 2004; Van Eemeren, 2010) is able to sustain such a context-focused perspective because it acknowledges that argumentation has both a normative argumentative dimension and a contextual one. As Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2007, p. 64) write:

We make, in fact, a radical distinction between, on the one hand, the model of a critical discussion, which represents an analytic ideal, and, on the other hand, empirical argumentative activity types, which are to be found in the reality of argumentative praxis.

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Consequently, pragma-dialecticians recognise two kinds of goals for which discussants may employ argumentation: there is, on the one hand, an argumentation theoretical goal, and, on the other hand, an institutional goal. As these goals are not identical, they cannot both be realised to a full extent. Consequently, the argumentation theorist has to choose which goal should be given priority, because there is no a priori reason to suppose that one is more important than the other. Hence, pragma-dialecticians can position themselves at either side of the debate.

Yet, pragma-dialecticians are generally favouring an argumentation-focused position as they would prioritise the normative ideal instead of contextual considerations. Consequently, a context-focused interpretation is not yet developed. Below, I therefore discuss the current argumentation-focused pragma-dialectical approach to fallacies in order to adapt it as such that it can be employed to study the argumentative discourse in public debate from a democratic perspective.

2.2 The pragma-dialectical approach to fallacies

Within the pragma-dialectical theory argumentation is defined both as a dialectic activity and as a pragmatic activity. These are fundamental presuppositions which should be respected by any pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. The pragma-dialectical perspective means that pragma-dialecticians assume that argumentation is essentially an activity to systematically “attempt to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a critical discussion” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 95). Consequently, for pragma-dialecticians, the ideal model of a critical discussion is the normative standard used for evaluation of argumentative discourse. The pragmatic perspective on argumentation enables pragma-dialecticians to account for the empirical dimension as well: it is seen as a linguistic feature used by speakers to attain various goals. Hence, pragma-dialecticians recognise that discussants will not only aim at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, but also at other goals. The ideal model for the evaluation of argumentative discourse is defined by a set of 15 rules (idem, pp. 135-157) which constitutes a procedure which ensures that standpoints are maximally

critically tested (idem, p. 57). In other words, this model is problem valid for resolving a difference of

opinion on the merits. Any interpretation of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation should therefore acknowledge the relevance of the ideal model of critical discussion as it is presupposed that argumentation should aim at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits. The normative standard which results from employing the rules of the ideal model is called reasonableness: “the sound use of the faculty of reasoning” (idem, p. 124, italics in original).

This ideal model is embedded within the philosophical tradition of critical rationalism. As the model ensures maximal critical testing, when employing these rules, one will attain the critical scrutiny demanded by critical rationalists. For pragma-dialecticians as well as other critical rationalists, the ideal of critical scrutiny is considered to be of fundamental importance because of a firm belief in human fallibility – that is, that ideas can never be confirmed definitively. Any approach which does not is doomed to having to resort to doubtful solutions to justify belief (idem, p. 131).

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Then, belief has either to be justified by circular reasoning or by arbitrarily declaring something axiomatic. Otherwise, the resulting argument will suffer from infinite regress because it cannot find a solid ground.

Critical scrutiny is according to critical rationalists an alternative to finding definitive legitimisation of standpoints because it enables discussants to overcome their difference of opinion. This means that standpoints are not justified objectively, but relatively: someone is justified in assuming a certain position because it has survived critical testing better than its alternatives. Still, because justification is grounded in procedure, rather than content, critical testing of a standpoint will never end: any outcome of a critical discussion can be challenged later on again.

Since critical scrutiny is highly valued by pragma-dialecticians, each move which hinders the process of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits should be called a fallacy. Fallacies are simply obstructions or deficient moves in argumentative discourse with respect to the argumentative ideal. Concretely, this means that whenever an argumentative move undermines a rule of the ideal model of a critical discussion, it should be labelled as fallacious, because, since the model is problem valid, such a violation will make the resolution of the difference of opinion more difficult (idem, p. 162).

Both an argumentation-focused and a context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics should acknowledge these theoretical starting points. First, argumentative discourse is a dialectical activity – which means that it should be aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits. Second, pragma-dialecticians must recognise that discussants may have other goals as well. Third, the integration of these two dimensions should respect that the theory belongs to the tradition of critical rationalism. Hence, due to the dialectical perspective and importance of critical scrutiny in pragma-dialectics, the evaluation of argumentative discourse from any pragma-dialectical perspective should be grounded in employing the ideal model of a critical discussion such that it justifies belief.

Within an argumentation-focused perspective, these presuppositions are easily acknowledged. Then, argumentation would always be subjected to the norms of the ideal model and should consequently always aim at maximal critical testing. Yet, due to the fact that the pragma-dialectical theory has incorporated a pragmatic perspective on argumentation as well, the context should also be considered when evaluating argumentative discourse. It may, however, never undermine the rules of the ideal model when approaching argumentation from an argumentation-focused perspective.

In order to properly evaluate argumentative discourse, it is therefore important to clearly distinguish two types of norms (Snoeck Henkemans & Wagemans, to appear, p. 5). On the one hand, there are rules, which are prescriptive in nature; on the other hand, there are criteria, which are descriptive in nature. These rules are the rules of the ideal model of a critical discussion. In principle, the rules are supplemented by criteria (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 104) to specify how the rules for argumentation should be interpreted within the context because it should be clarified which argumentative moves in context exactly count as a norm-violation.

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Conventions of the institutionalised context may of course affect argumentation on each level: conventions may be definitional in nature (and operate on the level of criteria), but might as well be normative (and operate on the level of rules). Consequently, Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (to appear, pp. 5-8), argue that it is possible to identify three ways in which conventions may affect the norms of argumentative discourse.

First of all, conventions may operate on the level of criteria. As criteria are definitional in nature, they can be easily justified: these conventions simply clarify what is already regarded as accepted within a particular context. As a consequence, besides general criteria which are included in the ideal model of a critical discussion, there will be context-specific criteria, which define, for example, what counts as a legitimate authority within a particular context. As long as the context only specifies criteria, the rules for a critical discussion will not be undermined.

Second, conventions may justifiably operate on the level of rules from an argumentation theoretical perspective. A justification might be that the convention is “a way of ‘repairing’ the non-fulfilment of one or more higher-order conditions” (idem, p. 6), because the rules of the ideal model of a critical discussion are only problem valid if the presupposed higher-order conditions are indeed fulfilled. Then, a convention contributes to a reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion albeit the rules for critical discussion are affected because without these conventions the critical rationalist ideal of critical scrutiny would not be attained. An example would be the institutional burden of proof of a doctor during medical consultation: the burden of proof is largely shifted to the doctor because there is a substantial difference in expertise between the doctor and the patient (idem, p. 6). As long as the conventions enhance critical testing of the standpoint, the ideal of the critical discussion is not undermined.

Yet, third, such conventions may also be unjustified from an argumentation theoretical perspective. An example is the time limit to discussions taking place in court: at some point, it is necessary to come to a verdict. Although this convention cannot be justified from an argumentative perspective, it is totally understandable from a legal perspective. However, as such conventions are not instrumental for maximal critical testing, pragma-dialecticians should acknowledge in this respect that institutions may to some extent encourage discussants to commit fallacies.

2.3 A context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics

This inevitable conclusion for an argumentation-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics is undesirable given the nature of the aim of this project: I want to identify fallacies in public debate which are relevant to mention from a democratic perspective in order to be able to improve the institution with respect to its societal purpose. It is unhelpful in this respect to conclude that public debate encourages fallacious moves because it does not encourage discussants to aim at maximal critical testing if it functions perfectly well from a democratic perspective.

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Of course, in a strict sense, such moves in public debate are fallacious because the ideal model is the normative standard to evaluate discourse; but when evaluating, some of these moves should not result in a fallacy judgment because mentioning them is not relevant given the reason why the institution exists. I want to identify fallacies which have to be resolved from a contextual perspective without having to resort to the conclusion that it might be a good thing to commit fallacies. Since pragma-dialectics cannot yet explain how one could deal with this problem, it is necessary to formulate a context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics in order to give a context-focused account of fallacies.

Given that one takes a democratic perspective on argumentative discourse in public debate, it would also be unfair to judge participants in public debate primarily by the standards of the ideal model of a critical discussion: the conventions in public debate demand the participants to realise a political ideal (for which the institutionalisation should be problem valid). If one would take an argumentation-focused approach, the participants would be judged by a standard which they are not primarily supposed to realise in society. Then, the norms of a critical discussion are simply projected onto argumentative discourse of which it is presupposed that it has been constructed by other (non-argumentative) demands.

From a context-focused perspective, it is fair to presuppose that discussants should not primarily aim at advancing good argumentation as the pragma-dialectical argumentative aim of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits is not efficient to organise everyday life. When having to realise non-argumentative goals, it is generally not desirable that a discussion goes on forever. In politics, for example, it is necessary to make a decision at some point; for citizens, there needs to be some legal security after a legal case has been closed by court. Consequently, this would mean that argumentative discourse could easily leave the realm of reasonableness without anyone who would bother. What is necessary for this project is to be able to identify fallacies which should bother participants.

When taking a context-focused approach, it is acknowledged that argumentation is primarily employed in society to serve other aims than resolving a difference of opinion on the merits. When individuals try to realise these societal aims, it might turn out that it is instrumental to advance argumentation – to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits. Consequently, one may assume that the pragma-dialectical normative ideal is only aimed at by discussants participating in argumentative practice if this ideal is helpful to realise certain societal goals. This means that in a context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics the ideal of critically testing standpoints has limited applicability.

Nevertheless, I fully acknowledge the abovementioned pragma-dialectical starting points. Although argumentation does aim at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, it is primarily a means to realise other aims. The context therefore determines to what extent the ideal model of a critical discussion is applicable to evaluate argumentation – the model is still the normative point of reference. Yet, because the model has limited applicability, it is only possible to evaluate

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argumentation in context when one formulates an amended version of the ideal model which is instrumental to realise the critical testing of standpoints required to realise the societal goal – a model which has incorporated the rights which should be granted from a contextual perspective. In this respect, it can only be emphasised that the model of a critical discussion is an ideal model: it will not be found in reality.

Of course, amending the rules is not simply an empirical endeavour. To some extent, given the societal goal at hand, discussants do aim at critically testing a standpoint. It might be that conventions lead to less critical testing than would be desirable from an institutional perspective. Since employing the rules as they are formulated in the ideal model is the most efficient way to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits – this means that if one has the same goal as assumed for the ideal model, then one should assume its rules as well – a deficient move from an argumentative perspective is relevantly fallacious if there is no institutional justification available or, if there is an institutional justification, a more reasonable alternative. I believe that the relevant argumentative aim when assessing argumentative discourse is therefore “not a maximal but, given the institutional constraints, only an

optimal critical testing of the acceptability of the standpoint at issue” (this suggestion has been made

by Snoeck Henkemans & Wagemans, to appear, p. 9, italics in original) – which, I believe, means that argumentative moves should only be labelled as fallacious when they obstruct the critical testing of standpoints in a way which is not necessary for realising the societal goal. When an argumentative move obstructs the optimal critical testing of a standpoint in context, it is relevant from a societal perspective to call it a fallacy.

By focusing on optimal critical testing, the argumentative aim is subservient to the institution’s primary aim – to what Van Eemeren (2010, p. 129) called the institutional point, the reason why the institution exists at all. If fallacies are beneficial to reaching the institutional goal, they will not and should not result in a fallacy judgment from a context-focused perspective. Otherwise, one ends up with concluding that many argumentative institutions are encouraging fallacies while it is not desirable to claim that these institutions should be improved. By assuming the subservience of dialectical demands, the pragma-dialectical theory can be employed from a context-focused perspective.

The subservience of reasonableness implies that the realm of critical testing of standpoints should remain within the boundaries of the institutional goal. Since this means that there is an asymmetrical relation between the two goals, it is possible to integrate them into a goal which can be used by the argumentation theorist to assess whether a set of rules is problem valid for optimal critical testing given the practical aims to be realised. This goal may be called institutional reasonableness. By focusing on this notion, a context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics still respects critical rationalist demands: standpoints will be tested critically to the extent which is required to realise various societal demands. This is sufficient, because, according to critical rationalists, it is anyways not possible to justify a standpoint definitively.

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Consequently, a context-focused interpretation of pragma-dialectics is grounded in what one could call the principle of subservience.

Principle of subservience

When evaluating argumentative discourse, the argumentation theorist evaluates it in light of institutional reasonableness.

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Argumentation in public debate

3.1 Public debate as democratic practice

Before it is possible to identify what would count as a relevant fallacy in public debate, it is necessary to describe public debate’s current argumentative dimension. Relevant fallacies are namely any discrepancies between the moves which are currently encouraged by the institution and which should be encouraged were the institution perfectly instrumental to realise its institutional reasonableness. In this section I do not make any judgments yet; only in section 4 I determine whether this adapted set of rules demands the optimal critical testing of standpoints in public debate.

The first step in this section is specifying public debate as a democratic practice. This ensures that it is clear what public debate refers to and what important contextual starting points are. Second, in order to describe its argumentative dimension, I discuss each pragma-dialectical commandment of the “code of conduct for reasonable discussants” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 187-196) in light of the current conventions in public debate. This shows what is demanded by the institution with respect to advancing argumentation.

When talking about public debate, one intuitively knows that it belongs to the political domain: only when people discuss political matters it can be called public debate. It is a free-floating exchange of political ideas which enables citizens to form an opinion and to criticise political agendas. In this respect, it can be seen as a preparatory stage for political decision-making: arguments are exchanged among all citizens which are input and feedback for their representatives in parliament who will be making the political decisions.

Clearly, public debate refers to a broad range of activities. On a large scale, they share of course the same conventions (i.e. laws), but in their specific instances there may be additional demands. I believe, however, that these activities can be categorised similarly because they all contribute to the overall purpose of public debate: to enable citizens to discuss political issues. On the one hand, each activity within public debate contributes to the discussion among citizens which enables them to make up their mind on political issues themselves. On the other hand, each activity enables a continuous interaction between citizens and politicians which may give citizens a chance to influence decision-making.

In order to clarify this broad category further, analysing the term “public debate” is helpful as well: it is a debate and it is public. Since it is a debate, it is about advancing argumentation. What does

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it mean, however, that it should be public? On the one hand, it might mean that the discussion is going

on publicly: it should be possible for everyone to access the argumentation advanced. This means that

it should be possible that the argument disseminates easily among citizens: it should be advanced through a medium which makes the argument easily accessible to any fellow citizen. Such media may range from a speech or contributions to an open discussion, to the mass media. Via such media – call them public media – anyone will in principle be able to assess and evaluate the argumentation, and if convinced, they might use public media to enhance the dissemination of the argument.

On the other hand, it might mean that the discussion is a discussion of the public – in the case of democracies, of citizens, who are the public of their chosen representatives. Discussions belonging to public debate should be accessible to anyone with respect to participation as it is necessary within a democratic society that the citizenry is able to discuss political matters as well. Hence, the demands for participating in public debate should not be too high in order to ensure this open access.

Recognising that public debate is characterised by open access, it is clear that there cannot be many prerequisites or obligations for participants besides the few laws which limit freedom of speech. This suggests, for example, that standards of decency should not and cannot be a prerequisite for participation. The main purpose of the debate as a democratic institution is namely to allow citizens to participate in discussions on political issues – not to force them to be reasonable or decent participants. There is an emphasis rather on freedom than on quality. Obliging citizens to give up this political freedom would be undesirable from a democratic perspective.

Below, I presuppose this characterisation when specifying public debate’s argumentative dimension by discussing the effects of its conventions on argumentation. Afterwards, in section four, this argumentative characterisation will be assessed by whether it ensures optimal critical testing of standpoints given the goal of public debate – that is, whether it is instrumental to realising its institutional reasonableness.

3.2 Interpreting the pragma-dialectical rules in public debate

Below, I discuss each commandment of the pragma-dialectical “code of conduct for reasonable discussants” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004, pp. 187-196) and identify how these rules are influenced by or changed due to conventions in public debate without making yet any normative judgments or providing justifications for such adaptations (which happens in section 4). I only want to find out which argumentative moves are currently encouraged by the conventions in public debate.

The freedom rule

The first commandment is the freedom rule: “discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question” (idem, p. 190). This commandment grants participants an unconditional right to share their opinion. This right is explicitly granted in many democracies by including individuals’ right to freedom of speech in the constitution. Yet, the right to

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freedom of speech is not granted in a full sense: it is limited by law in a few respects, like, for example, concerning racism. This means that it is institutionally encouraged to respond to a protagonist: “you are not allowed to say that, because it is racist”. It is similarly possible to criticise doubts raised by an antagonist by claiming that it is unlawful.

It is not really clear to what extent laws influence the freedom rule. Although legal courts establish the formal scope of these laws, judgments are not necessarily consistent. Within this domain, freedom should in principle not be limited by further ethical considerations. As it seems that it is rather difficult to convict someone for advancing such “forbidden standpoints”, the realm of freedom of speech is still quite extensive.

Moreover, due to the fact that such formal conventions encourage certain argumentative behaviour, such legal rights can be used as well by participants for rhetorical purposes while not being dialectically sound (see for example Van Laar, 2006). The existence of freedom of speech limiting laws may therefore introduce moral considerations in the domain of freedom of speech. Of course, such moves are not always accepted by discussants, because the right to freedom of speech is explicitly mentioned as civil right and can therefore be used as well as part of an argumentative strategy. Consequently, this might be used to convince the discussant that it is not justified to refer to the mentioned law in this case. Hence, albeit institutionalised moral considerations may affect evaluation of argumentation in public debate, the political right to freedom of speech may do this as well. Yet, albeit it is rather unclear to what extent laws influence the freedom rule because citizens will themselves balance between moral considerations and civic freedom, it is clear that such laws limit the freedom rule to some extent.

Additionally, the political right to freedom of speech constitutes public debate’s open access by ensuring that there are no additional preconditions which apply to the status of the speaker: everyone can join public debate, irrespectively of their education and skills, their ideology, moral preferences or decency. Due to this right, it is possible to realise the democratic goal of public debate that every citizen can participate in politics.

The political right to freedom of speech also ensures that no one can forbid anyone to reopen a discussion as there is in public debate – due to its opinion-forming character – no pressure to come to a decision. Hence, in contrast to formal political debates, there is no time limit in public debate: issues can be debated continuously in public debate (Zarefsky, 2009, p. 116). This is even necessary if one wants to evaluate the voting behaviour of one’s representative in parliament.

In conclusion, the political right to freedom of speech ensures that everyone can join public debate and that issues can be discussed without time constraints. In principle, it grants as well that anything can be said, although there are laws which are limiting this right to some extent. Yet, conventions in public debate encourage discussants to refer to such laws as well as the political right to freedom of speech to persuade someone to retract an undesirable speech act.

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The obligation-to-defend rule

Insisting in public debate rather on freedom than on quality of argumentation obviously affects the obligation-to-defend rule: “discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 191). Democratic rights imply that no citizen should be obliged in public debate to defend his/her standpoint against doubts: there is no automatically assumed obligation to defend the standpoint if requested to do so, because citizens are fundamentally free. That discussants do not have this obligation contributes to public debate’s open access: no one needs any argumentative skill, or even willingness to argue, to participate in public debate.

Yet, it should not be forgotten that I am dealing with public debate: utterances are only analysed as part of public debate if the discussant anticipates at least some doubt – which suggests a difference of opinion. I am not dealing with a simply random shouting of words. This means that in order for a speech act to be analysed as a contribution to public debate, the protagonist needs to be prepared to at least assume some burden of proof when requested to do so, however minimal.

As discussants cannot be obliged to develop a fully-fledged argument in favour of a standpoint which resolves the difference of opinion, one cannot ensure that any standpoint will be properly defended at all (see also Zarefsky, 2009, p. 120). Yet, when politicians would observe public debate, they are not going to consider every individual’s contribution; instead, they will consider the aggregate argument for a certain standpoint. This means that the argumentation is perceived as a polylogue (see for example Lewiński, 2010, p. 99), because it is then possible to identify stronger defences and more reasons for a given position. From a polylogical perspective, a standpoint has only to be defended in

principle: although a particular individual might not be able to assume the required burden of proof, in

order to have a politically successful argument there should still be someone who defends the standpoint against criticism. Consequently, this suggests that one could distinguish between individual and collective argumentative obligations. In this way, the argumentation theorist can demand critical scrutiny to political standpoints in public debate while respecting democratic demands of freedom and accessibility in public debate.

Rule 1

“Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question”

a. This right is unconditional because there are no requirements pertaining to the status of the participant.

b. This right is in principle unconditional because every standpoint is justified to be advanced by the political right to freedom of speech except when specified by law.

c. This right is unconditional because there is no time limit to a discussion taking place in public debate.

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The standpoint rule

The third pragma-dialectical rule, the standpoint rule, states that “attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 191). In public debates, like in various other political contexts, this right is slightly amended: standpoints can be assigned due to one’s membership of, for example, a political party (Mohammed, 2009, p. 132) or a trade union. This does not mean, however, that the discussant is necessarily bound to this standpoint: if not, (s)he needs to explain this discrepancy. Of course, for some actors this cannot be done so easily: a member of parliament cannot as simply deny such standpoints as a passive member of the same political party.

The relevance rule

The fourth commandment is the relevance rule: “standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or non-argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 192). To what extent is this rule applicable given that citizens’ freedom and public debate’s accessibility are of primary importance? I distinguish again between what the individual should do and what should be done collectively.

As said, individually, citizens should at least be willing to advance some minimal amount of argumentation to participate in public debate. Although it will be impossible to oblige discussants to advance relevant premises given one’s democratic freedoms, a proposition in defence of the standpoint should still be relevant in some respect: arguers do not have to justify their claim, but they should be willing to legitimise it. Ieţcu-Fairclough (2009, p. 131) argues that something counts as a legitimation when it “[supports] a normative claim by invoking publicly shared systems of norms, values or beliefs which can in turn be justified as worthy of being publicly shared” (italics in original). Hence, citizens only need to explain why their thought is valuable to public debate. The standpoint is accepted because it is worthy of being shared – not because the argumentation was convincing. Consequently, if a discussant refers to democratic values, it should be considered to be part of public debate, because it is worthy to consider the standpoint for political reasons. By insisting on at least having advanced such

Rule 2

“Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so” a. An individual protagonist only has to be willing to advance a minimal form of argumentation. b. A collective protagonist should defend the standpoint as long as an antagonist requests to do so.

Rule 3

“Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party” a. A standpoint of an organisation of which an individual is a member counts, for individual arguers, as

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a legitimation, exclamations such as “Fire!” are excluded from the domain of public debate. This would acknowledge intuitions that only politically relevant information is part of public debate.

Although individuals may advance such legitimations, a standpoint cannot be defended by the collective protagonist by simply stating “because many people believe this”, “because no one dares to defend this”, or “I have the right to say this”. For the collective protagonist, such moves are fallacious because they do not contribute to improving the quality of political decisions. Such speech acts will therefore generally not be included in the reconstruction of the polylogue.

The unexpressed-premise rule

Since public debate should be analysed as a polylogue, evaluation by the unexpressed-premise rule – “discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 192) – must be adapted as well. Since discussants belong to a collective protagonist, premises advanced by people defending the same standpoint may be assumed for any individual discussant defending the same standpoint. However, discussants can easily dissociate themselves from such premises by explaining why one is not willing to defend that premise. Then, that discussion will be postponed in order to be dealt with by another discussant who participates in this collective protagonist.

The starting-point rule

The sixth commandment, the starting-point rule, states that “discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point” (idem, 2004, p. 193). Within public debate, one may assume that democratic principles count as accepted starting points. When considering a legitimation, just referring to democratic principles will be enough. The collective protagonist may employ these principles within a larger argumentative

Rule 4

“Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint”

a. A contribution of an individual arguer is relevant if it is legitimised.

Rule 5

“Discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises”

a. Discussants can be held accountable for premises uttered by other members of their collective protagonist.

b. Discussants may dissociate themselves from such premises by explaining why they are not willing to defend this premise.

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constellation – but simply referring to those principles will of course not be enough to sufficiently justify a standpoint.

Moreover, individual arguers may simply assume the starting points of the electorate they are aiming at because in democracies the focus in politics is on mobilising individuals to pursue a political agenda (e.g. Ieţcu-Fairclough, 2009). If argumentation is employed to achieve this aim, it is not fallacious – for individuals – to use starting points which are beneficial in this respect. Even if the antagonist does not belong to this set of individuals, the individual arguer has sufficiently defended the standpoint to leave the discussion as it functions as a legitimation. Again, this does not lead to a conclusive defence for a collective protagonist.

Commandments 7, 8 and 10 are not really affected by conventions in public debate. Still, a remark should be made concerning commandment 7 and 8. The validity rule – “reasoning that in an argumentation is presented as formally conclusive may not be invalid in a logical sense” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 193) – as well as the argument scheme rule – “standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by means of appropriate argument schemes that are applied correctly” (idem, p. 194) – concern the determination of the acceptability of an argument. If the testing of the inference cannot be checked by means of logic, the discussants should employ another procedure to test the inference. As for individual discussants only legitimations are demanded, it is unclear to what extent those rules are applicable to such instances.

The concluding rule

One may say, of course, that an individual can conclusively defend the standpoint quite easily in public debate. Yet, such a conclusive defence does not have much value – when advancing a legitimation, essentially, the “real” standpoint defended is “I am allowed to utter x”. In the end, what matters is a conclusive defence on the level of collectives – because this contributes to decision-making. Then, conclusion of a difference of opinion only happens when both collectives agree on the outcome. It will be questionable whether any discussion will then ever reach a conclusion.

Yet, some issues are not recurring anymore and one may consequently say that a standpoint has been conclusively defended because doubts are not raised anymore – doubts have, however, not

Rule 6

“Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point”

a. Something is an accepted starting point for individual arguers if it is a value, norm or belief widely shared within the collective protagonist.

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been removed either. After in parliament a decision has been made and due to the issue’s diminished relevance the controversy may simply disappear (see Zarefsky, 2009, p. 117). Since participants are not acknowledging the debate anymore, I would say it has been concluded. Of course, at any point, the discussion can be reopened.

By having discussed each commandment of the “code of conduct for reasonable discussants”, I have formulated the rules for evaluation of argumentation in public debate given its current structure. There are a few issues which should be kept in mind when determining whether these rules are sufficiently aimed at optimal critical testing.

First, argumentation in public debate should always acknowledge citizens’ freedom and public debate’s accessibility. Critical scrutiny may never be enhanced by obliging citizens to accept more argumentative duties. Consequently, although there will be large differences in expertise and skill among different participants in public debate, the experts and the skilled cannot simply be obliged to accept an institutional burden of proof because they are entitled to enjoy democratic freedoms.

Second, as public debate is a broad activity type various sub-activity types may confront discussants with additional conventions. Various public media which ground these sub-activity types can therefore be requested to employ additional conventions.

Third, there is a gap between the individual and collective protagonist which remains yet unresolved: no one is responsible for the collective argument. Consequently, practically, at this point, the collective protagonist does not exist but as an analytic tool for reconstruction. The amount of critical testing can be increased if it is possible overcome this gap between individual rights and collective duties without undermining basic democratic principles.

4

Fallacy judgment in public debate

4.1 Public debate and critical testing of political standpoints

Above, I introduced as institutional goal of public debate that every citizen should be able to participate in political discussion. When formulated as such, it is unclear how exactly argumentation theoretical goals are subservient to or instrumental for this goal – or, actually, whether such norms can be employed at all for evaluation. What is necessary, as suggested in section 2, is that the aim of a particular institutionalised practice is formulated as such that it incorporates the aim of critical testing – its institutional reasonableness. Below, a definition of institutional reasonableness for public debate

Rule 9

“Inconclusive defences of standpoints may not lead to maintaining these standpoints, and conclusive defences of standpoints may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints.”

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will be formulated in order to enable the evaluation of its argumentative discourse from a context-focused perspective.

As said, public debate belongs to the political domain. In this domain, individuals determine society´s future organisation. In order to make such decisions, a particular decision-making system has to be employed. Throughout history, this system has often been monarchical; in many modern societies, representative democracy – wherein mandated representatives vote on political issues – has been chosen as system to come to a timely decision. This system is characterised by a set of values, which is embedded in all practices which belong to the political domain. As Van Eemeren (2010, p. 140) states: “the general institutional point (...) that a great deal of the communicative activity types in the political domain have in common is arguably preserving a democratic political culture by means of deliberation”. Consequently, like all other practices which are part of the constellation of the democratic decision-making system, public debate aims primarily at upholding democratic values.

In every democratic society, each institution in the political domain – which can be as diverse as different forms of parliamentary debates, elections and public debate – aims at upholding the democratic values because each of those institutions has been established to guarantee the success of the decision-making procedure by fulfilling a specific function within the democratic organisation of the political domain. These institutions are therefore both being created by and recreating the democratic political order. Within a representative democracy, public debate enables every member of the citizenry to participate in the decision-making process and contributes thereby to the realisation of democratic values like equality and freedom: public debate enables citizens to participate in political discussions while still maintaining the efficiency necessitated by the size of modern society by organising the decision-making process via mandated representatives.

On the one hand, citizens can participate in decision-making by determining who would be a suitable representative to make political decisions on their behalf if they can freely make up their own minds. On the other, as Neier (1979, p. 149) argued, political participation of citizens should not end here. Public debate enables a fundamental continuous interaction between the government and the governed: the electorate should always feedback the people in power. There should be a constant dialogue between the governed and the governing in order to justify the decisions made by representatives. In contrast to the goal set by the pragma-dialectical ideal model, argumentation in public debate should not primarily aim at critical testing to make good decisions, but at stimulating citizen-involvement. Democracy is employed as a system because it is the only just way to come to a decision. Hence, public debate has a strong signalling and rhetorical dimension which enables citizens (including politicians) to pursue political agendas.

This is precisely why Plato opposed a democratic organisation of the political domain: it does not lead to good policy. In his The Republic (1894, p. 141), he argued that philosopher-kings should rule a society: as they would receive a life-long training and have the right nature for this task, the

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quality of political decisions would be as high as possible. Nowadays, such a system would be considered to be unjust – but is it really not desirable to ensure good decisions to some extent?

The question is whether there is a quality-ensuring system which is democratically justified. Unfortunately, the basic democratic mechanism, voting, does not necessarily result in good decisions. According to Concordet (Swift, 2006, pp. 213-214), voting results in good decisions if and only if the average person is likely to be right. By means of deliberation, however, it can be ensured that this is the case. By demanding that standpoints are critically tested among all citizens (i.e. a large sample), it is likely that the quality of decisions improves. This quality dimension of public debate should remain, however, necessarily subservient to other democratic values because otherwise its rationale for implementation – justified decision-making – is undermined. I would propose that institutional reasonableness in public debate is defined as “critically testing political standpoints in a fashion as accessible as possible to every citizen” – which allows the argumentation theorist to demand optimal critical testing in public debate.

4.2 Necessary fallacies in public debate

Since I have assumed the principle of subservience, the argumentative discourse will be evaluated by a standard of optimal critical testing – that is, with respect to the just defined institutional reasonableness of public debate. That does not mean that I agree with Zarefsky (2009, p. 120) that

it is harder in political argumentation to identify fallacious arguments, because derailments of strategic manoeuvring are in the eye of the beholder and are easily influenced by one’s particular political believes and commitments. Recognising the activity types in political argumentation, one must give the arguers significant latitude before judging them harshly.

Namely, since public debate may function as a quality-check in modern democracy, there should be as much critical testing of political standpoints as possible given the non-argumentative institutional aims. Within these boundaries, the analyst is justified to employ pragma-dialectics to evaluate argumentative discourse in public debate: there is no reason to excuse participants in public discourse from being optimally critical from a democratic point of view.

With respect to optimal critical testing, one may distinguish between necessary and unnecessary fallacies. Necessary fallacies must be committed in order to realise the institutional aims. Consequently, such fallacies should not result in a fallacy judgment in an evaluative analysis: as these moves are only fallacious from a strictly argumentation theoretical perspective, the identification of such fallacies in context has no added value from a context-focused perspective. When the analyst, however, discovers unnecessary fallacies – fallacies which are not necessary for realising the intuitional aims – it means that critical testing is suboptimal: there could be more critical testing than is actually taking place given the democratic argumentative constraints. These fallacies should result

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in a fallacy judgment by the analyst, because from a democratic perspective, these fallacies should become resolved.

Below, I discuss two changes to the ideal model which need further justification. First, the limitations to the freedom rule set by various laws infringe strictly spoken argumentative rights. This change cannot be justified from an argumentative perspective, because it is not compensating for certain missing higher-order conditions. Since the context is prioritised, this change can be justified by a contextual demand – in other words, it needs to be clarified whether these laws lead to necessary fallacies. Second, the lack of obligations to assume a burden of proof is problematic if to some extent critical testing of standpoints is desired. In the previous section, I already suggested that by analysing argumentative discourse in public debate as a polylogue, critical demands can be posed, but there is still a gap between individual rights and collective obligations. It should be shown that the right to not assume a burden of proof in public debate is an unnecessary fallacy if one wants to close this gap.

The necessity of limitations to freedom of speech by laws is highly debated in political philosophy. On the one hand, it is argued that such laws pose necessary limitations because otherwise the fundamental equality of citizens is undermined (e.g. Fennema, 2009; Fennema & Mausen, 2000). Such an account presupposes that political matters can only be discussed freely if all participants can join the discussion as equals. On the other hand, such constraints to freedom of speech have been questioned (e.g. Wijnberg, 2010; Storme, 2007; Neier, 1979). In a democracy, it should not be possible for any perspective to prevail definitively: it should always be possible to question anything, even standards of decency. This fundamental right is the freedom which enables individuals to challenge those in power (e.g. Neier, 1979). This perspective assumes that freedom is constitutive of equality: only when participants are completely free, they can discuss political matters as equals. At this point, I can only conclude that these laws might lead to necessary fallacies – for me, this issue is not yet resolved.

Second, the fact that participants do not have to assume a burden of proof would definitely undermine the process of critical testing. Yet, this is no problem at all if it is necessary to realise democratic goals. It seems that the lack of a burden of proof indeed only leads to necessary fallacies in public debate: each member of society is fundamentally politically free and should not be forced in this respect. No individual is bound to critically test political standpoints. Public debate only helps to

allow a critical discussion – not to ensure one.

By approaching argumentative discourse in public debate as a polylogue, the critical dimension becomes more important: arguments are advanced and criticised by collectives of discussants. This does not interfere with individual rights. Yet, this does not result in assigning any individual a duty to fulfil the collective obligations either. Although there is a democratic justification for freeing discussants from the burden of proof, it only leads to necessary fallacies if there is no alternative, more reasonable organisation possible which equally respects democratic values. If the gap between the individual and collective protagonist can be closed, individuals will still have their

Institutional fallacies in public debate. On unnecessary excuses when discussing political matters publicly.

Institutional fallacies in public debate

On unnecessary excuses when discussing political matters publicly

Menno H. Reijven

Table of Contents

Institutional fallacies in public debate

Introduction

Pragma-dialectical evaluation in context

Argumentation in public debate

Fallacy judgment in public debate