Challenging the state : using limited statehood to explain the rise of IS

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Challenging

the state

Using limited statehood to

explain the rise of IS

Master’s thesis

Author: Joost Kroon, BSc. 10823840

Supervisor: mr. dr. R. Manikkalingam Second corrector: mr. dr. M. Dekker University of Amsterdam

Department of Political Science June 26th, 2015

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“People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough

men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.”

– George Orwell

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Introduction

In the post-Westphalian world, we still tend to think of states as the building blocks on which a large part of the international system is based, and for good reason. They have without a doubt diminished in influence, but are by no means down for the count. Institutions like NATO, the UN, and the IMF have come to play a dominant role in the international playing field. The debt crises of recent years in southern Europe have shown the mandate of international monetary and financial institutions to try and solve the problems, rather than having each individual state perform its own negotiations to get its money back. Yet at the same time, single states like Russia and China are prevalent in international media, often because of a regional conflict. Russia has received a lot of criticism for its annexation of the Crimean peninsula, for instance, and China is under considerable criticism for its alleged annexation of many islands in the South Chinese Sea.

The question of what the state exactly consists of has kept many scholars occupied over the course of more than two millennia. Virtually no definition of the concept is free of normative bias. Definitions are often more about what the state ought to be than what the state is. At the very least, there is usually some degree of bias that stems from the way states are usually structured. Today’s Western state is no different. Many see it as a complete package that is internationally recognized, internally sovereign, democratic with free and regular elections, and has quite some other characteristics as well. While there are most certainly states who fit this description, the question remains whether or not this is definition is tenable.

The main point I will make in this thesis is that the way we think about states does not hold when applied to modern cases in international relations. There is a difference between the way we think of states and a way to think of states which is more in line with what the state is empirically. Some authors in the literature on this topic underscore this point. They argue that the discourse on governance remains centred on “an ‘ideal’ type of modern statehood – with full internal and external sovereignty, a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, and checks and balances that constrain political rule and authority” (Risse 2013, p. 1). The

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benchmark state with which others are compared is often a democratic and capitalist state governed by rule of law (Risse 2013, p. 3).

Authors with these viewpoints often see a discrepancy between this way of viewing states from an analytical point of view and the states we label as such in practice. Risse, for instance, mentions how most of the entities we label states do not fit the earlier definition. If we see a state as an entity that also provides services and public goods, a lot of states existing today would not fit the description (Risse 2013, p. 4). A movement that demonstrates this difference quite clearly is the Islamic State. This jihadist group is currently wreaking havoc in large parts of Syria and Iraq, in which countries the group has a large amount of territory under its direct control. From its very beginning, it has been very clear about its goal: the (re)creation of an Islamic caliphate. Achieving this goal requires not only military conquest. It also requires that the group act like a state, in the sense that it provides its citizens with certain provisions and commodities.

The discussion whether or not the Islamic State will eventually be successful in achieving the creation of a global state is not particularly relevant here. The key element that makes their case useful for this thesis is that they have set out to do so. As I will argue later on, a great deal of the tasks normally ascribed to the state have to do with the provision of certain services, like maintaining order and providing infrastructure. IS trying to do this on such a large scale is what sets them apart from many other armed groups. They might not be the first group to strive towards creating an own state, but the scale of their ambitions is virtually unprecedented in recent history.

At the moment, the group is one of the most important actors in the conflict in Iraq and Syria. It has become so influential that in fact, some have argues that it ought to be seen as a hostile military force, rather than an armed insurgent group (Bilger 2014, p. 1). I will argue that the main reason why the group has become so successful is because it is able to create a chaotic power vacuum in an area through covert assaults. It is then able to capitalize upon the power vacuum it created by moving into an area in full force, capturing it for its own caliphate.

Using IS as an example, I set out to prove that the model of the state as sovereign ‘provision provider’ is incorrect. I will argue that the most appropriate and empirically correct way to

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define a state has more to do with which actor has the monopoly of (legitimate) force than who builds roads and funds schools. Viewing the state in this manner also allows for an adequate understanding of the rise of IS. The main question is therefore in what ways the Islamic State challenges existing views of the state. My argument will consist of three general sections. First, there is the theoretical approach. It discusses a number of concepts that have to do with the features and functioning of the state. Respectively, the concepts of sovereignty, failed states, limited statehood, and state functions will be discussed. The discussion of the armed group as a concept will conclude this section of the thesis. Although this concept does not tie in directly with the previous concept, it is useful to have discussed what we are and are not talking about when discussing groups like IS.

My aim in discussing these concepts is to demonstrate how each of them can be used to define the state in the manner that is more in line with what we see as a state empirically. Sovereignty, the failed state, and state functions are each concepts that can be understood in various ways. For each, there are ways to interpret them that fall in line with the contemporary Western vision on the state, which is arguably wrong, as well as ways which better suit the minimum definition of the state. This minimum definition is a way of defining the state that fits all entities we call a state today, regardless of normative orientation. I will focus on ways to define the three concepts that fit with this minimum definition.

Limited statehood is perhaps the most important concept discussed in this thesis. It is a concept that offers an alternative way of describing a lack of central authority in a state. The larger the extent to which a territory knows limited statehood, the more absent the central state is. External actors are then able to take up functions of the state in that territory. As a concept, limited statehood is very versatile, yet also very applicable to the minimally defined state, perhaps even especially so. The concept does not have to apply to the entire territory of a state, but can also apply to a particular region, policy area, or part of the population. This versatility makes it very useful in my analysis. Relating to IS, for instance, I will argue that the group is able to exploit areas of limited statehood it has created itself by setting up a proto-state in those areas.

After explaining the concept of limited statehood thoroughly and discussing some literature on armed groups as a concept, the thesis will continue with the second part. This part is

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devoted to analysing the Islamic State. The analysis again consists of three parts, outlining the structure of the group, its tactics, and its territorial control, respectively. Broadly, the analysis will focus on how IS has been able to do what it does, and why it does it, in order to get a feel for the workings of the group.

The third and final part of my analysis revolves around applying the theoretical knowledge of the first part to the empirical knowledge of IS outlined in the second part. Particular attention is given to two subjects. First, I will discuss how IS has managed to exploit absences of central authority in areas of limited statehood in Syria and Iraq. I argue that this exploitation is key to explaining the success of the group. Second, I pay attention to what functions that are usually ascribed to the state IS fulfils in the regions it has under its control.

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Research design and methodology

The main question addressed in this thesis is how the Islamic State challenges our conceptions of the state. I have chosen to focus on the Islamic State as the group challenging these conceptions because of its extremely high ambitions regarding the creation of a new state. That is not to say there have never been groups with similar ambitions. IS, however, offers a contemporary example of such a group, and has a very high profile. Consequently, there are large amounts of information and analyses available on the group. What also makes the group a suitable choice is that the state it wishes to build is a new state altogether. The group does not wish to convert entire existing countries to their version of Islam, but rather to carve out a caliphate of its own with no regard to pre-existing notions of territorial sovereignty.

I will be using two separate research methods to answer the main question. The mainstay of my work will be a literature study on the Islamic State and several concepts that relate to the use of violence by states. This approach is most appropriate because of both the limited scope of my thesis and the goal of my analysis. It would not be practical to gather my own empirical data. Many primary sources would be in Arabic or other languages I do not speak, and there have been many who have conducted research of their own with better means and resources. It is consequently better suited to focus on secondary sources. Using sources from different perspectives will hopefully offset potential bias in my analysis.

The literature I would like to examine in my analysis of each group is preferably academic literature on the topic. This kind of literature can be expected to be accurate, and more importantly, not influenced by a political agenda. It has been written by authors with expertise on the subject, thereby making their judgement on the matter at least reasonably reliable. This also foregoes the necessity to conduct empirical research of my own on IS, which would consume time I might not have. However, developments around the group are still very much in motion during the writing of this thesis. Academic literature on the topic of this group is still quite absent in many peer-reviewed academic journals. That is why I have also used a lot of literature from different sources, such as think tanks and defence analysts.

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These are not necessarily as independent as scientific authors, but often contain a lot of relevant empirical information.

To complement and verify my findings on the topic of IS, I have reached out to several Iraqi citizens from Kurdistan with family in the Netherlands. The goal of these interviews is to get a view from someone who has dealt with developments in the region first hand, or knows closely some others who have. Their input will allow me to see in what ways the earlier findings based on the literature are actually true in reality. My plan is to conduct two interviews, so the findings of one can be balanced against the findings of the other.

Information obtained by these interviews will be processed in the relevant sections of my analyses in parts two and three, as those are the ones that involve empirical information on IS. The best way to allow this is to give the interviews a semi-structured format. This requires setting up questions in advance, but also allows the interviewer to explore meanings the participants give to their answers (Kazmer and Xie 2008, p. 258). Both interviews will therefore have the same questions, but not every question might be answered in the same amount of detail. Due to practical reasons, I have had to rely on e-mail to have the interview questions answered. Although this is not ideal, I have tried to circumvent any disadvantages from this format. For instance, if necessary, I have followed up unclear answers by asking the respondents to elaborate on them some more. Working this way also makes transcribing the interviews superfluous, saving quite some time.

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Theoretical framework

The main focus of this thesis is to prove that there are better suited ways of approaching the state as a concept than the way we approach it today. This way is rightfully seen by critics as influenced by, and based on, contemporary Western values like democracy, capitalism and freedom. Needless to say, criticism on approaching the state as defined by these values is not criticism on the values themselves. There are many states today that cannot be defined according to these values, however. We see Belarus as a state, while its president has been in office since 1994. China is another clear example, in which the Communist Party has formed the ruling elite since the days of Mao Zedong, while not allowing any significant opposition.

The purpose of this section is to evaluate literature on the state critically, while simultaneously offering an approach I find more suitable. This approach is based on the state as the actor who has control over the means of violence in a particular area. The actor who is able to successfully enforce his will by force or the threat thereof has the authority to call himself the state, I will argue. Note that I do not take the legitimacy of the force into account. Legitimacy is ultimately subjective. One may have a particular reason to believe a state is legitimate, but in the end, that belief is based upon norms or opinions. It is not based on facts that are just as true for someone with opposing views. Because of this, it is not suited for my approach here, as that is aimed at a minimal definition that describes the state in terms not subject to norms.

A total of five concepts will be discussed in this section. It will start with a brief history and discussion of sovereignty, explaining how to interpret it in a way that coincides with my aim in defining the state. Next, I will discuss some views on what the functions of a state are. In line with creating the aforementioned minimal view on the state, these functions will be focused on the state as the actor most successfully able to enforce its rules and decisions. I will subsequently discuss states that are unsuccessful in this endeavor in the part on failed states. My main point will be that in spite of attempts to nuance the concept, it is still heavily influenced by the contemporary Western conception of the state. I will then argue that the concept of limited statehood is more suitable for this purpose. This will be outlined in the fourth part of this section. It will conclude with a brief discussion on the concept of armed

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groups. This part will revolve around the theorem that there is no one satisfactory definition of this concept, though there are certainly groups that can fulfill functions normally ascribed to the state.

Sovereignty

Sovereignty is a concept with a rich history. Traditionally, the concept as we know it today is attributed to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Many think (and have thought over the years) that the signing of the peace treaties in Münster and Osnabrück resulted in a time-tested agreement of non-intervention of states in the domestic affairs of others. From 1648 onwards, states started respecting each other’s territorial integrity, staying out of each other’s business unless their own safety required them to do so. This idea is historically inaccurate. While sovereignty defined as non-intervention does exist, the concept of it only came into existence in the late eighteenth century. It was developed by Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss international jurist, and is therefore also referred to as Vattelian sovereignty (Krasner 2001, p. 17; p. 20).

Even so, while many think this form of sovereignty dominated international relations until the rise of supranational institutions (like the EU or UN), there have always been violations of the non-intervention principle. Something as basic as money lending between sovereign states can lead to situations in which the non-intervention principle is not upheld. Krasner explains situations like these as follows: when one sovereign loaned money to another, there was no higher authority to appeal to if one of the parties did not hold up its end of the bargain. That is why strict conditions were often imposed on the state receiving the money, such as that any income of that state should first be devoted to payment of interest. Such conditions are a violation of the non-intervention principle central to Vattelian sovereignty (Krasner 2001, p. 27). Krasner mentions many other examples of violation of the non-intervention as well, but mentioning them all would not be relevant.

Some of the classical thinkers of political theory have also hinted on what we now see as sovereignty, although they have sometimes not named it as such. In Hobbes’ Leviathan, he proposes sovereignty as a solution of the “war of every man against every man.” Note that this version of sovereignty bears little resemblance to the principle of non-intervention

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mentioned earlier. Instead, he focuses on a sovereign as the supreme authority in the use of legitimate violence (Hobbes 1651, pp. 84-85). All men are originally in a state of nature, in which there is no protection from the violence of others. Ensuring safety and survival requires the influence of a third party with the authority and means to enforce a social contract. This third party is referred to as the Leviathan (Hobbes 1651, p. 106). Pledging allegiance to the Leviathan means transferring one’s rights to it, in return for which the Leviathan will protect these rights. Such a distribution of power is present even in the most basic state. When one citizen is harmed by another, the harmed citizen does not have the right to enact retribution on the wrongdoer out of his own initiative. It is a function of the state to ensure that the wrongdoer is punished accordingly and the victim is compensated. For my thesis, the concept of ‘domestic’ sovereignty is most relevant. This definition, first given by Krasner (2001, p. 19) focuses on the ability of authority structures to effectively regulate behavior (by force if necessary). A state can be recognized internationally as the legitimate source of power over a territory, but it is only domestically sovereign if it can also regulate the behavior of its citizens. It is most relevant because it concerns the role of the state in the most minimal sense. In its most basic form, a state is only able to hold power if it has the means to enforce its will. This conception is vital to understanding the rise of IS, who, as I will argue later, consistently erodes central authority to facilitate its expansion and take up the role of a state itself.

Krasner also mentions other forms of sovereignty. I will briefly outline these and explain in what ways they can potentially be useful as well. International legal sovereignty is about the recognition of states on an international level. The more a state is recognized by other states, the more it can be considered sovereign on an international legal level (Krasner 2001, p. 19). In the case of IS, this definition is not relevant. Recognition on an international level is not what they seek. In fact, they could not care less. In their view, the only authority is that of Allah. The followers of IS believe their caliphate is the only legitimate state in the eyes of Allah, and all other states and international institutions are constructs of apostates. Recognizing their authority is heresy (Wood 2015). The concept of international legal sovereignty is therefore not particularly useful.

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Interdependence sovereignty, finally, revolves around border control. The more a state is interdependently sovereign, the more control it has over movement across its borders (Krasner 2001, pp. 21-22). Movement is defined in a very general sense, including physical movement of persons and goods without control of the state, but also information or data. IS, like many other armed groups, has set up their operations in border region. At the time of writing, the group has conquered so much territory on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border that it has become effectively obsolete. The interdependence sovereignty of both countries is severely violated as a result. In a sense, though, this conception of sovereignty also relates to the ability of a state to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. IS can easily control the border between Syria and Iraq because there is virtually no central authority who has the force to prevent them from doing so.

As mentioned earlier, then, what Krasner refers to as domestic sovereignty is the most relevant conception. In part, this is due to the concept of statehood. In a global context, functioning states are also assumed to be able to implement and enforce global norms and rules. Even in the discourse about fragile states, state building is seen as the solution for establishing or restoring order (Risse 2013, pp. 1-2). This reveals an implicit bias towards Western models of statehood. Risse uses the example of China and Russia: “We might find the political and economic systems of the People’s Republic of China and Russia morally questionable, but they certainly constitute states” (Risse 2013, p. 3). This means that even though both countries are recognized as states, they would not necessarily be states in the Western model, making this model flawed.

Risse consequently argues that the state in general should be defined otherwise. In a more narrow approach, he suggests that what is most basic about the state is its monopoly on the use of violence (Risse 2013, p. 4). Not only is this very closely related to the definition of domestic sovereignty Krasner provided, but Risse even explicitly mentions Krasner as the one coining this term. The use of domestic sovereignty in this thesis therefore describes statehood in a way that is seemingly free of bias. More importantly, though, it makes it possible to distinguish between what Risse refers to as statehood as an institutional structure of authority versus the kind of governance it provides (Risse 2013, ibid.). Somalia might theoretically still be recognized as a state from an institutional point of view, but in practice, it lacks any control over its territory whatsoever. From Risse’s point of view, then, it

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is quite possible to consider Somalia no state at all, since it provides no governance of any kind.

Clapham (1998, p. 144) argues that throughout history, so-called quasi-states have been very common. These might have formal territorial integrity, but in fact only exist by the grace of more dominant states, against which a quasi-state would not be able to defend itself. More dominant states often have varying degrees of informal influence on the behavior of a quasi-state. This view is based to a large extent on the system of two superpowers representative of the Cold War-era, making it anachronistic in today’s system (Clapham 1998, ibid.). It does not have to be representative of the international system of today to bring its point across, however. The idea that formal territorial integrity does not equal statehood is as relevant today as it has ever been.

State functions

It is argued that in its most simple and bias free sense, statehood is defined by the use of organized force or violence. However, there are many ways in which states can carry out organized violence. It is possible to make a division of four general categories, as done by Tilly (1985, p. 181):

1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force

2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories

3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients

4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state making, and protection

Each of these four forms of organized violence, in turn, can take many forms. Also note that violence is interpreted here more in the sense of coercion than as actual, physical violence. Extraction, for instance, can range from simple plunder to bureaucratic taxation. All of them depend on having control over organized means of coercion, though (Tilly 1985, ibid.).

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Principally, then, state making is a protection racket (Tilly 1985, p. 169). An actor demands patronage in return for protection from harm, either by outside forces or the actor itself. This can also be beneficial for those from whom patronage is expected, if the actor demanding it is their best chance at some form of actual protection. The view Tilly puts forward is obviously very simplified. It is predominantly based on the development of the early nation states in Europe from 1400 AD onwards. A great amount of modern developments are left out of the equation, such as the international cooperation that has characterized the international system since the twentieth century.

However, this model may still have some merit when applying it to the influence armed groups like IS can have over small (i.e. sub state level) communities. An intra-state ethnic conflict, for example, often involves armed groups exploiting ethnic sentiments for political goals (Blin 2011, p. 16). Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) illustrates this nicely. This group, consisting of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, was involved in an ethnic conflict in the late 1990’s. All of the four categories Tilly describes apply to the KLA. The goal of this group was Kosovan independence. This means that first and foremost, the KLA was concerned about the protection of the Albanian Kosovans (including themselves). The most important part of their fight was against Yugoslav armed forces (Özerdem 2003, pp. 79-80), which fits Tilly’s definition of war making. Although Kosovo was not independent at that time, it can be argued that war making does apply to the KLA. According to Tilly, it requires having clear and continuous priority as wielders of force.

The KLA also partook in what Tilly describes as state making. After the retreat of Yugoslavian armed forces, many Serbian Kosovans fled the region for fear of retaliation attacks, which became more and more frequent (Judah 2000, p. 74). Groups based on other ethnicities, such as the Serbians in Kosovo in this case, are seen as rivals to be overcome in the fight for independence. Tilly describes this as state making. All of the features outlined above require extraction. This too applies to the KLA. An important source of income for the KLA was levies that were imposed on earnings of members of the Albanian diaspora in Europe and the US (Özerdem 2003, p. 80), which fits Tilly’s concept of extraction very well. Of course, other examples of armed groups might not fit Tilly’s model to the same extent. There is, however, enough reason to say that there is merit in applying this model to different armed groups.

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This model, however appropriate, is only one model. A different account is offered by Poggi (1978). He describes two different ways of defining the state and the political. One of these ways, conceived by Easton, sees the state as a matter of allocation of resources. Resources can mean anything. They may range from actual, physical goods to abstract matters like power or rights (Poggi 1978, p. 2). According to the author, there are three ways in total in which their allocation may be structured. Most importantly, there is the third way of command. Allocation according to this way of structuring is done simply by order of someone else (Poggi 1978, pp. 2-3). Command is seen as the most important way of structuring because according to the author of this model, political allocations will necessarily involve the submission of one party to the will of the other. Effective allocations can only take place when commands are binding, that is, if the giver of the command can follow-up with punishment for non-compliance (Poggi 1978, p. 3).

The other model outlined in this chapter, created by Schmitt, defines politics along the lines of ‘us versus them’ (Poggi 1978, p. 6). Politics, in its essence, is all about a group deciding who are its friends and who are its foes. Ultimately, this depends on whether or not the existence or political activity of another group poses a threat to the preservation of a group as an autonomous, integral society. Political activity therefore comes down to ensuring one’s own preservation, which is the ultimate goal of the state. Decisions in the political sphere are therefore by nature existential. They are reactions to conditions imposed on one group by others (Poggi 1978, p. 7). The political overrules any other kind of consideration, be it economical, normative, or otherwise.

Actual armed conflict is a very real possibility in the Schmittian model. It is in fact no more than the “consequent actualization of foe-ness”, and a condition whose actual possibility politics presupposes (Poggi 1978, p. 7). All political conduct is the conduct relating to the possibility of war, and is superior intrinsically to all other forms of activity because it most closely relates to the preservation of the collective. Without this collective, after all, other activities could not take place properly (Poggi 1978, p. 8). Effectiveness rather than deliberation is key to this model, which is why the decision to label a group friend or foe must be placed in the hands of a small group, or preferably even a single individual. Any normative consideration in this decision is intrinsically irrelevant, and subordinate to practical considerations (Poggi 1978, pp. 8-9).

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The failed state

By contrast, the concept of the failed state is much more recent than that of sovereignty, reaching back only some twenty-odd years. Helman and Ratner (1993, p. 3) describe a failed state as a state “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.” They are characterized by civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation. The most apparent (and therefore most widely used) example of a failed state is Somalia in the early 1990’s. Insurgencies and natural disasters eventually led to a complete collapse of government and a descent into anarchy. Other examples Helman and Ratner mention are Bosnia and Liberia, whose “governmental structures have been overwhelmed by circumstances.”

This generalization has attracted a lot of criticism and sparked debate about the definition of a failed state. Gros (1996), for instance, mentions that “the circumstances surrounding state failure dictate how severe their difficulties will be and how much it will take to get them back on their feet.” While there is little doubt that the states of Somalia, Bosnia and Liberia failed in one way or the other, it would be a serious oversimplification to say that they have failed for the same reasons. Having established this, Gros then tries to offer a more accurate taxonomy of what a failed state exactly is. He does distinguish a common origin of state failure: “an overall breakdown of the corpus of formal and informal rules governing society, accompanied by the disappearance of formal authority or its emaciation.” It makes sense, Gros argues, to place failed states along a spectrum rather than piling them all on one heap (Gros 1996, p. 457).

He then proposes a taxonomy of five different kinds of failed states. The most extreme kind is called the anarchic state. These states have no central authority whatsoever, neither from an official government nor some other kind of (armed) force. Scarcely better is the mirage or phantom state. They do have some central authority, but it is only present in limited areas, like the protection of a despot and his followers. It is lacking in all other areas. Up next in the taxonomy is the anemic state. The small, yet important, difference with the phantom state is that in an anemic state, some state functions are still fulfilled, however scarcely and poorly, whereas phantom states does not do anything other than protecting its leader (Gros 1996, pp. 458-460).

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Captured states form the forth out of the five kinds of failed states. A centralized authority is present in these states, but fierce competition between rivaling elites renders it inoperable for purposes common to the state. Conditions like these occur when a governing elite uses government resources solely for the ends it sees fit itself, rather than those that serve the country as a whole. A fitting example is the genocide in Rwanda, where Hutu officials gave information to militias on the whereabouts of Tutsis (Gros 1996, p. 460). The taxonomy concludes with the aborted state. These have become failed even before the consolidation of state formation. Aborted states did not lose control over the means of force, for instance, because they have never been able to acquire it in the first place (Gros 1996, p. 461). The author remarks that although these are different categories, they need not be mutually exclusive. Their goal is simply to rid the concept of the failed state of oversimplification. This added clarification does not raise the concept above fundamental criticism. Call (2008) still believes that a “failed state” is a fallacy that misleads analysis. He points out no less than six deficiencies. One point of very fundamental criticism is that the concept implies some definition of a state that leans heavily upon Western values. These assumptions are problematic in the sense that they do not apply equally to every country. To some countries, they might not even apply at all. The vision of the ideal state is based heavily on features of Western states, with little to no attention being paid in failed state literature to past (partial) failure of exactly these states (Call 2008, p. 1499).

This bias is visible in the sense that the goal to work toward in restoring failed states is a unitary state. While this might certainly constitute the ideal situation from a Western point of view, continually working toward this goal in a linear fashion might actually have adverse effects. Some states that are seen as failed by the West might be better off on the short term with an institutional arrangement of a different level than that of the state. A country with stark divisions along ethnic cleavages might be better suited with an equal division of local power along these cleavages at first, before attempting to create a unitary state. Even then, it is assumed that there was a functioning state in the Western sense of the concept to begin with. Fixating on a unitary state when attempting to ‘unfail’ a state might negate a long history of relative stability based on cooperation on a different level (Call 2008, pp1499-1500).

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Also, the solution for a failed state is often seen as restoring or reinforcing order. If order is lacking, this could provide a solution. If a state regime is the cause of state failure, however, reinforcing the existing order means reinforcing the existing problem. Granting a corrupt government millions in development aid will do little to solve the actual problem, and might in fact make it worse by advancing abusive authority and fueling resentment. This is not to say that undermining state authority will be the solution in this example. Brokering deals with subnational warlords, thereby consolidating their power at the expense of the state, undermines the ultimate goal of a functional state just as well (Call 2008, pp. 1498-1499). It goes to show, then, that the failed state as a concept is somewhat hollow.

Limited statehood

When discussing the state, there is often an implicit bias towards consolidated statehood. This means assuming states as democratic, capitalist, and governed by the rule of law (Krasner & Risse 2014, p. 548). This is problematic for two reasons, Krasner and Risse argue. First, most states are neither completely consolidated nor completely failed. Second, there is no linear relationship between service provision and the level of statehood or state capacity in areas of limited statehood (Krasner & Risse 2014, pp. 548-549). Although these points make sense, they need some elaboration.

By the first point, the authors mean that statehood is no dichotomy. A state is not either failed or consolidated, but rather something in between. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the two core features of the state are the control over the use of force and the ability to implement and enforce rules and regulations, like Lee et al. (2014, p. 637) do. It is not true that states either have complete control over these two features, or none whatsoever. Many states have some semblance of control, but not enough to say that they are completely consolidated or completely failed (Lee et al. 2014, pp. 644-649).

This closely relates to Krasner and Risse’s second point. Lee et al. have examined the relationship between the monopoly of force and the ability to extract taxes on the one hand, and the provision of public goods and services on the other. They have concluded that such a relationship does not exist (Lee et al. 2014, p. 649). It is therefore implied that even if states have a strong monopoly over the use of force (which means they can be considered states in

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Krasner and Risse’s definition), they can still come up short in the provision of public goods and services (which means they cannot be considered states in the ‘consolidated’ sense). The grey areas that are neither consolidated nor failed states Krasner and Risse call areas of limited statehood. Areas like these are characterized by a central authority, like a government, that fails to implement and enforce rules and decisions, in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, or both. The ability of central authorities to perform these two tasks can be differentiated along two dimensions: territorial, which relates to areas of a country’s territorial space, and sectoral, which refers to specific policy areas (Krasner & Risse 2014, p. 549). It follows from this that limited statehood is a spectrum: rather than being present or absent, areas of limited statehood can have it to a certain degree, be it large or small.

In these areas, collective goods and services can be provided by a variety of different actors, not just the state itself. These actors can be domestic or foreign. Examples of foreign actors providing public goods or services are international financial institutions to religious organizations or multinational corporations (Krasner & Risse 2014, pp. 550-551). The goods and services provided can range from basic things like clean drinking water, education, or even security and law enforcement.

For such an external actor to provide these goods or services in areas of limited statehood successfully, three factors play a role: legitimacy, task properties or complexity, and institutional design (Krasner & Risse 2014, p. 547). Legitimacy is defined here in an empirical rather than a normative sense. It is not relevant if the provision of goods or services in a certain situation is right from an abstract, moral point of view. It is better to see it as something stemming from both the engagement of domestic actors in provision efforts, and the outputs provided, as well as the extent to which these outputs are seen as normatively appropriate by the target populations. These two dynamics are referred to as input and output legitimacy, respectively (Krasner & Risse 2014, ibid.).

Task properties, also referred to as task complexity, form the element that most closely relates to the actual provision at hand. Provisions can be ranked along two axes: the number of interventions necessary to provide a good or service, and the number of entities that need to be coordinated (Krasner & Risse 2014, ibid.). In its most simple form, a task would

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require one intervention by one organization, such as the distribution of condoms by a group seeking to decrease HIV-infections. A more complex task would be to decrease corruption in an entire region or country, as that would almost certainly involve multiple organizations performing many interventions. The fewer interventions necessary to complete a task and the fewer institutions or actors necessary to do so, the more likely a task is to succeed. The final characteristic is institutional design. It is a broad characteristic that refers to a number of things, but revolves around the institutional arrangement linking external actors to local or national actors. This, in turn, can include the degree of legalization or institutionalization (the degree to which procedures are contained in laws or conventions), together with the level of resources available. Structures like these can be provided both by the external actors or the ‘host’ state itself (Krasner & Risse 2014, ibid.). A jihadist group, for instance, could be very effective in enforcing order because the laws and rules it enforces are described in sharia law.

More precisely, there are a number of conditions to be met in order for any governance structure to be effective. External actors are more likely to be successful if their endeavors are 1) adequately funded and 2) coded in laws and customs to a large rather than small degree (Krasner & Risse 2014, p. 559). Further research of the second condition allows it to be defined more precisely. Governance structures are likely to be successful if the decision-making rules are precisely defined, if there are sufficient monitoring capacities, and if the institutional design allows for some flexibility to local practical conditions (Krasner & Risse 2014, ibid.).

The article by Krasner and Risse focuses on the possibility of external actors to take over functions of the state with benign intentions. They discuss how these actors can step in and enhance the capacity of the state by focusing on a specific task. However, it also has to be possible for a group to step in with other intentions by definition. Suppose Anbar province in western Iraq is an area of limited statehood because it lacks the provision of security by government forces. Under these conditions, it is very well possible for an external actor like IS to step in and fulfill that role for those who come to live under its rule. As long as the conditions outlined above are met, there is reason enough to believe the external actor

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would be successful in its intent, regardless of what it is. This is an important fact to keep in mind during the rest of the analysis.

Armed groups

The armed group as a concept is not vital to the analysis presented in this thesis. I nevertheless consider it of some importance to discuss the topic here. In some cases, I will be referring to IS as an example of an armed group. It should therefore be established what I am and am not discussing in these cases. An important issue with discussing the armed group is that it is a catch-all concept of which the specifics can be unclear. Analytically, it can be hard to distinguish between an organized crime cartel one the one hand, and a terrorist organization on the other.

Bruderlein (2000, pp. 9-10) provides a very minimal definition of armed groups, consisting of three characteristics. First of all, a basic command structure has to exist. Commanders of an armed group have at least some degree of control over the behavior of their combatants, specifically regarding their behavior towards civilians. Secondly, violence of armed groups is politically motivated. The main goal of the violence, in the end, is to make a particular status quo unsustainable. The third aspect mentioned by Bruderlein is independence of state control. This aspect is closely related to the first one. It can be hard to distinguish between autonomous pro-government forces and government-controlled groups. In the end, the autonomy of the group is decided by the measure of control the leaders have over the group.

Even when discussing a moderate attempt to outline armed groups generally like this, there are some aspects that raise doubt. One could argue, for instance, that it is impossible to make a clear distinction between political, religious and criminal motivations. If an armed group were to take up black market oil trading as a means to fund its struggle, it could be said that any violent acts by that group to preserve an oil field is not politically motivated. Instead, the goal of maintaining control over that oil field is motivated primarily by financial gains of the group, before it is motivated by a political ideal. There is also the aforementioned grey area regarding when exactly an armed group is state-controlled. It is possible that a state is not the official commander of a group. When a pro-government

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group is supplied by the state, however, it is easy to say that the group cannot exist without state help.

An equally broad (or even broader) definition is given by the International Council on Human Rights. They describe armed groups as groups that are “armed and use force to achieve their goals and are not under state control ” (Hofmann 2006, p. 396). This definition does not even factor in political motivation for violence. It would also be possible, for instance, for the mafia to be considered an armed group, even if their violence is entirely criminally motivated. Note that the basic command structure as described in Bruderlein’s definition is also missing. Any organized group carrying arms and acting outside of state control could be considered an armed group, according to this definition.

Broad definitions like these do have an advantage. The more specific a definition of an armed group becomes, the more likely it is to become politicized (Hofmann 2006, p. 396). Maintaining a broad definition makes it possible to steer clear of any such bias. Hamas provides us with a very clear example. This Palestinian group consists of two branches, one for armed and one for political conflict. Some countries label them both terrorist organizations (Israel does so most prominently), while others label only the military branch a terrorist organization, while yet others consider neither to be terrorists. Different countries give different statuses to the same group, which indicates that the label ‘terrorist’, or in fact any label, is very hard to define objectively.

Yet others try to work around this problem by defining armed groups as “insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations” (Shultz et al. 2004, p. 1). While providing us with a decent enough understanding of what an armed group is roughly, the problem is that this definition alone fails to detail vital specifics. A militia can consist of insurgents that others label as terrorists, that rely to some extent on criminal activities to sustain themselves. To be fair, though, the authors do try to give a more detailed taxonomy of what armed groups have in common generally, as well as what defines each of the four subdivisions they give to these groups.

Shultz et al. define six elements along which armed groups can vary: leadership, rank and file membership (i.e. whom does the group consist of), organizational structure and functions, ideology or political code of beliefs and objectives, strategy and tactics, and linkages with

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other non-state and state actors (Shultz et al. 2004, p. 17). They then outline the four labels they described earlier to such a length that it would be hard to do their nuances justice if they were to be summarized here. It is more important to point out a significant flaw in their work: a bias by omission. The authors of the paper are connected to an institute that is part of the United States Air Force. Any analysis is therefore focused on armed groups the United States armed forces might encounter in their strategic endeavors. Private security contractors, for instance, show many features of an armed group in the definition of the International Council for Human Rights. They are armed, are specifically created to achieve certain goals through the use of force, and initially operate outside of state control. However, groups that might also be affiliated with Western states are never mentioned. This bias is underscored by other definitions of armed groups as a concept. Vinci (2008, p. 299) describes them as “non-state actors that have the capacity for systematic military action.” This makes it possible to consider private security contractors like Academi (formerly known as Blackwater) an armed group. Armed groups also vary from non-state actors in that they are “completely autonomous and independent of the state and not subject to its authority whatsoever” (Vinci 2008, ibid.). This addition might raise some problems, however. If an armed group is supplied by a government in secret, can it be said that the group in question is not subject to the authority of any state whatsoever? If not, what is it instead of an armed group? While there is no question that armed groups can operate without state authority, this authority can take many shapes and sizes. Proving that a group is or is not influenced by it therefore remains very difficult.

In summary, it is hard to come to a satisfying and workable definition of an armed group for use in this thesis. Since the concept only plays a very limited role, though, this is not of too much importance. My main point is proving that the current conceptions of the state are heavily influenced by Western norms, and that IS provides us with an example of this point. In fact, depending on how one views the role of IS in the areas it occupies, it might even be hard to view it as an armed group in any of the definitions above. Many definitions of an armed group say that the group is a non-state actor. If you see IS as a state in the most minimal sense, because it controls the means of force in its territory, it is no longer a non-state actor. It would then be more appropriate to call it something like a non-state-like actor or something similar.

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The Islamic State

The second main section of my thesis is devoted to analyzing the group known as the Islamic State. As one of the crucial elements of the thesis, a good understanding of how the group functions is essential. I will be discussing a total of three aspects of the group. First, I will outline the structure of the group. How does it function? Also, how is its hierarchy formed? The second subchapter of this section will regard the tactics of the group. Specific attention will be given to the ways in which it has been able to conquer large areas in seemingly very short amounts of time. Finally, I will discuss the territorial control of the group. Where is it most powerful? What makes this possible? The information on which to base the analysis of this third part is potentially susceptible to changing conditions, due to the ongoing nature of the conflict. I will try to make this section as up do date as possible, but there is a possibility that it will no longer be after completion of the thesis.

Structure

Recently discovered documents reveal that IS’s success is partly due to a meticulous hierarchical structure. The Iraqi security apparatus under Saddam Hussein was a major inspiration for this model. At its heart was the idea that nobody could be certain he wasn’t spied upon, with everyone keeping an eye on everyone else. In the model, two forces operate in parallel. On the one hand, there is a regional emir (a commander) in charge of murders, abductions, snipers, communications and encryption in a certain district. This emir is supervised by another emir, active on a provincial level, whose job is to oversee lower emirs to ensure they do their jobs (Reuter 2015).

On the other hand, intelligence services operate in parallel at every level. There is a general intelligence department that reports to a security emir, who also commands deputy-emirs in the regional districts. In turn, these district deputy-emirs command spy cells in their region. There is also a separate division of “security officers”, who report to the emirs of regional districts. This allows everyone to keep an eye on everyone else (Reuter 2015).

This part of its structure is not what distinguishes it from other insurgent groups, however. Few have been this successful in actually conquering and ruling over large territories in both Iraq and Syria. In the territories it has under its control, the group seeks to implement their own political and cultural agenda. Their Syrian capital of Raqqa saw interference of the

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group in school curricula, for instance, and the creation of a consumer protection authority (Woertz 2014, p. 1). It also provides its citizens with some degree of basic infrastructure, repairing roads, and providing gas and electricity. An approach like this is remarkably different from other jihadist groups. Most al-Qaeda affiliated groups do have a degree of control over a territory, but IS is singular in their aim to create a state of their own.

The structure the group uses has very important implications for the tactics it uses to keep occupied territories under its control. As mentioned earlier, the group has a very strict internal hierarchy that is based on an earlier layout of the Ba’athist security and intelligence apparatus. A major benefit of this kind of organization is that with it, the group is able to maintain an administration that has been described by those who live under it as “fast and efficient”. All parts of the administration are linked, making it easy to share information between these parts, who seem to be working well together as a result (Lister 2014, pp. 25-26).

In Iraq, IS has benefited from a desire among the Sunni part of the population for a stable form of Sunni governance, as opposed to the Shi’a-led central government. This has created a void for the group to fill. It has eagerly filled this void with a combination of municipal administration and aid (Lister 2014, p. 26). The administrative governance it provides consists mainly of policing, religious education, settling tribal affairs, sharia courts, and other affairs. The aid the group provides is more basic than that, consisting of humanitarian aid in many forms, as well as offering the management of municipal facilities by members of the group. Setting aside the extremely conservative religious agenda, IS offers many of the provisions one would normally expect from a state (Lister 2014, ibid.). Although this is different from the way many other armed groups treat territory under their control, it is by no means surprising when you take the ambitions of the group into account.

Running the kind of operations IS does requires a lot of resources. The matter of financing is of obvious vital importance to its survival. Oil provides the group with its most important source of revenue. It is sold on the black market to a variety of different buyers. Ironically, the Assad regime is generally considered to be one of those buyers, because of its access to the power grid (Woertz 2014, p. 1). There are no definitive statistics on how much the sale of oil actually earns the group, but estimates range from $1 million to $5 million a day, with six

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out of every ten Syrian oil fields being under their control. Not only refineries and oil fields it directly occupies are factored into these estimates, but also by cooperating with people who have worked on these sites rather than seizing them (Woertz 2014, p. 2).

The sale of oil on the black market runs through a decade old smuggling network that runs through several countries, including Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran (Daragahi and Solomon 2014). Many see curtailing the oil revenues as instrumental to defeating the group, but the fact that the network it uses runs through several countries is one of many factors complicating this approach. Getting these countries together to discuss this issue would be a arduous task, even more so because a large part of the network runs through the autonomous region of Kurdistan. There are even sources who claim that the oil network is instrumental in keeping up the economy in Iraqi Kurdistan. The central Iraqi government is withholding funds meant for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), making the latter dependent on oil revenues, including those from black market sources (Daragahi and Solomon 2014). Ironically, this means that in an indirect fashion, the KRG is providing funds to the same organization it is currently fighting.

Some say, though, that this source of revenue will not sustain it indefinitely. Air strikes and oil price corrections are said to weaken IS’s market position in addition to the discounts the group already has to offer due to the low oil quality (Woertz 2014, p. 5). The Iraqi oil fields it has under control are not the most productive ones in the country. Those are located in the far north and south of the country, out of its reach. The Syrian oil industry was already in bad condition before the war, and has only deteriorated due to the persisting conflict. The amount of barrels the fields produced per day by 2013 had diminished to less than a tenth of the amount produced in 2002, the peak year. From a record of 677 000 barrels per day in 2002, production was at an all-time low of 56 000 barrels per day in 2013 (Woertz 2014, p. 2).

The group also has other sources of income that provide it with its funds. These come in many shapes and sizes. In the territories it has under its control, a ten percent tax is levied on all local residents and businesses. A special tax is levied on Christians living in these areas, as was common in times of earlier caliphates (Woertz 2014, ibid.). There are also more informal ways in which resources are acquired. Criminal activities form a large additional

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source of income. Looting, extortion, ransoming and trafficking provide the group with a fairly lucrative, though unstable source of revenue. It is thought that even before IS took complete control over the city of Mosul, it extracted some $8 million from local businesses (Woertz 2014, p. 3). Ransom forms an even larger source of income, and has been very important during times where the group had no oil fields under control. Some estimates put the ransom revenue at tens of millions of dollars, often paid by Western governments (Woertz 2014, ibid.).

Some doubts can be raised about the sustainability of particularly looting as a source of income. Only so much can be taken from those under its control before they have nothing left to hand over. The system of looting, then, can be compared with that of a Ponzi scheme (Woertz 2014, p. 5). A system like this only functions as long as there is a constant new inflow of money, in this case from looting. Looting becomes more difficult when everything has been taken already, necessitating a constant expansion. The group’s territory cannot expand indefinitely before it reaches some kind of limit, either internal or external. Taxing inhabitants of occupied territory only provides it with so much income. When compared with the ambitions of global conquest the group has, the latter seems outsized compared to its means.

Tactics

The Islamic State is comprised of Sunni Muslims. It has been so since its origin under the wing of (the vehemently anti-Shi’a) al-Zarqawi. This particular religious denomination is vital in the tactics and functioning of IS. The group has been so successful because it seemingly was able to exploit existing power vacuums, quickly consolidating its own overt presence, such as in the Iraqi city of Mosul (Lister 2014, p. 18). The overt presence IS had in Mosul after its capture only came after a covert campaign focused on the outskirts of the city that spanned several years, however. It is in campaigns like these that IS exploits sectarian fissures most efficiently, using its own Sunni background as a means to present itself as “the protector of true and pure Sunni ideals” (Lister 2014, ibid.).

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The means they use are partly dependent on political and sectarian context, and partly on classic terrorist methods. Much like other terrorist organizations, they use extreme violence like executions and suicide bombing, which they carry out in covert cells (Lister 2014, pp. 17-18). In Iraq, these attacks are predominantly aimed at Shi’a Muslims, in order to provoke sectarian backlash against the Sunni population. Attacks like these often result in radicalization of Shi’a Muslims, who then start committing similar atrocities and join militias. The ensuing violence further deepens the sectarian cleavage, further isolating Sunnis from their Shi’a counterparts.

IS was also able to capitalize on pre-existing tensions between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims in Iraqi society. Under prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Shi’a majority that had long been oppressed under the rule of Saddam Hussein began to seize control of the state. This came at the expense of the Sunni population, who began to feel increasingly isolated and oppressed. A fitting example can be found in the violent arrest of a powerful Sunni member of the Iraqi parliament in late 2013, killing several, and the forceful shutdown of a peaceful Sunni anti-government protest camp (Welsford 2014, p. 4). Developments like these have even led some to believe that the current situation in Iraq is not so much an uprising of IS, but a larger Sunni uprising which IS has been able to capitalize upon (Welsford 2014, ibid.). It is then able to convert the existing dissatisfaction amongst Sunni Muslims to a kind of tacit acceptance of the new situation.

It is possible to discern some similarities in the tactics used in both Syria and Iraq. The majority of their offensives rely on a tactic that is common among insurgent groups: clear, hold, build (Bilger 2014, p. 11). IS’s approach to this tactic begins with creating a power vacuum for it to enter later. The capture of Mosul was preceded by years of covert activities that did not just aim at instigating sectarian violence, but also at eroding the presence and authority of armed forces (Lister 2014, p. 18). This cleared the city for capture. The holding is done by moving armed forces into the area that is to be taken, often by force, and eliminating any forms of resistance. In doing so, IS quickly takes up a central role in local affairs. It then consolidates this role by offering dispute settlement, taking over industries, and many other local enterprises (Lister 2014, p. 19).

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A method of carrot and stick is used to quickly assert dominance in newly conquered territories. Overt displays of military dominance help conjure and reinforce an image of the group being in complete control, control that also hinges on strict enforcement of sharia law. The sale of alcohol, tobacco and pork is banned, attendance of the five daily prayers is made mandatory, gender mixing is outlawed, to name a few of the measures. Transgressions on these new laws are punished severely in accordance with Sharia law, such as by execution or amputation, with special police units in charge of enforcement (Lister 2014, pp. 26-27). Keeping ‘the stick’ in clear sight is what keeps the conquered population in line on the short term. Combining it with ‘the carrot’ is what ensures (tacit) compliance for a longer duration, and even a potential degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the Sunni population. A considerable amount of financial resources is spent on social provisions, such as sharia courts, hospitals, and public transport. IS also takes over more key provisions like electricity, gas, and water, as well as local factories and bakeries, giving them full control over the core needs of the civilian population (Lister 2014, pp. 27-28). The ideology of the group is also spread through religious education and Islamic academic curriculums, as well as public ceremonies. These ceremonies are used to hold sermons, provide free food for children, and sometimes to celebrate new pledges of allegiance by local dignitaries (Lister 2014, p. 28).

Combining these two methods of governance has made IS successful is maintaining a semblance of control and order over the territories it has conquered up until now. The kind of welfare and governance it provides is often an improvement of the conditions of the population. This is a crucial factor in the acceptance of the population of the harsh measures that come with it (Lister 2014, pp. 28-29). Compared to the alternative of instability and lawlessness, IS often comes across as a somewhat acceptable option for many Sunni Muslims, at least on the short term. The actual government of the state is often seen by Sunnis as repressive, sectarian, and influenced by foreign powers, with the opposition being scarcely better (Lister 2014, p. 29). The pseudo-state IS provides, unforgiving though it may be, at least offers a chance of improvement.

Another tactic that has proved successful for IS has been attracting foreign fighters to bolster their numbers. Although this is by no means a new approach to jihadist warfare, IS has revolutionized it by its clever usage of social media like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube

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(Klausen 2014, p. 4). Both the group itself as a lot of its members have many different accounts in many different languages. This has played a large part in promoting the appeal of IS to Western Muslims, with as many as 85 percent of tweets by Western fighters being in their original Western language (Klausen 2014, p. 7). The content of these messages largely consist of what is referred to as “religious instruction” and “reporting from battle”, each category making up over 38 percent and over 40 percent, respectively (Klausen 2014, p. 11). Both these categories comprise a number of similar kinds of messages. The “religious instruction” category holds messages relating to “fatwas, religious edicts, scholars, prominent religious figures, (…) prominent jihadists, or quotes from scripture” (Klausen 2014, ibid.). “Reporting from battle” also refers to a lot of different, though similar subjects, like pictures of dead martyrs, pictures and discussions of battles, but also information on how to make it into Syria (Klausen 2014, ibid.). Remarkably, the number of active accounts is relatively small in comparison with the total number of suspected fighters active in or for the caliphate. This could imply that only a small number of fighters have access to internet, or more likely that a select group is entrusted with publishing messages on behalf of the group. Social media accounts like these can also be used to perform a kind of psychological warfare at the same time. Pictures and videos of beheadings, crucifixions and other kinds of grisly executions or torture serve as a message what will happen to those who oppose IS. Some argue that this is done both to break the resolve of enemies, as well as to coerce the support of civilians in a similar fashion (Ingram 2014, p. 7). They also put the group on a global podium, cementing their reputation as the hardline group we know. Widely known examples of this kind of message are the video of the beheading of American journalist James Foley, and the even more brutal execution by immolation of Jordanian air force pilot Mu’ath al-Kaseasbeh.

A written interview with Hazhar and Torin Ahmad, Iraqi Kurds living in Erbil and Utrecht, respectively, confirms this finding. They mention how in the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish regions, the group has tried to recruit new followers by word of mouth ‘advertising’, through its own kind of education on the internet, mosques, and propaganda films filled with quotes and passages from the Quran. According to the interviewees, this has led to some 1500 to 2500 Kurds to join forces with IS, despite being branded as traitors for doing so. They believe this