The European Union as the UK’s Other: To what Extent did Collective Identity, European and National, Play a Role in the Arguments of Both, Remain and Leave Camps before the Brexit Referendum?

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The European Union as the UK’s Other

To what Extent did Collective Identity, European and National,

Play a Role in the Arguments of Both, Remain and Leave

Camps before the Brexit Referendum?

________________________

Master Thesis MSc. Political Science

European Politics and External Relations

Academic Year: 2019-2020, June 2020

Course: 7324P231ZY; Identity Politics in the European Union Student: Nina-Maria Appenzeller

Student Number: 12719005 Email: Nina.Appenzeller@web.de Supervisor: Dr. Theresa Kuhn

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The following contribution examines the role of European and national identity in the UK before the 2016 Brexit referendum. While the study of the UK’s national identities has so far drawn many scholar’s attention, the impact of co-existing collective identities on the referendum’s discourse and possibly its outcome has not been studied suffi-ciently yet. By conducting a content and discourse analysis of parliamentary debates before the referendum, I investigate the role of collective identity in the arguments of Remainers and Leavers. Results show that both prioritize national identity in their speeches, however it is predominantly the Remain side who negatively contextualizes European identity and constructs the EU as a threat. Leavers, on the other hand, stick to praising their own national identity. Overall, the UK constructs the EU as its “other”, making the referendum’s outcome in a time marked by changes significantly less star-tling. Lastly, these results not only shed light on the impact of collective identities on the referendum’s discourse. Moreover, they emphasize the controversy on national identities competing with the European one, relevant for the superordinate discourse on the EU’s future.

Key words

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List of Abbreviations

EU European Union

GB Great Britain (England, Scotland, Wales)

MP Member of Parliament, here: politician in the British par-liament in Westminster

MS Member state(s)

PM Prime Minister

Torie Conservative Party, officially: “Conservative and Union-ist Party”

UK United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland)

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List of Tables and Figures

Figure 1 The Proportion of European and National Identity by Re-mainers and Leavers.

23 Table 1 Ratio European – National Identity for Remainers

and Leavers

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Table 2 Average and Standard Deviation for Collective Identity be-tween Remainers and Leavers

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Table 3 Contexts for References to European and National Identity 27 Figure 2 Contexts of European Identity by Remainers 28 Figure 3 Contexts of European Identity by Leavers 28 Figure 4 Contexts of National Identity by Remainers 29 Figure 5 Contexts of National Identity by Leavers 29 Table 4 Construction of European Identity by Remainers and

Leav-ers

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Table 5 Construction of National Identity by Remainers and Leav-ers

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Figure 6 Construction of European Identity by Remainers 32 Figure 7 Construction of National Identity by Remainers 32 Figure 8 Construction of European Identity by Leavers 33 Figure 9 Construction of National Identity by Leavers 33

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Acknowledgements

This Master Thesis would not have been possible without the support of several peo-ple. First of all, I want to thank my supervisor, Theresa Kuhn, and my second reader, Daphne van der Pas, for their continuous support in the process of writing this thesis. Secondly, I thank the University of Amsterdam for providing study spaces and intend-ing to maintain a close-to-normal routine in these peculiar times. I thank my fellow student Jan for accompanying me through this challenging, yet in the end very reward-ing process of writreward-ing a thesis in times of a global health crisis. I thank Melchior who has always encouraged me and continues to make me more ambitious every day. Lastly, and most importantly, I thank my parents for enabling me to study in Amster-dam, for believing in me and the unlimited love and support they show me.

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1. Introduction

The past 15 years have brought several challenges to the European Union. After an economic, a financial and a migration crisis, another critical juncture for the EU oc-curred in June 2016: The United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union. The outcome of the Brexit referendum was, apart from Trump’s election as the US presi-dent, the event that – in 2016 – most shook the foundations of not only Europe, but the entire world.

In the so-called “Brexit referendum”, 51,9% of the UK’s population decided to leave the EU, giving an uncomfortable answer to the question of an ever-closer union in a time of multiple crises. Already in 2014, before the Brexit referendum was even foreseeable, the authors Braun and Tausendpfund stated that these crises strongly challenged the EU and thus its integration process (2014: 231-232). Simultaneously, the UK in that way constituted the first member state ever deciding to leave the EU since its founda-tion.

Even though the referendum was partly owed to an inner political conflict between David Cameron, then Prime Minister, and Boris Johnson, then mayor of London, there is more to it than just that: the relation of European identity next to national identities, and the possible threat perceived by it. This aspect revolves around the question in which way national identities can co-exist with a European identity.

While the UK has always proven to be a rather special and difficult member in the European Union (Gibbins 2014, Leith 2019, Richard 2005), it is particularly the impact of collective identity in the arguments of both, Remainers and Leavers, that is striking. High-ranking members of government from both sides have continuously propagated the membership question as a Manichean matter of “either - or” during the campaigns, as if the national component could not co-exist with the European one. Additionally, Brexit is something unprecedented. While the UK has not been the first EU member state considering to leave the EU (cf. Greece in 2015), it was the first to officially take this decision to full ends. Moreover, it can be considered a ground-breaking event in the history of the EU which will shape its character and future significantly. The EU, often considered “sui generis”, offers various models on how it should aim to look like. Regardless, it is not surprising that uncertainty in times of crises and different attitudes

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towards the widening and deepening of the EU prompts a perception of threat to a member state’s own national identity.

Co-existing identities themselves are highly disputed, e.g. in the field of migration. Fur-ther, the EU employs vast amounts of resources in order for citizens to stronger identify themselves with the EU. Brexit has been the proof that this is not accomplished equally in all member states (see also Leith 2019). Analysing the extent to which the co-exist-ence of both forms of identity impacted the parliamentary discourse in the UK before the referendum can thus provide valuable insight for the overall meaning of the EU’s future integration and the way national and European identities can co-exist in general. Further, investigating to what extent European and national identity played a role in the speeches of higher positioned politicians in Westminster promises insights into the UK’s decision on EU membership. To examine to which extent collective identity im-pacted the parliamentary speeches of Remainers and Leavers, I focus on parliamen-tary speeches from May 2015 – David Cameron’s re-election and confirmation that the referendum will take place – until June 2016 – the actual referendum.

This thesis begins with an overview on the existing research on collective identities and the special relationship of the UK and the EU. Due to the aim of this thesis, partic-ular attention is paid to literature on the co-existence of national and European identi-ties. Thereafter, a clarification of the necessary theoretical framework takes place, in-cluding concepts of collective identity in general, the contestation in which manner multiple identities can co-exist, followed by the concepts of national, European identity and British identities. Chapter four displays the method chapter, in which the choice of research methods for this thesis, content and discourse analysis, are introduced, ex-plained and justified. After conducting the analyses on the hypothesis and the research questions the results are reported, statistically described and tested with the Chi² method. After having answered the research questions, the results are then further analysed and placed in the wider context. I end the thesis with a brief recaption of the results, considering the possible relevance of the outcome for other member states of the European Union and which role collective identity will play in the future, with special regard to the future scenarios of the EU.

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2. Literature Review

In the following chapter, I provide an overview on the literature in order to place my research in the already existing one. Attention is paid to the current state of discussion on the co-existence of European and national identities, the UK-EU relationship, and the impact of the referendum itself. While Brexit seems unprecedented, it is particularly the role of national identity that can provide great additional explanatory value. I show that previous membership referenda have already contributed significantly to the dis-course on the de-integration of the European Union. Furthermore, I argue that other reasons for Brexit, apart from the more apparent ones, have not been paid sufficient attention thus far.

2.1 The Co-Existence of Collective Identities

The question, whether several collective identities are generally able to co-exist, seems to be solved as a matter of the past. While a possible co-existence was initially still questioned, Karolewski (2010) and Diez Medrano (2001) in their contributions take this fact for given. As Risse states: “It is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decrease one’s loy-alty to national or other communities” (Risse 2003: 2). Consequently, the co-existence of collective identities itself is not contested anymore.

Regarding the manner, in which multiple identities can co-exist, scholars have thought of various structuring principles: inside, next to, on top of or mixed with each other. Diez Medrano argues for the perspective of so-called “nested identities”, meaning “lower- and higher order identities, […] the latter encompass(ing) the former” (Diez Medrano 2001: 757-758), whereas Risse (2015) proposes them to be boxed inside each other, comparable to Russian Matryoshka dolls. Concepts of a marble cake have also been applied, however, I do not consider this concept to be helpful in this thesis as it assumes a blending into each other, instead of complementing one another. Hence, while something new is created, it simultaneously assumes the loss of other parts.

Apart from the characteristic of organization, scholars widely agree that not every per-son has to identify with every identity, meaning identities can be cross-cutting (Risse

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2003, Risse 2015). In contrast, what has not been agreed on yet is which relationship European and national identity relate to each other.

2.2 European and National Identities – and their Co-Existence

Like many other matters in the context of identities, also the existence of a European identity has been a long-contested field. Back in 2005, shortly after the so-called “Big Bang” enlargement of the EU, Bruter (2005) posed the question whether European identity actually existed. Some argue it already came into existence after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 (besides other things known for laying the foundation for European citizenship), others consider the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (which specified the values the EU is founded upon) and its aftermath to be a crucial turning point for the develop-ment of a European identity.

As it seems a concept most scholars can hardly agree on, Richard (2005) took the approach of defining European identity by what it is or has not: no universal language, no capital, no “long-held symbols and institutions” (Richard 2005: 8), which probably leaves more questions than answers. Other attempts have been made to define the concpt by scholars such as Kohli (2000), Checkel (2009) and Leith (2019). Equally, their definitions vary greatly by their level of breadth or narrowness: an unaware feeling of belonging, the attachment to “some larger political unit” (Kohli 2000: 117), a natural process of getting used to “supranational political structures“ (Checkel 2009: 38) or even a strong sense of awareness of shared values, traditions and culture in everyday life (Leith 2019)1_.

Likewise, the importance of European identity is highly controversial. Karolewski for example examines the relation between collective identity and citizenship in the EU. He argues that every type of collective identity is connected to a certain form of citi-zenship and consequently considers European identity crucial, in regard to questions of citizenship in Europe (Karolewski 2010). Other scholars, however, argue that Euro-pean identity is not even a desired outcome, but only a by-product which incidentally occurred. They ask the, perhaps provocative, question whether it is in fact necessary (Kohli 2000).

1_{According to Leith, the core of European identity can be found in the “civic identification with}

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2.3 The National Identities of the United Kingdom

What nowadays seems to be in the focus of scholarly discourse is the interaction be-tween national and European identities and the impact they have on one another. Looking at the mix of specifically UK and European identity, White has conducted a remarkable study in three European countries, the UK being one of them. He inter-viewed taxi drivers on everyday-life matters and asked them to explain various topics from the fields of economics, politics and society. The result was that in the UK the EU simply did not have a place in everyday life. He observed very low levels of politiciza-tion which can accord for the lack of reference in the taxi drivers’ statements (White 2010a, White 2010b). Even though six years have passed between the conduction of this study and the referendum, there is little evidence this aspect has changed in British every-day life.

In 2010, Risse dedicated one of his studies to the overall quality of relations between the UK and the EU. According to him, the UK has always had “EU a la carte”, carefully allowing certain parts to be adopted, merely to a certain degree. Hence, the lower level of politicization and identification with the EU hardly appears surprising. Haesly (2001) puts it slightly harsher, calling the UK the “strange partner” which does not seem to fit in (ibid.: 83).

Great Britain’s special role in Europe and its distinct national identity have always served as a source of legitimation for decision-making in the field of politics. Gibbins (2014) points out that the UK is further constraint by its internal identity conflicts, as the UK does not solely possess one identity, but several due to its composition of more than one nation. This might also account for what Risse (2010) concludes: In contrast to other EU member states (that constitute non-EU countries as the “other” for their collective identification) the UK considers the EU to be “the other” (Risse 2010, Leith 2019). Gibbins (2014) underlines this perception as he focusses on critical junctures in the British-European history, such as the Maastricht Treaty, and points out that glob-alisation makes the UK question part of their national identity. Therefore, the British also feel threatened by impacts of globalization and the EU.

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2.4 The Impact of the UK’s Withdrawal from the EU

Since the official Brexit referendum four years ago, scholars have invested great effort into analysing which reasons contributed to the UK voting for “Leave”. The assess-ments typically address social, economic or political aspects, the latter ones being the most interesting for this thesis.

Partially, an explanation for the UK’s decision to leave the EU can be found in the national party spectrum. Vasipoulou (2016) and Moore (2018) rightly indicate that the Conservative Party, the strongest party in the UK, was torn even before the referen-dum, possibly even “since Britain first applied to join the EEC in 1961” (Moore 2018: 2). During the campaigning in 2015 and 2016, leading Tory politicians, including the Prime Minister, did not agree on one common and clear line, neither the second-strong-est party – the Labour party. This ultimately resulted in a torn image for the public. However, following Hobolt’s assumption, party affiliation might not have played the most important role. She examined the relationship of party affiliation and Brexit opin-ion, concluding that “Brexit-related identities and polarization emerged despite no longstanding leave/remain divide and in a manner that cross-cut partisan identities.” (Hobolt 2020: 6) Consequently, party affiliation was a less influential factor than one would initially expect. Freeden (2017), on the other hand, focussed on the influence of populism, pointing out that even politicians in parliament made use of populist slogans (ibid.: 1, 15-17). He particularly stresses the notion of “othering”, going full circle with the core concept of collective identity, making this contribution a particular valuable one for this study.

Lastly, it is necessary to look at previous membership referenda within Europe. Gibbins (2014) conducted a full discourse analysis on the referendum on EEC membership in 1975 in the UK, focussing on the parliamentary and public speeches. Again, the scholar discovered the notion of othering to be strongly relevant; underlining the high importance identity has had and continues to have in such membership questions2_.

Apart from the UK, Greece was the last member to conduct a referendum on its mem-bership in the Eurozone in 2015. Nevertheless, the cases are not comparable as their

2_{Primarily, the scholar distinguished between friendly, non-radical and radical others. According to his}

results, those citizens voting against an EEC membership did not consider the European Union as a “friendly other”, but predominantly as a “radical other” (Freeden 2017: 8).

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referendum was restricted to the austerity policies by the European Union. While a so-called “Grexit” could have been a possible scenario, the majority of the Greek were not discontent with the membership itself and leaving the EU was not the main intention (Artelaris 2018, Tsatsanis 2016).

Having thoroughly examined the literature on the co-existence of European and British identity, Britain’s particular role in Europe and the possible reasons for Brexit, it be-comes apparent that particularly the impact of European and national identities on the referendum’s outcome has not been assessed sufficiently. Likewise, a content and discourse analysis of the parliamentary speeches leading to the Brexit referendum has not been conducted yet – neither with a focus on collective identities nor a related one. In part, this is certainly owed to the extensive quantity of documents in need to be examined. Additionally, at first glance, there might be more obvious and plausible in-fluences than collective identity for the referendum’s outcome. It is easy to point a fin-ger at apparent explanatory motives like populism, migration or the economy to com-prehend or even blame the outcome and to oversimplify the complexity behind it, as it was visible for example in the media3_{. Nevertheless, this literature review has clarified}

there is more to it than just these subjects, challenging the “usual”, omnipresent ex-planatory motives. In fact, this thesis picks up the aspect of national and European identity, shedding light on a neglected aspect not only relevant to understanding the outcome of the Brexit referendum and the extent to which collective identity played a role, but also considers the implications for the EU’s future. Hence, this thesis investi-gates a strong force of influence in EU politics, yielding explanatory value to the mean-ing of the referendum not only for the UK, but the EU and its challenges.

3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter builds up the necessary theoretical concepts for this thesis: collective identity, national and European identity as well as the co-existence of multiple identity

3_{Looking at media coverage before the referendum, it came down to only two salient topics: immigration}

and economy. “(O)ther issues, such as sovereignty, security, democracy and devolution, were much more marginal” (Hobolt 2016: 1262), Hobolt stresses. Both, Remainers and Leavers, did put their focus on different topics: Whereas Remainers concentrated on possible economic consequences, Leavers “mobiliz(ed) people’s fears of immigration” (ibid.:1261).

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forms. Moreover, it is necessary to introduce concepts of the UK’s national identities and a very brief overview on the historical development of the Brexit referendum. Even though the concept goes back to the antiquity, identity can probably be consid-ered one of the most contested concepts in social science. While a universal definition does not exist, we can agree that identity is a vague, abstract concept which is either ascribed “too much or too little” relevance. (Brubaker 2000: 1-2, Gibbins 2014: 4, Kohli 2000: 114).

Regardless of its application to individuals or groups, it is a “collective phenomenon” with a “consequential sameness among members” (Brubaker 2000: 7). It can also be defined as “a network of feelings of belonging to and exclusion from human subgroups” (Bruter 2005: 8). This sense of belonging to groups was also key aspect of Henri Tajfel’s social identity theory, which laid the foundation for what scholars today define as social identity: “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group […] together with the value and emo-tional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978: 63-65, Tajfel 1981: 255).

3.1 Collective Identity and the Co-Existence of Multiple

Collec-tive Identities

In contrast to individual identity, which itself can be considered a collective phenome-non (Brubaker 2000: 7), collective identity refers to the identification “to some larger political unit” (Kohli 2000: 117). This feeling of belonging originates from a fundamental distinction between the “inside” and the “outside”, the “self” and the “other” (Brubaker 2000, Elias 1994: 11, Kohli 2000, Risse 2010).

However, this “sharp distinctiveness from non-members” (Brubaker 2000: 10) does not necessarily have to be constructed upon real differences. Just as Elias’ concept of the Established and the Outsiders assumes, a “principle of meta-contrast” (Risse 2010: 27) is applied – not reality, but the perception of differences matters (see also Tajfel 1981: 257-259).

One can distinguish three categories collective identity is built upon: the affective, eval-uative and cognitive dimension (Kuhn 2015: 41, Risse 2010: 21-22). The cognitive di-mension entails the individual’s self-categorization and which group they ascribe

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themselves to. The evaluative entails the criteria the categorization is based upon and lastly the affective dimension is the emotional component, the feeling of belonging to a certain group (Risse 2010: ibid.). In the course of this thesis, particularly the self-categorization and emotional attachment will be relevant.

Apart from the othering which establishes the own collective identity, something else occurs to improve the self-identity: the deliberate act of favourably comparing one’s own collective identity while derogating the others’ (Elias 1994, Grimm 2016, Ka-rolewski 2010, Mummendey 2001, Tajfel 1978; 1981). As Mummendey states: “(A) positive evaluation of one’s nation depends on favourable comparisons with other na-tions” (2001: 161). Different collective identities do not only have to serve as a con-trasting point, they can also co-exist peacefully with each other in the identification of people.

As previously mentioned, the possibility for several collective identities to co-exist is not contested anymore (Diez Medrano 2001; 2010, Risse 2010, Karolewski 2010, Mummendey 2001). People who hold these identities do not feel them conflicting with each other, but “learn to negotiate between their identities and to invoke the in context-dependent ways” (Risse 2010: 23)

The mere existence of more than one collective identity, however, does not explain the relation in which they co-exist. Checkel states that they “do not wax or wane at each other’s expense. Instead, they are often nested in complex and variegated patterns for different individuals and groups, […] triggered in specific situations leading to different kinds of politics” (Checkel 2009: 9-10). The following variations are possible: 1. sepa-rate (with barely any overlapping), 2. cross-cutting (some members of one group being member of another one), 3. nested (within each other, “such as layer of an onion or as Russian Matryoshka dolls”, Risse 2010: 24) or 4. blended (without stressing hierarchy of each identity too much, possibly intertwining), making it even harder to distinguish between the two (Brubaker 2000, Checkel 2009, Diez Medrano 2001; 2010, Mum-mendey 2001, Risse 2010).

However, not everyone who belongs to one group necessarily jointly has to belong to another one. Neither do they necessarily have to function in an inclusionary way, meaning that the belonging to one group does not necessarily overlap (Risse 2003). Lastly, and most relevantly for this thesis, the co-existence of multiple collective

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identities can have a negative impact: one identity can be perceived as a threat to another one, particularly to local identities (Diez Medrano 2001: 760, Grimm 2016, Haesly 2001, Leith 2019 and others). This will become more visible once the concepts of national and European identity have been introduced.

3.2 European Identity

European identity, equally as national identity, can be grasped as “a sense of belong-ing to some larger political unit” (Kohli 2000: 117), the point of reference bebelong-ing Europe. It is self-evident that Europe and the European Union do not refer to the same political unit. Nevertheless, MP’s in Westminster used the two words interchangeably. Unfortu-nately, a clear distinction in the discourse is nearly impossible. Hence, in this contribu-tion European identity will be understood as the sense of belonging to the European Union, corresponding to the parliamentary discourse, which also referred to the UK’s membership in the EU, not the UK’s position in Europe, when the EU membership was discussed.

The European identity’s deliberate implementation started decades later than the ac-tual founding of the EU and its predecessor, the ECSC, through documents and agree-ments such as the Maastricht Treaty (Kohli 2000: 119) and the Lisbon Treaty. This underlines the fact that the consolidation of a European identity had initially not been provisioned for. Wondering whether European identity is an outcome which was actu-ally aspired or just a by-product is therefore reasonable (see also Cram 2012, Kohli 2000). Kohli argues for the latter, stating European identity was only a by-product of institutional changes, neither a pre-requisite for success nor a desired outcome (Kohli 2000: 119)4_{. Here, Checkel’s comparison of European identity as ship with an unknown}

destination (2009: 2) seems remarkably fitting.

4_{As the EU is “sui generis”, there are no role models one could compare it to. Is a shared European}

identity in fact necessary? Nations alone need identity to define themselves, as it accounts for who they are – but the concern of a needed European identity is a more complicated one: the member nations already exist for themselves – hence, this more relates to the much more fundamental question how far the EU as a whole is supposed to evolve – solely an economic union, a political one, or even a deeply integrated federal state?

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Concerning specific criteria, Karolewski (2010) proposes that “collective identity is built upon experience of shared history (and) communication with each other, combined with a feeling of commonness” (ibid.: 2). Due to the EU’s uniqueness, however, it faces several challenges. As Richard problematizes, it “cannot be based on any one lan-guage, as most national identities are. (It) is also not based on any clear borders, a capital, or a preexisting [sic] state with long-held symbols and institutions” (2005: 8). Cram proposes a distinction between “identification as, […] with, and support for the EU” (Cram 2012: 72; italics in original). Nevertheless, to be able to trace the impact of European and national identity in the British parliamentary discourse, a more precise description of characteristics is required. Kohli establishes four varying understandings of European identity which are observable: Firstly, a constitutional understanding, sec-ondly the idea of Europe (“what it could or should be”, Kohli 2000: 120), thirdly, the cultural practices which manifest the identity (“through which these meanings are cre-ated and maintained”, ibid: 120), and lastly “collective identity as experienced and ex-pressed by the individual citizens” (ibid.: 120-122). Particularly the second understand-ing has incited several debates. As diverse as the member states are, so too are their understandings of the EU and, accordingly, of European identity. Is the EU merely an economic union or is it beyond that also a community of values?

What certainly can be stated is that the European identity derives considerable parts from its shared history – its founding impetus. In fact, where single nations carry strength from their past, the EU has founded itself on principles against it. The unifying force is not one glorious history, but the prevention of something horrible: the founda-tion’s guiding principle is built on the “never-again” of its own history (Risse 2010: 56, Cram 2012: 78, Checkel 2009: 3)5_{. To this day, this fact, partly due to the different}

ways of embedding an understanding of the Second World War, contribute to the diffi-culty of establishing a European identity.

The relationship between national and European identity plays a crucial role for this thesis. Relying on the concept of nested identities, Checkel states that the co-existence of European and national identities is “unproblematic […], since they can all easily

5_{Checkel states: “Europe’s past leads through luminous and dark periods; it encompasses the good}

and the bad; it inspires hope and despair. European ambivalence today reflects this legacy” (Checkel 2009: 3), referring to the difficulty of establishing one European identity in the presence of this experi-ence.

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cohabit in a nested structure causing neither psychological nor cognitive dissonance” (Checkel 2009: 31). For the argument of this thesis, I will equally assume that Euro-pean and national identities do co-exist in a nested or box-like manner.

As Risse adds, “(t)he EU motto of ‘unity in diversity’” even “celebrates the multiplicity of overlapping identities” (Risse 2010: 24). Hence, the EU’s identity should not pose a threat to national identities, as they can exist next to each other. A feared “cultural uniformization” (Karolewski 2010: 49) becomes unlikely. Diez Medrano adds that Eu-ropean identity is only perceived as a threat to national identity in some countries. This depends on how European identity is constructed there (Diez Medrano 2001: 760). This elaboration on possible threats to national identities through the European one seems repetitive with respect to the literature review, nonetheless builds the basis for the further proceeding of this thesis.

3.3 National Identity and the Identities of the United Kingdom

National identity, as a sub-form of collective identity, also refers to a larger unit, in this case a nation. As Kohli states quite broadly, “national identity is part of one category of collective identities, namely those with a territorial reference” (Kohli 2000: 117). Gib-bins gives a narrower definition, stating “(n)ational identity – be it defined as a com-monality of laws, national myths, culture, memories and/or psychological we-feeling – is what […] holds a nation together” (Gibbins 2014: 4).

Karolewski’s criteria for collective identity (shared history, communication inside the collective, feeling of commonness, 2010: 2-3) can be applied to nations as much as to the EU, presumably even better as a nation possesses more “nation-like” characteris-tics than the EU. Comparable to European identity, national identity also relates to a vision to the own nation, how it could or should look like. Every nation is differently shaped by language, historical experiences, cultural practices and values. Usually, their source of identification stems from how they differ from other countries, what their role is in relation to their neighbouring countries or even in the world and its influence. If one wants to understand the UK’s national identity, one must first abandon the sin-gular use of the term "national identity". Due to its composition of four countries, the UK possesses not only one but several national identities. As Gibbins wonders: “(Is) it

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right to talk about British identity, as if Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales do not have their own ideas of who they are […]?” (2014: 4)6_.

These multiple identities in turn have served not only for the diversity and heterogeneity of the UK’s identity (see also Gibbins 2014), but also as a constant source of internal conflict. Mistakenly, the terms “Great Britain” and “United Kingdom” have been used interchangeably. Comparable to the EU and Europe, MP’s referred to the present iden-tities synonymously, presumably without a deliberate distinction. This thesis focusses on the UK’s national identity, as it was the UK as a whole who was a member of the European Union.

The construction of identity in the UK has always been strongly imbalanced due to the “historical absorption of formerly independent entities, and devolution of power” (Bruter 2005: 43), making the imbalance present until today. Its history is one of the two com-ponents the UK acquires substantial parts of its self-conception from, such as its former Empire and the two World Wars. Other defining symbols and experiences entail “the Magna Carta in defining early democracy, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in heralding a new political liberty and the sanctity of a non-interventionist state in direct opposition to authoritarian continental systems” (Gibbins 2014: 21-22). These have not only been used to strengthen the national identity but lay the foundation for understanding British values and interests in the present days. Perhaps it is not surprising that these motives are frequently used by politicians and political elite to boost national identity, to mobilize citizens or even to “bolster […] the politics of the present” (ibid.: 22).

The other main aspect of its national identity is the British exceptionalism, justified with the “exclusive geographical position, language, history and national myths” (Gibbins 2014: 3). Particularly now, in an era strongly shaped by globalisation and its accelera-tion of processes, where the world appears ever-smaller, not even the UK can with-stand being subject to a changing national identity. While it still might view itself as a global force, in a leadership position and driven by its unique empire-experiences, globalisation, in fact, “renders the notion of the island nation redundant” (Gibbins 2014: 2), questioning fundamental aspects of its identity.

6 Risse for example claims that “Scottish nationalism has been constructed in sharp contrast to English

identity” (2010: 82), resulting in Scotland being very pro-European, “embrac(ing) Europe and European-ness (ibid.: 82).

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This shift in national identity may well account for part of the somewhat unusual, even tense relationship between the UK and the EU. Notwithstanding, the relationship be-tween Great Britain and the rest of Europe has always been a complicated one. As Leith clarifies: “(W)hile many politicians like Churchill supported post-war European integration, they did not necessarily see Britain as being part of it” (Leith 2019: 561). As we have observed, scholars commonly argue for multiple collective identities to co-exist without problems (Diez Medrano 2001; 2010, Risse 2010, Karolewski 2010, Mummendey 2001). Nevertheless, the UK “has remained remarkably stable in its re-sistance to Europeanization over the past fifty years” (Risse 2010: 81). This is proven by Eurobarometer surveys which regularly supported that the UK was by far the strong-est Eurosceptic MS. The British were not only the “awkward, even unwilling” (Richard 2005: 67) member state in the EU, they even saw the European identity “conflict(ing) with national identity rather than being complementary to it” (Leith 2019: 563).

In contrast to other members, for them the EU has primarily been an economic union. Apart from that, their national values also account for every further step of integration, every delegation of competences to the EU to be condemned as allegedly undemo-cratic or as a loss of sovereignty. As Risse clarifies: “Parliamentary […] sovereignty […] relates to a seven-hundred-year-old parliamentary tradition and hard-fought victo-ries over the king” (Risse 2010: 82).

What needs to be added is that the two dominant parties in the UK, the Tories and the Labour Party, were both internally divided on the European issue. Even the political elite did not strive to establish a European identity next to the British one. The particu-larly sceptic members of parliament (MP’s) even saw the EU to be “a threat to British interests, as an attack on national sovereignty, and as an attempt to supplant British-ness with a continentally oriented, foreign-imposed identity” (Gibbins 2014: 3).

Since the UK is living through fundamental change, it is not surprising it tries to stick to its fundamental principles and tries to find strength in its own national identity. “Partic-ularly in times of crises”, Karolewski stresses, “the significant Other becomes activated […], since the binary construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ helps in overcoming the crises by using blaming and scapegoating strategies” (2010: 28).

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3.4 The Preceding of the Brexit Referendum

Therefore, it comes as no surprise how the referendum developed. While this thesis does not wish to engage too much with the historical aspect, a short overview on the development is necessary.

Hobolt titles the referendum to be “the culmination of decades of internal division in the British Conservative Party on the issue of European integration” (Hobolt 2016: 1261). Initially, the referendum on the membership in the European Union was a promise for re-election by David Cameron in 2015, as he otherwise feared defeat. In May 2015, the Conservative Party with Cameron as its leader got re-elected and he was forced to place the referendum on the agenda. Apart from tactical reasons during the election campaigns in 2014, the referendum was less a question of national identities, but about the internal political conflict between Johnson and Cameron. In November 2015, Cam-eron called on the EU to imply fundamental reforms in areas of welfare and migration on EU level. After a summit of all heads of state of the European Union in February 2016, Cameron declared his negotiations to have been successful and announced an official date for referendum: June 23, 2016. Simultaneously, this outlines the time frame which will be applied for the analysis of the parliamentary speeches. How did the focus shift so much from internal political divisions to a fierce battle on the protection of na-tional identity?

3.5 Hypotheses and Research Questions

In order to find out, this thesis will examine which role national and European identity took on the level of the political elite, in parliamentary debates. As not a single party in the United Kingdom was unanimous on the membership issue, it seems reasonable to look at politicians’ contributions based on being Remainer or Leaver, thus in favour or against of leaving the European Union7_.

To analyse how both sides prioritize collective identity in their speeches, and which role this played in the arguments of both, I will firstly test how often they referred to European and national identity in their speeches. As Remainers wanted the UK to stay

7_{Note that this is solely about the vote in the referendum. The group distinction does not take into}

account variations of the “Remain” spectrum. Very Eurosceptic politicians which still voted “Remain” are hence included in the “Remain” spectrum as much as the most Europhile MP who also declared to vote “Remain”.

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member of the European Union, it is instinctively assumed that these politicians re-ferred to European identity more than to national identity. Leavers, on the other hand, considered the EU to be a threat to national identity, and consequently might have prioritized national identity.

This leads to the following hypotheses:

1.1 Remainers mention European identity more frequently than national identity. 1.2 Leavers mention national identity more frequently than European identity.

While the quantity gives a first impression of how the politicians of both sides utilized European or national identity in their speeches, the mere frequency does not consider in which context these have been mentioned. Did the MP’s only refer to one of the concepts in a positive or negative context? Disregarding the contexts in which the iden-tity forms have been mention could hence distort the results strongly. In order to con-sider this aspect, the second working question shall be:

2. In which contexts do politicians from both camps, Remain and Leave, mention European and national identity?

Lastly, this thesis puts particularly European identity as well as the UK’s national iden-tities into its focus. As previously mentioned, there exists great controversy on the EU’s being and future. Specifically the UK has turned out to be one of its greatest critiques, advocating for the so-called “multi-speed Europe”. Consequently, it does not only seem relevant to analyse in which contexts collective identity has been referred to, but also what the various politicians from both sides understand as “the UK’s national identities” and “European identity”. I therefore pose the third research question of this thesis to be:

3. How do politicians from both camps, Remain and Leave, construct European identity as well as the UK’s national identities in their speeches?

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4. Methodology

Before beginning the actual analysis, I now introduce discourse and content analysis as the selected methods for this thesis. In the following, I justify why this is the ideal method to examine the role of collective identity in the parliamentary debates and out-line how I plan to apply it.

4.1 Content and Discourse Analysis

As mentioned in the beginning, I opt for a combination of both, content and discourse analysis. According to Neuendorf, content analysis describes “the systematic, objec-tive, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (2002: 1) and is used to examine the informational content of a medium. These media can consist of e.g. articles, poli-cies, speeches, Tweets, commercials. It can be deductive or inductive, working with pre-established categories based on prior-defined theory, and further be carried out quantitatively as well as qualitatively.

Discourse analysis, on the other hand, entails “the examination of argumentative struc-ture in documents […] or […] statements as well as the practices through which these utterances are made” (Hajer 2006: 66). In contrast to content analysis, it does not seek to retrieve “hard facts” but focusses on the way in which matters are constructed. The method ascribes language a fundamental role for our everyday life as it “profoundly shapes our view of the world and reality” (ibid.: 66). As Hajer states, language pos-sesses the power to create or to diminish political conflicts (Hajer 2006: 67). Conse-quently, the method is very apt for examining the way how politicians constructed col-lective identity in the parliamentary speeches8_.

Content analysis offers the advantage that, carried out quantitively, it is quite objective. The coding categories are established beforehand and reliability is ensured through a second coder to test code. A disadvantage of content analysis is that it can be

8_{Baachi’s and Goodwin’s “What’s the problem represented to be” (WPR) approach agrees with that}

structuralist perspective (Bacchi 2009: 16). Transferring the importance of speech acts to the field of politics, one should examine the relationship between the “definition of a political problem” and “the particular narrative in which it is discussed” (Hajer 2006: 66). Further, she continues, that “(l)anguage has the capacity to make politics, to […] shift power-balances […] It can render events harmless, but it can also create political conflicts” (Hajer 2006: 67), stressing the power of words another time.

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reductive. This is the reason why Research Question 2 (Q2) conducts a contextual analysis building on Hypothesis 1 (H1) and Research Question 3 (Q3) supplements the research with the inductive and more qualitative approach. Therefore, the strength of discourse analysis here is that it recompenses the flaw of the content analysis. After firstly only focusing on the mere frequencies, it then includes the contextual aspect as well as the way in which identity has been constructed.

A content analysis consequently takes place regarding H1, as it aims to examine the frequency of references to national or European identity in the parliamentary debates by means of pre-established categories (European and national identity). Q2 is then performed by means of a discourse analysis. After having analysed the frequencies and the contexts of European and national identity within the parliamentary speeches, Q3 then examines in which way these have been constructed. Since Q2 and Q3 are less about retrieving hard facts, but about the ways in which language is used – in which contexts politicians refer to identities and how they construct them in their state-ments – I then shift to discourse analysis.

The coding itself is conducted by the author of this thesis, without help from an auto-mated program. This happens for the following reason: No matter which of the many definitions of “identity” one pursues, it is a concept which is strongly built on the dis-tinction between groups. Basing a coding scheme on the notion of othering, the “us” versus “them”, would lead to an immense amount of falsely marked fragments. Only in a minority of cases do these references actually correspond to expressions of identifi-cation. Clearing the results generated by a program would presumably take up a sig-nificant amount of time. More extensive studies such as by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), who were confronted with a similar problem, opt to combine human and auto-mated coding in order to score more reliant results9_{. Nevertheless, this would go}

be-yond the scope of this thesis. I therefore opt for the more time-consuming, yet more precise option of human coding.

For H1, I proceed by gathering the content, coding the parliamentary sessions for “Eu-ropean identity”, “national identity” and their synonyms, counting the frequency of each.

9_{Rooduijn and Pauwel (2011) faced a similar issue for the concept “populism”. One of the two}

compo-nents they aimed to measure populism with was “people-centrism”, the distinction between the elite and the people, the “us versus them”. As an automated program incorrectly would have coded an immense amount of “we”s and “us”s, he chose to combine automated and human coding; excluding the compo-nent of “people-centrism” from his automated coding and instead focussing only on the other one.

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Following up, I statistically analyse the results by calculating absolute and relative fig-ures, the standard deviation and lastly run a statistical analysis with Chi² in order to answer the first hypothesis. Q2 builds up on the collected content, as these text frag-ments will be scanned for their contexts. They are then clustered and analysed accord-ing to the differences between Remainers and Leavers and put into relation. Lastly, Q3 will again make use of the text fragments from H1 to analyse how politicians have constructed collective identities in their speeches. Results are clustered and juxta-posed between Remainers and Leavers.

4.2 Data and Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this thesis are parliamentary debates. These are accessible through the official webpage of the UK parliament and sub-divided into different vol-umes (“Volume 602” etc.). Parliamentary speeches as a medium have been chosen rather than party manifestos, as the former ones reflect the current political state more adequately. Furthermore, manifestos tend to be formulated in a more neutral style, whereas parliamentary speeches allow for clearer statements. Parliamentary speeches instead of public speeches have been selected as this thesis focusses on the elite-level rather than the citizen-level and the inclusion of other speeches would have disturbed the comparability of setting, tone and audience.

The time frame is set from the 7th_{of May 2015 until the 23}rd_{of June 2016. This entails}

the time from the parliamentary elections in 2015 until the day of the Brexit referendum. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, David Cameron accomplished his re-election as a Prime Minister, winning the absolute majority for his party. Before the election, Cam-eron’s promise in case of re-election was to hold a referendum on the UK’s member-ship in the EU. Thus, the 07th_{of May 2015 describes the date the referendum turned}

into something “real”.

For the analysis, all parliamentary sessions that took place in the selected time frame initially have been taken into consideration. A selection was made based on the overall topic of the sessions. Hence, only sessions that treated the UK’s membership in the EU were included. Other criteria were the following topics and terms: the UK’s renego-tiation process with the EU, the UK’s role in the world, the proceeding of the referen-dum itself, every session whose title included “EU”, “membership” or “renegotiation”.

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This resulted in a total of 32 speeches, with an approximate length of 80 pages each. After having gone through all of them thoroughly, 18 were excluded from the analysis as they did not contain any discourse on the EU membership or contributions by any of the chosen politicians, leaving a total of 14 speeches. For a complete overview on all examined parliamentary sessions, see Appendix 2.

As mentioned, the focus of this thesis is the elite-level, hence politicians, not citizens. These are believed to have had the most significant influence during the referendum campaigns, being in parliament and simultaneously engaging in the official campaigns for both sides. Moreover, the expression of politicians’ views is easier to grasp and measure, due to the fact that these regularly give statements on recent issues and every parliamentary session has to be protocolized.

Politicians are selected according to the following criteria: politicians representing the strongest parties in parliament, hence party leader or in the case for Scotland and Northern Ireland, their representative in Westminster. As entire parties were split on the referendum question and Cameron explicitly suspended the party discipline, solely including party leaders would not have been sufficient to render the analysis repre-sentative and would cut out the diversity in opinions. Therefore, I include ministers and their shadow ministers from departments which were related to the politics on the ref-erendum: The Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Europe. Moreover, I intend to consider at least one representative from the other countries in the UK, even though they are barely as represented as England in Westminster. This ultimately results in a list of twelve politicians, for an overview see Appendix 1.

Already before the analysis it is noticeable that a vast majority of the relevant politicians were Remainers. The criteria for the selection of the politicians were subjected to mul-tiple re-evaluations. Nevertheless, this sample turned out to be the one most accurately and truthfully reflecting the level of politicians in Westminster. Evidently, the disparity is borne in mind as the analysis proceeds.

4.3 Operationalization and Process of Analysis

In order to conduct the coding systematically and to fulfil the criteria of validity and verifiability for scientific research, it is necessary to establish a code book. This entails an exact description of the categories which will be applied. According to Neuendorf

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(2002), categories need to be mutually exclusive, clearly defined and not leaving too much space for interpretation. This ensures that they actually measure what is desired to be measured (see also Neuendorf 2002: 112, 118-119). In the process of this thesis, one coded fragment, a so-called snippet, consists of one sentence. Every snippet which relates to collective identity is classified as either European or national identity. For H1, a deductive coding scheme is applied. While the coding for European and national identity is in its origin about syntactical distinctions, synonyms have to be found, as no politician directly refers to “identity”. These are defined beforehand by means of the theoretical framework. Regarding Q2, I move from a deductive to an inductive approach, from content to discourse analysis. The same snippets from H1 are used again, but then contextual distinctions are made to examine the context in which European and national identity have been referred to, ultimately resulting in a list of various different contexts for both sides10_{. This shift of methods aims to avoid the}

flaw of content analyses being reductive, by adding an extended and more interpretive question (Q2) to the hypothesis (H1). Lastly, after examining the context, Q3 has a look at the construction of European and national identity by the MP’s. Contrastingly to H1, the second and third part focus on the politician’s language, in which contexts they refer to collective identities and how they construct them.

As Neuendorf (2002: 112) states: “Reliability is the extent to which a measuring proce-dure yields the same results on repeated trials.” In this thesis, inter-coder reliability is tested with support from a second coder. The test-coder is also a Master student, who proof-codes three out of the 14 entire selected parliamentary sessions, accounting for approximately 15% of the total data (sessions vary significantly in length). Testing only one or two sessions would have let too much space for random results or distortion, hence three seems adequate to further ensure a minimum percentage proof of the entity. Due to the limited amount of time of the test coder, this intercoder-reliability test then focusses solely on H1. H1 is the core foundation the other two questions build on (every reference of national or European identity is coded, then scanned for contexts or ways of identity construction).

10_{An initial plan to only scan for negative and positive contexts would have simplified the coding}

pro-cess, but simultaneously narrowed down the gain of new knowledge significantly. Consequently, an inductive set up has been preferred to capture the contexts of collective identity.

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As a snippet comprises one sentence, but the absolute number of sentences is un-known, percentage agreement seems the best fitting method. The reliability is tested in both ways: the percentual agreement of Coder 1, the author of this thesis, with Coder 2, the test coder, as well as vice versa.

After the coding process, I statistically analyse the results. For H1, the frequencies of national identity and European identity are statistically analysed by calculating the ab-solute and relative numbers, the average as well as the standard deviation. Further-more, the impact of single politicians are regarded. A Chi² test then illustrates whether the results are statistically significant. For Q2, the contexts are listed, grouped accord-ing to topics and separated by Leave and Remain side. Likewise, the results for Q3 are collected in groups according to the way in which national and European identities are constructed. For both, Q2 and Q3, the distribution of the results are presented in absolute and relative numbers as well as percentages.

4.4 Empirical Limitations of the Research Design

Lastly, it is necessary to consider the empirical limitations of this study as every taken decision had implications for the extent to which this study is generalizable.

This study is based on the selection of twelve members of parliament which are con-sidered to be the most relevant in the parliamentary discourse, hence the most repre-sentative. As a consequence, the two main sides which are opposed in this analysis are not balanced11_{. Moreover, due to this selection, statements by other MP’s are}

ex-cluded. Further, speeches in Holyrood or the Welsh National assembly and neither public speeches by politicians are taken into consideration as the tone, setting, audi-ence and other conditions would have varied significantly. Additionally, the previously mentioned unclarity concerning the multiple national identities of the UK (referring to England, or the UK or GB?) also impacts the clarity of the results, since it is hard to distinguish whether politicians actually referred to English, UK or British identity.

11_{Several renown politicians from the Leave-side did not contribute remarkably in the parliamentary}

sessions. For example, Boris Johnson, then mayor of London, barely contributed on the membership issue at all. Nigel Farage, leader of the UKIP party, was not member of the national parliament. Overall, the UKIP party only provided one single MP in Westminster, who did not contribute in the debates. Michael Gove, then Minister of Justice and outspokenly Leaver, did not participate in any debate.

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5. Results

After going through the data units and coding them according to the three research parts of this thesis, the results are presented in the following section.

5.1 The Representation of Collective Identity in the

Parliamen-tary Discourse

The overall relation between references to European and national identity from both, Remainers and Leavers, is 45% to 55%. Hence, there is a difference between the two identity forms, however, not a striking one. Looking at the distinction in Figure 1, we can observe that the relation between European and national identity on the Remain side is almost perfectly equal (49% EU identity – 51% national identity). Leavers, on the other hand almost exclusively refer to national identity, European identity there does not appear to be relevant at all (7% EU identity – 93% national identity).

Figure 1: The Proportion of European and National Identity by Remainers and

Leav-ers.

As mentioned before, the amount of Remainers and Leavers is not equal. Looking at the most relevant positions in parliament in the 2015 Cameron Cabinet, nine out of twelve ultimately sticked to the Remain side, no matter how Eurosceptic they presented to be. Likewise, this imbalance is mirrored in the absolute numbers visible in Table 1:

49% 7% 51% 93% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Remainers Leavers

H1: Average Frequency European and National Identity per Parliamentary Session

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Out of 159 references to collective identity in all the examined parliamentary sessions, 144 are attributable to the Remain side. Therefore, it seems appropriate to calculate the average amount of references to collective identity per politician.

Table 1: Ratio European – National Identity for Remainers and Leavers.

As indicated by the absolute numbers, politicians from the Remain camp refer to na-tional identity slightly more often than to European identity. In the course of all speeches of the year prior to the referendum, the average politician from the Remain camp referred to European identity 7,8 times versus 8,2 times to national identity; both being above the overall average. It seems worth pointing out that particularly the ref-erences to European identity are almost 33% higher than the overall average.

Looking at the average Leaver politician, one notices they referred to national identity more often (4,7 times in total). European identity, on the other hand, did not play a role at all (only 0,3 times). Nevertheless, both figures are strongly below average, national identity has been referred to 36% less than the average suggests.

Furthermore, the values for the standard deviation need to be highlighted, noted in Table 2. Particularly the value for national identity on the Remain side attracts atten-tion: 13,0. This implies that the variation on the Remain spectrum is high.

Looking at the most remarkable values, David Cameron sticks out. As the Prime Min-ister, he had to participate in the so-called “Prime Ministers Questions”, contributing to the speeches significantly more often than other politicians: Out of the 159 references to collective identity, 60 account for him (20 EU identity – 40 national identity). Conse-quently, his answers distorted the overall impression. Even though this reflects the reality in parliament, I thus also calculated the average and standard deviation for the

Absolute Percentual EU Identity 71 45% Nat. Identity 88 55% EU Identity 70 49% Nat. Identity 74 51% EU Identity 1 7% Nat. Identity 14 93% Overall Remain Leave

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Remain group excluding the values for him. As a result, the average for European identity converges a lot closer to the overall average, but the average for national iden-tity and hence the standard deviation for references to national ideniden-tity on the remain side halve. This might be the most noteworthy result of the whole hypothesis: David Cameron, then Prime Minister, in favour of remaining in the EU, accounted for almost 50% of the references of national identity and mentioned European identity even less then his colleagues from the Remain camp.

Table 2: Average and Standard Deviation for Collective Identity between Remainers

and Leavers.

Thereafter, I calculate the Chi² value for Remainers and Leavers, in order to test if the above listed differences are statistically significant. As a nominal measure of cohesion, one initially assumes an equal distribution of references to European and national iden-tity and then juxtaposes the observed values with the expected ones. The Chi² test gives a value of 0,00187, hence below 0,05. Therefore, the difference is statistically significant and the null hypothesis can be rejected. For the exact calculation, see Ap-pendix 5.

As the absolute number of sentences is not known, I chose percentage agreement to test the inter-coder reliability. For this case, a test coder has proof-coded three parlia-mentary sessions. The agreement of Coder 1 with Coder 2 yields at 84% (80% for European identity and 88,6% for national identity), the agreement of Coder 2 with Coder 1 at 67,4% (58,3% for European identity and 76,4% for national identity). For the exact calculation, see Appendix 6. According to Neuendorf (2002: 142-144), an

EU Nat. Mean 5,9 7,3 Standard Deviation 6,9 11,5 Mean 7,8 8,2 Standard Deviation 7 13 Mean 6,3 4,3 Standard Deviation 5,9 7 Mean 0,3 4,7 Standard Deviation 0,5 3,1 Overall Remain Remain excl. Cameron Leave

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agreement above 80% is highly reliable, and one between 60% and 70% sufficiently reliable.

Concerning the Remain as well as the Leave side, the results contradict Hypothesis 1.1, but verify Hypothesis 1.2. Remainers in fact mention European identity almost as much as national identity (49% – 51%). This contradicts the initial assumption that Remainers refer to EU identity more frequently as they are more EU-friendly. However, partly this is accounted for by the Prime Minister, who strongly referred to national identity in his contributions. Excluding him from the analysis and calculating it sepa-rately can adjust this.

Unsurprisingly, Leavers mention national identity more often than European identity (93% – 7%). Nevertheless, the great difference is astounding. Part of these results appear contra-intuitive in the first moment, but much less so once we look at the results from Q2.

5.2 Contextual Results for European and National Identity

After the first results from H1, the contextual analysis can now provide deeper insights into the results. Remainers and Leavers refer to European and national identity in over-all similar contexts, the range of contexts does not diverge significantly. Nevertheless, they do so in different ways; the underlying “connotation” varies greatly. Therefore, I split up the contextual groups between Remainers and Leavers, as the overall distinc-tion of “economy”, “democracy” etc. would have blurred the results. While five catego-ries coincide with both, European and national identity, four additional categocatego-ries have been implied for EU identity and two for national identity, which can be seen in Table 3 below. For the complete table with absolute numbers, please see Appendix 7, for the comprehensive description of the categories, see the Codebook in Appendix 3.

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Table 3: Contexts for References to European and National Identity.

Beginning with the overall results regarding European identity, by far the most refer-ences have been made in the context of the level of integration. 11,95% of the total references related to European identity and criticised the level of integration. Astonish-ingly, this percentage is even slightly higher for the Remain camp and only half as high for the Leave side (12,5% Remainers – 6,67% Leavers). Worth mentioning on the side of European identity is the context of advantages of being a EU member, visible in Figure 2 and 3. While only the Remain side accounted for this value, 9,72% is remark-ably high (Leavers: 0,00%). EU identity in the contexts of economy, guaranteed rights, shared values, shared history and the loss of sovereignty only played a moderate role overall (ranging between 3,14% and 5,16% each), and none for the Leave side at all. Surprisingly, only a minority of references have been made in the context of the EU’s role in the world (1,26%).

Total (%) Remainer (%) Leaver (%)

Economy 3,14% 3,47% 0,00%

Crises: migration, climate change 1,26% 1,39% 0,00%

Guarantee of fundamental rights 4,40% 4,86% 0,00%

Shared values 4,40% 4,86% 0,00%

Advantages/benefits due to MS 8,81% 9,72% 0,00%

Level of integration 11,95% 12,50% 6,67%

Shared history 4,40% 4,86% 0,00%

Role in the world, power, influence 1,26% 1,39% 0,00%

Loss of control/democracy, forced

against will 5,66% 6,25% 0,00%

Economy 6,92% 7,64% 0,00%

Crises, migration, climate change 1,89% 2,08% 0,00%

Shared values (democracy,

sovereignty) 5,03% 4,86% 6,67%

Shared history 5,03% 3,47% 20,00%

Role in the world, power, influence 26,42% 25,00% 40,00%

Security 3,77% 4,17% 0,00%

Exceptionalism 5,66% 3,47% 26,67%

Total 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%

Nat. EU

The European Union as the UK’s Other: To what Extent did Collective Identity, European and National, Play a Role in the Arguments of Both, Remain and Leave Camps before the Brexit Referendum?