Local European integration: tipping the scales against Euroscepticism

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Local European integration:

tipping the scales against Euroscepticism

A comparative study of local Europeanisation and local public opinion in

England between 2014 and 2016

Master thesis

11th of June 2018

Leiden University - Faculty of Governance and Global affairs MSc Public Administration

Specialisation in International and European Governance

Author: Julie Zimmermann - s1904205 Supervisor: Dr Dovilė Rimkutė Second reader: Dr Andrei Poama

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Abstract

The literature about public opinion on the European Union (EU) and the explanation for attitudes towards the organisation mainly focuses on political cueing at the national level, and individual level explanatory factors in the same country. This research brings attention to the less documented local level with a focus on English localities. The results of the UK EU referendum demonstrated how public opinion can be greatly divided following local patterns. Therefore, the hypothesised causal effect studied is the impact of local authorities’ European political integration on local public opinion. The study consists of a comparative analysis of eight English city-regions to determine: to what extent does the level of Europeanisation of English local authorities influence local public opinion on the EU? The theoretical explanations analysed, and the sample studied during the research highlights the importance of individual level factors to explain Euroscepticism and support to the EU but confirm to an extent the influence of local Europeanisation levels on local public opinion. The study also emphasises the local disparities existing in England in terms of Europeanisation and devolution.

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Foreword

This research is the final project of the master’s programme in Public Administration with a Specialisation in International and European Governance at Leiden University.

Between April and August 2016, I had an internship in the European and International Office of Bristol City Council, as well as spending time in its Brussels office. During this period, I observed that the Europeanisation of a city can have a direct impact on the people who live in that city and especially when the results of the UK EU referendum were announced. This inspired me to delve further into this topic and explore whether the same phenomenon exists in other areas of England.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Leiden University’s lecturers and tutors who helped me to develop my knowledge of International and European Governance as well as my academic skills.

A particular thank you to Dr Rimkutė who has been a strong guide through this work and to Dr Andrei Poama for reviewing my paper.

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1-Introduction

1.1 Brexit: UK, England and local divides

The United Kingdom (UK) is a unique and interesting case of differentiated integration to the European Union (EU). The path the country took is narrow; it did not join either the European Monetary Union (EMU) or the Schengen area and it continuously bargained to obtain independent control from the supranational organisation. Nonetheless, the UK’s relationship with the EU started with three failed attempts to join the European Economic Community (EEC). At the time, Former French President Charles de Gaulle was against the idea of including the UK in the EEC (Ellison, 2006, p.859). The UK was diminished by the decline of the British Empire and the Conservative government was enthusiastic about the economic advantages that came from low rates on trade. The country finally joined the EEC in 1973 (Startin, 2015, pp.313, 314). In 1975, under the pressure of the anti-marketeers, the first referendum on the UK’s membership of the EEC was held. 62,2% of the population voted in favour of remaining in the organisation (Gifford & Wellings, 2018, pp. 270-272).

Four decades later, the results of the UK EU referendum were received by Europe as a shock: 51,9% of the votes were in favour of leaving the EU, also called ‘Brexit’ by the press (Startin, 2018, p. 456). The British population has been greatly shaken and divided by the results, some welcomed them with glee others with despair. Thousands of British citizens even applied for other European citizenships only a few months after the results of the referendum (Marsh, 2018; BBC News, 2018; The Guardian, 2018). The results, as well as the reaction of the public after its announcement, emphasises the divide that exists in the UK on the question of the EU. Firstly, it points at a divide between its nations: Scotland voted in favour of remaining in the EU (62% of the votes) as well as Northern Ireland (55,8%); however, Wales and England voted to leave (52,5% and 53,4% respectively) (Electoralcommission.org.uk, 2018; Franklin, Holder, Osborn & Clarke, 2018). The direct implications for these national majorities to differ from the country majority could lead to a possible break-up of the UK. In fact, the Scottish pressures in favour of independence and its pro-EU profile could result in another referendum for Scottish independence, following the one held in 2014 (HM

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Government, 2014). Furthermore, Northern Ireland, because of its geographical position, could be more inclined to find an arrangement with the EU to allow free movement of goods and people with Ireland. Secondly, thanks to a closer study it is possible to notice the different patterns that seems to appear even on a national scale. Between rural and urban areas, the votes differ greatly, but variation is also noticeable between localities. After the publication, analysts pointed out some individual factors to explain the results, between young and older segments of the population for example. However, some cities that claimed their support to the EU such as Bristol or Greater Manchester showed a particularly high level of votes in favour of remaining in the EU (61,7 % and 60,4% respectively) (Franklin et al., 2018).

1.2 Problem definition and research question

Following some real-life observations working with the European and international office of the Bristol city council as well as its Brussels office between April and August 2016, this research builds on the assumption that local authorities’ European political integration influences local public opinion support to the EU. For instance, Bristol, as a greatly Europeanised city, is the city that voted the most in favour of remaining in the EU in England, based on percentage of votes. This research aims to compare the available data on the level of Europeanisation of eight English city-regions and votes for and against remaining in the EU based on the results. The conclusions of this research could be a starting point for another piece of large data analysis of local authorities’ Europeanisation and its consequences on locally expressed Euroscepticism and EU support. The research tends to answer the following research question:

To what extent does the level of Europeanisation of English local authorities influence local public opinion on the EU?

1.3 Relevance

The literature about public opinion on the EU and the explanation for individuals’ attitude towards the EU mainly focuses on political cueing and individual explanatory factors. These two aspects are analysed at the national level in most of the research (Inglehart, 1977; Gabel,

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8 1998; Janssen, 1991; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Hooghe, 2007; Boomgarden, Schuck., Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011; Brözel & Risse, 2018). As Guterjan underlines through his analysis of devolution and fusion theory applied to local authorities, local actors’ attitudes towards the EU have not been actively researched yet (Guterjan, 2015, p.941). However, the results of the UK EU referendum bring a new light to the analysis of British Euroscepticism and especially to the complexity of English attitudes towards the EU. The nature of the votes demonstrates the need for a focus on the diversity of national public opinion. The research on Euroscepticism is developed around explanatory factors for the emergence of Eurosceptic attitudes and origins of the movement (Spiering, 2004; Down & Wilson, 2012; Devries & Edwards, 2009; Wellings & Baxendale, 2014; Startin, 2015; Gifford, 2016; Fox & Pearce, 2018; Usherwood, Leruth & Startin, 2018; Vasilopoulou, 2018), but little attention has been paid to the factors that could make voters less receptive to the Eurosceptic narrative and more likely to express attachment and/or interest in the EU.

1.4 Structure of the research

This paper is structured following the chronological order of the research. The objective in doing so, is to immerse the reader in the progression that led to the final conclusions. The paper is separated into five sections: introduction (1); theoretical section (2); research design (3); results and data analysis (4); and finally discussion and conclusions of the research (5). Following this introduction (1), the theoretical section regroups two parts: the literature review and the theoretical framework. The literature review aims to explore the most influential literature on related topics such as explanations for individual attitudes towards the EU, political cueing and British Euroscepticism. The theoretical framework establishes the theoretical bases for the research: a detailed theoretical framework on local authorities EU integration and an elaboration of the main assumptions and hypotheses. The research design (3) describes the unit of analysis used, the logic behind the case selection and the operationalisation of the concepts elaborated in the theoretical framework into variables and ends with a comprehensive description of the data measurements and the data collection processes used in the research. The results and data analysis section (4) presents the results and analyses the data starting with the independent variable, then the dependent variable and finally assesses the hypothesised causal mechanism. In each part the data collected for each city-region

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is analysed and then compared with the rest of the sample to test the main hypotheses. The last part of this section links back the findings to the theoretical section. The paper ends with the conclusions and discussion (5); in this section, a summary of the results, in order to answer the research question, is followed by a discussion about the limits of the research, the possible future research on related topics and concludes with possible real-life recommendations based on the research findings.

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2- Theoretical section

2.1 Literature Review

A. Support for the European integration project Introduction to EU support theories

Extensive literature exists on the different explanations in support of the European integration project, which reveals a number of factors and actors involved in these mechanisms. Hooghe and Marks (2005) define three main families of explanations of support which focus on particular aspects: The trade theories, based on a rational perspective, highlight a cost-benefit calculation that motivates individuals or political actors to show support or be in opposition to the EU; the psychology of group membership theories that show how social identities - including national identities- influence attitudes; and finally, the cognitive and social psychology theories that tend to demonstrate how political cueing coming from the elite influences public opinion and vice versa (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). These three theoretical families are interesting to consider in understanding pro-EU and Eurosceptic attitudes.

EU support scholars often cite two concepts used by Genschel and Jachtenfuchs’ (2015) in their typology of actors’ constellations categorising mass public and elite attitudes towards EU integration: permissive consensus and constraining dissensus. A permissive consensus is a situation where both the elite and the mass public are in favour of European integration. A good example of permissive consensus is what the original EU member states experienced before the Maastricht Treaty. (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2015, p.10). A constraining dissensus describes the interplay between pro-integration elites and the mass public’s Euroscepticism. Public opposition to the EU constrains the elites that need to favour a differentiated integration in order to get the benefits they seek in European integration (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2015, p.10). In the case of the UK and more specifically England, Inglehart (1977) and Startin (2015) defend the idea that a permissive consensus never clearly existed (Inglehart,1977, pp.329-330; Startin, 2015). Unlike the original members of the European Economic Community (EEC), the division between the public and elites on the topic resulted in a constraining dissensus. If Brexit might suggest that the country got closer to a general opposition- mass public and elites being opposed to integration- some points in this theoretical framework will suggest that it might be more complex in reality.

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Boomgarden et al. (2011) also defined an interesting typology as well as four antecedents in support of the EU. According to them, support for the EU appears to present different characteristics. The nature and the kind of support could be either diffuse or specific and of utilitarian (a cost-benefit calculation linked to the trade theories) or affective nature (Boomgarden et al., 2011, p.242). The authors also define four antecedents in support of EU integration: economic evaluations, government approval, anti-immigration attitudes, and national identity (Boomargen et al., 2011, p.251). These different factors sum up some interesting findings made by individual theories in support of the EU and the article highlights a crucial point that will be used in this research: the feeling of attachment to the EU.

Individual-level theories and explanatory factors for attitudes towards the EU

Individual-level theories either for or against EU integration attitudes identify factors that could influence them such as age, generation, values or skills, which are useful to consider in this analysis. Gabel (1998) identifies five prominent individual theories of public support in the literature about European integration: utilitarian, class partisanship, support for the current government, cognitive mobilisation and political values. The utilitarian theory can be linked to the trade theory that represents a rational cost-benefit calculation for support. Class partisanship refers to the fact that regarding the EU, individuals tend to follow the position of a political party or an institution they relate to. Support for the current government means that depending on the individual’s support or opposition to the current government, the attitude of the political leaders will be a cue. If one individual holds a favourable attitude towards its government and that the government is pro-EU, this individual is more likely to be pro-EU as well. However, if another studied individual does not support the pro-EU government, he or she is more likely to be against the European integration project (Gabel, 1998). In the context of increased European Eurosceptic populism and hostile attitudes towards pro-EU elites, this theory presents interesting conclusions. Cognitive mobilisation stems from Inglehart (1977) who developed the idea of political skills that are still seen as strong explanatory variables for public support of the EU. His theory of cognitive mobilisation is introduced in the “Silent Revolution” where he describes the process of cognitive mobilisation as following: “The essence of this process is the development of the skills needed to manipulate political abstractions and thereby to coordinate activities that are remote in space and time” (Inglehart, 1977, p.295). The author pointed out that the understanding of distant politics that suggest a level of abstraction can only be grasped thanks to high cognitive skills. For instance, it is easier for less educated individuals to understand local politics, but it is harder to grasp national

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12 politics and even more so European politics (Inglehart,1977, p.295). Furthermore, the complexity of the EU administration and politics makes it barely accessible for less educated people and is criticised by the mass public for being an obscure elite-driven institution (Gabel, 1998, McLaren 2002, Fligstein 2008, Hooghe & Marks 2008). The political values theory which relates to social construction during the individual’s formative years- the individual’s experiences throughout their youth result in specific values during adulthood. Individuals born after 1980 are believed to be used to European integration, to naturally feel more European and less concerned about national sovereignty. Inglehart’s conceptualisation of materialist and materialist generations highlight the generational change in values that makes post-materialists generations more likely to support the EU. The author makes a distinction between materialists aims and values - fulfilling basic needs, ensuring physical security, feeling of strong national or local identity because of a parochial approach; and post-materialists who seek self-actualisation, intellectual development and feel more cosmopolitan. According to the author, the absence of armed conflict in the EU member states territories since the creation of the EEC is the reason for the development of a post-materialist generation (Gabel, 1998; Inglehart, 1977, p.296).

However, Janssen (1991) criticised Inglehart’s conceptualisation and concluded in his research that post-materialist attitudes are unrelated to attitudes towards the EU, at least not directly. Indeed, what Inglehart pointed out in his theory is the change of values and cognitive skills between pre-war and post-war generations in the 1970s (Inglehart, 1977). Janssen’s argument is that the three factors that influence EU related attitudes are education, political skills and values independently of the generation the individual belongs to. To support this theory, it is possible to consider Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. The distinction between the two generations made by Inglehart is close to Maslow’s theory of human motivation. Post-materialists are less concerned with the fulfilment of their basic needs thanks to economic growth and their physical safety would be able to seek to fulfil the higher-level needs on the Maslow’s pyramid (Maslow, 1943), such as self-actualisation. It is possible to argue then that this conceptualisation is less systematic and depends on other factors such as wealth, localisation or education.

Nevertheless, Down and Wilson (2012) studied in their research the importance of life-cycle and generation effect on EU attitudes. They discovered that both age and generation had an impact on support or opposition to the EU; for example, they showed that “The generation of Europeans that lived through the Great Depression or the Second World War are more supportive of the EU” (Down & Wilson, 2012, p. 449)- certainly because of the peace project

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that represents the EU as well as the economic hardships that this time represented and how it impacted their formative years. The cohort studied composed of individuals born after the mid-1980s, which appears to be when the EU started to deepen integration, are shown to be more likely to be pro-integration (Down & Wilson, 2012, p. 449). The cohort in between these two generations tend to be less supportive of the EU, probably because of less traumatic war experiences making them actively supportive of the EU as well as fast changes in national and supranational sovereignty. In this research, the authors’ analysis allows the understanding that generational and age support to the EU is actually a symptom of changes in environmental factors, education, political skills and national identity and are less of a direct causal mechanism. Down and Wilson’s life-cycle and cohorts effect theory accurately updates Inglehart’s conceptualisation that stressed the generational differences in support towards the EU but simplified them. Thus, demonstrating the implication of individual factors, such as political skills and values, to explain public opinion towards the EU.

Identities theories

Identities theories present interesting conclusions that are crucial to understand support or opposition of EU integration because of the individual’s sense of identity. The previous paragraph showed the limited explanation that age and generation can provide as factors for public attitudes towards the EU. How identity is socially constructed seems to be a better indication of support or opposition to European integration. Hooghe and Marks (2008) studied the implication of identity as a decisive element in multi-level governance through the postfunctionalist theory and stressed how identity can be politicised regarding the EU but also that it can determine attitudes (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p.13). They refer to the social identity theory that states that individual self-conception is shaped by group identification (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p12).

The notion of identity appears essential to understand the individual's attitudes towards the EU. The literature makes an interesting distinction between inclusive and exclusive identities that influence support or opposition to European integration (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p.87; Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p.13). An individual with an exclusive identity will only be able to identify with one identity - most likely national identity. Whereas, an individual with an inclusive identity may hold more than one identity; for instance, feeling European and English at the same time. In other words, an individual that constructed an exclusive national identity is less able to feel European and as a result will be more likely to oppose projects of European Integration that are perceived as a threat to this nationality (McLaren, 2002).

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14 However, according to Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), identities at different levels (supranational, national, regional or local) are not incompatible as they activate different processes of identification and their exclusivity depends on how the nationality has been conceptualised (Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001, p.760). The elements that tend to influence this conceptualisation are social interactions, the European or national perspective of school curriculum, culture, the role of the elite and individual level factors (Fligstein, 2008). What is argued here is that holding an exclusive identity is the result of an identity construction that placed the nationality as the main collective identity and who or what is not part of the ethnic national identity as the Other (Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012, p.112). Fligstein (2008) describes the emergence of an identity with the theory of collective identity formation, and states that for an identity to emerge there is a need for interaction between individuals who hold the same identity and to define who represents the Other (Fligstein, 2008, p. 124). In order to create or reinforce an identity, social interactions are key. That is why a strong attachment to regional identity is frequent (Fligstein, 2008, p.128). If McLaren (2002) underlines the point of perceived threat of the EU for national identity, Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) refer to the theories of nested group theory and identity choice theories to build their argument (McLaren, 2002; Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001, p.758). In their article, they explain how individuals are able to hold more than one nested identity and how they can identify to a larger unit if they perceive an identity as positive. This identity can provide the individual with pride and a sense of control or security (Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001 p.757-760). Identity is therefore essential in understanding support for European integration and how identifying with Europe appears to be individually constructed.

Emotions and feelings: a new perspective to understand attitudes

The study of emotions and feelings towards the EU offers a new perspective that allow to extend the cause supporting European integration. Emotions and feelings have only been recently identified as important factors in the EU support literature. Suggested by McLaren (2002) with the concept of perceived threat, the feeling of fear can be associated with the EU regarding the degradation of a nation state, its integrity, dominant identity and culture. European integration is seen as a threat to the symbol of nation-state and activates feelings of fear and rejection (McLaren, 2002, pp.552-554).

The emotional bond that can be created thanks to positive life experiences is a powerful tool to encourage pro-EU attitudes. In the typology of EU support studied in the first paragraph, Boomargen et al. (2011) make a distinction between the affective and utilitarian support for

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the EU. An affective nature opposed to a cost-benefit one suggests an emotional bond (Boomgarden et al., 2011, p.258). That bond could be developed through European identity and a feeling of attachment. In a recently published article, Verbalyte and Von Scheve (2017) highlighted the importance of feelings and how those feelings impacted support for the EU (Verbalyte and Von Scheve, 2017). This theory is interesting considering the emotional narrative of Eurosceptics that will be studied in the second part of the literature review. Support towards the EU is flexible depending on the factors cited but deep feelings and emotions linked to the perception of the EU are less likely to change so rapidly. If EU integration is perceived as a threat and is intrinsically linked to negative feelings, the individual is less likely to support the EU or to show only specific and utilitarian support. On the contrary, individuals who have positive feelings conditioning their support to the EU are more likely to feel European because they perceive the institution positively (Verbalyte & Von Scheve, 2017; Medran & Gutierrez, 2001, p.758; Boomargen et al., 2011). An assumption would be that if the individual developed positive feelings towards European integration this would be as a result of positive experiences involving EU integration or EU citizens- for example positive cross-border exchanges, travels or business. Janssen (1991) also established that value orientations and political skills are related to individual youth experiences such as a feeling of security experienced as a child (Janssen,1991, p.446). The importance of feelings and perception during the formative years as well as later in life should not be undermined considering support to the EU.

B. The UK EU referendum results: the symptom of a British social-cultural crisis Euroscepticism: political elites Euroscepticism and public opinion

The dynamics between the political elites and public opinion are essential to understand how Euroscepticism evolves. The literature on Euroscepticism includes elements to understand British Euroscepticism and the reasons for the UK EU membership referendum results. Euroscepticism is an encompassing term with multiple definitions that covers many concepts and attitudes. For the purpose of this research, Euroscepticism will be defined as : the voluntary opposition to European integration. These past decades, a rise in Eurosceptic attitudes is noticeable in response to the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992. The Treaty aimed to deepen European integration and introduced the notion of a European identity (Taggart,1998, p. 363; Spiering & Harmsen, 2004, p. 25). Scholars considered the changes in public opinion and literature flourished on the topic in order to explain this shift. Following this political event, they concluded that European public opinion moved from a permissive consensus to a

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16 constraint consensus (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). In the case of the UK, it seems that the country never knew a period of permissive consensus.

To understand the dynamic that exists between Eurosceptic elites and public opinion certain elements require clarification. Firstly, class partisanship is a factor that is necessary to consider through the study of EU support: if the individual has a strong feeling of belonging to an institution or a party, he or she is likely to follow its position on the EU (Gabel, 1998). Class partisanship is an even more interesting aspect in regard to Euroscepticism in the UK where elites are especially divided on the topic of the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 426). Secondly, Hooghe (2007) highlights the existing linkages between political parties and public opinion but that specify than they can both affect each other. On one hand, the top-down theory suggests that political cueing is enough to explain individual Euroscepticism, and on the other hand, the bottom-up theory presents the alternative explanation of public preferences- here opposition to the EU- influencing political actors. In other words, politicians choose to respond to public preferences in order to be elected or to have favourable opinion polls (Hooghe, 2007, pp. 6-7). Following the bottom-up theory, party Euroscepticism would constitute political opportunism for electoral strategies. Börzel and Risse (2018) confirm the politicisation and mobilisation by the Eurosceptic parties of pre-existing attitudes among a minority. They used collective identities and strong anti-EU sentiments for political opportunism (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 99). The top-down theory would suggest that if political elites’ cues are heterogeneous or not clearly exposed, individuals will choose to express opinions following individual level factors such as: “interests, values, and political predispositions” (Hooghe, 2007, p. 8).

Nevertheless, Taggart (1998) underlines in his work the diversity in ideology, degree and nature. He proposes classifying party Euroscepticism into a number of categories: the single issue Eurosceptic parties (in the case of Britain, UKIP), Protest based parties with Euroscepticism (for example the Green Party), Established party with Eurosceptic position (such as the Democratic unionist party); and Eurosceptic factions (in the UK The Conservative Party) (Taggart, 1998, p.371). In his analysis he concludes that parties that are considered as extremists tend to call themselves Eurosceptic, whereas moderate parties express Euroscepticism through factions (Taggart, 1998, p. 363, pp. 368-369). Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2002) typology of soft and hard Euroscepticism permits to classify parties regarding their position on Europe.

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Europhile Europhobe

EU-optimist

Euro-enthusiasts: optimists about the EU project, supportive of the EU integration project

Euro-pragmatists: interests work out within the EU project but not supportive of the idea

EU-

pessimist Eurosceptics: critical of the actual developments of the EU Eurorejects: reject the EU project and EU integration

Typology of party euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002)

The diversity in nature can be conceptualised into two dimensions: economic and cultural opposition to integration (Derives & Edwards, 2009, p. 9). These two dimensions are highly relevant considering the case on British Euroscepticism that derives from both.

Ideologies, Englishness and the Anglosphere

British Euroscepticism is a phenomenon rooted in British history, identity and vision; it reflects the factors for EU support or opposition studied already but also distinguishes itself from other European Euroscepticism because of its complexity and singularity. The term Euroscepticism emerged in the UK in the press in the 1980s (Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 1). Initially, hostility towards the EU appeared with the Labour Party anti-marketeers’ faction who were concerned about the consequence of European integration on welfare. Indeed, EU membership was initially a Conservative Party initiative that foresaw the economic advantages of exchange goods and services in the EEC. The economic purpose of this initiative, reinforced by the creation of the Single European Market (SEM) in 1986, is what conceptualised the dominant British vision on the EU: a vision of an intergovernmental organisation useful for its free trade area, to allow freedom to travel and invest abroad (Fligstein, 2008, p.135). Under the influence of the Treaty of Maastricht, the utilitarian approach of the EU membership has been progressively accompanied by an emotional and psychological narrative based on strong national identity, protection of national sovereignty and fear of immigration in the context of Freedom of Movement (Startin, 2015, p. 320). The emergence of euro-reject Eurosceptic parties and hard euroscepticism identified as far-right Euroscepticism contributed to this tendency (Spiering, 2004, pp. 129-131; Taggart & Sczczerbiak, 2002; Halikiopoulou &

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18 Vlandas, 2018, p.445). The creation of UKIP illustrates these emergences, as does the constitution of a faction of Eurosceptic Conservatives (Taggart, 1998, p. 369).

The recent dominant British Eurosceptic narrative is characterised by an emotional and unrealistic vision - rarely supported by empirical evidence- based on a symbolic threat that the EU presents. This discourse appears to work well especially on the individuals that hold an exclusive identity (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 87; Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 13) and on public opinion in general that lacks knowledge on the EU (McLaren, 2002, p. 559). As studied previously, the literature identifies a number of factors to explain EU support and opposition. Fox & Pearce (2018) make a crucial point in this regard that seems to follow the main EU support theories:

It is unlikely that the majority of UK citizens who voted to leave the EU did so solely because they believed EU membership was bad for the country, but because of other concerns as well relating to their nationality identity, political engagement, associations with other political institutions, and judgements about the performance of the national government (Fox &

Pearce, 2018, p. 34; Gabel, 1998).

British Euroscepticism, like other European Eurosceptic trends, features many aspects including radicalism, populism and nationalism (Usherwood, Larus & Startin, 2018, p. 474).

In the case of British Euroscepticism, the nationalism aspect appears to be the most prominent. British history and a feeling of identity are key drivers to analyse this phenomenon. The UK distinguished itself from the rest of the continent following the events of the Second World War. The country always differentiated itself from the atrocities committed, the countries occupied and the autocracies that flourished during this period. The term of British differentness arose to express the emotions and identity that made British people think they were different from other Europeans (Spiering, 2004, p.145). As an illustration, it is possible to consider here the distinction that is made with the UK and continental Europe designated as the Other (Wellings & Baxendale, 2014, p. 125; Fligstein et al., 2012, p.112). To the concept of British differentness, the concepts of Britishness and Englishness can be added to understand British nationalism. This concept describes the belief that British people are different, that they do things in a certain way implying a great deal of national pride (Spiering, 2004, p. 137). This feeling, that is more shared by English people than citizens of other British nations, is connected to British history.

Nostalgia and pride of the British Empire’s achievements are highly noticeable in the English Eurosceptic and some right-wing parties’ narratives. However, the attachment to the former Empire and the national pride of its expansion through the Commonwealth are still

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promoted in schools (Wellings & Baxendale, 2014, p.). But also, Fligstein (2008) confirms how much the British government resisted the teaching of Europe promoted through the creation of European identity. The UK is one of the countries that is the most national about its political collective identity in Europe. The general public knows little about how the EU works and education lacks Europeanisation. This is noticeable not only in the way history is explained to children but also the lack of a requirement of learning a second language- whilst learning a second and third language is compulsory until 18 years old in high school in France for instance and often whilst studying at University, British pupils need to make an active choice to learn a second language from the age of 14. If a British student is willing to do an Erasmus exchange, he or she needs to study one more year for a three-year Bachelor’s degree with high fees, which can be highly dissuasive (Fligstein, 2008, p. 147, p. 130).

This strong national attachment and its history explains why political elites and the mass public tend to see the EU as an international organisation that give them access to European markets. Gifford (2016) concludes that “The Anglo-model of political economy has been ideologically reproduced in opposition to the territorial logic of European integration” and therefore marginalised itself because of its Eurosceptic political economy (Gifford, 2016, p. 785). Even more, Eurosceptics consider that the choice of joining the EU was only one of many and that the Anglosphere is today a more preferable one (Wellings & Baxendale, 2014, p. 123). Indeed, they consider that European allies are not reliable and that transatlantic alliances and partnerships with the Commonwealth are better options that would not deprive the UK of its national sovereignty (Spiering & Harmsen, 2004, pp. 16-17). The literature tends to study European Euroscepticism in terms of political party systems and elites cueing but often leaves out the wider cultural context that played a decisive role on British Euroscepticism and the results of the UK EU membership referendum (Spiering & Harmsen, 2004, p. 16).

The UK EU referendum: societal causes and campaigns

The results of the UK EU referendum are the symptoms of major societal differences in Britain and especially England. Firstly, the British identity crisis studied previously reached a critical point during the UK EU membership campaign that opposed pro-European liberal visions and nationalists right-wing ideas. The British society has always been divided on the EU topic. As Gifford and Wellings (2018) emphasise, referenda represent the inability to deal with different opinions in the political sphere and that is why the political elites decide to organise a referendum to settle the issue at stake (Gifford & Wellings, 2018, p. 270). In the case of the EU membership, the UK already ran a first referendum in 1975 under the influence of the

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anti-20 marketeer and the population voted in favour of EU membership with 62,2% of the votes (Gifford & Wellings, 2018, pp. 270-272). Since 1975, the EU has been turning slowly into a supranational project as opposed to an intergovernmental organisation. Moreover, the nostalgic Eurosceptic narrative of a strong British empire contributed to the public opinion being in favour of leaving the EU. What needs to be highlighted here is the diversity in the patterns of voting in the country. The four nations had different majorities- Scotland and Northern-Ireland voted in favour of remaining in the EU while Wales and England voted to leave. Especially in England, the majority of cities voted to remain and the majority of rural areas to leave. This division in the vote demonstrates divisions in British and English society.

Secondly, the organisation of a referendum testifies the division that existed between political elites. Hooghe and Marks (2005) state that if the elites are divided on the EU topic so is the rest of the population because of political cueing. Nevertheless, they conclude that “the extent to which exclusive national identity bites on support for European integration depends on how divided national elites are” (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 437). Historically, elites have been divided on the topic, in the past between Labour and Conservative and today in a more anarchic way. This assumption would mean that during this referendum public opinion was particularly receptive to the Eurosceptic narrative. During the campaigns for the UK EU membership referendum these divisions played in favour of Brexit. The Conservative Party, originally in favour of the EU membership for the SEM, did not manage to show a united front. Former Prime Minister David Cameron campaigned for Remain - the name of the campaign in favour of EU membership- after negotiating terms with the EU that he considered as more favourable for the UK. And yet Boris Johnson, Former Mayor of the City of London and current Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs, did not hold the same viewpoint. The pro-Brexit faction of the Conservatives has probably emerged from this event, as Taggart (1998) specifies “factionalism can be the result of a prominent figure publicly breaking off from the overall party position” (Taggart, 1998, p. 369). In doing so, Johnson weakened Cameron’s position. The Labour party, despite being in favour of remaining in the EU, was not actively engaged in campaigning; The leader of the Labour party, Jeremy Corbyn did not campaign in favour of EU membership. Furthermore, Cameron’s Remain campaign was mainly based on a rational economic argument which neglected other important factors and did not succeed in balancing the unrealistic fears and invoked emotions that were involved in the leave campaign discourse. Nigel Farage, former leader of UKIP, based his narrative on hard Euroscepticism, emotional and psychological arguments, and especially fear of immigration that he framed as the country’s major issue (Startin, 2018, p. 464; Whitaker, 2018, pp.

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100-107; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002). The Leave campaign was also strengthened by an intense Eurosceptic tabloid press; The Sun, The Dailymail, and The Spectator campaigned intensively for Brexit and used the same unrealistic fears playing on the readers’ perceived threat (Startin, 2015, p. 320; Leruth, Startin & Usherwood , 2018, p. 470; McLaren, 2002).

Thirdly, British public opinion is torn on the European question: only 51,9% of the votes were in favour of exiting the EU (Startin, 2018, p. 456). The utilitarian theory points towards the explanation that depending on whether voters are part of the economic winners or losers of EU integration they will be in favour or opposed to the EU. The conceptualisation of the individual identity as an exclusive or inclusive nationality is believed as well to have influenced the vote. The generational and life-cycle theory confirms that younger people were more likely to vote in favour of remaining in the EU (Franklin et al., 2018; Down & Wilson, 2013). Linked to the cognitive mobilisation theory, Fligstein (2008) shows that those who are either highly educated, younger or are white-collar workers are more likely to feel European than those who are either less educated, older or blue-collar workers (Fligstein, 2008, p. 127). The individuals that feel Europeans are the ones who are more likely to have voted in favour of the EU, as well as those who saw an economic interest in staying in the EU. The differences in the votes illustrate many sociocultural differences between the voters themselves. The results of the UK EU referendum would have been the combined effect between a political elite concerned about losing power because of the EU becoming a supranational state and mass votes from a divided public opinion going through sociocultural changes (Fligstein et al., 2012, p. 118).

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22 2.2 Theoretical Framework

A. Theoretical framework: Local EU integration, an opportunity to encourage EU integration European integration of local authorities and economic security

Local authorities' empowerment through devolution seems to be the solution to territorial diversity and need for autonomy. Interestingly, debates about devolution in the UK present similarities to the debate around European integration. Similarly to EU membership, devolution was the topic of a referendum that failed in 2004: a referendum for the establishment of a North East of England assembly. The referendum campaign showed a greatly divided political elite on the topic of devolution and the project was rejected by 77,93 % of the votes (Gifford & Wellings, 2018, p. 270; Mulholland, 2004). As a result, the referendum slowed down the devolution process (Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 259). During the 20th century, home rules were a major issue that the political sphere struggled to deal with. Two problems emerged during this period, the nations need for sovereignty from the 1960s pressured by nationalists’ dissent and English economic and cultural diversity intensified because of Thatcherism (Bradbury, 2013, p. 12). These movements were amplified by the decline of national economy causing increasing disparities in the territory and the identity crisis that Britain had to face when losing its power as an Empire (Spiering, 2004, p. 142). The traditional centrality of the legislative and fiscal power of the British parliament greatly shaped the vision of British politics. From the 1970s, domestic reforms as well as the evolution of European integration impacted this vision. Nations, regions and cities expressed the need to protect their interests and to specialise themselves to reduce inequalities thanks to the SEM and assistance funds from the EU. Indeed, regional development theories particularly emphasise the importance of these last two to succeed in the context of globalisation (Perry, 2007, p. 1052). The tendency of devolution hit Europe in the 1980s, which coincided with the British devolution phenomena (Shaw & Skyes, 2005, p. 196). The central-local government dynamic, improved with the reform agenda of the Labour government in 1997, provided local authorities with more inclusion in decision-making through new procedures and leadership structures (Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 260).

Devolution in the UK, and especially amongst English regions and cities, permitted the territories to progress at their own pace and to adapt to economic changes. Regional autonomy and decentralisation are for Bradbury (2013) the ultimate proof of democratic maturation (Bradbury, 2013, p. 26). The autonomy of regions and cities allows a closer relationship between citizens and policies. In the context of globalisation, localities gained in responsibility

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(Herrschel, 2014, p.5) and under the pressure of European and international competitiveness cities started to “be actors in their own right within an increasingly fragmented and differentiated globalised economic space” (Herrschel, 2014, p. 53). “The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016” now includes cities ("Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016", 2018). A relative autonomy of what is called city-regions also has been established with the “Local Government Act” in 1972 to create “a two-tier metropolitan structure for the big cities and their hinterlands on the model of Greater London” (Bradbury, 2013, p. 20). City-regions formed combined authorities regrouping the local authorities part of the urban area to coordinate their local governance. Since, updates of this Act adjusted its scope. A parallel can be made here back to the notion of city-state described by Inglehart (1977) as one of the first system of political communication and decision-making (Inglehart, 1977, p.295). Globalisation and European integration are movements that seem to encourage devolution and division. The more abstract politics and economies are becoming, the more likely a need for close politics emerge.

Emergence of a European identity at the local level

English local authorities’ level of Europeanisation is influenced by it politico-administration systems as well as attitudes and preferences. England requires a focused analysis because of its specific relationship with the EU and national identity as well as its territorial socio economics and cultural diversity. Devolution for the nations would need independent analyses regarding their historical and legal particularities. Therefore Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are not part of the research.

The EU represents an opportunity both for local authorities looking for autonomy and for the EU to deepen and implement regulation. Progressively, under the influence of intensified devolution phenomena the concept of Europe of Regions emerged. The EU had the opportunity to reach the different territories it is composed of and gain in political legitimacy (Bradbury, 2013, p. 25). The European Spatial Development Policy (ESDP) had the ambition to reduce the disparity on the EU territory and promote its global growth focusing on regions that needed support (Shaws and Skyes, 2005, p. 183). In the context of national austerity, EU funding for development projects greatly help cities such as Bristol but also regions to grow thanks to EU funding (Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 261). Local-supranational links helped local authorities bypass the national government in order to have access to European policy-making and influence the EU’s agenda (Guterjan, 2015, p. 937). EU regulation significantly affects local authorities and their actions: “In England approximately 50 % of European legislation is

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24 implemented by subnational authorities” (Sutcliffe, 2007, pp. 252-260; Guterjan, 2015, p. 941). Since the 1990s, local governments and cities became more and more Europeanised under the influence of increased European integration and devolution, adapting their political structure accordingly. A pillar in terms of local authorities having their voice heard in the EU is the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty that strengthened their positions and participation to decision-making. The cohesion policy for 2007-2013 was followed by the cohesion policy 2014-2020 and placed the focus on a list of strategies that went under the name of Europe 2020 (Guterjan & Miles, 2016, pp. 640-644). In this framework the role of cities is targeted as essential to implement policies, including integration policies (Guterjan & Miles, 2016, p. 641).

Guterjan (2015) theorises the local-supranational dynamic based on the fusion theory. This theory states that “National and European institutions do not act independently from each other but fuse vertically and horizontally in a common policy cycle and under a supranational polity” (Guterjan, 2015, p. 939). He brings this analysis to the local level and describes the local authority’s level of Europeanisation with the following five As - absorption, attention, adaptation, action and attitudes. In his analysis the author researches the “systemic linkages between the evolution of European governance and micro-developments at the local level” (Guterjan, 2015, p.938, Guterjan & Miles, 2016, p.640). The five As are interesting concepts to consider to evaluate Europeanisation of localities. Absorption refers to the dynamic of European funding schemes and economic agendas that the local authorities receive. It represents a strong indicator of the EU’s impact as receiving funds also means compliance with the EU regulative frameworks. Attention considers the extent to which the local authorities have a European agenda. Cities are more likely to get involved in international and European affairs. A concrete indicator of attention would be local authorities’ administrations dedicated to European affairs. Adaptation, refers to the capacity of the local to adapt structurally to new institutions and decision-making; a good illustration of this notion is for example the establishment of representation in Brussels to lobby in favour of the city or region. It is interesting to note here that English local authorities were the first ones to do so. Action defines the promotion of the local authority political preferences, for instance through networks such as Eurocities. Finally, attitudes are those of local actors towards European integration. Attitudes has not been studied yet by scholars at the local level but Guterjan suggests that it could be evaluated through one or more of the following three different measurements: performance fusion, that defines the accepting of obligations; political fusion, that refers to local actor preferences’ regarding new political institutions and mechanisms or the compound fusion, that evaluates if local authorities are willing to seize opportunities to engage in EU politics through

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the European Commission (Guterjan, 2015, pp.941-949). Sutcliffe (2007) regroups these concepts into two categories: formal presence in consultative bodies such as the Committee of Regions the Council of Ministers and informal mechanisms with regional information offices in Brussels to lobby EU institutions, networks of other regional and local authorities (Sutcliffe, 2007, p.262). These different theories and measurements permit to establish the variations in politico-administration that can illustrate the level of Europeanisation of local authorities. The local level, an opportunity for the EU integration project

The English local level represents an opportunity for the EU as it allows diversity in European integration and European identity to emerge. Literature on the topic of supporting the EU highlighted the importance of considering economic interests with the utilitarian theory but also the individuals’ need for economic security with identity theories as determinants of support or opposition to the EU. Through devolution and EU funding schemes, more Europeanised local authorities appear to have reached economic security despite the British national economy. The asymmetry in growth thanks to differentiated European integration at the local level is noticeable in the votes of the EU UK referendum. The larger cities, more likely to be involved in EU affairs, show a majority of votes in favour of remaining in the EU (Franklin et al., 2018). It seems that the localities that are more Europeanised managed to encourage pro-EU attitudes. This assumption means that EU economic security would affect positively the citizen’s perception on the EU.

As stated by identity theories, a positive perception of a large unit identity would make the individuals more inclined to adopt this identity as their own. Besides, perceiving this identity as positive, for example European identity as modern and open could encourage the individual to actively adopt this identity (Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001, pp. 757-758.). In the case of English cities, citizens that are opposed to the Eurosceptic vision or narrative could choose to define themselves as Europeans and have a strong local identity to escape from the current perceived national identity. This tendency is highly relevant regarding the socio-cultural and generational divide that exists in England. Then, the positive perception on the EU can be built through economic security but building European identity amongst local citizens is achieved through political integration and social construction. Establishment of nations and countries are political constructions that put together individuals with different group identities and interests; which is why culture and social interactions are essential to build a collective identity and a feeling of attachment to it (Fligstein et al., 2012, p. 109). As the supranational

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26 organisation that the EU aspires to be, it is essential that it takes these constructions in consideration.

Moreover, thanks to Europeanisation of local authorities, the EU has the opportunity to reduce the abstraction of its politics and maximise its positive impact on regions and cities. An important point made here is that the emergence of a European identity and support to the EU is greatly influenced by local authorities’ EU involvement and no longer solely the member states. Furthermore, in the case of England, this involvement would be the solution for local actors to bypass a Eurosceptic governmental elite and promote European integration. Fligstein et al. (2012) argued that the more familiar and positive the view of the role of Europe is in individuals’ lives the more likely they are to feel European (Fligstein et al., 2012, p. 118). Local initiatives and non-governmental actor's promotion of European identity such as Europe-wide civic associations networks can also reinforce this feeling (Fligstein, 2008, p. 172). The literature on Euroscepticism underlined the importance of negative emotions towards the EU in Eurosceptic attitudes. Similarly, positive feelings such as good memories, positive experiences and cross-borders social exchanges should make citizens more likely to support the EU as it develops affective support: an emotional bond (Boomgarden et al., 2011, p.258). To conclude, different levels of Europeanisation amongst local authorities should influence the individual's attitudes towards the EU.

B. Main assumptions and hypotheses

The literature studied previously permits to formulate three solid assumptions. Some important points made in the theoretical section are necessary to consider in order to build the main hypotheses. Firstly, it has been established in the literature review of attitudes towards the EU that EU support can either be of a utilitarian or affective nature (Boomgarden et al., 2011). Secondly, the second part of the review highlighted that British, and especially English Euroscepticism, is the result of a divided society. Citizens that do not feel that the EU serves their interests or do not feel any attachment to it are more likely to be receptive to the Eurosceptic narrative. The theoretical framework and study of the phenomenon of devolution demonstrated that the compatibility between local and European identities suggests that local authorities would be able to achieve more integration than at the national scale. Integration at

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the national level is difficult because of the existence of a strong national identity, and fear of losing centralised government power. Through this analysis emerged three main assumptions:

1. The engagement of local authorities reduces the level of abstraction of EU politics.

2. Thanks to devolution, local authorities can choose their own path to European integration which influences its citizens, who are more likely to be supportive of the EU as they can witness its benefits in their everyday life.

3. A high level of Europeanisation within local authorities might be the antidote to Eurosceptic narratives drawn on an emotional and identity discourse based on perceived threat (McLaren, 2002, Startin, 2015).

These main assumptions, built thanks to the literature reviewed in the field and the theoretical framework, are solid basis for developing hypotheses. The study of the relevant literature emphasised the effect that identities and negative feelings have on attitudes towards the EU. In this research, the assumptions elaborated in the previous paragraph points out that local authorities’ Europeanisation level could have an effect on EU local public opinion. The literature on British Euroscepticism during the campaign analysed the Eurosceptic narrative and concluded that the Leave campaign was based on an emotional and psychological discourse: fear of immigration, lack of awareness and exclusive identities (Startin, 2015). The divided results within the British and English territory as well as real-life observations demonstrated the interest of focusing on this possible influence. That is why in this paper, the theory that European integration at the local level could have had a negative effect on public opinion’s receptivity to Eurosceptic narratives and boost pro-EU attitudes is followed. Two hypotheses can be formulated for this research:

Hypothesis 1: A higher level of Europeanisation for local authorities results in a higher level of EU support and a lower level of Euroscepticism among local public opinion.

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28 Hypothesis 2: A lower level of Europeanisation for local authorities' results in a lower level of EU support and a higher level of Euroscepticism among local public opinion.

Through the following pages, the research tends to answer the following research question: To what extent does the level of Europeanisation of English local authorities influence local public opinion on the EU? In order to do so, the research consists of a comparative study of a small number of most similar cases which aims to reach an explanatory conclusion.

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3 – Research design and data collection

3.1. Unit of analysis, case selection and operationalisation into variables

In order to test the hypotheses formulated in the previous section the data is analysed at the local level. The local level of analysis allows data collection from local authorities and local public opinion. In order to analyse the possible causal mechanism targeted by the research, a specific case selection is conducted and more specifically a purposive case selection (Neuman, 2014, pp. 273, 274). The data is collected from the eight English city-regions that are part of the first wave of city deals devolution (HM Government Cabinet Office, 2012). The reason for this case selection is that the cities that are part of this first wave have a longer experience of devolution which should make its effects more visible. Moreover, Greater London is not included in this research as it has had a specific status since the 1950s. This status makes it an exception to devolution and a globalised city that could threaten the validity of the research (Gifford, 2016, p. 784). A city-region includes a group of local authorities that can be officially combined or unofficially bound by shared resources such as European funds. The importance of considering city-regions rather than the local authorities of the eight major English cities can be explained through two major arguments. Firstly, the devolution deal includes the local authorities that are part of the urban area around the city. Secondly, most of the funds and European policies are implemented at the city-region level and cannot be divided by local authority. To define the local authorities that are part of the city-region studied, this paper focuses on the official combined authorities and/or city-regions as declared in the city devolution deal.

The city-regions studied are the ones detailed in the following table (Table 1). The research case selection is based on most similar cases. That is why the variation in the main explanatory variable is necessary and closely studied from the start of the research. The dependent variable is studied through the analysis of the results in order to assess the possible causal mechanism that exists between the two. All the city-regions are in England and have a population, between 1 100 000 and 2 700 000 million inhabitants. This deliberately eliminates the largest and smallest city-regions that would represent a threat to making a valid comparison. The cases are either named in the research by their current official name, Greater Manchester,

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30 Greater Birmingham, Sheffield city region, Liverpool city region (LCR); either the name of their Combined Authority name if they do not have one, West Yorkshire Combined Authority (WYCA), North East Combined Authority (NECA) and finally if the city-region did not formed a combined authority the case is designated by the main city’s name followed by the term city-region, Bristol city-region, Nottingham city-region. That is why the term city-regions and city region appear in the paper and relate to a different devolution setting.

City-region Local authorities Status of the

city region

Bristol city-region Bath & North East Somerset, Bristol,

North Somerset, South Gloucestershire. non-official

Greater Birmingham

Birmingham, Bromsgrove, Cannock Chase, East Staffordshire, Lichfield, Redditch, Solihull, Tamworth, Wyre Forest.

non-official in 2016

Greater Manchester

Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, Wigan.

official

Liverpool City region Halton, Knowsley, Liverpool, Sefton, St

Helens, Wirral official

North East Combined Authority

County of Durham, Gateshead, Newcastle, North Tyneside, Northumberland, South Tyneside, Sunderland

official

Nottingham city-region

Ashfield, Bassetlaw, Broxtowe, Gedling, Mansfield, Nottingham, Newark and Sherwood, Rushcliffe

non-official

Sheffield city region Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham,

Sheffield official

West Yorkshire Combined Authority

Bradford, Calderdale, Kirklees, Leeds and

Wakefield official

Table 1. Case selection of the city-regions

The combined authorities are the one that applied before 2016, the possible combined authorities were established by the Office of National Statistics in July 2015 in a document called (Office of National Statistics, 2015, p. 13).

Local European integration: tipping the scales against Euroscepticism