Lobbying within the European Committee of the Regions by Dutch members: multilevel governance in practice

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Lobbying within the European Committee of the Regions by Dutch

members: multilevel governance in practice

Sóphia Verhees S1273450 Date of submission: 4 July 2019 Thesis supervisor: dr. Rood Second corrector: dr. Cusumano

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Introduction

As a result of large decentralization processes of recent times, Dutch decentral governments have had to increasingly deal with the implementation of laws and regulations coming from the European Union (IPO1_{and HNP}2_{, 2015: 9). The decentralization process has allegedly made it therefore increasingly}

important for Dutch provinces and municipalities to influence European policies, as the latter are ultimately responsible for the implementation of said policies (Mastenbroek et al., 2013: 20). Next to this process of decentralization, another process has simultaneously taken place; namely, the fortification of the position of European provinces and municipalities within the EU decision-making procedure on laws and regulations. The strengthened position of regions and municipalities has been warranted by, among other institutions, the Committee of the Regions (ibid.). This institution caught the attention of the writer, as it is a relatively unknown European institution; yet, in theory at least, it could be of importance to regions and municipalities. It enables them to represent their interests directly at the EU level, thus surpassing the national governments. Situated in Brussels, the Committee exists of 350 members (and 350 alternates); these members are regionally or locally elected officials within their own member state. Each member state appoints its own members3_{. Since the signing of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the term of office of Committee members}

has been extended from four to five years, thereby putting it on equal footing with that of the

European Parliament and the European Commission4_{. Members write opinions on new EU laws which}

are proposed by the European Commission. Committee members are eligible for the task of opinion writing by obtaining a rapporteurship (AIV, 2016: 24); other members might contribute to opinions. Opinions are voted upon during plenary meetings held at the Committee; when adopted, they are sent to the relevant European institution. It is mandatory that the Commission and the Council of the EU request Committee opinions in those cases when proposed EU legislation are likely to have an impact on regions and municipalities. However, EU institutions are not under any obligation to act on Committee opinions5_.

The Committee of the Regions has, through its active promotion of multilevel governance (the institution has issued both a White Paper and a Charter on the application of this theory), established itself as an advocate for the inclusion of subnational governments in European-level policy crafting and implementation. The Committee’s Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe indeed calls for a so-called “bottom-up approach”, implying that local and regional governments should be consulted

1_{Interprovincial Assembly, the Dutch institution for interprovincial cooperation}

2_{“Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies (House of the Dutch Provinces), which is the Brussels-based post of}

Dutch provincial representatives

3_{“About”, cor.europa.eu}

4_{“Milestones in the history of the Committee of the Regions”, cor.europa.eu, p. 31} 5_{“About”, cor.europa.eu}

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regarding the creation and implementation of EU-level laws. Multilevel governance has been described by the Committee as cooperation between various levels of government (local, regional, national and supranational)6_{. Furthermore, by allowing subnational governments to represent the}

interests of its citizens, the practice of multilevel governance could bring the EU and its inhabitants closer together and increase the EU’s democratic legitimacy (Schönlau, 2017: 1176). As the Committee employs elected representatives who advise European institutions, it aims to practice multilevel governance by making regional- and local voices heard at the European level.

This thesis utilizes both primary and secondary sources. Regarding primary sources, this thesis makes use of interviews with Dutch Committee members and other stakeholders in the field. Secondary sources exist of academic literature and official documents. The integral text of the primary sources used (existing of interviews) is available with the writer.

The central research question of this thesis pertains to the ways in which Dutch Committee members make use of the Committee, as it has emerged that the Committee has multiple functions.

The first chapter of this thesis will feature a theoretical and practical discussion of multilevel governance theory. In the second chapter, the history, functions, and level of influence of the Committee of the Regions will be touched upon. The third and final chapter contains the results of interviews conducted with representatives of both provincial- and municipal Dutch Committee members and an external academic in the field. The central question of chapter three, divided into sub-questions, is posed with the purpose of determining in what ways the Dutch representatives have utilized the Committee of the Regions. The conclusion features an analysis as to which features of the Committee might be regarded of as characteristics of a multilevel governance institution.

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Multilevel governance within the context of the EU

1.1 The “governance”-aspect of multi-level governance

In order to understand multi-level governance, it might be helpful to first examine the term “governance”. Firstly, Rosenau emphasizes that governance cannot readily be compared to

government. He argues that government implies actions which are supported by official authorities; after all, the latter are necessary in order to ensure the enforcement of governmental policies.

Governance, however, alludes to actions supported by common interests; these actions do not always need backing by official authorities in order to ensure compliance with policies. Thus, governance can said to be more comprehensive than government. Governance does involve governmental institutions, yet it also comprises informal systems (1992: 4). It has indeed been argued that part of the originality of governance lies in its “[..] emphasis of process over institution” (cited in Peters and Pierre, 2004: p. 77). According to Peters and Pierre, governance implies a process in which national government and society pool their resources and cooperate under common goals (2004: 78).

Moreover, governance systems ensure compliance in rather unique ways. Whereas governments ensure compliance with their policies by emphasizing their status as sovereign and constitutional rule systems, governance mechanisms have to rely on several informal tools and methods such as shared norms, unofficial agreements, and fruitful bargaining (Rosenau, 2004: 32).

Finally, Rhodes has described governance as self-organizing systems. According to the author, governance can be typified as a system in which the national state maintains only a minimal presence (1996: 660). Rhodes agrees with Rosenau (1992) that governance is a more encompassing system than government, as it incorporates informal systems as well. Finally, according to Rhodes, governance involves a high level of independence from the national government, as governance systems are able to organize themselves on their own account. However, the national government might still guide governance systems in a more indirect manner (ibid.).

1.2 Multi-level governance: the term and its history

According to Bache and Flinders, Gary Marks has coined the term multi-level governance (hereafter to be called ‘MLG’) in 1992 (2004: 2). Initially, the concept was defined by Marks as ‘a system of

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continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993: 392, cited in Bache and Flinders, 2004: 3).

By developing the MLG approach, Marks initially attempted to describe the changes that were made to EU structural policy as a consequence of the 1988 EU Structural Funds reform (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 2; Bailey and De Propris, 2002: 408). This reform was a reaction to the deepening of the EU integration project, which had culminated into the Single European Act a year before (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 2-3). The most important goal of the reformed Structural Funds was to prepare the poorest regions of the EU for the forthcoming Single Market; in other words, to stimulate economic cohesion (Bailey and De Propris, 2002: 408). In order to offset the expected negative effects of the Single Market, it was decided that structural funding to poorer regions would increase by 100% (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 2-3). Moreover, a number of new principles were implemented, one of them being the partnership principle. This principle allowed subnational administrations to partake in the crafting of local policies for the first time (Bailey and De Propris, 2002: 408; Bache, 2012: 629). The reformed Structural Funds thus actively supported the cooperation between national and sub-national governments by applying the so-called ‘bottom-up’ approach (Bailey and De Propris, 2002: 408). Next to allowing subnational governments a say in the drafting of policies, the implementation of the partnership principle meant that subnational governments would take on a partnership with national and supranational institutions with regards to the management of structural funds (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 2-3).

Meanwhile, Marks and other academics kept elaborating the concept of MLG until it took on a broader meaning; it now mostly referred to the multilayer identity of the EU, as the EU comprises several overlapping authorities (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 2; Stein and Turkewitsch, 2008: 7). Expanding on the broader meaning of MLG, Hooghe and Marks argue that the concept entails power sharing between supranational, national- and subnational institutions. Supranational bodies, most importantly the European Parliament and the European Commission, are especially powerful policy influencers as they have the ability to act independently of national governments. Since multi-level governance entails the sharing of power, it follows that decisions are being taken collectively. This in turn implies that national administrations have to give up a substantial amount of control to

supranational bodies which decide on EU-wide laws and regulations (2001: 3-4). Subnational governments are oftentimes entrusted with the task of implementing said laws (c.f. Mastenbroek,

2013: 20).

Further, Hooghe and Marks argue that multi-level governance theory breaks with the idea that subnational bodies act solely within their national boundaries; according to them, regional bodies act on both the national- and supranational platforms. Thus, national administrations no longer have the exclusive rights to create connections between member states and European Union (EU) institutions

(ibid.).

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levels of government (2004: 77). Levels of government within EU member states used to be

hierarchical, as information exchange, resources and regulation mostly travelled through all distinctive government levels in a top-down order, whereas within the EU framework, supranational actors regularly contact subnational bodies directly, thus bypassing the national government (ibid: 76). Finally, an important point made by Peters and Pierre is that MLG is a democratic system, as it is open to a multitude of institutions (ibid.: 86). In a similar vein, Piattoni argues that MLG allows for

subnational actors to express those concerns that may not be brought to the fore in national or supranational contexts as such (2010: 242).

1.3 Scholarly criticism of MLG as a theory and in practice

Several scholars have cast their doubts on the usability of the concept of MLG. Scholarly criticism pertains not only to the theoretical aspect of the term, but also to possibly negative consequences of its implementation on the ground.

As for the theoretical aspect of MLG, Jordan argues that, as opposed to the more common theories, MLG does not contain a number of provable hypotheses (2001: 201). George (2004: 116) disagrees, stating that MLG does indeed contain hypotheses. He argues that the central hypotheses of MLG refer to the EU and whether or not it serves as an example of a MLG-system, as opposed to the EU being a system consisting of national governments.

Moreover, according to Jordan, MLG tends to exaggerate the level of independence of subnational institutions, as the state remains a notably powerful actor; any power given to subnational bodies has been kept limited to a small number of policy areas (2001: 201). George, however, reminds Jordan that Gary Marks often clarifies that MLG does not assume the independence of subnational bodies (2004: 118).

Further, building on the work of Jeffrey, Jordan argues that MLG assumes subnational bodies to be passive receivers of power from either EU supranational institutions or national administrations, instead of institutions which actively attempt to claim power themselves (Jeffrey, 2000: 8, mentioned in Jordan, 2001: 201). Additionally, even though subnational institutions have the ability to avoid national governments by acting directly on the European stage, this does not automatically mean that they can actually influence decisions. And finally, according to Jordan, MLG-proponents tend to overlook the significance of the international political stage, upon which the EU acts as an

independent actor nowadays (for example, during global trade negotiations with other international trading blocs) (Jordan, 2001: 202), which might imply that subnational governments are less likely to be consulted by the European institutions in this regard.

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Next to criticizing the theoretical aspects of MLG, scholars have casted their doubts over its practical implementation. For example, Peters and Pierre criticize MLG for its allegedly appeasing character. They state that MLG-systems tend to prefer consensus, appeasement and efficiency gains over certain essential norms and standards which tend to be propagated by democracies. Many national laws and regulations have been implemented in order to change behavior; an example might be the

implementation of national gender equality laws. Since MLG tends to prefer informal rules of the game over conventional regulations (the latter more likely to propagate democratic norms and values than the former), there is a risk that certain actors might be able to avoid those regulations which safeguard democratic values and human rights (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 85). Furthermore, the authors take issue with the consensual approach of MLG, as a consensus within the context of MLG usually indicates a type of agreement which has been imposed by the most powerful actors within the MLG framework (ibid.: 87).

1.4 The practice of MLG in the EU

From attempting to grasp the essentials of EU cohesion policy, MLG went on to become a widely used concept in relationship to the EU as a whole (Bache, 2012: 630). Schmitter went as far as to brand the term ‘’the most omnipresent and acceptable label one can stick on the contemporary EU’’(Schmitter, 2004: 49, cited in Bache, 2012: 630). According to Piattoni, MLG is more than just a type of

governance; rather, it defines the EU as an entity in itself (2010: 228).

The practicality of the MLG framework in the context of the EU becomes visible in the four

consecutive phases of policy crafting; namely policy initiation, decision-making, implementation and arbitration. During the initiation phase, the European Commission exerts its power to set the agenda; however, other actors such as the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, advocacy groups and EU member states may influence the Commission’s policy initiatives. Then, the decision-making phase has been labeled as that phase of the policy-making process in which governments of EU member states have proven to be more influential than other actors. Reportedly, MLG can be detected in its most obvious form during the subsequent implementation phase, as policy implementation is an everyday practice which requires the Commission to cooperate with subnational authorities and advocacy groups. Finally, the arbitration phase involves the supranational European Court of Justice (ECJ). ECJ decisions create precedents which are often taken over by member state courts and the Commission. In sum, each phase of EU policy-crafting highlights the ways in which EU member states are being included in a multi-tiered governance system at the hands of their heads of state and several sub- and supranational bodies (Pagoulatos and Tsoukalis, 2012: 67).

The popularity of MLG as a practical concept within the context of the EU is also reflected by its widespread adoption among EU institutions, for example the European Commission and the

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Committee of the Regions (the EU assembly for representatives of regions and urban areas, hereafter to be called CoR) (Bache, 2012: 630; CoR Mission Statement). For example, former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi has described the EU as a MLG system (Pagoulatos and Tsoukalis, 2012: 69). Furthermore, the CoR even regards the promotion of MLG as one of its priorities (CoR Mission Statement). The institution argues that MLG (which focuses on the

cooperation between several governmental levels) and the principle of subsidiarity (which implies that the creation and implementation of EU policies takes place at the governmental level which is most suitable) are closely intertwined. Since the CoR has been granted the role of guardian of the principle of subsidiarity, its endorsement of MLG seems to make logical sense7_.

In its 2009 White Paper on MLG, the CoR points out that MLG fits perfectly within the EU political framework, as the concept implies, amongst other things, a Europe consisting of people. MLG reportedly strengthens the democratic elements of the EU and augments its effectiveness8_{. As a}

concrete example of how MLG might have a positive impact on EU policies, the CoR mentions the issue of climate change. It claims that cities are responsible for 75% of all carbon emissions; this indicates that in order to diminish carbon emissions, a MLG-approach might be most commendable as this approach would involve subnational tiers of government9_{. Furthermore, the implementation of}

MLG might help to bring the EU closer to its citizens. In the 2014 Van Den Brande Report, former President of the CoR Luc Van den Brande advises Commissioner for Regional and Urban Policy Johannes Hahn on MLG and the partnership principle. In his report, Van den Brande states that decision-making processes are still mostly of the top-down variety. This hierarchical decision-making method seems untenable as citizens increasingly wish to participate in the democratic process. MLG fits in well with this new climate as it allows subnational actors and citizens to represent themselves. Thus, an adequate implementation of MLG would support the EU in its effort to close the democracy gap between itself and the European citizens (Van den Brande, 2014: 9).

In conclusion to this chapter, it has now become clear that MLG is a concept with very diverse aspects to it. MLG cannot simply be called an abstract theoretical term which is only used by scholars, seeing as the term has been propagated by EU institutions and leaders alike. In any case, the concept seems to be an apt characterization of the way in which the EU functions nowadays. The EU institution which is perhaps most clearly associated with the concept of MLG is the CoR. With its status as a MLG-institution, the CoR can be, amongst other things, analyzed for its ability to bring the EU closer to its citizens by representing subnational interests, to stimulate a bottom-up approach regarding the drafting

7_{"Opinion of the Committee of the Regions: Building a European culture of multilevel governance: follow-up to}

the Committee of the Regions’ White Paper", CoR, 2012: 63; CoR Lisbon Treaty

8_{“The White Paper on Multilevel Governance”, CoR, 2009: 9}

9_{"Opinion of the Committee of the Regions: Building a European culture of multilevel governance: follow-up to}

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and implementation of EU laws, and to function as a network through which cross-border projects might be initiated.

In the subsequent chapter, this thesis will further elaborate on the history and functions of the Committee.

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2. A Characterization and Evaluation of the Committee of the Regions 

2.1 A concise history of the Committee of the Regions

Although it was not until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that the Committee of the Regions (CoR) was created, its roots allegedly lie in a proposition made in 1960 by the predecessor of the European Parliament (called the European Parliamentary Assembly) to establish an advisory committee on subnational economies. In turn, the 1986 Single European Act further encouraged the concept of such a committee as it acknowledged the importance of strong regions for the creation of the EU single market10_{. What is more, by having made the European Community responsible for cohesion policy,}

this Act clearly demonstrated the Community's intention of closing the gap between affluent and impoverished European regions11_.

To further the development of regions and cities, the Commission then introduced a number of

programs which required cooperation between Community institutions and regional administrations of EU member states. Thanks to these programs, a dialogue was initiated between regional

administrations and Community institutions. The European Commission then decided to institutionalize this dialogue by establishing the Consultative Council of Regional and Local

Authorities in 1988. However, this council lacked independence as its members were appointed by the European Commission. Wishing to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU, in 1990 the

Commission publicized an opinion in which it requested the need for a truly independent advisory institution. In that same year, during the European Council of Rome, it became clear that several member states (including Germany, Spain and Belgium) agreed with the Commission on the importance it attached to the opinions of subnational governments. Then, as the result of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1991, the European Council of Maastricht gave its assent for the creation of the CoR. The Treaty of Maastricht allotted the CoR the capacity to advise the European Commission and the Council; moreover, a number of EU member state leaders wished for the

Committee to aid with the crafting of EU legislation and to serve as a platform of connection between EU institutions and the inhabitants of EU member states12_.

The Committee was particularly welcomed by the European Commission and the regional

governments of Europe’s strongest regions, such as those belonging to the German Länder and the Belgian and Spanish districts and regions (Boras-Alomar, 1994; Christiansen, 1996; Loughlin,

10_{''Milestones in the History of the Committee of the Regions 1994 - 2014'', CoR, 2014: 7} 11_{“Economic, social and territorial cohesion”, Europarl.europa.eu}

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1997;Weatherill and Bernitz, 2005, mentioned in Hönnige and Panke, 2013: 453; Jeffery, 1995: 247). The strong European regions had planned for the CoR to be employed as a platform through which they could influence EU decision-making; moreover, through the CoR these regions would be able to evade their domestic administrations (Boras-Alomar, 1994; Christiansen, 1996; Loughlin, 1997; Weatherill and Bernitz, 2005, mentioned in Hönnige and Panke, 2013: 453). Strong regional- and local authorities (i.e. the German Bundesländer and the Spanish autonomous communities) had, since the ratification of the Single European Act in 1986 and the renewed European Regional Development Policy of 1988, become less influential in the field of policy-crafting within their respective member states. Power was transferred from subnational actors towards their national governments (Keating and Hooghe 1996; Loughlin 1996, mentioned in Piattoni and Schönlau, 2015: 32-33). For example,

national governments were given the authority to determine the quantity of funds which were to be allotted to the European Regional Development Policy (Piattoni and Schönlau, 2015: 33). Hence, the strong local authorities were pleased with the establishment of the CoR; through this institution, they hoped to gain back some of the power that had been taken from them.

2.2 The CoR’s main functions

Regarding the CoR’s main functions, it is mandatory, conform the Maastricht Treaty, that the Council of the European Union and the European Commission seek advice from the CoR concerning regional subjects (Piattoni and Schönlau, 2015: 33). These subjects include education and youth, social policies, employment, health care, telecom - and energy networks, environment and climate change, culture, sports, economic- and social cohesion, and inter-EU transport (Zucca, 2012: 183; CoR Key Facts). The CoR has the right to start a case if it is not consulted on proposed laws concerning regional subjects (CoR Lisbon Treaty). Next to mandatory and additionally requested opinions (those

specifically asked for by the Parliament and the Council of the European Union), the CoR is allowed to publish opinions on its own initiative (Hönnige and Panke, 2016: 26).

The Committee collaborates with the Commission during the policy initiation phase (by reacting to White- and Green Papers from the Commission), the consultation phase, and in the decision phase (by crafting opinions in reaction to the Commission's legislative proposals) (ibid.). Furthermore, regarding the implementation phase, the CoR conducts territorial impact assessments; through these

assessments, the Committee attempts to identify problems regarding the implementation of European laws and regulations at the regional level (AIV, 2016: 24).

Next to its advisory role, the CoR is the designated protector of the principle of subsidiarity; since the Lisbon Treaty, the CoR has been given the right to bring cases of suspected violation of the principle of subsidiarity before the European Court of Justice (CoR Lisbon Treaty). By protecting this principle, the CoR ensures that EU institutions only take action within those policy areas in which they have

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exclusive competence, or when EU member states or the local governments within those member states are not in the position to act adequately (Article 5 TEU).

2.3 Academic critique on the functioning of the Committee

An important point of critique is the fact that the Committee wholly depends on the goodwill of the European Union’s three legislative institutions (the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council) in order for its opinions to be addressed; the institution cannot enforce compliance with its issued opinions (Cole, 2005: 57).

Moreover, it has been argued that the Committee suffers from a lack of budget and staff when compared to the Council, the Committee, and organized groups such as lobbyists. This bars the institution from delivering high-quality opinions in a timely manner. The Committee is at a

disadvantage as it receives proposed legislation at the same time as the earlier mentioned legislative institutions, but has a smaller budget and staff at its disposal (Hönnige and Panke, 2016: 628-629). Cole, elaborating on the lack of budget of the Committee, adds that the Committee, with the small budget it already has, is facing another problem; namely, its budget size is decided upon by the Council, Parliament and Commission; the exact same institutions which it attempts to influence. It follows that it might thus be in the Committee’s own best interest not to issue critical opinions towards these institutions, as the Committee might risk a budget cut. Cole notices a link between the lack of critical Committee opinions toward legislative proposals and the Committees’ interest to remain in the good books of the Commission, Parliament and Council (2005: 62). Christiansen, too, finds

Committee opinions not to be sufficiently critical of legislative proposals; moreover, Committee opinions are allegedly not very useful to the Commission as, in most cases, they only propose making a number of general amendments (1996: 111).

Further, Hönnige, Panke and Gollub (2015: 162) have found links between the timeliness and

originality of Committee opinions and willingness of MEPs and diplomats of the Council of Ministers to consider these opinions; as it has been argued that Committee opinions often arrive late and lack originality. A lack of interest in the consideration of Committee opinions logically follows.

Finally, a point of critique on the representation of subnational interests is made by Cole, who argues that the majority of members of the Committee merely votes on the adoption of Committee opinions instead of actively contributing to these opinions. According to Cole, this state of affairs seriously compromises the representative function of the Committee, as it is implied that only a small number of members are able to represent their subnational interests, whereas the Committee harbors a great number of members with an equally large number of interests (2005: 62-63).

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2.4 Forms of division within the CoR

Unfortunately, one of the most characteristic features of the CoR is its inner division, which manifests itself in multiple forms. It has been argued that the many types of divisions within the CoR (as elaborated further in this chapter) complicate effective representation of regional- and municipal interests (Christiansen, 1996: 115).

Presumably one of the more well-known cleavages within the EU as a whole, the division between Northern and Southern EU member states, has allegedly also become apparent within the CoR. This cleavage is mainly based on the fact that Northern member states are net contributors to the EU budget, whereas Southern countries are mostly net beneficiaries (Hooghe and Marks, 1996: 75). Moreover, overall seen, subnational administrations are politically, economically and fiscally stronger (and are thus more independent of the national government) in the North than they are in the South (Christiansen, 1996: 104). According to a representative of the Dutch province of Groningen (a member of the Committee, queried in chapter 3 of this thesis), the dividing line between members of Northern and Southern Europe is mostly language-based (the representative mentions Southern members who, at times, do not speak English); moreover, according to a representative of the Dutch province of Friesland (also queried in chapter 3), the alleged Northern-Southern dividing line is mostly based on preconceptions towards Southern European member states. The representative considers all Committee members (those coming from Southern member states included) to be hard-working people.

Furthermore, it had been expected that local- and regional CoR members having opposite interests would contribute to another divide. This is because, even before the CoR started functioning, there had been disagreements between regional and local governments within member states (i.e. France, Germany and Belgium) regarding the selection process of future CoR members (Christiansen, 1996: 97). However, local and regional representatives within the CoR have managed to set up a rotating presidency, which has assisted in the preservation of internal cohesion within the CoR. Moreover, since the CoR started functioning, it had become clear that there is no clear division of CoR representatives into local and regional groups. This is because member states contain several intermediary bodies which possess characteristics of both regional and local administrations. Examples of such bodies include the French départements, the provinces within Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, the German Kreise, the counties within Great Britain and Ireland and the amtskommuner of Denmark (Christiansen, 1996: 98).

Rather than a division between regional- and local representatives, a cleavage has been created within the group of regional CoR representatives. This division has emerged along the lines of the more versus the less powerful regional administrations (Christiansen, 1996: 97; 101). The more powerful regional authorities have the power to execute and to administrate public policies. An example of such

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an authority would be a state with a federal governmental system. The less powerful regional authorities often lack the power to craft policies themselves. An example of such an authority would be an administration within a centralized governmental system. The more powerful regional

administrations (i.e. those from Belgium, Spain and Germany) can be recognized by both their larger administrative staff and their bigger budget. The differences in working styles and practices between members of powerful and less powerful regions caused a rift when both types of members met in the CoR. The preferred working practice of the stronger regions was the representation of CoR members in Commission meetings and plenary sessions by appointed delegates. This method had been a tradition within Germany’s Bundesrat (Christiansen, 1996: 102). Under the assumption that a similar working method would be adopted by the CoR, the stronger regions sent political heavyweights (among others the Catalan and Galician presidents, the mayor of Barcelona, four German regional Minister-presidents and a large number of Flemish cabinet members) to the Committee, with the underlying idea that the more comprehensive advisory work could be assigned to the appointed regional delegates of CoR members or to the administrative arm of the CoR. The plan of delegating work to either lower staff or to the CoR administration did not materialize however, as a majority of CoR members voted against this working style (ibid.). In short, due to different governmental practices within the context of their respective member states, regional administrations tend to have confrontations within the context of the CoR regarding working practices.

Even though the less powerful regions prevailed regarding the working style within the Committee, both regional representatives coming from federal member states and representatives from centralized member states are allegedly able to exercise the same amount of power. According to the coordinator and head of office of the House of the Dutch Provinces (HNP), in the past, regions with legislative powers (those located in federalized member states) wanted to have more say in the Committee; however, this wish has not materialized. The coordinator argues that nowadays it does not matter whether or not a rapporteur has legislative powers at home.

Finally, CoR members are divided according to political groups. The CoR harbors five political fractions, namely the European People’s Party, the European Alliance, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, the Party of European Socialists, and the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. Political groups tend to hold meetings in advance of CoR plenary sessions during which Committee opinions are voted upon (“About’’, cor.europa.eu).According to the head of the HNP, large political groups have a bigger budget and have better chances at acquiring rapporteurships (personal communication, 17 May 2018).

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2.5 Sources of influence of the CoR

Even though the CoR faces a number of challenges due to apparent internal divisions, it has been argued that it might indeed exert influence in a number of ways.

According to Piattoni and Schönlau, the Committee is in the position to positively influence

democratic processes within the EU; for example, it can serve as a platform where local expertise can be shared. Moreover, the CoR has the ability to check whether EU laws and regulations impact EU citizens equally (2015: 21). The CoR's function as guardian of democratic processes in general might be seen in relation to its function as guardian of the principle of subsidiary.

Second, even though it has been argued that the CoR is not in a position to actively influence EU policy as it is perceived as a largely symbolic institution (Christiansen, 1996a and b, mentioned in Warleigh, 1997: 104), the Committee has since long enjoyed the support of the European Commission - the EU's main policy initiating institution. When the CoR was first established, it received a large amount of support from Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, and Bruce Millan, former Commission member in charge of regional policies (Ross 1995, mentioned in Warleigh, 1997: 104; Europa.eu). The Commission had wanted to set up a panel like the CoR as it found it necessary to increase the amount of consultations it could request during the drafting of proposals, so that their proposals would increase in value and legitimacy. This way, it would be more likely for Commission proposals to be accepted by the Council. Another reason behind the

Commission's wish for the establishment of the CoR was that it needed an institution which would be able to counteract the power of the Council of Ministers; this became an important Commission goal under the influence of President Delors (Ross 1995, mentioned in Warleigh, 1997: 104).

Thus, the Commission saw and sees the Committee as an institution which gives it legitimacy through the status of Committee representatives as representatives of EU citizens. Moreover, it has been suggested that the Commission treats the Committee in a way that does not correspond to the latter's low institutional stature, as it has been notifying the CoR in advance of its work schedule (Warleigh, 1994: 104-105). It has also been argued that the Commission takes CoR opinions seriously; according to research conducted by Carroll on a Commission follow-up report on received Committee opinions, the Commission hardly ever turns down CoR opinions (Carroll, 2011: 353). It should be noted, however, that Committee opinions are not always very critical of legislative proposals and at times obsolete (suggesting amendments which are already included in existing legislation), thus making it easier for the Commission to (partly) adopt Committee opinions; furthermore, the Committee is one of many stakeholders advising the Commission, making it difficult to decide in the end which party has issued the most influential opinion. Stakeholders may share the same opinion on proposed legislation

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at times13_{. Nonetheless, it appears to be the case that there is a positive interinstitutional working}

relationship between the Committee and the Commission (personal communication with the head of the House of the Dutch Provinces (HNP), 17 May 2018). Even though a few years ago the relationship between both institutions had been deteriorating, in recent times the attitude of the Commission vis-à-vis the Committee has improved again. The presence of European Commissioners at plenary sessions of the Committee indicates a good working relationship between both institutions. During these sessions, Commissioners explain proposals that have been put on the agenda by the Commission, for example the proposal on the multiannual financial framework. The head of the HNP adds that especially under the Juncker Commission, the cooperation between the Commission and the Committee has intensified (personal communication, 17 May 2018). Finally, the Dutch national coordinator of the Committee emphasizes that the Commission is obliged by treaty (namely, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) to exchange information and legislative proposals (such as the proposal for the new budget) with the Committee and to ask the Committee for its opinions on these proposals (personal communication, 18 May 2018).

Regarding the European Parliament’s attitude towards the Committee, the head of the House of Dutch Provinces argues that the Parliament’s attitude has improved, as in recent years, the quality of the Committee’s recommendations has improved (personal communication, 17 May 2018). In terms of their content, the Committee’s advices have gained more significance. As a result, the Parliament finds the advices to be increasingly useful (ibid.). Carroll confirms this, as he argues that the European Parliament regards the Committee’s opinions as important (2011: 353). His research stemming from 2008 points to a largely positive (meaning: either partially or wholly adopted opinions, opinions which received serious acknowledgement, and opinions which were merely received by the Commission and the European Parliament but nevertheless increased the visibility of the CoR vis-à-vis these

institutions) reception of CoR advice (ibid.: 347-348). However, research conducted in 2016 points to a lack of importance attached to Committee opinions by Members of European Parliament (MEPs) (and diplomats belonging to Permanent Representations of the Council of Ministers) (Hönnige and Panke, 2016: 630).

As for the concrete cooperation between the European Parliament and the Committee, one example is provided by the Dutch national coordinator of the Committee, who mentions the presence of Members of the European Parliament at the Committee’s plenary meetings in Brussels. Another example of cooperation is the organization of joint commission meetings (personal communication, 18 May 2018). The head of the House of the Dutch Provinces adds that rapporteurs belonging to the Dutch delegation within the Committee have been proactive in discussing opinions with those in Parliament who are discussing the subject in question (which is the relevant rapporteur in the Parliament) (personal communication, 17 May 2018).

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It follows that the relatively positive perception of the Committee held by both Commission and Parliament might contribute to the Committee's ability to exert influence on European policies through its advisory function.

It can be concluded that the establishment of the Committee was requested mostly by the European Commission and by the strongest EU regions. The Commission wished to gain more democratic legitimacy through the establishment of the Committee, whilst the strong regions wished to gain more power vis-à-vis their respective national governments. The CoR’s power seems to stem mainly from its ability to provide the European institutions with mandatory advice concerning regional subjects. However, the Lisbon Treaty allegedly gave the CoR more prestige as it extended the term of CoR members and provided it with the power to bring cases before the Court of Justice. Academic critique on the functioning of the Committee pertains to its inner division, its lack of budget, the lack of originality and timeliness (and thus low level of influence) of its opinions, its inaccurate representation of regional interests, and, perhaps most importantly, its lack of decision-making power.

Then, regarding the CoR’s inner divisions, the North-South division is (according to academics) caused by different levels of autonomy of subnational governments, and by the fact that northern member states tend to be net contributors to the EU budget whereas Southern member states tend to be net recipients. It seems to be the case, however, that the perceived North-South division is at least in part due to preconceptions towards Southern Committee members; moreover, the division appears to be language-based. Different ideas about working practices within the CoR make up another important divisionary aspect. Finally, members are divided into political groups. Despite its divisionary features, the CoR has some ways to exert its influence. It allegedly has the ability to positively influence the democratic processes within the EU and it seemingly enjoys the support of the Commission. The Committee maintains close working relationships with both the Parliament and the Commission. It is not completely clear whether this close collaboration results in appreciation of these institutions for Committee opinions.

The next chapter will consist of a case study including eight interviews with the representatives of Dutch CoR members. Each representative speaks on behalf of one CoR member, which in turn represents one Dutch province or municipality. Furthermore, a municipal stakeholder and an expert in the field of EU governance will be queried. The interviews will focus on one central question, namely: How have the Dutch provinces and municipalities operated within the framework of the Committee of the Regions? The central question will be divided into five sub-questions.

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Chapter 3: How have Dutch provinces and municipalities operated within the

framework of the Committee of the Regions?

There are different channels which might be employed by subnational governments in order to exert influence at the European level. Dutch regional-and local governments might for example turn to the “Rijk” (the national government) in the form of the government, the House of Representatives (Second Chamber) and individual ministries (Mastenbroek et al., 2013: 28).

National governments are represented at the European level in the Council of Ministers (and European Council), where they can influence legislative proposals from the European Commission. The Council of Ministers consists of ministers from every EU member state; which ministers these are depends on the policy area to be dealt with, which varies. A large number of official consultations precede the regular Council meetings. For example, each member state has a Permanent Representative in the Coreper consultations (Committee of Permanent Representatives) which take place on a weekly basis. During these consultations preparatory work is carried out with regard to decision-making in the Council. Coreper is supported by so-called Council working groups; they take over the everyday work of the Council (ibid.: 28).

The BNC14_{group is an example of such a Council working group. After the Commission submits a}

new legislative proposal, the position of the Dutch government toward this proposal is determined in the BNC group. A BNC-“fiche” (file) is composed within the group, explaining what the Commission proposal implies for the Netherlands and how the Dutch government broadly thinks about the

proposal. The implications of Commission legislative proposals for provinces and municipalities can also be included in the file (AIV.nl, 2016: 19). On behalf of the Dutch provinces, the IPO

(Interprovincial Consultation) also participates in the BNC group, as well as the VNG15_(Mastenbroek

et al., 2013: 29; AIV.nl, 2016: 19). The BNC-group is coordinated by the ministry of Foreign Affairs (AIV.nl, 2016: 19).

The EOBB16_{is another example of a Council working group. Within this group consultations on}

European issues take place between the ministries of Home- and Foreign Affairs, the VNG, the IPO and the Union of Water Boards (Mastenbroek et al., 2013: 29). Research carried out by Radboud University Nijmegen on behalf of the IPO has shown that the EOBB has become less important because there is an increasing number of bilateral contacts between provinces and ministerial

departments; for example, there is good contact between provinces and the ministries of Home Affairs,

14_{Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen (Assessment of New Commission proposals)} 15_{Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (Association of Dutch Municipalities)}

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Economic Affairs, and Infrastructure & Environment (Mastenbroek et al., 2013: 32). According to a representative of the VNG (queried further in this chapter), only the larger cities approach the

ministries for lobbying purposes. According to a municipal member of the Committee (queried further in this chapter), individual ministries are sometimes approached by the VNG on behalf of Dutch municipalities (if the ministries and the VNG are aligned on a certain European dossier, there will be coordination between these two parties).

Another type of working group is formed by the IBD-Teams17_{; within these teams, cooperation takes}

place between the IPO, the VNG, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and other ministerial departments with the aim of influencing decision-making on European legislation in general (Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, 2011 in: Mastenbroek et al., 2013: 29). When provinces expect difficulties with regard to the implementation and enforcement of the new legislation proposed by the Commission, they can make sure, through their contribution within IBD-Teams, that their expected difficulties be included in the national governments’ final position on the Commissions’ legislative proposal (Mastenbroek et al., 2013: 32).

Then, regions and municipalities might attempt to influence the European Council. It has emerged, however, that this institution is mostly focused on the other European institutions and is not very receptive to lobbying on behalf of representatives of subnational government (such as lobbying through the Committee of the Regions by regional- and municipal government representatives). Subnational governments might influence the Council (and other EU institutions) more effectively by maintaining close contacts with their national delegations in Brussels (the Permanent Representation). Contacts between the Permanent Representation and the Dutch provinces have intensified after the establishment of the House of the Dutch Provinces (AIV.nl, 2016: 28).

Finally, subnational governments have the possibility to approach the national parliament. Each year, consultations take place in the Second Chamber (House of Representatives) regarding the agenda of the European Commission (ibid.: 28). However, research conducted by the Radboud University of Nijmegen has shown that provinces hardly use the House of Representatives to express their views on proposed EU legislation (ibid.: 32). This is probably due to the fact that the House of Representatives is under no obligation to consult the subnational authorities about the latter’s views on EU dossiers. However, in practice, regular (sometimes informal) contact does take place between members of the House and subnational authorities. This is confirmed by the representative of the municipality of Zwolle (queried further in this chapter). Approaching the House on their own initiative is not seen as very useful by subnational governments, as they prefer to exert influence early in the legislative process (AIV.nl, 2016: 20). Late influencing (through the House, for instance) might have as a

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consequence that several other parties beat them to the game by capturing their opportunity to influence European decision-making officials earlier in the process.

Subnational governments, next to exerting influence via the national government, individual ministries and the House of Representatives, might also attempt to influence EU policies through European institutions such as the Committee of the Regions or the CEMR18_{(Council of European Municipalities}

and Regions) (Mastenbroek et al. 2013: 35; Christiansen and Lintner, 2005: 11). Within the framework of the Committee of the Regions, subnational governments have the possibility to contribute to Committee opinions regarding proposed EU laws. They might also join regional cross-border projects via the Committee (Mastenbroek et al. 2013: 35). Furthermore, it has been argued that the Committee predominantly functions as a networking platform, as it enables European regions to meet up for lobbying purposes outside of the Committee (AIV, 2016: 25). In short, it appears to be the case that the Committee might be employed for various purposes, and to varying degrees of success. This chapter will, by means of interviews with provincial- and municipal stakeholders, attempt to determine in what ways, and to which degree of success, Dutch subnational governments have utilized the Committee.

In order to answer the main question of this chapter, five sub-questions will be employed. These questions will be addressed by representatives for the Committee members of five Dutch provinces and three Dutch municipalities. Furthermore, a representative of the VNG (the Dutch umbrella organization for municipalities which assists the municipal members of the Dutch delegation to the Committee) will be queried. The first question of the interview is asked in order to determine to what extent provinces and municipalities have contributed to Committee opinions. The second question is asked with the purpose of determining the relative importance of the Committee for subnational governments, as Committee members might also opt to utilize other institutions. The third question is posed with the aim of finding out the Committee’s institutional shortcomings. The fourth and fifth questions are used to query subnational representatives about the extent to which their presence in the Committee has boosted cooperation amongst international regions and municipalities as well as the conducting of lobbying.

18_{A European organization uniting national associations of subnational governments (such as IPO and VNG),}

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3.1. To what extent have the interviewed provinces and municipalities contributed to

Committee opinions?

The Flevoland representative stated that the province has written a Committee opinion on an

innovation program for small- and medium-sized enterprises (called the CIP); by writing this opinion, the province aimed to reduce the regulatory burden of this program, thus making it more accessible. Furthermore, together with the rest of the Dutch delegation within the Committee, the province of Flevoland has contributed to an opinion with the aim of creating legislation for better air quality. Then, a rapporteur from the province of Gelderland, on behalf of the Dutch delegation, wrote an opinion on the water framework directive (a framework relating to the quality of water; this was an European directive which had to be transposed into Dutch legislation). As there was a heated

discussion at the time about the directive in the European Parliament, the rapporteur's opinion was all the more important. Another opinion written by a Gelderland rapporteur was on the subject of

“missing links in infrastructure” (such as roads and tracks which do not properly connect to each other

at national border crossings).

Then, the Groningen representative claims that the province has contributed to an opinion on energy

legislation.

The Friesland representative states that the province has contributed to an opinion on the subject of circular economy. Emphasizing the importance of active participation within the Committee, the representative mentions that the province attempted to influence the ‘narrative’ on the subject by giving presentations, working on amendments and inviting the German rapporteur in charge of writing the opinion on circular economy. The representative claims that part of Friesland’s opinion on the subject could certainly be seen in the final opinion of the Committee. The province of Overijssel has had rapporteurships in the fields of organic farming and energy efficiency. The provincial representative emphasizes the importance of obtaining a rapporteurship, as rapporteurs can get in touch with the Parliament and the Council; according to the representative, a rapporteurship can lead to improved access to decision-making parties.

Representatives for the provinces of Overijssel and Friesland both admit that it is often very difficult to ascertain whether a province has, through opinion-writing, had an impact on European-level legislation. According to the representative, the Dutch delegation (existing of Dutch provinces and municipalities within the framework of the Committee) does create the right conditions in this regard. This view is supported by the representative of the municipality of Weststellingwerf and by a VNG-representative, who both argue that the Dutch delegation is both effective in the writing and in the lobbying of opinions. The VNG-representative admits that lobbying is easier for the Dutch delegation than it is for other delegations as Dutch Committee members are geographically close to Brussels. The Weststellingwerf representative adds that the Dutch delegation has obtained a relatively large number of rapporteurships during the past term of office of Committee members; furthermore, there is much

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appreciation for the quality of Dutch opinions as they are perceived of as less controversial than opinions from other countries. Therefore, Dutch opinions are rarely voted down by the rest of the

Committee members.

Municipal Committee members wishing to write opinions are oftentimes assisted by the VNG, as it would be too expensive to do this on their own. According to a VNG representative, the municipality of Houten under mayor Lamers, assisted by the VNG, has written two opinions on legislation for cleaner air. Then, the municipality of Weststellingwerf recently crafted an opinion about the subject of plastics in the circular economy. The municipal representative states that the European Parliament’s opinion on the same subject was almost entirely consistent with the opinion of the municipality of Weststellingwerf, which has probably had a positive effect on the level of influence of the

Committee's opinion; moreover, the Commission has in recent years become somewhat more

receptive to opinions about high-quality recycling. The representative admits that it is difficult to trace back how influential an opinion was in the end because the EU legislative process takes on average seven years; Committee members attempt to exert influence at the very beginning of this process. In the meantime, other parties have time to exert their influence on the Commission as well. Then, the representative of the municipality of Zwolle emphasizes that the municipality is relatively new to the Committee and thus needed time to acclimatize. The representative argues that members cannot immediately attempt to obtain a rapporteurship; first, one must become acquainted with the rest of the Dutch delegation and with the functioning of the European institutions. Moreover, the work conducted by a municipal member within the Committee comes on top of the tasks the member has to complete for the municipality itself. Furthermore, the current member of the Committee for the municipality of Zwolle (the deputy mayor) belongs to the small liberal ALDE fraction within the Committee. The size of the fraction to which a member belongs is taken into account during the distribution of rapporteurships. Fractions are assigned a number of points based on their size. Important rapporteurships (dossiers) represent a large number of points. Due to its small size, the ALDE group must be very selective in the selection of rapporteurships; sometimes the group must decide to forgo a rapporteurship altogether because it has not enough points left. Nevertheless, the deputy mayor of Zwolle did attempt to obtain a few rapporteurships; however, these attempts were

unsuccessful.

Furthermore, the representative for the municipality of Opsterland has obtained a rapporteurship in order to write an opinion with the aim of granting all municipalities and provinces a greater voice in the European Semester19_{through a code of conduct; this opinion was adopted unanimously within the}

Committee. An important final point is made by both representatives for Zwolle and Opsterland, who emphasize that municipal Committee members will never write an opinion in their own name; they

19_{The European Semester is a time period of six months during which EU member states align their economic-}

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write opinions as members of the Dutch delegation, on behalf of the political group to which they belong, and on behalf of all 355 municipalities of the Netherlands.

3.2. What is the level of importance of the Committee to the interviewed Dutch

provinces and municipalities when compared to other European institutions?

A majority of representatives agree on the Committee’s importance to their respective provinces and municipalities, as it is the only formal European platform where subnational governments have

something to say. Involvement of regions regarding the crafting and implementation of new legislation is important as many laws have to be carried out by regional institutions, as stated by the Groningen representative. It has been argued by one representative that, if used properly, the Committee can have an influence. The Zwolle representative appreciates the Committee’s efforts of defending the interests of subnational authorities, mentioning the institution’s establishment of the Cohesion Alliance20_. Despite members’ appreciation of the Committee, most queried representatives (with the exception of the representative of the municipality of Weststellingwerf) admit to utilizing multiple institutions. For example, the Flevoland representative mentions that the Committee is part of a policy cycle; the province firstly gets in touch with the Commission; secondly, it gives advice through the Committee of the Regions; and thirdly, it gets in touch with the European Parliament. The Overijssel

representative argues that the province gets in contact with Commission officials; moreover, the Dutch delegation is also a member of the Council of Europe and the CMR, the latter being a lobby

organization. The representative of Zwolle states that his municipality maintains contact with Dutch Members of European Parliament. The VNG-representative states that municipalities might, in addition to participating in the CoR, decide to participate in European municipal projects for the exchange of best practices such as Eurotowns or Polis, as this is arguably where their greatest

expertise lies.

According to several representatives, membership of the Committee of the Regions leads to improved access to policy makers (Members of Parliament and Commission officials) and opinion leaders. More specifically, representatives of Gelderland and Opsterland add that members can get even better access to these officials once they obtain a rapporteurship within the Committee. The importance of the rapporteurship is further confirmed by representatives from Overijssel and Friesland. Further, it has emerged that the Committee is appreciated by its members for its network function. For instance, the Gelderland representative argues that it is absolutely worthwhile being a member of the Committee when keeping in mind its network and platform functions. The Overijssel representative is of the opinion that the Committee mostly serves as an entrance (“springboard”) for building a network.

20_{Members of this alliance are committed to maintaining European cohesion policy; the Commission intended to}

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The Groningen representative agrees, adding that the network function implies that members can enter into coalitions with other countries. The Friesland representative finds the network function

advantageous as you, as a Committee member, get to exchange knowledge with other regions and municipalities; furthermore, Committee membership offers the possibility to join European projects. One example of such a project is the circular economy project; the province of Friesland could partake in this project because it entered the circular economy network through Committee membership. The representative finds the network function of the Committee perhaps more important than its function of influencer of legislation. The VNG-representative agrees, arguing that the Committee is primarily a networking tool for establishing contacts with the Parliament and the Commission. Networking is especially important to Dutch members, as the Netherlands is a small country.

Networking allows for collaboration between Committee members, therefore, members can attempt to influence legislation more effectively, as stated by the representative of the municipality of

Weststellingwerf.

3.3 What have been the main shortcomings of the Committee with regards to the

protection of interests of each interviewed Dutch province and municipality?

When inquired about the alleged political division within the Committee, a majority of provincial representatives actually find this type of division to be an added value; according to both the Flevoland and Groningen representatives, party groups must attempt to reach a compromise; they find this process to be interesting. Both the Gelderland and Groningen representative find the division to be advantageous, as members can sit together with like-minded members. The Overijssel representative adds to this that thanks to the division into party groups, members only have to deal with six parties instead of 350. According to the Friesland representative, however, the party-political division can sometimes lead to complex situations, as members are both part of their region/municipality (and thus, part of a political group) and of their national delegation; the latter sometimes wants to vote something different than the former, which can lead to tensions. On the other hand, members thus have multiple voting options, which can also be advantageous. The VNG-representative and the municipal

representative of Weststellingwerf do not appreciate the division into political groups, mentioning that there are often disagreements within and between these groups.

When queried about the degree of influence of Committee opinions, the Flevoland representative argues that this depends on the subject, adding that the Commission is required to consult the Committee, particularly in the case of regional policy; the Committee’s advice on this topic is not ignored by the Commission. However, regarding other topics the Committee’s advice is less influential. The Groningen representative finds Parliamentary opinions often to be more influential

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According to the Friesland representative, the way in which the Committee is able to exercise influence has changed in recent years; through the emergence of social media and better

approachability of Members of European Parliament, the advice that the Committee wants to give often already lies with the party that the Committee wants to influence. This means that Committee advice once it is ready, is often irrelevant as it comes too late. The VNG-representative adds another reason as to why Committee opinions often come too late for Members of European Parliament; namely, the new way of functioning of the Parliament. During the Parliament’s first reading of the Commission's legislative proposal, the EP already starts negotiating with the Council on this proposal (the so-called 'trialogue'; whereas Parliament used to work with two readings, one reading usually suffices nowadays; therefore, it can work quicker than before, implying that Committee opinions should be admitted earlier in the process in order to be considered by Members of European Parliament). The municipal representative of Weststellingwerf is of the opinion that, as an opinion-writing member, you can speed up the process yourself by getting into contact with an EP-rapporteur more quickly and in the early stages.

Furthermore, a great majority of representatives finds the Committee to be very bureaucratic, as, for example, its processes are complicated, long-term and very formal; moreover, it might bar members from making institutional changes to the Committee. The Committee functions at times in an

inefficient manner. For example, plenary meetings are often repetitive, as discussions take place which already took place during meetings of the Committees’ specialist committees. Some members claim not to be bothered by bureaucratic procedures, with one representative stating that bureaucracy levels of the Committee are comparable to those of the European Parliament.

The lack of quality of Committee opinions has been cited as another shortcoming. It has been argued that issuing focused opinions is difficult due to the diversity of interests and governmental levels present within the Committee. Due to this diversity, opinions often have a compromise-like (non-committal) or open-door character. Opinions are arguably not very concrete as they are often an average of European opinions. A side note to this is that, according to the municipal representative of Zwolle, own-initiative opinions are often written on topics which are only of interest to the opinion-writing member, implying that own-initiative opinions are far more concrete than opinions required by the European Commission. Own-initiative opinions are issued fairly often; at times, they even

outnumber the required opinions.21

Then, opinions are said to be static; an opinion can only be sent once. If the EP, after reading the opinion, believes that it should be amended, then this is no longer possible. The EP itself is more flexible with its advice; there are intermediate consultations with, among others, the Council.

Lobbying within the European Committee of the Regions by Dutch members: multilevel governance in practice