Measuring the Influence of the European Commission in the Paris Agreement - A Qualitative Analysis

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Measuring the Influence of the

European Commission in the

Paris Agreement

A Qualitative Analysis

Bonita Bhandari S2293471 b.k.bhandari@umail.leidenuniv.nl Leiden University MSc Public Administration International and European Governance

Advisor

Prof.dr. A.K. Yesilkagit

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Chapter One: Introduction

The Paris Agreement was a unified response to growing concerns shared by political leaders over the declining state of the environment and rapidly growing threat of climate change (Gao, Gao & Zhang, 2017). Negotiations took place in the UNFCCC, whose ultimate goal to tackle climate change proved a daunting task for the participant nations (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 1992). The legally binding requirement proved an additional obstacle for participants to agree on fair and feasible terms for all nations. The intense debate that took place over the terms of the agreement reflects the wider political phenomenon of environmental policymaking and the challenges that arise. Feindt and Oels' (2005) paper explains that the socially constructed policy problems concerning the environment create struggles over the inherent concepts of the natural phenomena involved, leading to material and power effects/relations. During the negotiations in the UNFCCC over the Paris Agreement, political actors used expert interpretations to compensate for their lack of technical knowledge when they sought to resolve the threat of climate change. As discord arose from conflicting interpretations of the climate situation and its consequences, creating an international policy that sufficiently mitigated and resolved the problem was dependent on a cohesive understanding by the political actors involved.

The paper will focus on Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, a frequent item of discussion in the negotiations which gained notoriety that endured after implementation. The final text of Article 2 states the following: "Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels" (UNFCCC, 2015a, p.3). This journey towards achieving agreement over this part of the text reflects an intense struggle of translating the environmental issue of rising global temperature change into an international,

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legally binding treaty and overcoming the divide between the nations who wanted the limit set at 2°C and those who insisted on 1.5°C. But what makes this policy different to the plethora of other policies which were also international and involved a significant number of member states? The Paris Agreement clearly demonstrates the trend of non-state members as having an increasingly significant role in international policymaking, the most notable in this case being the European Commission. As an international bureaucracy residing within a supranational institution, the European Commission was central to the UNFCCC negotiations from the very start. Analysing the actions and influence of the European Commission during the Article 2 negotiations will help gain insight into the current dynamics of international bureaucracies in international policymaking, particularly in policy areas such as environment and climate change, where the issues still face difficulties on the international stage.

International Bureaucracies

International bureaucracies are a permanent body within an international organisation that possess a formal hierarchical structure, focusing on one policy (or group of related policies) and are typically awarded a level of autonomy by national member states (Trondal, 2011). Academic literature in political science and public administration has analysed the growing influence of international bureaucracies in policymaking at an international, national and regional level. Studies initially focused on international organisations and their influence over member states, before shifting perspective to the autonomous international bureaucracies within them, and the civil servants' role in forming international policies, both informal and formal (Eckhard & Ege, 2016; Xu & Weller, 2008). Significant studies in this area helped form an understanding of how international bureaucracies established an influential role on the international stage, forming an almost separate entity to the international organisations to which they belong. This literature has examined whether this autonomous nature allows the international bureaucracy to express preferences that differ

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from those of the international organisation in which it belongs. Moreover, it raises the question of whether the international bureaucracy can then influence national state actors who hold diverging preferences during international negotiations, resulting in the international agreement or policy reflecting the convergence of preferences aligned to that of the international bureaucracy. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) described "hard" and "soft" influence, framing the structure of international organisations and that of international bureaucracies, whereas other academic studies looked at how the international bureaucracy acts beyond state control (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009).

Determining the extent of influence held by international bureaucracies has been analysed on a political level in various ways; identifying the degree of sovereignty that nation states have over the ratification process of international agreements, measuring the authority transferred to international organisations and whether it has a beneficial impact, or analysing the benefits of influential international bureaucracies for smaller nation states. It has become increasingly important for academic scholars of political science and related fields to fully understand how international agreements are formed, as it no longer lies solely in the hands of member states. There has been a wealth of research concerned with national governments, their behaviour as an actor, their interactions and preferences, and others. But to understate the role of non-state actors is to omit important factors involved in international policymaking.

Previous Literature

The study of individual international bureaucracies has been approached to a large extent in academia, with many focusing on their general approach to international negotiations rather than analysing specific behaviour over a fixed period pertaining to the formation of one international policy. For this case study, a significant proportion of literature

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found was written during the Paris Agreement negotiation process, looking at the behaviour of key negotiators, resulting in analyses that were largely speculative of how this behaviour would affect the finalised Paris Agreement. This paper will take an ex-post view of the European Commission's influence over the whole process, filling a gap in the literature by providing a more current analysis of the events that transpired in the UNFCCC negotiations. The literature surrounding the implementation and aftermath of the Paris Agreement misses key factors as well; while the temperature limit conflict is discussed in depth, many authors do not adequately address the link with policy creation, and particularly the influence of key players as having extended consequences beyond the finalisation of the Paris Agreement. Therefore, this paper can contribute to understanding of struggles in implementation by analysing the formation of the policy itself, creating a more rounded and extensive view of influence in international policymaking. It will also shed light on the European Commission's role in the process, differentiating it from the European Union as an international organisation, thereby contributing to current literature on the significance of international bureaucracies in international policymaking.

Research Question

The research question aims to contribute to the literature surrounding international policymaking, following growing interest in sources of influence during the negotiation of these policies. The paper focuses exclusively on international bureaucracies, reflecting the trend in academic literature on the importance of international bureaucracies compared to their international organisations in which they are contained. The research question is therefore phrased as such:

To what extent does the European Commission influence international environmental policymaking?

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This research question will be applied solely to the case of the Paris Agreement, looking specifically at the role of the European Commission as an international bureaucracy and key actor during negotiations. The analysis will find out the extent to which the European Commission influenced negotiations such that their preferences were represented in Article 2 of the final text of the agreement, which stated that the overall temperature increase limit should be kept at “well below 2°C below pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015a, p.3).

The research will be carried out by analysing official documents from the negotiations in the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) which lead to the Paris Agreement. Although the Paris Agreement was finalised in COP24, documents from previous Conferences will be included to demonstrate changing preferences and the trend of influence from the European Commission. Additionally, process tracing will be undertaken to create a causal map which will isolate the key influential events and allow insight into the changing role of the EU as an influential actor in international environmental policymaking.

Limitations

Due to time and availability restrictions, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the qualitative research process that this paper has chosen. One such limitation is the inability to secure interviews of relevant staff members who were involved in the negotiation process for the Paris Agreement and could therefore give a first-hand account of the events. This has been deemed unfeasible due to the limited time given for the completion of this paper and difficulty in reaching such individuals. The information they could give would have provided a valuable insight into the internal mechanisms and processes in place which explains the reasoning behind influential decisions made by the European Commission. Also, there would have to ne multiple interviews from different sources to reduce overall bias and better complement the document analysis and process tracing. Additionally, confidential

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documents from the European Commission from any meetings held to discuss positions on the temperature limit is inaccessible and therefore cannot be used. This is also true for the UNFCCC, meaning that there is limited insight into the exact reasoning for influential actions committed by the European Commission. This information would create a more rounded and extensive answer to the research question, answering why and not just how the European Commission influenced the temperature limit in Article 2.

Societal Relevance

On a broader scale, the results from this thesis can contribute to a better and more refined understanding of the challenges facing environmental policymaking. The Paris Agreement is the first legally binding international agreement in the environmental policy sphere which holds its members accountable for damaging the environment. The temperature limit has long been considered an important part of minimising the impact of climate change, but it has been officially represented for the first time in this agreement. Results from this research would help ensure that future international policies (or amendments to the Paris Agreement) benefit from complete knowledge and can have a greater positive impact. Furthermore, future policymakers can use this research to better understand the link between policy formation and implementation and assess whether the success of an international policy can be attributed to its creation and the influences of the key players that were involved. Within the context of international bureaucracies, we can gain a more complete image of the European Commission as an important and influential actor in international policymaking, as they are generally considered to hold a strong position on the international stage when it comes to policy areas such as trade. This paper would contribute to a more rounded image of the extent to which the European Commission is gaining autonomy through examining the impact of their negotiations in international environmental policymaking. Finally, the results from this research can shed more light on the dynamics between

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international bureaucracies as non-state actors and national governments in international policymaking.

Academic Relevance

Contemporary academic literature has established the importance of international bureaucracies on the policymaking level, distinguishing them from the international organisations they are part of (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). The case study is an example of this wider academic phenomena (Toshkov, 2016), which the thesis can contribute to by applying a theoretical framework to investigate how the actions of international bureaucracies (in this case, the European Commission) are received and how they influence important international agreements. Additionally, in contrast to theories which look within the international bureaucracy to identify organisational structure facilitating influence, the research can focus on the external conditions and strategies which allowed the international bureaucracy to translate its preferences in an international policy. Results taken from this thesis can allow for better predictions on the trends of international policymaking by academics in the international political field.

Summary

This chapter has laid out the problem structure, provided academic context surrounding international bureaucratic influence and detailed the research question. The following chapter outlines relevant literature, reviewing prominent theories in the field of international organisations and bureaucracies and explains the chosen theoretical framework in its conclusion. The choice is made by assessing suitability of application to the case study to adequately assess the presence and extent of influence from the European Commission in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. In the methodology chapter the research question is stated again, before presenting the overall research strategy, explaining and justifying the variables

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which will be measured in order to answer the research question. The analysis chapter starts with a brief but comprehensive background of the case study to provide context. The causal map of essential and influential events appears along with an explanation and analysis of the documents described in the previous chapter. The conclusion chapter summarises the findings and discusses their generalisability.

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Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter presents a critical review of existing literature relating to the research question which was explained in the introduction and restated below:

To what extent does the European Commission influence international environmental policymaking?

The literature review centres around the approaches to measuring actors' influence in policymaking, looking at sources and factors which determine the extent of influence. This review process contextualises the research undertaken in this paper and expands on the theoretical foundations outlined in the introduction. In this way, the most suitable theoretical framework is selected for this thesis that can answer the research question and determine the appropriate measures to take to investigate the influence of the European Commission in the Paris Agreement. The review is made credible by taking quality academic literature that has been peer-reviewed, published under a high-ranking journal, and relates closely to the research topic of the thesis (Kaminstein, 2017). During the progress of the review, the topic of influence was divided into subcategories which represent two general approaches to influence in international policymaking; principal-agent theory and sociological perspectives. Within these two branches of influence are smaller areas which help the reader distinguish between the various themes that have developed over the years with regards to changing views on the role of nations and non-state actors in international policymaking. The operationalisation of the concept of influence is made clear in the conclusion of the chapter as the chosen theoretical framework is explained and justified.

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In fundamental terms, Principal-Agent (PA) theory examines the relationship between actors and the roles they assume; the “principal” on one side has the authority to delegate tasks or other actions to be performed by the “agents” who typically possess expert and relevant knowledge (Widerberg & van Laerhoven, 2014). The principals also determine the manoeuvrability and freedom that the agents can exercise in order to execute the principals' mandate. The theory identifies issues of control in the case of asymmetric information and goal difference between the two, where the agent may be able to use the opportunity to act in their own self-interest and fulfil their own objectives. When applied to international organisations, PA theory can be used to explain the relationship between international bureaucracies, who are the agents carrying out the tasks of the member states as their principals (Bauer & Ege, 2016).

Hawkins et al (2006) investigate determinants and variation in autonomous influence as awarded by national governments to international bureaucracies. They focus on delegation, defining it as “a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former” (Hawkins et al., 2006, p.7). By weighing the benefits from awarding more delegation with the potential for opportunistic behaviour from the agents, the influence given to an agent can be determined. The authors highlight the main benefit of delegation as the division of labour derived from specialist knowledge and expertise offered by the agent (Hawkins et al., 2006), increasing the probability of principals granting more autonomy to the agent, a factor which was mentioned previously. Collective decision-making as another benefit conducive to greater delegation relates to the European Commission, as they are noted to demonstrate such an advantage given their nature as an international bureaucratic agent who restores equilibrium when domestic powers are uncertain in their collective choice. Hawkins et al (2006) are also keen to point out undesired consequences of principals delegating authority to their agents. A large discretion given to

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agents may cause them to engage in agency slack, a disadvantageous outcome for the principals (Hawkins et al., 2006, p.8). The agent may shirk by exerting little effort into fulfilling their mandate, but for international policymaking, slippage may be more concerning. Any discrepancies resulting from gravitating preferences between the agent and principal could lead to the agent simply acting autonomously, operating within the means it has been afforded by the principal to fulfil their own goals (Hawkind et al., 2006). The authors state that greater benefits to nation states (as principals) can lead to greater international cooperation and therefore willingness to incur agency losses.

Decision-making and autonomous influence

Looking at the decision-making abilities of an international bureaucracy as a factor of their influence has previously been explored the collaborative paper "The anatomy of influence: Decision making in international organizations" by Cox and Jacobson (1973). The authors found that the decisions made by international organisations aligned with the ideologies of the Western member nations within them, uncovering an imbalance of influence attributed to self-interested motives of individuals in the international organisation. For international policymaking, looking at the internal conditions of an international bureaucracy (and the factors of internal influence) may explain the extent of their influence on the international politics stage; for example, the alignment of their decisions compared to the ideologies of the nation states.

Reinalda and Verbeek (1998) revisited the study by Cox and Jacobson (1973) in their book "Autonomous policy making by international organizations". They find that the results obtained previously are no longer applicable; due to changing political landscape and reduced colonial power, Western nations no longer have such influence in international organisations, contributing to their increase in autonomy. The authors also challenge the notion that high salience of a political issue leads to member states delegating less authority to the

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international organisation, pointing out that actors aren’t as rational as they are depicted in realist theories. An international bureaucracy can therefore exert influence in international policy issues, even when their decision-making doesn't align to the ideals of nation member states. Importantly, Reinalda and Verbeek (1998) claim that the role of international bureaucrats themselves is vastly understated, arguing that a consideration of cognitive influence could uncover more about actors and their relationship between their preferences and decision-making.

Institutional design

An international organisation's independent access to staff and financial resources as an agent is a factor that determines the degree of delegation and discretion from their member state principals (Bauer & Ege, 2016). This institutional design can facilitate or hinder this access, thereby affecting the degree of autonomous influence available to the international organisation.

As literature on international bureaucracies grew, da Conceição-Heldt (2013) contributed to the understanding of agency slack by looking at delegation at a national and international level. The analysis found that variation in the "delegation mandate and oversight mechanisms" (da Conceição-Heldt, 2013, p.23) in institutional design affect autonomy and control over agents. As mentioned in Hawkins et al. (2006), the likelihood of agency slack increases as the amount of discretion given to agents also increases. If discretion is rule-based, and oversight mechanisms are stronger and more effective, the chances of agency slack decreases and the agents can fulfil the goals of the principals to a greater extent. Additionally, Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) concur with other academics that there has been an oversight in literature concerning institutional structure (da Conceição-Heldt, 2013; Hawkins et al., 2006). Their study contributed to the overall understanding of non-governmental actors and the structures which allowed them to wield influence in international

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politics. From these authors it can be concluded that investigation into an international bureaucracy's imposed oversight mechanisms can explain any undesired behaviour and diversion from the nation states' goals concerning policymaking. This can be balanced against the assumption that actors are rational, where the development of rules and processes is derived from their desire to ensure survival by deliberately converging to the principals' preferences (Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, 2001) which can be reflected in international policymaking.

Another study by Johnson and Urpelainen (2014) contests the idea that preference diversion leads to less discretion awarded to the agent (Hawkins et al., 2006). Instead they find that if agents offer enough expertise to outweigh the risks that come with agent autonomy, the principals grant high levels of discretion, even in cases of known preference heterogeneity. The agent (in this case, the international bureaucracy) can therefore gain a large amount of discretion whilst utilising their significant expertise and not worry about the principal imposing oversight mechanisms or other restrictions to avoid agency slack or control loss. This, applied to international policymaking, can be used to understand the reasons for the extent of influence available to international bureaucracies.

Sociological Approaches

Functionalism in organisational behaviour

In response to the dominance of realism present in explanations of variation in international organisations, Brechin and Ness (1988) introduced sociological concepts to the field of institutional influence. They found nuances in organisational behaviour by treating them as active actors with their own preferences, "wearing masks of altruistic public interest" (Brechin & Ness, 1988, p.247) whilst serving their own interests. In this way, international organisations wield influence using their resources in the same way that nations states do.

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The authors' highlighted the importance of understanding the role of non-governmental actors as factors which influence the organisational environment. This missing overlap between the field of international relations and sociology was revisited 25 years later by the same authors (Brechin & Ness, 2013) where they found both sides had converged and considered factors which affect influence in international organisations. The definitions and understanding of how and why international organisations behave has become more nuanced; they are known now to have their own preferences separate to those of the nation states, and the organisational environment can be explained by taking into account the wider international organisational context.

Sociological constructivism

Sociological institutionalism emerged alongside academic research which featured international organisations as important non-state actors in international politics. March and Olsen (1984) assessed the recent development of literature in political science and international relations, noting a convergence of different theoretical strands to form sociological institutionalism, referred to by them as "new institutionalism" (March & Olsen, 1984, p.734). They described institutional behaviour as being driven by either a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness. The former is driven by self-interest and rational choice, assuming complete information and prior knowledge by the actors who make the choices (March & Olsen, 1984). The logic of appropriateness conforms more to the norms and identity of the international organisations, where the actors do not have complete information and instead must interpret historical, path-dependent rules of the institution in their own way (March & Olsen, 1984). This development in institutionalism prompted new research which diverged from rationalist assumptions of international bureaucratic behaviour, forming a sociological basis to explain autonomous behaviour and the subsequent effect on international organisational or international bureaucratic influence.

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Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) offer a different approach to the analyses of changes in institutional structure and institutional design. The authors directly examine international bureaucratic influence and the effect it has on international policymaking, a perspective used by other academics (Eckhard & Ege, 2016). Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) take cases centred around environmental policy, uncovering the types of influence they exert, and the conditions which enable the degree of influence. Here, international bureaucracies seek to fulfil their original purpose of creation, using problem-solving and even operating outside of their legal mandate to accomplish this goal (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). Tying together PA theory and sociological theory, the authors acknowledge the rational, self-interested nature of international bureaucracies who are granted autonomous influence by their member state principals (Hawkins et al., 2006). However, they sought to explain how agents develop different preferences and behaviours, counteracting the perceived over-exaggeration of their opportunistic nature. Similarly, Biermann & Siebenhüner (2009) filled the literature gap regarding variation in influence exhibited by international bureaucracies, bringing in organisational management theory as part of their theoretical framework, introducing empirical evidence to sociological concepts.

The findings from their research found three types of influence present in all international bureaucracies (cognitive, normative and executive), noting that the amount of influence given to international bureaucracies is decreased as political salience and international regulation costs increase (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). Distinguishing international bureaucracies as independent actors compared to the rest of the organisation was a perspective shared by Xu and Weller (2008), who also note a bias in PA theory regarding the overstated role of nation states in international politics. Arguing for research which is agent-centric (agents here being international civil servants) fills the gap in understanding international organisations and their variation in autonomous influence.

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Previous to this, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) sparked a wave of research on the role of international organisations as agents operating beyond the nation state (Widerberg & Laerhoven, 2014) in their published work "Rules for the world: International organisations in global politics". As with Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009), the authors addressed the dual nature of international organisations, combining the rational drive of goal fulfilment with the sociological side of independent and autonomous influence (Brechin & Ness, 2013). The theoretical framework is based on a constructivist understanding of how international organisations have evolved over time, operating beyond the scope for which they were created (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). It is evident that the authors challenge long-held beliefs about the dynamics between member states as principals and their international organisation agents, looking at internal (within the organisation itself) and external (state-induced) factors for sources of change in behaviour and the influence of knowledge and authority as "social construction power" (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p.7). Results show that internal factors contributed more to the evolution of international bureaucracies and their increase in scope, rather than it being derived from PA theory explanations of state delegation. Their influence may be seen to fulfil their own divergent preferences, reducing perceived legitimacy; transparency may mitigate this conflict, allowing the international organisation to maintain their level of influence and autonomy (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

Summary of Reviewed Literature

This chapter reviewed prominent academic contributions to the main theoretical approaches measuring the influence of international organisations in international politics. Hawkins et al. (2006) established fundamental observations of PA theory which saw international organisations as rational agents whose autonomy is granted by the member state principals through delegation and discretion (Hawkins et al., 2006). Johnson and Urpelainen (2014) challenged the notion that the degree of delegation is in part influenced by preference

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heterogeneity (Hawkins et al., 2006) finding instead that principals were actually willing to overlook risks of control loss in order to benefit from resources and knowledge offered by the agent. Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) found that although rational and self-interested organisations achieve their own goals through institutional development, principals can mitigate this agency slack through implementing better oversight mechanisms and specific delegation mandates (da Conceição-Heldt, 2013). Cox and Jacobson's state-centric view of decision-making in international politics was later contested by Reinalda and Verbeek (1998), who identified the changing political landscape and the emergence of international organisations as actors operating beyond state control and gaining autonomous influence through cognitive influence.

The second approach starts with the rise of sociological institutionalism, where March and Olsen (1989) note that the motives of international organisations are no longer rational and self-interested, but they conform more to norms and interpret social rules to determine what is appropriate behaviour. Brechin and Ness (2013) reviewed the literature gap between the state-centric approach of international relations and limited scope of sociological organisational analysis over a 25-year period, identifying convergence of the two academic fields in the period since the publication of their previous paper (Brechin & Ness, 1988). Barnett and Finnemore (2004) amplified the research trend which focuses on the role of international bureaucracies as influential, autonomous political actors. Additionally, they gained insight into the internal culture, structure and norms as a means of explaining variation in international political influence. Xu and Weller (2008) concurred with these findings, recommending further research into the role of international bureaucracies based on sociological concepts. Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) took this perspective further, investigating the internal structures of international bureaucracies which allow them to wield

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different types of influence, basing their theoretical framework on elements of both PA theory, sociological institutionalism and constructivism.

Justification for Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009)

After careful evaluation and consideration of the literature above, the thesis shall use chosen elements from the theoretical framework developed by Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) to answer the research question detailed in the first chapter. The authors do not completely reject PA theory or sociological theory; rather, they combine elements of each approach which reflect the advancements in academic research regarding the influence of international bureaucracies. The variables measuring influence relate to PA themes of delegation (problem structure) and discretion (polity) and sociological aspects of culture and personnel (people and procedures). The authors expressly distinguish the international bureaucracy from the international organisation within which it resides, as the international bureaucracy is seen as an entity with its own preferences, culture and functional scope. In this way, the European Commission is an example of such an international bureaucracy, known for being a prominent actor in the international policymaking sphere, acting independently from the other European institutions.

The research question can now be conceptualised in a more narrow and defined manner; it focuses more on the degree of influence as defined by Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) to determine the effect the European Commission had on the outcome of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. Given the limited scope of the thesis, it is appropriate to choose a specific aspect of the theoretical framework that defines influence and analyse the case study thoroughly to determine the presence of that influence in the actions of the European Commission. Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) describe three types of influence; cognitive, normative and executive. Cognitive influence concerns itself with information creation and

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distribution, normative influence defines the norm-building activities which facilitate international cooperation, and executive influence develops mechanisms which allow for the implementation of the international policy or agreement (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). Of the three, the authors find that it is executive influence where the international bureaucracy have operated beyond their original mandate, aligning with the other academic scholars in the field of international organisations (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Xu & Weller, 2008). Given the nature of the Paris Agreement as one of environmental policy issues, the European Commission has limited cognitive influence. It would be difficult to objectively analyse the normative influence of the European Commission as a lot of the information is internal and inaccessible for the purposes of the thesis and research question. Therefore, executive influence as detailed by Biermann & Siebenhüner (2009) is the most feasible and informative variable from the theoretical framework that will fill the societal and academic gap that explains the influence of international bureaucracies in international policymaking.

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Chapter Three: Methodology

As was already outlined in the previous chapter, the analysis will use the theoretical framework of executive influence from Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) to answer the research question. The thesis has opted for a qualitative case study approach as the most appropriate method of analysis for several reasons. According to Neuman (2014), qualitative research understands the importance of research which is not isolated, but instead considers situational context and the wider subtext of the study, therefore gaining additional meaning through the situation in which the case study occurred. This suits the descriptive and exploratory nature of the research question. Using qualitative methods, this approach can draw from various perspectives and data points, producing a detailed and complex understanding of the Paris Agreement negotiations and uncovering the underlying mechanisms which explain the sources and extent of executive influence from the European Commission. By doing this, the research engages in "third order interpretation" (Neuman, 2014, p.180) using the framework by Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) to better understand the variables and outcome of the case study. Quantitative analysis, though it is rigorous and not without merit, distances itself from the social themes and nuances of which qualitative analysis is familiar. The Paris Agreement encompasses variables which make for an interesting analysis; political and non-political actors, the international policymaking stage, the difficulties of navigating and negotiating solutions for environmental issues, and the emergence of a large international bureaucracy (the European Commission) as a significant player. The results of the analysis in this paper will be able to contribute to the wider understanding of international bureaucracies in international politics; specifically, it will aid future analyses of international bureaucracies in agreements of other environmental policymaking negotiations.

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Operationalisation of Concepts

Dimensions of Influence

In order to operationalise and measure the concept of influence, the thesis will use parts of the framework by Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) in order to categorically isolate and analyse influential behaviour. The authors define influence as "the sum of all effects for, or attributable to, an international bureaucracy" (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009, p.41). These effects can be observed in three distinct ways: output, outcome and impact. For the purposes of this paper, the analysis will utilise the first two of these to measure the influence attributable to the European Commission. Output is defined in its most basic terms as the activities of the international bureaucracy and the actions it took during a series of events (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). This is the most feasible of the three dimensions, with data readily available to determine the degree of activity from the international bureaucracy.

Outcome identifies the observed changes in targeted actors which come as a result of the

output and activities from the international bureaucracy (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009), thus allowing the researcher to directly identify influential behaviours. These two components are complementary and enough to determine whether the European Commission did indeed exert executive influence when negotiating the formation of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. The third dimension, impact, measures the effect of influence in the policy itself, looking at real-world changes which come about as a result of the policy objectives (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). These observations would be difficult to achieve given the short period of time that has passed since the Paris Agreement was signed and the complications involved in isolating the Paris Agreement's effects on the environment compared to other policies or international agreements. Assessing impact requires rigorous research that is beyond the scope of this thesis and will therefore not be included in the analysis or research process.

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Executive Influence

Executive influence is defined by the authors as "direct assistance to countries in their effort to implement international agreements, which might reshape national interests" (Biermann & Siebenhüner, p.48). Direct assistance from the European Commission to other nations can be seen as their output, while the change in the national interests of the target actors translates as the outcome. The activities which denote executive influence have been laid out by Biermann & Siebenhüner (2009) as part of their theoretical framework and will be used in this paper to guide the analysis and ensure that only relevant data is included. Using these activities as the basis for coding categories in the document analysis will allow the researcher to detect the presence of executive influence from the European Commission. Any subsequent changes in behaviour as a result of these activities can then be evaluated to assess the effectiveness of their influence.

Administrative Capacity

The ability to implement the international agreement at a national level affects a nation's willingness to agree to the policy's terms and is stated by the authors to be one of the most effective ways that an international bureaucracy can exert executive influence. By encouraging an increase in administrative capacity, the international bureaucracy can make their goals of the international policy more feasible, especially for nations who lack the resources or means to implement the terms themselves (Biermann & Siebenhüner. 2009). Since the Paris Agreement includes terms which aid the implementation of measures to achieve the temperature limit, it is expected that the document analysis will find instances of the European Commission increasing the administrative capacity of nations which are opposed to their objectives in an attempt to change their behaviour.

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Capacity building encompasses activities which help nations in different ways, so it has been split up into two subcategories to aid accurate identification:

Outreach programmes

The international bureaucracy may use training programmes in their target countries to spread their ideas and beliefs about certain topics, using knowledge to encourage the domestic civil servants to change national interests towards an international policy or agreement. The distinction here with cognitive dissonance is that programmes and outreach are designed to assist target actors by providing knowledge on how an international policy may specifically benefit them.

Diffusion of policies

An international bureaucracy can help facilitate the spread of successful international policies from one nation to another, acting as diffusion agents (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). Evidence of successful environmental policies implemented by the European Commission may lead to a change in actors' behaviour.

Exchange of Information

The international bureaucracy may facilitate the exchange information about their objectives or ideas at the national level in order to change the opinion or attitudes of other actors. This may present itself in several ways; official statements, commissioned scientific papers, visiting the nation itself to talk to individuals at a governmental level, or similar methods.

National/Transnational Partnerships

If the international bureaucracy establishes or supports the formation of national or transnational partnerships which help the implementation of their objectives, it is likely to increase support from other actors, particularly the actors who are the target of such support. Here, the research will investigate whether the European Commission encourages or

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instigates measures which allow for opposing actors to receive help to implement the Commission's target goal of a 2°C temperature limit.

Financial and Technology Support

Services which are provided by the international bureaucracy which relate to financial or technology support for other actors are included in this measure. In the case of the Paris Agreement, this would represent services the European Commission support or provide which makes their policy objectives more achievable than the alternatives. For actors such as the developing nations and countries which are more affected by climate change, this may lead to a change in behaviour.

Adoption of New Laws/Programmes

The international bureaucracy may persuade national governments to adopt or reformulate new policies or programmes. This may come in the form of new laws or instruments, setting up research institutions or independent advisory councils whose goal is to mitigate or reverse the negative effects on the environment (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). The European Commission may exert executive influence here by establishing institutions which support their goal of setting the temperature limit increase at 2°C.

Data Collection

For both the process tracing and document analysis, data was taken from official sources and websites of the European Commission, UNFCCC, national archives of the national governments, and the IPCC. This was to ensure the data was as little removed as possible from the actors under observation. Media sources, such as online articles, press conferences and interviews, were also included wherever necessary to provide an additional viewpoint for the analysis. Meeting notes, agendas, structure of the conferences were all documents sourced from the UNFCCC and other meetings which were relevant for the Paris Agreement (such as the G8 summits), as they provided information on what was to be

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discussed and what was concluded in the COP. The decision papers from the COPs were taken as a measurement of the European Commission's effectiveness, and whether they were achieving their goals of including the 2°C temperature limit. Press releases and official statements from the European Commission's website provided clarity on their intentions for implementation procedures and strategy direction regarding the measures behind the achieving a 2°C temperature limit. Where necessary, academic articles taken from high quality academic journals were consulted as a means of providing information that was not otherwise available. Finally, supplementary documents from the IPCC - particularly their feasibility reports - will provide data from the scientific community regarding the ability to achieve the temperature limit, reflecting the overall consensus of the UNFCCC.

Process Tracing

Process tracing was chosen as part of a comprehensive qualitative research approach as it provides a deeper understanding of the case study by analysing the relationships of causal mechanisms involved (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). A causal map was created by using a descriptive method of events, isolating key actions which contributed to the final temperature limit included in Article 2 and identifying the prominent actors involved, particularly the European Commission. The results can help the analysis to determine if the preferences of the European Commission prevailed, and if so, which actions were pivotal in achieving those goals.

Qualitative Document Analysis

The theoretical framework on executive influence from Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) will guide the analysis and form the foundations of a directed document analysis, a deductive style of content analysis which is grounded in existing theoretical findings (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). One purpose of this is that the analysis is testing the theory in question, contributing to its validity (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) by applying it to a case study that

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centres on international environmental policies. Another benefit to this approach is that directed content analysis uses concepts and variables in the chosen theory to form initial codes or categories with which to conduct the research. In this thesis, the codes for detecting executive influence from the European Commission will be formed from the variables listed when operationalising influence earlier in this chapter. Using established theory to guide the document analysis decreases researcher bias, counteracts the descriptive nature of process tracing, and increases validity of findings (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Kohlbacher, 2006; Neuman, 2014).

Using the coding categories for executive influence, the research aims to find evidence of executive influence committed by the European Commission which contributed to the UNFCCC decision to establish the temperature limit at 2°C. After finding instances of these actions, the analysis will evaluate whether the European Commission did indeed exert executive influence in the negotiations of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement to align the final agreement with their own goals.

Validity and Reliability

To ensure consistent validity and reliability, the research implements triangulation by collecting data from multiple sources for the same event which is being analysed. These sources are taken from different official websites of the international organisations, international bureaucracies and national governments involved in the analysis, making sure the data is as true as possible. Additionally, the research uses theoretical underpinnings to minimise researcher bias, increasing objectivity when producing results and aiding replicability of the study.

Limitations

By using only one case study to analyse a greater phenomenon, the research limits itself to a niche and specialised series of events. Care must be taken to ensure that the results

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of the analysis are applicable to future research on the topic of international bureaucratic influence. The generalisability of the research will take into account the unique aspects of the Paris Agreement negotiations, making sure it doesn't affect the validity of findings which contribute to the role of international bureaucracies in international environmental policies. Another limitation to consider is the exclusion of interviews, which was not possible due to the timeframe to complete the thesis. Interviews can be highly useful when gaining insight into the internal workings of an international bureaucracy, increasing validity of the analysis and strengthening triangulation efforts. It is therefore more difficult to investigate the internal decision-making concerning the output of the European Commission or UNFCCC. The data included in the analysis is taken from official documents published on websites, increasing the need for multiple sources of data to minimise bias.

Summary

This chapter outlined the research methods and data used in order to determine if the European Commission exerted executive influence in negotiations to establish a 2°C temperature limit in the Paris Agreement. Choosing a qualitative, single-case study allows the researcher to form a more comprehensive understanding and consider the wider context of the events under analysis (Neuman, 2014). In order to present a more concise, descriptive narrative of the negotiations, the thesis will use process tracing to create a causal map of key events which lead to Article 2 of the Paris Agreement setting the primary temperature limit at 2°C. This will guide data collection for the document analysis, achieving triangulation by taking documents and other sources of information from official websites and trustworthy media outlets. Taking the theoretical framework by Biermann & Siebenhüner (2009) as a foundation, the research will engage in directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Actions which exhibit executive influence as laid out by the authors will serve as the coding categories for document analysis, minimising researcher bias and increasing replicability.

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Executive influence is present when executive actions from the European Commission affect other actors and result in decisions which align with their goals for the temperature limit.

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Chapter Four: Analysis

This chapter shall present the analysis of the European Commission's role in the Paris Agreement negotiations over the temperature limit in order to answer the research question. The first section will be a comprehensive history of the case study, providing a general understanding of the negotiations whilst identifying the contributions and actions of the European Commission throughout. It will mainly centre around the discussion of the temperature limit, an item of dispute present from early in the negotiations (Gao, Gao & Zhang, 2017) and will conclude with a causal map. This background knowledge will help clarify the second section, where evidence of executive influence from the European Commission will be presented and evaluated. Finally, this chapter will end with a brief summary of the findings before proceeding to the concluding chapter.

A History of Climate Change

In Rio de Janeiro 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was drafted and signed, entering into force in March 1994 (Climate Change Secretariat, 2002). The UNFCCC's main objective to reduce or eliminate greenhouse gases and their negative effect on the climate was to be achieved through international cooperation and recognition of the different capacities of the member nations (UNFCCC, 1992). The UNFCCC treaty text included aspects of previous discussions surrounding environmental issues, such as the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) and directly references the General Assembly resolutions dating back to 1989 which looked at the responsibility to protect the climate for future generations (United Nations General Assembly, 1989). There are three notable parts of the UNFCCC final text which are relevant to analysing the influence of the European Commission later on in this chapter. The first is the mention of rising sea levels and the risk towards low-lying coastal areas and

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islands, stating that they are "...particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change" (UNFCCC, 1992, p.5). Secondly, the treaty concedes that responsibility lies with the developed nations to resolve the effects of greenhouse gas emissions relative to their contributions. The third inclusion is the highlighted importance of using environmental knowledge provided by scientific resources and expertise. The UNFCCC was a soft agreement, containing no enforcement procedures for member states to adhere to any requirements laid out in the text ("Status of the Ratification of the Convention", n.d.).

It was the Kyoto Protocol which set out binding and more detailed obligations to its member states, focusing more on measuring and monitoring emission levels (UNFCCC, 1998). It became an important foundation that guided future international agreements, setting a standard for measuring the adverse outputs of activities contributing to overall levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Developed countries were officially recognised as key contributors of these emissions, produced through industrialisation and other similar activities to successfully achieve strong economic growth (UNFCCC, 1998). Though there was little indication of a strategy to reduce emissions, the European Commission expressed an urgency to implement the Protocol as quickly as possible, fearing that a delay would lead to an increase in CO2 levels (European Commission, 1999).

As the Kyoto Protocol evolved, other mechanisms and programmes arose which were more tailored to the participating members' needs and capabilities. The COP18 in Doha increased focus on financial support by creating the Green Climate Fund, a means of providing long-term financing for developing nations ("Specific Outcomes", n.d.). Although most of the financing is sourced from developed countries, the funding aims to give the most high-risk nations the opportunity to pre-empt or reverse the effects of climate change, using new technologies and adapting regional and national systems. Initial ideas to create an institution which focuses on climate change solutions evolved to become the Climate

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Technology Centre, a collaborative network of experts across multiple sectors and geographical areas who could provide advice and implementation support to developing countries (UNFCCC, 2011a).

Copenhagen was the setting for the COP15 in 2009, where a non-binding document known as the Copenhagen Accord was finalised on the 18th December (UNFCCC, 2009a). During negotiations, consensus was reached over several criteria set out by the Kyoto Protocol, elevating the status of climate change into a political priority, and reaching solutions that accounted for the capabilities of all nations (UNFCCC, 2009a, p.5). Maintaining adherence to the emission declarations as set out by the Kyoto Protocol was widely endorsed by the member countries, ensuring continuation of important measures. The non-binding characteristic of the text may have contributed somewhat to reaching an overall consensus; however, several important developments emerged from the COP15 which proved significant in future UNFCCC conferences.

The Copenhagen Accord was the first official UN agreement to state 2°C as the maximum temperature limit, adding that more scientific research was to be undertaken to reduce it further to 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2009a, p.7). Prior to the COP15, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) produced a report containing scientific recommendations for achieving these temperature limit goals, leading to sustainable development procedures (UNFCCC, 2009c). Another central theme in the Copenhagen Accord is the reinforcement of adaptation plans, previously created as a means to mitigate the negative effects of climate change, emphasising again the necessary steps needed to proactively help developing countries, small island states and African nations. It was also generally agreed that the developed countries should be held to stricter measures when monitoring and submitting plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, whereas developing countries would be held to a lesser extent (UNFCCC, 2009a). This echoes the statements

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made in the final text of the UNFCCC (1992) regarding historical responsibility and international cooperation. Additionally, the introduction of a temperature limit signalled a change from qualitative concepts to a quantitative goal, leading to progression in climate change talks. The Copenhagen Accord attracted criticism from both political and public figures, many taking issue with the lack of binding commitments on member states to actively reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve the 2°C goal (Vidal, Stratton & Goldenburg, 2009). Other leaders, such as then-UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, questioned the legitimacy of the centralised decision-making of the agreement, pointing out that the select nations involved - USA, China, India, Brazil, South Africa - decided on fulfilment obligations for member parties who were not participants of the COP15 negotiations ("Copenhagen climate summit", 2009). The European Commission expressed disappointment at not achieving their objective of a binding, ambitious goal, but remained determined that the negotiations in the next conference would yield more success (European Commission, 2009c).

The COP16 was held in Cancun, simultaneously serving as the sixth meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and with intentions to formalise terms laid out in the Copenhagen Accord. The generally more positive and optimistic approach in negotiations resulted in reinforced support for terms previously agreed in both international agreements (UNFCCC, 2011b). Here the temperature limit featured more prominently, once more maintaining the intention to keep global temperature increases below 2°C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2011c). Increased cooperation over the implementation and mitigation measures lead to a contribution from the developed countries of $30 billion towards the facilitation of adjustment procedures for developing countries (UNFCCC, 2011c).

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As the Conference of the Parties advanced through Durban, Doha and Warsaw, focus remained on improving more sustainable mechanisms for developing countries. It became more challenging to strike a balance between the need to eliminate the risk of climate change for vulnerable countries whilst adhering to their need for sustainable economic growth, as well as filling an ambition gap in emission pledges. Therefore, the SBSTA and SBI carried out a review in the years 2013-2015 to assess the feasibility of lowering the temperature limit goal to 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2015b), a goal repeatedly advocated for by the countries who were most at risk of climate change. Despite admissions that more research was to be conducted in order to confidently recommend an adjustment, the negotiating text for the COP21 in Paris acknowledged the scientific research. This resulted in the final text of the Paris Agreement recommending efforts to reduce the temperature increase to 1.5°C, although, based on stronger scientific evidence and long-standing presence in negotiations, the global temperature increase limit was to remain at 2°C (UNFCCC, 2015a, Art.2).

Process Tracing

A causal map has been constructed below, selecting pivotal events and decisions to demonstrate the progression of the 2°C temperature limit from first mention to finding a place in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. Several of these events can be attributed to three main groups of actors and have been grouped together as such; the scientific community, the European Commission and the developing nations. Additionally, two events have been bolded to highlight their importance in the presence of 2°C in the final agreement text and alignment to the goals of the European Commission. The quantification of the temperature limit was instigated by the European Commission, leading the scientific community to begin research at a 2°C anchor point. Similarly, the push from the European Commission to secure a legally binding agreement paved the way for reaching consensus amongst the member nations during UNFCC negotiations.………...

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Document Analysis

The following section will lay out evidence that has been gathered to determine the presence of (and degree of) executive influence from the European Commission. The findings will list the executive actions carried out by the European Commission with regards to achieving consensus over the temperature limit and assess whether they were effective. Effectiveness will be carried out according to whether they fulfil the criteria for executive influence according to Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009).

Establishing the 2°C Temperature Limit

A major determinant of executive influence is increasing administrative capacity for target actors so that they are more capable of implementing international agreements, thereby increasing the likelihood of achieving consensus over the agreement's terms (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). The topic of the temperature limit was the most controversial and divisive term in the UNFCCC negotiations from early on (Gao, Gao & Zhang, 2017), and was represented in the final text of the Paris Agreement as "...holding the increase in the global average temperature limit to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels" (UNFCCC, 2015a, p.3). When the UNFCCC was established in 1992, there was no mention of the need for a specific global temperature limit increase, with the UNFCCC objective explicitly stating that managing greenhouse gas emissions is necessary to "prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to...enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner" (UNFCCC, 1992, p.4). It is important to see how the European Commission interpreted this objective and anchored negotiations around the 2°C temperature limit, and what executive actions they took in order to achieve consensus with dissenting actors.

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The first mentions of average global temperature rises can be traced back to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), who produced their First Assessment Report on Climate Change in 1990 with the intention of providing policymakers with accessible scientific information to allow them to make informed political decisions. Whilst the IPCC does not make official recommendations, the report from Working Group II presented policymakers with scenarios depicting the impact of potential average global temperature rises, ranging from 1.5-5°C (IPCC, 1990). In the time between the reports, the UNFCCC was established and signed by all member states, recognising the scientific findings and pledging to tackle the environmental problems fairly and efficiently. The IPCC's Second Assessment Report (IPCC, 1995) built on scenarios from the previous report, making them more defined and clear as to the consequences of temperature rises. Notably, they asserted that if emissions continued on a mid-range path, the "best estimate" (IPCC, 1995, p.5) results in a 2°C temperature increase gap from 1990-2100. The low and high estimates projected a 1C and 3.5°C increase respectively.

The 1996 EU Council meeting in Luxembourg used these IPCC reports as a scientific basis for discussing viable means to reduce carbon emissions, resulting in a target goal phrased as “global average temperatures not exceed 2 degrees above pre-industrial level” (European Commission, 1996, sec.6). The 2°C estimate from the IPCC scenario was interpreted here as a threshold below which it is possible to avoid the severe consequences of greenhouse gas emissions on the environment. This decision has been retrospectively criticised, with critics pointing out a lack of explanation for the decision to choose 2°C, and it was not explicitly mentioned in the IPCC report as a suitable target for lowering emissions (Randalls, 2010). The Council understood the necessity of reducing CO2 levels as published

by the IPCC and expressed its intention to continue to include scientific research in the policymaking process (European Commission, 1996). The 2°C temperature limit was met

Measuring the Influence of the European Commission in the Paris Agreement - A Qualitative Analysis