The role of food culture in everyday nationalism : the case of Singapore's Hawker Centres

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UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM

The Role of Food Culture

in Everyday Nationalism

The case of Singapore’s Hawker Centres

Kelly Ong (11706791) 6/14/2018

Master Thesis in Human Geography 2017 – 2018 Supervisor: Virginie Mamadouh

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1. Introduction

“Hawker food embodies the essence of being Singaporean.”

(Chandrashekhar, 29 May 2016)

In today’s age of globalization, the meaning and relevance of the nation and food culture have been increasingly brought to a question in a world ‘perceived as uncertain and constantly changing’ (Antonsich, 2015, p. 304). Transnational flows of people and ever-changing territorial boundaries have created increasingly multicultural nations and amalgamated food cultures around the globe, ‘creating diasporas with multiple linguistic allegiances and perceptions of belonging that are no longer identified purely with territory.’ (Valentine et al, 2008, p.376). It is of little surprise then, that there has been some skepticism over what constitutes national identity, belonging and rights to food ‘authenticity’ (Ichijio & Ranta, 2016).

In spite of these, nationalism and food culture have remained as important topics of study and discussion, both in academia and in one’s daily experiences of the nation (Avieli, 2005; Brubaker et al, 2006; Duruz & Khoo, 2014; Ichijio & Ranta, 2016).

Farrer (2015) and dell’Agnese et al (2018) points us to the fact that food products and culinary exchanges have been occurring for centuries, and that ‘culinary globalization must be recognized as an ancient and unending process that neither began nor ended with European colonization’ (Farrer, 2015, p.2). Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a) call to attention that ‘the nation and its derivatives are not simply discrete objects traded in elite discourse or constructed by the state’: they are also everyday processes that involve ordinary members of the nation (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, p.554; Skey, 2011).

On the other hand, studies have discovered that a sense of belonging towards one’s nation can still be experienced outside of its geographical territory, an example being immigrants practicing their ‘home’ food culture in a foreign land (Duruz & Khoo, 2014; Schermuly & Forbes-Mewett, 2016; Kong, 1999). These go to show that food culture is still relevant in today’s globalized world, and constitutes an important outlet of expression for who and what we are on a continual basis (Avieli, 2005; Ichijio & Ranta, 2016).

According to Brubaker et al (2016), discussions regarding ethnic and national identity often come ‘predictably packaged with standard sets of qualifiers’ and tend to neglect explanations about how ethnicity and nationhood are constructed in detail (Brubaker et al, 2006, p.7). This is whereby ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ are often studied as categories of analysis rather than categories of practice, and what often results is group generalizations and excessive institutionalism that restricts our understanding of the nation on-the-ground (Goode and Stroup, 2015, p.732;

Brubaker et al, 2006, p.9; Skey, 2011). These understandings have led several authors to view the everyday as the quotidian and object of analysis for nationalism, in order to better understand how the masses experience nationhood for themselves (Brubaker et al, 2006; Goode and Stroup, 2015, p.732; Skey, 2011; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a).

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7 Altogether, there are been strong lines of reasoning for the relevance of food culture and nationalism today, and in a world that is perceived to be ever-changing.

In the nation of Singapore, eating has been described as a ‘national pastime’, and hawker centres are among one of the best places to enjoy Singaporean food (Duruz & Khoo, 2014; Kong, 2007). Singapore has been described as ‘The Great Taste of A Cultural Melting Pot’ (Independent, 19 Dec 2009), and hawker food has been termed as a ‘national heritage’ (Yong, 7 Mar 2016) as it embodies inter-culinary flavours that are ‘found’ in Singapore’s multicultural society. Kong (2007) piques that the term of ‘hawker centre’ is so familiar in Singapore, that its irony is not apparent or taken for granted in the everyday life. This is because a hawker is defined as ‘a person who travels about selling goods, typically advertising them by shouting’ according to the Oxford English Dictionary. In contrast, Singapore’s hawkers have permanent stalls with proper facilities such as water and electricity, and non-verbal advertisements such as celebrity

recommendations are the norm of food advertisement at hawker centres. Several hawkers have prospered and expanded their businesses into commercial chains, and there are even hawkers who have acquired international fame with the much-acclaimed Michelin star (BBC, 24 Nov 2016; Han, 4 Aug 2016). Altogether, a visit to Singapore’s hawker centre may constitute a pleasant surprise, as one can find a wide variety of ethnic and intercultural cuisine at a low cost and high quality. As operating managers and governmental authorities regularly conduct ‘spring cleaning days’ and hygiene inspections at hawker centres, customers are assured that hawker food is safe for consumption as well as a pleasant dining experience.

However, as we will witness later in this study, Singapore’s hawker centres are not always simple facts of life; neither is hawker food always an easy food to digest:

‘Chicken rice. Bak kut teh. Hokkien mee. A Singaporean would identify these dishes as “Chinese food”, but try to look for these three dishes in China and you would be stumped.’

- An article on the national flagship newspaper (Koh, 8 Aug 2017) “Chinese food. Like China Chinese food. Usually don’t appeal to me because it is

not native Singaporean food. But once in a while I will try, but rarely. I see more and more such stalls coming up in Singapore and I feel sad because it implies/signifies the erosion of the local culture. Inevitably I feel it encroaches on

our heritage and it is of putting.”

- Singaporean survey respondent in this study in response to a Chinese hawker stall. The above remarks suggest certain complexities of ethnic identities in Singapore, in this case the boundaries drawn between ‘us’ Singaporean Chinese versus ‘them’ China Chinese. On the other hand, non-Singaporeans may also experience hawker centres in similar exclusionary manners, as evidenced by Vanderperre’s perspectives on hawker food that is deemed to be non-traditional and non-Singaporean food in hawker centres:

“When I arrived in Singapore 10 years ago, the only thing I personally wanted to eat was hawker food. But now when we go to a hawker centre, we see more shops

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8 that are closed or more shops that are offering something different. I've seen French cuisine being offered in hawker stalls which is much more expensive than

your usual plate of noodles.”

- Christophe Vanderperre (Straits Times, 8 Jul 2016) The examples above introduce us to the complex relationship between food culture and the everyday life as well as to the research topics of this study, which are the relationships between food culture and everyday nationalism. The quotes above informs us about the salience that identity and belonging may have in the seemingly mundane features of in daily life, such as eating local food in hawker centres for the case of Singapore.

This thesis is divided into four main sections. Chapter 2 comprises of the theoretical framework, which explains an analytical framework of everyday nationalism, and as well as its relationship with food culture. It also includes a section on how hawker centres are relevant for the food-and-nationalism axis in the case of Singapore. Chapter 3 constitutes the research methodology, which constitutes the methodology undertaken by this study of everyday nationalism in the case of Singapore’s hawker centres. Chapter 4 constitutes an analysis of everyday nationalism in Singapore, which includes the nation-building project of Singapore, and how the population is classified in the national census. This is relevant and important for our understanding, as it affects the way food culture is viewed and experienced. It also explains the historical background behind the trade of hawking, from the streets to hawker centres. Thus, Chapter 4 forms the basis of understanding for the empirical findings of this study, which can be found in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 7 constitutes a discussion about the findings of this study, and Chapter 8 constitutes the conclusion of this thesis, whereby a response to the main research question would be given.

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2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I first introduce the discourse of everyday nationalism (Section 2.1), and provide an analytical framework which informs how all things work in this thesis. Next, I would discuss the topic of food culture and how it relates to nationalism (Section 2.2). Followed by this, the significance of place and everyday places would be brought out in the analysis of food culture and nationalism (Section 2.3). Finally, I will introduce the case of Singapore’s hawker centres (Section 2.4). This section includes an explaination of how everyday nationalism in Singapore works (Section 2.4.1) and how hawker food culture (Section 2.4.2) is unique and relevant for this study. Lastly, an argument for the case of Singapore’s hawker centres as a food-and-nationalism axis would be given (Section 2.4.3).

2.1 Everyday Nationalism

According to Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a), ‘Nationalism is the project to make the political unit, the state (or polity) congruent with the cultural unit, the nation…The targets of these endeavours are the people themselves: to make the nation is to make people national.’ (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008a, p.536).

Today, most countries around the globe undertake a civic definition of the nation, whereby it is characterized in the form of a citizenship and naturalization (or integration) policy (Goode et al, 2015). Many scholars have described the existing literature on nationalism and national identity as being ‘dominated by a focus on the historical origins of the nation and its political lineaments.’ (Edensor, 2002, p.1; Antonsich, 2015).

According to Hobsbawm, nationalism ‘cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist’ (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 10).)

In the recent years, there has been a growing body of research on the banal processes in relation to nationalism as a political ideology, and as a form of distinguishing individual and group identity (Billig, 1995; Jones & Merriman, 2009; Koch & Paasi, 2016; Knott, 2015; ibid). Most notable of these is Billig’s work on ‘Banal Nationalism’ (1995) which outlines the everyday

representations of the nation which build a shared sense of national belonging (Billig, 1995; Koch & Paasi, 2016). His argument is that the nation is ‘flagged’ in multiple ways, permeating both built and symbolic landscapes as well as people's daily lives. Examples of these banal national symbols include coins and monuments, that serve as constant reminders of the nation that often go unnoticed in daily life. Billig’s focus on the banal and quotidian ways in which nationalism is reproduced in the everyday life has opened up new terrains and avenues of potential research, not just for geographers and social scientists (Koch & Paasi, 2016). However, several

commentators (Koch & Paasi, 2016) and authors such as Jones and Merriman (2009) have noted certain limitations about Billig’s work. They explain that Billig’s terminology of banal

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nationalism has ‘perhaps unwittingly’1_{constructed a distinction between banal and hot processes} that reproduce nationalism (Jones & Merriman, 2009, p.165). Hence, there is a certain

misleading impression that banal nationalism is a categorically different form of nationalism from ‘hotter’ varieties (Jones & Merriman, 2009; Benwell & Dodds, 2011), as though both banal and hot elements of nationalism do not combine together or be related to each other in context of the everyday. These reasons have led to the idea and concept of everyday nationalism, which focus is on the everyday contexts within which nationalism is reproduced.

Everyday nationalism is a sub-field within the discourse of nationalism, which refocuses

attention on the lived experience of ordinary inhabitants as well as the role and relevance of the everyday in constituting nationhood. Everyday nationalism thus offers an ‘empirical lens’ for which nationalism can be analyzed from ‘below’ (Hobsbawm, 1991; Knott, 2015, p.1), whereby ordinary members of the nation are viewed as the consumers, (re)producers and challengers of nationalism. Studies of everyday nationalism have included how daily conversations (Skey, 2016), popular culture (Edensor, 2002), everyday ethnic and national identifications (Antonsich, 2016), food and lifestyle habits (Ichijio & Ranta, 2016) help to imagine and construct the nation for ordinary inhabitants in the everyday.

According to Paasi (1998), the everyday life ‘does not consist only of a local context but also of national socialization (knowledge, values, rituals, memory) and participation in a broader

division of labour and a struggle over meanings through locally embedded institutional practices.’ (Paasi, 1998, p. 85). These practices as having been ‘mediated and sedimented’ (ibid) in the

consciousness of individuals, and transfused in their social identities and everyday lives. Hence, we are reminded that our study of everyday nationalism does not translate into a dismissal or ignorance about institutional categories nor ‘top-down’ practices, although they may run counter to the day-to-day experiences of members of the nation (Skey, 2011; Paasi, 1998; Goode & Stroup, 2015). This is because they necessarily influence and give structure to the daily lives of members of the nation (further elaborated in the upcoming sections).

This necessarily leads us into a discussion about what is the context and meaning of the everyday in our study of everyday nationalism.

2.1.1 Meaning of the everyday

The meaning and concept of the everyday has been debated within the discourse of everyday nationalism.

For example, Billig (1995) and Edensor (2002) view the everyday as synonymous with the ‘mundane details’ and ‘quotidian realms’ of ‘social interaction, habits, routines and practical knowledge’ which have been neglected by existing analysis (Edensor, 2002, p.17). According to this understanding, the everyday is conceived as a space in which the nation is expressed through banal and mundane practices (Knott, 2015).

1_{‘Perhaps the key problem with Billig’s thesis, ironically, lies in its terminology. While the term “banal}

nationalism” has entered into popular usage in the social sciences and the humanities, it can, nevertheless give the impression that it is a categorically different form of nationalism from ‘hotter’ varieties.’ (Jones & Merriman, 2009, p.165).

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11 In contrast, Jones and Merriman (2009) argue that the everyday is both a ‘place of banal and mundane processes’ but which may also incorporate a variety of hotter ‘differences and conflicts’ that affect people’s lives on a habitual basis (Jones & Merriman, 2009, p. 166). Unlike Billig (1995) and Edensor (2002), they aim to demonstrate that the everyday is not synonymous with the banal and aim to unpack the banal-hot dichotomy through this conception.

In this thesis, I take after the conceptualization of the everyday as an object of analysis (Brubaker et al, 2006; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008a; Skey, 2011). This understanding of the

everyday in the discourse of everyday nationalism ‘focuses less on elites and institutions than on the quotidian practices by which ethnic and national identities are elaborated, confirmed,

reproduced, or challenged’ (Goode & Stroup, 2015, p. 718). Thus, the context of the everyday is characterized by vernacular2_{understandings of nationhood, whereby it is:}

‘embodied and expressed not only in political claims and nationalist rhetoric but in everyday encounters, practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cult idioms, cognitive schemas, mental maps, interactional cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, social networks, and institutional forms.’

(Brubaker et al. 2006, p.6-7) According to Skey (2011), ‘many aspects of our social lives are carried out according to habit, routine or precedent, with little or no reflection.’ (Skey, 2011, p.14). Some authors go even further to say that ‘ordinary people are often indifferent to national(ist) claims made in their names’ (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008a, p. 554; Brubaker et al, 2006; Fenton, 2007). Hence, this conceptualization of the everyday does not assume that nationalism is a relevant or pervasive aspect in the

everyday life. Perhaps most importantly, the understanding of the everyday as an object of analysis enables us to analyze empirical or theoretical phenomena that is generated and used amongst members of the nation, of which is not restricted to national nor ethnic categories. In relation to the topic of this thesis, understanding the everyday as an object of analysis is vital for understanding the role of food culture in the everyday life. This is because enables us to study empirical phenomena of food culture in the everyday nation, as both categories of practice and analysis (Avieli, 2005; Duruz & Khoo, 2014; Ichigo & Ratna, 2016). In this manner, we would able to utilize vernacular identifications and categorizations to understand the relationship between food culture and everyday nationalism i.e. ‘food-and-nationalism axis’ (Ichigo & Ratna, 2016, p.1).

Scholars have pointed out that while recent academic work has contributed to our understanding of the ways in which the nation is ‘experienced, embodied and imagined’ through daily activities, these studies often lack a coherent analytical framework in how we can study and make sense of these processes (Skey, 2011; Goode & Stroup, 2015). Skey (2011) laments that most academic and public debates around the subject of nationalism ‘rarely gets to grips with the question’ of why nationality and nationalism might be important for people, in light of other ongoing processes like globalization and immigration (refer to Introduction). Thus, we will review the following concepts (Section 2.1.2-2.1.4), that would form a basic framework of understanding how everyday nationalism works. These concepts would also help us to assess the role and relevance of food

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12 culture in everyday nationalism (Section 2.2), and explain certain processes in the case of Singapore’s hawker centres (Section 3).

2.1.2 Concept of Sedimentation

The concept of sedimentation was first introduced by the philosopher Husserl (Smith, 1995) and was subsequently developed for the ‘phenomenological analysis of everyday life’ (Berger &

Luckmann, 1991, p.34, 85-89). It is defined as ‘The process whereby a particular discourse comes to be seen as objective or natural rather than one possible way of making sense of the world.’ (Skey, 2011, p. 13; Laclau, 1990).

In relation to how this takes place in the life of an average human being, Berger and Luckmann (1991) explain that only a small portion of the totality of human experiences is retained in consciousness. They explain that human experiences are transmitted across people and generations through common activities and sign systems, and that the experiences that are retained to a certain extent become sedimented (Berger & Luckmann, 1991). The authors describe language as a ‘decisive sign system’ that objectivates human experiences, and becomes both the basis and the instrument in effecting existing knowledge. Each generation articulates his or her experiences relevant to the time of the language, which may be ‘new’ or take on different meanings in other generations. Thus, this process, the actual origin(s) of knowledge could become obscured or ‘unimportant’ in the process of sedimentation, enabling a different tradition or experience to be invented.

The role of institutions in the process of sedimentation has also been brought out by several scholars (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Essed, 1991; Said, 1994; Lefebvre, 1991). They have a crucial role in setting limits, establishing normative frameworks and generating hierarchies of knowledge and status. They also regulate and manage many aspects of daily life. Skey (2011) explains that in the case of the nation, these institutions are the new institutional forms associated with the modern state that create a world ‘susceptible to and dependent on nation-centric understandings of social reality’ (Malešević, 2011, p.11). Berger and Luckmann (1991) explain that for the institution to be taken as a ‘permanent’ solution to a ‘permanent’ problem of the given collectivity, it necessitates a form of an ‘educational’ process (Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p.87). This is whereby potential actors (e.g. ordinary people) come to be or ‘must be’

systematically acquainted with institutionalized actions and the meanings behind them (Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p.87). Hence, while institutions play a crucial role in sedimentation

processes, we also observe individual capacity and choice in the enactment and maintenance of institutions.

This discussion leads us the concept of human agency, as it demonstrates how nationalism is relevant for members of the nation in the context of the everyday life.

2.1.3 Concept of Human Agency

Human agency refers to the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. Burr describes individuals as ‘discourse users’ (Burr, 1995, p. 90), and as mentioned above, nationalism cannot be understood unless it is also analyzed from the masses (Hobsbawm,

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13 1991). These point to role of ordinary people as participants and agents of translation3_{in the} ongoing processes of nationalism, and processes of sedimentation that occur in the nation. In ‘Nations, nation identities and human agency: putting people back into nations’, Thomspon (2001) reminds us that national identities are ‘acquired’ and not ‘conferred’, and critiques the viewpoint that all members of a nation share a common national character (Thompson, 2001, p. 21). Studies on national identity have documented existing mindsets such as ‘you get identity from the country you come from’, revealing the popular notion that nations, national identity and nationalism are all objective, fixed and natural entities (Paasi, 1998; Thompson, 2001, p.23; Antonsich, 2016; Skey, 2011;). However, these conceptions limit the importance and capacity of individual choice in their own practice of everyday nationalism (Thompson, 2001).

For instance in a study by Caldwell (2002), ordinary individuals rearticulated and reclaimed their Russianness through choosing to consume what is seen (and therefore constituted) as Russian food, against the onslaught of global capitalism. (Caldwell, 2002, p. 305-13). In this manner, the individual choice of ordinary people constitutes national sensibilities and meanings, and differential reconstructions of nationalism in the context of the everyday life. Moreover, Skey (2011) argues that ‘it is [ordinary] people who work within (and against) institutions and

organisations and continuously produce social formations (gender, religion, class, nation) by defining themselves and organizing their activities in particular ways’ (Skey, 2011, p. 13-14). Thus, individual choices and lifestyles reproduce and challenge certain traits of nationalism to a certain extent. This brings us to the topic of identifications and categorizations. How do the terms that people use to call themselves, others, and certain food items matter?

2.1.4 Concept of Identification and Categorization

Existing studies on group identification (Tajfel, 1981) and categorisation (Turner et al., 1987) have shown that the actions and behaviour(s) of individuals are being justified by these group categories. Other authors have also suggested that they are one of the primary determinants of thought and behavior (Skey, 2011).

Searle suggests that certain individuals draw on nationalism rather than other social identities, because ‘in our current world context…national identity provide[s] us with more opportunities for positive self evaluation’ (Searle, 2001, p.62; Skey, 2011). These do not imply, however, that all national, ethnic or group identities are equal. For instance, Skey (2011) mentions that group identities are ‘clearly’ unequal and not at the same ‘ontological level’, and that there are varying outcomes of being categorized at a certain time and place (Skey, 2011, p.22). Antonsich (2015) also reminds us that ‘the way that people look at themselves (self-identification) does not reflect the way others look at them (social categorization)’ (Antonsich, 2015, p. 37). For example, the dominant census categories of ‘Chinese’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Malay’ in Singapore would simply fall under the same census category of ‘Asian’ in the United States, whereby all these dominant ‘racial’ groups would simply be faceless Asian minorities in the latter case. Several studies have also pointed out how institutional structures tend to legitimize or privilege certain groups more than others, displaying relations of dominance and subordination amongst group identities

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14 (Antonsich, 2016; Low, 2013; Skey, 2011; Goh, 2008). They also demonstrate how institutional and group categories affect how ordinary individuals view themselves and others, as belonging within the boundaries of the nation.

In relation to the case study of this thesis i.e. Singapore, a survey conducted by Velayutham (2007) was highly informative in this respect, with regards to how Singaporeans would choose to describe themselves, if it were:

(a) Chinese/Malay/Indian/Eurasian-Singaporean (b) Singaporean-Chinese/Malay/Indian/Eurasian (c) Singaporean

(Velayutham, 2007, p. 162-165) One of the respondents said that “I always thought of myself as Chinese and Singaporean. Guess it’s due to the fact that when we fill out application forms, we are always asked for this field”. This highlights the significant role that institutions in processes of sedimentation and group identification, whereby individuals come to be ‘systematically acquainted’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1991) with institutionally-constructed categories and identifications through daily routines and activities like paperwork.

For two respondents who identified with ‘Singaporean-Chinese’, one said that it is “because I don’t want to be confused as being from China, and because my race is after all Chinese” (Velayutham, 2007, p. 163). However, this motivation is different for the other, who explained that her Singaporean identity is ‘my main identity’ as she was born in Singapore and holds a Singaporean citizenship, whereas being Chinese is a “secondary description of my identity, a characteristic that differentiates me from other Singaporeans of other races”. (Velayutham, 2007, p. 163-164).

Velayutham (2007) notes that only a small number of participants selected the last option of simply being ‘Singaporean’, and that individuals also tended to be of mixed parentage or have inter-racial marriages. He explains that these individuals reject the nation’s theory of

multiracialism (further explained in Section 3.1), as they choose not to endorse ‘Singapore’s racialized or hyphenated national identity’ (Velayutham, 2007, p.164).

Not only does the survey introduce us to some of the elements regarding the identifications and categorizations that are involved in everyday nationalism in the case of Singapore, it also reminds us about the individual choices and capacities to define one’s nationhood (human agency).

2.1.5 Summary: Everyday Nationalism

With the above concepts of sedimentation, human agency, as well as identification and categorization, we can observe an analytical framework through which to understand how everyday nationalism works:

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15 The concept of sedimentation enables us to understand how nationalism is an ongoing process of construction and de-construction, and visualize this process in the context of the everyday life and scale at the individual level. The critical role of language and institutions behind the sedimentation process informs our analysis on how these carry significant influences on how members of the nation may choose to identify themselves and translate their own experiences of nationhood.

The concept of human agency helps us see to see the significance of ordinary members of the nation in the study of everyday nationalism, as a bottom-up project. It enables us to recognize the potential that individuals have in (re)producing and challenging nationalism in the context of the everyday, and examine the extent in which individual members of the nation ‘replicate and invest meaning in regime claims through daily practices.’ (Goode & Stroup, 2015, p. 726) Although there may be endless varieties in the ways in which one can express feelings of belonging towards a nation, the concept of human agency reminds us that members of a nation do not necessarily share a common national character nor mindset towards belonging in a nation. In the case of people with transnational identities (e.g. immigrants or people with dual citizenships), this may constitute multiple ways of expressing belonging to two or more nations. Altogether, this concept helps us to view individual capacities and practices as important and relevant within a broader study of everyday nationalism.

The concept of identification and categorization informs us that the extent of internalization of national and ethnic categories has a significant impact on how one views himself and others. It also enables us to draw a relationship between nationhood and the types of identifications or categorizations that an individual is subject to, in a voluntary fashion or not. This is especially significant when there are varying outcomes of being categorized at a certain place and time (Skey, 2011), and in the cases where social categorizations do not necessarily reflect self-identifications and vice versa (Antonsich, 2015). The latter may be seen in the case-related survey of identifications in Singapore (Velayutham, 2007), whereby the ‘Singaporean-Chinese’ category did not reflect the individual interpretations of identity (‘Singaporean-Chinese’ and their own) nor personal motivations that both respondents had. Lastly, broadening the range of

identifications and categorizations beyond national and ethnic understanding of nationhood prevents us from analyzing ethnic groups and nations as actors or the objects of our analysis4 (Goode & Stroup, 2015).

In sum, these concepts provide us with a framework of everyday nationalism, and how we may understamd the everyday as an object of analysis (Brubaker et al. 2006, p. 6-7; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008a; Goode & Stroup, 2015). Nationalism is an ongoing processes of continuity and change (concept of sedimentation), and individual agencies and identifications constitute everyday expressions of belonging and nationhood. This understanding is important before we proceed to explore the role of food culture in everyday nationalism, as explained in the next section.

2.2 Food Culture

4_{This refers to the everyday and vernacular understandings of nationhood provided by members of the}

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16 Food is not neutral, and holds significance beyond the mere fulfilment of physiological needs. Tell an Italian chef that “These [tortellinis] are wontons! It’s a mini Chinese dumpling. It’s not a tortellini.”, and you may land up with a lifetime ban from the restaurant, unless you are a Michelin star chef like David Chang (Goldfield, 10 May 2018).

From tortilla riots in Mexico to the outright rejection of foreign-imported rice by the Japanese, studies and events in history have shown that how people perceive food reflects how they view themselves and their national identity, and vice versa (Avieli, 2005; Ichigo & Ratna, 2016; Tochikubo, 17 Dec 2009; Pons, 5 June 2015). Despite the rhetorics about globalization and the growing irrelevance of place, food-related practices continue to be identified according to national or regional names. This suggests that spatial identities attached to food often linger in the minds of people, and implies that ‘recipes and food habits are still mostly place-based.’ (dell’Agnese & Pettenati, 2018, p.1; Farrer, 2015). Ichigo and Ratna (2016) have remarked that while it is ‘clear’ that nations do not have ‘monopolies’ over food, there is ‘constant tension and conflict between the different forces that try to appropriate food’ (Ichigo & Ratna, 2016, p.1).

Thus, while food culture is largely characterized as ‘the manner and methods, in which food is prepared, commodified, and consumed by a particular society’, it is also deeply political on many levels. (Mendel & Ranta, 2014, p. 414)

2.2.1 Banal Representation of Nations in Food

‘Few aspects of everyday life still appear labelled in geographical terms as what we eat.’

(dell’Agnese & Pettenati, 2018, p. 12) From food labelling and marketing strategies in the mall supermarket to snacks at the

cornershop,the national branding and images of food that we see on a constant basis reminds us that we live in a nation with particular characteristics, and that we live in a world of nations (Ichijio & Ratna, 2016). This process is being advanced by globalization, whereby international exports such as ‘pure Canadian maple syrup’ and ‘Indian curry’ increasingly enter the local supermarket, and local food supplies are ‘liberated’ from natural seasons (dell’Agnese & Pettenati, 2018, p.1). As food is routinely constructed and reproduced as ethnic5_{or national,} consumers become oblivious to the banal representation of nations in food. These understandings of food and nations also sediment into ‘common sense’ knowledge, when people come talk about or consume cuisines as ethno-national products in their day-to-day lives. Examples of these would be seen in great detail in the case of vernacular understandings of Singapore’s hawker food and centres.

Several authors have pointed out that the real and imaginary differences amongst food items and nations also establish food-related boundaries, at both the individual and group level (Ichijio & Ratna, 2016; Fischler, 1988). These boundaries serve to remind people about who they are (and who they are not), and cause certain food items to be perceived as a consumable entry into a

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17 foreign culture and nation (Ichijio & Ratna, 2016; Casino, 2015). The latter is despite disputes about food identity and national food rights, including contentions about national food icons and cuisines. For instance, Fish and Chips is widely viewed as the national food dish of Britain ie ‘British/English Fish and Chips’, although its historical origins traced to Jewish immigrants in London during the 1860s. Yet, writers, cookbooks and news sources describe Fish and Chips as being a traditional dish that has existed for hundreds of years (Panayi, 2014).

Thus, the banal nationalism in food not only derives from institutions and commercial entities, but also ‘the writings of food authors, historians and critics, everyday talk and advertisements.’ (Ichigo & Ratna, 2016, p.6).

2.2.2 Constructing, Reproducing and Challenging Nationalism

Food culture, through routine and mundane activities, such as the consumption of food with friends and family at certain places, helps to construct and reproduce the nation. While these normalising structures and patterns are subject to changes and modifications over time, they often sediment into social and cultural food ‘rules’ for a prolonged period of time (concept of sedimentation). The existing variety of food rules and ‘dining etiquettes’ in across nations, places and settings attest to this. For instance, the same South Indian-influenced flatbread dish that is called roti prata in Singapore, ‘transforms’ into roti canai across the Singapore-Malaysia border, and vice versa (Tay, 23 June 2010; JackieM, 24 Aug 2011). Hence, how an individual calls the dish can reveal a certain national allegiance and identity, demarcating boundaries between amongst ‘us’ versus ‘them’.

Place settings and food ‘rules’, like knowing how to eat Dim Sum the ‘right way’ in Cantonese restaurants (Adcock & Tsai, n.d.) and understanding South African history and traditions in padkos6_{(Schermuly & Helen Forbes-Mewett, 2016, p. 2438), reproduce the nation and} nationalism through food. Thus, food culture ‘institutionalises’ our lives and identities by providing common structuring and normalising patterns in certain domains. It also creates a sense of belonging and place in the nation, even when they are outside of national boundaries. The capacity of food to stimulate memories of different places have been brought out by several authors, and Gunew (2000) ‘suggests that food assumes such a great importance within diasporas because of the way that it connects a previous life with the present one.’ (Schermuly & Helen Forbes-Mewett, 2016, p.2435; Gunew, 2000; Duruz, 2006; Chen, 2010). Thus, traditional food practices as well as feelings of nostalgia form a vital component of migrant ‘home-building’ practices and identity formation, stimulating and recreating a sense of belonging and nationhood (Hage, 1997; Ichigo & Ratna, 2016).

At the same time, food culture constitutes as a medium whereby citizens are able to ‘challenge’ the nation in their everyday lives. Goode and Stroup (2015) mention that that everyday

nationalism can be witnessed in quotidian economic behaviours which are motivated by ethnic choices, such as the refusal to hire foreign workers and boycott of brands or food items that are

6_{Padkos (Afrikaans) refers to ‘food for the road’. It reflects resilience and an instinct of survival, due to}

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18 perceived to be culturally ‘inauthentic’ or conflicting with one’s image of the nation (Goode & Stroup, 2015, p. 728). Scholars have also described how members of the nation come up with creative and innovative ways of challenging top-down nationalism, such as the usage of word puns and objects of popular culture in the everyday life (Edensor, 2002; Ichigo & Ratna, 2016). Nonetheless, food culture does not perform singular functions along the lines of constructing, reproducing and challenging nationalism. This may be most clearly seen in how the consumption of food objects may simultaneously fulfil the purposes of reproducing and challenging

nationalism. An example is the Vietnamese banh Tet, which are rice cakes that are prominent culinary icons in the celebration of the Vietnamese New Year. Avieli (2005) explains that the food practice of making a cylindrical version of banh Tet cakes in the Centre and South of Vietnam is intentionally used to distinguish themselves from that of the North, which are ‘square like the earth’ according to the national legend (Avieli, 2005, p. 181). The former is a response towards the North, which is perceived as having an ‘authentic and pure’ culture and political hegemony over the nation. Thus, the cylindrical version of Vietnamese banh Tet both constructs regional nationalism, and challenges top-down nationalism. She then argues that [Vietnamese]

nationalism is no longer abstract but substantial, when ‘the nation becomes physically embodied by its subjects’ (ibid).

2.2.3 Summary: Food Culture

Food culture is deeply connected to one’s sense of identity, and as seen above, it is also related to everyday nationalism. Banal representations of nations in food construct different images and imaginations about nations and the food practices of people who live in them, and the food ‘rules’ and practices in the seemingly mundane affairs of daily life can serve to define a nation and its people. At the same time, food culture has the capacity to constitute as individual and group responses towards top-down nationalism, such as in the choice between a cylindrical or square shape of banh Tet to mark one’s allegiance to the nation or region (Section 2.2.2). This reminds us that the establishment of food cultures in certain places and contexts are not isolated affairs, but are highly connected to broader networks and socio-spatial process that occur in society (e.g. globalization, trade policies). Thus, food culture is liable to both continuity and change. Altogether, these concepts point us to the importance of having vernacular knowledge and understandings towards food culture, in order to understand how nationhood is practiced and experienced amongst individual members of a nation. Figure 2.2.3 below provides a summary of the relationship between food culture and nationalism:

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19

2.3 Everyday Places

Based on the above frameworks and discussions, we have witnessed how nationalism and the everyday not only consists of human activity and action, but also micro-interactional and discursive moments, such as in the browsing of food products with national references in supermarkets. This suggests that everything that we see and experience in this world is

emplaced7_{: ‘it happens somewhere and involves material stuff.’ (Gieryn, 2000). Thus, this section} attempts to explain the significance of everyday places, for reasons such as the location of food culture in a nation. For the purpose of this study, everyday places refer public places that are accessible and frequently visited by members of society.

As everyday places are both places of duty and encounter in the average person’s daily routine (or vice versa), they have a stronghold in the lives of ordinary people (Kong, 2007; Gieryn, 2000; Harvey, 1983). Scholars have emphasized that people and place are ‘intimately integrated’ together, and that the ‘social relations of everyday life are often objectified and naturalized, in the specificities of place.’ (Yeoh & Kong, 1996, p. 53-54; Zukin, 2009). Gieryn explains, “Places are endlessly made, not just when the powerful pursue their ambition through brick and mortar, not just when design professional give form to function, but also when ordinary people extract from continuous and abstract space a bounded, identified, meaningful, named, and significant place” (Gieryn, 2000, p. 471; de Certeau, 1984; Etlin, 1997).

Hence, contrary to the notion that places are static and ahistoric forms, place is a ‘process of becoming’ (Yeoh & Kong, 1996, p.53; Pred, 1984).

Gross (1988) has described place as multicoded spaces that are constantly used and interpreted by individuals, who in turn ‘read’ and ‘write’ into the built environment in a variety of ways (Goss, 1988, p. 398; Yeoh & Kong, 1996). Thus, everyday places function as unique locations of collective experiences, that ‘evokes and organises memories, images, feelings, sentiments, meanings and the works of the imagination’ (Walter, 1988, p. 21; Yeoh & Kong, 1996, p. 53). At the same time, the human faces behind the winners and losers of the layered struggles in place-making serve to remind us ‘place is not just a setting or backdrop, but an agentic player in the game - a force with detectable and independent effects on social life’ (Gieryn, 2000, p.466; Thrift, 2003; Werlen, 1993). This quality of place is expressed by Thrift (2003), who posits that ‘we all know’ certain places make us come alive, while others do the opposite (Thrift, 2003, p. 103; Yeoh & Kong, 1994).

Unlike the confines of homes and private areas, everyday places are open and active settings that allow greater room for contestation and processes of social change, some examples being the crossing class and racial boundaries (Low, 2017; Harvey, 1973). Several authors have also

pointed out that ‘the informal discursive public sphere allows voices and conflicts to be expressed in ways in which the more inflexible formal institutions or democratic governance do not allow’ (Dahlberg, 2005, p. 130; Low, 2017; Fennell, 2012; Yeh, 2012; Mazzarella, 2003). Thus, while everyday places are locations of collective experiences that can serve facilitate the construction

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20 and reproduction of nationhood, they also function as locations to challenge or rethink top-down nationalism.

2.4 Summary

To recap, ‘Nationalism is the project to make the political unit, the state (or polity) congruent with the cultural unit, the nation…The targets of these endeavours are the people themselves: to make the nation is to make people national.’ (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008a, p.536).

In Section 2.1, we have examined the discourse of everyday nationalism, and reviewed a few key concepts that form the analytical framework and basis of understanding phenomena in this study. For example, the concept of sedimentation helps us to understand how ‘common sense’ understandings and conceptions can be partially fixed in an ever-changing society. The

relationship between food culture and nationalism is drawn in Section 2.2, whereby we observe how the banal representation of nations and food culture are both expressions and responses towards nationalism. As seen from some of the case studies in this chapter (Section 2.1.3 & Section 2.2.2), food culture enables individuals and groups to imagine and reproduce feelings of belonging and nationhood. At the same time, the strong relationship between food culture and identity amasses a weight of capacity, that is sufficient enough to move one towards challenging or re-defining nationalism for oneself.

The qualities of place and everyday places are examined in Section 2.2.3. As seen above, everyday places are places of duty and encounter (Kong, 2007; Gieryn, 2000; Harvey, 1983), processes of becoming (Yeoh & Kong, 1996, p.53; Pred, 1984), ongoing projects and outcomes of place-making (Thrift, 2003; Werlen, 1993), multicoded spaces (Goss, 1988, locations of collective experiences (Yeoh & Kong, 1996; Walter, 1988), and open settings that enable change and contestation to occur (Low, 2017; Fennell, 2012; Yeh, 2012; Dahlberg, 2005, p. 130; Mazzarella, 2003). While this suggests a chaotic conception of everyday places – whereby the outcomes of place may alter in different hands of ownership, cultures, be malleable over time, and inevitably contested – it is precisely these qualities that make place invested with human meaning and value, and differentiate place from mere space (Gieryn, 2000)

In relation to the topic of this thesis, everyday places are not only places where food culture can be located in a nation: they facilitate the generation, reproduction and contestation of both nationalism and food culture (Kong, 2007; Duruz & Khoo, 2014).

For example, chicken rice in hawker centres may be known as ‘Singaporean Chicken Rice’ to a tourist, ‘Hainanese Chicken Rice’ to a Singaporean-Chinese and ‘Chinese Chicken Rice’ to an Indian immigrant (Duruz & Khoo, 2016). Although these identifications are dependent on human agency as well as the identifications or categorizations that one carries, the terms given to

chicken rice above will not make sense, if geographical location (origin and destination) and qualities of place were removed from the overall equation.

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21 Thus, the spatial dimension is an immutable foundation that cannot be removed in one’s encounters in the world, and experiences with food culture and nationalism. To reiterate Avieli (2005), nationalism is no longer abstract but substantial to the individual, when the nation becomes physically embodied in the form of food. This brings out the significance of everyday food places for the purpose of this thesis, and the complex relationship between food, the nation and place in the everyday life. In this respect, I argue that hawker centres provide a crucial lens for understanding everyday nationalism in the context of Singapore, which we will examine in the next chapter.

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22

3. Singapore’s Hawker Centres: Food-Nationalism Axis

‘They have grown up with Singapore, and are changing in tandem with a new generation. They are everyday icons of Singapore.”

– Simon Tay, Chairman of National Environmental Agency, Singapore (Kong, 2007, p. 15) Singapore is a nation-state that was founded in 1965, and that has a total population of 5,610,000 as of 2017 (Singapore Department of Statistics, June 2017; Appendix 9.1). Amongst these, there is a citizen population of 3,440,000 (61.3% Total) is classified as 76.1% Chinese, 15.0% Malay, 7.4% Indian and 1.5% ‘Others’. Prior to the nation’s independence in 1965, Singapore was a British colony (1819-1940) that was temporarily occupied by the Japanese during World War 2 (1942-1945). After the British granted internal self-governance to Singapore in 1959, the nation shared a brief period of merger with its neighbouring country, Malaysia (1963-1965).

The trade of hawking has existed since the 1800s, and has ‘grown up’ with the nation (Kong, 2007, p.15). Today, Singapore’s hawker centres are large open-air complexes that offer a wide variety of tasty and affordable food, and are much-loved eating places amongst Singaporeans and visitors from abroad (Groundwater, 7 Mar 2018; Independent, 19 Dec 2009; Food and Travel, n.d.). As seen in the Introduction, Kong (2007) points out the irony of the term ‘hawker centres’, as hawkers are known to be itinerant street vendors (page 6).

In this chapter, I will explain everyday nationalism in Singapore through the nation’s theory of multiracialism (Section 3.1). This is because it is the main foundation of governance in the nation, and this theory structures the logics of nationhood amongst members of the nation. Followed by this, I will illustrate how the trade of hawking has evolved in the nation (Section 3.2). Followed by this, I will demonstrate how Singapore’s hawker centres constitutes as a food-and-nationalism axis in the everyday life (Section 3.3).

3.1 Nationalism: CMIO

“We, the citizens of Singapore, pledge ourselves as one united people, regardless of race, language or religion, to build a democratic society, based on justice and equality, so as to achieve happiness, prosperity and progress for our nation.”

- National Pledge (Wei & Saparudin, 1 Aug 2014)

Several authors have described how the nation of Singapore was ‘imagined’ and created through universal concepts that would unite a diverse population and transcend the boundaries of ethnic grouping (Ortmann, 2009, 29; Rocha, 2011; Chua, 1998). These universal concepts are the ideals of multiracialism, multiculturalism, multilingualism, multireligiousity and meritocracy.

Ortmann (2009) explains that as the nation’s past was wrought with ethnic tensions and

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23 the ‘two key founding myths of the Singapore state’ (Ortmann, 2009, p.30). Hence, a new theory of multiracialism that would incorporate the other universal ideals (e.g. multilingualism,

multireligiousity) was created, marking the foundations of a new multiracial nation (Rocha, 2011).

Singapore’s theory of multiracialism is otherwise known as the CMIO, the racialized framework of Chinese, Malay, Indian and Other (CMIO): ‘separate, but equal, races making up a unique and compelling Singaporean identity’ (Rocha, 2011, p. 104; Chan 2009; Hill and Lian, 1995; Siddique, 1989).

As a form of acknowledgement to the presence of four different racial groups in the nation, four different languages were established as official languages of Singapore: English, Mandarin, Malay, Tamil. Amongst these, English is official language that is used in institutions and the government, and serves to function as a shared and uniting language amongst the different racial groups. Under the nation’s bilingual education system (1966),

The other languages serve as individual representatives for the various [dominant] racial groups in the nation, and each of them functions as the second or ‘Mother Tongue’ languages to be learned under Singapore’s bilingual education system (1966). This is whereby one would learn a second language that is meant to be inherent or representative of one’s racial identity.

Velayutham (2016) explains, ‘At school, racial identity is tied to bilingual education: Chinese-Mandarin; Malay-Bahasa Melayu; and Indian-Tamil (more recently Punjabi/Hindi).’

(Velayutham, 2016, p. 455-456).

The conception of a multiracial nation with four different racial groups is reinforced in both institutional and non-institutional settings, such as in the private spheres of everyday life. In day to day life, common questions of “what are you?” in everyday conversations (PuruShotam, 1998, p. 53-54) and the promotion of racial practices, ethnic and religious festivals such as Chinese New Year for the Chinese and Hari Raya Puasa for the Malays, causes one to continually imagine and experience the nation as one that is multiracial (Rocha, 2011; Ministry of Manpower, n.d.). In the urban landscape, the representation of the four official languages in signages (Figure 3.1) and city planning of heritage districts serves to represent the ‘culture’ of each racial identity in a nation that is multiracial, multilinguistic, multireligious and multicultural: Chinatown for the Chinese, Kampong Glam for the Malays, Little India for the Indians (Kong & Kong, 1994; Henderson, 2010). Apart from this, institutions and management structures (e.g. identification cards, official forms, publication press, ‘self-help groups’) are organized on the basis of race, reinforcing the concept of race as a visible and grounded form of identity (Chua, 2003; Rocha, 2011; Velayutham, 2016).

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24 Figure 3.1 Singapore’s 4 Official Languages in Urban Signage

Source: Michelin Guide, Singapore (Yong, 2 Nov 2016)

Thus, the theory of multiracialism (CMIO) forms the core framework of governance in the nation. The following descriptions of the four different racial groups details the methods in which each racial group was formulated and invented through the nation’s logics of race:

‘Chinese’ identity

Given significant linguistic differences amongst the Chinese ethnic groups in Singapore, the official language of Mandarin was used as a uniting element amongst them, and to build a homogeneous Chinese racial identity. Some examples of Chinese ethno-linguistics groups in Singapore are the Hokkiens, Teochews, Hakkas, and Hainanese, that mainly originate from Southern China (Chua, 2005; Kong, 2007). Even within some ethno-linguistic groups, there were further sub-group divisions and linguistic differences e.g. Hokchews and Hinghua amongst the Hokkiens. Therefore, Mandarin was promoted amongst the Chinese community and

institutionalized as a ‘Mother Tongue’, while the other existing Chinese languages were

ideologically reduced to ‘dialects’ (i.e. not proper languages) to be spoken in the confines of home and private spaces (Rocha, 2011; ibid). Mandarin also came to be adopted as the only official race-language in institutions and the media, for instance as the spoken race-language in the ‘Chinese’ television channel in the national broadcast media. Thus, the Mandarin language is often used as a measurement of one’s Chinese racial identity, and hallmark representation of the Chinese racial group (Velayutham, 2016; Chua, 2005). In the recent years, there has been a growing awareness in the breakdown of communication within some Chinese families, especially amongst the younger generations and their grandparents who are unable to speak Mandarin (Rocha, 2011; Johnson, 26 Aug 2017; Ng & Smalley, 26 Sep 2017). For instance, the demand for Chinese dialect lessons has ‘shot up’ amongst young Singaporeans in the past few years, who ‘want to connect with the elderly or their own roots’ (Ng & Smalley; 26 Sep 2017)

‘Malay’ identity

According to the definition of a Malay in Singapore, a Malay is ‘someone who is Malay, Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, Arab or any other person who is generally accepted as a member of the Malay community by the community’ (Rahim, 1998, p.18). Similar to the case of the Chinese racial group above, the Malay race-language is used as a uniting language amongst the ethno-linguistic groups as well as the ‘Mother Tongue’ language in schools. However, Chua (2005) notes that the Malay identity is further linked to the religion of Islam, whereby it is taken to be the ‘defining

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25 element’ of all ethnic Malay groups (Chua, 2005, p.5) Hence, all Malays are assumed to be

Muslims, and Malay converts to other religions are viewed as anomalies or are ‘excluded from the national ‘Malay’ community’ if the religion of conversion is Christianity (Chua, 2005; MOSG; 5 Jan 2017; Zuber, 2 Feb 2010).

‘Indian’ identity

Amongst the Indian ethnic groups in Singapore, there were some who were followers of religions apart from Hinduism, such as Buddhism, Christianity and Islam (Chua, 2005). It was found that there were even more ethno-linguistic differences amongst the Indian population than that of the Chinese, and thus religion and language could not function as uniting elements for a racial Indian identity (Chua, 2005; Cheng, 8 August 2017). Therefore, Indians in Singapore were defined by the geography of South Asia, which includes the present-day nations of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Chua, 2005; Benjamin, 1976). As Tamil was the majority language (59%) amongst the Indians at the time of independence (Bolton & Ng, 2014, p. 307), it was promoted as the official and ‘Mother Tongue’ language of all Singaporean Indians. Although other South Asian languages such as Bengali and Urdu were recently institutionally accepted as ‘Mother Tongue’ languages for ‘Indian’ students, the language of Tamil is still assumed to be the native language of all Indians in Singapore (Chua, 2005; MOE, 12 June 2018; Singh, 28 Nov 2011). In sum, racial Indian group is used to describe all descendants from South Asia, which includes Singaporean Indians and different nationalities from South Asia (Chua, 2005; Benjamin, 1976).

‘Other’ identities

Individuals and groups that did not fit neatly within the above classificatory frameworks of being ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’ or ‘Indian’ are casted into the category of ‘Others’. This meant that existing ethnic groups or individuals from mixed-race backgrounds, such as Eurasians and Peranakans were casted as an ‘Other’ or subsumed under some broader categories (Rocha, 2011; Lam, 11 Jun 2017). This is despite the fact that some of these ethnicities have existed in Singapore since the 1800s, with family names such as Ferrao (1820), McIntyre (1939), Gomes (1949), De Rozario (1849) (Lam, 11 Jun 2017; Rocha, 2011; The Eurasian Association of Singapore, n.d.). As a response to the rise of inter-ethnic marriages and changing demographics of Singapore, the government now recognizes Eurasians as an official ethnic group (2006) and enables residents to register double-barrelled racial identities (e.g. Indian-Chinese) as of the year of 2011 (AsiaOne, 30 Dec 2010; Rocha, 2011; Chua, 2003; Barr & Skrbis, 2008). However, there was an emphasis that the racial identity in the double-barrelled racial identity would constitute one’s primary race i.e. not the race before the hyphen, whereby one’s education and socio-economic advantages would be characterized by the primary race.

In addition to these, the non-assignment of a ‘Mother Tongue’ language to the ‘Other’ racial category causes them to be viewed with doubt and suspicion other members in the nation, and perceive a lesser sense of belonging in the nation. This can be seen from the experiences of Kristangs such as Mr Andre D’Rozario and Ms Anthonisz.:

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26 “Growing up in Singapore, all of us could really relate to not having a mother

tongue, not having something to call our own.”

“You got pink IC or not? Your English very good ah? Your grandparents from where?”8

(Lam, 11 Jun 2017) Graham Ong-Webb, a Eurasian of Dutch, Portuguese, English, Indian and Chinese ancestral roots shares:

“You’ll spend … almost all of your life justifying that you’re Singaporean.”

- Graham Ong-Webb, 42-year-old Singaporean (Cheng, 8 August 2017) From the above remarks, we see that one’s identity and belonging to the nation is highly linked to the nation’s theory of multiracialism (CMIO) and institutionalization of race in the everyday life, as well as the crucial role of ‘Mother Tongue’ used to distinguish one’s racial identity. Velayutham (2016) has also described how individuals of ‘mixed’ racial ancestries and who cross racial boundaries are viewed as acts of transgression, as seen above in the case of a Malay convert to Christianity (Chua, 2005; MOSG; 5 Jan 2017; Zuber, 2 Feb 2010).

Everyday Nationalism: Multiracialism

In sum, the theory of multiracialism (CMIO) constitutes as the framework of governance in Singapore. As the concept of race is institutionalized and deeply entrenched in both the public and private lives of Singaporeans, race is continually reinforced as a grounded and visible form of identity. Moreover, the consumption of certain images and representations of racial identities (e.g. Malays as Muslims) informs one’s understanding of other racial groups and members of the nation. Rocha (2011) has also pointed out that the recent census no longer explains and puts disclaimers about the blurring of racial and ethnic boundaries, institutionally reducing and advocating racial identities as a method of governance. Henceforth, everyday nationhood is measured according to one’s ability to identify himself or herself amongst the dominant racial categories (CMIO), and perform his identity according to the national script of race. Thus, Benjamin (1976) observes:

“Singapore’s multiracialism puts pressure on Chinese to become more Chinese, Indians to become more Indian and Malays to become more Malay”

(Benjamin, 1976, p. 124)

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27 This leads us to the next section, where we will examine the ‘underbelly’ of the nation: the trade of hawking and hawker food.

3.2 Street Hawking to Hawker Centres

Previously, we have read about how hawker centres are favourite eating places amongst

members of the nation, and they have ‘grown up’ with the nation (Kong, 2007, p.15). This section attempts to describe what street hawking may have looked like in the early days of Singapore, and illustrates what hawking (and hawker food) means to members of the nation (Section 3.2.3).

3.2.1 Humble beginnings

Unlike the furnished hawker centres that we see today, the hawkers of Singapore before the 1980s were makeshift vendors without proper amenities or facilities, as seen from Cameron’s account in the previous chapter. They made a humble living of selling hawker food without ‘potable water supply, electrical supply, sewerage and drainage systems, toilets, lighting and bin centres.’ (Kong, 2007, p.31). As the business of street hawking required little start-up cost and capital, it was an attractive business for those who were unemployed or little formal education. The business of street hawking continued to flourish in post-war Singapore, whereby a spirit of survival ensued amongst the local population, and the efforts of the government were directed towards economic stabilization (Ortmann, 2009; Rocha, 2011). However, street hawking was soon found to be incompatible with the government’s vision of the Singaporean nation.

As the hawkers did not have access to proper amenities such as waste facilities, food and liquid waste disposals in public areas were commonsight, and their street-side locations were obstructed vehicle and pedestrian flows. Moreover, most of the hawkers on the streets of Singapore were unlicensed and ‘illegal’: it was estimated that only a quarter to a third of them were licensed in the early 1950s. Not only does this make them vulnerable targets of the police force, as their hawking equipment would be confiscated during police inspections or raids, the health and hygiene standards of hawker food were also brought to question (Kong, 2007; Duruz & Khoo, 2014). The former Head of the ‘Hawkers Department’9_explains,

‘At that time [1960s], the government had the objective of turning Singapore into the cleanest country in Asia, and street hawking were among the challenges to be

surmounted in pursuit of that goal.’

(Kong, 2007, p. 30) Thus, the informal trade of street hawking defied the national script of law and order, hygiene and cleanliness, as well as certain images of urbanization. It has been piqued that ‘the ‘survival any individual hawker’s trade depended on his ability to escape the unfavourable attentions of

9_{The ‘Hawkers Department’ was a part of the Ministry of Health in Singapore, until it was integrated}

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28 the police.’ (Kong, 2007). Some street hawkers even paid ‘protection fees’ to gangs and secret societies, in attempt to safeguard their livelihoods.

While street hawkers were viewed unfavourably by the government, most of the Singaporean public were sympathetic to their plight, as they were seen as respectable people who tried to make a honest living (Kong, 2007). The latter may be best described as ka-ki-kang10

entrepreneurialism or the “village boy” myth (Duruz & Khoo, 2014, p.59), whereby one becomes ‘one’s own boss’ based on personal merits of hard work and resourcefulness. These factors gave a common ground of understanding amongst the Singaporean population, ka-ki-nang: ‘we are all of the same kind’. This refers to the acumen that we are all ordinary people, who strive to make a proper living in the same land. Apart from this shared sense of identification and belonging, the street hawkers (and their food) were a significant part of the everyday life. Many Singaporeans today can still remember the days of street hawking, where their ‘calls would be heard well before they came within sight, tiltillating salivary glands building up expectations’ (Kong, 2007 p. 134; Duruz & Khoo, 2014). Food writer Sylvia Tan recalls:

“[R]oving hawkers worked out a system of food delivery whereby shop-house dwellers would lower baskets whenever they heard the food calls, and in this way, exchange cash for food…The food calls were distinctive – you could not mistake the

nasal cry of the loh kai yik man for the guttural calls of the ap bak (braised duck) man; nor the clacking of bamboo clappers of the noodle man for the mee goring

man’s insistent clanging of frying implement against wok.”

(Tan, 2004; Duruz & Khoo, 2014, p.100) As seen from the quote above, street hawkers made everyday life more vibrant and colourful, and hawker food serves to embody memories of growing up and living in Singapore.

3.2.2 Modernizing Singapore, Hawker Centres

Kong (2007) mentions that it is perhaps thanks to the Hawker Inquiry Commission, that hawkers have remained as a part of the Singaporean landscape (Kong, 2007, p. 27). The Commission was established in the 1950s, while there were great tensions amongst the police, hawkers and members of the public. It consolidated the interests and opinions of stakeholders involved in the business of street hawking, which ranged from the Municipal Health Officer to representatives from group/civilian organisations like the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Teochew Guilds and the Indo-Ceylon Club. They also sought the opinions of hawkers who operated on the streets and public lands, even those who operated within coffee shops11_.

In the meantime, several hawkers rallied together for permissions to build markets and shelters of their own, and some Singaporeans also chipped in for the survival and operation of hawkers.

10_{Ka-Ki (oneself, one’s own, to do it yourself), Kang (head, own): Ka-Ki-Kang (Be your own boss) or ‘you}

work your way into being your own boss’. Mixture of Teochew and Hainanese dialects.

11_{Hawkers and coffee shop owners would sometimes collaborate together in a harmonious food and drink}

The role of food culture in everyday nationalism : the case of Singapore's Hawker Centres