Does Le Petit Journal rime with cynical?
The Effect of Political Satire on Young French People's Attitudes towards Politicians, Politics and the Media
Fanny Chays (10583777) University of Amsterdam Supervised by dr. Judith Möller
June 26th, 2014
Master's Thesis
Graduate School of Communication Master's programme Communication Science
Author Note
Fanny Chays, Communication Science (Erasmus Mundus Journalism, Media & Globalization), Graduate School of Communication, University of Amsterdam.
Correspondence concerning this should be addressed to Fanny Chays, fannychays@orange.fr
Abstract
This study investigates the effect of the popular political satire TV show Le Petit Journal on young French people's attitude towards politicians, politics and the traditional media. Using a two-group, post-test only online experiment (n = 193), we found that participants exposed to the critical content of Le Petit Journal rated politicians featured in the show more negatively, regardless of their political affinities. We also found that Le Petit Journal has an indirect effect on young people's levels of political cynicism: the cynical outlook towards the political world offered by the show only significantly affected participants from the right-wing party. Contradicting the argument that satirical content would increase distrustful attitudes towards the traditional news media, this study shows that exposure to jokes about mainstream
journalists and serious journalism in Le Petit Journal actually makes young people less skeptical towards the traditional news media. Therefore, our findings suggest that political satire might have less detrimental effect on young audiences than feared. We discuss the implications of the findings in the light of the inconclusive debate over the threat that new, critical forms of political information might represent for the future of democracy.
Keywords: political satire, political cynicism, media skepticism, youth, democracy, French television.
Does Le Petit Journal rime with cynical?
The Effect of Political Satire on Young French People's Attitudes towards Politicians, Politics and the Media
Political satire fascinates and disturbs at the same time. On the one hand, its unique way of packaging political information with humor is praised for being able to renew attention for politics and increase political knowledge among the least interested (Baum, 2003; Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Xenos & Becker, 2009; Prior, 2010; Young & Hoffman, 2012). But on the other hand, it is accused of generating distrusting attitudes by repeatedly painting a negative, bitter picture of the political world (Hart & Hartelius, 2007, Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011, Balmas, 2012, Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Satirists' jokes turn scholars' laughter sour, as they still wonder whether satire is a "boon or bust for democracy" (Becker and Waisanen, 2013, 171). This study addresses this question by investigating the potential impact of political satire on political attitudes.
In the United States, where effects scholars have been particularly interested in the satirical genre, Jon Stewart of The Daily Show is accused by some of "political heresy" (Hart & Hartelius, 2007). In France, as no academic research to date has investigated the potential impact of the national political satire shows on the public, it is the press that expresses its concerns with the ever-more popular political satire TV show Le Petit Journal: its host Yann Barthès, is referred to as a "trublion" (translated: troublemaker). Such nicknames surely illustrate concerns rather than optimism about the impact political satire might have on viewers' democratic performance. And with good reason, as satirists reveal the misconduct of politicians, the absurdities of the political arena and the artificiality of the news media, they give a chaotic impression of public life. Scholars have found that this negative brand of political humour is particularly persuasive (Morris, 2009) and might therefore have strong influence over the audience's political attitudes towards the democratic institutions at large.
Previous studies found that exposure to satirical shows do increase level of cynicism among its viewers (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011). Problematically, younger viewers were found to be even more susceptible to this effect (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006).
Called a "generational language" by some (Jones, 2010, p. 251), satire has become a popular channel of information for younger people who are attracted by the entertaining quality of this format. By choosing satirical shows as a source of news, young people exposed themselves to a type of political information that is inherently negative and that bring them to apprehend democratic institutions (political institutions, but also the media) as dysfunctional. This vision of the political world promoted by satirical shows trigger cynical attitudes among the audience, and particularly so among the young audience (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Because young people have shapeable attitudes, they are more susceptible to these satirical messages than older viewers (Adriaansen, van Praag, de Vreese, 2010). More importantly, attitudes developed in young adulthood are likely to follow them as they grow into older citizens (Niemi & Klingler, 2012). "Cynical today, cynical tomorrow?", wondered de Vreese in a study linking strategic news consumption and cynical attitudes. Our study applies this interrogation when exploring the relationship between exposure to political satire and cynical attitudes towards politics and the media. If this question turns into an affirmation, the quality of the future of democracy might be endangered. Indeed, a high level of distrust towards the politics is often related to little faith in the political system and demobilization (Cao & Brewer, 2008).
The relationship between political satire and political cynicism among younger viewers is therefore very relevant for the future of democracy (Hart & Hartelius, 2007). Yet, only a few studies have investigated the link between exposure to political satire and political attitudes focusing on younger audience (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner &
Morris, 2008). This study contributes to feeling this void by investigating the impact of political satire on young people's political attitudes.
Additionally, the current research has been bound to the American context, especially to the analysis of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report (Baym, 2006; Brewer &
Marquardt, 2007; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Morris, 2009) so we have little information whether the effects hold in a different context (Balmas, 2012). Moreover, and most importantly, very few studies have tested the causality relationship between watching satire and political attitudes (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Becker, 2011), researchers employing a survey methods rather than an
experimental design (Morris, 2004; Cao & Brewer, 2009; Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011; Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2012; Balmas, 2012). By conducting an original experimental research in France, this study contributes to further understanding of the causal mechanism between political satire and political attitudes in a European context.
This study is built around the following research question: To what extent exposure to the French political satire show Le Petit Journal has an effect on young adults' attitude towards politicians, the broader political system and the traditional media? This study starts by situating the existing research on the effects of political satire on political attitudes. Particular attention is given to the potential effect on younger audiences and the associated implications for the future of democracy. Before reporting the analysis of the
experimentation, we contextualize the popularity of the show Le Petit Journal in connection with the changing French hybrid media system. Finally, we discuss the results of this study in the light of the broader debate on the potential detrimental effect of political satire on the functioning of political systems.
Satirical news, political cynicism and media skepticism
Journalist: You are particularly accused to ridicule politicians, and so to drag down the world of politics, which doesn't really need it…
Yann Barthès: (…) mocking the power, it is part of democracy, it's necessary. And what we air makes sense, we don't just laugh. We have the same footage than other TV channels, but we give another look on it. Our job is to decode this puppet show. 1 ("Yann Barthès on rit", 2013)
Le Petit Journal's host Yann Barthès very rarely talks to the media. But when he does, journalists always ask him to reflect on his show's impact on democracy. This is also what many scholars interested in political satire TV format ask themselves around the world (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Balmas, 2012; Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011).
However, despite the rich satirical heritage in the French media and the growing phenomenon that is Le Petit Journal, no research to date has been undertaken to measure the effect of the successful satire show à la française on the public, forcing us to turn to foreign studies, mostly American where this field of research has been particularly fertile.
As studies about the political effects of nontraditional news formats flourish, it has become difficult to make sense of the labyrinth of results. While some research has shown constructive effects of watching political entertainment shows, especially on knowledge about public affairs and political candidates (Baum, 2003; Young & Hoffman, 2012; Brewer & Cao, 2007; Baek & Wojcieszak, 2009), other studies have been more cautious in attributing any learning value to this genre (Prior, 2010; Kim & Vishak, 2008). As for attitudes, results are too inconsistent. While Baumgartner & Morris (2006), Brewer & Marquardt (2007), Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell (2011), Boukes and and Boomgaarden (2012) found that nontraditional news programs were related to higher levels of political cynicism or mistrust, for Balmas (2012) and Baumgartner & Morris (2008) the effect was indirect, and in other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In the original French version: "- On vous reproche en particulier de tourner les hommes politiques en ridicules,
(…) Se moquer du pouvoir c'est la démocratie, c'est nécessaire. Et puis il y a du sens dans ce qu'on diffuse, ce n'est pas que de la rigolade. On a les mêmes images que les autres chaînes de télévision, mais on les regarde
scholars' work (Hoffman & Thompson, 2009; Becker, 2011) the effect was missing. From this overview, one may ultimately wonder: are political entertainment shows beneficial or
detrimental for the well-being of democracy?
This lack of agreement in the scholarly debate around the effect of nontraditional news shows can be attributed to a lack of conceptual clarity when defining what these formats entail. Indeed, attitudinal effects of exposure to political satire shows are studied under the larger umbrella of soft news effects. In that sense, political satire, also called "political
comedy" (Becker, 2011; Hoffman & Thompson; 2009), "fake news" (Balmas, 2012) or "mock news" (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007) is analyzed along with "late night shows" (Balmas, 2012) or "comedy talk shows" (Guggenheim Kwak & Campbell, 2011). Even though those formats share some characteristics, especially a mix between entertainment and politics, it is
problematic to study their effects on audiences together, as these formats differ in tone, content and style. A closer look at previous research shows that, studies on talk shows have found a positive effect of political trust (Tsfati, Tukachinsk & Peri, 2009), while political satire shows were related to more negative effect on political cynicism, on perception of political candidate amongst younger viewers, decreased trust in government and the media (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008), and increased impression of inefficacy and alienation (Balmas, 2012). This is because the way of dealing with politicians and politics in these two formats differ. While talk shows are an opportunity for political guests to show their likeable personality and appear close to the people (Kwak, Wang, Gugghenheim, 2011), political satire shows reveal the absurdity of their actions, the
artificiality of their discourse and their dishonesty and selfishness (Balmas, 2012, p. 3). While politicians are no more than a “sub-species of celebrity. (Neveu, 2005, p. 332) in talk shows, in political satire shows they are rather a target for negative jokes and criticism. Another point of difference is that satire shows also target the traditional media, denouncing its "excess and
artifice" (Baym & Jones, 2012, p. 12). It questions the role of journalists by doubting their watchdogs function and ridicule their rigidity. This is what has been called "meta-coverage", a critical analysis of the role, presence and behaviors of the news media (Brewer & Marquardt 2007, p. 254). In that sense, satire is a unique sub-genre of political entertaining in that it encourages to think critically, or even cynically, about the political and the media systems (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007).
It is precisely this two-folded influence (critical versus cynical) that is problematic: in the one hand, the effect of political satire may be positive if it contributes to develop a sense of critique among the public. Hence, satire may prove to be “essential for an engage,
sustainable, democratic public culture” (Hariman, 2008, as cited in Baym & Jones, 2012, p. 12). This is what Cappella and Jamieson (1996) define as a "healthy skepticism" (p .72). Indeed, a certain level of public distrust could be desirable for the quality of democracy, as skeptics monitor the malpractice of their government and participate in the political debate to voice their discontent and attempt to change the status quo (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Cao & Brewer, 2009; Van de Walle & Six, 2013). On the other hand, satire becomes more
threatening if it systematically denigrates the political arena, and creates a "routine
generalized distrust of governments" (Van de Walle & Six, 2013, p. 4). If so, it takes distrust to a new level, the one of "corrosive" cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson 1996, p. 72). Defined as an "antagonistic distrust and contempt for politicians" (Boukes & Boomagaarden, 2012, p. 6), cynicism "promotes a spiral of delegitimation", that could be destructive for democracy (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 26). As a result, cynical citizens might step aside the political system in which they have little or no faith (Hart & Hartelius, 2007). The negative approach to the news media is also problematic, as it may encourage cynicism or skepticism towards the traditional media, which in turn reinforces mistrust in political institutions –the media being commonly referred as one (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006).
This ambiguous impact is particularly important when looking at the specific effects on younger audiences. Firstly, it might turn away young people even further from serious political news, leaving sarcasm as the only prism for analyzing the political world
surrounding them. Secondly, as raised by Tournier (2005), although satire encourages criticism towards representational institutions, it fails to offer alternatives to this failing system. It leaves young citizens with the idea that politics is doomed. Given that young people today are the mature citizens of tomorrow, the question "how can we base democracy on defiance and mockery?"2 is highly relevant (Comte-Sponville, 1993 as cited in in Colovald & Neveu, 1999, p. 346).
Young adults, hybrid media and political socialization
Young people's political attitudes and behavior are influenced and shaped by what has been called 'agents of political socialization'. And one of the most important agents is the media (Moeller & de Vreese, 2013; Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim; 2011). Indeed, most of our impression of the political word comes through the mass media (Hoffman & Thompson, 2009, p. 7). Although limited, literature on the media as a political socialization agent
(Moeller & de Vreese, 2013) has acknowledged the crucial role that television play in helping young people making sense of the political world around them, as TV is the main channel through which they are exposed to political content (Hoffman & Thompson, 2009, p. 7; Buckingham, 1999, p. 173). Ironically, young people are often described as very low
consumers of traditional news media: researchers have shown that young Americans tune out of hard news shows (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). In France, the picture is hardly different, as young adults account for 25% of those who rarely or never watch TV news (Ifop, 2007). Due to the proliferation of channels and the growing offer of programs, youngsters desert
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
information channels to land on new hybrid programs offering both entertainment and information (Morris, 2009). With the advent of the political satire format, a few researchers have started to wonder which impact this type show -and the sarcasm, irony and parody that goes with it- may have on younger generations if it serves a socializing function (Young & Tisinger, 2006; Tournier, 2005; Feldman, 2007). In France, Tournier (2005) asks: "what will be the ethical and political bases of generations socialized in a culture of satire shows: will they differ from previous generations by showing a greater ability to critique or will they be caught by a certain defiance towards democratic institutions?" (p. 722). This question finely captures all the complexity of political socialization by the media, and especially TV, in today's world. In one hand, the diversity of formats allows young people to discover the world of politics from another set of eyes, less intimidating than hard news. But on the other hand, this look on politics is inherently negative and impertinent, and may leave younger audiences with the impression that the political system is dysfunctional, as explained previously
(Moeller & de Vreese, 2013).
Certainly, the tone of political satire shows is the same for the entire population, but it is the interpretation that might differ between generations. First, because younger generations have grown up in this fragmented media environment where the line between news and entertainment is blurred, it is more common for youngsters to apprehend these shows as legitimate sources of information (Feldman, 2007, p. 422). Another reason for the different impact of these shows between generations is that younger viewers are more susceptible to media effects (Adriaansen, van Praag, de Vreese, 2010). And the media effects are especially powerful when it comes to political satire given that the messages are conveyed using
political humour, and that messages presented with humour are more attention-drawing and persuasive than serious media message (Morris, 2009).
It is commonly acknowledged that political attitudes are not completely stable among younger citizens, therefore strong media messages, such as satire, may shape these attitudes (Adriaansen, van Praag & de Vreese, 2010, p. 438).Moreover, development of attitudes during the period of young adulthood will have an impact on their lives as mature citizens as those years as considered to be the most "formative" (Niemi & Klingler, 2012, p. 32). In addition, as noted by Moeller and de Vreese (2013) as young people transit to adulthood, the role of the media becomes ever more pre-eminent as other agents, such as the family and the education institutions, become less influential. Hence, the attitude patterns established during adulthood, such as distrust towards politicians and the political system remain stable
throughout adult life, then studying the effect of political satire shows is crucial. Indeed, cynical attitudes towards politician and systemic distrust could result in "keeping more youth from the polls" (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006, p. 362). And as younger citizens are future of democracy we need to understand how this cynical attitude forms (Adriaansen, Praag & de Vreese, 2010, p. 440)
Contextualizing today's hybrid TV news landscape
Before venturing into the empirical analysis of the power of political satire TV shows on shaping political attitudes, one should look at the context in which such format could gain such popularity. Needless to say, the very essence of political satire is related to the particular societal, political, cultural, historical and technological setting which enables and constrains the nature of satire (Baym & Jones, 2012). Yet, most studies looking at the democratic effects of satire fail to address the importance of context, leaving the reader with the idea that those shows exist in a vacuum. Holbert and Young (2013) precisely called scholars in the field to acknowledge the "broad historical, political and technological shifts underlying the growing phenomenon" in order to inform the effect mechanisms under scrutiny (p. 485). Ever more, as
the majority of studies exploring the link between non traditional news format and political attitudes are North American, this effort of contextualization is especially important here to understand why 1,4 million French people, especially the young audience, turn to the satire show Le Petit Journal every night.
France has "an old tradition of mocking its absolute authority" (Doyle, 2012, p. 44), however, until the mid 80s, this satiric heritage only shined through the press and the radio, TV being merely a medium reserved for serious political news show. It is only when the public service broadcasting system opened to private control that more entertaining
information programs started to threaten the authority of the dominant public networks and the popularity of traditional political news (Doyle, 2012, p. 48). The deregulation of the broadcasting market was accompanied by a crisis in the French political communication model, leaving some room for the new private channels to renew the programming landscape and introduce the political satire genre (Amey & Salerno, 2009; Doyle, 2012).As summarized by Doyle, "this served the purpose of attracting audience but also helped create an image of irreverence for authority and a sense of freedom that helped justify the existence of the new networks." (Doyle, 2012, p. 43)This idea of free, independent TV was truly embodied in the creation of Canal + in 1984 which at the time was the only channel without a hard news show: a veritable upheaval that brought a renewal in the thinking and making of the news (Doyle, 2012). With its flagship show Les Guignols de l'info, a puppet satirical news show, the channel legitimized the blending of politics and entertainment as a new form of political talk (Amey & Salerno, 2009).
Profiting from the perceived lack of credibility of political actors at that time, this new type of political shows proposed a new way of talking about politics, less elitist and more transparent. Thus, talk shows revealing the private life of politicians and political satire shows revealing their mistakes seduced the public in search for another truth (Doyle, 2012). This
new hybrid TV model challenged the monopoly of political information by elites and experts. Moreover, it brought citizens to "construct political meaning through multiple channels." (Holbert & Young, 2013, p. 494)
It's in the gradual legitimization of other programs than hard news shows as sources of political information that Le Petit Journal was born. Started in 2004 as a segment of the talk show Le Grand Journal on the channel Canal +, it became famous by mocking the wrong-doings of politicians during public appearances (Amey & Salerno, 2009). In 2011, with its ever-growing success, Le Petit Journal becomes a show on its own. Just like the notorious "Journal de 20h" (the evening news bulletin), Le Petit Journal starts on an image of news studio with the news anchor sitting at his desk, announcing the date and welcoming the viewer to the show. Except from the presence of a public, the setting is very similar to a serious news show. Again, plagiarizing traditional hard news show, the host Yann Barthès comments on the current news and public affairs and sometimes interview political guests, but all with a satire twist. The rest of the show is divided between segment of political news, parody and sketches. Under the category of "Info/entertainment" of the network hosting the show, the set up and content of Le Petit Journal is symptomatic of the gradual blurring of the once rigid line between hard news and entertainment.
As briefly mentioned, the growing popularity of shows that mock politics and challenge power is a result of a growing distrust towards elected officials and the political system at large. This demand for political satire should, however, be looked upon
consideration, especially among the younger audience as it may underline an increase in cynical attitudes (Tournier, 2005).
Hypotheses
What makes political satire shows so popular, is their ability to desacralize the political elites by exposing their unprofessional conduct in a humorous way. However, jokes
about politicians' being dishonest, incompetent and corrupt do not solely make the audience laugh, they also persuade them of these negative portrayals (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006, Morris, 2009). Indeed, by repeatedly portraying political actors in a bad light, satire "makes negative images of politicians available in the minds" (Cao & Brewer, 2009, p. 8). Given that political humor has a persuasive power (Morris, 2009), and that young people are more impressionable and receptive to media messages (Adriaansen, van Praag, de Vreese, 2010)
they might be even more susceptible to humorous satirical media messages than older viewers. Baumgartner and Morris (2006) previously found young people tended to rate individual politicians mocked in The Daily Show more negatively, both as a result of the negative jokes and youngsters' vulnerability to persuasion. As discussed earlier, political satire shows don't restrict their mockery to politicians. As the work of mainstream journalists is also being ridiculed, their evaluation among the audience should also be negative. We thus predict that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Exposure to the political satire show Le Petit Journal encourages a negative attitude towards the politicians and journalists featured in the show among young viewers.
The effects of political satire on broader attitudes are also investigated. Previous research has found a positive relationship between watching political satire shows and distrust in
traditional media (Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Balmas, 2012). This is because satirists criticize the "traditional news' trivial coverage of politics" and question the watchdog role of the mainstream media (Balmas, 2011, p. 292). The audience exposed to satirical content about the media may in turn question the accountability of the media when it comes to fair and accurate political
information. Moreover, to suggest the absurdity of the media, political satire show even ridicule the format of traditional news by plagiarizing it (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007). By targeting their jokes both towards the "substance and the form" of traditional news media (Brewer & Maquardt, 2007, p. 254), political satire programming both interrogates the content of the news and questions the legitimacy of mainstream media (Baym, 2005). As a result, skepticism towards the traditional news media is expected among viewers of political satire. Such assumptions lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Exposure to the political satire show Le Petit Journal triggers distrust towards the traditional media among young viewers.
By ridiculing the world of politics, revealing the flaws of the system, and giving the idea of a chaotic organization of public life, political satire paints a cynical, rather than just critical, picture of politics. Indeed, satirists often just mock the absurdity of the system without offering alternatives (Tournier, 2005). In that sense, satire highlights problems of public life but doesn't promote "social change" (Hart & Hartelius, 2007, p. 267). Cast in this light, political satire shows seem to foster cynicism, rather than skepticism among viewers. A previous experimental study indeed found that exposure to the American satire show The Daily Show was positively related to cynical attitudes among the audience (Baumgarter & Morris, 2006). A study relying on cross-sectional survey confirmed that this effect was particularly noticeable among younger viewers, whose political attitudes are more shapeable than older citizens (Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011).Based on these arguments and previous findings, we expect that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Exposure to the political satire show Le Petit Journal increases levels of cynicism towards politics among young viewers.
Method Experimental design
To investigate the effects of exposure to Le Petit Journal on French young adults, a two-group posttest-only experiment (n=193) was conducted online between April 25, 2014 and May 11, 2014. After agreeing to the consent form and answering question about their political affinities, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: the experimental condition in which they were exposed to a segment of the French satirical show Le Petit Journal (n = 85) and the control condition in which they watched the extracts of hard news shows (n = 84). Afterwards, they filled a questionnaire measuring their attitudes towards political and media actors featured in the video as well as towards politics and the media at large. Participants were then thanked for their participation, debriefed and provided with the necessary contact details if they had any complaints or query. The suggested duration of the experiment was of about 15 minutes.
Participants
This study used a convenient sample drawn from social media and professional connections. Recruitment from social media platforms also allowed a snowball sampling which allowed to increase the size and the diversity of the sample, and contributed to a greater generalizability of the findings. A total of 193 people took part in the experiment, 101
successfully finished it, which brings the dropout rate to 46%. This relatively high dropout rate can be explained by two factors: the first and most plausible answer is that some people clicked on the link by curiosity, although not eligible and/or willing to participate in the experiment. As a matter of fact, 61 questionnaires received less than 5 minutes of attention from this type of participants. Another explanation could be that the first questions related to political ideology may have turned off some participants.
Participants aged over 30 and under 18 were removed from the sample in order to ensure that the sample consists of young adults only. The final sample consisted of 53% of women and 48% of men (M = 1.48, SD = 0.5) with a mean age of 23.5 years old (SD = 2.9). 97% of the respondents were residing in France at the time of the experiment. On average, participants were rather highly dedicated, the median education level corresponding to a Bachelor's degree (M= 4.07SD= 1.12). 45.5% of the participants had an education level corresponding to a Master's degree. 48,9% of the participants reported being on the left side of the political spectrum, 19,4% place themselves in the center of the political spectrum, 29,5% of the participants reported being on the right side of the political spectrum, 2,2% did not know where situate themselves on the spectrum. 41,4% indicated that they feel close to a particular party, among which 11.6% identified with Front de Gauche (extreme left-wing), 10.1% with EELV (Green party), 23.2% with PS (Socialist party) 1.4% with UDI (Centre-right), 47.8% with UMP (Right wing party), 5.8% with FN (extreme right-wing party). As pointed out by Bryman (2012, p. 674), it is almost impossible to calculate the response rate for online experiment spread through social network or online forum, nevertheless, given the sampling method, a rough response rate of between 15% and 25% has been found.
Stimulus material
As previously mentioned, participants were randomly allocated to one of the two conditions composing this experiment. In the experimental condition, participants viewed a 2'40'' video clip containing a shortened segment of the show Le Petit Journal dating from February 17, 2014. The segment is called "Flash Info" –understand news flash- in which the host Yann Barthès goes over the political news of the last days and how the media reported on it. In the extract selected for the experiment, Yann Barthès comments on a radio interview of former prime minister Jean-Marc Ayrault on Europe 1, one of the largest radio stations in
France and on a debate between a socialist politician (David Assouline) and an extreme left wing politician (Jean-Luc Mélenchon) on the 24h cable news channel BFMTV. This extract reflects the show's trademark that made it so popular: highlighting the absurdity of politicians and the media by editing and commenting over traditional media's footage. The editing of this particular newsflash does not allow the viewer to clearly understand which issues were
discussed in the interview or the debate, rather it focuses on the misconduct of the politicians and the journalists and the non-professional relationship between them. This issue-less segment also allows the stimulus to be less time-based, which was an advantage considering that the French government reshuffled at the time of the experiment, making specific issues covered in previous show irrelevant, and thus humor about it outdated.
Participants in the control condition viewed a 2'40'' video clip composed of two extracts: the same radio interview and the same debate used in Le Petit Journal's video, but in their original formats, without comments and editing. The only editing undertaken was in order to make the video as short as the one in the experimental condition, so segments of the radio and TV shows were cut and edited together. Therefore, the participants could follow only a short part of the interview and the debate, which gave a restricted overview of the issues debated. However, they were still able to understand the exchange between the journalist and politician and the politicians in the same way as if they were zapping from program to program.
By having real footage that only differs in editing and style between the two
conditions, the external validity of the study is improved. Indeed, it ensures that the variations between the groups are a results of the manipulations made in Le Petit Journal. Screen shots of the video used for the stimuli and a transcript of each stimulus can be found in Appendices B and C.
Measures3
In the firing line of Le Petit Journal are not only politicians and the world of politics as a whole, but also mainstream journalists and the traditional media. Thus, the purpose of this experiment is to measure whether exposure to the political satire show impacts on
viewers' attitudes towards politicians and journalists specifically, and more generally whether it generates more political cynicism and media skepticism among the watchers.
Partisanship. Only four questions were asked before the participants were exposed to
the stimuli, those being related to political ideology and attachment. The reason for ordering these questions this way was to ensure that their self-reported political preferences were not shaped by the stimuli. Moreover, it is a variable that should be taking into great consideration, given that previous studies have found that political partisanship played as a moderator and that political humor can be understood differently depending on political affinities (Becker, 2014, Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). Participants were first asked to place themselves on a left-right political axis. Participants who answered "I don't know" were exempt from other questions regarding political attachment. Political attachment was measured by the question "do you feel close to any particular party?" If answered affirmatively, participants were asked to indicate which party they feel closer to compared to the others (a list of the 6 parties in France was presented).
Evaluation of politicians and mainstream journalists. Two measures were created:
a thermometer rating (based on Baumgartner, 2008) for which participants rated each politician and the journalist appearing in the stimulus on a scale from 0 to 10, and an
evaluation based the actors' personal traits. Respondents indicated whether they thought each featured political and media actor was 'competent', 'reliable', 'intelligent', 'honest',
'incompetent', 'not credible', 'stupid', 'dishonest'. Respondents could tick as many of the 8 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 It is important to note that the items of the questionnaires were displayed in French language, therefore the
attributes they wanted to. This measurement could have been improved by using a scale for each attribute. To overcome this inaccuracy in the measurement, we recoded the answers into one new 3-point scale and one 4-point scale measures. This was done by crediting the value 1 when a box was ticked, 0 when it was left blanked and by dividing the attributes in two categories: a positive evaluation (comprising the competent, reliable and honest
characteristics) and negative evaluation (comprising the incompetent, not credible, stupid and dishonest characteristics).4 Reliability analyses showed that the measure "negative evaluation of politicians" was reliable, the measures "positive evaluation of politicians" and "negative evaluation of the journalist" were poorly reliable (! = .55, M= 0.43, SD= 0.45; ! =.52, M= 0.63, SD= .92). The measure "positive evaluation of the journalist" was dropped as not reliable.
Media skepticism. Three items were combined based on those developed by Tsfati &
Cappela (2003). Respondents indicated on a 7 point scale how much they agreed with the statements "Journalists are motivated only by personal ambitions and institutional
competition", "Journalists are honest watchdogs" (1= strongly agree, 4= neutral, 7=strongly disagree), as well as how much of the time they could trust the media to report news fairly (0= never, 1= only some of the time, 2= most of the time, 3= always). The two last items were reversely recoded to match the direction of the first item, so that a high value indicates high levels of media skepticism. Responses were combined to form an index5 (! =.56, M=4.21, SD=.89).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 To account for the forced response, the attribute 'intelligent' was removed from the 'positive evaluation'
measure, following the hypothesis that hesitant respondents are likely to tick the 'intelligent' box (considered as an easy choice, given that politicians and journalists at the highest level are commonly referred as being part of the intelligentsia). A frequency analysis confirmed this hypothesis, with an average of 43 respondents ticking the attribute 'intelligent' (n=169).
5 The factorability of these items was examined. A correlation analysis shows that some items were less
correlated than others, with a coefficient slightly under .3. However, all three items were kept and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy showed a value of .61 which is above of the bare minimum of .5 (Field, 2009, 647). The anti-image matrix diagonal values were also all above .5 and all communalities above .3 asserting the common variance between items. Finally,from the initial eigenvalues, we can observed that 53.3%
Political cynicism. A battery of six indicators was used to measure this
multidimensional concept, based on previous studies (Agger, Goldstein & Pearl, 1961, De Vreese, 2004, Jackson, 2010). To the statements "Politicians are capable people who know what they do", "Politicians keep their promises", "Politicians always try to do what's best for their country", "I'm satisfied with the way that government works in our country", "Politicians are interested only in people's vote, not in their opinions", "Politicians only care about
themselves or special interest", respondents were asked how much they agreed with them on the same 7 point scale than above (1= strongly agree, 4= neutral, 7=strongly disagree). Here again, the two last items were reversely coded to measure cynicism. An overall measure for political cynicism was created from the combination of these 6 items6 (!= .79 M= 5.1, SD= .99). A translation of the integral questionnaire, including the items for exploratory data not presented here, is available in Appendix C.
Results Descriptive statistics and exploratory data
The results presented below are from exploratory data that do not participate in
answering the hypotheses, however, they are interesting to introduce as their implications will be discussed in the upcoming discussion section.
Participants exposed to Le Petit Journal were more likely to think that the interview and political debate were more about personality than substance, compared to those who watched the original footage from the traditional media. This difference was significant (p < .001).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
reliability analysis was run, showing that the measure 'media skepticism' is reliable with a Cronbach alpha value of .56 (M= 4.21, SD= 0.89).
6 A factor analysis was run. From a correlation analysis, it was observed that the 6 items significantly correlated
(r >.3) with at least two other items. So all items were kept to construct the measure. The factor analysis indicated a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value of .8 which is commonly considered as great (Field, 2009, 647). Here also, the diagonals of the anti-image matrix were all over .5 and the communalities all above .3. The initial eigenvalues indicated that the first factor explained 51.3% of the variance. The combined measure of 'political
The video viewed was significantly more likely to be liked and shared on social media platforms by those who watched a satirical segment (p = .005).
Young people who watched the video of Le Petit Journal were also more inclined to go vote at the next Presidential elections than those who watch a segment for the traditional media. Although not significant (p = .320), this result is worth some attention in the broader discussion around political satire, distrustful attitudes and political disengagement.
Main results
Specific evaluation of the featured actors. From our first hypothesis (H1), it was expected that participants in the political satire condition -those who viewed a segment of the show Le Petit Journal- would display a more negative attitude towards the politicians and journalists featured in the video clip than participants who watched original footage from the traditional media. As mentioned earlier, two indicators were created to measure the attitude towards featured political and media actors: a thermometer rating and an evaluation based on their perceived performance.
As shown in Table 1, a negative relationship was found between exposure to Le Petit Journal and the thermometer ratings of political actors featured in the video. In other words, participants gave significantly lower scores to politicians appearing in the stimulus than those who viewed the news segment with the same political actors (p = .010). Similar results are observed for the rating of the journalist, with viewers of Le Petit Journal attributing a lower grade than participants in the news condition, however, this difference was not significant (p = .239) in the case of the media actor.
Series of one-way ANOVA analyses confirmed a greater negative attitude towards politicians for the participants in Le Petit Journal condition, as indicated by a lower mean in Table 2. Although valid, this result should be looked upon with consideration given its marginal statistical significance (p = .056). As for the journalist, participants in the satire condition gave a worse negative evaluation, but this difference was insignificant. The positive evaluation of politicians was slightly worse among participants in the experimental condition, but this difference was here agin insignificant (see Table 3).
These findings appear to lend some support for the first hypothesis. Yann Barthès' critical comments and jokes targeted at politicians resulted in more negative attitudes among viewers towards these politicians. Nevertheless, the power of his satire was unassertive when it comes to attitude towards media actors. Noteworthy, these findings even hold when
controlling for party identification, which underlines the strength of the relationship between exposure to the show and negative evaluations of featured politicians.
[Table 2 & 3 about here]
Overall media skepticism. H2 stated that exposure to Le Petit Journal would trigger skepticism towards the traditional media among viewers. Table 4 shows that there is a significant relationship between media skepticism and exposure to the show, however this effect goes in the opposite direction than predicted. Indeed, viewing the clip from the political satire show made respondents less skeptical towards the traditional media than people
exposed to the news segment (p = .008). Therefore, H2 is not supported. Though surprising, several elements can explain this outcome, as will be reviewed in the discussion section.
Overall political cynicism. We supposed in our third hypothesis that exposure to Le
who viewed the video from Le Petit Journal displayed slightly higher levels of cynicism than viewers of the news segment as seen from the results of ANOVA analyses in Table 4.
However, this effect was not statistically significant (p = .607). The insignificance in the results could be seen as a product of a ceiling effect for cynicism among young French citizens, the means in both conditions being around 5 on a 7-point scale. This argument will be discussed in the next section.
[Table 4 about here]
Interaction effects
Considering that in the stimuli were featured political actors from the left of the political spectrum exclusively (Jean-Marc Ayrault and David Assouline are from the Socialist party, PS, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon from the extreme left wing party, FDG) it is reasonable to consider that exposure to Le Petit Journal could interact with the participants' partisan identification. Indeed, by discrediting the left, in governmental power at the moment of this study, the show may reinforce right wing participants' cynical attitude towards the
government and national politics. Therefore, interaction variables were created where exposure to the political satire show stimulus (1= exposure, 0= no exposure) was multiplied by one of the 6 partisanship dummies7. From Table 5 displaying the results of the only significant regression analysis, we see that partisans of the main right wing party, UMP, are significantly more cynical after having viewed Le Petit Journal than participants who don't identify with this party (p = .048).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Each dummy was created as follow: for the Front de Gauche (FG) dummy, participants who said they identify
Coming back to our third hypothesis, these findings show that exposure to Le Petit Journal does not significantly increase levels of political cynicism among young viewers, unless they are partisan of the right wing party, the UMP.
[Table 5 about here]
Qualitative results
Beyond the quantitative analysis of the results, a qualitative exploration of participants' answer to the question "what did you think about the video" allows a more in-depth, multifaceted understanding of the possible attitudinal effects of political satire on young audiences. Although it was required to give an answer, a simple look at the length of the answers shows that they were really willing to share their opinion about the videos. Therefore, an analysis of participants' answers 'on the spot' offers a glimpse into what young people really thought of the satire and news clips, something that is more difficult to capture with a quantitative analysis (Tournier, 2005, p. 694). Participants in the satirical condition
commented more about the critical behavior of politicians and the absurdity of the political world than participants who watched segments from the traditional media. Answers such as "It reflects the poor utility of politics in our society8", "This video clearly shows that the government does know how to govern France9", "it gives us a pitiful image of French
politicians10" not only demonstrate that participants were encouraged to think cynically about political actors and politics after being exposed to a satirical segment, they also show that they acknowledged the 'decoding' role of Le Petit Journal (as shown by the choice of verb
-emphasis added). In other words, viewers of Le Petit Journal's video were aware that the satirical show offers an interpretation of political events rather than a direct transcription, as it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In the original French version: "Le reflet de la piètre utilité de la politique dans notre société"
9 In the original French version: "Cette vidéo montre bien que le gouvernement ne sait plus comment gouverner
la France"
is the case in traditional news shows. Indeed, participants in the news condition were more likely to comment on the issues debated ("we have a complex system, more coherence would be good…especially in the administration11", "stop entrepreneurship is not a solution to bring down unemployment, raise taxes for businesses either…12") than on the state of the political world. The implications of these qualitative results will be discussed in relation to our quantitative findings in the following section.
Discussion
This study showed that exposure to Le Petit Journal generates negative attitudes towards politicians among young viewers and boosts political cynicism among supporters of the main opposing party, the right-wing UMP. Contrarily to our expectations, we also found a negative relationship between exposure to Le Petit Journal and media skepticism. Although the direction of some of these results was unexpected, the causal connection previously established between watching the satirical show and political attitudes (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006) was verified by the experiment research design. Explicitly referring to our research question, our findings suggest a strong relationship between exposure to Le Petit Journal and attitude towards politicians. The effect was lesser regarding attitudes to the broader political system. Finally, a sizable effect on attitudes towards the traditional media was found.
Previous studies showed that young people, particularly, tend to be more negative towards politicians after exposure to satirical messages (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011). This is because satirists' jokes directed to politicians highlight their misconduct and suggest their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 In the original French version: "nous avons un système beaucoup trop complexe et que l'uniformité ferait un
peu de bien.. notamment dans l'administratif"
12 In the original French version: "Enlever l'auto-entreprenariat n'est pas une solution pour faire baisser le
incompetency and selfishness (Balmas, 2012) and because young people's attitudes are less constant and more likely to be shaped by these media messages than older, more politically sophisticated audiences (Adriaansen, van Praag, de Vreese, 2010). In line with these arguments, our findings showed that the negative depiction of politicians' behavior in the French satirical show Le Petit Journal caused young viewers to evaluate these politicians more negatively than viewers who were deprived of the satirical jokes. Although previous studies suggested a correlation through cross-sectional surveys, very few studies tested its causality (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Our results did contribute to this shortcoming by confirming a strong causal relationship between exposure to satirical messages and negative evaluation of politicians, even when controlling for political partisanship. Indeed, participants from all political sides showed "cooler attitudes" towards the politicians mocked in the
stimulus, although all from the political left (Becker & Waisanen, 2013). Thus, this
relationship is particularly convincing considering that political humor could be interpreted differently, depending on the political affinities of the viewers (Young, 2004). This results are line with recent findings that reassert the persuasiveness and unconditional nature of satirists' jokes on young viewers' impression of politicians (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Becker, 2012).
Negative perceptions of governing politicians "may carry relatively little consequences because they can be short-lived" (Cao & Brewer, 2009, p. 8). However cynical outlook of the government and politics in general "may carry longer-term and more profound consequences" (Cao & Brewer, 2009, p. 8). It is thus important to interpret the results regarding general political cynicism with caution. The relationship with general political cynicism was less evident, though. Exposure to the stimulus from Le Petit Journal was indirectly associated with political cynicism: only right wing partisans showed significantly higher levels of political cynicism after being exposed a satirical item that ridiculed the political arena. This
unprecedented indirect effect can be partly explained by the specific political context in which this experiment was conducted. Indeed, the political left was just defeated at local elections, which undermined the legitimacy of the socialist party, in power, and urged the President to appoint a new government. It is likely that these events reinforced the disappointment of right-wing partisans towards the government and elected officials; a feeling primed and enhanced by the political absurdities highlighted in the stimulus. Nevertheless, based on findings from previous studies, we expected a stronger link between cynical attitudes among younger viewers and political satire exposure (Baumgarter & Morris, 2006). To understand the smaller effect here, it is worth noting that participants in both the experimental and control conditions displayed very high levels of cynicism, thus compromising the influence of a one-time exposure to the satirical segment. A very recent poll shows that 86% of French people aged between 18 to 30 had no or little trust in politics, 98% thought some or all politicians were corrupt ("Génération quoi", 2014). This 'ceiling effect' in cynicism is translated in participants' answers to our open-ended question "what did you think of the video?": the impression that French politics was failing was observed in both conditions with comments such as "politics is worse and worse13" and "we can't trust politicians.14" It is only by looking at more qualitative responses from the participants that the potential of Le Petit Journal to make young people think more critically about politics was revealed.
Previous research also found a detrimental effect of watching political satire on attitudes towards the traditional media (Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 2011, Baumgartner & Morris, 2006, Brewer & Marquardt, 2007, Balmas, 2012). The rationale behind this effect is that, by lampooning mainstream journalists and mocking the news making process, satirists encourage viewers to be skeptical about the way traditional media operates. Our results suggest otherwise: we found that participants in the Le Petit Journal condition were less !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
skeptical towards the traditional media than those exposed to original footage from the
traditional news media. Although the direction of this result goes against previous findings, its implication deserves some attention. We argue that by deconstructing the "artifice of news" and revealing "the broader machinery of public discourse" (Baym & Jones, 2012, 5), satirical shows provides viewers with an interpretation grid of the world of news. By doing so,
intimidating hard news become more intelligible and accessible for younger audiences. Also, by applying Adriaansen, van Praag and de Vreese's (2010) remark that substantive news coverage can decrease political cynicism among younger viewers, we project here that substantive explanation on how news are made and what they are made of might also
decrease levels of skepticism towards the news media. Feldman (2007) previously pointed at the tendency to attribute the disaffection of young people for news to their reliance on political entertaining programs for political information, without strong evidence (p. 407). Here, our findings suggest that political satire programming might tune young people back in rather than tune them out from political news. This outcome thus holds promising implication for the quality of democracy.
Altogether, this study has reasserted the previously shown potential of political satire TV shows to affect young people's attitudes towards politics and the media (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner, 2008; Balmas, 2012). These results, however, only reflect short-term effects.As attitude formation is a continuous process (Moeller & de Vreese, 2013) we recommend that researchers interested in the impact of political satire on young cohorts conduct long term longitudinal studies. Such approach would help clarifying the numerous speculations, including ours, over the opportunity or threat that political satire represents for the future of democracy. Effect scholars should also venture in more qualitative studies, since quantitative analysis capture only limitedly the multidimensionality of political attitudes. As
hinted by our very small-scale discourse analysis, interviews might inform the effect mechanism of political satire in a less monolithic, more encompassing way.
Some limitations in the design of the study should also be acknowledged. First, this experiment relied on a convenient sample, therefore it may not be generalizable to the larger young adult population. This sample was generally highly politically knowledgeable,
politically interested, and rather highly educated. These characteristics might not represent the whole youth population, nonetheless they do reflect the core audience of satirical shows, usually more educated and politically sophisticated (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). This sample was also relatively small, and the statistically significance of some results could have been improved by a larger number of participants.
Secondly, these findings are based on an experimental design, commonly criticized for its low external validity. Moreover, online experiments' internal validity is often questioned as participants might be less dedicated to the task than in a controlled laboratory setting.
However, since online participation allows respondents to complete the experiment in a familiar setting and that watching the show online is not so far from as natural configuration (the show is widely watched online), the format of this experiment may enhance the low external validity. Regarding internal validity, pollsters found that young people in France tend to multitask while watching TV (Desplanques, 2008), therefore their attention to the program they watch is also superficial in a natural setting.
Thirdly, some measurements developed for the questionnaire could be improved. Especially the recoding effort to create a scale for the evaluations of the featured politicians could have been avoided by creating a scale for each attribute measured.
The last limitation concerns the stimulus. This experiment was conducted at the beginning of spring 2014, shortly after the government was reshuffled as mentioned earlier. Thus, to avoid choosing an outdated segment, we selected a stimuli that was less issue-based
than in previous studies (Baumgartner & Morris 2006; Baumgartner & Morris 2008): the footage from Le Petit Journal only offered criticism over the behavior of the political and media actors featured, while the news footage gave a superficial overview of the issue debated. It is thus possible that the difference in results was shaped by the unequal
interpretation frames between the two stimuli. Future research should pay particular attention in the stimuli selection in order to ensure the best causality possible.
Despite the room for improvement, this study has a number of important implications. Most importantly given the audience segment under scrutiny here, is the potential impact of negative attitudes towards politics on political participation. Some researchers have seen in cynicism a demobilizing attitude (Cao & Brewer, 2008), and thus a danger from political satire shows to "pollute" democracy (Jones, 2010). From our sample, participants in both conditions indicated strong intentions of voting for the next presidential elections, with even more commitment from the ones in the Le Petit Journal condition compared to those who watched the traditional news segment. Although not statistically significant, this result might play in favor of arguments seeing in nontraditional news a way of contributing to public discourse (Balmas, 2011) rather than alienating young people from political processes (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Following the distinction between "reflexive, "monitoring" skeptics (Van de Walle & Six, 2013, p. 4) and disillusioned cynics (Van de Walle & Six, 2013; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), the attitude of our sample might reflect more skepticism than cynicism. Moreover, and more anecdotally, the fact that viewers of Le Petit Journal were significantly more willing to share the video on social media than those in the control group also supports the argument that political satire shows might open more public discussion than traditional news shows (Jones, 2010).
Political satire disturbs the "Children of Democracy", advocated Hart & Hartelius (2007, p. 263). We argue that if it manages to disturb young people's habit of political
inaction, political satire may rather enhance a democratic public culture. Hence, further research should carefully identify which type of distrustful attitude is triggered by political satire before concluding that "democracy is endangered" if young people get their news from political entertainment (Jones, 2010, p. 208).
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank dr. Judith Möller for the encouraging supervision over this thesis work. I would also like to express my gratitude to Mark Boukes for sharing insights and tips on the chosen topic. I should like to say how grateful I am for the knowledge and experience acquired during this Master's degree, both inside and outside of the classroom.
References
Adriaansen, M. L., Van Praag, P., & De Vreese, C. H. (2010). Substance matters: How news content can reduce political cynicism. International Journal of Public Opinion
Research, 22(4), 433-457.
Agger, R. E., Goldstein, M. N., & Pearl, S. A. (1961). Political cynicism: Measurement and meaning. The Journal of Politics, 23(03), 477-506.
Amey, P., & Salerno, S. (2009). «T'en es où avec Arlette?»: infotainement et traitement des élus politiques à la télévision française. Politique et sociétés, 28(2).
Armatti, L. (2014, May 5). "Petit journal": le trublion de l'info fait sa mue. Télérama.
Retrieved from http://television.telerama.fr/television/petit-journal-le-trublion-de-l-info-fait-sa-mue,111647.php
Baek, Y.M., Wojcieszak, M. E. (2009) Don’t expect too much! Learning from late-night comedy and knowledge item difficulty. Communication Research. 36(6): 783-809
Balmas, M. (2012). When Fake News Becomes Real: Combined Exposure to Multiple News Sources and Political Attitudes of Inefficacy, Alienation and Cynicism. Communication
Research, 0093650212453600.
Baum, M. A. (2003) Soft News and Political Knowledge: Evidence of Absence or Absence of Evidence?, Political Communication, 20(2) : 173-190
Baumgartner, J. C., & Morris, J. S. (2008). One “nation,” under Stephen? The effects of The Colbert Report on American youth. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 52(4), 622-643.
Baumgartner, J., & Morris, J. S. (2006). The Daily Show Effect Candidate Evaluations, Efficacy, and American Youth. American Politics Research, 34(3), 341-367. Baym, G. (2005). The Daily Show: Discursive integration and the reinvention of political
journalism. Political Communication, 22(3), 259-276.
Baym, G., & Jones, J. P. (2012). News parody in global perspective: Politics, power, and resistance. Popular Communication, 10(1-2), 2-13.
Becker, A.B. (2011) Political Humor as Democratic Relief ? The Effects of Exposure to Comedy and Straight News on Trust and Efficacy, Atlantic Journal of Communication, 19(5) : 235-250
Becker, A. B., & Waisanen, D. J. (2013). From funny features to entertaining effects: Connecting approaches to communication research on political comedy.Review of
Communication, 13(3), 161-183.
Bennett, L. W. (2007). Relief in hard times: A defense of Jon Stewart's comedy in an age of cynicism. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 24(3), 278-283.
Boukes, M., Boomgaarden, H. (2012) Soft news and political cynicism: how exposure to political information genres relates to public cynicism about politics, Manuscript
submitted to 65th Annual Conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research, 1-41
Brewer, P. R., & Marquardt, E. (2007). Mock news and democracy: analyzing The Daily Show. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 15(4), 249-267.
Brewer, P. Cao, X. (2009) The Daily Show and Perceptions of Government, Presentation to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, 2-26
Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods. Oxford university press.
Buckingham, D. (1999). Young people, politics and news media: beyond political socialisation. Oxford Review of Education 25(1): 171-184
Cappella, J. N., & Jamieson, K. H. (1996). News frames, political cynicism, and media cynicism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 71-84. Collovald, A., & Neveu, E. (1999). Political satire on French television. Modern &
Contemporary France, 7(3), 339-349.
De Vreese, C. H. (2004). The effects of frames in political television news on issue
interpretation and frame salience. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 81(1), 36-52.
Desplanques, E. (2008, April 19) Les jeunes zappent la télé. Télérama. Retrieved from http://television.telerama.fr/television/les-jeunes-zappent-la-tele,27834.php Doyle, W. (2012). No Strings Attached? Les Guignols de l'info and French
Television. Popular Communication, 10(1-2), 40-51.
Feldman, L. (2007). The news about comedy Young audiences, The Daily Show, and evolving notions of journalism. Journalism, 8(4), 406-427.
Guggenheim, L., Kwak, N., & Campbell, S. W. (2011). Nontraditional news negativity: The relationship of entertaining political news use to political cynicism and
mistrust. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 23(3), 287-314.
Hoffman, L. H., & Thomson, T. L. (2009). The effect of television viewing on adolescents' civic participation: Political efficacy as a mediating mechanism.Journal of
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 53(1), 3-21.
Holbert, R. L., Young, D. G. (2012) Exploring relations between political entertainment media and traditional political communication information outlets in Valdivia, A. N. (Ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Media Studies (pp. 485-504) MA: Wiley Blackwell
Ifop (2007) Les électeurs fançais et l'information télévisé pp. 2-20. Retrieved from http://www.cevipof.com/bpf/barometre/vague1/synthese/BPF-V1_R04_TV.pdf
Jackson, D. (2010). Strategic media, cynical public? Examining the contingent effects of strategic news frames on political cynicism in the United Kingdom. The International
Journal of Press/Politics, 1940161210381647.
Jones, J. P. (2010). Entertaining politics: Satiric television and political engagement. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Kim, Y. M., & Vishak, J. (2008). Just laugh! You don’t need to remember: The effects of entertainment media on political information acquisition and information processing in political judgment. Journal of Communication, 58(2), 338-360.
Kwak, N., Wang, X., & Guggenheim, L. (2011). Laughing all the way: The relationship between television entertainment talk show viewing and political engagement among young adults. Ann Arbor, 1001, 48109-1285.
Moeller, J., & de Vreese, C. (2013). The differential role of the media as an agent of political socialization in Europe. European Journal of Communication,28(3), 309-325.
