The economic vote of populist voters in the Netherlands

T

HE ECONOMIC VOTE OF POPULIST VOTERS IN THE

N

ETHERLANDS

Marnix Gerding

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. W. van der Brug Second reader: Dr. A. Hakhverdian

Master thesis Political Science: Political Economy (MSc) University of Amsterdam

2

Contents

I.INTRODUCTION ... 3

II.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 6

III.RESEARCH DESIGN ...11

IV.RESULTS ...14

V.CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ...18

REFERENCES ...20

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVES MAIN VARIABLES ...24

3

I.

I

On the evening of the latest provincial election day in the Netherlands, Thierry Baudet, the leader of the right-populist party Forum for Democracy (FvD), entered the stage amidst his political supporters when the exit polls turned out to be in favour of his party. From out of nowhere, FvD became the largest party in the country, which shows the increasing popularity of populist parties elsewhere in Western countries over the last twenty years (Guardian 2018). The victory speech he gave included references to a deteriorating country in which the political elite made a mess of the Dutch culture, the economy, the universities and even the architecture of buildings (NRC 2019). A typical characterization of leaders and populist parties is noting the decay in all different areas of a country caused by the corruption of the political elite (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Mudde 2004). Another well-known example comes from US President Donald Trump, who had said to ‘drain the swamp’ in Washington D.C., which refers to the many corrupt politicians in Congress. However, there are also examples on the left of the political spectrum, such as the Spanish Podemos, the Greek Syriza and the Dutch Socialist Party (SP), by which the antagonism ‘people versus the elite’ is the core message of their political party (ibid). These parties often accuse the neoliberal elite of getting richer and richer while the ordinary people do not see their wage increase and might even lose their jobs (Mouffe 2018, Mudde 2004).

There is extensive academic research that comments on the possible causes of the upheaval of populist parties (Ivarsflaten 2005, 2008, Van Assche 2018, Gidron and Hall 2017, Hawkins et al. 2017, Inglehart and Norris 2016). One explanation relates to the cultural backlash idea by which populist voters see their traditional values being replaced by progressive post-materialist values, such as support for same-sex marriage and LGBT-rights (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Gidron and Hall 2017). Senior citizens, white men, and less educated citizens actively reject the rising tide of progressive values and are in this way potential voters to populist appeals (Inglehart 1990). The rise of cosmopolitan Green parties and other identity-politics related groups is an example of this shift in societal values. Another explanation relates to the impact of immigration: immigrants are seen as a threat to welfare programs in western societies, especially by right populist parties (Rydgren 2005, Hogan and Haltinner 2015). In a cultural sense, immigrants are perceived as a threat to western/European culture, and they do not adjust to western norms and values (ibid). Furthermore, it is also argued that individuals who vote for populist parties are more cynical towards politicians and have less trust in political institutions than non-populist voters (Doyle 2011, Oesch 2008). The success of populist parties is based on the mobilisation of the reservoir of popular discontent: disaffected and alienated voters who articulate their deep-seated disenchantment with contemporary politics.

4 Another explanation is the economic one. This explanation entails the idea that a specific group of people are the ‘losers of globalisation’ and as a result, these people move their vote to anti-establishment parties (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Oesch 2008, Hawkins et al. 2017, Gidron and Hall 2017). In the current age of globalisation, which is defined by the decline of the industrial sector and the burgeoning of the service sector, workers need to be flexible, professional, and entrepreneurial to stay afloat socially and economically. Those who are not—the unemployed, the underemployed, the unskilled, and those whose jobs are threatened by advancing technology—are the “losers” of globalisation. Consequently, over the last decades, the income of the middle class in developed Western nations has stagnated or declined and the gains of economic growth have gone to the top ten per cent of the population (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Piketty 2014). Given the fact that economic inequality is a possible explanation of the rise of populist parties, it is still unclear on which level populist voters make their choice. Is the voter’s own financial situation the decisive factor to vote for a populist party, or does the deteriorating national economy matter as well?

Research on the link between economic voting behaviour and populism has only been focussed on right-wing populism (Ivarsflaten 2005, Mughan et al. 2003). Other research has been based on the consequences of the euro crisis in which the rise of populist parties has been caused by people who had economically suffered by severe austerity measures (Hobolt and Tilley 2016, Negri 2019, Magni 2017). My thesis will contribute to this literature in two different ways: I examine both left and right-wing populism, and, as previous research has been focussed on objective economic indicators, I analyse populist voting behaviour in the light of subjective economic and financial perceptions. I focus on the Dutch case, with the Socialist Party (SP) on the left and the Freedom Party (PVV) on the right, which provides an interesting database of two populist parties. While economic inequality can be seen as a possible explanation of the rise of populist parties, this thesis discusses the question of how these grievances are formed: are they based on an ‘egocentric vote’, which means that the voter takes his/her own declining financial situation as a reason to vote for a populist party (also known as ‘pocketbook voting’), or are they based on a ‘sociotropic vote’? The latter assesses the economic situation as a whole (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, Kramer 1983). This puzzle leads to the following research question: is support for populist parties motivated by egocentric and/or sociotropic economic perceptions?

This thesis shows that neither egocentric nor sociotropic perceptions correlate with a vote on the SP. These voters are not significantly more negative about both the Dutch economy and their financial situation than voters on other parties. In the case of the PVV, a correlation between a higher likelihood to vote for this party and a more negative view on someone’s financial situation does exist. However, the effect of negative egocentric perceptions become insignificant when

5 controlled for positions on two political issues. The first political issue deals with reducing income differences by government policy and the second is about the Dutch culture that is under threat. In other words, a higher likelihood of voting for the PVV does not stem from negative economic perceptions but the respondent’s view on political issues. This result underlines that the right-wing populist parties focus on cultural exclusionism and identity-issues. The PVV attracts more voters who have strong opinions about sociocultural topics (in this case, the statement about the Dutch culture), rather than socioeconomic ones.

6

II.

T

V

In this chapter, the relationship between the performance of the economy, its perception, and how it influences the voting behaviour of citizens will be discussed. Subsequently, this academic debate will be linked to the concept of ‘populism’. Recent research has shown that the euro crisis dramatically changed the political landscape in Western European countries: mainstream parties lost their voters to challenger parties, as many people faced a declining economic situation, although the specific policies of these challenger parties mattered as well (Hernández and Kriesi 2016, Hobolt and Tilley 2016). Examples of the latter include European integration and immigration, on which the challenger parties have stronger views than mainstream parties, as the latter could risk imperiling relationships with past and prospective coalition partners when they change their view (Van de Wardt et al. 2014). Challenger parties doubled their vote share whereas both mainstream left and right lost about five per cent of their share since the beginning of this century.

The concept of ‘challenger party’ can, as well as the concept of ‘populism’, have slightly different definitions, but it has been argued that a challenger party could be a populist party at the same time (Rooduijn 2019). Hobolt and Tilley (2016) provide a common denominator of ‘challenger parties’ which are “parties that defy existing patterns of party competition by rejecting the traditional economic dimension of politics and mobilizing on new issues or adopting more extreme positions on existing issues”. Examples of challenger parties are Front Rassemblement, Podemos, the Five Star Movement and in the Netherlands, the SP and the PVV. Mainstream parties are parties that frequently alternate between government and opposition (ibid). In the next subchapter, I will discuss the concept of populism more profoundly.

Several articles point to evidence that personal economic circumstances, such as declining wages, benefit cuts or unemployment, are important determinants of voting behaviour (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011, Margalit 2011, Richter 2006). Elections are a way to reward or to punish the incumbent parties for their policy performance (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011). Elinder et al. (2015) also show that voters do not only review political parties’ performances in a retrospective way (i.e., looking backwards), but also in a prospective way (i.e., looking at parties’ future performances). The commonality between these two ways of voting deals with voting based on a voter’s financial situation or attitudes, which is called egocentric or pocketbook voting (Kramer 1983, Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011).

The antagonist of egocentric voting is sociotropic voting, which can be defined as follows: “voters assess and respond to economic conditions in terms of altruistic or "sociotropic"

7 considerations, according to what is good or bad for the country as a whole” (Kramer 1983). So the national economic performance is the main reason that a voter will choose for the incumbent parties or the opposition party instead of his/her financial situation. Sociotropic voting is usually measured by asking respondents about either objective economic standards (Hansford and Gomez 2015). These could include questions on unemployment and economic growth numbers or subjective views, e.g., if the national economic prospects will be better, stay the same or get worse (ibid).

However, the difference between egocentric and sociotropic voting might be somewhat artificial. First, sociotropic voting is not necessarily synonymous with voting for the public or national interest or contrary to voting based on self-interest (Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011). For example, a sociotropic voter understands that the performance of the economy is significantly influenced by the policies the incumbent president and his party have pursued (ibid). However, finding out to what extent government policies are responsible for one’s fortune is not straightforward (ibid). Moreover, almost all of someone’s personal experiences might be subsumed by personal components (ibid). The best information regarding the ‘government-induced’ component of personal income is how well the economy is doing as a whole. Egocentric voters use the same information to determine which party makes himself or herself personally better off (ibid). Moreover, these voters could be even the same person.

Due to this fact, the way these variables are operationalised has a large impact. For instance, research on economic attitudes among Danes turned out to be in favour of the egocentric vote, as the sociotropic variables were not operationalised in a non-traditional way (Stubager et al. 2014). However, after adding the standard sociotropic variable (i.e., the question goes like ‘Looking back over the past year, would you say the national economic situation has gotten worse, better, or stayed the same?’), the results reproduces the standard result: strong sociotropic and weak egocentric effects (ibid). The Danish case underlines the general findings in the literature: voters are affected by the evaluations of their country’s economy rather than by their personal financial situation. In other words, voters react sociotropically rather than egocentrically (Stubager et al. 2014, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007, Lewis-Beck et al. 2013). Moreover, these studies control for partisan-based support of the incumbents and this effect on economic perceptions turn out to be minimal (ibid). In the next section, I will link the two concepts within economic voting behaviour to populism, after which I formulate three hypotheses.

8

P

Populism is defined as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Canovan 2004, Mudde 2004, Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). According to this definition, there are two populist parties in the Netherlands: the Socialist Party (SP) on the left side and the Freedom Party (PVV) on the right side of the political spectrum (Rooduijn et al. 2014). However, behind this clear conceptualisation lies a more profound academic debate about what the term ‘populism’ actually means (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Rooduijn 2019, Canovan 2004, Mudde 2004, Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). Rather than a rhetorical style or doctrine, populism should be regarded as a ‘thin-ideology’ that can be linked with either leftist or rightist ‘grand ideologies’, such as socialism and conservatism (Mudde 2004). More importantly, this concept should not be seen as a dichotomous one but rather as a gradual one (Rooduijn 2019). Parties can be populist to a certain degree, by which the PVV and the SP are two parties which are interpreted as more populist than other parties within the Dutch political landscape (March 2007, Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, Vossen 2010).

Since these parties cover different sides of the political spectrum, I will briefly discuss the difference between left and right populism. Left-wing populist parties have, in general, far less concern with doctrinal purity and class-consciousness than the traditional left, i.e., the social-democratic parties. Left-wing populist parties are ‘left’ in their emphasis on egalitarianism, and their identification of economic inequity and inequality as the basis of existing political and social arrangements. Lastly, their political agenda primarily consists of seeking after collective economic and social rights for their constituents (March 2007, Otjes and Louwerse 2015, Mudde 2007). On the other side, right-wing populism is characterised by the commitment to authoritarianism and nativism, which is the idea that only members of its nation should inhabit a state and that non-native elements pose a threat (Mudde 2007). Their core standpoints include punishment of crimes, the restrictions on immigration and asylum, and limiting the reach of the European Union (Ivarsflaten 2005). On socio-economic issues, right populist parties have an ambiguous position, as some parties share a neo-liberal economic agenda (such as Forum for Democracy in the Netherlands), while other parties take a more centrist position on socio-economic issues (e.g., the French Front Rassemblement). In conclusion, the label ‘left-wing populist’ refers mainly to these parties’ positions on socio-economic issues, while right-wing populism is usually related to these parties’ stances on authoritarianism and nativism (Otjes and Louwerse 2015, De Lange 2007).

9 As is stated in the introduction, there has been much research done about the possible causes of the rising popularity of both left and right populist parties in the West. In this thesis, economic voting behaviour is examined to set up the analytical framework, and the main focus is on the economic explanation. Scholars who emphasise the importance of the economic factor point to the idea that most of the populist voters can be featured as the ‘losers of globalisation’. The process of globalisation did not benefit all people to the same extent. The middle-class in Western countries saw their income declining over the last decades, whereas the individuals with the highest incomes became even wealthier (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Rodrik 2018, Guiso et al. 2017). For example, many blue-collar jobs moved to low-wage economies, which affected the job security of workers in certain sectors (ibid).

Moreover, technological automatization, the erosion of organised labour, shrinking welfare safety-nets, and neoliberal austerity policies hurt the socioeconomic position of the lower and middle class in Western countries. Besides the negative side-effects of the unification of domestic markets and entanglements of domestic economies, the economic insecurity caused by the Great Recession from 2007 further boosted the popularity of populist parties (Algan et al. 2017). However, it goes too far to state that all voters of populist parties are the losers of this era: “There is no consistent proof that the voter bases of populist parties consist of individuals who are more likely to be unemployed, have lower incomes, come from lower classes, or hold a lower education” (Rooduijn 2018: 364). I emphasise that the economic factor is one of many possible explanations for the rise of populist parties, and I will focus on the link between economic voting behaviour and voting for populist parties. I will test the following hypothesis:

H1a Negative egocentric perceptions increase the likelihood of a vote for the SP. H1b Negative sociotropic perceptions increase the likelihood of a vote for the SP.

As mentioned earlier, the core feature of left-populist parties are socioeconomic issues. Therefore, I would expect that voters who are both facing a deteriorating personal financial situation (retrospective and/or prospective), alongside the fact that the national economy is performing worse or has performed worse over time, are more likely to vote for the SP. The SP actively campaigned before the elections of 2012 (dataset of this thesis) on the fact that the ‘ordinary citizen’ had to pay for the mistakes of ‘failing bankers’, which leads to the idea that the party attracts egocentric voters. Besides that, the SP can be considered a challenger and a populist parties, by

10 which they appeal to the ‘losers of globalisation’. Therefore, it can be expected that egocentric voters become attracted by the agenda of the SP.

H2 Negative egocentric perspectives increase the likelihood of a vote for the PVV.

The core issues of the PVV are related to sociocultural issues. Their prime issues are the threat of Islam and foreigners to the Dutch culture, mass immigration and integration issues. Therefore, voters who want to decide upon national economic policy are not likely to vote for the PVV. On the other hand, the PVV has a shared agenda with the SP in the sense that they are both challenger and populist parties, but more specifically: they appeal to the ‘losers of globalisation’ and act against the ‘loose elite’ who only care about the like-minded people in their cosmopolitan world, not that of the ‘common citizen’. PVV-voters are mainly composed of educated, socioeconomically middle-class people, and, following from the ‘loser of globalisation’ explanation, these individuals did not benefit from the era of globalisation. Therefore, I would expect that they vote with their ‘pockets’ to get compensation for this loss.

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III.

R

D

To test my hypothesis, I use the survey of the NKO (Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek) of 2012. The most recent dataset of 2017 was not accessible at the time of selecting the data. Until 2012, the survey was executed by the Statistics Netherlands (CBS), a governmental organisation that produces statistical information and data about a wide area of social issues. The NKO surveys take place on an occasional basis when elections are held. The survey of 2012 was conducted six weeks after the national election of that year and had a response of 1490 respondents1_{. These respondents were} drawn randomly from the population register of the CBS. For internal consistency of the data, the differences between the sample and the total population are corrected through a weighting factor based on characteristics as gender, age, urbanisation degree, marital status, origin and turn up during the election.

These elections were held prematurely after the first cabinet of prime-minister Mark Rutte (VVD) fell. This was due to the fact that the PVV resigned the coalition, in which the Christian Democrats (CDA) were also part of, because of the possible increase of the retirement age. The elections were a close call for the right-conservatives (VVD), who won slightly more seats compared to the social-democrats (PvdA). Both parties formed the coalition of the second cabinet of Rutte. The PVV lost nine seats but maintained a relatively significant role in the Dutch political landscape. Moreover, the Netherlands currently provides both left-wing as well as right-wing populist parties. Consequently, a comparison between left and right populism can be made to see if economic perceptions influence the choice for both the SP and the PVV. If this is the case, then it leads to the question of how economic perceptions influence the choice for both the SP and the PVV.

DEPENDENTVARIABLE

The dependent variable is the probability to vote for the SP or PVV on a scale from zero to ten concerning the linear regression2_{. This regression analysis allows us to examine the possible linear} consistency between the continuous independent and the continuous dependent variable. In the case of the logistic regression, a dummy is created to compare the SP voters with all the other voters as well as for the PVV voters. Consequently, the actual voting behaviour is examined rather than the likelihood of voting.

1 _{See Appendix A: Table 1 for respondent’s party choice (p. 24)} 2 _{See Appendix A: Figure 1 for descriptive statistics (p. 24)}

12

D

The operationalisation of the independent variables goes as follows: two variables from the NKO belong to the sociotropic way of voting and two to the egocentric way. The sociotropic variables are measured by the following question and statement: ‘Would you say that over the past twelve months, the Dutch economy has improved, stayed about the same or has worsened?’ (answer categories: improved, remained the same, got worse), and ‘I am afraid the Dutch economic prospects will deteriorate’ (answer categories: fully agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, fully disagree). The egocentric variables consist of the following NKO variables: ‘How likely would it be to presume that your household income will seriously decline within the coming 12 months?’ (answer categories: very likely, likely, unlikely, very unlikely) and ‘I am afraid my own financial prospects will deteriorate’ (answer categories: fully agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, fully disagree). For the sake of clarity and readability of the models, I merged the following answer categories: ‘fully agree’ with ‘agree’ as well as ‘fully disagree’ with ‘disagree’.

Furthermore, all independent variables are recoded in a way that a higher score means a positive view of the economy or the respondent’s financial situation. The descriptives clearly show an overall negative attitude towards the Dutch economy and the own financial situation of the respondent based on the sample3_{. However, the respondents do not significantly differ in their} thoughts on if it is likely that their household income will decline within the next twelve months. More importantly, it turns out that the independent variables correlate with each other4_{. Therefore,} the two variables regarding egocentric voting will be called ‘egocentric perceptions’ and the two variables regarding sociotropic voting will be called ‘sociotropic voting’.

C

To make sure the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable is not affected by other explanations, I add several control variables to the models. First of all, the ‘loser of globalisation’ thesis entails that voters who are less educated, from lower socioeconomic classes and have lower incomes are more likely to vote for a populist party (Rooduijn 2018, Hawkins et al. 2017, Inglehart and Norris 2016, Gidron and Hall 2017, Bovens and Wille 2010). These features could have influence on the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. Therefore, I control for five background characteristics: gender, level of education (finished), age, household income and religiosity.

3 _{See Appendix A: Table 2 (p. 25)} 4 _{See Appendix B: Table 7 (p. 31)}

13 Another possible explanation of a vote for a populist party is the lack of trust in democracy, political institutions and politicians (Rooduijn 2018, Doyle 2011, Oesch 2008). Therefore, the following three variables are added: first, the variable ‘External Political Efficacy’ (V243 in NKO Codebook) is an index of three variables related to how trustworthy MP’s and political parties are and how much influence you as a citizen have. Second, ‘Political Cynicism’ (V256) is an index of five variables which emphasise the trustworthiness of politicians (these questions are about their corruptness, reliability, talks, promises and if they are profiteers or not). Third, ‘Political Trust’ is an index I created consisting of four variables concerning the level of trust in the elections, the government, the national parliament, and political parties (V231, V445, V446, and V451). Fourth, the respondent’s self-rating from left (=0) to right (=10) is measured to examine if the respondent sees himself/herself as more left or right compared to the party he/she is sympathising with.

As a final point, I control for two political issues. One that is labelled as ‘left’ and one as ‘right’, as it could be that the reason for voting on populist parties could be agreement or disagreement with one of these issues (Hawkins et al. 2017, Ivarsflaten 2005, 2008). In the same way as the difference between left and right populism is discussed in the theory-section, these differences also apply to political issues. The left political issue is the following statement: ‘The government should take measures to reduce the differences in income-levels’ by which respondents can fill in these answer categories: fully agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, fully disagree (V527). The political issue from the right-side of the political spectrum is a statement on native culture as the ‘The Dutch culture is threatened’, by which the same answer categories as the previous statement are used (V560).

METHODS

The main focus of this thesis lies in comparing left versus right-wing populism pertaining to sociotropic and egocentric voting behaviour. Therefore, a linear and logistic regression is executed in which the probability of voting for the SP and the PVV, as well as the dummy-variable of SP and PVV voters, is put in separate models. All control variables are added at the same time in both forms of analysis. In the case that none of these effects turn out to be statistically significant, these variables will be analysed without applying control variables to see if the effect of the independent variables are statistically significant in the first place. If one or more independent variables turns out to be significant, then the control variables will be added one for one to find out which of these is the explaining variable.

14

IV.

R

Table 1 provides a rough comparison between what the voters of the SP, the PVV, and other parties think of the four statements, which are the independent variables in the statistical analysis. The SP voters do not differ very much compared to voters of other parties so that hypotheses H1a and H1b are likely to be rejected. In particular, SP voters are less negative about the performance of the Dutch economy over the last year than other voters. The PVV voters score more negative on all four variables compared to both SP and other voters, so there is more space for possible confirmation of hypothesis H2. However, Table 1 does not provide answers about the causal effect behind these different outcomes.

Table 1: Voter’s response on independent variables

SP voters PVV voters Other voters

So

cio

tro

pic Over the past twelve months, the Dutch economy’s condition has gotten worse

56.6 % 68.1 % 58.0 %

Fully agree/agree with ‘I am afraid Dutch economic prospects will deteriorate’

67.5 % 87.4 % 60.0 %

Eg

oc

en

tric

Very likely/likely to presume that respondent’s household income will seriously decline within the coming 12 months

53.5 % 67.4 % 50.5 %

Fully agree/agree with ‘I am afraid my own financial prospects will deteriorate’

60.8 % 78.2 % 51.6 %

Both the linear and the logistic analysis show that the independent variables are insignificant when controlling for background characteristics of the respondent, self-rating on a left-right scale, political efficacy, political cynicism, political trust and two political issues (standpoint on if the government should reduce income differences and if the Dutch culture is threatened)5_{. In other} words, both egocentric and sociotropic voting motivations do not seem to correlate with a higher likelihood of voting for either the SP or the PVV. However, it could be that the independent variables are insignificant as one of the control variables are the explaining factor of voting for a populist party.

This is the case with left-wing populism. As Table 2 clearly shows, the effect of the sociotropic variable on a vote for the SP is significant, whereas the effect of the egocentric variable is insignificant. However, the significance of the sociotropic variable disappears when the control

15 variables are added6_{. Therefore, both hypotheses H1a and H1b are rejected. The control variables} that cause the insignificance of the sociotropic variable are ‘political efficacy’, ‘left-right self-rating’ and ‘Reduce income differences’7_{. In other words, people who do not trust MPs or political parties a} lot, consider themselves as very left and think that the Dutch government should reduce income differences are more likely to vote for the SP. The sociotropic perceptions do not matter after controlling for these variables.

In the case of the PVV, the egocentric variable turns out to be significant8_{. There is a strong link with} a negative view of the respondent’s financial situation and the likelihood that the respondent votes for the PVV, but there are no control variables applied to this model. The next step is examining which control variables are the actual drivers of a higher likelihood of voting for the PVV.

Table 3 shows the statistical model in which the control variables are build up step-by-step. The first model contains background characteristics of the respondent, the second adds the political attitudes of the respondent, the third adds how the respondent places him or herself on a left-right scale, and the fourth adds political issues. The results of this table show that political attitudes (political efficacy, cynicism and trust) are making the respondent’s economic attitudes less negative, but there is still a significant correlation with voting for the PVV. When political issues are added as in the case of the fourth model, the link between economic attitudes and the likelihood of voting for the PVV turns out to be insignificant. The political issues are derived from issues that are characterised as left and as right on the political spectrum. Hence, it is remarkable that the standpoints on income reduction are significant in the case of the PVV, a party which main focus is

6 _{See Appendix B: Table 1 (p. 26)} 7 _{See Appendix B: Table 3 (p. 28)} 8 _{See Appendix B: Table 6 (p. 31)}

Table 2: SP (probability to vote for)

Model 1 Model 2

Sociotropic perceptions -.283 (.138)*

Egocentric perceptions -.182 (.142)

N 1387 1385

Adjusted R2 0.2 % 0.0 %

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *

16 on cultural issues such as the Islam, the Dutch identity and traditions. The latter confirms the relevance of the second political issues about Dutch culture. The people who think that the Dutch culture is threatened are more likely to vote for the PVV. On the other hand, the PVV is placed on the left side with respect to socioeconomic issues so that left socioeconomic issues could be backed by PVV-sympathizers as well. Although the party does not actively campaign on these issues or do even mention it in their manifesto, the people who have strong opinions about socioeconomic issues (the government should take action to reduce income differences) are more likely to vote for the PVV.

To conclude this chapter, it is not the economic perceptions that relate to a higher probability to vote for the PVV. Instead, the explanatory power of negative egocentric perceptions on a PVV-vote disappears when two political issues are added to the model. These specific political Table 3: PVV (probability to vote for)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Egocentric perceptions -.700 (.137)*** -.375 (.139)** -.387 (.136)** -.126 (.133) Religiosity -.145 (.059)* -.133 (.058)* -.227 (.057)*** -.250 (.055)*** Age -.029 (.005)*** -.031 (.005)*** -.029 (.004)*** -.032 (.004)*** Gender (male = 1) .510 (.148)** .535 (.145)*** .424 (.143)** .450 (.138)** Education -.475 (.064)*** -.257 (.067)*** -.210 (.067)** -.099 (.066) Political efficacy -.340 (.082)*** -.223 (.082)** -.197 (.080)* Political cynicism .093 (.056) .111 (.055)* .034 (.054) Political trust -.735 (.173)*** -.868 (.171)*** -.688 (.166)*** Left-right self-rating .311 (.034)*** .326 (.036)*** Reduce income differences .346 (.075)*** Dutch culture is threatened .639 (.074)*** N 1328 1294 1252 1232 Adjusted R2 _{8.3 % 15.0 % 20.4 % 26.7 %}

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p <

17 issues are more salient for these voters compared to views on the national economy or someone’s financial situation. In the case of the SP, negative economic perceptions do not correlate with a higher likelihood to vote for this party, despite the fact that the socialist’s political fundaments are socioeconomic ones.

18

V.

C

In this thesis, I focussed on the economic voting behaviour of populist voters in the Netherlands. More precisely, I looked at how egocentric and sociotropic perceptions affect the voting decision of populist voters. In contrast to what could be expected from the academic literature, egocentric perceptions are not of importance with respect to left-wing populism. The voters of the SP do not differ with other voters in this respect. Sociotropic considerations are related to a vote for the SP, but this effect becomes insignificant when controlled for political efficacy, left-right self-rating, and political issues. On the other side, egocentric perceptions are related to vote for the PVV, the right-wing populist party. However, the effect of negative egocentric perceptions becomes insignificant when controlled for standpoints on two political issues. The first issue deals with reducing income differences by government policy and the second is regarding the Dutch culture that is under threat.

A vote for the PVV is not primarily based on negative egocentric perceptions, but rather that views on income reduction and the Dutch culture. The latter is important to the debate about the causes of populism, as it emphasises that a vote on right populism is derived from negative cultural attitudes. This outcome is in line with the cultural explanation of populism: progressive values tend to prevail over traditional values in a society, by which populist voters support traditional values and norms (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Gidron and Hall 2017). This explanations also entails the ‘threat’ of immigrants to the nativist’s culture, norms, and values (Van Assche et al. 2018, Rydgren 2005, Hogan and Haltinner 2015).

As a side-note to this academic debate, it is remarkable that a typical left political issue (the statement that the government should reduce income differences) is a salient issue for PVV sympathisers and voters. It could be argued that this leaves the door open for the economic explanation of populism. More specifically, the ‘losers’ want to increase their income –or at least that the top wealthiest part pays their fair share of taxes– since their opinion is that the Dutch government should reduce income differences. With this in mind, the PVV-voters might vote indirectly with their pockets.

Generally speaking, measuring perceptions are not a satisfying concept to understand the causes of a populist vote. As Table 1 (p. 14) shows, the views on the personal financial situation and the performance of the Dutch economy differ between populist and non-populist voters, but the statistic models show there is no correlation. The variance in both egocentric and sociotropic perceptions do not matter whether someone will vote for a populist party or not, which raises the question of why there are differences in perceptions at first sight. It could be that egocentric and sociotropic perceptions influence each other, e.g., negative perceptions about someone’s financial situation could also lead to a negative view of the Dutch economy as a whole. It could also be that

19 examining only one country (in this case: the Netherlands) means less variance compared to other research, which has used a European survey or several national surveys (Hobolt and Tilley 2016, Magni 2017, Negri 2019). Therefore, future research can be done on a European level to see if the egocentric and sociotropic voting considerations affect a populist vote. But the Dutch case also provides another interesting dataset in which the new right populist party Forum for Democracy (FvD) is added. As I stated in the introduction, this party’s core business is not the apparent incompatibility of Islam with Western values, but praising the Dutch culture in an intellectual and romantic way. It would be interesting to examine if the grievances of FvD-voters are mainly economically or culturally based.

20

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24

A

A:

Table 1 Party voted for in the 2012 elections

Party N % CDA 124 8.7 PvdA 358 25 VVD 401 28 GL 38 2.7 SP 147 10.3 D66 131 9.1 CU 38 2.7 SGP 29 2 PVV 95 6.6 PvdD 28 2 50Plus 27 1.9 Other party 13 0.9 Blanco 4 0.3 Total 1433 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 One

(never) Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine (certainlyTen

some day) Pe rc ent ag e Probability Figure 1 Probability of future vote for populist parties

PVV SP

25 Table 2: Descriptives independent variables

Independent variable %

Evaluation economic situation in the Netherlands, past twelve months Improved

Remained the same Got worse

I am afraid Dutch economic prospects will deteriorate Fully agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

10.4 30.8 58.8 10.8 52.5 22.1 Disagree 13.9 Fully disagree

Likelihood of substantial decline in household income next 12 months Very likely Likely 0.7 21.5 31.9 Unlikely 35.5 Very unlikely

I am afraid my own financial prospects will deteriorate Fully agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Fully disagree 11.2 14.2 42.1 24.2 17.3 2.3

Note: only the valid percentage is for all variables taken into account (without ‘don’t know’ and

26

A

B:

Table 1: SP (probability to vote for)

Model 1 Model 2 Sociotropic perceptions -.139 (.127) Egocentric perceptions -.214 (.137) Religiosity -.278 (.056)*** -.283 (.056)*** Age -.034 (.004)*** -.035 (.004)*** Gender (male = 1) -.109 (.143) -.094 (.142) Education -.074 (.068) -.084 (.068) Left-right self-rating -.573 (.036)*** -.576 (.036)*** Political efficacy -.016 (.082) -.007 (.082) Political cynicism -.066 (.055) -.078 (.055) Political trust -.155 (.170) -.160 (.170)

Reduce income differences .584 (.076)*** .571 (.076)***

Dutch culture is threatened .041 (.076) .034 (.076)

N 1236 1232

Adjusted R2 _{33.4 % 33.4 %}

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *

27 Table 2: PVV (probability to vote for)

Model 3 Model 4

Egocentric (New Financial Prospects) -.077 (.093)

Egocentric (New Household Income) -.107 (.145)

Religiosity -.255 (.055)*** -.251 (.055)*** Age -.032 (.004)*** -.032 (.004)*** Gender (male = 1) .454 (.138)** .445 (.138)** Education -.098 (.066) -.100 (.066) Left-right self-rating .260 (.033)*** .325 (.035)*** Political efficacy -.195 (.080)* -.196 (.080)* Political cynicism .042 (.053) .034 (.053) Political trust -.690 (.166)*** -.705 (.165)***

Reduce income differences .347 (.075)*** .346 (.075)***

Dutch culture is threatened .646 (.074)*** .647 (.073)***

N 1240 1236

Adjusted R2 _{26.9 % 26.7 %}

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *

28

Table 3: SP (probability to vote for)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Sociotropic perceptions -.273 (.138)* -.277 (.143) -.163 (.126) -.139 (.127) Religiosity -.500 (.063)*** -.491 (.064)*** -.284 (.057)*** -.278 (.056)*** Age -.029 (.005)*** -.028 (.005)*** -.029 (.004)*** -.034 (.004)*** Gender (male = 1) -.533 (.160)** -.504 (.163)** -.233 (.144) -.109 (.143) Education -.043 (.069) -.083 (.075) -.152 (.067)* -.074 (.068) Political efficacy .155 (.092) .002 (.083) -.016 (.082)* Political cynicism .014 (.063) -.007 (.056) -.066 (.055) Political trust -.122 (.193) -.185 (.172) -.155 (.170) Left-right self-rating -.666 (.034)*** -.573 (.036)*** Reduce income differences .584 (.076)*** Dutch culture is threatened .041 (.076) N 1328 1294 1256 1236 Adjusted R2 _{8.5 % 8.3 % 30.2 % 33.4 %}

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p <

29 Table 4: Non-populist (=0) vs SP-voters (=1)

Model 1 Model 2 Sociotropic perceptions .048 (.210) Egocentric perceptions -.059 (.215) Religiosity -.210 (.127) -.205 (.127) Age -.038 (.007)*** -.038 (.008)*** Gender (male = 1) .133 (.221) .199 (.221) Education -.192 (.107) -.203 (.107) Left-right self-rating -.438 (.060) -.449 (.061)*** Political efficacy .002 (.133) -.003 (.135) Political cynicism -.035 (.084) -.027 (.084) Political trust -.604 (.260)* -.574 (.264)*

Reduce income differences .445 (.134)** .450 (.136)**

Dutch culture is threatened .149 (.114) .130 (.114)

N 1124 1121

Nagelkerke R2 _{.254 .257}

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *

30 Table 5: Non-populist (=0) vs PVV-voters (=1)

Model 3 Model 4

Egocentric (New Financial Prospects) -.405 (.236)

Egocentric (New Household Income) -.313 (.314)

Religiosity -.414 (.143)** -.412 (.143)** Age -.026 (.009)** -.025 (.009)** Gender (male = 1) .524 (.284) .541 (.286) Education -.166 (.124) -.173 (.123) Left-right self-rating .407 (.078)*** .396 (.077)*** Political efficacy -.131 (.167) -.135 (.168) Political cynicism .039 (.097) .027 (.097) Political trust -1.367 (.327)*** -1.407 (.325)***

Reduce income differences .210 (.145) .205 (.147)

Dutch culture is threatened .751 (.173)*** .801 (.170)***

N 1128 1125

Nagelkerke R2 _{.402 .399}

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *

31 Table 6: PVV (probability to vote for)

Model 1 Model 2 Egocentric (New Financial Prospects) -.496 (.094)***

Egocentric (New Household Income) -.513 (.147)**

N 1400 1410

Adjusted R2 _{1.9 % 0.8 %}

Note: unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p

< 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 7: Correlations independent variables

New Dutch

Economy New Economic Prospects New Financial Prospects New Household Income New Dutch

Economy Pearson Correlation 1 .327** .206** .146**

Sig. (2-tailed) - .000 .000 .000

New Economic

Prospects Pearson Correlation .327** 1 .484** .242**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000 - .000 .000

New Financial

Prospects Pearson Correlation .206** .484** 1 .502**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 - .000

New Household

Income Pearson Correlation .146** .242** .502** 1

Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 -