The Catalan lobby
Political lobbying in the European Union
Joris van Santen 10053018
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam Main Supervisor: László Marácz Second Supervisor: Robin de Bruin
Table of contents
Abstract...3
Acknowledgements...3
1. Introduction ...4
1.1 European Union and the Regions...4
1.2 Lobbying in the European Union ...5
1.3 The Catalan Case ...5
1.4 Research Design ...6
1.5 Conclusion ...7
2. European Union ...8
2.1 European Integration Theories...8
2.1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism...8
2.1.2 Multi-level governance ...9
2.1.3 Paradiplomacy...9
2.1.4 Protodiplomacy ...11
2.2 The European Union and the Regions ...11
2.3 International Treaties ...15
3. Lobbying ...17
3.1 Definition of lobbying and political lobbying...17
3.2 History of lobbying ...18
3.3 Lisbon treaty ...19
3.4 Framework for business lobbying ...20
3.5 Direct Regional Interest Representation in the European Union ...23
3.6 Jones’s Taxonomy of Policy Influence ...27
3.6.1 Evidence and advice ...30
3.6.2 Public campaigns and advocacy...30
3.6.3 Lobbying and negotiation...30
4. Case study - Catalan case ...32
4.1 Catalan history of culture and identity...32
4.2 Recent Catalan history ...35
4.3 Response ...39
4.3.1 Catalan response...39
4.3.2 Spain’s response ...40
4.3.3 EU’s response ...41
4.3.4 International media’s response...41
4.4 Assessment of the Catalan lobby ...42
5. Conclusions ...52
Abstract
For the past two years, Catalan separatism has been dominating the news in Spain. What exactly is occurring in Catalonia and Spain and why does the European Union refuse to become involved? Catalonia has historically had a n individual cultural identity within Spain with the according amount of cultural nationalism. In the past decade, however, the nationalism has shifted into separatism, eventually resulting in the organisation of an illegal referendum for independence. The Spanish government has used their monopoly on violence in order to prevent a majority of Catalans from voting in the elections, to an allegedly disproportional extent. Additionally, the Catalan government as a whole was dissolved and political as well as civil society leaders were put in detained for rebellion against the state. This thesis will search for the answer by initially offering qualitative research on the developments leading to the current situation, followed by an assessment of lobbying at the EU done by the Catalans. Deriving from this assessment, is the conclusion on whether lobbying at the EU has any effect or if the EU simply cannot react to domestic problems. The paradox of promoting regional empowerment and simultaneously upholding the principle of subsidiarity will be discussed.
Keywords: Catalonia, European Union, Human Rights, Political Lobbying, Self Determination
Acknowledgments
This thesis is completed in June 2019, a month after the European parliamentary elections in which Catalan politicians in detention were elected for the European parliament. The research has found itself amidst rapidly changing developments surrounding the topic, which made it interesting and at times difficult, due to the fact that any day more relevant data would
become available. Therefore, I express my desire for further academic research on the topic, as it is clear that the situation in Catalonia will not lose its urgency in the nearby future.
1. Introduction
It is 2019 and the then elected president of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, is in exile in Brussels. The Spanish state has issued an arrest warrant, and upon returning to Spain, he will be arrested and incarcerated in his home country Spain for organising an illegal referendum for independence in Catalonia. There he would join twelve former colleagues who are already imprisoned and currently on trial for charges of rebellion and misuse of public funds. Brussels, however, will not extradite him, for he hasn’t committed any crimes according to Belgian and European law. This situation could, or even should, result in a European crisis in which Spain and the European Union (EU) find themselves in a standoff. Surprisingly, according to many, there is no crisis. For the time being, there is merely a domestic problem in which Spain has the mandate to act as they desire. Catalonia is reaching out to the world, in particular by lobbying to the European Union, to help Catalonia take a stance against the accusations of crimes against democracy and humanity by Spain. The Catalan politicians and civil society leaders who are incarcerated were, in the eyes of many Catalans, merely enjoying their freedom of speech and assembly. Additionally, the police violence that was used during the illegal referendum was deemed disproportional. Additionally, the right to self-determination is mentioned as a universal right. The European Union has signed international treaties in which these basic human rights are embedded, therefore the European Union should interfere in this domestic issue according to a majority of the Catalan people. However, there is no response from the European Union to what is occurring in Spain. What enables this situation to happen? The research question of this thesis will therefore be:
Through which channels did Catalonia lobby for self-determination at the level of the European Union? To what extent has it been successful?
The structure of this thesis will be as follows. 1.1 European Union and the Regions
In order to answer the two research questions, an understanding of certain political theories and trends in the European Union is necessary. The context of these theories, and why they are applicable, will be introduced in this chapter, and further elaborated in the following chapters of this thesis.
At first, the notion of subnational entities in Europe will be assessed. Due to the fact that Catalonia is a region not only of Spain but also of Europe, a good understanding of the position
that regions have in the EU is of importance. Therefore, the second chapter of this thesis will provide a theoretical understanding of European integration theories that apply to the mandate and preference representation that regions have in European decision-making.
Secondly, as stated above, the Catalan pro-independence voters have expressed their desire for intervention by the EU, based on the assumption that basic human rights are being violated. Accordingly, the international treaties signed by the EU to which they refer will be presented. As a result, having looked at the level of regional interest representation and the international treaties regarding human rights and the right for self-determination, a conclusion will be drawn regarding the question whether the EU facilitates a window in which the pro-independence Catalans can operate.
1.2 Lobbying in the European Union
After having established the general theories regarding the power of regions in the EU, the third chapter will provide a historical context of lobbying, followed by the framework in which business lobbies as well as political lobbies can operate in the EU. Both are presented, taking into account the fact that business lobby is more well-known than political lobby, but that they have much in common. Of both lobbies a clear definition will be put forward. The Catalan lobby is the main topic of this thesis, and thus will be referred to frequently. The definition of Catalan lobby as used in this thesis, which will be elaborated further in chapter four, is as follows:
- Catalan public and private actors who attempt to influence policy at the EU level After describing the historical context and the current rules and practices regarding (political) lobbying in the EU, a theoretical tool will be presented by which lobby influence can be assessed. The ‘Typology of influence activities’ by Harry Jones (2011, p.2), as presented in his research ‘A Guide to Monitoring and Evaluating Policy Influence’, is a taxonomy through which lobby activities can be categorised in order to assess their potential for influence on policies. This tool will be used in chapter four to assess the Catalan lobby in the EU.
1.3 The Catalan Case
Chapter four will provide a qualitative understanding of the Catalan history and current developments. After having presented the relevant developments in terms of cultural and political thought leading to the present day, the various paths taken by the Catalan lobby in order to lobby at the EU will be categorised, using Harry Jones’s (2011) taxonomy tool.
Finally, after having collected all qualitative data and having used the taxonomy tool by Harry Jones, a conclusion will be given about the possibilities for Catalonia in the current position of the EU and the possibilities for a lobby with significant policy influence.
1.4 Research Design
In order to assess the Catalan lobby as stated above, it is imperative to choose a research method by which the research question can be answered. This thesis will offer an analysis of the position of Catalonia in Spain and the EU and in order to analyse Catalonia’s position, text and document analysis will be used. The analysis of the historical context, current events and international position of Catalonia constitutes a qualitative study, so consequently this research method is suitable according to Glenn Bowen, who in his article ‘Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method’ (2009, p.29) stated that ’As a research method, document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative studies – intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organisation, or program’. Due to the topical nature of the developments surrounding Catalonia, making a qualitative assessment will require the use of news articles as well. By doing so, this thesis will be able to provide a current, relevant contribution to this field of study.
Before proceeding to document analysis, one could question the nature of a document itself. What is a document and when does an object become a document? As Gorichanaz and Latham stated (2016, p.1115), scholars ‘historically focused on the material aspects of documents; more recently, the academics focus has turned toward the social and perceptual aspects of documents’. Additionally, they claim that documents can only exist when human recognition is given in the context of the object (idem, p.1115). Following this line of reasoning, one can argue that documents are subject to bias and not a viable research method. Nonetheless, the number of research reports and journals that mention document analysis as part of their methodology has been increasing (Bowen 2009, p.27). Especially in historical and cultural research, document analysis provides insights that can be used to answer one’s research question (idem 2009, p.29-30). In line with the subjectivity as described in Gorichanaz and Latham (2016), one could argue that the use of news articles will emphasise the notion of subjectivity. For the sake of objectivity, this thesis will provide news articles from all sides of the political spectrum, taking into account their subjectivity when reporting
In this thesis, books, articles, journals, letters, newspapers, background papers, institutional and organisational reports will be used. Together, as confirmed by Glenn Bowen (2009), they will offer a rich description, facilitating a qualitative assessment of the research topic.
1.5 Conclusion
At last, after the assessment of the EU’s position on regions, the understanding of lobbying as well as the evaluating of such (political) lobbying, and the evaluation of the Catalan case, a conclusion will be provided in which all data will distillate into the answer to the research question.
2. European Union
In this chapter, a theoretical understanding of the position of the regions within the EU is given, followed by the international treaties, signed by the EU, that are deemed relevant for this thesis.
2.1 European Integration Theories
At first, the theories of liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance will be assessed. They will provide understanding of the relationship between supranational, national and regional sovereignty. Next, the theories of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy will be presented, as they provide understanding of exceptions to these relationships and might establish a new European political hierarchy.
2.1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism
In the field of European Studies, up until the 1980s, there were two theories of International Relations that dominated the scientific debate: liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. In essence, according to liberal intergovernmentalism there are three stages of EU decision-making process: foreign economic policy preference formation, inter-state bargaining and institutional delegation (Moravcsik 1995, p.612). In this theory it is assumed that major EU decisions do not take place in anarchy, but are taken in reference to previous agreements (idem, p.612). Therefore, as is the case with any theory of intergovernmentalism, the states are viewed as actors that are rational and unitary (Cini & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2016, p.66). This means that European integration can only be assessed by focusing at the actions that national governments take to integrate further, not by looking at the European integration project as such. The involvement of other actors in this international playing field is recognised, but the relation between states are channelled through these national governments and the influence is ‘crucial, and certainly not controlling’ (Nugent 2010, p.26). The national governments are ‘bargaining’ for their domestic policy preferences in an international playing field that is designed not as a common project, but as an economic tool to manage the costs and benefits that economic interdependence produces for the national governments (Moravcsik 1995). Additionally, the state governments have the right to use a veto, which means that they remain the principal actor in international bargaining. By having this right to veto, the national actors always have power over their own preference and thus on the actions towards the EU level. The subnational governments or actors in the Member States of the EU do play an important role, since they influence the position of national governments
(Nugent 2010). After the national preference in the international bargaining stage is set, however, the subnational
entities do not play an important role anymore, since the bargaining between the national governments has started and one cannot act without consent of the state government at the EU level (Tatham 2011). Therefore, according to the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, the national governments, with their right to veto, will remain the gatekeeper to the EU level. Consequently, subnational governments would not be able to influence EU policy directly but will always have to try and influence policy through their national governments.
2.1.2 Multi-level governance
As explained earlier, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism was dominant until the 1980s. After that, new developments in the field of the EU were cumulating, such as the Single European Act in 1986, and European integration became more complex and comprehensive. The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism did not grasp some of the decision-making structures as other actors besides the national governments influenced the European decision-making process. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2011) developed another theory, which they called multi-level governance. They described European integration as ‘a policy creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of governments – subnational, national and supranational’. Also, the ‘decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by national governments’ (idem 2001, p.2-3). This means that multi-level governance is different from liberal intergovernmentalism, as multi-level governance acknowledges EU policy influence by subnational entities, whereas liberal intergovernmentalism does not. Shared influence is key to the theory of multi-level governance, with the developments in the EU, such as the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, in the making the theory was developed to incorporate the current EU playing field and its changed dimensions. For example, the fact that subnational entities can bypass their national governments in the EU decision-making process, means that certain bargaining power is drawn from national governments. In this way, the ‘gatekeeping’ role of the national governments is undermined and according to Piattoni the actors are crossing these gates ‘without the keepers permission’ (Piattoni 2009, p.166).
2.1.3 Paradiplomacy
Following the tendency that started in the 1980s, subnational entities gradually gained influence in the EU policy. There were subnational representation offices in Brussels that were opened and the subsidiarity principle had as a consequence that the EU created the
Committee of the Regions in 1994 (Jeffery 2000, p.2). Additionally, there was a reform of the EU regional policy
in 1988, which made subnational actors recognised partners of the EU. As a consequence, the power of the EU regions was enhanced. The reallocation of funds influenced the actions of the EU regions as well. These subnational actors saw an opportunity to place themselves in the middle of the EU regional policies and receive EU regional funds, thus bypassing their national governments (Bache & Jones 2000, p.17). As Jeffery stated, they had ‘autonomous channels of access to the extra-state arena of European policy-making’ (Jeffery 2000, p.2). For this thesis, assessing the subnational relation of Catalonia with the EU level, this period will prove to have been crucial. At the time, the narrative of the ‘Europe of the Regions’, which will be further elaborated in the following paragraphs, was created to describe the renewed relationship between the different levels of decision-making. The subnational entities would be in power to act around the gatekeeping powers of central governments. This claim, however, was short-lived, when the academic consensus described the subnational actors as not being able to have an independent role at the EU level (Tatham 2008). Subnational actors remained a part of the national government, which meant that giving power to subnational governments would undermine the national governments and would not be durable.
So, in theory, the national governments still act as gatekeepers. Other authors, however, did find evidence of subnational governments that successfully influenced EU policy through bypassing their national government (Tatham 2008; Keating 2008). For example, region specific preferences, such as fisheries, are being lobbied at EU level, which makes it prone to identification as a mere lobby interest instead of regional interest. It was Keating who suggested the term ‘paradiplomacy’, based on the inability of national government to control all relationships, including the relationship between the subnational government and the EU. Additionally, the new policy fields in the EU give ‘rise to complex patterns of paradiplomacy and inter-regional networking’ (Keating 2008, p.630). This conclusion is also drawn by Jeffery (2000, p.2), who describes the traditional role of the national government as the exclusive authority of shaping their EU policy as outdated, and identifies that subnational actors can now act upon their own preferences for the Member State, hence sharing competence with the central government regarding EU policy making. One can conclude that both theories, liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance that facilitates paradiplomacy, can co-exist. Scholars are divided on these theories, a division that shows that there are for both perspectives. It is identified that subnational actors have direct contact with EU institutions (Nugent 2010). As he argues, subnational actors will work with the EU more
through their national governments when it has no specific preference in that policy field and, where appropriate, in
the international arena such as EU institutions in matter where there is specific preference (Tatham 2008; Nugent 2010). So it is clear that subnational actors, when appropriate, use their contacts in the EU and establish a network in which they operate to bypass their national government. To what extent this is effective, and to what extent one can speak of bypassing the national government fully, is still a challenge to assess due to the final mandate that national governments have.
2.1.4 Protodiplomacy
In addition to the theories of paradiplomacy, one can distinguish paradiplomacy from protodiplomacy. Whereas paradiplomacy is aimed at international diplomacy by sub-state actors parallel to the state diplomacy with no conflict of interests, protodiplomacy is aimed at opposing the diplomacy of their state (Segura 2017, p.346; Lecours 2002, p.107). Sub-state goverments openly attempt to gain foreign support for their eventual declaration of independence, and for this reason the field of protodiplomacy makes it easier to assess than the field of paradiplomacy itself (Lecours 2002). By assessing the attempts of sub-state governments to gain support of other state governments, a practice which can be identified and categorised, one can address the amount of protodiplomacy apparent in a situation.
2.2 The European Union and the Regions
European Integration is characterised by the notion of sovereignty, mainly by the loss of such sovereignty when policy making is shifted to supranational entities. The position of regions in Europe has changed accordingly. The EU’s policy in order to facilitate regional interest representation and the channels through which regions can search for such representation will be presented.
As the European Union has gradually been integrating, new forms of cooperation amongst Member States have occurred. Up until the 1970’s, regional policy in Europe was a national matter (Cappelen et al 2003, p.623), but as economic cooperation grew, a greater focus on regional policy started to occur. A leap forward for EU regional policy was taken in the ‘80s and ‘90s, when Multi-level Governance was first developed. As stated before, Multi-Level Governance defines the existence of multiple levels of decision-making beyond the national and supranational one in Europe (Piattoni 2009). As a result of the acknowledgement of regional importance, the European Community started to develop regional funding in the ‘70s
(Cappelen et al 2003, p.623). Gradually the importance of regions grew, and the European regions reacted to these developments. During the ‘80s, subnational missions were initiated, and regional offices were opened in Brussels in order to represent the regional needs. Birmingham City Council being was first, followed by many Spanish comunidades autónomas, German Länder and Italians regions (Trobbiani 2016, p.22). These ‘paradiplomatic’ practices are underlined by Keating (2000, as cited in Trobbiani 2016, p.22) when he defines the regions as being ‘increasingly recognised as a unit of production, whose success depends on the capacity to mount a coherent project, thereby tapping the energies of both public and private sectors’. Additionally, he states that a larger role is being given for business associations and firms, research and educational institutions, and cultural bodies (idem, p.23).
The European Community’s focus on regions was best seen during the 1988 structural funds reforms. The objective was to ‘make the funds more effective in reducing the gap between advanced and less-advanced regions, and strengthening economic and social cohesion in the European Community’ (Cappelen et al 2003, p.622), and with the single market as a future aspiration it redefined the allocation of funds around conceptual guidelines (Trobbiani 2016). One of the most important notions during these reforms was the involvement of the regional actors in the structural funding reforms. The new conceptual guidelines empowered the regional actors to take part in the bargaining and decision making phase. These developments created a narrative of ‘Europe of the Regions’, which was received well among academics (idem 2016, p.10). The sub-national authorities’ expanding jurisdiction was a sign of their progressive rise to power among the most powerful political entities in Europe.
In the European Parliament, the narrative of ‘Europe of the Regions’ got recognition, as for example the Greens adopted this vision when pleading that regions and peoples instead of nations or nation-states were to become the primary political units in a new, decentralised, diverse and democratic Europe (Banai 2012, p.43). The ‘Europe of Regions’ could be described as ‘a loose confederation of regions, culturally defined, historically developed, self-determined but intertwined’ (idem 2012, p.43). The purpose was to, in advance of the Treaty of Maastricht in the early ‘90s where supranational tendencies were developing, define the importance of cultural legitimation in political representation. The Greens were wary of the Maastricht Treaty, as these cultural differences would not be addressed properly. In a federal Europe (of the Regions) cultural boundaries would be respected and therefore the
decision-making should be done by parliamentarians and not by delegates of governments (idem 2012).
In fact, as Trobbiani argues, the idea of ‘Europe of the Regions’ was more of a political slogan than a goal of the EU (2016, p.10). The exact definition among scholars has changed over the years. Most literature in the mid-1990s referred to a ‘Europe of the regions, with the regions, with certain regions or through the regions’ (Tatham 2008, p.494). The importance of addressing the regional differences was however undisputed. Another slogan that was used during the 1990s, with the introduction of the EU as we know it today, is ‘Unity in Diversity’ (Crepaz 2016, p.24). As a result of the Schengen area, in which free movement of goods, people and services was established, the borders between countries needed to be redefined. Cultural differences became a core value for the European Union, as can be seen in the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU in 1993: ‘Respect for and protection of minorities’ is specifically mentioned as a condition for joining the EU from that moment onwards (idem 2016, p.24). As Crepaz describes, the implementation of the regional dimension in the EU has been necessary for the peace and tranquillity in Europe. This is due to the fact that the 20th century was characterised by oppression of minority groups, but after
the Second World War the focus lay on human rights and acknowledgement of cultural differences within a nation-state, rather than on rethinking the notion of the nation-states themselves (Crepez 2016, p.25). However, many minorities still did not feel as if they ‘belonged’ to the nation-states they were citizens of, and a ‘Europe of Regions’ in which regional interests are represented, would provide a good solution for this issue (idem 2016). From the side of the EU, in light of the growing importance of regional representation, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) was founded in 1994 in order to address the need for regional representation. As Jacques Delors said during his inauguration: ‘’The Committee of Regions is called upon to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the Union… If one had to justify its creation in one sentence, it is this one I would put forward’’ (Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, at the inaugural session in 1994). The aim was to establish a chamber of regional and territorial authorities, acting as a third legislative chamber alongside the Council and the European Parliament (Piattoni 2012, p.62). The expectations of the CoR have not been met according to many, ironically due to the discrepancy of regional mandates within the Member States of the EU (Crepez 2016, p.28). While, for example, the German Länder can decide many policies regionally, in France the system is more centralised and the set of competences is limited. This discrepancy leads to different expectations of the role of the CoR, which
complicates its pursuits and weakened the position of the institution. As a result, throughout the years the CoR’s mandate and composition has been adjusted and strengthened through various EU treaties, which have enlarged the mandatory consultation and made the CoR a body of representatives with an electoral mandate (Crepez 2016; Trobbiani 2016). Especially the Treaty of Lisbon gave the CoR significant power, giving it the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice when defending their own prerogatives. Additionally, it could start ex-post subsidiarity controls on new legislation (Crepez 2016, p.29).
Even though the CoR has been criticised for its inability to have measurable impact on EU policy, it still provides EU institutions a ‘good link with the grassroots’ and is ‘good for developing transnational projects and joint ventures’ (Tatham 2008, p.506). The functionality of the CoR is best seen in two kinds of situations. The first is as advisory board for the Commission, to provide a more solid basis of argumentation when the Commission creates regional policy. Second, the Commission not only presents their policy to the CoR for consultancy, but occasionally includes the CoR in the development of the policy. It is clear that this policy influence was aimed at when the CoR was established. In reality, however, these circumstances are rare and the overall influence of the CoR is seen as diffuse and weak (idem 2008, p.506).
Some authors claim that the position in which the CoR is now situated is special and perhaps a positive one. The CoR has an electoral mandate, which means that it’s members do not only represent the regions in Europe in general; but also represent the region(s) of which they are an elected candidate (Trobbiani 2016). In Piattoni’s view (2011), this is a ground-breaking position in which the CoR functions, and therefore could be seen as the future of European governance in which lobbyism, supranational and regional policies occur simultaneously. However, there is no consensus among scholars regarding this optimism. As Trobbiani (2016, p.19) states, many studies have tried to measure the effectiveness of the lobby activities by the CoR, and the analysis suggests that ‘the decision-making triangle of the EU might actually only value the CoR’s opinion when seeking to create a critical mass of consensus behind its own initial positions.’ Furthermore, the representativeness is criticised, as the members are chosen by national governments, meaning that the national governments can bargain with their own regions who will receive the seats, making it a centralised election diminishing the notion of regional interests (Trobbiani 2016, p.500).
2.3 International Treaties
As mentioned above, representation of the regions is embedded in European integration theories and policies. On a universal scale, empowerment of regions is protected as well. Spain and the EU have signed international treaties, to which the Catalan separatists are currently referring. Even though the EU is not a state, it has an ‘observer status’ in the UN and signs treaties as the EU as a whole. To what extent and in what context the Catalan separatists refer to these articles will be elaborated in the fourth chapter of this thesis. The international treaties regarding self-determination and human rights that are referred to are:
- The Charter of the United Nations, written in 1945 after the Second World War, and in particular article 1.1: ‘develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ (Charter UN 1945). - Article 1 of the International Covent on Civil and Political Rights, signed in 1966,
states that ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (ICCPR 1966).
- In 1995, the United Nations signed the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, in which article 1.2 states that the declaration will ‘Continue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognise the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-determination.’(General Assembly 1995).
- Article 19 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers’ (UN 1948).
- Article 20 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.’ (UN 1948).
To conclude, the EU has historically tried to empower regions, as the EU is composed of them. Through political slogans such as ‘Europe of the Regions’, attempts were made to incorporate regions in the EU decision-making process, but one could argue that this line of
thought has not proven to be successful. Still, as the theory of multi-level governance emphasises, decision-making is occurring on many different policy levels, which makes it interesting for regions with certain goals. Additionally, the EU has signed international treaties that consolidate human rights and the right to self-determination. Because of the aforementioned reasons, one could argue that the EU does provide a window in which the Catalan pro-independence actors can operate.
3. Lobbying
In the previous chapter, an overview was given of the theories of European integration that are applicable to the Catalan lobby. In this chapter, an understanding of lobbying will be given. At first, a brief history of lobby is presented, followed by the definition of lobbying in which the difference between business lobbying and political lobbying will be put forward. Secondly, the frameworks in which business lobby and political lobby act according to the current European legislation are assessed. One must note that this thesis focuses on lobbying within the EU, therefore the assessment of this framework is merely based on frameworks in the EU. An assessment of lobbying within the EU is necessary in understanding the Catalan lobby in Europe, and the reactions on said lobby practices.
3.1 Definition of lobbying and political lobbying
One cannot imagine a political landscape in the EU without lobby practices of some sort. The term ‘lobbying’ is prone to different views, therefore it is important to determine a definition to base this research on. There is a difference in paradigm on defining lobbyism, whether lobbying is considered to be intentional or non-intentional (Bernhagen & Bräuniger 2005, p.43). A big corporate, in line of reasoning of the non-intentional scholars, asserts influence even though not actively contacting and pressuring policymakers. This view on ‘democratic capitalism’ (idem 2005) that they identify, also regards influencing public opinion in order to assert influence on the policymaking level, also known as indirect lobbying (Sobbrio 2011, p.236). This definition of lobbying is underlined by Oanta and Vasilcovsch (2014). In this thesis, their definition will be followed, in which they take a broad concept and where lobbying is defined as ‘an organization or individual seeking to influence policy, but doesn’t attempt to be elected’ (2014, p.177)
In this thesis, the term political lobbying will be frequently used, therefore a clear definition is necessary. As is the case with lobbying, political lobbying too is a practice in which policy is being influenced by those who do not attempt to be elected. With political lobbying, however, the ‘individual or organisation’ as stated in Oanta and Vasilcovsch’s definition (2014), is a political actor, an individual or organisation that has an democratic electoral mandate, or is being supported by such individuals or organisations. Also, this thesis is focused on political lobbying merely in the EU. Therefore, the definition of political lobbying that will be used in this thesis is: ‘subnational actors seeking to influence EU policy’.
3.2 History of lobbying
On a national level, governments have dealt with the question of lobbying in various ways. The word ‘lobbying’ has acquired negative connotations, mainly due to the unfair advantage that actors that are capable of lobbying have over others, and to the fact that lobbying is in opposition to the notion of democracy (Warleight & Fairbrass 2002, as cited in Oanta & Vasilcovsch 2014, p.172). The critiques that lobbying had received, demanded a dialogue with the public opinion and EU Member States have acted differently upon these demands. This has led to disparity in legal frameworks regarding lobbying in the Member States of the EU. Some countries have had laws for lobbying for decades, whereas other countries recently started to ‘control’ the lobby practices in their countries.
To underline the difference between various Member States, one could start with the etymology of the term ’lobbying’ itself. Its origin lies at first in the Latin laubia, lobia, meaning ‘covered walk in a monastery’, and later on the German word lobby that can be translated as ‘wide entrance, a hallway in an institution’. In the 19th century the verb ‘to lobby’ became certified, at first in 1850. The word ‘lobbyist’ came shortly after, in 1863. Early use of the word ‘lobby’ can be found in reference to the Willard Hotel, a well-known hotel for diplomats in Washington, where groups approached the lawmakers that were present and attempted to influence their decision-making. (Oanta & Vasilcovsch 2014, p.172). They did so, because legislators did not obtain their private offices, the meetings held were in the lobby of the hotel, hence the term lobbying. The term truly gained recognition when it was used by former President of the United States General Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877), after the White House was destroyed in a fire and the president, who was staying at a hotel, was dissatisfied with the people that tried to convince him of making certain political decisions in his hotel lobby (idem 2014, p.171).
In Europe, at the national level, there have been different approaches to dealing with lobbyism. Two of Europe’s greatest forces, Germany and France, have dealt with it in vastly different ways. For example, the first laws regarding lobbying in Germany, were created in 1972.They were the first country in Europe to do so (European Parliamentary Research Service 2016, p.14). In France, on the other hand, the first laws were created in 2016. In 2018, the first laws regarding lobbying were implemented in France (idem 2016, p.13). This means that the German government has had more time to integrate lobby practices in the national narrative of politics and economics, whereas in France the existence of lobby practices have not been part of the
political and economic narrative. During the years of European integration, policymaking gradually shifted from the national level to the level of European institutions. Due to the implementation of the Single Market, lobby groups have witnessed an exponential growth (Oanta & Vasilcovschi 2014, p.178). The European parliament, in their Briefing Paper ‘Lobbying in the European Union’ of 2007, stated that ever since 1993 after the Maastricht Treaty, there were two tendencies regarding lobby activities in the European Union. The first, is the search for increased transparency in the decision making process. The second, is that the amount of lobbyists have been increasing steadily every year (European Parliament 2007) The European Union continued to allow lobby practices and as Oanta and Vasilcovschi stated (2014, p.177), ‘There is significant resource dependency between government and lobbyists based on regulatory needs, expertise, information and reputation’. For this reason, it is of importance to create a framework that is based on long-term thinking and through which lobby groups can operate with consent and control. The Transparency Register would be an answer, as the European Union ‘expects the EU decision-making process to be as transparent and open as possible’ (Transparency Register 2019).
3.3 Lisbon treaty
Even though views regarding lobbying vary between Member States, the EU has provided a legal framework which they implemented in the Treaty of Lisbon 2009. When assessing the implementation of these lobby regulations, one must take into account that France, at the time, did not have any domestic regulations regarding lobby. Therefore, it was a remarkable accomplishment of the EU to be able to implement these notions in the Treaty of Lisbon. One can observe it as the beginning of a new era of governance in the EU which acknowledged the presence and influence of lobby actors. Leading to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission had issued a Green Paper in which the definition of lobbying was posed: ‘all activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of the European institutions’ (European Transparency Initiative 2006, p.5). Additionally, in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union was posed that ‘the institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action’ (TFEU 2009). As we have seen, there has been a paradigm shift regarding lobby practices in Europe. The paradigm shift first occurred between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, and was fuelled by
the replacement of the hegemony of the Welfare State with a predominant neo-liberal paradigm (Loughlin 1996, p.160). In this neo-liberal paradigm, there is a basic distrust of the public sector and promotion of market-based approaches to public policy issues (idem, p.160). Lobbyism and acceptance of its presence could be viewed as a poignant example of such developments. Nowadays, lobby practices have become an integral part of the political landscape and policy structures.
3.4 Framework for business lobbying
When speaking of lobbying in the EU, notably the ways in which it can be done, one could identify two routes: the Brussels route and the national route. The Brussels route implies direct lobbying at the European institutions or the advisory institutions of the EU. On the other hand, taking the national route, lobbyists focus merely on the national ministries, parliaments, advisory institutions and constitutional courts (Greenwood 2011, p.25). Mostly, these two routes are taken simultaneously, given the nature of European policy making. Policy-making is based on intergovernmental decision making as well as supranational dialogues, making it appealing for interest groups to focus on both routes (idem 2011). To be able to assert more influence, interest groups often make use of networks and coalitions at the national, transnational or supranational level (Kohler-Koch & Eising 1999, p.195). These networks and coalitions consist of individuals and lobby groups that have the same agenda and interests. By working together, information exchange can lead to higher chance of influencing the decision making process. Additionally, forming civil society coalitions on a supranational level is sometimes endorsed and subsidised by the European Union, for example in the case of consumer rights or environmental interest groups (European Transparency Commission 2006, p.5).
From the EU’s perspective, regulating lobby practices is proven to be difficult. At first, as stated in Article 10 TEU: ‘The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy, Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen’ (TEU 2007). The principle of free democracy, with every citizen having the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union, implies that every company or organisation will have the same right, as it is formed by Union citizens. Interest representation - or lobbying - is the communication between interested members of society and the representatives on behalf of
the State that have decision-making powers. Following Article 10 TEU, this is crucial to the legitimisation of the democratic system,
as the decision-making process is occurring in communication with civil society, or as the European Parliament stated: ‘In a system governed under democracy, policy-related decision-making processes cannot and must not take place in a ‘vacuum’ or in hermetic isolation (European Parliament 2014, p.8). By the restriction of processes in a ‘vacuum’, the open, responsive, pluralistic character of the European Union is being put in a legal framework. An important notion is that, according to the European Parliament, a free democracy also entails the right to be able to speak to an official in confidence, as happens in lobbying (idem 2014, p.8). The right for citizens to participate in the democratic life of the European Union is thus found in Article 10 TEU, resulting in difficulty to regulate such practices.
Additionally, as stated in Article 11 TEU, the ‘institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action’, while Article 11.2 TEU requires the institutions to ‘maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’ (TEU 2007). The provisions in this article could be interpreted as an obligation to maintain transparency all along the legislative process, as it states: ‘open, transparent and regular dialogue’. The European Parliament, however, explains that it is the general view that it contains any legal framework, but in reality it does not have any legislative powers. Therefore it cannot be chosen as basis for powers that can be used to implement mandatory transparency requirements in respect of interest representatives (European Parliament 2014).
An article that is necessary to assess in the framework for lobbying is Article 15 TFEU, which states the following:
1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.
2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act.
3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the
principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph. (TFEU 2008)
The fact that lobby practices could not be regulated in its entirety, are shown in these provision in the statement of the European Parliament. At first, it states that the institutions and bodies shall conduct their work ‘as openly as possible’. Even though this provision is seen by some as a step forward (European Union Democracy Observatory 2011, p.5), legally describing the necessity for transparency in the Treaty of Lisbon does not offer ground for legislative power (European Parliament 2014, p.15). This means that no legal action can be taken when transparency is not open ‘enough’ in the subjective view of one party. In a legal framework, the ‘as openly as possible’ notion therefore could be described as legally useless. Still, agreeing on shared values and preferences has been the basis of almost every EU Treaty, making it possible to use soft power towards other Member States in the EU in order to uphold this notion of openness. This mechanism has been the basis of many EU treaties and therefore it is useful to incorporate in the Treaty. The third notion, where the right of access to documents by Union citizens is described, also leaves room for interpretation as article 15.3 states that this right is ‘subject to the principles and the condition to be defined in accordance with this paragraph’ (TFEU 2008).
Apart from the above mentioned articles, the ‘flexibility clause’, which has been around for decades, is noteworthy (European Commission 2019). The flexibility clause was included by the fathers of the treaties in recognition of the fact that it would be impossible to provide for all contingencies that may arise throughout the integration process. It allows the EU to act in areas where EU competences have not been explicitly granted in the treaties but are necessary to the attainment of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It thus represents a means of adapting to new challenges. The former flexibility clause – found in ex Article 235 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) and ex Article 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) – was retained in the Treaty of Lisbon in Article 352 TFEU despite the broadening of competences of the EU. It requires unanimity in the Council and, since the Lisbon reform, also the consent of the European Parliament. The Commission is obliged to draw the attention of national parliaments to the use of this legal basis. The ex-ante review procedure for subsidiarity applies to all legislative proposals. The flexibility clause as described in Article 352 TFEU is:
1. If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined by the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the
a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
2. Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission shall draw national Parliaments’ attention to proposals based on this Article.
3. Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.
4. This Article cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and security policy and shall respect the limits set out in Article 40 second paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union.
The most recent use of the flexibility clause was in 2012, when the Commission issued a proposal to financially assist non-euro members. In the aftermath of the economic crisis, during which tools such as the European Financial Stability Pact (EFSP) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) were implemented, the flexibility clause paved the way by granting an ability to simplify the procedure of financial assistance. This means that the flexibility clause is an opportunity to accelerate the decision-making process at EU level in case of urgent matters.
3.5 Direct Regional Interest Representation in the European Union
After having established the framework of lobbying in general, the framework for political lobbying in the EU can be presented. In order to assess the framework in which regional interest representation is currently possible in the European Union, one must identify the institutional bodies in which political lobbying is possible and to what extent. In the figure below, Tatham (2008) shows in what way regional non-governmental interests can be represented in the European Union. He identifies six different paths that regions can take in order to influence EU policy:
Figure 1, Direct Regional EU interest representation (Tatham, 2008, p.498)
The first path is the Council of Ministers. As stated in art 203 of the Maastricht Treaty, Member States are granted the right to include regional representatives in their delegation to this forum (Tatham 2008, p.499). However, art. 203 does not allow regions to represent themselves at the Council of Ministers. A regional minister appearing there represents the state, and there needs to be a prior agreement among the regions and the state as to what their interest is.
The second path a region can take in order to represent their preferences is at the Commission. Since the Commission holds monopoly on proposing legislation, it should ‘consult widely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents’ (Protocol 9 TEU 2007). Some authors claim that the Commission deliberately cultivated bridges between the regional actors and the supranational actors. The extent to which regions have access to the Commission, however, is differentiated. Democratically elected, strong regions that have high levels of competence tend to have more influence compared to the non-majoritarian weaker ones (Tatham 2008).
Thirdly, a region can lobby at the European Parliament. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have a big amount of soft power, in addition to their power of endorsement and
censure of the College of Commissioners (idem 2008, p.506). Located in the heart of Brussels, the elected officials can represent their region directly in the voting system of the parliament. Also, proximity of other Member State’s officials can lead to a bargaining position for mutual benefits. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has the obligation to consult the CoR, which increases the influence regions can have on this institutional body.
Fourthly, Tatham identifies the CoR as a channel of political lobbying. As stated above, the CoR has flaws but has gained more power throughout the years because of the fact that the other EU bodies are now obligated to consult the CoR. The Lisbon Treaty added four policy areas to this obligation (civil protection, climate change, energy, services of general interest). One could argue that the relevance of the CoR is gradually expanding, therefore it is becoming less irrelevant in the European arena.
Fifthly, regions are represented by the Regional Brussels offices. As Marks summarised in his article ‘What Do Subnational Offices Think They Are Doing in Brussels?’ (2002, p.3), the regional offices are gathering information, networking, liaising between the region and the EU and they influence policy. Tatham (2008) as well as Marks (2002) agree on the fact that the regional offices in Brussels are not capable of decisive policy influence in the EU. Again, the discrepancy between strong regions and institutional weaker ones is apparent in the competence of the regional offices, as well as the notion that no mandates are transferred to the offices and it acts merely in an advisory manner. In a more recent study by Andres Rodriguez-Pose & Julie Courty (2018), they analysed the influence on budget allocation by the regional offices. They concluded that although the offices may have led to better information management, networking and more fruitful links between EU officials and the region, the offices have had ‘a negligible effect on the distribution of regional development funds’ (Rodriguez-Pose & Courty 2018, p.220).
Finally, Tatham (2008, p.508) mentions the European Networks and Associations. By this, he means organisations such as the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE), the Assembly of European Regions (AER), or the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR). He notices a divide in thought on the possibility of influencing these networks and associations among scholars, similar to the divide in multi-level governance and liberal intergovernmentalism. Some authors, according to Tatham (2008), see
and therefore are challenging the monopoly of the nation-state in the international arena. Others, more
comparable with the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, are more sceptical about the influence of such organisations. For example, the AER published the Udine Declaration in 2007, in which a new form of European identity is described on the basis of ‘the emergence of identity that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that identities, rights and obligations associated … with citizenship are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions’ (Ivic 2010, p.444). In his article, Ivic states that the Udine Declaration and its concept of a European identity is a contradictory one. The declaration states that identity is a ’constantly shifting phenomenon’. Notwithstanding, the declaration speaks of a ‘common understanding’, ‘Europeanness’ and a ‘sense to belonging to a common space’ (idem 2010, p.444). According to Ivic, the nature of these regional policy representative organisations is confirmatory for the regional policy in the European Union: full of contradictions (Ivic 2010).
The channels through which the European regions are represented at EU level are mentioned above. What competences regions have in their domestic policy, however, is another issue. Landesblindheit, which can be loosely translated as ‘regional blindness’, is an expression that is used in Germany. By this, they mean the blindness that national governments experience when they are not taking into account the regional preferences in their country (Robledo 2013, p.31). In Europe, especially because of their emphasis on stimulating regions but their incapability to do so, this term is applicable as well. A noteworthy take on the competences of regions in the EU is stated in Tatham’s ‘The Rise of Regional Influence in the EU - From Soft Policy Lobbying to Hard Vetoing’ (2018, p.673), in which he describes the shift of European regions as policy spaces to policy actors. Taken into account all different routes that regions can take in order to influence policy, their influence is increasing. Equally important is that lobbying at EU level has an effect on their domestic policies (idem 2010). This means that engaging in EU political lobbying can influence their position in the nation-state from which the region is part of and ‘as Europeanization and regionalization processes deepen, their intersection becomes inevitable’ (idem 2010, p.684).
To conclude, the paradox of EU policy regarding regions is that it actively promotes national and regional diversity and uphold democratic values, but on the other hand the EU is founded on the principle of territorial integrity and respects the Member States’ rule of law. As stated in Article 2 TEU, the responsibilities of the EU regarding regions include ‘respect for human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for (…) the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ (TEU 2007). Simultaneously, the responsibility is to respect ‘essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State’ is stated in article 4 (idem 2007). This paradox will be made clear when examining the Catalan case. 3.6 Jones’s Taxonomy of Policy Influence
As stated earlier, lobby practices have become increasingly present in the EU political landscape. Assessing policy influence is a challenge, according to the general consensus among scholars. For this reason, Harry Jones (2011) has provided a ‘Guide to Monitoring and Evaluating Policy Influence’, which is a tool that is useful when assessing policy influence. As Jones explains, when trying to influence policy one can choose the ‘inside track’, i.e. working closely with the decision-makers themselves, or the ‘outside track’, meaning seeking influence change through pressure and confrontation (Jones 2011, p.2). Parallel to that, one can identify evidence based influence, and interest based influence on the other hand (idem 2011, p.2). These four different approaches to influencing policy can be put in a figure as seen below:
The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) method is widely recognised as a crucial tool to managing and implementing projects, programmes and policies in both public and private sector organisations (Jones 2011, p.3). In assessing M&E policy influence, however, there are challenges that have to be met in order to successfully measure the influence. At first, the ‘attribution problem’ arises. This problem is due to the complex nature of policy processes, and the impossibility to predict the consequences of a set of activities regarding policy influence (idem 2011, p.3). These ‘conceptual and technical’ challenges make it difficult to precisely assess the influence on policy change, since policies are never rational nor linear in their decision- and implementation process. As Jones (2011) argues, there is an inevitable subjectivity whether policy has been influenced significantly or not. The policy context is constantly subject to change through external forces, in contrast to other organisational forms, hence measuring significant change is a challenge. Thirdly, practical problems that constrain the production and use of knowledge about policy influence are apparent. As policy influencing through various lobby practices is beneficial to one party, and therefore less so for the other side of the policy spectrum, lobby organisations are not likely to share their ‘good practice’ of policy influencing (idem 2011, p.3). Decision-making actors are not likely to address the influence that external actor had on their policy making, since that is regarded as non-democratic and not as a strength for politicians.
The measurement of significant policy influence is thus widely accepted to be difficult according to scholars, but there are tools through which one can assess the attempts of a ‘political lobby’ and categorise them. In the following table, Harry Jones has created a tool in which you can ‘check the boxes’ in order to assess whether, and to what extent, the interest group has attempted to influence policy.
Figure 4, Typology of Influence Activities (Jones, 2011, p.2)
Type of influencing Where? Through what channels? How? By what means Evidence
and advice
• National and international policy discourses/debates
• Research and analysis, 'good practice'
• Formal and
informal meetings • Evidence-based argument • Providing advisory support • Developing and piloting new policy approaches
Public campaigns and advocacy
• Public and political debates in developing countries
• Public communications and campaigns
• Public meetings,
speeches, presentations • 'Public education' • Television, newspapers, radio
and other media • Messaging
• Advocacy
Lobbying and negotiation
• Formal meetings
• Face-to-face meetings and discussions
• Semi-formal and
informal channels • Relationships and trust • Membership and participation in
boards and committees
• Direct incentives and
As is summarised in the table above, there are three categories that can be identified in policy influence:
3.6.1 Evidence and advice
Actors that try to influence policy base their suggestions on evidence of their own findings (Jones 2011). By doing so, they legitimise their claim for change and often use external experts in order to back their evidence (idem 2011). Through ‘policy briefs and seminars’, an overview of established information is given and passed on to the decision-making actors. In the case of the Catalan lobby, there have been several attempts to legitimise the independence of Catalonia through evidence, as will be explained in the following paragraphs.
3.6.2 Public campaigns and advocacy
The second category that Jones (2011) identifies in assessing policy influence is the use of public campaigns and advocacy. This type of policy influence, which is frequently called public diplomacy, is probably one of the most multi-disciplinary areas in modern scholarship (Torras-Vila & Fernández Cavia 2018, p.1). The following examples will confirm the point of view that public diplomacy is regarded a versatile field of study. The goal of public diplomacy is two-folded. At first, one attempts to create supportive public opinion in other states. Secondly, the changed public opinion is used to force policy change at other governments (idem 2018, p.2). The main difference between government policy and public diplomacy is that the latter is aimed at projecting values and ideas to the international arena, whereas the former is merely focused at government officials (idem 2018, p.2). Projection of values and ideas can, according to Nye (2002), be categorised as soft power. In his theory of soft power, he identifies hard power as a power which is a ‘traditional sort of power, a vision which pointed to military force, economic capacity and the potentialities derived from them as the most genuine expression of the power of a state’. Soft power, on the other hand, is to get others to aspire what we aspire, and this is becoming increasingly important (Nye 2002, as cited in Torras-Vila & Fernández Cavia 2018, p.2). In the theory of public diplomacy, the actors do not necessarily have to be national actors, sub-national institutions or cultural nations can be actors of public diplomacy too (Xifra 2009, p.67-68). Catalonia can be seen as an example of stateless nation building that executes public diplomacy, as they have been developing a European and international tradition for over 25 years (Torras-Vila & Fernández Cavia 2018, p.4). The second category in Jones’s taxonomy of policy influence (2011) is, in line with the theory of multi-level governance and the notion of ‘Europe of the
Regions’, therefore increasingly relevant in the current political landscape in the EU, mainly due to its multi-disciplinary character.
3.6.3 Lobbying and negotiation
The third category which Jones identifies is the literal lobbying part of policy influencing. One must look at meetings and direct contact between the decision-making bodies and the actors that attempt to influence their policy.
In order to establish an assessment of the lobby possibilities in Europe for Catalonia, this tool provides an overview in which one can ‘check the boxes’ for lobby practices. In the next chapter, the Catalan case, this tool will be used to help categorise and distinguish the Catalan lobby practices. By doing so, a conclusion will be made possible of which lobby practices have been available and, more importantly, which lobby practices have proven to be inaccessible.
4. Case study - Catalan case
In this case study, the ‘Catalan case’ is assessed, the referendum for independence that the Catalan people organised on the first of October 2017, and its consequences. The Spanish government ruled the referendum illegal, and was not reluctant to use force in its attempt to stop the referendum from happening. It eventually did take place, which resulted in legal action against the Catalan politicians and civil society leaders that made it possible. In order to have a good understanding of the ‘Catalan case’, this chapter will be built up as follows: at first, an overview will be given of Catalonia and its identity leading to separatism up until the referendum on the first of October 2017. Next, the events around the referendum will be discussed including the reaction of the European Union and the international press. Finally, using the tool of assessing policy influence by Harry Jones (2011), the attempts of political lobbying by the Catalan government will be assessed.
4.1 Catalan history of culture and identity
The first reference to Catalan as a language dates back to the 11th century, when it became the
main language in the kingdom of Aragon (Cruanyes & Ortiz 1986, p.21). The kingdom’s economic expansion led to a spread of the Catalan language to the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Corsica, the former kingdom of Naples, Sicily and Adriatic coast up to Greece. It was up until the beginning of the 18th century, when king Philip IV of France waged war on the kingdom
of Aragon, that the Catalan language was thriving and used as official language. During this war, the crown of Castilla was in desperate need of the riches of the Catalan countries and successfully ended the war on the 11th of September 1714, a day that carries significance to the Catalan people up until today. From this day on, the Catalan language has been subjugated to other languages in the kingdoms or countries in which Catalan is spoken. In Spain itself, it was subject to cultural and institutional repression, Catalan was merely spoken at home and disappeared in its written form.
During the industrial revolution in the 19th century, Catalonia prospered economically which
led to economic independence of the Spanish state while still being politically dependent of it (Guibernau 2014, p.10). During this period, the usage of Catalan as a cultural language made a re-entrance during the Renaixença (Renaissance). Whereas Catalan had been forbidden for centuries, now in these thriving times the usage of Catalan was allowed to a certain extent, leading to this Renaissance of Catalan culture. Notable is the need for codification during that period, since the language had survived for centuries in merely spoken form. The period of
