Irony, metaphor and argument in editorial cartoons
A preliminary account of the interaction between the tropes of irony
and metaphor in the implicit communication of an editorial cartoon’s
argument.
Name of student: Florian Willem Gerritsen Student number: 10675388
E-mail Address: florian.gerritsen@student.uva.nl University: University of Amsterdam Faculty: Humanities (FGW)
RMA programme: Argumentation, Rhetoric and Communication Date of completion: 15 August, 2019
2
Table of contents
0. Abstract 1. Introduction
2. The editorial cartoon as a satirical argumentative genre
3. The multimodal metaphor as an organizing principle in editorial cartoons 4. Irony and metaphor as interacting organizing principles: a preliminary account
4.1 Irony as reversal of evaluation based on conceptual incongruity
4.2 Irony and metaphor as interacting organizing principles in editorial cartoons 4.3 Analysis of example cartoons in which Irony and metaphor act as interacting
organizing principles 5. Conclusion
3 Abstract
Editorial cartoons may be said to implicitly communicate the argument that a political event or the behavior of a public official should be evaluated negatively because it has certain characteristics which conflict with a commonly shared norm. Studies examining argumentation in editorial cartoons have thus far concentrated primarily on how the trope of metaphor, an ontological mapping across conceptual domains, can convey the propositional content of an editorial cartoon‘s argument, while preliminary evidence suggests metaphor may interact with other tropes in doing so. In this study I present a preliminary theoretical account of how the trope of metaphor might interact with the trope of irony in order to express the propositional content of a cartoon‘s argument. I base this preliminary account on an existing theoretical account of how metaphor can convey the propositional content of a cartoon‘s argument editorial cartoons and a conceptualization of irony as a verbal expression which implicitly communicates a (generally negative) evaluation of a particular target through reference to a conceptual domain, the norms of which the target failed to conform with. Combining these two research insights I argue that irony and metaphor can interact in the implicit communication of a cartoon‘s argument, with the former implicitly communicating the claim that the behavior/event depicted in the cartoon failed to abide by norms related to a topical conceptual domain and the latter mapping this norm violation from the non-topical conceptual domain depicted in the cartoon to the conceptual domain of the non-topical behavior/event that is being criticized in the cartoon.
1. Introduction
Editorial cartoons are a form of satire, a discursive genre concerned with levying criticism on a particular target and, by virtue of this criticism, promote certain norms or values the target failed to uphold (Manning & Phiddian, 2004; Townsend, McDonald, & Esders, 2009). As a form of satire, editorial cartoons are inherently argumentative, as the claims that the targeted behavior or event exhibits characteristics which conflict with a generally shared norm form the supporting premises for the claim that the event or the behavior should be evaluated negatively (Feteris, 2019; Feteris, Groarke & Plug, 2011). In editorial cartoons the propositional content of this argument is communicated implicitly through multimodal (i.e. visual-verbal) cues presented in the cartoon. It has been observed that, in the implicit communication of this criticism, editorial cartoons often utilize rhetorical tropes, as an
4 ―organizing principle‖; a means to structure the multimodal content of the cartoon in such a way that the propositional content of the cartoon‘s argument (the norms and the implication that the targeted behavior or event has characteristics which deviate from these norms) can be inferred (Moss, 2007, p. 241; cf. Bostdorff, 1987).
Various authors (e.g. Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017; Schilperoord & Maes, 2009; cf. Bounegru & Forceville, 2011; Feteris, 2019a; Edwards, 1997; Templin, 1999) have argued metaphor to be the primary trope used in this regard, as editorial cartoons ‗tell a story‘ about fictional world and, at the same time, refer to events and characters in the real world, thereby inviting readers ―to map properties from a more tangible area of reality [(the events depicted in the cartoon)] onto one that is more abstract [(the real world news event the cartoon comments on)]‖ (El Refaie, 2009, p. 186). However, Bounegru & Forceville (2011, p. 224), examining the use of metaphor in a small sample of editorial cartoons commenting on the 2008 financial crisis, have observed that metaphors seldom work alone in communicating a cartoon‘s satirical message, but often interact with other tropes. Similarly, a content analysis of editorial cartoons conducted by Pedrazzini & Scheuer (2018, p. 118), found metaphor to be ―a distinctive rhetorical resource in political cartoons notwithstanding the fact that other resources also play a significant role" with the authors noting that tropes such as irony and hyperbole are chief among these additional resources. While there is thus some evidence that, in the communication of an editorial cartoon‘s argument, the trope of metaphor often interacts with other tropes, the study of tropes other than metaphor in editorial cartoons, especially in relation to argumentation, has thus far been relatively neglected (Pedrazzini & Scheuer, 2018, p. 118).1 The trope of irony2 might especially be interesting to examine in this regard, as it is often associated with satire (e.g. Averbeck, 2013; Booth, 1974, pp. 27-31; Kreuz & Roberts, 1993), and it has also been shown to occur in editorial cartoons (Conradie, Brokensha & Pretorius, 2012; see also Bostdorff, 1987; Burgers, et al., 2012; Olson & Olson, 2004; Pedrazzini & Scheuer, 2018).
1
To the best of my knowledge, Moss (2007) is the only study that discusses tropes other than metaphor in editorial cartoons
in relation to argumentation, although her study is very brief and has little to say about argumentation reconstruction. For
studies of tropes other than metaphor in relation to editorial cartoons (although not directly related to argumentation) see Negro Alouesque (2013) for a discussion of metonymy in editorial cartoons, Muir (1987) of a discussion of synecdoche in editorial cartoons and Conradie, et al. (2012), as well as Olson & Olson (2004) for a discussion of irony in editorial cartoons.
2
Irony, in this study, refers to, what is commonly called verbal irony. Verbal irony involves cases in which a relationship of contrast exists between the literal meaning of an utterance and its figurative, intended meaning and is distinct from
situational irony, which involve a relationship of contrast between expected outcomes of a situation and actually occurring
outcomes, which falls outside the scope of this study (for further reading on the nature of this distinction see Elleström (2002), Luciarello (1994) and Muecke (1986)).
5 It is my aim in this study to develop a preliminary theoretical account of how irony might interact with metaphor in order to express the propositional content of a cartoon‘s argument. In order to do so I will start out, in chapter 1, with a brief characterization of the editorial cartoon as a satirical argumentative genre and discuss the prototypical argumentative pattern of the argument expressed in editorial cartoons, as described by Feteris (2019a). In chapter 2 I will analyze an example cartoon in accordance with the existing theoretical account of how the multimodal metaphor acts as an organizing principle in editorial cartoons and argue that 1) in editorial cartoons with a multimodal metaphor the norms which form the basis of the criticism expressed by the cartoon are conceptually derived, they are related to a non-topical conceptual domain which is visually referenced in the cartoon and 2) the implication that the behavior/event targeted in the cartoon does not conform to these norms is
visually evoked, the behavior/event is visually shown to deviate from these norms. I will argue
on the basis of this analysis that, as an organizing principle in editorial cartoons, the trope of metaphor functions as a means to map a set of norms and a norm deviation from a non-topical conceptual domain to the conceptual domain of the cartoon‘s topic (the topic domain), while not, itself, establishing the norms or the norm deviation, as these are, respectively, conceptually derived and visually evoked.
In chapter 3 I will, firstly, discuss the trope of irony, which I define, following Burgers, et al. (2011, p. 190) as a written expression ―with a literal evaluation that is implicitly contrary to its intended evaluation.‖ Moreover, I will argue that irony, defined in this way, can be understood as essentially relying on a conceptual incongruity, an incongruity between the norms of a conceptual domain (which is referenced in an ironic expression) and its co- or context. Secondly, based on this characterization of irony, I argue that irony might interact with the multimodal metaphor in editorial cartoons, with irony establishing a negative evaluation (through a conceptual incongruity) and metaphor mapping this negative evaluation onto the topic domain (through visual and verbal references to the topic in the cartoon). Finally, in order to illustrate how this might work in practice, I discuss two example cartoons in which irony and metaphor are combined. In both of these cartoons, the conceptual incongruity created by the ironic caption and the visual content of the cartoon implies a negative evaluation of the behavior which deviates from the norms of the conceptual domain referenced in the ironic caption, while the behavior as depicted in the cartoon is linked to the conceptual domain of the cartoon‘s topic via metaphorical mapping. Both tropes thus fulfill a specific function, together communicating the propositional content of the cartoon‘s argument.
6 2. The editorial cartoon as a satirical argumentative genre
It is my aim in this study to develop a preliminary account of how the trope of irony can interact with the trope of metaphor as a means by which the propositional content of an editorial cartoon‘s argument is communicated. Before examining how editorial cartoons communicate an argument and the role irony and metaphor play in the communication of this argument, however, it is necessary to firstly discuss in what sense editorial cartoons may be said to express an argument. In this chapter I argue that editorial cartoons can be said to express an argument because they are a form of satire. Satire is a genre of communication in which, through the articulation of criticism, certain norms or values are promoted and reaffirmed. As a form of satire, editorial cartoons negatively evaluate a public event or the behavior of a political actor, on the basis of the implicit claim that it conflicts with norms or values that are (implied to be) tacitly shared. Following Feteris (2019b) I argue that this message can be considered an argument, with the implicit claim expressing a norm violation functioning as a supporting premise for the standpoint expressing the negative evaluation of the target.
As can be observed in the literature, editorial cartoons are generally characterized as a
negative form of communication, in which criticism on political actors and events is
expressed (Abraham, 2009; Buell & Maus, 1988; Koetzle & Brunel, 1996; Mello, 1998; Williams, 1997). Schneider (2011, p. 54), for example, notes that ―first and foremost, editorial cartoons convey messages that carry a trenchant political or social critique‖ and, likewise, Mello (1998, p. 399) defines the editorial cartoon as ―a negative form of political and/or social commentary meant for mass production and quick consumption.‖ Although some have dismissed the editorial cartoon as offering merely a ‗passing chuckle‘ for the sake of entertainment (cf. Meadow, 1980, p. 203), the critical judgment expressed in editorial cartoons always implicitly invokes and reaffirms commonly accepted norms and values (Bal, et al., 2009; Chen, et al., 2017, p. 134, 136-139; Duus, 2001; Edwards, 1995, 1997; Giarelli, 2006; Manning & Phiddian, 2004; Townsend, et al., 2007). In this sense, editorial cartoons are a form of satire, that is, a discursive genre concerned with safeguarding certain (moral) norms or values through the communication of (often humorous) criticism (Feinberg, 1967, p. 9-19; Quintero, 2007; Test, 1991, pp. 15-36). In satirical communication, these norms or values are almost never articulated explicitly, but implied by virtue of the criticism itself (Feinberg, 1967; Quintero, 2007). Editorial cartoons, as a form of satire, thus always
7 implicitly promote or reaffirm certain norms or values, by offering a critical evaluation of political actors or events (Desousa & Medhurst, 1982, p. 85; Negro Alouesque, 2013; Townsend, et al., 2007, pp. 236-237).
In the traditional account of satire, the promotion of norms and values is considered the primary goal of the satirist (i.e. it is the reason why he is expressing criticism; Townsend, et al., 2007; Quintero, 2007). While one might question whether it is the aim of a cartoonist to promote particular norms or values through criticism,3 it is safe to say that any form of criticism relies on the implicit invocation of particular norms or values (cf. Quintero, 2007, p. 3). As Feinberg (1967, p. 11) notes ―the moment one criticizes and says something has been done in the wrong way, he is implying that there is a right way to do it‖ (emphasis added). If a cartoonist expresses a negative evaluation of a version of the world as it is (according to the cartoonist), a version of the world as it should be is always implied (cf. Chen, et al., 2017, pp. 136-139; Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017, pp. 140, 148). The norms that have been violated by the criticized actor or event (i.e. the norms that constitute the behavior or event as it should be) can be left implicit under the assumption that the audience and the critic share the same general standards regarding what behavior in a particular situation or context ought to be like (Test, 1991, pp. 18, 29; cf. Feteris, 2019a, p. 373). Thus, while it may not be certain that cartoonists-as-satirists aim to promote certain norms or values, they must assume particular norms to be shared, as a reader unfamiliar with the norms or values of a particular culture is unlikely to be able to interpret the cartoon as conveying criticism (cf. Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017).
The fact that the critical evaluation communicated in editorial cartoons is always based on the implicit claim that the criticized target has violated a particular norm or value makes editorial cartoons ―inherently argumentative‖ (Kjeldsen, 2015a, p. 121; see also Feteris, 2019a; Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017). Because editorial cartoon‘s expresses criticism and criticism, as discussed, is always based on the implicit violation of a particular norm or value, editorial cartoons always implicitly support the claim that target behavior or event should be evaluated negatively with the argumentation that (particular aspects of) the behavior or event conflict with a commonly held norm or value (Feteris, 2019a; Feteris, Groarke & Plug, 2011). Feteris (2019a), has argued that this argument always follows a ‗prototypical argumentative pattern‘ – a pattern typical of a particular type of argumentative
3 From the scarce amount of studies examining editorial cartoonist‘s view of their profession it would appear they do to a
certain extent. For example, a study by Riffe, Sneed & van Ommeren (1985), surveying a large sample of US cartoonists, found that the claim ―an editorial cartoon generally has a moral purpose‖ was supported by most cartoonists in their sample (scoring an average 3.9 on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
8 activity (Van Eemeren, 2016) – which can be abstractly represented (Feteris, 2019a). While a number of prototypical argumentative patterns can be distinguished (see Feteris, 2018; Feteris, et al., 2011), the cartoons of interest in this study (cartoons which employ irony as a communicative device) employ argumentation based on a symptomatic relation, the prototypical form of which is depicted in Scheme 1.
1 The behaviour/event X must be evaluated negatively
1.1a The behaviour/event X has characteristics Y1, Y2, etc.
1.1b The characteristics Y1, Y2, etc. of the behaviour/event X must be evaluated negatively
1.1b.1a Characteristics Y1, Y2, etc. conflict with value W 1.1b.1b Value W is a generally accepted value
Scheme 1. Argumentative pattern based on a symptomatic relation in an editorial cartoon (following Feteris, 2019b).
As Van den Hoven & Schilperoord (2017, p. 139) note, an editorial cartoon ―does not so much contain argumentation but instead instructs the reader to construct argumentative meaning.‖ The argument expressed by an editorial cartoon (which often follows the pattern depicted in Scheme 1) is thus expressed implicitly: the visual verbal content of the cartoon is structured in such a way that a reader can infer the argument (Feteris, 2019a).4
Although in some cartoons the argument can be inferred by examining either only the visual or only the verbal content,5 in most editorial cartoons ―the two modes are typically so completely intertwined as to be virtually inseparable‖ (El Refaie, 2009). In other words the editorial cartoon is a multimodal genre of communication, a genre in which the visual and
4 In assuming that non-verbal modes of communication can communicate part of the argument, this study follows Kjeldsen‘s
(2012, p. 240) rhetorical perspective on argumentation, which considers argumentation to be a ―communicative action, which is performed, evoked, and must be understood in a rhetorical context of opposition.‖ Within this perspective, images can serve as cues which ―evoke intended meanings, premises and lines of reasoning‖ and thus imply (or contribute to the implication of) an argument (i.e. instruct the reader to construct a standpoint supported by premises) provided they are used in a context of opposition (i.e. a context the reader recognizes as one in which arguments are advanced; Kjeldsen, 2012, p. 240; Van den Hoven, 2015; cf. Gelang & Kjeldsen, 2011; Kjeldsen, 2015b). See Tseronis (2017) and Tseronis & Forceville (2017) for further discussion on theoretical perspectives on argumentation which do or do not allow for the possibility of visuals being able to argue.
5
Examples where the visual mode is the primary mode of communication see Bostdorff (1987) and Wekesa (2012), for an example of a cartoon in which the verbal mode is the primary mode of communication see Van den Hoven & Schilperoord (2018, pp. 143-144).
9 verbal modes of communication are interdependent (Groarke, 2017; Kjeldsen, 2012).6 The primary question of interest in this study is how the visual-verbal content of the editorial cartoon is structured in such a way that a reader (who possesses the necessary foreknowledge) can be expected to be able to infer the argument. In other words, the question ‗how is the argument of an editorial cartoon expressed?‘ In the following chapters I will address this question by discussing how the rhetorical tropes of metaphor and irony can serve as a device by means of which the propositional content of the argument is conveyed. Before discussing this subject, however, two related theoretical stipulations are in order.
Firstly, I will assume, from here on out, that, in principle, an ―ideal reader‖ (i.e. a reader who posses all contextual information necessary for a complete interpretation of the cartoon such as knowledge of the news event, knowledge of interpreting editorial cartoons and knowledge of the general norms and values in a particular culture) should be able to reconstruct the argumentation of an editorial cartoon (according to the model in Scheme 1). This does not, of course, mean that such an ideal reader would actually do this when interpreting the cartoon; the prototypical pattern argumentative pattern depicted in Scheme 1 is an analytical model for the reconstruction of an editorial cartoon‘s argument and not meant to reflect of the conscious inferences made by a reader when interpreting the cartoon (Feteris, 2019a, 2019b). However, in order for any reader to be able to infer that the cartoon is negatively evaluating a particular target (the cartoon‘s standpoint), it is necessary for him or her to be aware of the implicit claims that certain norms or values are commonly shared (1.1.1b) and the targeted behavior/event has characteristics which conflict with these norms or values (1.1.1a). If readers are not aware of these claims, they will be unable to infer that the cartoon is conveying criticism (although this does not, of course, mean that they have to agree with them).
Secondly, because the argument reconstruction model is an analytical model, any reconstructions of argumentation in editorial cartoons following in this paper do not account for differences that might occur among individual readers. As interpretation of the cartoon is ultimately left to the reader, editorial cartoons generally leave room for a certain amount of, what Feteris (2019a) calls, ―interpretative latitude.‖ While I agree with Blair (2004, p. 55) that the conventions of the editorial cartoon ―permit an explicitness and precision of meaning found in few other visual genres,‖ even ‗ideal readers‘ are likely to differ in their concrete
6
Multimodal, in this study, refers solely to the combination of the verbal the visual modes, the two modes generally combined in the editorial cartoon. See Tseronis & Forceville (2017) for an overview of the concept and the modes of communication generally considered within studies examining multimodal argumentation and communication.
10 articulation of the cartoon‘s message (cf. El Refaie, 2009). This does not mean that cartoons are ambiguous in their message, since this interpretative latitude exists within fairly narrow margins. It does, however, mean that any (analytical) reconstruction of a cartoon‘s argumentation can only approximate the positions the cartoonist expresses. Therefore, the analytical reconstructions of the argumentation put forward by the cartoonist I articulate in later chapters are what might be called the ‗baseline argument‘: the approximate positions the cartoonist commits himself to in a particular cartoon.
In summary, the editorial cartoon is considered in this study to be satirical argumentative genre, in which a negative evaluation of a public event or the behaviour of a political actor is expressed. As cartoons are a form of satire, the critical judgment they convey is always based on the implicit claim that aspects of the behaviour or event conflict with a generally held value or norm. Therefore, editorial cartoons are argumentative: they express a standpoint supported by argumentation. However, the propositional content of this argument is communicated implicitly through multimodal means, meaning that, editorial cartoons provide visual and verbal cues which enable the reader to reconstruct the argumentation. Because the argument editorial cartoons express follows a prototypical argumentative pattern it is possible to reconstruct this argument analytically, in which case a systematic analysis of the cartoon‘s content leads to a plausible reconstruction that approximates the positions a cartoonist commits himself to in the cartoon.
3. The multimodal metaphor as an organizing principle in editorial cartoons
As we have established in the previous chapter, editorial cartoons communicate a negative evaluation of a particular target (an event or the behavior of a public official), an evaluation that is implicitly based on the claim that the target violated a particular norm or value. Following Bostdorff (1987), Van den Hoven & Schilperoord (2017) it may thus be stated that editorial cartoons express an incongruity between, on the one hand, the situation or behavior
as it is or is implied to be and, on other, the situation or behavior as it should be (according to
particular norms or values). It is this incongruity which constitutes the negative evaluation of the event or behavior targeted in the cartoon, as it is not as it should be.
As various authors have argued (Bostdorff, 1987; Feteris, 2019a, 2019b; Groarke, 2017; Moss, 2007; Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017), the propositional content of an editorial cartoon‘s argument is often conveyed by means of a rhetorical trope, a stylistic
11 device which uses a visual, verbal or multimodal ‗expression‘ with a literal meaning (i.e. the meaning commonly signified by the particular image or text) to convey an intended figurative meaning (Corbett, 1965, p. 427; see also Hariman & Lucaites, 2008). Rhetorical tropes can, in other words, function as an organizing principle, a means to structure the multimodal content of the cartoon in such a way that the incongruity between the behavior/event as it is and as it
should be is made manifest and the cartoon‘s argument can be inferred (Moss, 2007, p. 241;
Bostdorff, 1987).
The multimodal metaphor, an ontological mapping across conceptual domains established via visual-verbal means, has been argued to be the principle trope to fulfill this function in editorial cartoons (Bounegru & Forceville, 2011; Edwards, 1997; Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017; Negro Alouesque, 2013; Pedrazzini & Scheuer, 2018). As editorial cartoons generally ‗tell a story‘ about a fictional world, while at the same time referring to events and characters in the real world, a multimodal metaphor can be employed to map properties from the fictional domain of the cartoon to the real world domain of the cartoon‘s topic (El Refaie, 2009). However, in the communication of a cartoon‘s satirical criticism, the multimodal metaphor has been observed to function in tandem with other tropes, irony being one of them (Pedrazzini & Scheuer, 2018; cf. Bounegru & Forceville, 2011).
While no systematic account of how irony and metaphor might interact in editorial cartoons has been developed, Feteris (2019a) and Van den Hoven & Schilperoord (2017) have discussed how the multimodal metaphor can function as an organizing principle in editorial cartoons. Following these authors I will, in this chapter, discuss how multimodal metaphors can fulfill this function in editorial cartoons, by examining an example cartoon (taken from Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017) in order to answer the questions 1) How, in editorial cartoons with a multimodal metaphor, are the particular norms or values that the behavior/event should conform to invoked? and 2) How, in editorial cartoons with a multimodal metaphor, is it implied that the behavior/event does not conform to norms it should conform to?
Metaphors are ―ontological mappings across conceptual domains‖ (Lakoff, 1993, p. 209). A
conceptual domain is a ―coherent conceptual structure representing the way a person knows a
particular part of reality including objects, events, persons, and relations among them‖ (Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017, p. 142). The conceptual domain of cooking, for example, involves objects (a dish, cooking utensils, ingredients), events (cooking the dish, cutting the ingredients), people (a cook) and relations (the cook prepares the dish, the ingredients
12 together make up the dish). In a metaphor attributes of one conceptual domain (the source domain) are mapped onto another conceptual domain (the target domain). If, for example, a commentator were to say ―The secretary has cooked up some pretty bad policy,‖ she would be talking about the (target) domain of policy making in terms of the (source) domain of cooking, creating metaphorical mappings such as MINISTER IS COOK, POLICY IS DISH and POLICY MEASURE IS COOKING INGREDIENT (Schilperoord & Maes, 2009, p. 229). Where verbal metaphors establish a cross-domain mapping via grammatical structures, multimodal metaphors do so through a combination of words and imagery (Bounegru & Forceville, 2011). In editorial cartoons multimodal metaphors are generally realized by placing elements (stereotypically) associated the conceptual domain of the cartoon‘s topic (the
topic domain) and elements (stereotypically) associated with a different conceptual domain (a
non-topical source domain) in the same cartoon (Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017; Schilperoord & Maes, 2009).
An example of an editorial cartoon containing a multimodal metaphor can be found in the cartoon in Figure 1, which comments on the (former) Dutch Secretary of Administrative Innovation Thom De Graaf‘s attempt at designing a new electoral system (‗nieuw kiesstelsel‘). The cartoon contains visual elements associated with the (source) domain of ‗cooking‘ (a kitchen, cooking ingredients, a cooking pot and a chef-like figure) and visual-verbal elements associated with the (target) domain of policy creation, which is the topic domain (De Graaf‘s face and the verbal label ‗new voting system‘). As Schilperood & Maes (2009) note, in cartoons with a multimodal metaphor the two conceptual domains are ‗blended‘, whereby it is implied that there are structural correspondences (mappings) between the two domains. Correspondences between the domain of cooking and the domain of policy making are that both involve a producer (the cook or the politician) whose goal it is to produce (cook or design) a particular product (the dish or the policy). In Figure 1, these correspondences are made clear by De Graaf‘s head being placed on the body of the cook (a visual clue linking ‗cook‘ and ‗politician‘), the name ‗Thom‘ on the cook‘s pants (a verbal clue linking ‗cook‘ and ‗politician‘) and by the label ‗new voting system‘ on the cooking pot (a verbal clue linking ‗dish‘ and ‗policy‘).
13 Figure 1. Cartoon by Tom Janssen, published April, 2004 in Trouw. Source: http://www.tomjanssen.net/. Translation of text on pot: ―new voting system‖.
Conceptual domains do not only imply stereotypical roles, participants, outcomes, etc. but also ―conventional evaluations‖ of whether the behavior in the domain is ―successful or unsuccessful, normal or abnormal, permissible or illegitimate, etc.‖ (Mussolf, 2006, p. 28; Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017). In other words, the intended audience may be assumed to be familiar with the norms which demarcate whether behavior in a conceptual domain is normal, permissible, legitimate, etc. If a cartoon shows a particular event execution is inconsistent with such norms, it can be inferred that the cartoon depicts a failed execution of behavior in the conceptual domain, resulting in a (negatively) valued understanding of the event (Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017). In the case of the cartoon in Figure 1 three visual elements are inconsistent with the norms associated with the conceptual domain of cooking: the cook is a child (whereas cooks should be adults), the kitchen is messy (whereas kitchens should be tidy) and black smoke is coming from the dish, indicating it is failed (whereas dishes are supposed to be successful). There thus exists an incongruity in the cartoon between ―visually evoked what is and conceptually derived what should be” (Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017, p. 148, italics in original). Recognizing this incongruity it can be inferred that the cartoon depicts an abnormal or illegitimate act of cooking, or, more specifically, that the way in which cook has produced his dish fails to abide by the norm that dishes should be cooked with dexterity and care (the way an adult would cook a dish), and therefore, should be evaluated negatively. Because familiarity with the norms of the
14 conceptual domain is assumed, there is no need to reference them directly: as soon as behavior is recognized as abnormal or illegitimate, it is implied that a norm has been violated (i.e. the norm which expresses the behavior which would have been normal or legitimate in the same circumstances).
Through the metaphor the norms of the source domain of cooking are mapped onto the topic domain of policy making. In other words, through the metaphor, it is implied that policy designers, like cooks, should be adults, should be orderly and should produce successful policies. Because of this mapping, violations of these norms in the source domain, imply violations of the norms in the topic domain. Thus, because De Graaf-as-cook is not an adult, not orderly and his policy-as-dish is not successful, it is implied that cartoon depicts an abnormal or illegitimate act of policy designing (Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017, p. 148). More specifically, it is implied that the way in which De Graaf has designed his policy fails to abide by the norm that policy should be designed with dexterity and care and, therefore, should be evaluated negatively. On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to reconstruct the argumentation expressed by the cartoon following Feteris‘ (2019a) model for argument reconstruction: the behavior which the editorial cartoon argues should be evaluated negatively is De Graaf‘s designing of the new voting system (X), as this behavior has the characteristics of being disorderly and careless (Y) and these characteristics conflict with the general norm that policy should be designed with dexterity and care (W). A reconstruction of this argument can be found in Scheme 2.
15 1 Secretary of Administrative Innovation Thom de Graaf‘s designing of the new
voting system (X) should be evaluated negatively
1.1a Secretary of Administrative Innovation Thom de Graaf‘s designing of the new voting system (X) has the characteristic of being disorderly and careless (Y).
1.1b Policy design which has the characteristic of being disorderly and careless (Y) should be evaluated negatively
1.1b.1a The characteristic of being disorderly and careless (Y) conflicts with the norm that policy should be designed with dexterity and care (W).
1.1b.1b The norm that policy should be designed with dexterity and care (W) is commonly shared
Scheme 2. Reconstruction of the argument expressed (via a multimodal metaphor) in the cartoon in Figure 1.
I have analyzed this example cartoon in order to answer two questions, the first being ‗How, in editorial cartoons with a multimodal metaphor, are the particular norms or values that the behavior/event should conform to invoked?‘ As we have seen in the analysis of the cartoon in Figure 1, through a (visually referenced) conceptual domain the reader is provided with a normative framework, a set of assumptions as to what constitutes normal or permissible behavior (i.e. behavior in accordance with the norms of the conceptual domain) and what does not. It is interesting to note that it is not the metaphor which invokes these norms, but the (visual referenced) conceptual domain. What the metaphor does is map these normative assumptions from the source domain onto the conceptual domain of the cartoon‘s topic (in this case the conceptual domain of policy making), via visual and verbal elements that reference the cartoon‘s topic. The first question may thus be answered as follows: the cartoon invokes particular norms or values that the behavior/event depicted in the cartoon should conform to, by (visually) invoking a conceptual domain the norms of which the reader is assumed to be familiar with. Via the metaphor it is implied that the norms of this domain also apply to the conceptual domain the behavior/event belongs to.
The second question I wished to answer was ‗How, in editorial cartoons with a multimodal metaphor, is the implication that the behavior/event does not conform to norms or
16 values it should conform to communicated?‘ As we have seen in the analysis of the cartoon in Figure 1, the behavior in the cartoon is visually depicted as deviating from the norms of the source domain. Because the metaphor maps the norms of the source domain onto the topic domain, deviations from the norms of the source domain are implied to also be deviations from the norms in the topic domain. Consequentially, any behavior which does not conform to the norms of the source domain is implied to also not conform to the norms of the topic domain (the conceptual domain the targeted behavior belongs to). The second question can thus be answered as follows: the implication that the behavior/event does not conform to norms or values communicated it should conform to is communicated by visually depicting the target as deviating from the norms of the source domain, whereby it is implied that the target deviated from the norms of the conceptual domain the target belongs to (the topic domain).
In conclusion, in this chapter I have discussed how the multimodal metaphor can act as an organizing principle in editorial cartoons (following Feteris (2019a) and Van den Hoven & Schilperoord (2017)). That is, how the multimodal metaphor can act as a means to communicate the propositional content of a cartoon‘s argument by establishing an incongruity between, on the one hand, the situation or behavior as it is (or is implied to be, in the cartoon) and, on other, the situation or behavior as it should be (according to particular norms or values). As the analysis demonstrated, the multimodal metaphor does not itself establish the norms or values that the behavior/event should conform to. Rather, by visual reference to a conceptual domain, certain norms associated with this conceptual domain are invoked and, by implication, the behavior depicted in the cartoon is subject to them. In other words, the norms or values that the behavior/event should conform to are conceptually derived. As metaphors are ‗ontological mappings across conceptual domains‘ the conceptual domain these norms and values are derived from, is not the conceptual domain the topical behavior/event belongs to, but a distinctly different conceptual domain that is implied to be similar to the domain of the cartoon‘s topic. Moreover, the implication that the behavior/event is not as it should be is
visually evoked, it is implied through the visual depiction of the target behavior/event as
incongruous with the conceptually derived norms. Again, because the metaphor maps the norms of the conceptual source domain on to the topic domain, it is implied that the behavior/event is not as it should be in the topic domain, because it is not as it should be in the source domain. As an organizing principle in editorial cartoon, the multimodal metaphor thus maps a norm deviation from one domain onto another, while the norms themselves are
17 conceptually derived from the conceptual domain visually referenced in the cartoon and the norm deviation is visually evoked.
4. Irony and metaphor as interacting organizing principles: a preliminary account
As discussed in the previous chapter, in editorial cartoons in which a multimodal metaphor functions as an organizing principle, the norms and values that the topical behavior/event should conform to are conceptually derived. They are related to a conceptual domain (visually) referenced in the cartoon. Moreover, the implication that the topical behavior/event does not conform to these norms is visually evoked, the cartoon visually depicts the behavior as incongruous with the conceptually derived norms. Through the metaphor, the conceptually derived norms and the visually evoked behavior inconsistent with these norms are mapped from the non-topical conceptual domain visually depicted in the cartoon onto the topic domain (referenced verbally and visually in the cartoon), allowing for the reconstruction of an argument which negatively evaluates the topical behavior. The multimodal metaphor is thus not itself responsible for the negative evaluation of the behavior of the non-topical conceptual domain, but maps this negative evaluation from the non-topical conceptual domain onto the topic domain.
In this chapter I argue that the trope of irony can function in tandem with the multimodal metaphor in the communication of an editorial cartoon‘s argument. In the first section, I will discuss the trope of irony, which I define, following Burgers, et al. (2011, p. 190) as a verbal expression ―with a literal evaluation that is implicitly contrary to its intended evaluation.‖ Contrary to metaphor, irony is an inherently evaluative trope: it always produces an evaluation of a particular target, which is generally negative. Moreover, this implicit evaluation always relies on a conceptual incongruity, an incongruity between the norms associated with a conceptual domain which is referenced in the expression and the co- or context of the expression. In the second section I will present a preliminary account of how irony and metaphor might interact as organizing principles in editorial cartoons. I will argue that irony can establish a negative evaluation of particular behavior depicted in the cartoon (through conceptual incongruity), while the trope of metaphor can transfer this negative evaluation from the (non-topical) conceptual domain referenced in the cartoon onto the topic domain. In order to illustrate how this might work in practice I will, in the third section, discuss two editorial cartoons in which these two tropes are combined and examine how each
18 fulfills a specific function in the communication of the propositional content of the cartoon‘s critical argument.
4.1 Irony as reversal of evaluation based on conceptual incongruity
A number of theoretical approaches to irony have developed over the past three decades. Surveying the field, Colston & Gibbs (2007) note that the various leading theories ―are all likely explaining a portion of the phenomenon, or one of a variety of mechanisms underlying the comprehension of the phenomenon, without necessarily being incompatible with one another‖ (Colston & Gibbs, 2007, p. 4). Comparing the leading theoretical approaches to irony,7 Burgers, et al. (2011) have argued that five defining characteristics of irony are commonly observed in the literature (for a more detailed discussion see Burgers, 2010). First and foremost, an ironic expression has both an ironic and a non-ironic meaning. As a trope, irony creates a contrast between the literal, non-ironic, meaning of the expression and the figurative, ironic, meaning it communicates (cf. Corbett, 1965, pp. 445-6). Secondly, the relationship between these two meanings is one of opposition. This does not necessarily mean diametrical opposition (e.g. good meaning bad or love meaning hate) but can involve any sort of ‗contrary‘ relationship. Thirdly, ironic expressions are implicit, they are not flagged as ironic and a reader needs to be cued in some way in order to infer the ironic evaluation. As a consequence of their implicitness, certain readers may be unaware that a particular expression is intended to be interpreted ironically. Fourthly, ironic expressions are evaluative: they are aimed at communicating an evaluation of someone or something. While positive evaluation through irony is possible, the intended evaluation of an ironic expression is generally negative. Finally, this evaluation is always directed at a target, a person or situation that is evaluated (generally negatively) through irony. On the basis of these five characteristics, irony can be defined as ―an utterance with a literal evaluation that is implicitly contrary to its intended evaluation‖ (Burgers, et al, 2011, p. 190).8
Additionally, while some authors have discussed the possibility of ‗visual‘ or ‗wordless‘ irony (Currie, 2011; Scott, 2004), Burgers and his colleagues assume, in line with most theories on irony, that irony takes places on the level of the written (or spoken) evaluative proposition (Burgers, et al., 2013).
7
That is, (Neo-)Gricean definitions, irony as (indirect) negation, relevance theory, pretense theory, mental space theory and irony as reversal of evaluation. See especially Burgers (2007, 2010), Burgers, et al. (2011) and Burgers & Steen (2017).
8 While Burgers, et al. employ the term utterance, I prefer the term ‗expression‘ since it is less ties irony to the realm of
spoken dialogue. Even though I do not pursue this line of reasoning any further, the term ‗expression‘ also leaves open the possibility of wordless irony discussed by Scott (2004) and Currie (2011), since it does not delimit irony to the verbal or written realm.
19 Depending on the circumstances in which it is expressed, any expression can be both ironic and non-ironic (Burgers, et al., 2011, 2012, 2015). As discussed an expression is ironic only if the intended meaning is contrary to the literal meaning. Therefore, it must, in principle, be possible to recognize that the literal meaning is incongruous with either the context or the co-text surrounding the expression, whereas the ironic meaning is not (Burgers, et al., 2011, 2012, 2015). In contextual incongruity, the literal meaning of the expression is incongruent with information provided outside the text of the expression, such as the actual beliefs held by the speaker or the material environment in which the expression is uttered (Burgers, 2010, p. 16). For instance, in the textbook example ―Great weather!‖, uttered during a downpour, the evaluative predicate ‗great‘ is incongruous with the actual weather conditions. A receiver aware of the fact that a downpour is not generally considered ‗great weather‘ can be assumed to recognize this incongruity and be able to infer that a meaning contrary to the literal meaning of the expression is contextually congruent (e.g. ‗the weather is not great‘). In
co-textual incongruity the literal meaning is incongruent with information provided in the co-textual
expressions accompanying the ironic expression (its ‗co-text‘). Take, for example, the sentence ―Ronald is a genius; it took him twenty years to get his high school diploma‖. In this example the evaluative predicate ‗genius‘ is incongruous with the co-textual phrase ―it took him twenty years to get his high school diploma‖. A receiver aware of the fact that taking twenty years to obtain a high school diploma is generally not a sign of being a genius can be assumed recognize this incongruity and be able to infer that the a meaning contrary to the literal evaluation is co-textually congruent (e.g. ‗Ronald is not a genius‘).
While contextual and co-textual incongruities differ with regard to the ‗source‘ of the incongruent information, they both rely on pre-existing knowledge assumed to be present in the mind of the reader. As Averbeck & Hample (2008, p. 397) point out ―there must be some key element of shared information known to be factually incorrect by both the sender and receiver (…) [as] the sender relies on this information being held by the receiver so that the receiver may use it in decoding the ironic nature of the message‖ (cf. Brown, 1977, p. 177; McQuarrie & Mick, 1996). Deviating slightly from Burgers and his colleagues, I would argue that this ‗key element of shared information‘ generally relates to stereotypical norms associated with a particular conceptual domain referenced (implicitly or explicitly) in the ironic expression (cf. Kaufer & Newirth, 1982; Tindale & Gough, 1987). Recall that a conceptual domain is a ―coherent conceptual structure representing the way a person knows a particular part of reality including objects, events, persons, and relations among them‖ (Van den Hoven & Schilperoord, 2017, p. 142). As discussed in the previous chapter, when
20 conceptual domains are referenced, stereotypical attributes, behavior, roles, relations, etc. associated with the conceptual domain are implicitly invoked. The receiver is assumed to be familiar with such stereotypical elements, which may be said to constitute the norms that demarcate which attributes and behavior is congruous with the conceptual domain and which is not. The implicit assumption of shared conceptual knowledge allows irony to be implicit: assuming that the receiver possesses certain conceptual knowledge, the sender anticipates that the receiver will spot the incongruity and thereby infer the ironic intent, without having to explicitly articulate that he or she is being ironic (Tindale & Gough, 1987, p. 10).
Contextual and co-textual incongruities are therefore both cases of conceptual
incongruity: an incongruity between, on the one hand, shared knowledge of the attributes or
behavior stereotypically associated with a particular conceptual domain (which constitute the norms of the conceptual domain) and, on the other hand, the implication that the attributes or behavior of a particular person, object or situation is incongruent with the attributes or behavior stereotypically associated with this conceptual domain (i.e. incongruous with the norms of the conceptual domain; cf. Kaufer & Newirth, 1982). Consider again the ‗Ronald is a genius‘ example. In this particular case, it is assumed that the sender and receiver share the knowledge that ‗performing well in school‘ is stereotypical of the conceptual domain of ‗genius‘. Therefore, people who do not conform to the norm of performing well in school are generally not geniuses. It is this specific norm that the co-text is incongruous with: Ronald is called a genius (conceptual domain), he must therefore be performing well in school (norm), but Ronald is not performing well in school (co-text), therefore he is not a genius (ironic meaning). In other words, in irony, a person, object or situation is implied to exhibit characteristics which conform to the norms of a particular conceptual domain (through the literal meaning of the expression) while it is implied that they, in reality, exhibit characteristics which do not conform to these norms (through co- or contextual information).
The notion that irony is based on conceptual incongruity also allows us to explain why irony is evaluative. Because ironic expressions always implicitly or explicitly reference a conceptual (and receivers are assumed to know which behavior is congruous with the norms associated with the conceptual domain and which behavior is not), a deviation from conceptual norms always results in a valued understanding of the target. In other words, irony produces a valued understanding of a particular target as a consequence of an incongruity between what the target should be like and what the target is like. The former can be derived from shared knowledge about the stereotypical attributes of a conceptual domain (implicitly or explicitly) referenced in the expression, while the latter can be derived from co- or
21 contextual information (cf. Herrero Ruiz, 2009, pp. 175-176). This also means that, while irony always takes place at the level of the written evaluative proposition, the proposition does not have to be explicitly evaluative (i.e. reference a conceptual domain with an evaluative connotation which is used to directly evaluate a target, such as ‗great weather‘ or ‗genius‘ which are both positive). Irony might also be implicitly evaluative, in which case the conceptual domain referenced does not have an evaluative connotation. In cases of implicitly evaluative irony, the conceptual domain still invokes particular norms and, if it is implied that the target does not conform to these norms their behavior is negatively evaluated for failing to do so.
To summarize briefly up to this point, irony involves an expression which has five defining characteristics: it expresses both a non-ironic and an (intended) ironic meaning (1), these two meanings relate oppositionally to each other (2), its intended meaning is communicated implicitly (3), its intended meaning is evaluative (4) and this evaluation is always directed at a particular target (5). The literal meaning of the expression must be incongruent with its co- or context so that a reader can infer that the expression is meant to convey not the literal meaning, but a meaning contrary to the literal meaning (characteristics 1 and 2). Moreover, certain conceptual knowledge must be shared between the sender and the receiver, as this is essential for recognizing the incongruity, and this knowledge being shared allows the intended meaning to remain implicit (characteristic 3). Finally, the specific nature of the implicitly shared knowledge is related to particular norms associated with a conceptual domain referenced in the expression. These norms constitute what the target ought to be like, while the co- or contextual information provides information as to what the target is like. This
conceptual incongruity between ‗ought‘ and ‗is‘ results in a valued understanding of the
target: the behavior or attribute which fails to conform to norms it should conform to (characteristics 4 and 5).
4.2 Irony and metaphor as interacting organizing principles in editorial cartoons
In the previous chapters it has been discussed that editorial cartoons communicate an argument expressing a negative evaluation of a public event or the behavior of a public official, which is based on an incongruity between, on the one hand, the behavior/event as it
should be (according to particular norms or values) and, on the other the behavior/event as it is (according to the cartoon). Irony, as discussed in the previous section, produces a negative
22 evaluation of a particular target on the basis of a conceptual incongruity: an incongruity between norms derived from a conceptual domain verbally referenced in an (ironic) expression and co- or contextual information which indicates the target does not conform to these norms. As can be observed, this conceptual incongruity is similar to the incongruity that forms the basis of the negative evaluation expressed in the argument communicated in editorial cartoons: the conceptual domain verbally referenced in the ironic expression invokes certain norms (which constitute the behavior/event as it should be), while it is implied that the target does not conform to these norms through co- or contextual information (which constitute the behavior/event as it is). Thus, in principle, the trope of irony can implicitly express the necessary components of the critical evaluation expressed in an editorial cartoon‘s argument (as identified in Scheme 1). Firstly, the target of the criticism (X) is the behavior/event that which conflicts with the norms of the conceptual domain verbally referenced in the ironic expression. Secondly, the characteristic of the behavior/event that is criticized (Y) is the characteristic of the behavior/event which conflicts with a concrete norm associated with the conceptual domain. Finally, the commonly shared norm/value (W) is the concrete norm this characteristic conflicts with.
How might this critical evaluation be expressed through irony in the context of an editorial cartoon? Firstly, as irony takes place at level of the written evaluative proposition, the conceptually derived norms would need to be invoked via a verbal expression which references a conceptual domain. Moreover, in order for the content of the cartoon to be subjected to these norms, the verbal expression must occur in the form of a caption (i.e. a header or a footer), as captions apply to the full range of activities depicted in the cartoon (cf. Edwards, 1997, p. 48). Secondly, the behavior visually depicted in the cartoon must be incongruous with norms associated with the conceptual domain referenced by the caption, as only if this is the case is a conceptual incongruity created which leads to a negative evaluation of the visually depicted behavior. As an organizing principle in editorial cartoons, irony might thus express the incongruity between the behavior/event as should be and the behavior/event as it is by 1) verbally referencing a conceptual domain (and associated norms) through a caption and 2) visually depicting the behavior/event in the cartoon as deviating from these norms.
As editorial cartoons often present the topical behavior/event in terms of a non-topical conceptual domain the critical evaluation that is expressed through irony can interact with a multimodal metaphor in conveying the cartoon‘s critical argument. As discussed in the previous chapter, in editorial cartoons multimodal metaphors map a set of conceptually
23 derived norms and a visually evoked deviation from these norms from a non-topical conceptual domain to the topic domain. As I have just argued, the trope of irony can function as a means by which a conceptual domain is referenced (through a caption) and an incongruity between norms derived from this conceptual domain and behavior visually depicted in the cartoon is established. Thus, in conjunction irony and metaphor can express the propositional content of an editorial cartoon‘s argument, with the former expressing the negative evaluation of particular behavior through conceptual incongruity relating to a topical conceptual domain and the latter mapping this negative evaluation from the non-topical conceptual domain to the topic domain. In order to examine how this might work in practice I will, in the following section examine two cartoons in which irony and metaphor may be said to act in tandem as organizing principles and reconstruct the argument expressed in these cartoons via the argument reconstruction model depicted in Scheme 1.
4.3 Analysis of example cartoons in which Irony and metaphor act as interacting organizing principles
Thus far I have discussed how irony and metaphor may interact as organizing principles in editorial cartoons. While the trope of irony can establish a critical evaluation of behavior visually depicted in the cartoon, the trope of metaphor can map this critical evaluation from the non-topical conceptual domain referenced in the cartoon to the topic domain. I will now discuss two cartoons by the Dutch cartoonist Tom Janssen which express the propositional content of their argument through a combination of irony and metaphor.9 In each analysis I will start out with a discussion of how the relation between the conceptual domain referenced in the caption and the behavior visually depicted in the cartoon creates an incongruity which results in a negative evaluation of the visually depicted behavior. Subsequently I will discuss how this negative evaluation is mapped from the non-topical conceptual domain referenced in the caption to the topic domain and reconstruct the concrete argument implicitly communicated by the cartoon..
A first cartoon in which the tropes of and metaphor are combined as organizing principles can be found in Figure 2. The cartoon in Figure 2 comments on steel tariffs imposed by the US on the EU, which took effect on the day the cartoon was published. The figures depicted in the
9
As I am myself Dutch I have examined only Dutch cartoons in order to ensure not missing any cultural references that I might miss when examining foreign editorial cartoons.
24 cartoon represent US president Donald Trump (on the left) and EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker (on the right). The conceptual domain referenced in the caption is the conceptual domain of ‗friendship‘. Through the caption it is implied that the visual content of the cartoon is a depiction of friends, or, put differently, that norms associated with the conceptual domain of ‗friendship‘ apply to the situation depicted in the cartoon. However, the visual elements of the cartoon establish a conceptual incongruity: Trump is depicted as squeezing Juncker‘s hand with a metal glove (verbally labeled ‗Steel Tariffs‘) and the facial expression of Juncker, as well as the stars surrounding the handshake, indicate that Juncker is experiencing Trump‘s behavior as unpleasant or even painful. This behavior is incongruous with a norm associated with the conceptual domain of friendship, namely that friends do not intentionally cause harm to each other. The caption ‗friends‘ can thus be interpreted as an ironic caption: a situation which is (visually recognizable as) not ‗friends‘ is (verbally) called ‗friends‘. As it is specific behavior by a character in the cartoon which violates a norm associated with the conceptual domain of friendship (thereby preventing the situation from being friendship), this behavior is cast in a negative light. Concretely, it is implied that Trump and Juncker‘s behavior should conform to the norms of friendship (one being to not intentionally cause harm to each other), and that Trump, whose behavior conflicts with this norm, should be criticized for failing to do so.
25 Recognizing Trump‘s behavior as it is visually depicted as incongruous with how it should be according to the conceptual domain referenced in the caption, it is possible to infer the negative evaluation expressed in the cartoon through irony. Examining only the incongruity between the (non-topical) conceptual domain referenced in the caption and the visually depicted behavior in the cartoon, we may infer that the target of the criticism (X) is Trump‘s squeezing the hand of Juncker with a metal glove, that the characteristic of this behavior which conflicts with a schematic norm (Y) is that it hurts a friend of Trump and this characteristic conflicts with the norm (W) that friends do not intentionally hurt each other. A reconstruction of this argument can be found in Scheme 2.
Figure 2. Cartoon by Tom Janssen, published June 1, 2018 in Trouw (translated version by cartoonist depicted). Source: www.caglecartoons.com/viewimage.asp?ID={801BE699-09F8-40F0-A212-2A29DF0DD222}
26 1. Trump squeezing the hand of Juncker with a metal glove (X) should be evaluated negatively
1.1a Trump squeezing the hand of Juncker with a metal glove (X) has the characteristic of hurting a friend of Trump (Y)
1.1b Behavior (by Trump) which has the characteristic of hurting a friend of Trump (Y) should be evaluated negatively
1.1.1a Behavior (by Trump) which has the characteristic of hurting a friend of Trump (Y) conflicts with the norm that friends do not intentionally cause harm to each other not intentionally cause harm to each other (W)
1.1.1b The norm that friends do not intentionally cause harm to each other (W) is a generally accepted norm
Scheme 3. Reconstruction of the argumentation of the cartoon in Figure 2 based on an analysis of the conceptual incongruity.
As the reconstruction in Scheme 3 shows, the negative evaluation resulting from the incongruity between the norms of the conceptual domain referenced in the caption and the behavior visually depicted in the cartoon does not directly relate to the cartoon‘s topic (the steel tariffs Trump has levied on the EU). This topic is verbally referenced in the cartoon through the verbal label ‗steel tariffs‘ on Trump‘s glove. Through this verbal label it is implied that Trump‘s squeezing Juncker‘s hand with a metal glove is a metaphorical representation of Trump‘s levying of steel tariffs on the EU. The act of levying steel tariffs against a country (or a union of countries in the case of the EU), takes place not in the conceptual domain of friendship, but in the conceptual domain of intergovernmental relations. More specifically, the topic domain is ‗intergovernmental relations between allies‘, as Trump and Juncker both head a governmental administration and these governments are allied. Thus, through metaphorical mapping it is implied that (relations between) allies are like (relations between) friends, that levying steel tariffs on an ally is like squeezing a friend‘s hand with a metal glove and that economically hurting an ally is like physically hurting a friend. These metaphorical mappings are established via the verbal label steel tariffs on Trump‘s glove,10
10
Although it is not essential to grasping the cartoon‘s message, the fact that Trump is wearing a metal (or iron) fist creates an additional layer of meaning, since the expression ‗to rule with an iron fist‘ indicates a particular ruthless and
27 combined with foreknowledge about the relationship between Trump and Juncker in their functions as heads of a governmental administration.
When interpreting the cartoon metaphorically, it can be inferred that the target of the criticism (X) is Trump‘s levying of steel tariffs on the EU, the characteristic of this behavior which is criticized (Y) is that it economically harms an ally of the US and the conceptually derived norm that this characteristic conflicts with (W) is that is that allies do not enact policies against each another that harm each other. A reconstruction of this argument can be found in Scheme 3. Considering the issue of interpretative latitude, variations may occur among individual readers. For example, where I use the word ‗Trump‘ others might use ‗the US‘, ‗the Trump government‘ or ‗the Trump administration‘, where I have used the word ‗ally‘ others might use ‗friendly government‘, ‗trading partners‘ or ‗fellow democratic leader‘, where I have used the term ‗harms‘ others might use the terms ‗disadvantages‘, ‗hurts‘ or ‗negatively impacts‘ and so on. Nonetheless, all these variations are different expressions of the same point, which follows from the fact that the cartoon characterizes the relation between the US and the EU in a particular way and criticizes the US for failing to behave as it should considering the way its relation with the EU is characterized.
1. Donald Trump‘s levying of steel tariffs on the EU (X) should be evaluated negatively
1.1a Donald Trump‘s Levying of steel tariffs on the EU (X) has as a
charac characteristic that it economically harms an ally of the US (Y)
1.1b Behavior that has as a characteristic that it economically harms an ally of the US (Y) should be evaluated negatively
1.1.1a Behavior that economically harms an ally of the US (Y) conflicts with the norm that allies do not enact policies against each other that harm each other (W)
1.1.1b The norm that allies do not enact policies against each other that economically harm each other (W) is a generally accepted norm
Scheme 4. Reconstruction of the argumentation of the cartoon in Figure 2 based on a metaphorical interpretation of the cartoon.
uncompromising style of ruling. The metal glove that Trump is wearing could thus be interpreted as emphasizing the implied harshness of Trump‘s policy decision.
28 A second cartoon which combines the tropes of irony and metaphor can be found in Figure 3. The cartoon in Figure 3 comments on protests in Turkey against policies enacted by the governmental administration of Turkey president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. During these protests a woman in a red dress (who did not partake in demonstrations but happened to pass by) was sprayed with tear gas by riot police and subsequently became a symbol for the force used against protestors (Kelley, 2013). The caption ‗dialogue in Turkey‘ references the conceptual domain of ‗dialogue‘ and implies that the visual content of the cartoon is a depiction of dialogue (in Turkey). Therefore, norms associated with the conceptual domain of ‗dialogue‘ are implied to apply to the situation depicted in the cartoon. However, the visual elements of the cartoon establish a conceptual incongruity: Erdogan is depicted as spraying the woman in the red dress (the ‗opposition‘) in the face with the contents of a spray can (which is shaped like a text balloon). As the woman‘s face is obstructed by the contents of the spray can (and the woman in red‘s speech balloon is empty) it is implied that the woman is being incapacitated or ‗silenced‘ by Erdogan‘s behavior. This behavior is incongruous with a norm associated with the conceptual domain dialogue namely that, in a dialogue, both parties engaged in the dialogue should be free to voice their opinions. Thus, a situation that is not a dialogue (as it should) be is ironically called a dialogue through the caption. Recognizing the incongruity between the norms of dialogue (one being that both parties engaged in a dialogue should be free to voice their opinions) and the situation depicted in the cartoon (one party is prevented from voicing its opinions by the other party) it can be inferred that the cartoon is critical of the behavior which fails to accord to the norms of dialogue (Erdogan spraying the woman in the face with a spray can).
