“…the skyline rises in the East.”
(Rem Koolhaas, in Roy & Ong 2011).Chloe Pottinger-Glass
Email: cpottingerglass@gmail.com
Student number: 11401346
Supervisor: Karin Pfeffer
Local Supervisor: Champaka Rajagopal
Second reader: Courtney Vegelin
International Development Studies (Msc)
University of Amsterdam
January 20
th2017
Word Count: 26,879
ABSTRACT
As the locus of urbanization moves ever Southward, so too are centers of poverty and deprivation shifting, and in the process creating new dynamics of city-making. In the context of
India – a country which has experienced rapid urban shifts since the 1990s, this project examines the actors, structures and processes which control, produce, negotiate and contest
urban space through one specific case study of a slum eviction in Bangalore. Via qualitative methods of semi-structured interviewing and mapping, as its central question this study deeply
considers the linkages between social, spatial and discursive processes of marginalization, an approach which has been relatively empirically unexplored.
It argues that dynamics of growth in the city rest upon a ‘pro-rich’ growth agenda characterised by the systematic exclusion of the poor, elite capture governance, corruption and embedded systems of informality, which together create a paralysis of effective development as legitimate governance is undermined. The outcomes of these systems are socio-spatial polarization as the poor are spatially excluded and the re-definition of urban citizenship to include only those who
can afford to buy-in.
Keywords: Spatiality, governance, slums, Indian urbanism, informality, discourse, exclusionary development
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ... 3 ... 3 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ... 5 IMAGES, FIGURES AND TABLES ... 6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... 7 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ... 8 CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 12 i) THE POLITICS OF SPACE ... 12 ii) WORLD CITIES ... 15 iii) PRO-POOR/PRO-GROWTH AGENDAS ... 17 iv) URBAN GOVERNANCE ... 18 v) SUBALTERN URBANISM ... 20 vi) RESEARCH GAP ... 22 CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND ... 23 i) TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE INDIAN STATE ... 23 ii) NATIONAL HOUSING AND SLUM POLICY ... 25 iii) SOCIO-POLITICAL DIVISIONS ... 26 iv) RESEARCH LOCATION: BANGALORE ... 28 ... 28 CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY ... 31 i) PROBLEM STATEMENT ... 31 ii) RESEARCH DESIGN ... 31 ... 33 iii) DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS ... 35 iv) METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION ... 38 CHAPTER FIVE: FROM SWAMP TO SHOPPING MALL ... 41 i) KEY EVENTS ... 41 ii) THE SITE: SOCIO-SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS ... 44 iii) SOCIO-SPATIAL PATTERNS OF MARGINALIZATION IN BANGALORE ... 50 CHAPTER SIX: ACTORS AND DISCOURSE ... 52 i) ACTOR BLOCS ... 52 ii) DISCOURSE ... 57 CHAPTER SEVEN: GOVERNANCE PROCESSES ... 63 i) TACTICS ... 63 ii) INSTRUMENTS ... 65 iii) MECHANISMS ... 67 CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION ... 71 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION ... 79 BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 86 APPENDIX ... 100 i) INTERVIEW GUIDE ... 100 ii) RESPONDENT LIST ... 102ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BBMP - Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara PalikeBDA – Bangalore Development Authority BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party
BPL – Below Poverty Line CSO – Civil Service Organisation EWS – Economically Weaker Sections HLRN – Housing and Land Rights Network ID - Identification
IT - Information Technology
JNNURM - Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission KDSB – Karnataka Slum Development Board
MLA – Member of Legislative Assembly MTR – Mass Transit Railway
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation NGV – National Games Village
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PIL – Public Interest Litigation
PMAY - Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana PPP – Public-Private-Partnership
PUCL –Peoples Union for Civil Liberties RAY – Rajiv Awas Yojana
RTTC – Rights to the City
RWA – Resident Welfare Association SSD – Samta Sanik Dal
UN – United Nations
IMAGES, FIGURES AND TABLES
Images
Image 1: Bangalore skyline
Image 2: JNNURM blocks beside private houses Image 3: BBMP fence
Image 4: NGV gate
Image 5: Animals chewing rubbish alongside fence Image 6: Dog sleeping in front of temple
Image 7: JNNURM blocks cluster tight together Image 8: Pavement dwellings
Image 9: Pavement dwellings against wall Image 10: Tin houses over drain
Figures
Figure 1: Visualization of key themes, actors and hypothesized interactions Figure 2: Time line infographic of Ejipura eviction process
Figure 3: Actor networks
Maps
Map 1: Location of Bangalore in India.
Map 2: Eviction site and surrounding area. Source: Google maps, edits from author Map 3: Enlarged view of EWS quarters and surrounding area
Map 4: Distance from Ejipura to Sulikunte
Tables
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My utmost and profound gratitude to my supervisor Karin Pfeffer and my local supervisor Champaka Rajagopal, who were the best mentors any student could ask for. I’ve learned so
much from you and your guidance and support throughout this process has been truly invaluable.
Also to my research assistant Srivarsha NT (Varsha), who was more of a partner than assistant and without whom this work would not have been possible.
I also extend my thanks to the staff at Action Aid Bangalore, both in their support and participation in this project, and also for their unwavering work for social justice and support
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
As sustained patterns of urbanization create radical shifts in spatial and demographic fabrics throughout the Global South, cities are playing increasingly dominant roles as centers of both production and consumption, becoming sites of great wealth and power, but also of poverty and marginalization (Gupta et al. 2015; Parnell & Pieterse 2010). Meanwhile, the international dominance of neoliberal capitalism which has included the rolling back of state functions and the ascendancy of the private market in driving growth, has tended to fuel exclusionary patterns of development as inequality widens and the urban poor bear the brunt of inadequacies (e.g. Duggan 2012).
Within this urban challenge, one of the greatest impediments to reducing poverty and inequality remains the provision of adequate housing and basic services, particularly for the approximately 881 million urban slum dwellers which constitutes around 33% of the urban population (UN Habitat 2016 :57).1
“Housing determines the mutual relationship between every human being and surrounding physical and social space. This involves degrees of exclusion or inclusion in terms of collective and civic life, which together with socioeconomic conditions, are the essence of urban dynamics. This is why the fate of housing will largely determine the fate of our cities.”
(UN Habitat 2016 :49)
Housing inadequacies are far from a straightforward matter to address. For instance, Shatkin (2004 :2469) argues that this ‘shelter crisis’ is “inherent to globalising cities in
developing countries,” as a contradiction emerges between extensive development and rising property values and the shelter needs of low income people. This has entailed the
proliferation of slums as the sole form of shelter available to many and the massive
1 It is important to note the sensitivities associated with the nomenclature around such settlement areas. Gilbert (2007) problematizes the usage of the word ‘slum’ due to the negative connotations of the word and the inhabitants it refers to, also as it may lead to city planners simply demolishing slums in order to ‘help’ the people. However, following Kuffer et al. (2016), I utilize the word slum as this term explicitly expresses physical characteristics such as high densities or irregular patters, as opposed to other popular terminology such as ‘informal settlement’ which although has less negative
connotations, also implicates the legal tenure status of an area. Slum is defined here according to the UN Habitat as an area that exhibit certain characteristics including inadequate access to safe water, sanitation and other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing, overcrowding, and insecure residential status (UN Habitat 2003).
displacement of low income residents from central locations (ibid.). The UN Habitat World Cities Report (2016 :54) notes that state influence has been decreasing in many countries in the South, with the private sector filling gaps in formal housing supply. In reality, this has mostly provided for the more profitable top percent of the population with privileged access to services and in the best locations. Whilst acknowledging the effects of ethnic and armed conflict and disasters in causing the growth of slums, Kothari, former UN Special
Rapporteur, points to the “persistence of economic policies that are steeped in the neoliberal framework [as] perhaps the most pernicious and overarching of the structural obstacles that block progress on realising housing and land rights for the worlds most marginalised peoples” (2015 :2).
Forced evictions of slums can occur for many reasons, among them slum clearance drives, large scale infrastructure projects and land acquisition measures associated with urban renewal and city ‘beautification.’ This refers to strategies including the clearance of ‘undesirable’ elements from cities including street traders and informal settlements whilst promoting modern developments and green spaces (see e.g. Watson 2009). Where alternative housing is provided in re-settlement programmes, land is often located in peripheral areas, contributing to further exclusion as vital livelihood networks including employment opportunities, public services and amenities, and social networks are disrupted (e.g. Patel 2015; Dupont 2011).
In considering urban spatial change and slum policies, attention must also be paid to the processes they are embedded in. Just as power has been shifting from state to sub-national scales, so too has there been a shifting focus from government, to governance, which
acknowledges the importance of non-state actors, such as the private sector and civil society organizations in managing urban growth. Within this, new institutional arrangements such as public-private-partnerships (PPPs), have become popular developmental strategies for
everything from large scale infrastructure, to core service provision (Miraftab 2004). Alongside this comes a need to re-evaluate the criteria upon which we judge governance – whether fairness and transparency, or profit and efficiency are the standards to which we hold municipal governments to account. This question will have critical ramifications for the consideration of the challenge of slums.
A country with particular relevance in this debate is India – a nation at the epicentre of trends of rapid urbanization and an emerging global economic hegemon. In the past decades, imaginaries of ‘cities of the future’ (Nair 2005 :333) have fuelled visions of urban growth while interplays between state vision and private sector interests dominate the control and
production of urban space.
“Rajkot will get a skytrain…Ahmedebad will get a metro… Cities are branded – for sale, i.e. for inviting investors. Big projects are a kind of fashion statement for cities, sold to the upwardly mobile, aspiring to bring the Seine promenade to Ahmedebad or a Shanghai skyline to Mumbai… These visions promote big money and big players in the urban space, opening up cities for monopolistic control.”
(Mahadevia 2011 :57).
This vision has not entailed the most inclusive development agenda; India’s cities face deep rooted poverty and inequality. Mohanty et al. (2005 :40) note that “some of the worst slums in the world can undoubtedly be found in India.” While the Indian state previously played an active role in generating housing for low and middle income households, since the mid 1990s, housing for the poor has not been a priority and the private sector has tended to target the more lucrative middle and upper classes (UN Habitat 2016 :52). Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a national plan to create a ‘slum free’ India. However, this has incurred widespread eviction drives, the scheme relying on a problematic assumption: that one can get rid of poverty by simply eradicating slums (Arabindoo 2011). In Delhi, at least 200,000 of the city’s 3 million slum dwellers were evicted since 2004 to facilitate the city’s preparation for the Commonwealth Games; in Chennai alongside the 200,000 already displaced, there are plans to evict an additional 300,000 – approximately 50% of Chennai’s slum population (ibid. :637).
As cities in the South continue to expand, exclusionary urban growth constitutes an urgent developmental problem. Through examining the actors, structures and processes which control, produce, negotiate and contest urban space, and the visions and agendas which fuel them, we can further understand the processes which shape urban development. This research contributes to the production of understanding in this area, taking as its focus one case study of a slum eviction in the Indian city of Bangalore - the case of Ejipura. This location was chosen due to links with an ongoing research project (Dynaslum), and the case chosen as it was one of the largest and highest profile of its kind in Bangalore (HLRN 2013 :1).
This makes it a compelling location for this study as it has garnered much attention and the question of whether it is setting a precedent is salient.
In this research, spatial and discursive analysis is combined to explore the linkages between social, spatial and discursive processes of marginalization. This approach is relatively
underutilised in the academic debate, particularly from an empirical perspective. Firstly, this work will discuss relevant literature and debates (chapter 2), the background of the study, i.e. the Indian context (chapter 3), and the methodological approach (chapter 4), before going on to empirical findings (chapters 5, 6 and 7). Empirical chapters focus on: i) the case (and space) itself: characteristics, and changing socio-spatial dynamics; ii) actors, actor blocs and their discourses and iii) governance strategies.
To conclude, in striving for a more sustainable, equitable and inclusive world, it is critical to focus on cities as key sites of this change, paying attention to broader tends as well as
specificities according to context. Understanding dynamics of change will be vital in
contributing to positive policy influence towards the ultimate goal of making cities work for everyone.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To understand processes of urban transformation in Bangalore, five areas of literature are presented: the politics of space, ‘world cities,’ pro-growth and pro-poor development agendas, urban governance, and subaltern urbanism. Within these themes, academic debates and empirical applications are drawn out and I show how each provides an important analytic lens for understanding the case explored in this thesis.
i)
THE POLITICS OF SPACE
“…there is a politics of space because space is political.” (Lefèbvre 1972 :59)As urbanization continues on an unprecedented scale, highly asymmetrical concentrations of wealth and power are creating and exacerbating conflict over space. Yet, ‘space’ is not a fixed and static entity to fight over. In recent scholarship, it has been regarded not just as influencing social organisation, but in fact itself as socially produced and indicative of deep seated dynamics of power and control (Certoma et at 2012 :1). The manner in which these mechanisms of power and control manifest in the production of urban space is central to this research.
The Right to the City
One of the most influential scholars of the politics of space was Henri Lefèbvre. According to his 1972 book ‘Le droit à la ville,’ (The Right to the City) to have a ‘Right to the City’ (RTTC) is to “claim some kind of shaping power over the processes of urbanization; over the ways in which our cities are made and re-made and to do so in a fundamental and radical way” (Harvey 2008 :2). This encompasses two basic principles: the right to participation, and the right to appropriation. The right to participation holds that citizens should play a central role in any decision that contributes to the production of urban space, and the right to
appropriation entails the rights of inhabitants to physically access, occupy, and use urban space, as well as the right to produce space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants (Purcell 2002 :102-103). The notion of ‘urban citizenship’ is derived from this theory, with Lefèbvre insisting that inhabitance in a city alone is basis for citizenship (ibid.). This theory has enduring relevance; Zerah et al. argue (2011 :1) that the RTTC approach can be seen as “part of a critique of the capitalist model of accumulation; conceived as a counter-narrative to
the wave of neoliberal reforms that have transformed relationships between the state, the private sector and civil society in cities the world over.”
These ideas have since been incorporated into mainstream development discourses. For instance, in 2005, UNESCO and UN Habitat initiated a project called “Urban Policies and the Rights to the city: Rights, Responsibilities and Citizenship” (Zerah et al. 2011) followed by a UN Habitat report (2010) on the state of the worlds cities which articulates the
importance of utilizing the RTTC as a vehicle for social inclusion. Utilizing a rights based approach to urban development provides a strong moral and institutional imperative for equitable growth with a focus on the most marginalized in the city (Parnell & Pieterse 2010). This was an approach also taken by the Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) to frame their investigations into the Ejipura eviction, claiming (2013 :vi) that the struggle for the rights to the city is part of a “new politics of resistance,” an “articulation to consolidate the demand for the realization of multiple human rights within city space.”
The Production of Space
Lefèbvre’s later work, ‘The Production of Space’ (1991), was equally influential. Here, Lefèbvre argues that more than just the material physical aspects that form it, cities are a “complex socio-political construction which informs the production of and claims on city space” (Nair 2005 :20). This reasoning was the basis of the RTTC approach – problematizing the social constructions of the politics of space and the nexus of power which constitutes urban planning and governance. Lefèbvre defines three categories which conceptualize space as produced:
• Representations of space, relating to abstracted space, defined or planned by agents who hold power and knowledge.
• Spaces of representation, which engage with spaces that are lived and formed by human experiences, memories and feelings.
• Spatial practices, which relate to people’s perceptions on the basis of their experiences of daily life, relating not just to materiality, but also to the processes by which
materiality is produced (hence also the networks of social relations that mediate these processes) (Dhananka 2016 :5).
This includes the ways in which people understand and relate to space, how it is shaped, and shapes their own identity and feelings of citizenship and how power structures can facilitate the means to control and produce it.
Place-making & the politics of forgetting
Since Lefèbvre, other scholars have examined space as it relates to politics, power and also discourse. Lombard (2015) advanced the analytical lens of ‘place-making,’ looking at how power structures and specifically discourses shape spatial realities. Analyzing activities in a Mexican slum area, Lombard (ibid. :98) shows how residents are involved in the “everyday appropriation of space”, “gradually conferring their own meanings onto the formerly agricultural land on which many settlements are located” in a process through which tracks become streets, and overgrown areas become football pitches. From this, we can see that ‘power’ may mean the power to determine place meaning, with more powerful actors
subsuming these meanings as space is re-appropriated or erased. Via this understanding, it is possible to view locations as simultaneous sites of resistance and domination, enabling a more nuanced perspective on power relations and dynamic tensions that interact in one place (ibid. :101).
In the Indian context, Fernandes (2004) examines discursive-spatial strategies which render invisible marginalized groups from the dominant national political culture in what she terms the ‘politics of forgetting.’ She argues (2004 :2416-7) that the production of middle class identity is linked to a politics of ‘spatial purification’ which centers on middle class claims over space and corresponding drives to cleanse such spaces of the poor. She concludes that such forms of local spatial politics indicate the creation of an “exclusionary form of cultural citizenship.” This construction of proper citizen, its association with new middle class values (and the lifestyle and consumption habits this entails) has provided a justification for many large scale urban developments which exclude the poor as they fail to fit with the prescribed image of the modern city.
The examination of discourse as it relates to power and identity is key and I utilize this lens of place-making to draw out these complex dimensions. Yet where Fernandes points to a politics of forgetting, I will investigate the extent to which mechanisms of spatial control are much more direct.
ii)
WORLD CITIES
Constructing the World City
As globalization processes entail economic restructuring, centres of power are being re-articulated from state, to sub-and supra-state scales (Brenner 1998). In this process, cities are becoming increasingly dominant nodes of organisation. An influential model which has theorized this shift is the global, or ‘World City’ coined by Friedmann (1985) and further popularized by Sassen (2001), referring to the city as the new site of global economic flows and international competition.
Other scholars have since developed this idea, including Roy and Ong (2011) whose book on ‘Worlding Cities’ examines different Asian models and practices of urbanization within this conceptual framework. Ong (2011) notes that in addition to becoming sites of economic importance, so too do cities become sites for instantiating their countries claims to global significance, becoming symbols of prestige. Some scholars point out that this prestige does not just refer to its economic might, but also arguably to a certain type of urban form, with the ‘aestheticization’ of city space (Bhan 2009). These processes often entail the clearance of ‘undesirable’ elements such as street traders and informal settlements, while shopping malls and luxury housing spring up in their place (Greene 2003; Rajagopal 2001).
But where has this image come from, and is the path to the global city linear? Historically, many reproduced ideas associated with World Cities have been Western-centric (Hopkins & Solga 2013 :78); in most cases London and New York (sometimes also Tokyo) are considered as the ‘peak’ of city development. Following this, scholars including Shatkin (1998), and Gugler (2004) denounce the Western bias in the model, advocating ‘other ways’ of becoming, and warning of a ‘slippery slope’ to past theories of development, most notably dependency theory, viewing Western economies as an end state that developing countries are “inexorably drawn towards” (Davis 2005; Shatkin 2007). However, Roy and Ong (2011) point out that instead, many cities are turning Eastwards in their models of development. For example, in the case of India, it has modelled its urban development predominantly on Shanghai and Singapore (Nair 2005; Benjamin 2008). Whether this is as an explicit rejection of Western models or rather in relation to the rapid growth of these cities in last several decades is unclear. Yet, it will still be
important to examine the manifestation of this model in a local contexts and what exactly it entails; i.e. how the ‘World City’ is being constructed in Bangalore.
Others have discussed the pitfalls of applying broad models of development without taking sufficient account of local context. Robinson (2002) argues such thinking is reductionist, and notes that “calculated attempts at World City formation can have devastating consequences for most people in the city, especially the poorest, in terms of service provision, equality of access and redistribution.” Shatkin (2007 :2) echoes this critique, asserting three negative features which he argues are common to global city development:
• Social inequality – emerging as social classes become polarized between a wealthy professional class and a low wage service sector (Molenkopf and Castells 1991) • Uneven development as social polarization becomes embedded in the spatial form of
the city with socioeconomic segregation and unequal access to liveable space (highly evident for instance in the American context in the suburbanization of the wealthy and ‘ghettoes’ of the poor)
• Political inequality, in which urban politics becomes dominated by interest groups who favour growth oriented policies (Logan and Molotch 1987).
Following these critiques, it will be interesting to see the ramifications of the application of the World City vision (whatever this definition may contain) and whether the negative implications as brought out by Shatkin and Robinson can be observed in Bangalorean context.
Aesthetic governmentality
Related to the notion of the aestheticized and modernized city, Ghertner (2011) calls attention to the visuality of urbanities as they emerge under World City models. He argues that spaces can be classed as “illegal, or legal, deficient or normal” based on their outer characteristics in a process he terms ‘aesthetic governmentality.’ Through this logic, a shopping mall, even if in violation of planning law is legal because it looks legal, and a slum, even if its residents have been formalised at their current location, is illegal because it looks like a nuisance (ibid. :288). In such a way, it is the “visuality of urban space itself” that determines the norms through which governments can shape cities, and, it is through the “idealised visions of world class cities (a little Singapore here, a little London there)” that shape the aesthetics of a world class city, effectively establishing norms for urban life and order (ibid. :289).
Other authors have explored this concept (mostly also in the context of India) including Datta (2016) who discusses the relationship between space, law, gender and the construction of illegality in squatter settlements in Delhi, and Follmann (2015) who cites aesthetic
governmentality in the context of how mega-development along on Yamuna river are
legitimised. Looking at empirical evidence, such processes can also be seen in many urbanities in the Global South. For example, ongoing drives to clear or ‘upgrade’ favelas in Brazil,
expedited in preparation for the Olympic games in 2016 as international eyes turned to the country (e.g. Kennedy et al. 2014), and in Egypt, drives to ‘modernize’ the unsightly informal waste management system of Cairo – a community of garbage collectors known as the Zabaleen who collected waste from homes and business – by instead contracting European firms whose large trucks struggled to navigate the city’s narrow streets and reducing overall rates of recycling (Furniss 2012). This theme of visuality of urban space and how it relates to
constructions of modernity, illegality and informality emerges strongly in my own work.
iii) PRO-POOR/PRO-GROWTH AGENDAS
Another relevant debate in the urban development literature comes from the distinction between ‘pro-poor’ and ‘pro-growth’ agendas. Pro-poor agendas are concerned with social redistribution and equality, typified by RTTC approaches and championed by international frameworks such as the Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals. In contrast, pro-growth agendas typically focus on market-driven pro-growth and privatization entailing a strong degree of interaction between public and private sectors (Kennedy et al. 2014).
Writing on the pro-growth agenda includes scholars such as Harvey, who in his 1989 paper identified a shift from what he called ‘urban managerialism’, a governance strategy focused on providing basic urban services, to ‘urban entrepreneurialism,’ which he characterizes as the “willingness of the neoliberal state at the local level to initiate, rather than simply manage the effects of urban economic development.” Molotch (1976) argued that private developers often become part of a coalition which in turn promotes a pro-growth agenda – what he termed the “growth machine,” a mechanism which perpetuates certain modes of governance as power becomes increasingly transferred to private actors. More recently, a similar argument was made by Rouanet et al. (2016), who, in the context of Bangalore, argued that developers can leverage
:1401), that although their strategies may align with governmental agendas for city
modernization, they can also constitute an obstacle, as the state is “outdone by developers ability to work through the intricacies of local land markets and bureaucracies,” leaving developers in a position to further their own representations of what the desirable city should be. In such a way, pro-growth strategies may leave private entities in positions of considerable power. Proponents of pro-growth agendas claim that regardless of the focus on inequality, policies are likely to be pro-poor in the long run (Lopez 2004).
The distinctions between these agendas was explored empirically in by Braathen et al. (2014). They note that in Lima, pro-poor housing policies were promoted such as supporting
incremental house building and the formalisation of informal settlements (ibid. :22). However, with the influence of pro-growth agendas that swept the cities of the South since the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, under President Fujimori, strategies also shifted to a reliance on the market and privatization. India followed a similar path, with PPPs and the market driving the “re-imagining of Indian cities” and housing policies increasingly influenced by global city visions (ibid. :23). On the other hand, in Brazil, notions of RTTC were included in the institutional framework for urban reform, and the goal of the 2010 housing programme Morar Carioca was the upgrading and formalisation of all the favelas in Rio via participatory means (Braathen et al. 2014). This strategy aligns more with recent moves to integrate the two agendas, so called ‘pro-poor growth’ which has been popularised by the OECD, World Bank and the UK Overseas Development Institute. This is defined as economic growth that leads to significant reductions in poverty (Ravallion 2004). However, Braathen et al. (2014) note that policies which might be pro-poor on paper are often problematic in their application. For example, an assessment of the Morar Carioca programme concluded it had actually increased socio-spatial segregation by building most of the houses in peripheral locations, with
programmes benefiting mainly the private entities (ibid. :52). Thus, while pro-poor growth may provide a progressive, market driven vision of growth, there still exist flaws in its application on the ground.
iv) URBAN GOVERNANCE
As an analytical tool, ‘governance’ as a concept moves away from more rigid understandings of political rule, instead recognising the roles of non-state actors. It has been defined by Levi-Faur (2012, in Gupta et al. 2015 :29) as “an interdisciplinary research agenda on order and
disorder, efficiency and legitimacy all in the context of the hybridization of modes of control that allow the production of fragmented and multi-dimensional order, within the state, by the state, without the state and beyond the state.” With the decentring of power towards the sub-national level, such a framework can provide a way through which to understand new dynamics and processes of governing at the city level. Normatively there emerges the question of what ‘good governance’ entails. Neoliberal moves towards privatization, de-regulation and
involvement of non-state actors are often presented as more democratic and the emphasis on efficiency echoes neoliberalism’s depoliticizing perspective (Gupta et al. 2015 :29). On the other hand, developmental state models see the state playing a more active role in managing society and the economy seen for example in Singapore (e.g. Huff 1995). The UN Habitat (unhabitat.org) proposed that good urban governance is characterized by:
• Sustainability: Balancing the social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations.
• Subsidiarity: Responsibility for service provision should be allocated at the closest appropriate level.
• Equity: Of access to decision making processes and the basic necessities of urban life • Efficiency: In the delivery of public services and in promoting local economic
development.
• Transparency and accountability: Of decision makers and all stakeholders
• Civic engagement and citizenship: Citizens must be empowered to participate effectively in decision making processes.
• Security: Of individuals and their living environment.
As a comprehensive framework for urban governance, these indicators are useful in evaluating the case of Ejipura. However, whilst this model recognises the role of the private sector (for instance stating that a practical means of realising the principle of efficiency can include delivery of services through partnerships with the private and civil society groups) it can still be placed broadly within the pro-poor camp of literature, which as its goal promotes equitable governance processes. The positionality of this framework within the wider debate must therefore be kept in mind, especially as the UN Habitat is an important driver in shaping urban development norms.
v)
SUBALTERN URBANISM
One final body of literature can broadly be called ‘subaltern urbanism.’ This refers to the means by which populations outside of hegemonic power structures engage in citymaking. The academic debate can be grouped into two main categories here: firstly, scholars such as
Benjamin (2008), Baviskar (2003) and Lombard (2015) who point to the agency of the poor within such structures, while others e.g. Roy (2009; 2011), Follman (2015) and Van Dijk (2011) highlight the contradictions that emerge within them.
Lombard (2015 :98) discusses how in Mexican slum areas, residents may be involved in the ‘everyday appropriation of space,’ incrementally adapting land to fit their uses.
Meanwhile, residents may be involved in illegal or semi-legal activities while simultaneously initiating formal processes to obtain official services. Benjamin (2008 :719) describes similar processes in India, explaining that in Bangalore, in the IT corridor of mega office
complexes, there exists a “complex and nuanced politics” in which village and town councils extend basic services while occupant groups actively play the real estate market through which “subverting the mega.” He also cites the system of ‘vote-bank’ politics, referring to when poor groups lobby municipal agents for some specific demands, for instance
protection from eviction, in return for their loyalty in municipal elections (Benjamin 2008 :719). These mechanisms, Benjamin bids us to consider as “evidence of a popular
consciousness” – a mode of effectively pressurising municipal and state administrators and constituting a subaltern form of participation.
This aligns with the positions of Bayat (2000) and Baviskar (2003) who tend to see informality as the practices of the subaltern, as part of ‘deep democracy’ or democracy ‘from below’ (Roy 2009 :84). Bayat (2000 :547) speaks of thousands of street vendors in Cairo, Istanbul and Tehran occupying streets in commercial centres and urban poor in Cairo creating spontaneous communities housing over 5 million people, against formal laws adding rooms onto dwelling and forcing authorities to provide urban services by otherwise tapping them illegally. In such a way, these gains may be achieved through the necessity to survive rather than an overarching political strategy but won as a result of “intense struggles and negotiations between the poor and the authorities and elites in their daily lives” (ibid.). As such, these authors emphasize the agency – albeit subversively – of the disenfranchised and their capacity to incite change.
Yet, structurally, the poor can be at a disadvantage via these informal systems. For instance, vote-bank politics can be viewed as ‘patron clientelism,’ in which there is a skewed power dynamic which leads to so called ‘appeasement’ politics (e.g. Singh 2012). Van Dijk (2011 :311) points out the insecurity of poor groups within this structure, arguing that they are more likely to rely on “clientship than citizenship.” Similarly, Appadurai (2000) notes that such a system is an extension of a world where property dealing is connected to local thugs and ward level politicians. Roy (2011) discusses cases in India where the state, in trying to push through mega-developments, created Special Economic Zones to overrule its own legislation protecting the area for agricultural purposes. Similarly, Follman (2015) discusses the Indian state intentionally empowering riverfront megaprojects to bypass environmental regulations to push through property development. These authors hold these mechanisms as evidence that informality, from being the object of state regulation, when produced by the state itself undermines its legitimacy and creates a roadblock of effective governance (Roy 2005; 2009, Follman 2015).
Subaltern urbanism provides an important lens through which to examine the case of Ejipura and the agency of the slum dwellers within it. However, in the Indian context at least, I
question whether the optimism of Benjamin, Appadurai and Bayat is misplaced. While the poor may indeed have agency, to consider their usage of informal tactics or everyday resistance evidence of some ‘deep democracy’ or participation, may be simplistic and their capacities to affect change are often severely limited.
One final related topic concerns modalities of mobilization. A useful framework comes from Braathen et al. (2014) who identify five categories: i) everyday forms of resistance; ii) social protest, or confrontational mobilization; iii) ‘judicialisation,’ – mobilization via court
mechanisms, and iv) engagement and partnership. In addition, they identify times when there has been an absence of mobilization, and when mobilization has been fragmented: v)
demobilization and the fragmentation of collective action. These categories provide a helpful framework for engaging with processes of mobilization and considering the tactics taken by various actors during the eviction processes.
vi) RESEARCH GAP
Based on the literature review, I believe a greater focus upon the mechanisms through which social, spatial, and discursive processes of marginalisation combine to fuel exclusionary urban development is necessary. Such an approach is utilised to some extent by Fernandes (2003) in relation to the emerging middle class in India and by Lombard in Mexico, although her study remains largely theoretical. Similar themes were explored within the Chance 2 Sustain research programme (e.g. Braathen et al. 2014; Kennedy et al. 2014). However, the case studies in these works do not concentrate in depth on the strategies of the various actors and none provide a multi-actor analysis, a gap my work addresses. Additionally, none focus specifically on
language, a strategy which has been able to provide me with a more nuanced understanding of the latent positions and agendas involved in this case.
Within their discussion of the upgrading of sub-standard settlements, Braathen et al. (2014) point to the central importance of the ‘agency of the poor,’ recommending further research be carried out on this topic – namely, insurgent citizenship and subaltern urbanism. My research responds to this identified gap, providing empirical material in these areas.
In the following chapters, I examine the case of Ejipura through the multiple lenses of the politics of space, world cities, growth agendas, urban governance and subaltern urbanism, looking at actors, actor networks, tactics and structures, whilst at the same time considering the ways in which cities themselves reflect and reproduce processes of marginalization. Through this approach, I have been able to unearth some of the complex interstices of urbanism in contemporary Bangalore, which may in turn provide insights about how to tackle exclusionary urban growth more broadly.
CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND
i)
TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE INDIAN STATE
In order to fully grasp the nuances of this case, it is important to situate the events of Ejipura in the broader context of India’s transformations over the past several decades from a largely socialist state at the time of its independence to currently something that can more accurately be labelled ‘neo-liberal.2
’ I l illustrate these changes via the rulings of certain court cases
towards slum dwellers and the rhetoric they use, linking these back to macro-economic shifts in the country.
Bhan (2009) the landmark case of Olga Tellis vs Bombay Municipal corporation in 1985 in which it was ruled that “[…]the right to livelihood is an important facet of the right to life… and “the eviction of the [slum dwellers] will lead to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to deprivation of life.” It continued, that the urban poor do not dwell on pavements or in slums “for the purpose of pursuing any activity which is illegal, immoral or contrary to public
interest… rather, many of them pursue occupations which are “humble but honorable” (Bhan 2009 :134). This second section is most telling, with the judgment displaying empathy for the pavement dwellers, but also, crucially, acknowledging their status as equal citizens deserving of respect and help. In this case, ‘public interest’ does not specifically exclude slum dwellers. The K Chandru vs. State of Tamil Nadu case in 1985 displayed a similar sentiment, in which the court argued that alternative accommodation must be provided before evictions can take place, with the judges stating that they hoped “[…]the government will continue to evince the same interest in the welfare of pavement dwellers and slum dwellers” (in Bhan 2009 :135).
However, with the case of Almitra Patel vs. the Union of India in 2000, it was ruled that Delhi should be the “showpiece of the country,” yet “no effective initiative… has been taken for cleaning up the city.” Slums, in this case, were described as “large areas of public land, usurped for private use, free of cost” (emphasis added). Other telling phrases from this ruling include the description of slum dwellers as “encroachers” “[...]rewarding an encroacher on public land with an alternative free site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket for stealing”. Bhan (2009 :135) states that from this point on, “the courts continued to refuse to hold the government
accountable for its failure to provide low income housing and to erode the right to resettlement.”
What happened between this period in which sentiments towards slum people were so sharply reversed? At what point did there become a distinction between slum people and the rest of the ‘public,’ on whose land slum people encroach? The profound economic and political changes India went through during these decades are paramount. Under the first prime minister Jawaharal Nehru (1947 to 1964), the fledgling independent Indian state saw its
‘socialist experiment’ characterized by state planned growth and import substitution crumble as poor economic growth rates led to stagnation and worsening poverty rates (Sharma 2009). After a domestic economic crisis in 1991, new economic policies were adopted opening markets and beginning India’s liberalization period. From the 90s, India experienced rapid growth of between 7 and 9% per year and with an expanding service and consumption-centric economy, the country became intent on “claiming its place on a global stage” (Bhan 2009 :136). This new mode of state action saw a declining role for state patrimony and afforded larger roles for market forces, including the introduction of PPPs as an urban development prerogative (Batra 2009 :19).
But what also emerged was a new mentality — as Ong describes (2006 :6), an “infiltration of market logic into politics” whereby the proper citizen was redefined in terms of their economic productivity and ability to buy-in. This signified that “the welfare, nationalist and developmental state that stressed cohesion and the inclusion of the poor in the national economic mission [was] no longer the dominant ethical model of India” (Bhan 2009 :137). This change in sentiment coincided with wide societal shifts and an emergent middle class from the 90s onwards. Fernandes (2003 :2415) describes this as the “visual embodiment of globalization,” representing the shift from state socialism to a political culture based on middle class
consumption. With these shifts, it becomes increasingly clear that the urban poor do not ‘fit’ in this new image of India’s cities and their claims to citizenship are challenged as what it means to be a citizen is redefined.
ii)
NATIONAL HOUSING AND SLUM POLICY
Since the 1990s, underpinning the massive urban momentum in India, there have been several national schemes attempting to address slums and urban poverty. These include the visionary Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) which launched in 2005, the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) which ran from 2010, finally the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY) which replaced the RAY under Modi’s government. The core goals and rhetoric of each are quite different therefore it will be useful to provide a brief overview of each.
The JNNURM was the “single largest initiative of the government of India for planned urban development,” investing about 50,000 crore (around $20 billion) over a nine year period (Chandrashekar 2016). In its 65 targeted cities, the scheme set out requirements including massive upgradation of physical infrastructure and a range of urban sector reforms in accordance with the 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act, for example introduction of property title reform and greater decentralization of power to municipal governments. A
sub-programme, the Basic Service to the Urban Poor (BSUP), focused on the integrated development of slums (Kundu 2014 :617-619). Notably, the BSUP sought to support slum upgrading, i.e. improving living conditions, providing security of tenure, basic services and amenities rather than demolition and resettlement.
In 2010 with the introduction of the RAY, a “slum free India” was envisaged with “inclusive and equitable cities in which every citizen has access to basic infrastructure and social amenities and decent shelter” (Mhupa). However, while the mission statement may advocate inclusivity, in reality, others note that the drive for a slum free India was less progressive, resulting in widespread evictions and slum demolitions (Arabindoo 2011; Sheth 2013; Chaturvedi 2013). Arabindoo (2011 :638) notes that ‘slum free cities’ is a convenient motif, as slum settlements are spatial entities, and are thus able to be identified, targeted and cleared.
In 2015, PM Modi subsumed the RAY into the PMAY. The PMAY took abold stance, calling for ‘housing for all by 2022,’ promising to provide homes to 18 million families in urban India (PM India website). However, by 2017, reportedly only 1.88 million houses had been built (Deb 2017). Looking at the implications of this scheme, Bhan (2017 :590) notes there has been a marked shift from talking about ‘housing’, to ‘houses.’ What this means is the possibility
of upgradation or ‘incremental housing’ has been removed — only new houses are to be built (ibid.). This may provide a reason why progress has been so slight. Despite this, the census in 2011 showed that there were over 10 million privately owned vacant homes in India, nearly half the urban housing shortage. This reflects a distorted housing market and highlighting the staggering divide between the rich and poor in the country (Deb 2017).
The implications of the PMAY can be seen in two ways: firstly, its reflection of continuing trends of market driven growth and an increasing preoccupation with land monetization; and also a certain rigidity of thinking — a failure to either recognise, or a knowing refusal to
accommodate solutions for the urban poor which are genuinely fit for purpose. Looking at the application of these schemes, Patel (2015 :232) argues that resettlement projects are often implemented in city peripheries, distant from peoples’ workplaces, school and hospitals. This leads to low habitation rates.On the other hand, despite insecurity of tenure and widespread lack of services and amenities, slum areas are usually located in strategic areas and are flexible: with dwellings that can be expanded incrementally (as income allows), and often coming part-and-parcel with economic activities that are often home based (Bhan 2017).
To conclude, it is important to bear in mind the shortcomings of these schemes, as goals of making cities ‘slum free’ are decreed, but policies enacted which take little account of the lived realities and needs of vast sections of the urban poor.
iii) SOCIO-POLITICAL DIVISIONS
One last relevant background topic is the caste system and the important ways it still
permeates Indian society. Although the caste system was formally abolished shortly after Indian independence, caste identities and related societal hierarchies remain an unavoidable facet of life in the contemporary state.
With independence and the abolition of untouchability, the Indian state introduced
reservations for jobs, seats in government and educational opportunities for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes3
, to begin redressing their abject marginalization. Historically, the lower caste’s educational opportunities were severely limited and the so called ‘untouchables,’ could
3
only undertake menial or unclean work such as cleaning streets and toilets. While caste issues have featured less prominently in contemporary discourse, Hindu Scheduled Castes along with religious minorities – particularly Muslims – are overrepresented in slum populations. For instance, in Delhi, one study found that 20% of slum dwellers are Muslim (compared to 13% in the general population), and 40% are Scheduled Caste (compared with 16% in the general population) (Banerjee et al. 2012).
With new opportunities afforded by democracy, the fledgling Indian state witnessed the political awakening of Dalit parties and movements. The ‘father of the Indian constitution,’ civil rights reformist Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, was key in sparking the growing political power of the Dalits. It was Ambedkar that popularized the usage of the word Dalit for the ‘Scheduled castes’: as Rao (2009 :1) explains, that “to call oneself a Dalit, meaning ‘ground down,’ ‘broken to pieces,’ ‘crushed,’ is to convert a negative description into a confrontational identity and to become a particular sort of political subject for whom the terms of exclusion on which
discrimination is premised are at once refused and reproduced in the demands for inclusion.” Through largely formal channels, Dalit and other oppressed bodies were able to critique the dominant Hindu order through a politics of recognition and rights (ibid. :3). In many ways, this spirit of contestation and negotiation is an important and continuing facet of Indian governance and statehood. However, engrained unequal power dynamics still weight the balance in favor of more historically dominant groups Gupta 2005 :409). What remains to be explored, are the complex ways these social structures continue to play out in the power nexuses which shape urban governance in the contemporary state.
iv) RESEARCH LOCATION: BANGALORE
Map 1: Location of Bangalore in India. Scale indicative. (Source: Free Vector Maps, edits from author)
Bangalore has experienced meteoric growth in the past three decades. From a population of just 4 million in 1992, aided by India’s IT revolution, this figure has grown by over double and is estimated to reach 10 million by 2020 (Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) 2017 :10). Between 2001-2011 it was the fastest growing city in India, with an estimated growth rate of 42% during this decade (ibid.). It is a city at the forefront of India’s World City visions; in 1999, Karnataka’s Chief Minister S.M. Krishna explicitly cited Singapore as his inspiration for the city’s future (Nair 2005 :79). In many ways, Bangalore is thus indicative of macro-developmental aspirations in India, as it seeks to become India’s forefront ‘modern’ city, with a cosmopolitan populace and emphasis on technology. However, due to this rapid growth, Bangalore has also been faced with an infrastructure at breaking point: an inadequate
transportation system, serious issues of pollution and water shortages, and a critical lack of housing for the urban poor (e.g. Lane 2007). Due to its rapid transformations, Bangalore constitutes a dynamic location for this study.
Image 1: Bangalore skyline (source: Indiapages.in).
Due to its many parks and lakes, until around the 90s, Bangalore was known as the ‘garden city’ and a pensioners’ paradise (Sudhira et al. 2007). However, its new nickname: ‘India’s Silicon valley’ indicates how vastly the city’s identity has changed. As the IT industry continues to expand, specially designed enclaves have been formed such as ‘Electronic city’ a vast
industrial park which continues to attract workers. Dehejia (2011) claims that much like the original Silicon valley, many of the city’s IT neighbourhoods seem to have drawn inspiration from software campuses in trying to create self-contained environments for their residents to live and work — “internalizing the externalities.” Enclaves such as these emerged mostly in the city’s peripheries, but gradually as the city grew, became part of its sprawl (Sudhira et al. 2007 :385). This has created an urban form whereby futuristic tech parks exist alongside haphazard sites of tent dwellings, where often reside the very labourers who are employed to craft this vision of the city.
One of the most pronounced challenges Bangalore is facing is a shortage of housing for economically weaker sections (EWS). Estimates of the number of people living in slums vary from between 10 and 26% of the total urban population (HLRN 2017 :vii). It has been suggested that this huge gap in supply and demand is not so due to rising populations, rather
because of “unbridled commercial development of housing for the urban elite, often producing an excess of luxury housing at the expense of investment in housing for the EWS” (HLRN 2013 :4). Meanwhile, increasingly neoliberal governance strategies have seen a decreasing role for the state in provision of basic infrastructure and services and the increasing popularity of PPPs as a method to expedite developments. A draft housing policy from Karnataka in 2010 stated that there is a need for the government to act as “facilitator” instead of “builder and provider” to achieve the goal of housing for all in the state (HLRN 2017 :8). These trends have led critics to claim that the paradigm of development visible in Bangalore is one of “exclusion and profiteering with the state relegating its welfare function to private actors,” whilst forced evictions are carried out under the guise of ‘beautification,’ ‘urban renewal and ‘slum free cities’ (HLRN 2013 :vi).
In terms of main governance structures, the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP), or the ‘municipal corporation’ is Bangalore’s civic and infrastructural administrative body, whose roles include zoning and building regulations, health, trade, education, parks and water bodies. Resulting from the 74th
constitutional amendment on urban governance instituted in 1992, constitutional status was granted to urbanities (Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), intended to greatly increase the powers and functions of municipal corporations. However, in Bangalore, these reforms were hardly implemented, leaving the organization bloated, inefficient and underfunded (Mahadevia and Datey 2012; Dhananka 2016). There are deep inefficiencies in city administration and in-fighting between departments common with Roy noting that, “most road and rail links that the government had promised to build to the airport have been delayed or scrapped, in part because lawsuits over acquiring the land and in part because they involve 32 government agencies” (Roy 2011 :78). In a master plan for 2031, the BDA (2017) focuses on transport, water, solid waste management and electricity. In the thirty page document, housing is mentioned just once in the text, indicating its lack of prioritization in city developmental plans.
From this overview, what can be concluded is that there exist deep tensions within Bangalore’s current urban form as growth rapidly outstrips the city’s capacity to provide for all its citizens. Moreover, this is likely to worsen as the municipal corporation remains weak and inefficient, while increasingly pro-corporate growth strategies are enacted to plug gaps in the city’s infrastructural deficiencies.
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines the research design, data collection and methods of analysis for this work. It concludes with a methodological reflection including some limitations and
considerations of reliability and validity.
i)
PROBLEM STATEMENT
In contemporary India, increasingly neoliberal developmental models of development and visions of ‘world cities’ together with weak and underfunded municipal governments have led to the popularity of strategies such as public-private-partnerships (PPPs) to provide
infrastructure and services in urban areas. However, these strategies have also threatened many of the city’s most vulnerable, particularly slum dwellers, who face eviction and
resettlement to make way for more profitable developments (Kennedy et al. 2014). Bangalore, a city which has experienced staggering growth since India’s liberalization in the 1990s with an estimated growth rate of 42% during this decade (BDA 2017 :7), has been at the epicenter of these shifts, undergoing radical socio-economic and spatial change. Where slum evictions have been commonplace in the larger cities of Delhi and Mumbai for decades, the recent high profile case of the Ejipura slum eviction in which over 1,500 families were evicted was one of the largest and highest profile to date. With this, there emerges a question of whether a precedent of exclusionary urban development is being set. In this context, it is important to explore the case, examining the actors, tactics and discourses involved and what these can tell us about the production and control of space in Bangalore. Ultimately, understanding this case will provide important insights into the complex trajectories of urban development and within this, implications for city’s most marginalized.
ii)
RESEARCH DESIGN
A qualitative, ‘case study’ approach was adopted in which one case – that of Ejipura – was focused on due to it being recent with evictees still living on pavements outside the eviction site, and high profile, hence it being well known and information about it being widely available. This case was examined in depth, with data gathered through semi-structured interviewing, document analysis and basic mapping. The unit of analysis was the case and physical space of
To address the lack of empirical studies in the urban realm which pay attention to the way in which social, spatial and discursive processes of marginalization interact, this research addresses the issue of exclusionary urban development in Bangalore through these interlinked angles, asking what the case of Ejipura can tell us about the way urban development is being carried out and how this relates to wider processes of socio-spatial change.
Main research question :
What does the case of the eviction of the Ejipura slum tell us about the way in which urban development is being carried out in Bangalore and how does this relate to wider processes of socio-spatial change?
Sub-Question 1:
What are the physical and spatial characteristics of the site at Ejipura and how has the space changed through time?
Sub-Question 2:
Who are the key actors and actor blocs involved in the eviction and what discourses did they use?
Sub-Question 3:
What governance tactics were utilised in the eviction process and what implications do these bear for wider governance processes in Bangalore?
Epistemology
The epistemic principles adopted are those of ‘critical realism’ (Creswell & Plano-Clark 2011 :45). This position integrates a realist ontology, wherein there is a ‘reality’ which exists
independently of our perceptions of it, with a constructivist epistemology which recognizes that understandings of reality are shaped by individual perceptions and experiences. A dominant guiding assumption of this work is the notion that physical space is socially produced, implying a constructivist positioning. However, such constructions of space result in material realities,
therefore a critical realist approach is more suitable than one which is purely interpretivist. Additionally, in this case there is a ‘story to be discovered’ which includes certain facts based on objective reality, although of course some of these ‘facts’ may differ according to different actors’ renditions of the story. While my goal has been to uncover the story from as many different perspectives as possible, as a similar approach ‘subtle realism’ (Bryman et al. 2008 :381) notes, we can never be absolutely certain about the truth of any account since we have no incontrovertible way of gaining access to the reality on which it is based. Moreover, while certain events can be said to have taken place, the meanings, significance and motivations behind such events come from a reality which is relative and socially produced.
Conceptual Scheme
Figure 1: Visualization of key themes, actors and hypothesized interactions
In figure 1, shown at the top are international discourses and imaginaries which include concepts such as world cities, pro-growth and pro-poor agendas such as Rights to the City.
These play a large role in informing the actions of the various actors. Although my hypothesis is that the group which includes state and private actors largely control the means of production of urban space, slum dwellers and the urban disenfranchised also have means of contestation and protest, often aided by bodies such as Dalit political groups and NGOs which do have a significant voice, although these are somewhat conceptually separate from the dominant ‘nexus of power’
My work has focused on exploring the actor networks which can form, their motivations and defining the mechanisms via which they can control, produce and negotiate urban space. By ‘mechanism,’ I refer to a ‘system of parts,’ i.e. several elements or strategies which come together to create a broader whole.
Operationalization of key dimensions
The way that I analyse data is not based on one theory, rather my theoretical lens is built through bringing together multiple strands of literature I have reviewed. Table 1details how this lens was developed. This operationalization has been informed by Peyroux et al. (2014) who utilised an approach dealing with similar themes in their publication on spatial knowledge management and participatory governance. This asked what actor coalitions and networks are present, what their power relations are, and what the discourses and framings around spatial knowledge management are, questions which are similar to the ones guiding my own research process.
Dimension Elements Literature
Spatiality Production of Space Lefèbvre (1991); Lombard (2015); Fernandes (2004)
Rights to the City Lefèbvre (1972)
Imaginaries World Cities: Friedman
(1986); Sassen (2001); Roy & Ong (2011); Shatkin (1998; 2007); Robinson (2002); Aesthetic Governmetnality: Ghertner (2011); Follman (2015); Datta (2016) Actors (municipal, judicial, private, civil society (NGOs), elite, EWS, Dalit, middle class)
Networks/blocs; power relations; motivations
Peyroux (2014)
Discourses Hajer
Urban governance Tactics (including
contestation/negotiation/mobilization); Instruments; Mechanisms
Braathen et al. (2014); Dhananka (2016) Normative good governance UN Habitat
Developmental agendas
Pro-poor/pro-growth Logan and Molotch (1987); Molotch (1976); Rouanet (2016); Lopez (2004); Braathen et al. (2014); World Bank; ODI (2008); OECD (2001)
Table 1: Operationalization of key dimensions
Although the data is not viewed through one theory, there is one overarching theoretical lens – Lefèbvre’s production of space. This thesis begins with the contention that ‘space’ is more than physical and calling attention to the way in which it is created and negotiated by actors situated in a network of flows. In such a way, all of these above themes could be said to come under the umbrella of the production of space.
iii) DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS
Data collection
This study involved ten weeks of fieldwork in the city of Bangalore, India. The data collection process consisted of preliminary interviews with key informants, a period of identifying possible respondents, then several weeks of semi-structured interviews with participants alongside site observation. Participants were selected strategically on the basis of being broadly representative of the key identified stakeholder groups: evicted slum dwellers, EWS residents, middle class respondents from the housing areas alongside the site, actors from the private entity Maverick holdings (the partner in the PPP deal), and state actors. During this process, documents were also gathered such as court petitions and contracts, and reports such as the publication from Housing and Land Rights Now (HLRN 2016), a fact finding report about the eviction. By the same authors, an impact assessment report (2017) was also published while I was in the field. Finally, a spatial mapping exercise was carried out. In total, thirty interviews were conducted, with lengths varying from five minutes (many of the interviews with slum residents and evictees were shorter), to four hours for one particularly in depth conversation. A snowball sampling technique was utilised, which involved identifying respondents who were then used to refer us to other respondents (Atkinson & Flint 2001 :1). This technique is well suited to accessing hard
to reach populations such as in this case, vulnerable slum dwellers and evictees, as many people would not consent to an interview without having been referred previously by a trusted person.
In my research gathering strategy, relating to sub-question one I conducted observations and carried out a rudimentary mapping exercise using Google Maps to understand the physical and spatial characteristics of the site (and the relocation area), then used an image processing software (Photoshop) to visually present data. To understand how it changed through time and how the case fits into wider patterns of socio-spatial exclusion in Bangalore, I relied on
secondary sources (such as the HLRN report and news reports) and key informant interviews including with academics and NGO staff who had knowledge of the history of the site.
For sub-question two, a first understanding of key stakeholders had already been acquired through literature review. To further refine this understanding, I reviewed news articles and publications and undertook interviews with key informants such as academics and NGOs who worked with slum dwellers. From interviews with actors from each identified bloc I was able to gain a deeper understanding of their motivations, connections, and power relations. For the second part of this question focusing on discourse, data came from the interview transcripts of the interviews and secondary interviews from the HLRN report (2016). Then, during the coding process I examined interview transcripts to determine what types of language was being used, relating this back to theory about broader discursive patterns.
For sub-question three, I relied upon the stakeholder interviews. The strategies, instruments and mechanisms which I identify emerged from the interviews, and findings were triangulated via secondary sources and key informant interviews. As the critical role that NGOs played in supporting slum dwellers emerged, detailed interviews with staff members were particularly useful in providing detailed insider information into tactics, both in terms of mobilization and from the angle of governance.
The data collection process was iterative, building upon information gained in each interview and incorporating emerging themes and topics into subsequent interviews. After about 25 interviews, similar information was emerging from respondents, so while further interviews after this point were useful to corroborate findings, this signified to me that I had reached a point of theoretical saturation. Interviews conducted in English were transcribed by me and ones not in
