The Paradox of Freedom and Identity: A Comparative Study on the Facticity of the Human Individual at Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault

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The Paradox of Freedom and Identity

A Comparative Study on the Facticity of the Human Individual

at Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault

Thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Nico van den Berg

10896643

Supervisor: Dr Christian Skirke – Second reader: Dr Michiel Leezenberg Faculty of Humanities – Department of Philosophy

University of Amsterdam

August 2019

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Part I Introduction

1 Research topic

The relationship between the freedom and identity of the human individual is problematic. Any identification demands, on the one hand, freedom or liberty to be in some way. On the other hand, identity is a limitation of being; it restricts the freedom to become. In this paper, I address this paradox through a comparison of the philosophical perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault. Both scholars assert the possibility of freedom for personal identity. However, their methodological frameworks, as well as the fundamental concepts regarding the human being that they deploy, differ significantly.

The inspiration for the research topic is that in Western society, freedom to expose one´s identity or to choose a different one is subject to fierce debate, which has a profound impact on personal and political domains. Once constituted along generally recognised social categories, contemporary society has become highly fluid, causing general feelings of confusion. Questions on identity, such as ´Who am I?´ or ´Who does (not) belong to us?´, by which one´s freedom is on the line, are frequently posed and discussed. Because of the fundamental connection between freedom and identity, a separate study on either notion would be merely a formal enterprise. Freedom can only be analysed, determined, and differentiated in respect to ´something´ (or ´nothing´) which can be confronted, resisted, or identified. Identity, in turn, is meaningless – an empty concept – without the idea of otherness, thus, freedom; whether or not such an idea actually will be possible.

One can reasonably state that the main interest of both Sartre and Foucault was the relationship between freedom and identity. Both Sartre and Foucault were prominent French intellectuals of their generations: They engaged in political life; reflected on traditional critical philosophy (e.g. Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger); and developed new approaches to and concepts in, respectively, existentialism and post-structuralism, however, in a somewhat antagonistic relationship (Flynn 2005, ix–x). Today, Sartre´s philosophical legacy may have shifted to the background, while Foucault is one of the most cited scholars in the human

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sciences. One can argue, however, as I do in this paper, that their conceptions of the human being are not fundamentally opposed. The outcome of this comparative study may contribute to an understanding of who we want to be tomorrow.

In the remainder of this introduction, I sketch the positions of Sartre and Foucault. Both scholars call attention to the reality of human beings, namely, Sartre´s réalité humaine (existentialism) and Foucault´s (post-structuralist) history of thought. Sartre understands the human being from a Heideggerian phenomenological perspective as ´being thrown into the world´. According to Sartre, the mode of being in human life is never set but continuously negated: ´I am what I am not; I am not what I am´ (Sartre 2003, 283). The project of being myself will fail, for I am condemned to be free – a continuous flight into the future. Foucault, too, denies any fixed substantial self. According to Foucault, the reality of the subject – or the ´truth´ regarding subjectivity – emerges through ´power relations´, which he, inspired by Nietzsche, deduces genealogically from historical discourse. The subject is not an ahistorical ego but forms itself through ethical ´practices of freedom´ in ongoing relationships with others. For Sartre, too, dynamic reciprocal relations with the ´Other´ mark the human individual. Both assert the ´situation´ of the subject, that is, the experienced life-world of the human individual. (However, Foucault rejects the Husserlian notion of the life-world as a condition for experience and knowledge, as I demonstrate.) An intrinsic feature of human relationships, as maintained by Sartre and Foucault, is conflict or resistance to power. Moreover, every human has the possibility of change and choice. Hence, Sartre and Foucault share common conceptual ground regarding the ´facticity´ of the human individual – this proposition is the thesis I expound in this paper.

2 Thesis statement and research questions

My thesis statement is as follows: The phenomenological ontology of Sartre and the genealogical analyses of Foucault share common conceptual ground regarding the facticity of freedom and identity of the human individual. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by addressing

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the following main research questions: What are the methodological suppositions of Sartre and Foucault regarding their conceptions of the human being? How do Sartre and Foucault conceive subjectivity, knowledge, and power relations? What are the main similarities between their conceptions, and what are the significant differences (i.e. those that might be difficult to overcome)? To what extent is Sartre an anti-idealist in transcendental phenomenology, and does Foucault set himself apart from phenomenology and transcendental presuppositions regarding, in particular, experience, autonomy, and subjectivity? How do Sartre and Foucault assess the human mode of facticity related to their conceptions of freedom and identity? Finally, how can the paradoxical relationship between the freedom and identity of the human individual be understood based on a comparison of the conceptions of Sartre and Foucault?

3 Outline of the thesis

The argument of the thesis has three major parts, each of which contains an introductory paragraph. In the first part, I give an account of the methodologies and theoretical frameworks which Sartre and Foucault apply, together with an account of their relevant works of primary interest for the thesis (sections 4–5). This discussion results in a framework for further analyses (section 6), which reflects the methodologies and works of Sartre and Foucault. Then, after these introductory sections, I advance my analysis in the second part according to the established framework. This investigation involves the themes of being and subjectivation, knowledge and truth, and power and resistance (sections 7–8). Each thematic section includes a presentation of the positions of Sartre and Foucault on the subject and an analysis of main similarities and differences between their views. In the last part, I start by introducing the relevant critiques of some scholars of Sartre´s and Foucault´s conceptions (section 9). After that, I reflect on common ground regarding the Sartrean and Foucauldian perspectives (section 10). In the final section, I offer a conclusion on the paradoxical relationship between the freedom and identity of the human individual.

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conceptual diversity, I do not present various related philosophical concepts of freedom and identity, helping readers to appreciate what is at stake concerning the positions of Sartre and Foucault. What is more, Sartre and Foucault each developed specific conceptions of freedom and identity, which are intrinsically connected to (i.e. influenced by) their whole conception of the human being and subjectivity. Therefore, I only present explicit characterisations of freedom and identity when I discuss Sartre´s and Foucault´s notions regarding the matter. Second, as Foucault and Sartre do, I investigate the relationship between freedom and identity primarily from the standpoint of the human individual and its conceptual opponent (´the Other´), rather than from the perspective of social groups or society at large. Third, substantive identities, such as those of politics, nationality, ethnicity, culture, class, religion, profession, gender, sexuality, and character, are immaterial to the subject of the thesis. Those identities serve merely as examples for explicating issues, for instance, Sartre´s ´living in bad faith´ or Foucault´s ´normalisation of sexuality´.

Finally, I provide a note on the philosophical notion of facticity, which is central to the thesis. Facticity derives from ´fact´ and, more specifically, from the Latin factum, meaning both ´made´ and ´act´. Leibniz distinguishes between ´truths of fact´ and ´truths of reason´, and for him, as in positivism, ´fact´ has a contingent, empirical meaning. Kant stretches the notion by considering moral consciousness as a (non-speculative) ´fact of reason´. In the phenomenology of Husserl, consciousness, or the transcendental Ego, is assigned a distinctive factual character. Pointing to the worldly aspect of the ego, Husserl writes, ´Hinsichtlich meiner und der Welt geht die Wirklichkeit jeder Möglichkeit vorher!´ In the existential phenomenology of Heidegger and Sartre, facticity is a fundamental feature of the human being who is ´thrown into the world´. (Orth 2010, 694). Facticity, then, refers not only to the concrete facts of life limiting one´s freedom – for instance, when one is born, where one lives, how one is raised, and the choices one made yesterday – but also to the fact that subjective experiences, knowingly or not, are intrinsically part of that life-world. Objectively and subjectively, we are always ´in situation´.

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Part II Theoretical framework

The methodologies and theoretical frameworks which Sartre and Foucault applied for their research are diverse, and their levels of inquiry shift between abstract conceptual thinking (e.g. Sartre´s modes of being or Foucault´s relations of power) and analyses of factual (e.g. historical or emotional) situations. For a fair comparison of the concepts in either body of philosophical work, one must reflect on their methodological presuppositions and general research strategies. Moreover, the differentiation of periods in their bodies of work must be taken into account. The following sections do not comprise a comprehensive methodological overview, but aim at narrowing the subject of the thesis, as well as accounting for the selection of works and the angles from which the inquiry will proceed. A survey of these methodological fields concerning the ideas of Sartre and Foucault makes it possible to surpass their overall antagonistic approaches. Hence, any subsequent philosophical – or sociological, ethical, political, and so forth – reference to both Sartre and Foucault will benefit – or might otherwise be in vain.

4 Methodologies and works of Foucault

Foucault wrote well but did not present his ideas in a distinctive manner. His concepts are dispersed and shift gradually throughout his works. Moreover, he was allergic to any denomination of the disciplines he might represent. His often-cited dictum – ´Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order´ (Foucault 2010, 17) – equally applied to his academic identity, due to the shifting formation and temporal sequence of his ideas and methodologies. Nonetheless, in his research, he generally deployed basic disciplinary idioms and methodologies. One could discuss whether his research was historical, sociological, or philosophical; that is an issue of definition. In general, he sought a historical account of the formation of ideas, especially ideas on knowledge, power, and the subject that shape ´the history of the present´ (1995, 31). Foucault himself regarded philosophy as ´perhaps [...] the most general cultural form in which we might be able to reflect on the reality of the West´ (2000a, 249; note the article ´the´,

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reflecting a concrete reality instead of ´reality´ in some abstract sense). He – in a pseudonymous writing – defined the philosophical outlook of his research project as follows:

To the extent that Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant, and his

project could be called a Critical History of Thought. [...] If what is meant by thought is the act that posits a subject and an object, along with their various possible relations, a critical history of thought would be an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those relations constitute a possible knowledge [savoir]. It is not a matter of defining the formal conditions of a relationship to the object; nor is it a matter of isolating the empirical conditions that may, at a given moment, have enabled the subject, in general, to become acquainted with an object already given in reality. The problem is to determine what the subject must be, to what condition he is subject, what status he must have, what position he must occupy in reality or the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that type of knowledge [connaissance]1_{. In short, it is a matter of determining}

its mode of ´subjectivation´. (459)

Critically questioning the (historical) conditions of the possibility of knowledge – that is, how knowledge is constituted and which position should be granted to the ´subject´ – Foucault clearly positioned himself as a ´post-Kantian´ and thus as the (Hegelian) ´son of his time´ (Han 2002, 37). The notion of ´subjectivation´ ([Fr.: subjectivation] a neologism of Foucault; sometimes translated into English as ´subjectification´), referring to the ´different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects´ (Foucault 1983, 208), is central to his work.

In Foucault´s lines of thought, the terms ´body´, ´soul´, (active or passive) ´subject´, ´man´, ´person´, and ´self´ seem to be merely correlatives and thus secondary to the processes of the subjectivation of the human being. Foucault´s use of these terms is not strict, partly due to how he analyses historical processes and epistemes concerning human individuals rather

1 _{The French term connaissance refers to a particular corpus or discipline of knowledge, while savoir refers to knowledge}

in general. Foucault´s use of these terms, both translated as ´knowledge´, is specific. He determines connaissance as ´the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it´, and savoir as ´the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance´. (Note A.M. Sheridan Smith, in: Foucault 2010, 15).

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than the constitution, or modes of being, of the human subject itself. (Cf. Han 2002, 166: ´[T]o be coherent, an analysis is needed of what the individual – as not yet formed subject – is as point of departure for subjectivation. However, such an analysis cannot be found in Foucault´s work´.) In doing so, Foucault adheres to some form of ´historical nominalism´ (as defined by Paul Veyne; Flynn 2005, 32). His post-structuralist interpretation of reality refutes general structures or abstract ideas that would underlie our social world. Instead, Foucault sought the historical discourses and practices that ´produced´ the social world and its inhabitants, revealing their plurality and contingency. Therefore, Foucault´s ´extreme nominalism´ is a form of social constructivism (33; cited term of I. Hacking).

Foucault repeatedly (e.g. Foucault 1983, 208; 1990b, 4; 2000b, 262–3) classified his body of research along three different axes, or ´modes of objectification which transform humans into subjects´ (1983, 208). These modes roughly coincide with three successive periods or phases in his professional career, in which his main interests involved, consecutively, the domains of ´truth´, ´power´, and ´subjectivation´. Generally, these periods are called the ´archaeological´, ´genealogical´, and ´ethical´ periods. (Some commentators, such as Thomas Flynn, referring to the idiom of Foucault himself, identify the last period as one of ´problematisation´. The reason is that, in later studies, Foucault reflected on the matter with the help of outcomes of previous historical analyses. However, as stated by Flynn, there also is textual support that problematisation is merely a refined form of genealogy; Flynn 2005, 28.) Foucault, still during his archaeological period, while referring to Nietzsche´s contrasting of wirkliche Historie with traditional history, underlined that

Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for ´origins´. (Foucault 2000a, 370)

According to Foucault, history cannot be studied from the linear perspective of an intelligible one-dimensional development of ideas and desires. History displays neither the gradual

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progress of humanity, nor rationality. The history of man is much less deductive and is instead discontinuous, non-narrative, multifaceted, diffused, and confused; it is ´anti-Platonic in character´ (Flynn 2005, 6–26).

In his early period, Foucault studied different historical artefacts, mainly manuscripts, that reflect the ´history of thought´ of a given period in Western society. He thereby distinguished between the Renaissance, the Ćlassical Age´ (ca 1650–1800), and the ´Modern Age´ (ca 1800– present). In each episteme [Fr.: épistèmè], he detected a particular discourse, or an implicit a priori system of rules, that determines how certain (scientific) domains and practices of knowledge (e.g. on madness) are conditioned and articulated. However, the boundary between archaeology and genealogy is rather vague. A distinction might be that on the whole, Foucault´s archaeological analyses are on the level of ´things´ (artefacts, grammar, discourse), while his genealogical analyses are on the level of ´power´. As Thomas Flynn notes, Foucault ńever resolved the question of their precise interrelation´ (24). Béatrice Han indicates the possibility ´to attribute to his enterprise any unity other than purely formal, a continuity that wouldn´t appear to be merely a fiction arising from retrospective illusions and a belated concern for coherence´ (Han 2002, 2). Therefore, one could equally – that is, without losing substantial features – consider Foucault´s archaeological projects as a particular form of his genealogy. Others, such as Michael Mahon (1992), also point out the centrality of genealogical thinking, along with the three axes, in Foucault´s writings. Foucault´s analyses in his later period of ethical practices in antiquity and modernity, and especially of sexuality, likewise have an overall genealogical stance. At the end of his career, Foucault identified his significant works as follows: Áll three [axes for genealogy] were present, albeit in a somewhat confused fashion, in Madness and Civilization. The truth axis was studied in The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things. The power axis was studied in Discipline and Punish, and the ethical axis in The History of Sexuality´ (Foucault 2000b, 262–3).

Although other disciplines are not disqualified, genealogy was evidently the main methodological field for Foucault´s clarification and interpretation of history, covering the

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more substantial part of his work. I only incidentally consider his comprehensive historiographic descriptions of antiquity and modernity when relevant for fully understanding or illustrating an argument. Likewise, I only examine ethical considerations which elucidate Foucault´s perspective that are relevant to the thesis. Further, although freedom practices are paramount to human beings and the final objective of Foucault (and Sartre), I leave ethical and political implications aside. In the next section, I discuss metaphysical, epistemological, phenomenological, and psychological features in the works of Foucault in conjunction with those at Sartre.

5 Methodologies and works of Sartre (and Foucault)

The philosophical methodologies of the ´early´ Sartre are fairly evident, as is the case with the ´phenomenological ontology´ of Being and Nothingness (Sartre 20032

), which includes metaphysical, epistemological, psychological, and ethical considerations. The essay seeks to provide an ontological determination of the human being, that is, of both ´what he is´ and of ´what he is not´. Sartre undertakes his ´pursuit of being´ from a distinct phenomenological perspective. The discipline of phenomenology became prominent starting from the first half of the 20th_{century with the seminal works of Husserl exploring the intentionality of}

consciousness. Sartre criticised some of Husserl´s suppositions and developed his view on the structure of consciousness in previous works (i.e. The Transcendence of the Ego [2004b] and The Imaginary [2004c]). Because the main features of this view are incorporated in Being and Nothingness, and, for the thesis, a complete determination of Sartre´s phenomenological ontology is redundant, I hereafter ignore these previous works. Sartre is highly indebted to Heidegger´s existential phenomenology, which studies – in general terms – concrete, real-life situations, including aspects of free choice and action (Smith 2013). In Being and Time, Heidegger (1962) recalls Plato´s The Sophist when restating the question of what is meant by ´being´. Such a metaphysical question, according to Heidegger, can only be articulated from the

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whole of being, which includes the existence [Dasein] of the questioner himself. For Sartre, following Heidegger, human existence is a state of ´being-in-the-world´, but he elaborates this condition of ´facticity´ at a more concrete level than Heidegger does. Below, I discuss in detail existential phenomenological aspects of Sartre´s account of the freedom and identity of the human being as well as Foucault´s view on the matter. Foucault, as is generally known, was an ardent critic of phenomenology and existentialism, including Sartre´s ontology, the arguments of which I bring to the fore.

The general metaphysical aspects of Being and Nothingness, as compared to the more specific fields of ontology and epistemology, are less important because of their insufficiency, as Sartre freely admits at several points throughout the work (e.g. in the first part of the Conclusion; BN, 637–47). According to Sartre, questions on origin, reason, necessity, or causality cannot be answered to a satisfying degree or can merely be answered hypothetically, for these terms presuppose – the totality of – being. For this reason, but even more because of the lack of a robust metaphysical outlook in Foucault´s writings – in fact, he vehemently rejects any particular metaphysical framework – metaphysics cannot serve as a comparative tool for the thesis. (I do not mean to disqualify the metaphysical features of their works altogether, for these form a ´necessary´ framework, or ´horizon´, for any further philosophical descriptions and analyses they exert – even for Foucault. However, a comparison of their rather vague metaphysics may not lead to common ground, the aim of the thesis.) Quite the opposite is the case for epistemology, for both Sartre and Foucault reflect on notions of knowing and knowledge. These notions are essential in their understanding of the relation of the subject, or the human being, with itself, others, and the world. I, therefore, expound epistemological issues raised by Sartre and Foucault.

In line with my objective regarding Foucault´s framework, I only examine ethical considerations which elucidate Sartre´s ontology that are relevant to the thesis. Likewise, I do not explore the historical or dialectical critique of the ´later´ Sartre. In his later years, Sartre engaged with Marxist thought, which culminated in his Critique of Dialectical Reason (Sartre

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2004a). Scholars vehemently disagree on whether the ideas from Sartre´s later period are an extension of or a deviation from those in his early works. In any case, Sartre´s historical social critique does not suit a justified comparison of his ideas with Foucault´s analyses of the abstract historical dimensions of the human individual.

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre portrays psychological traits of human beings considered in their factual mode, for instance, in his demonstration of temporality, or the gaze of the Other. He also scouts the prospects for existential psychoanalysis, an endeavour to enrich traditional empirically based psychoanalysis with his phenomenological ontology of human beings. More important, however, than Sartre´s discussion of the merits of psychology or psychoanalysis are his analyses of the behavioural aspects of humans based on affections (moods, feelings, attitudes), predominantly shame, fear, desire, and enjoyment. Foucault, too, uses affective idioms on many occasions but at different levels of analysis. On the one hand, he reflects on the behavioural patterns of human subjects based on mainstream psychological expressions (e.g. desire and pleasure in his investigation of the history of sexuality). On the other hand, he uses affective idioms on his more general genealogical level of analysis. Affection is prominent in Foucault´s thesis of a general human desire for knowledge, or the ´will to know´, by which ´truth´ and ´knowledge´ are somehow produced or fabricated (Foucault 2013). Though inspired by Nietzsche and related to his concept of power, the Foucauldian ´will´ is not some abstract, anonymous force which directs the history of humankind, but constitutes a real, existing desire of human beings. Either way, an analysis of affections, especially those of desire and enjoyment/pleasure, could play a central role in a comparison between the positions of Sartre and Foucault. However, a discussion on affections, broadly considered, would be beyond the scope of this paper and would be more effective as a treatise of its own. Therefore, I restrict this theme to, for instance, a discussion of Foucault´s notion of the ´will to know´ or Sartre´s conflicting relationships. An explication of psychological disciplines, including psychoanalysis and psychopathology, in the works of Sartre or Foucault is likewise beyond the scope of this paper.

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To conclude on the works of Foucault and Sartre regarding the thesis: I refer to the substantial part of Foucault´s works (recorded in the reference list), because his genealogical analyses and significant concepts are displayed throughout his works conceived in different periods of his academic career. In reference to Sartre´s philosophical works on the human being, I solely consult his magnum opus, Being and Nothingness.

6 Framework for the thesis

The three genealogical axes in Foucault´s body of work, which ´constitute any matrix of experience´ (2000b, 204), resemble the three cardinal categories of human reality under which Sartre subsumes all types of human conduct, namely, ´having, doing, and being´ (BN, 453). ´Knowledge´, then, is a modality of ´having´. ´Power´ – in other words, the active mode of ´power relations´ – equals ´doing´, and the self-definition of the subject reflects the different modes of ´being´ – being-in-itself, being-for-itself, and being-for-others. Although the resemblance has a somewhat artificial basis, and other relations can be exposed as well – for instance, the relation between knowledge and power or the relationship between the active feature of being-for-itself and the dual notion of knowing/knowledge – it serves as a framework for the argument of the thesis. Therefore, I compare Foucault´s position with Sartre´s position regarding, first, the theme of subjectivation, or the self-constitution of the human being; and second, joined in a larger section, the themes of knowledge and truth and of power and resistance. The common ground of the phenomenological ontology of Sartre and the genealogy of Foucault concerning the facticity of the human individual might thus be exposed. Subsequently, the more abstract, intrinsic relationship between freedom and identity regarding the positions of Sartre and Foucault can be expounded.

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Part III Thematic confrontation

In this part, I confront the positions of Sartre and Foucault in accordance with the thematic framework I have established. Each thematic section includes a reconstruction of the positions of Sartre and Foucault on the subject and an analysis of main similarities and differences between their views. I provide a rather extensive account of Sartre´s ontology because only in that way can one fully grasp and sufficiently evaluate his position in reference to Foucault´s. I start with the theme of being and subjectivation, for it includes, together with the general determinations I have outlined so far, an overall view on the human being which both Sartre and Foucault have articulated. These overall views comprise the background for the subsequent, rather abstract threads of knowledge and power. Naturally, as I illustrate in the last part of the thesis, the whole cloth of the human being can only be woven when these threads are identified.

7 Being and subjectivation

I. Sartre: Modes of being

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre progresses his (phenomenological) ontology of the human being from simple, abstract notions up to complex, concrete life situations. This ontological determination includes consciousness, the body, and their intimate connection with the Other and the outer world. Sartre distinguishes three kinds of being in the human reality: being-in-itself, being-for-being-in-itself, and being-for-others. These kinds, or modes, of being are ontologically inseparable: The one presupposes, or is conditional for, the others, and vice versa. However, as Sartre explains, being-in-itself is complete, solid, wholly positive, and self-identical; it ´lacks nothing´ and ´knows no otherness´. ´Being´ is and can only be what it is, thus, being-in-itself (BN, 21–3). One cannot even attribute an interior to it because this assumes the existence of an exterior, which is something other than being itself. Taken at face value, the self-identical being-in-itself seems a reformulation of Leibniz´s monad or Kant´s Ding-an-sich. However, in

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Sartre´s ontology being-in-itself is a particular mode of ´being´, which plays a dynamic – somewhat Hegelian – role in the constitution of the human. As I further expound in the next paragraph, being-in-itself is being3

revealed as a phenomenon by the negation of being-for-itself, that is, by what it is not: consciousness. Additionally, being-in-itself plays a substantial – but adverse – role in revealing the mode of being-for-others.

Sartre fully adopts Husserl´s well-known phrase áll consciousness is consciousness of something´ (7, 16). This statement means that consciousness is not some separate structure, instance, cogito, or tabula rasa that can be somehow impressed. Consciousness always transcends itself. It has no substance, no material existence in the world, no ćontent´. Consciousness is ´pure appearance´ (12), has absolute ´translucency´ (67), and only reveals the features of the world. (In this paper, I do not address the different modes of consciousness, such as self-consciousness, pre-reflective consciousness, and pure and impure reflective consciousness. For my argumentation, only the general features of consciousness, such as openness and negation, are essential.) As Mark Rowlands points out, referring to mental phenomena, Sartre adheres to an éxtremely strong form of externalism´ (Rowlands 2003, 75). Consciousness is real, but not as something found ´within´ the subject. Rowlands reconstructs Sartre´s ´radical reversal of Husserl´s idealism´. For Husserl, consciousness is primary and – experience of – the world derivative; the world is merely a ćorrelative´ of the ábsolute´ (i.e. self-evident) existence of consciousness. Sartre, on the other hand, while adopting most of Husserl´s foundational principles, reasons the intentional feature of consciousness (i.e. directedness towards objects, being itself without content) to its ultimate consequence: The existence of consciousness logically depends on the world (63–75).

When consciousness is ´pure appearance´, how is this transcendence then a part of being? Sartre proposes an elegant but still problematic solution: ´non-being´, or ´nothingness´ (BN, 4f). In reflecting on human behaviour, one can reveal this nothingness. As mentioned above, for

3

´Being´ commonly is referred to as éverything´, but this already stipulates a numerical and qualitative identity of being (i.e. évery´ and ´thing´). For Sartre, like for Heidegger, being has a more fundamental, metaphysical éssence´.

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Sartre, human existence is a state of ´being-in-the-world´ (27). In human conduct, one can consider the relationship of a person to the world as an objective reality, instead of regarding experience as just some subjective state (28). The subjective everyday experience, whose aspects we can all recognise as being true or real in our lives, offers insight into the human condition in general. In ordinary life, one has continuously different possibilities in terms of engagement with the world. One well-known example Sartre gives is Pierre´s absence in the café (33–4). Pierre could have been present – this was the expectation one had – but he is not. His absence, this negative possibility, stands out against the background of the café, and as such is part of the reality one experiences. Sartre gives more examples, such as when discussing how fear and anguish are related to freedom (53f), which culminates in the notion of ´bad faith´ (68). Hence, the appearance of consciousness is nothing but a relation to the world.

Sartre´s discussion of human conduct leads to two main characterisations of nothingness. The first is that man faces a world of possibilities; that is, the human condition of freedom always entails the possibility – and thus the notion – of denial, whether by conduct or in questioning the world. This negation is an intrinsic quality of human existence. The second characterisation is that nothingness, or non-being, is a radically different dimension of being than being-in-itself. Unlike being-in-itself, a non-being utterly lacks identification with itself; it is not what it is. Nonetheless, this non-being is an actual feature of the human world. As Sartre points out, ´For human reality, to be is to-be-there. [...] It is an ontological necessity´ (332). Hence, consciousness is not a being-in-itself, but a (non-)being which is active, a being-for-itself, which reveals itself in human experience as a real phenomenon. Stated differently, being (´everything´) only appears, as a phenomenon, when it is transformed, ontologically, into a being-in-itself by a being-for-itself, which is nothingness. In the chapter on Transcendence, Sartre captures the ontological dimension of consciousness and its absolute negating capacity as follows:

Nothing of what I see comes from me; there is nothing outside what I see or what I could see. Being is

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invention of philosophers. But from this being which ´invests me´ on every side and from which nothing separates me, I am separated precisely by nothing; and this nothing because it is nothingness is impassable. ´There is´ being because I am the negation of being, and worldliness, spatiality, quantity, instrumentality, temporality – all come into being only because I am the negation of being. (240)

Thus far, the phenomenological constitution of the for-itself has been a somewhat anonymous, self-referential enterprise. The objectivity of the world, including one´s body and the existence of other consciousnesses, still has to be established. A crucial factor in understanding the outer world, according to Sartre, is the mode of being-for-others. Sartre points out that Husserl´s hypothesis of the transcendental subject or Ego is insufficient for an empirical determination of (real) existence of the Other. Additionally, Hegel´s dialectical move remains highly idealistic, which cannot solve the ´scandal of the plurality of consciousnesses´ (268). Both views ultimately involve a relationship of knowledge rather than being. A fundamental feature of human reality, Heidegger indicates, is the facticity of being in the world, including being with others [Mitsein]. However, Heidegger´s theory cannot overcome idealism because his (Kantian) conception of some other ´self´ outside oneself is based on a reference to that very (inner, subjective) self. As Sartre claims, the existence of the Other is not merely conditional on one´s experience but, as the ´factual necessity´ of the cogito, a fundamental, contingent fact. ´We encounter the Other; we do not constitute him´, according to Sartre (274).

Sartre expounds his ontological view on the facticity of being-for-others through the psychological dimension of mutual perception and the multifaceted dimension of the body. In the section entitled The Look (276–326), he gives the example of the man one engages in a park. From a distance, I apprehend him as an object, like the benches he is passing by. At the same instant, I recognise him as another subject, someone like ´me´. This recognition is instantaneously mediated through the aspect of shame. Through the look of the Other, I lose my transcendence; that is, I realise ´I have an outside, a nature´ (286). (On the ontological level, the for-itself, representing the ´I/me´, has neither an essence, nor a nature. As mentioned above,

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the for-itself, or consciousness, lacks any identity. A for-itself can only be in a state of consciousness of something [e.g. my outside].) According to Sartre, this relation of ´being-seen-by-another´, a mutual recognition of subjectivity, is a basic contingent fact. The Other´s look is a necessary condition for my objectivity. However, that objectivity still must be realised through the ontological aspects of my body.

Sartre reflects on the body in three dimensions, again progressing from the abstract to the concrete. The first mode is the body as a being-for-itself. The body is the perspective from which the for-itself engages the world. The body de facto is, or manifests, the for-itself. Hence, my body can only be in a world, more specifically, only in a world for-me. The body-for-itself is not – yet – a physical thing. As Sartre puts it, ´I exist my body´ (375). The second ontological dimension Sartre considers is the body-for-others. For the Other, I am a point of view, as the Other is for me. At first, my body is only utilised and known by the Other. On this plane, the body is an ´instrumental-thing´, not merely a – separate – thing or instrument. For instance, my eye is not merely an ocular instrument or an eyepiece-thing, but something through which I actively view the world, in other words, through which I engage with the world. For me, the Other´s body is a meaningful object instead of just ´flesh´. A part of that body derives its meaning from the – metaphysically posited –´synthetic-totality´ of the body. For instance, her eyes look at me or some worldly object; his arm points towards this; she sits on a chair. The Other´s body is thus a ´body in situation´, whereby body and action are cohesive features (367). The Other´s body reflects the facticity of the Other´s transcendence. The situation is different for a corpse, which only is reminiscent of some past life, a thing among other things.

In a third ontological dimension of the body, I also ´exist for myself as a body known by the Other´ (375). In this dimension, the body is in its most concrete form. For, being aware of the Other´s knowledge of and use of my body, I realise that I exist as a body. In this radical modification of consciousness, the for-itself becomes aware it has an exterior. My body becomes alienated. For instance, the illness I suffer is caused by a stomach ulcer on which the physician can lay his hands – preferably, when I am anaesthetised and thus momentarily

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unconscious of my stomach pain. Here, some Cartesian dualism seems to slip into Sartre´s exposé. However, one must acknowledge that Sartre is still on the plane of phenomenological description. Although Sartre refers to ´inwardness´ and ´outwardness´, the body in this third sense is not just the physical object as in the classic mind–body debate or in naturalistic views (cf. Catalano 1974, 177; Gardner 2009, 148). It still is not a corpse of ´flesh and blood´, but a lived body. In other words, on the operating table or in a neuroimaging machine, my body is, for the moment, not mine. Hence, as Sartre conjectures in the first pages of the section on the body:

Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness; it can not be united with a body. Similarly being-for-others is wholly body; there are no ´psychic phenomena´ there to be united with the body. There is nothing behind the body. But the body is wholly ´psychic´. (BN, 329)

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre thus displays a completely inclusive (i.e. total) ontology of the human being from a phenomenological perspective, in which different aspects of its constitution – consciousness, nothingness, body, the Other, and the contingency of the world – are integrated in a synthetic unity (I elaborate the notion of synthetic unity below). Other essential features Sartre describes, such as the act of perceiving, knowledge, temporality, and relationships with others – all closely linked to Sartre´s conception of freedom – still must be addressed for a complete comprehension of his perspective. First, however, for an appropriate comparison, I expound Foucault´s concept of subjectivation. How does Foucault account for the constitution of the human being?

II. Foucault: Subjectivation

According to Foucault, the modern subject must not be conceived as an ahistorical Cartesian ego, a self-referential substance or principle, which a posteriori reflects upon the world (and itself). The subject is constituted by historical normative practices and is just as ´real´ as the (social and physical) world in which it partakes. We, including our historically produced modern selves, are historical beings. In Greek and Roman cultures, the human individual was

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generally treated as an active subject. Body and soul – or óuter´ conduct and ínner´ thoughts and feelings – though often addressed separately, remained integrated aspects of the self. The conception of the human subject changed during the development of other cultures. For instance, according to the Christian perspective, from the early centuries onwards, self-knowledge and the transformation of the self had a different objective. Continuous critical analysis of one´s conduct and inner life – that is, knowledge about one´s soul – became the path to glory. Final deliverance was possible only via renunciation of one´s self and, in particular, one´s body (´flesh´), alongside inner subjection to ´God´s will´. The separation of body and soul has become even more distinct in modern philosophy since Descartes. Above all, at the Ćartesian moment´, knowing oneself was requalified into a search for self-evidential truths and the care of the self was discredited (Foucault 2005, 14). According to Foucault, these – Christian and Cartesian – conceptions lack fundamental insight into the historical (i.e. genealogical) practices of the self-formation of the subject. The subject, he argues, ís not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself. [...] In each case, one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship to oneself´ (2000b, 290). Foucault sought a genealogy of subjectivity instead of a philosophy of the ´meaningful subject as the foundation of all knowledge and the principle of all signification´ (176). Hence, for Foucault, subjectivity is a product, not the origin, of historical conceptions of the human.

Whereas in later studies Foucault conceives of a relatively autonomous subject emerging from practices of self-formation, in earlier works he envisions a rather passive subject that is a product of techniques of domination. In Discipline and Punish (1995), Foucault focusses on the (criminal´s) body as the subject of power. The 18th

and 19th

centuries saw the development of disciplinary techniques in the penal system, such as constant hierarchical observation, normalising judgement, and examination. These techniques resulted in the production of ´docile bodies´ that could be ´subjected, used, transformed and improved´ (136). The ´docility´ of human individuals was effected through their active bodies – comprising movements, gestures, attitudes, and so forth – upon which subtle coercion was regularly exercised.

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Disciplinary techniques became the model for other institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and factories. What is more, these disciplinary techniques eventually pervaded all of modern society. As Foucault states: ´The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes´ (183). Another illustration of this process, which Foucault addresses in Madness and Civilisation (1988a), is how insanity was problematised (and, to a certain extent, aligned with criminal attitudes) following modern rational models of medicine, law, politics, et cetera. Previously, the ´mad´ lived within society, although at its margins. From the mid-17th

century onwards, these individuals were separated from society by confinement and eventually became objects for the medical treatment of their íllness´. Importantly, as these studies show, disciplinary techniques distinguish individuals from a multitude of anonymous bodies, thus ćonstituting´ individuals – á reality fabricated´ (1995, 194). The former, general subjects of sovereignty, over which power was executed, became subjects as persons. The dominating power, however, is impersonal and ´blind´; the individual is merely an object of power.

The normalisation in disciplinary society primarily operates on the body of the subject, as Foucault´s earlier studies illustrate. Somehow, the disciplining power becomes active through the emergence of a ´soul´, some interiority, of the subject. For instance, in the penal system of the 18th

century, preliminary investigation regarding the accused´s crime was publicly reinforced through the act of confession, as ´the moment of truth´ (43). Instead of merely being a body, on which the penalty would be executed, the criminal who confessed also demonstrated that she was a ´responsible and speaking subject´ (38). As a consequence of these disciplinary techniques, the (modern) soul is produced, the ´present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body´ (29). The disciplining of the body becomes effective through the creation of the soul. Hence, as Foucault vividly states, ´the soul is the prison of the body´ (30).4

4 _{The very notions of ´soul´, ´subject´, and ´person´ are rare in Discipline and Punish. Moreover, an explicit textual}

phrasing of the idiom ´self´ is absent. It is ´individual´ and ´body´ (and their plural forms) that are abundant in Foucault´s genealogical description of the penal system.

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One should keep in mind, however, that Foucault is not concerned with the metaphysical determination of such an interior, soul, or ego. Some scholars mention the process of ´internalisation´ (e.g. Heyes 2007; Prado 1995; Rose 1999; Vintges 2017), but this is a psychological notion. As Rosalind Gill points out, ´There is very little understanding of how culture relates to subjectivity, identity or lived embodied experiences of selfhood. We know almost nothing about how the social or cultural “gets inside”, and transforms and reshapes our relationships to ourselves and others´ (Gill 2008, 433). Certainly, Foucault hints at such a process throughout his work, such as when he explains that the subject ´inscribes in himself the power relation´ by which ´he becomes the principle of his own subjection´ (Foucault 1995, 202–3). Nevertheless, Foucault´s primary objective is a genealogical description of the formation of subjectivity among human beings, whether by the correlative of ´body´, ´soul´, (active or passive) ´subject´, ´person´, or ´self´. Now, having explicated the modes of being according to Sartre and Foucault´s conception of subjectivation, I address the paradox of identity in a comparison of both perspectives.

III. The paradox of identity

David Lewis states that ´Identity is not a philosophical problem´. A problem of ´personal identity´ might exist: for instance, whether a person, including his bodily parts, remains the same throughout time. This problem, however, is not about identity but personhood (Noonan and Curtis 2018). Consider, for instance, Anna, who once was a young child and is now elderly. Her posture and mentality changed over time, possibly at every distinct moment. Still, we consider the young Anna to be identical to the later Anna. A likewise, classic example is Plutarch´s paradox of the ship of Theseus: Does a ship that sees all parts replaced over time remain the same or not? One could extend the thought experiment to gradually renovating a ship sailing on the open sea, functioning continuously, which is analogous to physical and mental alterations over a human lifespan. How do Sartre and Foucault solve this paradox of identity? As I have stated at the outset, both call attention to the reality of human beings, but

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their methodologies differ significantly (i.e. a phenomenological versus a genealogical framework). In this section, I confront these viewpoints and bring to the fore provisional arguments on common ground for a general determination of the (modern) human individual.

Both Sartre and Foucault advance their conceptions based on the general category of the (human) individual. They do not focus exclusively on a particular constitutive dimension. Sartre gradually portrays the whole range of the individual from the modes of being up to the reality of body and consciousness, including relations with others and the surrounding world. Foucault, in his analyses of how the human being came to understand herself in modernity, shifts between the notions of subject, self, soul, and body, as well as their relationships with others and the (historically documented) world. The main difference is that Sartre elaborates a single (totalising) conception of the human being, while Foucault argues for a conceptual divergence of ´the´ human. However, both underline the possibility of profound differentiation of ´personal´ features and projects. Hence, Sartre and Foucault study the same object, the human being, but from different points of view. The difference is somewhat like in the following sketch: Sartre studies – the constitution of – a human being on board of a moving train; thus his object of study remains constant, while Foucault sees different perspectives (multiplicities) from the outside as the train with the human passes by. Of course, the same human boarded at the station. (On can question, however, as Foucault does, whether the human remains the same – or even fades away – beyond our horizon.)

Foucault declares that not power but the subject is the general theme of his research: ´I have sought to study [...] the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject´ (Foucault 1983, 208). Foucault takes the historical domain of human beings as the starting point for his analyses, in which he questions the very notions of ´human´ and ´subject´. Foucault objects to traditional history, and philosophy of history, due to their preservation of the ´sovereignty of the subject´, namely, ´making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action´ (2010, 12). For this reason, he also criticises transcendental philosophy, and phenomenology in general, of which he identifies Sartre as a typical

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protagonist. However, Sartre does not present an ´egological´, consciousness-centred philosophy, nor does he persist in some Cartesian dichotomy of subjective experience and objective reality of the material (and historical) world. On the contrary, in Being and Nothingness, he argues for the (contingent) reality of human existence, which is the foundation for any subjective experience. Sartre is less an idealist than a materialist. In his conception, he imparts the brute fact of life – the concrete reality of all things, including humans. A possible locus for misunderstanding Sartre´s conception of the ´reality of the subject´ is the way he develops his ontology. The notions of consciousness, self, for-itself, being-for-itself, subject, I/me (i.e. the author or the reader), and the human being shift throughout his work, and are interchangeable on many occasions. These notions, however, are figures of analyses. Being-for-itself (and even more so, ´for-Being-for-itself´) is a highly abstract Hegelian notion, which is the analytic part of the synthetic unity of the human being. All abstract moments – such as for-itself, consciousness, self, body, and the Other – are integrated in the synthetic totality, or concreteness, of ´man-in-the-world´ (BN, 28). The abstract moment of consciousness is, as I have indicated, not some entity but an activity, or, a kind of relation. Although consciousness is a prime feature of the human, it does not come ´first´ in the human´s constitution. (Sartre remains, in metaphysical terms, silent on the matter.)

For both Sartre and Foucault, then, understood from different perspectives, the paradox of identity in itself might be called illusory because the factum of the reality of the subject must be taken into account; that is, one must enclose all domains of the human individual. However, the contingency of the human being seems to discard any human agency. In the next sections, which analyse the themes of knowledge and power, I address this paradox of freedom – in which the problem of identity is still on the line.

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8 Knowledge and power

I. Foucault: Knowledge, or ´truth games´

In his archaeological phase of work, inspired by Georges Canguilhem and Nietzsche, among others, Foucault criticised traditional history (e.g. Foucault 1970; 1988a; 2010). Mainstream analyses of history credit a rather continuous process in the development of (Western) society, in which consecutive, relatively stable periods can be traced against the background of a linear ´total history´. Each period portrays a certain level of knowledge – however, described from the viewpoint of the present state of knowledge, which reflects present conditions of thought. Moreover, the traditional methods grant authority to the human subject, as I have shown in the previous section. Foucault, on the contrary, emphasised the discontinuity of history. He did not try to trace a sovereign ´development´ of the human subject or society at large, but to uncover the áutochthonous transformation´ of history based merely on the authority of historical documents. (Foucault wanted to write history, so he maintained, ín order to have no face´; 17.) Above all, academic discourse reflects, apart from meaning or truth, the (positive) ´given´ of history, what Foucault called the ´historical a priori´ (127). In fact, he revised Husserl´s notion of the historical a priori, whereby man is both a historical being and conditional for the historicity of the world (Oksala 2005, 67–8). Foucault´s historical a priori is not a Kantian condition for validating judgements, but a condition of things actually said and documented (i.e. the árchive´). The condition is defined as ´the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice´ (Foucault 2010, 127). The condition cannot be applied universally but is distinctive for each particular epoch.

As I pointed out in my examination of his methodologies, Foucault propounds a rather nominalistic interpretation of historical ´facts´. History must be taken at face value, without hidden meanings, guiding principles, or teleologies. For Foucault, as Frédéric Gros summarises, ´truth is not displayed in the calm element of discourse, like a distant and correct echo of the real. It is, in the most accurate and literal sense of the expression, a reason for living: a logos actualized in existence, which sustains, intensifies, and tests it: which verifies it´

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(Gros 2005, 529). The self-formation of the subject, according to Foucault, involves certain ´truth games´, more specifically, ´a set of rules by which truth is produced´ (Foucault 2000b, 297). Truth must not be regarded as a fixed modality, reflecting a particular transcendental origin – or logic – and as such morally restrictive or coercive for the human subject. Rather, truth is configured in the ethical dimension of self-creation. Foucault´s overall normative perspective entails diversity of forms of life. There should be as much space as possible for ethical self-formation, for governing oneself instead of being governed. This outlook is consistent throughout Foucault´s lectures, interviews, and works.

In his later éthical´ works, such as The Hermeneutics of the Subject (2005), The Use of Pleasure (1990b), and The Care of the Self (1988b), Foucault analyses the practices of the ćare of the self´ and how ´knowledge´ and ´truth´ were conceived in ancient times. In Hellenistic and Greco-Roman cultures, the ćare of the self´ [epimeleia heautou] was a fundamental principle in conducting one´s life. (This statement, as a matter of course, reflects the dominant perspective of aristocratic men: Women, children, slaves, peasants, workers, and strangers were socially marginalised.) The ´permanent duty of one´s whole life´ was not the care of the ´soul´ itself – i.e. as a substance – but an active principle in the performance of one´s whole life. Initially, the Delphic maxim ´know yourself´ [gnõthi seauton] was the leading principle in ancient Greek philosophy, but knowledge of the self gradually became subordinate to care of the self. Knowledge of one´s ´soul´ was a necessary condition for leading a fruitful, virtuous life, ranging from one´s health and household to one´s political concerns. By way of knowing oneself, one acquired the ability [tekhnë] to govern one´s personal, social, and political life. The care of the self was practised in different subcultures and philosophical schools, employing different techniques. These techniques include dialogue (a form of dialectical contemplation of the self), listening (while not speaking for some time, even up to five years for new Pythagorean disciples), meditation (remembering the truth in one´s soul, or the examination of one´s conscience), writing (recording one´s everyday life: events, thoughts, feelings, dreams, aspirations, etc.), and training (e.g. sexual abstinence, or physical privation). These practices

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led to transformations of the self, and, overall, to an intensification of subjectivity in the ancient world. (´Technologies of the Self´, in: 2000b, 223–51).

Analytic philosophers criticise Foucault for his subordination of truth and knowledge to history, by which he abandoned general standards for intellectual inquiry. Rationality, so they maintain, is prior to any inquiry, transcending historical, disciplinary, and cultural contexts (Prado 1995, 18). For Foucault, as I have mentioned above, the conception of rationality itself is an unceasingly historical creation. He rejects the possibility of objective, perspective-neutral knowledge, above or outside our historical driven position. In an interview on (post-)structuralism, while arguing against the self-constituting subject of phenomenology, he said, ´I think, in fact, that reason is self-created, which is why I have tried to analyze forms of rationality: different foundations, different creations, different modifications in which rationalities engender one another, oppose and pursue one another´ (Foucault 2000a, 443). At first glance, this seems to equal postmodernist views such as those of Richard Rorty (´socialisation all the way down´), Thomas Kuhn (´paradigm´), or Paul Feyerabend (´anything goes´). However, Foucault surpasses postmodernism by emphasising the intrinsic relationship between power and knowledge, involving mutual formation and (normative) determination.

In The Order of Things (1970), Foucault describes the emergence of the human sciences. In the historical process, the human was not only the subject but also the object of knowledge; he became known as human. In The History of Sexuality (1988b; 1990a; 1990b), Foucault emphasises discourses and practices of sexuality which are pivotal for knowing the human; the study, indeed, is a genealogy of the desiring man. The French subtitle of the first volume, La Volenté de savoir, points towards the productive force which transforms knowledge about sexuality. This force – i.e. power relations and their effects – is not directed towards knowledge about sexual desire itself but, conversely, towards the desire to know what sex is or ought to be. Somewhat overreacting to psychoanalysis, which was popular at the time, he stated, ´Whenever it is a question of knowing who we are, it is this logic that henceforth serves as our master key. [...] the matrix not only of the living, but of life itself. [...] Sex, the explanation for everything´

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(1990a, 78). His main target was, what he called, the ´repressive hypothesis´ (10). Sex, according to Foucault, once was free, and not an issue what so ever. Consequently, one had to ´liberate´ one´s ´innate´ sexuality from Christian morality and Victorian prudishness and restore the authentic, ´true´ relation to oneself. The term ´sexuality´ did not appear before the beginning of the 19th

century (according to Foucault; 1985, 3), nor did its problematisation – which significantly affected social institutions, the medicalisation of human life, family relations, social norms, and law. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault seeks to illustrate ´how an “experience” came to be constituted [...] that caused individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of a “sexuality”´ (4). The study was another attempt by Foucault to reveal historical processes of subjectivation.

II. Sartre: Knowing, or ´presence to ~´

Contrary to Foucault´s conception of knowledge, Sartre´s conception has a rather traditional epistemological mark, although with the unique characteristics of his ´phenomenological ontology´. Being and Nothingness starts with an analysis of the ´phenomenon´. According to Sartre, there is no being behind the appearance, or phenomenon; there only is appearance. As the phenomenon is ´absolutely indicative of itself´ (BN, 2), ´it manifests its essence as well as its existence´ (3). Sartre thus tries to go beyond the classic Platonic dualism of being and appearance. The phenomenon stands for a finite manifestation of the infinite possible manifestations in the world, of which the human being is an integral part. A single finite phenomenon stands for neither the existent nor its essence; it only is. Nevertheless, the essence itself is a (single) phenomenon, which seems to contradict the previous statement. This contradiction cannot be solved without reference to some instance or being for which manifestations occur. A phenomenon, thus, presupposes consciousness, or, which ultimately amounts to the same thing, a perceiving subject. As Sartre states: ´For the law of being in the knowing subject is to-be-conscious´ (7).

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The notions of ´perceiving´ and ´knowing´ in his exposition are largely interchangeable; the Sartrean conceptual difference is minor. They both refer to the activity of cognition, or consciousness itself. When Sartre points to ´perceiving´, he perhaps primarily refers to the concept of the phenomenon, the object that is known or perceived, whereas ´knowing´ is primarily related to consciousness, the subject that knows or perceives. With ´perceiving´ he also refers to the classical dualism of the cogito and the percipe, the instance that perceives and what it perceives. Sartre elaborates the notion of knowledge in the section on Transcendence. He defines ´knowing´ as ´presence to ~´ [Fr.: présence à ~], as a mode of being (197). Knowledge is not a relation, activity, quality, or property of beings but ´the very being of the for-itself´ (ibid.). As such, the classic gap or distance between subject and object is eliminated (however, yet, not entirely clarified). Moreover, by knowing, ´[t]he only being which can be encountered and which is perpetually there is the known. The knower is not; he is not apprehensible´ (200). The knowing instance – or more precisely, the being of consciousness – is ultimately a ńon-being´. Sartre surely wants to avoid traditional epistemology, in which knowing and knowledge, or perceiving and perception, seem to demand a kind of intermediate being other than the being of the phenomenon and the non-being of the consciousness. If the being of an appearance, or phenomenon, is merely its appearance (cf. Berkeley´s idealistic phrase ésse est percipi´), then perception, or knowledge, equals its metaphysical or epistemological foundation. The being of knowledge, however, cannot be determined by the knowledge itself. This determination would be a self-referential act, leading to infinite regression. The ´foundation-of-being´ of the totality ´perceived-perception´ escapes both of these latter terms. Thus, the being of the appearance points to another kind of being. As Sartre points out, ´knowledge refers to consciousness´, more specifically, consciousness is ´the transphenomenal dimension of being in the subject´ (7). Knowledge, then, can only be íntuitive´, ´the presence of consciousness to the thing´ (195–6), which implies that deduction and discourse are merely secondary instruments for gaining knowledge.

The Paradox of Freedom and Identity: A Comparative Study on the Facticity of the Human Individual at Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault