Far-right and Economy : how can economy explain the success of the LSNS? The case study of the 2016 Slovak parliamentary election

Far-right and Economy

How can economy explain the success of the LSNS? The case study of the 2016

Slovak parliamentary election

Marek Táborský (11447303) Supervisor: dhr. dr. Gijs Schumacher Master thesis Political Science Second reader: Mr. Matthijs Rooduijn Specialization: Political Economy

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Summary

The aim of this master thesis is to address the research question 'How can economy explain the success of the LSNS?'. The paper tries to find an answer to this question by examining a specific case study, which is the parliamentary election held in Slovakia in 2016. In them – unexpectedly – the far-right party LSNS succeeded by gaining more than 8%, which was a significant increase in comparison with the previous election results in 2010 and 2012, when the party gained only 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively. For the purpose of answering the research question, the thesis focuses on the analysis of significance of selected socio-economic factors in relation to the preference of LSNS in the election under review at both micro and macro level. These assumptions are tested as five hypotheses which follow general trends in the choice of far-right parties or candidates in Europe. The findings of this thesis allows for characterizing a typical voter of LSNS. It was confirmed that a typical voter of the far-right party in Slovakia is predominantly manually-working, younger, male voter. The party was also most frequently chosen among first-time voters, which is in accordance with the theory of Lubbers et al. (2002). On the other hand, it was not confirmed that unemployment was a significant factor for the preference of LSNS. Findings at the individual level suggest that the anti-system sentiment associated with LSNS is not so strongly linked to the economic situation of its voters. This also relates to the fact that the general – nation-level – economic situation had improved significantly since the previous elections (in which the party failed) marked by a strong impact of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis. It also agrees with the theory according to which the far-right benefits rather on socio-cultural issues (Allen, 2015).

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Table of Contents

Summary 2

Table of Contents 3

I. Introduction 4

II. Context of the Study 6

a. Far-right 6

b. LSNS 8

c. 2016 parliamentary election 11

III. Theoretical Background & Formulating Hypotheses 13

IV. Methodology & Research Design 18

V. Results 22

VI. Conclusion 28

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Introduction

The main topic of this diploma thesis is the relationship between far-right and economy. More specifically, the thesis, through a case study, examines major socio-economic factors and variables in relation to the choice of a far-right party. After the 2016 parliamentary election Slovakia was shaken by the suprising result of the far-right party called People's Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) which received more than 8% of the vote and 14 out of 150 seats in the National Council. Through the economic prism, in this paper, I am trying to find an answer to the major research question 'How can economy explain the success of LSNS?'. The aim is not to address the economic program of the party – it is not related to the nature of the paper and, moreover, according to data from exit poll, only 7.4% of the LSNS voters declared that the economic program was the reason they voted for the party. For comparison, this option was chosen on average by 20.6% of voters of other relevant parties. The goal is also not to analyze general reasons of the sudden increase of the party – in comparison with previous parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2012 – as this would be out of the scope of the paper itself but also of the topic of economy. Rather, the aim of the thesis is to analyze the party’s electorate in the 2016 election from an economic point of view, that is, to explain to what extent the selected economic factors have been significant in voting for the party at both micro and macro level, and how can these contribute to explaining the result of the party. LSNS is interesting for the case study because its neo-Nazi ideology is among the most radical in entire Europe. Moreover, it is the latest far-right party within the EU which entered national parliament. At the same time, there exist certain doubts that are also the greatest limit of this paper. In particular, the economy is only one factor in the choice of (not only) the far-right, and, moreover, its importance is a priori questionable, especially with regard to an extremist party. Therefore, economy alone cannot answer the question of what specifically caused the sudden increase in the support of far-right in Slovakia. Other, general, mostly social factors have been chosen to explain why the party has grown. For example, the "legitimization" of the party after the 2013 regional election, the general pre-campaign atmosphere, which I mention later on. However, combined with these general reasons, also certain economic factors could help the party to grow. That is why this thesis attempts to look deeper into the connection of economic aspects and LSNS voters.

5 My work with data in this paper will therefore be guided by economic hypotheses. I will try to find a link between economic factors and the choice of the party through the unique data from the exit poll. These will be complemented by a macro-analysis at the municipal and district level.

The paper is structured into 5 main chapters. In the first chapter, I present the context of the study - that is, far-right in Slovakia, the LSNS, and the 2016 election. This means that I will deal with the development of the far-right scene in Slovakia in order to better approach the case study. In more detail, I will present the party itself as well as the socio-political-economic context of the 2016 parliamentary election.

In the following chapter, I deal with the theoretical background where I also formulate specific hypotheses that emerge from the main theoretical concept that I am using here, and these are cleavages.

Subsequently, I am going to explain the methodology used in this dissertation work. In this chapter, I detail what data or variables I use and for what specific purpose.

The practical part of the diploma thesis follows. In this chapter, I test individual hypotheses, and analyze and interpret the results of the research.

This is followed by conclusion which summarizes the thesis and answers the research question.

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Context of the Study

This chapter aims to deal closely with the case study itself. For this purpose, it describes the concept of the far-right both in the European and, more specifically, in the post-communist and Slovakian context. Next, this chapter also briefly touches on the party which is under review in this thesis. Finally, it also deals with the election that the thesis attempts to analyze. More specifically, I will detail contextual factors that could have influenced the overall outcome of the 2016 parliamentary election, as well as the outcome of the party under review, the LSNS.

Far-right (in Europe & Slovakia)

At the beginning – also for the correctness and purpose of the thesis itself – I start with the conceptualization of the term "far-right" in the context within which this diploma thesis operate, that is, the European context and, from more micro perspective, the post-communist and Slovakian context.

The origin of the concept can be found in the study of fascism, and indeed political science was looking at what is now known as far-right through the prism of this term ("neo-fascism") for a long time after the Second World War. In the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the third wave of right-wing extremism (Beyme, 1988) occured in Western Europe. It brought about an expansion of far-right but also right-wing populist movements and political parties. However, many of these parties had not built on the historical tradition and legacy of fascism (Ignazi, 2006). This wave was, according to Mudde (1996), after the Second World War, both politically and ideologically most successful. The right-wing extremism has become an important element within and outside the party system. The new movements and parties began to be called "the radical right", "the extreme right", "the far right", or "the populist radical right".

The problems of contemporary conceptualization of the phenomenon of the far-right are related not only to historical changes, but also to the fact that the (varying) terminology is used not only for scientific but also for media and political purposes, often synonymously wrongly confused. The most commonly confused terms are "extremism", "radicalism", and

7 "populist radical right" (Kluknavská, 2012). While extremism can be described as an antithesis to democracy, radicalism challenges fundamental aspects of liberal democratic rules of governance, but does not necessarily require a change, or an exchange, of the political system (Eatwell, 2000). The term "populist radical right" is put forward by Mudde (2007) and refers to parties that combine elements of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. The overwhelming and most used concept in the region of Central Eastern Europe is the term far-right (Kluknavská, 2012), which I am also using in this thesis.

Among the major common characteristic features of far-right parties are, for instance, the rejection of the cosmopolitan society and immigration into European countries (Betz, 1994) or considering domestic political elites corrupt (Hainsworth, 2008). Mudde (2000) presented the combination of four ideological elements characterizing far-right parties - nationalism, xenophobia, law and order (strong state) and welfare chauvinism (the requirement for the state to guarantee that its social policy serves its "own people" and not immigrants).

In the post-communist countries, too, there has been a substantial increase in the number of far-right political parties and movements in the 1990s. Unlike in Western Europe, however, this increase was caused solely by the transformation of the regime and the end of the communist rule in 1989. This was, amongst other things, associated with the socio-economic transformation and the rise of nationalism (Mareš, 2008). According to Kopeček (2007), the far-right in the post-communist region of Central and Eastern Europe differs, in particular, by the absence of immigrants from non-European countries. This, however, is substituted by the hostility towards minorities. In Slovakia, for example, there are hostile attitudes towards the Roma minority (Spáč and Voda, 2015).

Currently, the far-right in Slovakia is not a homogeneous entity, but it is represented by a number of different streams and movements that differ from one another in terms of program issues, ideology and institutional conception. However, all of them stem from the radical nationalism, which in Slovakia often transits into racism aimed mainly against the Roma minority and the defense of the Slovak State, the client state of Nazi Germany in 1939-45 (Mikušovič, 2007).

8 The Slovak far-right and ultranationalist scene is composed of several entities of a different status, relevance and impact on society. These are political subjects, social organizations, some so-called alternative media and unregistered (illegal) clusters, including paramilitary groups (Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová, 2016). This scene does not form a single, homogeneous bloc, but it is rather a conglomerate of partially cooperative, partially competing entities that combine a common resistance to the existing establishment and an effort to establish another system.

Since the early 1990s, a number of marginal political subjects have been part of the Slovak radical and ultranationalist scene. Their results in the parliamentary elections ranged within a few tenths of the percent (as shown in Table 2). In recent years, their activities have diminished. At present, the political party LSNS is the main representative of the Slovak far-right scene.

LSNS

LSNS (People's Party Our Slovakia), which was officially established in February 2010, has emerged from what was known as the most famous Slovak organization among far-right movements called Slovenská pospolitosť (Slovak Brotherhood) which was registered as a civic association in May 1995. LSNS is now considered a subject which is the symbol of political ambitions of the Slovak right-wing extremism in general, which is also supported by the simple fact that it was the only far-right party running in the 2016 election. Although, as mentioned above, the far-right scene is not homogenous in Slovakia, with several emerging far-right movements and parties, these only remain marginal and LSNS is the only relevant far-right actor at the political level.

In Slovakia, national-populist parties have been part of the domestic political scene since the fall of communism and the introduction of parliamentary democracy. These parties have been represented in the National Council in all electoral periods since 1990, at certain times they were in government. But those were parties that, despite their populist character and often authoritarian tendencies when reigning, were not anti-systemic or extremist marked by a totalitarian ideology. LSNS uses its populist methods and anti-establishment rhetoric to address voters, but it is not a typical populist party. LSNS is rather an anti-systemic, extremist party (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, 2016). Its intention is to replace the existing

socio-9 political system with the one with a lack of basic features of liberal democracy, free market economy, and an open, cultural, ethnically and religiously diversified society (Vražda, 2017).

LSNS defines itself as a "national, social and Christian" party. This is not original, but rather repetitive within the far-right scene in the country (ibid). In the case of the LSNS, it is a definition which, in such an abbreviated form, interpretes its own radical ethnic nationalism, economic protectionism and social chauvinism, and an inclination to the non-elitist version of political Catholicism, following the ideological reference of the Slovak State.

The main political topics of the LSNS include: the European Union, the US and NATO, anti-Romanyism, antisemitism, the Slovak State, migration and migrants. The anti-West orientation of the party is best manifested by its relation to the EU and NATO. LSNS wants Slovakia to leave both these organizations. The party has also begun to collect signatures for a referendum. It agrees with the views of voters of this party, although perhaps less than might be expected. According to the poll, LSNS is the only party in which voters supporting Slovakia to leave the EU prevail.

Tab. 1. Expected result of the potential Slovakia EU membership referendum by voters of individual parties

Party Remain Leave Undecided

Slovak National Party (SNS) 78 14 8

Ordinary People (OĽaNO) 76 15 9

Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 73 19 8

Most–Híd 68 7 25

Direction - Social Democracy (Smer - SD)

66 24 10

National Average 62 23 15

We Are Family (Sme Rodina) 58 32 10

Non-voters 52 26 22

People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) 37 51 12

10 The LSNS leader, Marian Kotleba, had firstly been trying to establish himself as a politician at local and regional level. In 2010, Kotleba was running for Mayor of Banská Bystrica, the fifth biggest city in Slovakia in terms of population, in municipal election, but his result was only insignificant (with 828 votes, i.e. 3.27% of the vote, he finished third). In the same election, he ran for MP of the city council, but he was not elected to this office either. An important breakthorugh occured in 2013, when the LSNS leader was surprisingly elected the Governor of one of eight Slovakian regions. In the second round, he defeated the incumbent candidate of the ruling party, Smer-SD, although the results of these two candidates in the first round were 49.5% : 21.3% in favor of the incumbent candidate. Despite the fact that Kotleba's reign was accompanied by scandalous circumstances and many irregularities, this office gave him the opportunity of much more intensive communication with potential voters.

After its establishment, the LSNS participated three times in the parliamentary election - in 2010, 2012 and 2016. In the first two elections, the results were several times higher than the results of other ultranationalist parties that had run in the previous elections, but these results were not sufficient enough for the far-right party to become a relevant part of the Slovak party system. Only in the 2016 parliamentary election, the LSNS managed to significantly exceed the 5% threshold required to enter the parliament.

Tab. 2. Results of Slovak ultranationalist and far-right parties in parliamentary elections

Source: Gyarfášová and Mesežnikov, 2016

Party 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2012 2016 Ultranationalists SĽS 0.30 - 0.27 - 0.16 - - - SNJ - - 0.13 0.15 - - - - HzOS 0.32 - - - - Far-right ĽSNS - - - 1.33 1.58 8.04

11 2016 parliamentary election

In order to better grasp the outcome of the LSNS in 2016 – and especially in the context of its sudden increase compared to 2012 – it is necessary to better approximate the atmosphere in which the parliamentary election took place. This was in many ways specific. For the first time in the history of independent Slovakia, only one party was defending the governmental post - all previous governments were coalition, only in 2012, the centre-left party Smer-SD (Direction – Social Democracy) won majority with over 44% of the vote.

Tab. 3. 2016 Slovak parliamentary election results

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic

As clearly seen from the election results, the Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD) had dramatically dropped. On the other hand, assessing this decline as an utter failure would not be entirely objective, since it is rather 44% of the vote, which this party gained in 2012, that was an abnormal result. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe evident features of the incumbent punishment with almost every other party gaining more votes and seats compared to 2012. Dissatisfaction with the Smer’s reign, which has been sparked by several corruption scandals, was already obvious in the 2014 presidential election, when Prime Minister Fico lost in the second round with an independent candidate by 40:60 ratio. A few months before,

Party % +/- (2012) Seats won +/- (2012) Position

Direction - Social Democracy (Smer)

28.3 ▼-16.1 49 ▼-34 Centre-left

Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 12.1 ▲+6.2 21 ▲+10 Centre-right Ordinary People (OĽaNO) 11.0 ▲+2.4 19 ▲+3 Centre-right Slovak National Party (SNS) 8.6 ▲+4.0 15 ▲+15 Right-wing People's Party Our Slovakia

(ĽSNS)

8.0 ▲+6.4 14 ▲+14 Far-right

We Are Family (Sme Rodina) 6.6 New party 11 ▲+11 Centre-right

Most–Híd 6.5 ▼-0.4 11 ▼-2 Centre-right

12 as already mentioned above, the ruling’s party candidate had lost to the LSNS leader in the regional election.

Although none of the opinion polls prior to the 2016 election attributed more than 2% to LSNS, the party won more than 8% of the vote. It should be stressed here that the new electoral law adopted before the election prohibited publication of opinion polls two weeks before the election. Therefore, the general dissatisfaction, anti-system sentiment and sort of protest could also be one factor explaining good mobilization of LSNS voters. After all, the electorate of the party consisted of 39.2% of voters, who did not vote in the previous parliamentary election in 2012 – clearly the most among all parties. Also, up to 18.5% of the LSNS had previously voted for SMER-SD. For comparison, LSNS voters in 2012 accounted for only 12.7% of its electorate in 2016.

In addition to the new experience with the majority government, the atmosphere prior to the 2016 election in Slovakia was heavily influenced by the European migrant crisis that blasted moods in the society ever more. The topic of migration and migrants is one of the key issues in the communication and mobilization strategies of right-wing extremists. The atmosphere that emerged in Slovakia in the second half of 2015 and continued until the March 2016 election in the context of the refugee wave in Europe reinforced xenophobic political parties, including LSNS, whose leaders used this atmosphere not only to strengthen the electoral support but also actively nurtured it: by disseminating alarming and misleading information about the causes and possible consequences of migration waves for Europe and Slovakia.

After the election, a significant consensus was formed designating LSNS as a a fascist party. The party has been called "fascist" by representatives of the vast majority of parliamentary parties, President Kiska, who refused to meet with the leader of LSNS after the election, and representatives of several non-governmental organizations. After the election, a large number of journalistic and analytical contributions of experts (historians, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists) and journalists were published in Slovak media in which the LSNS was labeled "fascist", "neo-fascist", "neo-Nazi", with several authors justifying such designations using certain attributes of LSNS which has also belonged to the abovementioned ideologies. At the end, here again, the overwhelming and umbrella concept is the term "far-right", which is also used in this thesis.

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Theory & Hypotheses

The subject of the far-right in relation to economy is not as broadly represented in political science as the concept of populism. In particular, populism has gained an extraordinary attention due to its topicality. This was, among other things, devoted to the relationship of populist parties and the economy, for example, in connection with the global financial or European debt crisis. (Economic) populism is, however, a relatively broad concept and it includes parties from the far-left (Syriza), through the centrist populist parties (ANO 2011) to the far-right. The latter, however, is not often analyzed through the perspective of economy. More than populism and the economy, attention is drawn to the radicalism, extremism and distinctive social views of the far-right.

This goes hand in hand with the far-right being profiled and benefiting rather from cultural issues. For instance, Allen (2015) finds out that the far-right benefits rather on socio-cultural issues and, on the contrary, loses when the political debate is predominantly focused on economy. Indeed, according to previous studies in European countries, the choice of far-right parties or candidates, in general, is related to similar factors, such as the presence of minorities or immigrants (Halla, Wagner, & Zweimüller, 2013; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002). However, apart from these, important economic factors also arise. A greater tendency to vote for the far-right is often associated, for example, with higher unemployment (Bjørklund, 2007; Rink, Phalet, & Swyngedouw, 2013), younger age (Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002), lower educated, manually working men with below average income (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Rydgren & Ruth, 2013).

In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to set specific hypotheses, which stem from the main research question and the concept of economy, and from the possibilities offered by available data and analytical methods.

For this purpose, the major theoretical concept I will follow in this thesis is cleavages. I will look at it from the sociological perspective as described by Kopeček and Hloušek (2004). Within this approach, cleavages and political division are not only about opinion disagreements or long-lasting conflicts, but are rooted in the social structure of the population and form the so-called segments which manifest themselves in subsequent political conflicts of their political representation (in this case, of course, political parties).

14 Within a broad discussion on the definition of cleavages, some authors choose more social, attitudinal, or political definitions (Bornschier, 2009). Due to the economic nature of this thesis, I choose the social definition of this concept, which is also used by Bartolini and Mair (2007). According to this conceptualisation, a political division must comprise three elements to constitute a cleavage: (1) a social-structural element, such as class, religious denomination, status, or education, (2) an element of collective identity, and (3) an organizational manifestation in the form of collective action or a durable organization of the social groups concerned.

I choose the social definition of cleavages because its applications on the Slovakian environment create a prerequisite for explaining electoral behavior on the basis of voters' social affiliation which is related to the economic nature of the thesis.

Kopeček and Hloušek (2004) outline reasons why the original concept of cleavages can not be applied well in post-communist countries. These include high volatility, negative identification of voters with parties, or a different understanding of the concept of the right and left. However, these problems do not weaken the concept itself from the sociological perspective, because those are problems at the level of representation of social segments, but this does not exclude the presence of long-term segments in society, whose political representation may be variable.

As the concept of cleavages is strongly linked to the specific political context of Western Europe, it is customary to adapt it to the context of specific countries and their historical (political, economic and/or social) development (Bornschier, 2009; Kopeček & Hloušek, 2004; Madleňák, 2012).

In the case of Slovakia, Whitefield (2002), for instance, puts forward these social cleavages: ethnicity (Hungarians - Slovaks, Slovaks and others), religiosity, class, age, sector. He does also define ideological cleavages: ethnic liberalism, economic liberalism, pro / anti western attitudes, social and political liberalism, Roma minority.

Madleňák (2012) puts forward these cleavages in Slovakia: the centre versus periphery, Mečiarism versus Anti-Mečiarism (named after the authoritative PM in the 1990s), the conservative versus liberal, the socio-economic, the urban versus rural, and the ethno-nationalist cleavage (Hungarians – Slovaks).

15 Hloušek and Kopeček (2004) describe these cleavages: the controversy over the form of the regime, the state versus the church, the centre versus periphery, the nationalist cleavage, and Mečiarism versus anti-Mečiarism.

These cleavages combine social, political, and conflicting perceptions of this concept. Many of them, however, are not socially anchored, but rather reflect political conflict in certain historical periods. The lack of socio-structural anchoring of these cleavages, as defined by Bartolini and Mair (2007), leads me to reject these cleavages for the purpose of this thesis. I will therefore build on the original cleavages as defined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), taking into account the specific context of the post-communist landscape by extending their cleavages by the cleavage of transformation presented by Kitschelt (1995).

From the four original cleavages of Lipset and Rokkan, I choose to work with those two with an economic character: owner vs. worker and urban vs. rural. As described below, far-right represents the so-called losers (of transformation, in the specific context of Slovakia). This Kitschelt’s cleavage – which is mentioned below – goes hand in hand with the Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavages. Losers of transformation are, amongst others, usually manually working voters from rural areas. In Western Europe, for example, the variable of manual workers has a positive effect on the support of the extreme right (Arzheimer, 2009). Also, Eastern European voters of the far-right tend to be from smaller, rural, areas, as opposed to urban areas, Eastern Europe (Kupka et al., 2009; Minkenberg, 2017).

The first two hypotheses, therefore, will be:

Hypothesis I: Manual workers are more likely to vote for LSNS than for other parties.

Hypothesis II: Rural areas are the major source of votes for LSNS as opposed to urban areas. Of course, taking into account the second hypothesis, it is very relative to determine what is, or what is not, a rural area in the specific context of the Slovak Republic. Therefore, the logic of this hypothesis can also be translated as: 'The lower the population of municipality, the greater will be the share of votes for LSNS.' This is more detailed in the methodology section of the thesis.

Apart from the fact that the remaining two Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavages are not of an economic nature, their measurement would be very limited: the centre vs. periphery cleavage has its clear representation and its presence is evident from the distinction of the Hungarian

16 bloc, which, in the Slovak electorate, is completely autonomous. Confirming or refuting the church vs. state cleavage on the basis of LSNS electoral result would be too demanding in methodological terms as the data on religiosity are not utterly objective – the ratio of people officially reporting to the Roman Catholic Church does not vary very much across the country. It is rather individual conviction that matters here, as, for example, many atheists are officially part of the Roman Catholic Church from their very childhood. Moreover, following the theories on the relationship of religiosity and far-right in the post-communist Europe (Allen, 2015), it would be naturally expected that far-right voters will indeed have greater inclination towards religiosity (as ultraconservatives), and particularly with the non-elitist version of political Catholicism of LSNS. However, Slovakia is an exception in this respect. There has been conducted an opinion survey which found out that LSNS has the smallest ratio of voters, which consider themselves "deep believers", among relevant parties. At the same time, the party has the third biggest ratio of atheist voters (Múčka & Majchrák, 2017).

These cleavages are supplemented by the one of Kitschelt (1995) as has already been mentioned above. I regard this cleavage as the only possible enlargement cleavage for post-communist countries that meets the criteria of the definition of Bartolini and Mair. The cleavage of transformation – the so-called winners and losers of transformation – reflects the specific historical and economic context in that Slovakia, as a post-communist country, has overcome the transition from the authoritarian to the democratic regime, bringing about the market economy and civil liberties. Changing the political regime meant reversing the social strata.

Certain groups that relatively benefited from the previous regime (security of work, social system, labor status) lost by the transformation or do not have the same profits in the new regime as other groups, which is accompanied by lower education, lower rate of employment, and/or lower income. Minkenberg (2017), who puts forward motivations of Eastern European voters of right-wing extremists, for instance, does not see a typical extremist voter at the top of the social ladder, but also not at the very bottom; between the second to fifth lowest bar. According to him, such a voter is rather in the safe layer of the postmodern society, but he can also lose something objectively.

As Kitschelt (1995) puts it, the market economy is more suitable for those who have the potential to profit from it, i.e. they have a better education, a younger age, are located in urbanized areas and are men. The far-right represents the protest against this modernization,

17 making it a representation for the lower middle class and those who lost from the transformation (Arzheimer, 2012).

This cleavage naturally involves an economic aspect, reflecting the original cleavage of owner vs. worker, but at the same time brings about the specific context of transformation that divided society into social structural elements (point 1 of the definition of Bartolini and Mair above), also created a space for collective identity (2nd point of the definition) in the sense of identifying individuals as victims of the regime change, displaying nostalgia for the old regime or disappointment with the developments after 1989 when the transformation took place (SITA, 2014). People, who have failed to adapt to new social conditions after the fall of the communist regime and the introduction of a market economy, may sympathize with suggestions for quick and simple solutions offered by extremist, populist and radical-nationalist parties.

The other three hypotheses will then be:

Hypothesis IIIa: Unemployed voters are more likely to vote for LSNS than for other parties. Hypothesis IIIb: Higher unemployment in a district leads to greater support for LSNS there. Hypothesis IV: Lower average income in a district leads to greater support for LSNS there.

Tab. 4. Overview of cleavages used in the thesis

Cleavage Author Conceptualization Indicators

Owner vs. Worker Lipset & Rokkan, 1967 Middle and higher class vs. lower class

Manual vorkers vs. skilled/knowledge workers

Urban vs. Rural Lipset & Rokkan, 1967 City vs. countryside Urban or highly urbanized areas vs. rural or less urbanized areas

Transformation Kitschelt, 1995 Winners vs. losers of transformation

Employed voters with higher income vs. unemployed voters or

18

Methodology

In order to test the hypotheses and subsequently answer the research question, I use data at two levels: (1) aggregated for municipalities and districts, and (2) individual data obtained from the exit poll, which was conducted on the day of the parliamentary election on 5 March 2016 by the FOCUS agency for Markíza TV (the largest commercial television in the country). The survey was carried out in 161 municipalities in Slovakia on a sample of 20,128 citizens who answered a number of questions after the exit from a polling station. The accuracy of the exit poll data can, of course, be questioned as it "only" includes data on about 1% of the entire electorate. General accuracy can best be verified on the actual results and predicted results by the exit poll for each party. As far as the outcome of the election is concerned, the exit poll estimated the final results fairly accurately, when even the most striking differences between the estimated and the actual result of the parties did not exceed 1.24pp. This overview, along with the overview of sources used in the work, is given below.

Tab. 5. Comparison of actual and exit poll results Party 2016 result (%) Exit Poll prediction

(%)

Difference (pp)

Direction - Social Democracy (Smer)

28.3 27.3 -1.0

Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 12.1 13.3 1.2

Ordinary People (OĽaNO) 11.0 11.2 0.2

Slovak National Party (SNS) 8.6 8.0 -0.6

People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS)

8.0 6.8 -1.2

We Are Family (Sme Rodina) 6.6 5.9 0.7

Most–Híd 6.5 7.3 0.8

19 Tab. 6. List of used aggregated data

Tab. 7. List of used individual-level data

The main statistical method used in this paper is regression analysis conducted through the SPSS software. Through the obtained data, I will look for the effect of the individual variables, thus being able to assess the importance of selected economic factors for the choice and success of the party.

Name Level Source

2016 parliamentary election results District & Municipality Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic

Unemployment rate (February 2016) District

Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family

Average income District Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic

Population District & Municipality Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic

Name Type Respondents Data collection

20 Tab. 8. Variables overview

Variable effect Variable (operationalization) Individuals Municipalities Districts

Income effect Average income *

Population effect Dummy variables for individual categories *

Effect of employment Share of unemployed / Unemployment rate * *

Effect of employment Share of manually-working voters *

For the purpose of testing the first hypothesis (Manual workers are more likely to vote for LSNS than for other parties.), I use data at the individual level, from the exit poll. This provides me with data about the job category – more precisely, there are 11 categories in the exit poll questionnaire, one of which, of course, is "manual worker". Thanks to this, I will be able to find out whether manually working voters were more likely to vote for LSNS than for other parties.

In the second hypothesis (Rural areas are the major source of votes for LSNS as opposed to

urban areas. (The lower the population of municipality, the greater will be the share of votes for LSNS.)) I will monitor the population effect. For its better examination, I also include dummy

variables for different population categories of municipalities in the regression analysis. I divide 2,889 municipalities in Slovakia into 7 groups according to their population:

a) 0 – 1,000 b) 1,000 – 2,000 c) 2,000 – 5,000 d) 5,000 – 20,000 e) 20,000 – 50,000 f) 50,000 – 100,000 g) 100,000+

This will allow me to find out whether the lower the population of a municipality is, the greater the support for the LSNS is (or not). I work with both data - the official election results provided by the Statistical Office and the population of individual municipalities. In particular, I will of course work with the percentage result of the LSNS in each of the municipalities. Data

21 on the population are also provided by the Statistical Office and are as of 31 December 2015, which I consider more accurate than the data as of 31 December 2016, as the election were held on 5 March 2016.

In order to test the IIIa hypothesis (Unemployed voters are more likely to vote for LSNS than for other parties.), I work once again with the information provided by the agency, which

carried out the exit poll on the election day. Here I will be following the methodological pattern from the first hypothesis. As these hypotheses fall under one category (question regarding job category), I have, of course, recoded these two options ("manually working" and "unemployed") into two separate variables. I will attempt to find out whether the unemployed voters generally had a greater tendency to vote for LSNS than for other parties. Consequently, in the IIIb hypothesis (Higher unemployment in a district leads to greater

support for LSNS there.), I will work again with the unemployment variable, but this time at

the district level. This means that I compare the unemployment rate in 79 districts, which is reported by the Statistical Office as of February 29, 2016, with the official election result of the party in this or that district. I will be then able to compare these two results. At the individual level, I will examine whether the regression analysis shows a positive relationship between the share of unemployed voters and the LSNS gains, as expected by the hypothesis. If the same relationship is confirmed at the district level, it will support this conclusion. The Hypothesis IV (Lower average income in a district leads to greater support for LSNS there.) will also be tested at the district level, as it is the lowest level available for data on average income. At first glance, this might appear quite problematic, however, it is precise as they have been conducted by the so-called workplace method which means that workers are classed in the district where they actually work, not by location of 'their' firm. The principle remains pretty much the same as for the previous hypothesis. I will measure the relationship between the party’s result in a district with an average income there.

Besides this, at the individual level, I also included number of control variables which should help to find out who was a typical LSNS voter in the election. These are age, gender, (Hungarian) nationality, and abstention in the 2012 election.

22

Results

Tab. 9. Regression analysis results. The probability of voting for LSNS

Model 1 Model 2 B (Std. Error) B (Std. Error) Individual Level Constant -0,918 (0,155)*** -0,809 (0,158)*** Manually working 0,414 (0,077)*** 0,517 (0,077)*** Unemployed 0,172 (0,131) 0,267 (0,135) Man 0,557 (0,058)*** 0,542 (0,058)*** Age (7 categories) -0,446 (0,022)*** -0,419 (0,022)*** Education (4 categories) -0,137 (0,036)*** -0,193 (0,036)*** Hungarian nationality -2,016 (0,237)*** -2,020 (0,235)*** Abstention in 2012 0,569 (0,072)*** 0,563 (0,073)*** Municipality Level Constant 8,604 (0,110)*** Population

Below 1,000 (ref. cat.)

1,000 - 2,000 0,077 (0,228) 2,000 - 5,000 0,189 (0,304) 5,000 - 20,000 0,084 (0,502) 20,000 - 50,000 -0,494 (0,909) 50,000 - 100,000 -0,647 (1,691) 100,000+ -3,134 (3,378) District Level Constant 24,833 (3,881)*** Unemployment rate 0,164 (-0,193) Average income -0,018 (0,003)*** *** = p < 0,001

23 The regression analysis was undertaken at three levels, at individual, municipal and district level. At the individual level, through the hierarchical binary logistic regression, I examined the probability of voting for LSNS in relation to several variables. At the remaining two levels – municipality and district – through the linear regression analysis, I studied the relationship between the percentage success of the party in the election and selected socio-economic indicators such as population, average income and unemployment rate.

At the individual level, in terms of hypotheses, the thesis has been most interested with the voters' jobs explaining the choice of the LSNS, that is, the manual worker or the unemployed. Both of these options were included in the exit poll in the "job category", which included 11 different options including, of course, the "unemployed" or "manually working" options. To begin with, I first removed all respondents who did not answer this question. Of 20,128 respondents, the sample dropped to 19,531. In addition, as can be observed from the regression analysis table, I used two models at the individual level. The first model includes all the responses (19,531). In the second model, I included only responses of the voters of "relevant parties". This means the parties that entered parliament (passed the 5% threshold) as well as the two parties that did not pass it with 4.94 and 4.05%, respectively. Of course, it is necessary to test the hypotheses regarding the LSNS electorate as compared to all parties, and thus the entire exit poll sample. However, the second model may be particularly valid taking into account the fact that the remaining "irrelevant" parties, whose results range from 0.07 to 0.84%, may distort the results to a certain extent, as the sample of their voters was only small in the exit poll. In the end, however, it can be generally concluded that differences in results between the two models are negligible.

The first hypothesis regarding the relationship between manual voters and the far-right can be considered confirmed by the regression analysis results. Also in the Slovak context of the 2016 parliamentary election, it is valid that the far-right (LSNS) – as well as the theory holds (Arzheimer, 2009) – found an increased level of support among manually working voters compared to other parties. In fact, the party did win among manually working voters with over 29% of the vote.

Regarding the second hypothesis that was tested at the individual level it is important to note that, in the case of the choice of LSNS in the 2016 parliamentary election, the analysis did not significantly confirm the link between a voter's unemployment and the preference of LSNS.

24 This, in the context of the election under review, refutes the hypothesis that unemployed voters have a greater tendency to vote for far-right parties.

The same result can be observed even at the district level, which is an appropriate addition and confirmation of the individual level result, although oppositely as was expected. At the level of 79 districts, it was not generally confirmed that LSNS had significantly better results in districts with greater unemployment rates.

The link between a voter’s unemployment and preference of LSNS is significantly weaker than other statistically significant predictors of the choice of the party. Other control variables were also included in the analysis to see if they have something to say about the choice of the LSNS in 2016 and to help create a better pattern of a typical LSNS voter in the election. These were not the subject of the hypotheses, but they are a suitable socio-demographic supplement in the LSNS electoral review.

The party was chosen predominantly – in comparison to other parties – by younger voters, which is in line with that the party won among first-time voters with 22.7% of the vote (Gyárfášová and Slosiarik, 2016) and ended up second with 15.53% of the vote in the model parliamentary election that took place a few days before the real one at high schools across the country (Koník, 2016). This does not agree with the research of Allen (2015) who found out a neutral effect of age on the support of the far-right in post-communist countries. The regression analysis show that Slovakia is an exception in this respect. This can be explained by Lubbers et al. (2002) who used the theory of social integration. According to this theory young people are less integrated into stable social structures in which a strong process of political socialization is under way, the consequence being that they are more likely to vote for extremist parties.

At the same time, it needs to be stressed here that in the context of the 2016 Slovak parliamentary election a specific situation emerged. Previously, most of the youngsters (i.e. first-time voters) abstained from an election. The opposite thing occured this time. This could mean that these – otherwise uninvolved young voters – have been addressed and mobilized by the extremist party successfully, as well as many other abstention voters from the 2012 election. This is evidenced by the outcome of the regression analysis for the abstention voters variable, where a clear positive relationship exists between this voters' group and the choice of LSNS. This may confirm the assumption that LSNS was largely an option for sort of protest

25 voters. In addition, another, although unsurprising, socio-demographic finding is that male voters were much more likely to vote for LSNS than women.

Finally, four categories of education were included in the exit poll (primary school; high school, high school with a school-leaving exam; and university). The regression analysis shows that LSNS voters have generally lower education compared to voters of other parties. This is also in line with the general trend in Europe - according to studies (Allen, 2015; Lubbers et al., 2002), voters with lower education have a greater tendency to vote for the far-right - or, in general, for radical and extremist parties or candidates.

As one of the control variables the regression analysis also includes nationality, more specifically looking at the relationship of the Hungarian population in the country (9% minority) to the choice of LSNS. This party did not advocate an anti-Hungarian campaign. The Slovak-Hungarian frictions were overcome in the first decade of this century, and the "minority target" of extremists in the country is, as already mentioned in the Context of the Study section, Roma, Muslims and Jews (as some "external enemies"). Although this variable was not subject to any hypothesis, it was possible, despite the relatively neutral relationship of the LSNS to the Hungarian minority, to assume that members of the ethnic minority would not vote for the Slovak extremist party. After all, the Hungarians are represented by two parties in Slovakia - the more nationalistic SMK (Party of the Hungarian Coalition; 4.05% of the vote in the election) and the Hungarian-Slovak party Most-Híd (from the Slovak and Hungarian words for "bridge"; 6.50% in the election and government party afterwads). This assumption is clearly confirmed by the regression analysis; LSNS was chosen practically exclusively by Slovak voters. This, however, is no different to other non-extremist Slovak parties; Hungarian voters chose almost exclusively the two abovementioned Hungarian parties. This is in line with the centre-periphery cleavage in the Slovak context where the Hungarian electoral bloc is completely autonomous as mentioned in the Theory section. In general, therefore – at the individual level – it can be stated that the predominant predictor of the choice of LSNS is age (younger voters chose the party more often), gender (men voted for the party more frequently than women), lower education, and, most importantly for the purpose of the thesis, a job in the manual profession.

At the district level, as mentioned above, I researched the importance of unemployment rate in this or that district and the percentage result of LSNS there. This relationship, as well as at

26 the individual level, was not a significant predictor of the choice of LSNS. On the contrary, what has been confirmed to some extent is the importance of average income at the district level. More specifically, the lower the average wage, the higher the success of LSNS. Or, for a better interpretation of the regression analysis, the higher the average wage in a district, the lower the party's election's result there. The results of this analysis can not be generalized in a way that people with lower salaries elected LSNS, as this could lead to an ecological fallacy, since the data is only available at the district level. Therefore, even if we take the results of the analysis, because of the lack of data at the individual level, it is not possible to estimate the range in which LSNS voters' income is moving - whether it is mainly a slightly below-average wage or it is perhaps even approaching the minimum wage. However, the fact remains that in the districts with lower economic development – where the income is lower (below average) – LSNS did somewhat better.

The rural vs. urban division can be, following the results, confirmed. From the values of individual dummy variables it follows that LSNS did not succeed in smallest villages and bigger cities. In principle, it can be stated that a typical party voter comes from a smaller municipality (up to 5,000 inhabitants). Certain, but lower, support for LSNS can be traced also in the category of cities (municipalities that fulfill certain conditions and have at least 5,000 inhabitants). The distinction is then best exemplified by growing population. LSNS did generally worse (does not necessarily mean it did not pass the 5% threshold there) in district cities (in principle, cities in the category of 20 to 50 thousand inhabitants), even less in regional cities (essentially cities in the category of 50 to 100 thousand inhabitants), and even less in cities with over 100-thousands inhabitants – these are only two cities, the most liberal, the capital of Bratislava, and Košice. This, Košice, is in a way the opposite and "rival" of Bratislava, as it is located in the economically undeveloped east of the country, but the city maintains its liberal character, for example, the SMER-SD governmental party achieves here below-average results and, on the contrary, the more liberal opposition parties are more successful here, as well as in Bratislava.

The specificity of the LSNS is that in all indicators except the age it acts as a representative of losers of the transformation. It has the largest proportion of young and first-time voters, which completely deviates from the losers concept. It appears that LSNS is a representation for two groups of voters at the same time by this respect. On the one hand, for the part of

27 voters who have lost by the transformation, and on the other hand, it can appeal to young voters with lower political sophistication.

Tab. 10. Examination of cleavages in relation to the LSNS electorate

Owner vs. Worker Urban vs. Rural Transformation Centre vs. Periphery

Skilled Workers

Manual

Workers City Countryside Winners Losers Slovak Hungarian

LSNS * * (*) *

28

Conclusion

In today's Europe, there are not many countries in which parties similar to LSNS has succeeded. In the vast majority of EU countries, parties similar to LSNS are located at the very periphery of political scene and society. LSNS is not just a radical-nationalist party such as, for instance, the French National Front. LSNS and its values and idelogy are fundamentally opposed to the liberal democratic principles of an EU member state. With 8 percent of the vote LSNS is currently weak to change the character of the political regime. The party is isolated and it has zero coalition potential. However, the danger of the rise of extremism is also a suitable material for research.

This thesis therefore dealt with the parliamentary election held in Slovakia in March 2016 focusing on the far-right party LSNS. More than the general analysis of its actual result, the thesis attempted to look at the relationship between economy and choice of the far-right through the examination of the LSNS electorate. This is mainly because earlier studies have presented results of far-right parties predominantly through examining ideological and socio-cultural factors. At the same time, however, there are economic, authenticated patterns of voters that tend to choose the far-right. The thesis therefore investigated to what extent could these theories apply to the researched Slovak context.

This paper was looking at the major objective socio-economic factors that were available in the form of data and which can help analyze the LSNS electorate at both micro and macro levels. At the same time, the paper was undoubtedly limited to a certain extent. It dealt with the relatively narrow topic of the economy and the influence of economic factors on the choice of the far-right party. That is not an issue as such, but even within this topic, especially the unavailability of certain data did not make it possible to include all objective socio-economic factors.

The results of the research, however, allow to identify a typical voter of LSNS in the 2016 election from several perspectives. In connection with the hypotheses it was confirmed that – in comparison to other parties – manually working voters were more often present in the LSNS electorate compared to all other parties, which is especially striking when taking into account that the winner of the election – centre-left party – achieved almost four-times better result. In particular, these are usually younger men of Slovak nationality from smaller

29 municipalities (although not from the smallest villages). On the other hand, the research did not confirm unemployment as a clear predictor of the preference of LSNS. Nor can it be generalized that such a voter is economically poor. This suggests that the anti-system sentiment associated with the LSNS is not so strongly linked to the economic situation of its voters. At the individual level, the financial status of the party's voters could not be examined. At the district level, the assumption was confirmed that LSNS did somewhat better in regions with decreasing level of average income, but it can not be inferred from the findings that LSNS is chosen by poor – or even the poorest – voters. In general, however, it makes sense that a typical LSNS voter has a somewhat lower income, as the results of the regression analysis show that party voters are generally less educated. The share of university graduates is small. These conclusions are not an exception in the European context and are in line with the analysis of the support of far-right in Western Europe (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006).

In the end, to answer the general research question 'How can economy explain the success of the LSNS?', it can be summed up that economy, especially certain economic factors, can explain the preference of the party and appeared to be significant in analyzing the LSNS electorate and characterizing a typical voter of this party. Economy alone can not explain the result of the party, particularly in the context of its sudden and unexpected rise. There are several other non-economic factors which had a major influence on the party’s success in the election which would have to be researched foremost. And it indeed appears that it is mainly socio-cultural issues which best mobilize far-right voters. However, focusing on the economic side can provide a useful insight into the general patterns of the electorate of this party, which is fundamentally inconsistent with everything that forms the inner foundations and external frameworks of the contemporary social order of the country. The economic perspective offers an explanation to the preference of the party for certain categories mentioned above, which, to a certain extent, gives a clue why the party did rise in the election.

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