Program to combat jihadism
Case of the Netherlands
MSc Thesis
Master Crisis and Security Management Student: Roan Ligthart Student nr: s1592084
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker Second reader: Dr. Alastair Reed
Program: Crisis & Security Management Date: 13th January, 2016
Program to combat jihadism
Case of The Netherlands
Author: Roan Ligthart Student nr: s1592084
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker Second reader: Dr. Alastair Reed
MSc Program: Crisis & Security Management Date: 13th January, 2015
University: Leiden University
Faculty Governance and Global Affairs
Front page image: National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism NCTV (2014)
Leiden University Institute of Security and
Faculty Governance and Global Affairs Global Affairs
Schouwburgstraat 2 Koningin Julianaplein 10
2511VH The Hague 2595AA The Hague
The Netherlands The Netherlands
http://www.leidenuniv.nl/ http://www.universiteitleiden.nl/ governance-and-global-affairs/
I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Master in Crisis and Security Management of Leiden University ends with a master thesis project. In western societies, radicalization is becoming a mayor issue for governments to deal with. The individuals who radicalize are seen as a potential threat to society. Therefore, the Dutch government formulated an action program to combat jihadism. This thesis will analyze the current program of the Dutch government see to what extent this program relates to the expert recommendations by renowned institutions that provide research based policy advice. Via this route, I would like to thank the ones that helped me in the research process. First of all, I would like to express great appreciation to my thesis supervisor Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker. Without his proper counseling and supervision, the thoroughness of this thesis would not have been the same. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the professionals that have taken time for the interviews and providing me with extensive understanding about their practices. I would also like to express my utmost gratitude to Jessica Sciarone, MA for taking the time to review my thesis and to provide proper recommendations. Last but not least, I would like to show thanks to my classmates Brian, Kay and Lars who have provided support and shared the ups and downs of the master program of Crisis and Security Management.
I am sincerely grateful,
II ABSTRACT
The armed conflict in the Middle-East is complex and attracts western citizens to fight alongside terrorist groups. Internationally, western governments are creating measures to cope with the risk of (returning) foreign fighters, radicalization and terrorism. The Netherlands developed an action program to combat jihadism to counter the perceived risks. This master thesis researches this policy program of the Netherlands and compares it to the expert recommendations chosen for study. Due to the fact that many different countries, NGO’s and think tanks are working towards effective measures, a variety of recommendations are published. Furthermore, this thesis focuses upon the most recent recommendations in order to paint a contemporary sketch of reality. Short-term measures from the current Dutch policy program are, to a large extent, in line with these expert recommendations. However, more long-term measures are not (yet) incorporated, since these measures could reduce the risk of radicalization in the future.
III TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ... I Abstract ... II 1. Introduction ... 7 2. Methodology ... 10 2.1 Sources ... 11
2.2 Scaling & Interviews... 12
2.3 Definitions... 14
2.3.1 Jihadism ... 14
2.3.2 Foreign fighters ... 14
2.3.3 Terrorism... 15
2.4 Limitations ... 16
2.4.1 Data gathering & analysis ... 16
2.4.2 Expert recommendations & Best practices ... 17
2.4.3 Interviews ... 18
3. The phenomenon ... 20
3.1 International jihadism and foreign fighters ... 20
3.2 Historical dimension of foreign fighters in Europe ... 22
3.2.1 Recent incidents in Europe ... 22
3.2.2 The European threat ... 24
3.3 Case of the Netherlands ... 25
3.3.1 The Dutch Phenomenon ... 25
3.3.2Terrorsist Threat Assessment 40 (DTN 40) ... 27
4. Expert recommendations ... 29
4.1 Explaining the choice ... 29
4.2 The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)... 30
IV
4.4 The Global Centre of Cooperative Security (GCCS) ... 33
4.5 Exit-Germany ... 35
4.6 The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)... 36
4.7 The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) ... 37
4.8 The International Center for Study of Radicalization (ICSR) ... 39
5.The Netherlands comprehansive Action programmme to combat jihadism ... 41
5.1 The goal & structure ... 41
5.2 The action program to combat jihadism ... 42
5.2.1 Risk reduction regarding jihadist travelers ... 43
5.2.2 Travel interventions ... 44
5.2.3 Radicalization, disrupting disseminators and recruiters. ... 45
5.2.4 Counteracting radicalization ... 45
5.2.5 Social media and the internet ... 46
5.2.6 Information exchange and cooperation ... 46
6. Analysis... 49 6.1 The analysis ... 49 6.2 The ICCT ... 49 6.3 The GCTF ... 50 6.4 The GCCS ... 51 6.5 EXIT-Germany ... 51 6.6 The ISD ... 52 6.7 The RAN ... 53 6.8 The ICSR ... 54
6.9 Measures not included in recommendations ... 55
6.10 Overall analysis ... 56
7. Conclusion ... 58
V 9. Bibliography ... 62 9.1 Primary sources ... 62 9.2 Secondary sources ... 66 10. Appendices ... 73 Appendix 1. ... 73 Appendix 2. ... 79 Appendix 3. ... 88
7 1. INTRODUCTION
What is to be done with the millions of facts that bear witness that men, fully understanding their real interests, have left them in the background and rushed headlong to meet peril and
danger…? (Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground, 1864)
The conflict in Syria and Iraq continues and globally, terroristic activities seem to be on the rise. One could argue that the current situation is the aftermath of the Arab spring/Arab uprising, which started in 2008 (Khondker, 2011:676). Syria is situated in an armed conflict with terrorist movements like the Islamic State (IS).Western governments are confronted with citizens leaving their home country to fight in the Middle-East. These western citizens are called ‘foreign fighters’ (European Parliament, 2015:1). The phenomenon is not new at all, but the scale is (European Parliament, 2015:1). Furthermore, according to Neumann (2015), approximately 20.000 foreign fighters have left for Syria to fight against the Assad regime. The struggle in Syria claims more and more victims, in 2014 on average 5,000 people per month lost their lives because of violence in Syria (NCTV, 2015:5). However, the current situation in the Middle-East attracts western citizens.
The problem is recognized on an international level. The UN Security Council (2014) has adopted Resolution 2178, aimed at stemming the flow of foreign fighters. Furthermore, the EU is actively engaged in international activities (European Parliament, 2015:1). The European Commission (2014) published a recommendation for governments to prevent radicalization to terrorism and violent extremism. This significant international attention focuses on supporting the efforts to reduce the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq (GCCS, 2015). Within the EU, Member States are addressing the problem using a large number of different tools ranging from criminal law to de-radicalization efforts. “The Member States most affected have also cooperated with each other outside the EU framework. The United States has a particularly developed counter-terrorism framework now being used to deal with foreign fighters. Since 9/11, the EU and the US have cooperated on counter-terrorism despite different philosophies on issues such as data protection” (European Parliament, 2015:1).
The risk regarding jihadism and foreign fighters is also high on the political agenda in the Netherlands. Since the beginning of 2013 it has become clear that young Dutch Muslims started to travel to Syria to participate in the armed conflict (Forum, 2014). ‘’There are growing concerns that these fighters might return battle-hardened, radicalized and with
8 extensive radical networks that might inspire or even encourage them to attack the home country’’ (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014:3). The phenomenon is not new at all, however, the way the phenomenon is perceived is new due to the size and scope (European Parliament, 2015:1). The Dutch government has come up with several measures to cope with this problem. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) in the Netherlands created an action program to deal with this problem called: “The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism” (NCTV, 2014). This program consists of 38 measures to combat jihadism and foreign fighters.
Now, more than a year has passed since the action program was introduced. What makes a program to counter terrorism a good program? What are the main measures to take for key actors to deal with this phenomenon? These kinds of questions arise when studying this subject. A dive into this phenomenon will contribute to the academic debate and could help improve the current policy program. However, what kinds of recommendations are available? There are numerous institutions that have developed recommendations and best practices which are published and shared to help governments and other key actors to cope with this problem. This thesis focuses on some of the most recent expert recommendations of the most leading institutes. The institutions are chosen by geographical location to make sure that Dutch based institutes, internationally based institutes and intra-national policy based institutes are incorporated. This thesis explores the most recent expert recommendations to cope with jihadism and foreign fighters. Next, it examines to what extent the action program is in line with the most recent expert views by renowned institutions that provide research based policy advice, on how to deal with jihadism and foreign fighters. This allows us to say something about the quality and the chances of success of the action program. In order to achieve this objective, the following research question has been formulated:
To what extent does the action program to combat jihadism, by the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, relate to the recently formulated recommendations by renowned institutions that provide research based policy advice?
First of all, the methodology will be presented in order to show the structure and the choices made within this thesis. The chapter will also provide definitions of key concepts used in this study namely: jihadism, foreign fighters and terrorism. Thereafter, it provides an overview of the phenomenon of jihadi foreign fighters in general and that in Europe and the Netherlands. Next, expert recommendations by renowned institutions will be presented. These
9 recommendations are the most recent and the institutions are seen as leading in research based policy advice. Thereafter, the action program to combat jihadism by the NCTV (2014) will be introduced. This is followed by an extensive analysis. A comparison between the content of this program and the expert recommendations will answer the main research question. Finally, the conclusions will be given based on the findings of the analysis.
10 2. METHODOLOGY
Howell (2013) argues that methodology always is a follow-up of a good research question. This research will examine the measures taken on a national level by the Netherlands to combat jihadism and the threat of (returning) foreign fighters. This chapter will first introduce the risk posed for Dutch government. Second, explain the choice of methodology in order to show the structure of this thesis.
Jihadism in the Netherlands is not new at all (Bakker, 2015). However, there has not been a lot of qualitative research done on this subject. Therefore, this thesis aims to examine the current policy program of the Netherlands and connecting these to the best practices that are available. This connection will provide insight into the way the policy program is structured and reflects upon the general insights surrounding the combat of jihadism and foreign fighters.
The choice of methodology is a qualitative method in the form of a single case study. This means that the research will focus on contemporary research in the single case of the Netherlands. Furthermore, this case study establishes a link between measures and effects combined with an in-depth focus on the discussion of combating jihadism and foreign fighters. Robert Yin (2009:14) defines a single case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Thus, this case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in the real life context. According to Yin (2009: 6) case studies can be exploratory, descriptive, and/or explanatory in nature.
This thesis is descriptive as well as an evaluation of recommendations to combat jihadism and foreign fighters. This thesis is qualitative; however the use of quantitative data will be used to strengthen the theoretical framework and the argument. A single case study of the policy measures by the Netherlands will be examined according to the expert recommendations. The single case study will provide the researcher with a more specific and in-depth analysis (Hart, de Goede & Teunissen, 1998). Furthermore, this research will use triangulation, by using qualitative data and supporting this with quantitative data (Bryman, 2012:633) to increase the validity. Triangulation is ‘’using several kinds of methods or data to study a topic; the most common type is data triangulation, where a study uses a variety of
11 data sources’’ (Punch, 2006:145). The qualitative research will apply: literature analysis, desk-top research, document analysis and (semi-structured) interviews. Thus, this thesis uses mixed-methods to gain insight into the subject (Bryman, 2012). The literature analysis and the document analysis offer an in-depth analysis of the policy measures by the Netherlands to combat jihadism and foreign fighters.
The initial idea was to use the data from interviews with representatives from key actors in the field like; the NCTV, a municipality and the Dutch Police. However, during the research the focus shifted more towards an evaluation of the most recent recommendations and to analyze whether or not the recommendations relate to the action program of the NCTV (2014). Moreover, the availability of civil servants of the NCTV was challenging. This could be easily explained in line of the current terrorist events in Paris; hence chapter 3 will show the current terrorist threat in Europe. However, two interviews were held with representatives of a municipality and a local police. The interviews were ultimately used to gain insight into the implementation of the measures involving multiple key actors from a more practical point of view. The interviews helped me as a researcher to see the security situation from the executing organizations.
2.1 SOURCES
First of all, the phenomenon of terrorism and foreign fighters will be extracted from present literature. Due to the fact that the problem in intra-national, the phenomenon has to be explained from an international perspective before showing the national situation of the Netherlands. There are a variety of sources available to paint a proper picture about the problem situation regarding jihadism and foreign fighters. This thesis chose to first, show the phenomenon of jihadism and foreign fighters from an international to a national perspective. Thereafter, show expert recommendations developed to deal with this phenomenon. Consequently, the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism (NCTV, 2014) will be presented. Thereafter, the action program will be analyzed to see to what extent the program is in line with the expert recommendations. Globally, there are measures taken to combat jihadism and foreign fighters.
The United Nations created a program to combat jihadism together with the member states called: “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (2006:1). This is an instrument to improve international, national and regional efforts to counter terrorism and
12 foreign fighters. The European Union also formulated a strategy towards jihadism and violent extremism called: “Preventing Radicalization to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response” (2014:1). This strategy focuses preventative measures for the member states to enhance their response. The Netherlands is one of the member states and had the possibility to use these strategies and incorporate some aspects into their national action program. The NCTV published the Dutch program in 2014 called: “The Netherlands comprehensive action program to combat jihadism” (NCTV, 2014). Since the policy program is approximately a year after publication, the implementation process started. Some of the measures are implemented and some measures are not yet implemented. This thesis focuses on the action program itself and compares it to the most recent expert recommendations available. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism has to inform parliament three to four times a year in the Terrorism Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN). The latest Terrorism Threat Assessment (DTN 40, 2015) will be set forth to show the most recent developments in the Netherlands.
The prime focus of this thesis is to evaluate the latest policy oriented expert recommendations and to see whether these recommendations overlap the Netherlands comprehensive action program to combat jihadism (2014). Expert recommendations to counter violent extremism, radicalization, terrorism and of course jihadism will be taken into account. To combine multiple recommendations to the governmental response, a more broadly in-depth study will be shown using a variety of sources. The most recently formulated research based policy recommendations by the following renowned institutions will be used in the analysis: the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Global Centre of Cooperative Security (GCCS), Exit Germany, the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) and the International Center for Study of Radicalization (ICSR). These institutions are seen as leading in contemporary policy research concerning violent extremism, jihadism, terrorism and foreign fighters. The next paragraph focuses on the scaling methodology and the interviews.
2.2 SCALING & INTERVIEWS
This thesis evaluates policy based expert recommendations to the action program to combat jihadism (2014). Due to the fact that that the analysis of this thesis is extensive and varied, a simple yes or no answer is impossible. Therefore, a scaling methodology will be used to evaluate to what extent there is an overlap between the recommendations and the action
13 program. Scaling is used often in quantitative research with surveys. One of the most regularly used scales is the Likert scale. Likert scales are the four, five, six, seven, eight or nine point scales much used in various fields of research (Sclove, 2001). This thesis incorporates a scale that is similar to a likert scale. However, in this particular thesis this scale is not used for surveys but to compare best practices with the action program of the Netherlands to combat jihadism. To give an impression about the use of this type on scaling, an example is given below.
1. Not corresponding: refers to the situation in which the best practice is not represented within the national policy strategy of the Netherlands.
2. Somewhat corresponding: refers to the situation in which certain elements of the best practice are represented within the national policy of the Netherlands to a small degree.
3. Mostly corresponding: refers to the situation in which almost all elements of best practice are represented within the national policy strategy of the Netherlands.
4. Completely corresponding: refers to the situation in which the best practice is entirely represented within the national policy strategy of the Netherlands.
Thus, if ‘best practice X’ completely corresponds in the action program, the fourth box will be crossed. Furthermore, if ‘best practice Y’ not corresponds with the action program, the first box will be crossed, and so forth.
Figure 1. Example analysis chapter 8 Best Practice Not corresponding Somewhat corresponding Mostly corresponding Completely corresponding Best Practice X X Best Practice Y Y
In the Netherlands, multiple actors work together to counter jihadism and (returning) foreign fighters. In order to get a perception of the practices of these actors, two interviews are held with professionals. Due to the scarce availability of the professionals, only representatives of the following organizations are questioned:
1. The Municipality Zoetermeer 2. Police Department Gouda
14 The interviews are held on a semi-structured basis to gain insight in the implementation of the action program with the actors. The interviews are merely a tool to get some practical information about the implementation of the action program. Moreover, the interviews helped the researcher to get a clear understanding about the situation and the measures taken from a more practical point of view. The change in practice after august of 2014 will be of interest to see whether there has been a change after the action program was released by the NCTV (2014). The transcripts of the interviews are shown in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.
2.3 DEFINITIONS
This thesis makes use of a few difficult terms that are used often. Due to the fact that these terms are easily misinterpreted, the following definitions are provided: jihadism, foreign fighters and terrorism. “Only terms, words, or phrases which have special or unique meanings in the study are defined. Terms should be defined operationally, that is how they are used in the study” (Globio, 2010:1).
2.3.1 JIHADISM
Jihadism is the first challenging term that is defined. Fair et al. (2012:688) define jihadism as “a particular textual interpretation common to islamist groups espousing violent political action”. The importance in the use of the term jihadism is the violent political action behind it. The term is connected to violence and radicalism. “In fact, this current understanding of the word has resulted in the emergence of a new term: ‘Jihadis’ violent Muslim extremists. Although one who undertakes jihad is, more appropriately, called a mujāhid, noting the Arabic participial form, the term ‘jihadi’ has become the common anglicized term for an Islamic militant” (Grafton, 2011:235). It is of importance that the term jihadism is defined properly. Because this thesis focuses on policy implications and measures a governmental definition will be leading throughout this thesis. Therefore, this thesis will interpret the term jihadism as defined by the NCTV (2015:33); “an ideological movement of political Islam which is based on a specific interpretation of Salafist teachings and on the works of Sayyid Qutb and seeks a global dominance of Islam and the establishment of an Islamic state (caliphate) through armed struggle (jihad)”.
2.3.2 FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Foreign fighters are the second difficult term that is used often throughout this thesis. “One of the main problems with existing research on foreign fighters is the lack of conceptual
15 clarity: what exactly is a foreign fighter? When do we call someone a foreign fighter and when do we call him a terrorist?” (De Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014:61). The concept is connected to the increasing flow of western migrants to join terrorist organizations. Since the outbreak of the Arab spring, over 25.000 individuals travelled to another country to fight and join the conflict (GCCS, 2015). The notion of this term is the individual, leaving their home country to fight in another country. Bakker et al. (2013:2) also adds the first concept of jihadism to the foreign fighters who are participating in the struggle in Syria and Iraq, “these ‘jihadi foreign fighters’, also called mujahidin, as those who regard it their duty to participate in what they believe to be a jihad of the sword, a holy war against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its Shiite allies, and who join local or foreign groups with a jihadist political agenda”. This thesis reflects upon the concept of De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker (2014) of foreign fighters and also the term mujahidin and jihadi foreign fighters. However, due to the fact that this thesis focuses on government policy, the following definition by the NCTV (2015:32) will be leading: “a person who travels or had travelled to join a terrorist organization in a jihadist conflict zone”.
2.3.3 TERRORISM
Terrorism is a broad term in the literature and “terrorism quite simply is not a topic that is easily researched” (Silke, 2001:2). “Social structure and order, governance of society and politics are dependent on good communication, and good communication requires agreement on definitions of terminology. Terrorism can dramatically influence the world, as shown by the far-reaching and prolonged effects of the attacks in New York on 11th September 2001” (Bruce, 2013:26). The concept of terrorism is a widely discussed topic. “Terrorism is international. The command and control of terrorist groups, the recruitment, training, active operations and the target audience can all be located in different countries and so counter-terrorist measures will not be effective unless all nations cooperate in agreeing to the characteristics of terrorist groups and their activities” (Bruce, 2013:26). This shows that the counter terrorism measures that can be taken by a government should exceed national borders. International cooperation is necessary and in the case of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq this is challenging. However, there is no international consensus on the definition of terrorism. In 2010, the Head of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate stated: “the fact that there was not a universal definition of terrorism presented a challenge” (Smith, 2010). There is a variety of definitions available from: academics and researchers, the legal profession, United Nations, the health profession, law enforcement agencies,
16 governments that wish to protect their citizens, governments that wish to repress their citizens, terrorist groups and the media (Bruce, 2013:29). Due to the fact that this thesis provides an academic debate on the concept of terrorism and (returning) foreign fighters, terrorism is defined academically. There are several definitions available in the academic community. One of the most descriptive academic definitions is that of Tore Bjorgo (2005) whomstates that: “terrorism is a set of methods of combat rather than an identifiable ideology or movement, and involves premeditated use of violence against (primarily) non-combatants in order to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others than the immediate targets”. However, due to the fact that this thesis focuses on a policy program, terrorism is defined by the definition of the NCTV (2014:34); “from ideological motives threatening, preparing or using serious violence against people, or actions intended to cause severely disruptive social damage, with the purpose of effecting changes, inciting fear among the population or influencing political decision-making”.
The above mentioned terms are paramount to the structure and the understanding of this thesis. Obviously, there are many other terms used in this research that are not elucidated in this chapter. However, terms that are of importance will be explained in the context of the chapter. When dealing with these terms, there will be no distinction made between male or female subjects. These terms incorporate both sexes.
2.4 LIMITATIONS
2.4.1 DATA GATHERING & ANALYSIS
First of all, the study of terrorism and foreign fighters is a problematic one. “A limited range of methodologies in data gathering, combined with a reluctance to use more rigorous analysis, has left the field with serious deficiencies in many respects. Ultimately, the methods used by terrorism researchers are essentially exploratory. As a result the field struggles in its efforts to explain terrorism or to provide findings of genuine predictive value” (Silke, 2001:13). This shows that studying terrorism is challenging to say the least. Due to the fact that primary source material is hard to get, secondary source material is used frequently. Due to the fact that the concept of jihadism and the measures taken to counter this phenomenon are constantly changing, the literature on how to deal with the phenomenon generally lags behind what is happening on the ground. This study has looked at the most
17 recent recommendations of the ICCT, the GCTF, the GCCS, Exit Germany, ISD, the RAN and the ICSR. However, given the above mentioned fact that the phenomenon and policies are constantly changing there is the possibility that new expert recommendations are available in the literature that was not incorporated in this thesis.
Furthermore, this thesis focuses upon the current Dutch policy program. The thesis has a descriptive character. The analysis does not evaluate this program, but only compares it with these latest recommendations. This helps us to say something about the quality of the action program and the possibility of success. However, this does not mean that the conclusions from this thesis guarantee success. The conclusions will primarily say something about the completeness of the program and about to what extent the policy program is in line with the expert recommendations.
However, this is a qualitative research and there is some critique in the academic community. For instance, Bryman (2012) argues that qualitative research is often too subjective. Furthermore, the research is difficult to replicate because the research is unstructured and relies on the researcher ingenuity. Therefore, it is hard to generalize and there is a lack of transparency. Moreover, because this thesis is a single case study, there are limitations connected to this research design. Thus, the reliability and replicability of this single case study analysis is limited. Verschuren (2003) argues that in a single case study there is always the question the objectivity of the researcher. Facts from open source expert recommendations are compared to the action program. However, pure objectivity is impossible in a case study design and therefore this limitation is present in this case.
2.4.2 EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS & BEST PRACTICES
This research focuses on recommendations and best practices. ‘’Like all other domains of research, “best practice” research has its limitations’’ (Veselý, 2011:105) like the lack of theory and little transferability. Nonetheless, the expert recommendations and best practices are convenient in comparing policy measures and to say something about the possible chances of success.
18 2.4.3 INTERVIEWS
The initial idea of this thesis was to incorporate data derived from interviews of three representatives of the main actors namely: of the NCTV, a municipality and a local police to say something about the implementation process of the action program. However, during the research phase of this thesis, it became clear that the focus would be more on an evaluation of expert recommendations and to compare these to the Dutch action program (2014). Moreover, arranging interviews with civil servants of the NCTV was difficult to say the least. This could be explained by the time period of the research phase. There have been numerous threats and incidents in this time period. One of the biggest attacks in Europe was executed in Paris in November 2015 (Malnick et al., 2015). After the attacks, the threat moved to Belgium where Brussels had scaled to the upper highest threat level. Schools, universities and public transportation were closed and there was extensive police and military presence on the streets of Brussels. The security services were working around the clock to check for possible threats (van der Veen, 2015). Taken these developments into account, one could paint a picture why the NCTV had little extra time on their hands. The terrorist events in Europe will be explained more thoroughly in Chapter 3.
However, interviews with key representatives from the municipality of Zoetermeer and the Police Gouda were held. The interviews were helped to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon and the response from a more practical point of view. However, during the thesis the purpose of the interviews shifted from an analysis based intent to a more informative nature. To get a better picture about the phenomenon from a practical point of view, the full transcripts are available in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.
The main conclusion from these interviews is that the response is difficult for every actor involved. The following quote of the police officer in Gouda shows this complexity from a criminal law perspective:
“Look, when there is a homicide and there is a dead body then we have a case. As police we can try to track down the murderer, we have something tangible, a corpse. With radicalization we have nothing. We have someone who has a particular ideology. But, to what extent is this criminal?”1
1 Original translation: “Kijk, als je een moord hebt dan heb je een lijk en dan heb je een zaak. Dan gaan wij als politie kijken wie de moordenaar is, kijk je hebt dan iets tastbaars, je hebt een lijk. Bij radicalisering heb je helemaal niks. Je hebt iemand die zegt dat die achter een bepaalde ideologie staat. Maar in hoeverre ben jij dan misdadiger?”. See appendix 1.
19 The representative from the municipality of Zoetermeer also portrayed some difficulties in the management of radicalization to violent extremism. Not one organization can counter this phenomenon on its own. A multi-disciplinary approach is necessary to optimize the response:
“We cannot not do it, the police cannot do it, the prosecution cannot do it, schools cannot do it, the local community cannot do it. Together, we can do it and the municipality has to take a leading role.”2
2
Original translation: “Wij kunnen het niet, de politie kan het niet, het OM kan het niet, scholen kunnen het niet, de lokale gemeenschap kan het niet maar samen kunnen we het wel en daar heb je als gemeente wel een regierol in”. See Appendix 2.
20 3. THE PHENOMENON
The core object of study is the action program to combat jihadism. To understand why the Dutch action program to combat jihadism (2014) is formulated in the first place, one needs to know more about the phenomenon. In this chapter, the phenomenon of jihadism and foreign fighters will be explained. To that end, this research focuses on the phenomenon in general. Next, it will look into the phenomenon within Europe and provide an overview of recent jihadi terrorist attacks in Europe. Finally, it will discuss the case of the Netherlands. The actual measures by the Dutch government will be provided in chapter 5.
3.1 INTERNATIONAL JIHADISM AND FOREIGN FIG HTERS
“In June 2014 ISIS announced that it has established a Caliphate, under the name Islamic State” (AIVD, 2014:9). The terrorist movement desires to expand throughout the Middle-East and is attracting individuals all over the world. “Global jihadism can be defined as a worldwide violent ideological cult-like movement. Although global jihadism is often linked to political Islam (Islamism), and indeed to some extent relies on the same sources, it in fact represents a radical break with Islamism as a political movement” (NCTV, 2014:8). Since 2011 the concept of jihadism is often connected to the situation in Syria and Iraq and the amounts or foreign fighters who leave the home country to join the jihad. “Although foreign fighting is hardly new, scholarly research on the phenomenon is only a decade old. Since 2005, there has also been a dramatic rise in the number of transnational insurgents fighting in the Middle East, and they appear to have become the face of the jihad movement” (Malet, 2015:1). From the start of the Arab Spring in 2008, over 25.000 foreign recruits from 104 countries traveled to the conflict in Syria and Iraq alone (Schmid, 2015:1). The regime of Bashar al-Assad has less than 50% of foreign fighters on its side. There are at least 5.000 foreign fighters from Europe and other western countries and there are no signs of the flow of foreign fighters diminishing (Schmid, 2015:15). This is a contemporary study that shows some hard statistics in the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. “In the case of Syria, the phenomenon of foreign fighters emerged after non-violent protests in March 2011 turned into a full-blown civil war. The conflict already drew fighters from other parts of the world at an early stage” (Bakker, Entenmann & Paulussen, 2013:2). Within two years after the start of the civil war in 2011, Syria became the number one battlefield for jihadist foreign fighters, including fighters from Europe and the Netherlands.
21 There are several estimates available about amounts of western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Figure 2 on page 20 shows the total numbers of foreign fighters from 15 western countries and the numbers of foreign fighters per million citizens. These figures are s publicized by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (2015).
Figure 2. International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, United Nations (2015)
Even more worrisome than those that leave is the (potential) threat posed by those that return (de Roy van Zuidewijn, 2015). “The unprecedented size and scope of the foreign fighters phenomenon seen today has taken many observers by surprise. Analysts, policymakers, and practitioners are now frantically seeking to gain knowledge about the backgrounds, motivations, and actions of foreign fighters and the (security) risks they present” (GCCS, 2014). Thus, there is a significant risk regarding foreign fighters. De Roy van Zuijdewijn (2014:65) argues that foreign fighters can be divided into several categories “based on post-conflict behavior, they can be divided into five categories: the martyr, the veteran, the recruiter, the reintegrated fighter and the terrorist”. The phenomenon of foreign fighters plays a role inside the Netherlands as well as outside of the Netherlands. Therefore, this makes the phenomenon an internal- as well as an external threat to countries (AIVD, 2014:15).
Due to these international developments, policy measures are being developed on an international scale. The United Nations (2006) publicized a program to counter-terrorism called: The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This strategy was reviewed in 2012 in order to improve the global approach against terrorism. The most significant addition is the call for international cooperation to counter international terrorism (2012:4). This
22 shows that the phenomenon of jihadism and foreign fighters is acknowledged on a global scale and policy counter–measures are being produced on an international basis. The United States of America introduced their first counter-radicalization strategy in 2011 in line of the conflict in the Middle-East and the potential foreign fighters leaving for Syria or Iraq (Hellmuth, 2015). Thus, internationally there has been an extensive effort made to create strategies to counter jihadism and foreign fighters. Next to these policy oriented measures, the international community is responding with a multinational coalition to intervene. The coalition, including the Netherlands, is carrying out air strikes to counter IS. These air strikes have led to some responses of Dutch IS fighters which have used social media to reach out to their sympathizers to carry out an attack to the Netherlands (AIVD, 2014:9). The AIVD acknowledges the fact that these developments are a significant risk.
3.2 HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN EUROPE
The foreign fighter phenomenon is not new at all, also not in Europe. If we dive into the recent history, there have been numerous occasions of people going to fight in another country. Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2015:2) give some historical examples. The Spanish Civil War is one of the well-known examples of foreign fighters from an historical perspective. There have been thousands of non-Spanish citizens who came to Spain to fight alongside the republican government as well as the opposition. Moreover, more recently there have been indications of foreign fighters in conflicts in Afghanistan, Yemen, Mali, Chechnya, Somalia, Libya and Iraq. However, the amount of foreign fighters did increase after the Arab uprising and the current conflict in Syria and Iraq. Foreign fighters are nowadays seen as a threat by governments in western countries. However, what incidents have we seen in the last years that involve foreign fighters?
3.2.1 RECENT INCIDENTS IN EUROPE
Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2015:2) provide examples of a number of recent incidents. In 2011 a French citizen shot three paratroopers and killed a rabbi and three children. After an intensive search, the perpetrator was shot and killed by the local police. This individual had been a foreign fighter in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2011. The individual had claimed that he had been to Afghanistan and Pakistan for holiday purposes (Samuel, 2011).
Before the next incident in 2013 that involved foreign fighters, several arrests were made throughout Europe. In 2013 two individuals killed a man in the United Kingdom (UK) by
23 ramming him with a vehicle as a revenge for the military influence by the UK. One of the perpetrators wanted to join al Shabaab in Somalia and the other tried to bring the jihad to the UK (Rayner & Swinford, 2013).
Shortly after this incident, in 2014 a terrorist attack by a foreign fighter from Syria was committed in Brussels. This individual was a French citizen who had joined IS and killed four people in a Jewish museum (Chazan, 2014).
A couple of months after this horrendous attack, the next attack were carried out going into the history books as the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks. The individuals committed the attack on a satirical magazine called: Charlie Hebdo. The killers shouted: “We have avenged the Prophet!”. The perpetrators killed twelve people and claimed to be connected to al Qaeda in Yemen (Rayner et al., 2015).
A couple of days after, four people were killed in a Jewish supermarket in Paris. This attacker claimed to be part of IS, although he never went to the battlefield in Syria (Alexander, 2015). Yet a few days after these attacks, a passenger of the Thalys tried to shoot random passengers. He was overpowered by two American passengers when he tried to unload his assault rifle, no one died. The perpetrator was a Moroccan man who had been to the battlefield in Syria and Iraq in 2015 (BBC, 2015).
A few months after this incident, the biggest terrorist attack in Europe occurred since the 2004 Madrid bombings. In the heart of Paris, several terrorists launched an organized attack on a variety of locations including: the football stadium Stade de France, a theater called “the Bataclan” and on several restaurants. During the attacks over 130 people were killed and over 350 people were injured (Malnick et al., 2015). The perpetrators were of both French and Belgium origin. One of the perpetrators was found, with a fake Syrian passport. It is believed that the mastermind of the attacks was in Syria in 2013 and 2014. Moreover, most of the perpetrators are believed to have been in Syria and have returned to Europe before planning out the attacks (Washington Post, 2015). After the terrorist attacks, that were claimed by IS, political leaders of all over the world were responding to the incidents. The Prime Minister of the Netherlands stated: “We are at war with IS, not with the Islam3”.
3 Original translation: “We zijn in oorlog met IS, niet met de Islam” (Rutte, 2015). Retrieved from: http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/rutte-we-zijn-in-oorlog-met-is-niet-met-de-islam-a4186454/
24 3.2.2 THE EUROPEAN THREAT
The overall picture of terrorism in Europe is one of relatively few incidents, especially compared to the situation in Syria or elsewhere in the Middle-East or Africa. There have been seven attacks with a total of 163 people were killed since 2011 in Europe. Three of these incidents are related to the concept of foreign fighters. These figures might be relatively low, the impact these incidents have on society is enormous, and therefore Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2015:17) state that the phenomenon of foreign fighters should be called a “low probability, high impact threat”. The fear of religious terrorism had increased enormously the last years (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015:16). With this in mind, it is clear that the risk of foreign fighters is not only a primary security risk but also a threat that could shift the social cohesion and create a culture of fear (Glassner, 2009). However, there are two groups who could have specific motivations to worry about terrorism in Europe. The Jewish community has been a victim multiple times and the Muslim community is an indirect victim of terrorism. There are approximately twenty million Muslims in the 28 member states of the EU, only a small portion of these Muslims have an extremist ideology (Schmid, 2015:28). However, it could be that the Muslim community will blamed by other societal groups, for terrorist attacks by Islamic extremist organizations (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015:17).
Another issue for the security situation in Europe has to do with migrants and refugees. “Geopolitical developments around Europe directly impact the national security of European countries, the Netherlands included” (AIVD, 2014:12). The Armed struggle in the Middle-East is resulting in thousands of citizens fleeing the Middle-Middle-Eastern countries towards Europe. By ships and other types of transportation, a large flow of refugees is entering Europe and asking for asylum. Over a million migrants and refugees entered Europe in 2015 by land or by sea (BBC, 2015). This development has an effect to Europe and, the AIVD (2014) recognizes the fact that these refugees could pose a threat to the national security of the Netherlands as well.
Next to the refugee crisis, Europe is trying to cope with terrorism and foreign fighters by creating policy measures. The European Union updated several strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism since 2012. The Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan (RAN) was updated and shared with the member states. Furthermore, in 2013 Europe was faced with a big challenge. There were increasing amounts of European citizens that were travelling to
25 Syria to fight against the Assad regime. Numerous European citizens ended up fighting alongside terrorist groups like: Jabhat al-Nusra or IS. European countries started to put this phenomenon high on the political agenda. This resulted in a combined strategy by the EU member states in 2014 called: Preventing Radicalization to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response (EU Commission, 2014). This strategy provides member states with approaches to challenge radicalization, terrorism and violent extremism. Moreover, the strategy promotes the sharing of information and best practices in order to enhance the combined response. These publications help the external threat of jihadism and foreign fighters. The internal threat to the Netherlands has is addressed by the Dutch governmental institutions.
3.3 CASE OF THE NETHERLA NDS
To understand why the action program to combat jihadism (NCTV, 2014) is formulated in the first place, we need to look at the shape and size of jihadism in the Netherlands.
3.3.1 THE DUTCH PHENOMENON
After 2012 it became clear that the political- and security situation in Syria and Iraq was worsening. The Dutch government started to see jihadist groups gaining ground and becoming attractive for some Dutch citizens to join. The two main groups were Jabhat al-Nusra and after 2014 IS. “In the Netherlands we have recently seen ISIS sympathizers openly professing their allegiance to the movement, and social tensions have arisen as a result” (NCTV, 2014:5). These foreign fighters who join the jihad in Syria and Iraq are of absolute concern of the Dutch government. First of all, these individuals are Dutch citizens who go abroad to join a conflict and possibly join terrorist organizations. The Dutch government has a responsibility of their own citizens. Moreover, the citizens can come back to the home country, battle-hardened and ready to plot an attack (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014). This risk is also contested because “many of those who go to Syria and Iraq will not return because they will die there, either killed by the Assad regime, by inter-jihadi fighting (which has already cost more than 4,000 lives in just three months) or by IS when it becomes known that they are disillusioned and want to escape” (Schmid, 2015:28).
The NCTV communicates the level of terrorist threat to the public by publicizing a terrorist threat level. “The nature and seriousness of the terrorist threat are determined by many factors. In the Netherlands, we have 4 levels of ascending threat: minimal, limited, substantial and critical” (NCTV, 2015). In March 2013 the terrorist threat level in the Netherlands was
26 raised from limited to substantial, largely in response to the significant increase in Dutch jihadists leaving the country and heading for conflict zones in Syria (NCTV, 2014). The NCTV developed an action program in 2014 to combat jihadism and foreign fighters which will be presented upon in the chapter 5.
The AIVD and the Secret Service of the Netherlands was not entirely surprised by these developments, as jihadism is not new to the Netherlands. “Surreptitious and largely hidden, the first of these was a process of change within the country’s local jihadist networks. Having long been unsuccessful in establishing relationships among others with their counterparts in Pakistan and Somalia, they at last engaged with both facilitation networks and active fighting groups in conflict zones” (AIVD, 2014). Furthermore, the AIVD acknowledges the link with the conflict in Syria and Iraq and also links the expansion of the phenomenon to social media and propaganda (AIVD, 2014:16). “Jihadism in the Netherlands has attracted considerable media and political attention in the past few years. In June 2014 the AIVD published a report entitled The Transformation of Jihadism in the Netherlands: Swarm dynamics and new strength. This describes the emergence of a new generation of radical Muslims and jihadists, the role played by social media in this phenomenon and how a significant number of them have joined the conflict in Syria” (AIVD, 2014:15). The academic community has little knowledge about the actual motivations of Dutch citizens that travel to Syria of Iraq to join the conflict (Bakker & Grol, 2015:2).
Social-media is important to IS. The organization has got an advanced propaganda machine which operated mostly online. The visual footage is of high quality and consists of ideological statements. IS creates up to 90.000 tweets and social media posts online that appears to attract Muslims all over the globe (Schmid, 2015). In fact, numerous Dutch citizens left for Syria and Iraq and are being trained often as line fighters. These front-line fighters often learn to make explosives and to shoot with automatic weapons. These skills could be used to plan out an attack to the Netherlands when they return home (AIVD, 2014). At the end of 2014, 35 foreign fighters returned to the Netherlands. These individuals might be a threat to the national security of the Netherlands. However, not all returned foreign fighters pose a threat. The glorious battles and dazzling beauty of the Caliphate, which is portrayed by IS propaganda, is often not experienced by travellers. Some of them come back to the Netherlands disappointed and not all pose a threat. This is, however, extremely difficult to assess. For more on this subject, see the publication: “Leven bij ISIS,
27 de mythe ontrafeld” by the AIVD (2016). In order to show the most recent terrorist threat in the Netherlands, the latest terrorist threat assessment will be shown in the next paragraph.
3.3.2TERRORSIST THREAT ASSESSMENT 40 (DTN 40)
Next to the action program, the government of the Netherlands produces a range of strategic instruments to combat terrorism. One of these instruments is the provision of the Terrorist Threat Assessment of the Netherlands (DTN) which is published four times a year. The first DTN was issued in January 2005 where the National Counterterrorism Coordinator (NCTb) informed the President of the House of Representatives. Now, more than ten years later, the DTN 40 is published. In this DTN the threat level of the Netherlands remains substantial. Thus, the chance of an attack is real, however there are no immediate indications that an attack is near (DTN 40, 2015:1).
The level of threat is explained by the attempt of an attack on the Thalys on the 21st of August 2015. This attack was foiled by two passengers taking action against the individual who wanted to attack the train. Furthermore, the remarkable of this threat assessment is the inclusion of the refugee issue in the Netherlands. Media has been stating that potential IS members are among the asylum seekers. “With this in mind the EU and the Netherlands are alert to signs that ISIS or other terrorist organizations are abusing the asylum system” (DTN40, 2015:1). Moreover, there are a couple of policy measures taken to counter jihadism in regard to the asylum seekers. For instance, the staff of the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) will receive special training on security issues. Furthermore, the National Government Training Institute for the Prevention of Radicalization (ROR) will provide courses for professionals in the broader security, counterterrorism and immigration sectors.
As a consequence to the flow of asylum seekers, certain parts of society are using extremism. “This tendency can be seen in a number of recent incidents: the storming of an asylum seekers center in the town of Woerden on 9 October, the daubing of graffiti on reception sites and the issuing of threats to mayors and members of municipal councils. The demonstration by anti-Islam group Pegida in Utrecht on 11 October revealed the possibility of new violent confrontations between left-wing and right-wing extremists or between leftwing extremists and right-wing populists” (DTN 40, 2015:2). This shows that there is a friction in the Netherlands. This also means that there is not only a threat from the jihadist radicalization but also from other extremists. The NCTV helps communities with advice and practical
28 assistance that is provided in part by the Expertise Unit on Social Stability (ESS). The next chapter will provide key research based policy recommendations by renowned institutions.
29 4. EXPERT RECOMMENDATIO NS
“Missiles may kill terrorists. But good governance kills terrorism.” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2015)
In this chapter, we will explore the expert recommendations to counter jihadism and foreign fighters. First a small explanation about the choice of sources used for expert recommendations will be given. Thereafter, the expert recommendations will be presented per institute; summarizing the main recommendations used to analyze to what extent the Dutch policy program is in line with these recommendations. The analysis is presented in chapter 6.
4.1 EXPLAINING THE CHOICE
The academic- and the international community developed several recommendations in combating foreign fighters and jihadism. This research focuses on the most recent recommendations by expert institutes in the debate of countering jihadism and foreign fighters. Ideally, publications from 2015 or otherwise after the spring of 2014. During the initial research phase, several institutions were found that provide advice about countering jihadism, foreign fighters and violent extremism. Therefore, a choice had to be made to reduce the number of institutions.
The amount of organizations is reduced by means of choosing organizations from different geographical locations. The institutions chosen are located in the Netherlands as well as in other countries. Furthermore, institutions that have different partners and stakeholders are chosen. The institutions focus on local, national and intra-national research based policy advice. Moreover, institutes with slightly different focus on radicalization and foreign fighters are selected. This to make sure that the recommendations provide a broad scope to counter the phenomenon in order to provide an extensive analysis in chapter 6. Moreover, this thesis wants to focus on contemporary policy advice. Therefore, the expert recommendations selected, are derived from the most recent publications. Thus, the most renowned institutes that give recent and the most useful research based policy advice are selected. Therefore, this thesis focuses on expert recommendations formulated by the following organizations: the ICCT, the GCTF, the GCCS, EXIT-Germany, the ISD, the RAN and the ICSR. Consequently, the Dutch action program will be analyzed together with these
30 expert recommendations in chapter 6, in order to find out to what extent this program is in line with the expert views on how to deal with foreign jihadism and foreign fighters.
4.2 THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM (ICCT)
The ICCT is an organization and “independent think and do tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter-terrorism” (ICCT, 2015). The ICCT focuses on a variety of topics namely: countering violent extremism, foreign fighters, lone actors and terrorist groups, military and intelligence, monitoring and evaluation, policies and instruments, rehabilitation and reintegration and terrorism trials and cases (ICCT, 2015). Moreover, members of the ICCT create different types of publications; research papers, policy briefs, reports and perspectives. These publications are posted online and the ICCT also uses social media to let the public know about their publications.
There are several scholars and professionals that publish research based policy recommendations publicly via the ICCT website. The Director of the ICCT, Mark Singleton (2015:4) states that there are several factors that contribute to radicalization, foreign fighting and terrorism. These consist of push- and pull factors that contribute to this process:
Push Factors
1. Desire for revenge based on humiliation or experience of perceived injustice.
2. Alienation and identity crisis of uprooted migrants families in refugee camps and diasporas.
3. Marginalization or political exclusion.
4. Difficult life situations (e.g. unemployment, discrimination, inequality).
5. Unresolved conflicts, disillusionment with unbearable situation and perceived absence of other available instruments to bring about change.
6. Mental health problems.
Pull Factors
1. Ideologies that provide justifications for attacks against out-group members (e.g. nonbelievers).
2. Presence of a charismatic leader who translates grievances into incentives to engage in violent actions/jihad.
31 3. Imitation of apparently successful and highly publicized terrorist tactics.
4. Opportunity to upgrade one’s identity from “zero (in own country) to hero” (in the land of jihad).
When we take these factors into account, one could question where the solution lies. “The short answer is: through education and community work. There is a growing consensus that solutions have to be found at the level of communities. It is vital to involve parents, families, friends, schools, youth clubs, religious leaders etc. in dealing with the problem of radicalization. One must steer the dissatisfaction of young people into constructive channels. This requires a massive investment in engagement at the local level” (Singleton, 2015:5). Thus, the involvement of the local communities and education is an absolute necessity. Moreover, Bakker & Grol (2015:15) suggest several policies that governments should promote a counter-story or counter narrative that counterbalances propagandist messages. Potential foreign fighters should be supported by coaches and advisers to diminish recruitment for foreign fighters. Furthermore, the social debate in Muslim communities should be reinforced to increase knowledge and awareness. If an individual does in fact leave for Syria or Iraq, it is of importance that the family and friends in the home country are supported. One of the other contemporary best practices is the reintegrating of violent extremists. Very few programs have been evaluated. Moreover, what works in one country does not have to work in another country. Therefore, different approaches should be used in different countries. However, it is crucial to share information to make sure that all angles are being used in the development process. As mentioned before, sharing information is a vital instrument to help improve countering jihadism and the threat of foreign fighters for many different actors. For instance, when a foreign fighter or violent extremist is detained there are several practices on where these prisoners should be located inside of the prison. Many questions arise to “whether violent extremist offenders should be detained in separate prison units or integrated into the mainstream inmate population” (Singleton, 2015:5). European countries have taken different approaches and sadly there is no best practice that is universally accepted. At present, the Netherlands is the only country that consistently segregates extremist prisoners in separate high-security facilities (Veldhuis, 2015:10). Countries should share lessons learned from these initiatives. Furthermore, reintegration efforts of violent extremists need to be properly documented. When this is not done properly, a discrepancy between decision makers and frontline workers can occur. Therefore, proper
32 documentation of the entire process surrounding reintegration efforts is of vital importance (Singleton, 2015).
Thus, when we take the above mentioned research based policy advice into account, the following recommendations can be summarized: education and community work, share
information with other countries, counter-narrative jihadist propaganda, and coaches for potential foreign fighters, create social debate in Muslim communities and documentation of the reintegration process.
4.3 THE GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM (GCTF)
The GCTF is an organization that helps partners to counter-terrorism and recruitment of terrorism. The organization helps experts and officials to share experiences, programs, capacity needs, strategies and expertize and to meet with their counterparts from partnering countries (GCTF, 2015). The GCTF works on a variety of different subject namely: addressing the "foreign terrorist fighters" problem, promoting criminal justice responses to terrorism grounded in human rights and the rule of law, supporting victims of terrorism, taking action against kidnapping for ransom and other sources of terrorism funding, rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremist offenders, supporting efforts to address instability in the Sahel and other key regions, inspiring and supporting new international centers and initiatives to address critical challenges, developing a worldwide network of civilian CT practitioners, catalyzing implementation of the United Nations framework for countering terrorism (GCTF, 2015). The GCTF works together with several partners on an intra-national level. The UN is a close partner and the focus is to reinforce multilateral counter-terrorism efforts (GCTF, 2015).
The GCTF (2014) developed an expert recommendation consisting of best practices to help governments to create effective measures and policies to cope with the problem of (returning) foreign fighters. According to the GCTF (2014), there is need for tailored and targeted approaches to counter violent extremism and the threat of (returning) foreign fighters. When dealing with foreign fighters, specific needs, culture, concerns, and grievances of the family and community should be taken into account. Furthermore, Europe needs to have a common approach to counter terrorism and foreign fighters (GCTF, 2014:3). A recommendation is the multi-sectoral approach that incorporates education systems, faith-based communities and institutions, community organizations, frontline workers, and youth populations (GCTF, 2014:1). Furthermore, front-line workers should be transparent about their responsibilities
33 when dealing with these communities to create trust. Moreover, governments need to provide these communities with alternatives (counter-narrative) to travel to Syria or Iraq. In addition, efforts have to be done to build community resilience to prevent radicalization from the source due to the fact that the communities are in close connection to the prospected foreign fighters (GCTF, 2014:2).
Next to the promotion of community resilience, the detection of travelling and fighting for foreign fighters is of necessity to gather intelligence. A counter narrative for jihadist propaganda is necessary in combination with removing jihadi content. However, countering violent extremist measures, foreign fighter measures, terrorism measures are all part of the array of possibilities that are available to counter these issues. Each country is unique and therefore a universal uniform approach which is 100% effective is not possible. The sharing of best practices could help countries combining the counter efforts and learning from one another (GCTF, 2014:9).
When we take the above mentioned advice into account, the following research based expert recommendations can be summarized: define a common European approach, reconnecting
returned foreign fighters to family, multi-sectoral approach, transparency front-line workers, detecting foreign fighters, counter-narrative for jihadi propaganda, invest in community resilience and sharing best practices.
4.4 THE GLOBAL CENTRE OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY (GCCS)
The GCCS works alongside governments and the international community to develop and implement comprehensive and sustainable responses to complex international security challenges by researching efforts and information sharing. The global network works together with partner organizations and field expert officials and promotes multilateral collaboration and makes sure to create research based security related policy advice (GCCS, 2015). The main focus is on: countering violent extremism, criminal justice and rule of law multilateral security policy, financial integrity and inclusion. The GCCS and works together with academic institutions all over the world, the World Affairs Council, the UN, Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism and foundations like the International Peace Institute, the Better World Campaign and the Ford Institute. The GCCS has offices located in the US and the UK (GCCS, 2015).
