Terrorists Targeting Journalists

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A Comparative Study of Old and New Terrorism

Name: François Lopez Student ID: s1623796

Email: f.l.lopez@umail.leidenuniv.nl Date: 13 January 2016

Supervisor: Professor Alex. P. Schmid

Master Thesis - Crisis and Security Management Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Leiden University

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2 Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine why some terrorist organisations, which depend on the “oxygen of publicity” provided by the news media, would target journalists. Journalists have long been the targets of attacks by terrorist organisations and the thesis analyses why this has been the case. It focuses on two case studies of old and new terrorist organisations, namely ETA and IS respectively. Sources including statements, press releases, social media posts, and internal documents have been selected to conduct the analysis. The research is centred around three hypotheses: terrorist groups target journalists for collaborating with ‘the enemy’; terrorist groups target journalists in response to ‘negative’ portrayal and reporting in the media; and, new terrorist organisations do not require the ‘oxygen of publicity’ provided by the news media since they can count on the Internet and social media to serve this purpose. The thesis has found that hypotheses one and two can be confirmed as both ETA and IS justified targeting the news media for these reasons. The findings also suggest that hypothesis three can partly be confirmed. IS has been proficient in using the Internet and social media to bypass the gatekeepers of traditional media, but it still requires the ‘oxygen of publicity’ provided by the news media to spread its message. It is still too early to claim that the news media has become redundant for new terrorist organisations.

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3 Table of Contents

Introduction p.4

Part One: Theoretical Framework and Methodology p.7

Literature Review p.11

Part Two: The ‘New War’ on Journalists p.14

Part Three: Case Studies

- Case Study One: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) p.19

- Case Study Two: Islamic State (IS) p.30

Part Four: Old Terrorism vs. New Terrorism p.40

Discussion of Findings p.58

Conclusion p.64

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4 Introduction

Speaking in front of representatives of the American Bar Association at the Albert Hall in the UK in July 1985, then former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that the news media was playing into the hands of terrorists. Attracted by the violence and atrocities of terrorists attacks, Thatcher claimed, the news media was providing “the oxygen of publicity” on which terrorist organisations depend1.

The problematic relationship between journalists and terrorist groups has long been recognised by academics. Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf refer to the “impeccable logic of terrorism” to illustrate the notion that relatively small-scale acts of violence can be witnessed by very large audiences2. Terrorist organisations depend on the multiplier effects of the media to achieve several goals, such as spreading fear or drawing attention to their cause3. It has therefore been crucial for these groups to define their strategies based on their theory of ‘propaganda by the deed’. As Walter Laqueur puts it, “publicity is all” for the terrorist4

. Mass audiences are also vital for the news media; they tend to profit from the drama, grief, tragedy, and panic which terrorism provides. In order to satisfy its never-ending thirst for viewers, profit, and ratings, the news media thrives on the television-like ‘entertainment’ and real-life drama provided by terrorist attacks5. The terrorism-news media relationship is therefore one of mutual benefits, sometimes viewed as a form of ‘symbiosis’6

. Terrorist organisation need the media for publicity; the news media benefits from terrorist organisations’ ability to create fear which can be sold to anxious readers, listeners, and viewers.

Yet, despite the apparent symbiosis formed by terrorism and journalism, terrorist groups have often actively sought to eliminate their source of oxygen. Thirty years after Margaret Thatcher’ seminal statement, the world was shocked to witness the gruesome murders of journalists James Foley,

1

Thatcher, M. (1985) Speech to American Bar Association. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096

2

Schmid, A., De Graaf, J. (1982) Violence as communication: insurgent terrorism and the Western news media. SAGE, p.13

3

Weimann, G. (2005) The Theater of Terror, Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 9:3-4, p.383 4

Schlesinger, P. (1981) Terrorism, the media, and the liberal-democratic state: A Critique of the Orthodoxy. Social Research 48, p.85

5

Nacos, B. (2007) Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The central role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, p.37

6

Abraham Miller in, Tuman, J. (2009) Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism. SAGE Publications, 2nd Edition, p.163

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5 Steven Sotloff, and Kenji Goto in Syria, and the murders of French journalists at Charlie Hebdo in Paris. Considering the important role played by the news media for terrorist organisations, one may thus wonder why terrorists would actively target and kill journalists.

Despite the salience and prevalence of this issue, it appears that there has been a significant lack of research into terrorist organisations targeting the news media. Indeed, most research has focused on the interdependent relationship between terrorism and the news media7, and terrorist attacks on the news media have only been briefly explored by academics8. In the light of the rising trend in the phenomenon of terrorist attacks on journalists, which has been widely acknowledged by journalists themselves, this thesis seeks to fill a gap in academic research. Moreover, as existing research has demonstrated that terrorist organisations rely considerably on news media coverage of their actions and considering that terrorists target and kill members of the press, this thesis will also question the assumption that terrorists do indeed require the news media. The purpose of this thesis is thus to examine the reasons why some terrorist organisations choose to target and kill journalists. The central research question this thesis will seek to answer is: Why would terrorist organisations,

which depend on the “oxygen of publicity” provided by the news media, target journalists?

Two case studies will be used to answer the research question. A distinction has been made in part of literature on terrorism regarding ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism. Firstly, whereas old terrorist

organisations were mainly nationalist and secular9 in their goals, new terrorists are religiously motivated10. Secondly, old terrorism was intrinsically territorial and focused on a ‘homeland’, while new terrorism is de-territorialised and has a global outlook11. Thirdly, the use of violence by old

7

See Barnett, B., Reynolds, A. (2008) Terrorism and the Press: An Uneasy Relationship. Peter Lang Publishing Inc. & Matusitz, J. (2012) Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction. SAGE Publications. & Nacos, B. (2007) Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The central role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers. & Schmid, A., De Graaf, J. (1982) Violence as

communication: insurgent terrorism and the Western news media. SAGE 8

See Paletz, D., Schmid, A. (1992) Terrorism and the Media. SAGE Publications, p.133 & Schmid, A., De Graaf, J. (1982) Violence as communication: insurgent terrorism and the Western news media. SAGE, p.127 & Surette, R., Hansen, K., Noble, G. (2009) Measuring media oriented terrorism. Journal of Criminal Justice, 37, 4, p.367 & Wilkinson, P. (1997) The media and terrorism: A reassessment, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9:2, p.54

9_{Crenshaw, M. (2007) The Debate over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism. American Political Science Association.} Retrieved 1 December 2015, from

http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/New_vs_Old_Terrorism.pdf, p.7 10

Neumann, P. (2009) Old and New Terrorism. Social Europe. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.socialeurope.eu/2009/08/old-and-new-terrorism/

11 Ibid.

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6 terrorist organisations has been described as targeted and proportionate12, in contrast to new terrorist organisations’ reliance on indiscriminate violence13

. Lastly, old terrorist organisations were characterised by a hierarchy in their leadership with a clearly defined command and control

structure14. New terrorist groups, however, are composed of various cells and networks, and lack an identifiable hierarchy15. The case studies will thus consist of an ‘old’ terrorist organisation, namely

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty) or ETA, and a ‘new’ terrorist organisation, ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fīl-ʿIrāq wash-Shām, better known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or

IS. Both organisations have a history of actively targeting and killing news media outlets and journalists. The thesis will thus examine whether the rationale behind targeting journalists of old and new terrorist organisations differ.

The thesis will be structured in four parts. Part One will provide the theoretical underpinnings of the research, before setting out the methodology to conduct the analysis. Part Two will examine the current dangers faced by journalists when reporting on war and terrorism in particular, and will provide a brief chronological overview of terrorist attacks against journalists. Part Three will then consist of the two individual case studies. Part Four will compare and contrast ETA and IS’ use of the news media. A discussion will then examine the findings of the thesis.

12_{Spencer, A. (2006) Questioning the Concept of “New Terrorism”. The Journal of Peace, Conflict &} Development, Issue 8, p.7

13_{Ibid., p.9} 14

Neumann, P. (2009) Old and New Terrorism. Social Europe. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.socialeurope.eu/2009/08/old-and-new-terrorism/

15 Ibid.

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7 Part One

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Two theories were chosen to undertake the research, namely rational choice theory and

communicate theory. Each will be explained in turn, before setting out the methodology used to conduct the research.

Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory suggests that terrorists make decisions according to the expectation of maximising outputs16. Terrorist organisations perceive the value of their actions to be substantially high, while the costs of resorting to terrorism are regarded as low17. Martha Crenshaw argues that terrorist organisations seek political ends and that terrorism is a deliberate choice to achieve these ends18. Crenshaw suggests that non-state terrorists and governments are engaged in conflicts where each side aims to influence the behaviour of the other through their actions19. The aim of terrorist attacks is thus to “modify political behaviour by manipulating the options of the opponent”20. As such, Dipak Gupta states that a terrorist organisation “behaves ‘rationally’, that is, it aims at maximising its own welfare”21

. Rational choice theory thus suggests that groups making use of terrorism act rationally, or in ways that are perceived as beneficial to the group.

The instrumental approach to terrorism, also known as the rational approach, suggests that terrorists are strategic and rational actors. They do not make choices in a vacuum but rather have very

specific strategic objective when implementing a particular strategy or targeting a specific target. Their victims are instrumental in the sense that they are used “to manipulate a wider group”22

. Consequently, this theory was chosen to answer the research question as it can be used to propose that terrorist organisations choose their targets, and in this case the news media, for distinctly

16

McAllister, B., Schmid, A., in Schmid, A. (2011) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London & New York: Routledge, p.221

17_{Ibid., p.222} 18

Crenshaw, M. (1987) Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches. Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 10, Issue 4, p.13

19 Ibid. 20

21

Gupta, D. cited in McAllister, B., Schmid, A., in Schmid, A. (2011) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London & New York: Routledge, p.221

22

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8 strategic and rational reasons. As such, targeting journalists and the news media is a purposeful and rational choice by terrorists, which will have a desired impact on their struggle.

Communicative Theory

In the same vein as rational choice theory, communicative theory suggests that the immediate victim of terrorism is merely instrumental23. Terrorists aim to send a message and to intimidate others than the victims24. The terrorist act is therefore an act of communication since it aims to convey a specific message to specific audience25. As Alex Schmid and Bradley McAllister explain, communicate theory focuses on the “persuasive and dissuasive effects” of violence and “the role of the mass media in this signalling process”26

. According to this theory, by targeting a specific group of victims, terrorist organisations also seek to manipulate, deter, or intimidate one or more

audiences. Furthermore, the violence used to convey this message attracts the news media, in turn providing free publicity to the terrorists27.

Accordingly, by using terrorism as an act of communication terrorist organisations implement the strategy of ‘propaganda by the deed’ developed in the 19th century by Russian revolutionaries to impress target audiences28. As Jonathan Matusitz argues, this type of terrorism is “enacted mainly for publicity reasons”29

. By orchestrating acts of terrorism, terrorist organisations seek to catch society’s attention in order to disseminate their message30

. As such, terrorist organisations carry out violent actions and subsequently issue statements setting out the reasons behind their use of

violence31.

With regards to the news media, this theory suggests that by targeting journalists terrorists aim to send out a message to news media as a whole. This message “is likely to be, ‘You had better report fully and accurately about what we do and why we do it. If you cooperate, we provide you with

23

24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26_Ibid. 27 Ibid., p.247 28

Schmid, A. (2005) Terrorism as Psychological Warfare, Democracy and Security, 1:2, p.139

29_{Matusitz, J. (2012) Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction. SAGE Publications, p.39} 30

Garrison, A. (2004) Defining terrorism: philosophy of the bomb, propaganda by deed and change through fear and violence, Criminal Justice Studies, 17:3, p.268

31

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9 plenty more scoops. If not, some of your journalists will pay for it with their lives”32

. In line with this approach, Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter suggest that terrorist organisations can implement a strategy of intimidation33. This strategy is used to gain social control over segments of the

population, and especially to “demonstrate that the terrorists have the power to punish whoever disobeys them”34

. Consequently, terrorists target and eliminate individuals with the aim of deterring others who confront or resist them35.

Together, the theories suggest the following:

1. Terrorists are rational actors and their actions are strategic;

2. Terrorists aim to modify the behaviour of opponents through violence;

3. Terrorists want to send out a specific message to a specific audience through violence-generated publicity.

Methodology

In the light of this theoretical framework, the research will seek to answer the central research question of this thesis: Why would terrorist organisations, who need the “oxygen of publicity”

provided by the news media, target journalists? In order to answer this research question, the thesis

will first proceed with desktop research. Through a literature review of the academic research, the research will demonstrate why the relationship between journalism and terrorism has been termed a ‘symbiosis’. The thesis will then proceed to analyse two case studies, namely of ETA in Spain and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

The case studies will aim to answer the research question through document analyses. In the case of ETA, open-source documents such as press releases, statements, and official documents of the organisation will be analysed. These documents were found online, notably through archival research from media outlets. Regarding IS, open-source statements published on social media as well as the organisation’s official English-language magazine, Dabiq, will be examined.

32

33_{Kydd, W., Walter, B. (2006) The Strategies of Terrorism. International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, p.66} 34

Ibid. 35

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10 Furthermore, reports by non-governmental organisations and news media outlets will be used to complement the analysis. Two hypotheses were devised to answer the research question:

• Hypothesis One: Terrorist groups target journalists for collaborating with ‘the enemy’. • Hypothesis Two: Terrorist groups target journalists in response to ‘negative’ portrayal and

reporting in the media.

A third hypothesis was formulated to compare and contrast ETA and IS’ relationship with the media and in order to examine whether the advent of the Internet and social media has altered this relationship:

• Hypothesis Three: New terrorist organisations do not require the ‘oxygen of publicity’ provided

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11 Literature Review

This part of the thesis examines the state of the art on the subject of the relationship between news media and terrorism. The news media plays a prominent role in a terrorist organisation’s strategy. As then former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared in the mid-1980s, the news media represent “the oxygen of publicity” on which terrorists depend36

. The relationship of mutual dependence between terrorism and the media has been termed “symbiotic” by Abraham Miller37

. Not only do terrorist organisations depend on the news media, but the media themselves often actively seek coverage of terrorism.

Terrorists need the news media in order to promote their agenda as “without communication, there can be no terrorism”38

. As Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf explained in the 1980s, a terrorist-victim-target triangle exists, through which the immediate victim of terrorism is first of all a tool to convey a message to an ultimate target39. There are at least six potential target audiences for

terrorist organisations, namely “world opinion; the national majority that is opposed to the goals of the terrorists; the national minority or social class for which the terrorists claim to fight; the national government that is the direct opponent of the terrorists; rival political movements, both terrorist and non-terrorist; and the terrorists and their direct supporters”40. The immediate victims of a terrorist attack are mainly instrumental to reach one or more of these target audiences.

It is through the media that terrorists are able to reach their target audiences, through what Peter Simonson calls “social noise”41_{. This method consists in attracting attention through “noisy or} controversial” acts, such as terrorist attacks42

. There are four main reasons to explain terrorists’ quest for media attention: to spread fear, to acquire recognition for their struggle, to gather

36

Thatcher, M. (1985) Speech to American Bar Association. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Retrieved 28 September 2015, from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096

37

Tuman, J. (2009) Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism. SAGE Publications, 2nd Edition, p.163

38

39

Ibid., p.201

40_{Paletz, D., Schmid, A. (1992) Terrorism and the Media. SAGE Publications, p.77} 41

Simonson, P. cited in Matusitz, J. (2012) Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction. SAGE Publications, p.38

42 Ibid.

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12 sympathy, and to acquire legitimacy43. Gabriel Weimann emphasises the significance of the media for psychological warfare, as terrorists “believe that fear and panic can be spread by the coverage” of their attacks44. The news media are a “valuable instrument in terrorist strategy”45 and,

consequently, media-savvy terrorist organisations often base their strategy around attracting media coverage. This leads Brigitte Nacos to suggest that terrorist attacks are designed by their instigators according to their “likelihood of gaining media attention”46

. Terrorist organisations therefore go to significant lengths to attract the media, by staging “dramatic, unique, and unexpected events”47

and providing “cruel, shocking, and frightening images”48

. Yet, Jonathan Matusitz stresses that terrorists do not seek just ‘any’ media coverage. As he argues, terrorists seek “preferable coverage that will portray them in a positive light”49.

The news media are also particularly interested in the drama and fear provided by terrorist organisations’ attacks. Many media today focus on “infotainment”50

, actively seeking to provide viewers with drama, blood, shock, heroes and villains51. Since these elements are found in terrorist attacks, commercial profit dictates that news media cannot avoid covering them extensively52. As J. Bowyer Bell put it, “terrorists construct a package that is so spectacular, so violent, so compelling” that the news media simply “cannot refuse the offer”53. For terrorist organisations, the news media act as “facilitators”54

since without publicity, “terrorists would fail to achieve many of their objectives”55

. Indeed, as visual images have an influence on policy, broadcasting terrorist attacks

43

Nacos, B. (2007) Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The central role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, p.20-22

44_{Weimann, G. (2005) The Theater of Terror, Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 9:3-4, p.383} 45

Ibid. 46

47

48

49

Matusitz, J. (2012) Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction. SAGE Publications, p.59 50

51

52

Ibid., p.70

53_{Bell, B. cited in Paletz, D., Schmid, A. (1992) Terrorism and the Media. SAGE Publications, p.46} 54

Norris, P., Kern, M., Just, M. (2003) Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public. Rouletdge, p.9

55 Ibid.

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13 contributes to circulating the terrorists’ message. The news media also covet coverage of terrorist attacks to satisfy their quest for profit. For profit-oriented corporate managers, terrorist attacks provide the ideal combination of content to captivate viewers56. Walter Laqueur described terrorists as the “super-entertainers of our time”57_{, which news media cannot ignore since “corporate media} institutions dictate that special attention be paid to those events and developments that are most prone to fit the infotainment genre and believed to attract larger audiences”58

. Terrorist

organisations and the news media thus have an objective in common, namely to reach the largest audience possible. This explains why Miller defined the relationship between both protagonists as “symbiotic”59

.

It can therefore be said that there is a clearly observable phenomenon of indirect collaboration between the news media and terrorist organisations60. It does appear, however, that journalists have also been the targets of terrorists and that attacks on journalists have been on the increase in recent years61. As the Committee to Protect Journalists reveals, since 1995 more journalists have died while covering terrorism than war62. The subsequent section of the thesis turns to examining the targeting and killing of journalists covering terrorism, before examining historical developments in terrorist organisations specifically targeting journalists for the nature of their work.

56

57

Schlesinger, P. (1981) Terrorism, the media, and the liberal-democratic state: A Critique of the Orthodoxy. Social Research 48, p.85

58

Laqueur, W. cited in Nacos, B. (2007) Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The central role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, p.108

59

Miller, A. cited in, Tuman, J. (2009) Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism. SAGE Publications, 2nd Edition, p.163

60

61

Surette, R., Hansen, K., Noble, G. (2009) Measuring media oriented terrorism. Journal of Criminal Justice, 37, 4, p.367

62

Barnd, J. (2015) Are terrorists challenging freedom of speech by targeting journalists? Katu. Retrieved 28 September 2015, from

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14 Part Two

The ‘New War’ on Journalists

The purpose of this part of the thesis is to provide a context to the research question and ensuing research. It will examine recent developments in the dangerous work accomplished by journalists reporting on war and terrorism, before providing a context to the research by reviewing several terrorist attacks on journalists over time. Prior to this, however, the notions of ‘news media’ and ‘journalists’ should be clarified. In this thesis, these terms will be used to refer to “any

correspondent, reporter, photographer, cameraman and technical assistant, radio and television, who performs these activities as his/her principal profession”63

.

The targeting of journalists by belligerent groups is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, research by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reveals that 1,149 journalists have been killed whilst doing their job since 199264. The overwhelming majority of these journalists were covering politics and war, and the CPJ emphasises that most were not killed by crossfire or whilst being on a dangerous assignment; rather, they were murdered due to the nature of their employment65. Despite the protection afforded to them by International Humanitarian Law, which seeks to protect journalists “against direct attacks” as civilians “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in

hostilities”66

, journalists have indeed been explicit targets of armed groups for some time. Reporters Without Borders (RWB) has collected data on journalists explicitly killed because of their

profession, which reveals that 932 journalists were killed between 2002 and 2015 included. This data is demonstrated by the graph below67.

63

Casier, F. (2012) La protection des journalistes dans les situations de conflit armé. Centre d’étude de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

http://www.ismllw-be.org/session/2012_10_22_Frederic%20Casier%20texte.pdf, p.1 64

As of 25 October 2015. Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) 1149 Journalists Killed since 1992. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://www.cpj.org/killed/

65 Ibid. 66

Geiss, R. (2010) How does international humanitarian law protect journalists in armed-conflict situations?. International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved 19 November 2015, from

https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/protection-journalists-interview-270710.htm 67

Graph created by the author of this thesis based on RWB data. Reporters Without Borders (2015) Journalists killed. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-barometer-journalists-killed.html & Reporters Without Borders (2015) Round-up of journalists killed worldwide 2015. Retrieved 4 January 2016, from http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_2015-part_2-en.pdf, p.67

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15 The International News Safety Institute (INSI) has also kept track of journalists killed whilst

exercising their job, which the graph below illustrates. The Institute states that almost 1500 journalists were killed between 2004 and 201468, well above both the CPJ and RWB’s estimates. According to INSI, only a small percentage of these journalists were international correspondents covering a foreign conflict. Indeed, as the graph below demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of the fatalities were local journalists69, some of them used by international news media outlets.

68

International News Safety Institute (2014) Under Threat: The Findings. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.newssafety.org/underthreat/under-threat-the-findings.html

69 Ibid.

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16 INSI’s ‘Under Threat: The Findings’ report on the main changes and challenges to the safety of journalists over the past decade, further demonstrates the contemporary dangers faced by

journalists. As the report states, journalists today have effectively become the front line70. They are confronted with more threats than in the past few years, particularly that of kidnapping. Most significantly, the report reveals that armed groups now view journalists as legitimate targets and are actively marked as targets to be eliminated. In a similar vein, the CPJ stated that 2012 and 2013 were the worst years since it began recording this data71.

Speaking in 2014, Alberto Ibarguen, President and CEO of the Knight Foundation, a non-profit organisation seeking to promote quality journalism, stated “There is a New War on Journalists (…) Terrorists are the shock troops in this new war. They are not like the old censors. Today’s terrorists will kill a journalist not to stop a story, but to create one. They recruit in social media. They practice press release by execution.”72 In a similar vein, in May 2015 the Security Council “expressed deep concern at the growing threat to journalists and associated media personnel, including killings, kidnapping and hostage-taking by terrorist groups”73. News media professionals themselves have also acknowledged the dangers they are faced with today in their line of work. President and CEO of the Associated Press, Gary Pruitt stated in March 2015 that terrorist organisations “want to tell their story in their way from start to finish with nothing in between, and a journalist is a potential critical filter that they don't want to have around”74

.

Both Alberto Ibarguen and Gary Pruitt’s comments point to contemporary developments in the strategy of terrorist organisations actively targeting journalists with intent to kill them. The Global Terrorism Database of START at the University of Maryland has recorded attacks on journalists by terrorist groups since the start of its database in 1970. As the graph below demonstrates, attacks on journalists by terrorists are effectively not a new phenomenon75.

70_Ibid.

71

Ibarguen, A. (2014) The New War on Journalists. Knight Foundation. Retrieved 25 October 2015, from http://www.knightfoundation.org/press-room/speech/new-war-journalists/

72 Ibid. 73

United Nations (2015) In All-Day Debate, Security Council Voices Alarm at Growing Threats to Journalists, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2222. Retrieved 25 October 2015, from

http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11908.doc.htm

74_{Russia Today (2015) ‘PRESS logo makes you target’: Killing journalists should be war crime, AP chief} says. Retrieved 12 November 2015, from https://www.rt.com/news/245489-ap-journalists-targeting-killing/ 75

Global Terrorism Database (2015) Incidents Over Time targeting journalists & media. University of Maryland. Retrieved 25 October 2015, from

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17 The following brief chronology of terrorist attacks against journalists over the past four decades to illustrate this trend. It should be emphasised that this list is not exhaustive:

1) In March 1979, the editor of Italian newspaper Osservatore Politico, Mino Pecorelli was shot dead in Rome by the Red Brigades76.

2) Throughout the 1990s, journalists in Algeria were specifically targeted by both the Islamic Salvation Front (GSPC) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Journalists’ names were

published on hit-lists and no fewer than 123 Algerian journalists were either shot or beheaded between 1992 and 199777.

3) Basque journalist Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle, journalist for Spanish newspaper El Mundo, was shot in Andoain by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in May 200078.

4) In the months of January and February 2002, American reporter for the Wall Street Journal Daniel Pearl was captured and subsequently decapitated by terrorists in Pakistan79.

5) Freelance journalist Ajmal Naqshbandi was beheaded by the Taliban in Afghanistan in April 200780.

h=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&target=10&dtp2=all&s uccess=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

76

Willan, P. (2002) The man who knew too much. The Guardian. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/20/worlddispatch.italy

77

Zerrouky, H. (2015) Retour sur le massacre a huis clos des journalistes algeriens. L’Humanite. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.humanite.fr/retour-sur-le-massacre-huis-clos-des-journalistes-algeriens-564025

78

Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://www.cpj.org/killed/2000/jose-luis-lopez-de-la-calle.php

79

CNN (2002) U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl is dead, officials confirm. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/21/missing.reporter/

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18 6) Somali Freelance journalist Ali Ahmed Abdi was shot by Al-Shabaab gunmen in the

quasi-autonomous northern Republic of Puntland in March 201281.

Whereas terrorist attacks against journalists may not be a new phenomenon, the graph does reveal that, since 2011, there has been a dramatic increase in the number and frequency of attacks on members of the news media by terrorist organisations. Three of the most infamous cases took place in 2014 and 2015, firstly with the murders of James Foley and Steven Sotloff, two American journalists captured and subsequently beheaded by Islamic State terrorists; and secondly with the assassinations of Charlie Hebdo journalists by Islamist terrorists in Paris in early 2015.

The thesis will thus examine why some terrorist organisations have identified the news media and specific journalists as legitimate targets. Two terrorist organisations have been selected for the analysis, namely ETA and IS, as ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorist organisations respectively. The thesis will provide a brief introduction to each group before analysing their rationale for targeting the news media according to the three hypotheses. The next section will now turn to the case study of ETA, an ‘old’ terrorist organisation.

80

Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) Ajmal Naqshbandi. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/killed/2007/ajmal-nakshbandi.php

81

Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) Ali Ahmed Abdi. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/killed/2012/ali-ahmed-abdi.php

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19 Part Three

Case Study One: The ‘Old’ Terrorism - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Founded in 1959, ETA sought the establishment of an independent Basque state in Northern Spain and South-Western France82. This nationalist and Marxist organisation was responsible for more than 830 deaths over a period spanning about 40 years83. According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism (START), ETA was the fourth most active terrorist group in the world between 1970 and 201084. In 2011, ETA announced the “definitive cessation of its armed activity”85

and in late 2013 it declared an end to its violent campaign86. Throughout its period of activity, ETA focused mostly on individuals they perceived to be representatives of Spanish occupation of the Basque country87, namely the Civil Guard, national police, and the army88.

As Bruce Hoffman explains, they were particularly discriminate in their selection of targets and their attacks were particularly “restricted to a specifically defined ‘target set’”89

. In the 1990s, however, in the wake of the arrest of several of its leaders, ETA altered its strategy90. Based around the notion of ‘socialising the suffering’, ETA’ strategy sought to ‘distribute’ the pain suffered by its

82

Beifuss, A., Trivini-Bellini, F. (2013) Branding Terror: The Logotypes and Iconography of Insurgent Groups and Terrorist Organisations. Merrell Publishers., p.89

83

Sanchez-Cuenca, I. (2007) The Dynamics Of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA, Terrorism and Political Violence, 19:3, p.291 ; Although ETA was born in 1959, it did not kill anyone, a police commissar, before 1968. ETA’s last fatal attack, a police officer, took place in 2010. Sanchez-Cuenca, I. (2008) The persistence of nationalist terrorism: the case of ETA. Retrieved 11 November 2015, from

http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228772159_The_persistence_of_nationalist_terrorism_the_case_of_ ETA, p.7 & Decugis, J-M. (2015) Assassinat d’un policier en Seine-et-Marne en 2010 : un membre présumé d'ETA arrêté. iTele. Retrieved 20 December 2015, from http://www.itele.fr/france/video/assassinat-dun-policier-en-seine-et-marne-en-2010-un-membre-presume-deta-arrete-130600

84

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2011) Background Report: ETA Ceasefires by the Numbers. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/br/ETACeasefires.pdf, p.1 85

BBC (2011) Basque group Eta says armed campaign is over. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15393014

86

Whitfield, T. (2014) Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country. Hurst & Company, London, p.295

87

Shabad, G., Llera Ramo, F.J., in Crenshaw, M. (1995) Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania State University Press., p.441

88_{Drake, C.J.M. (1998) The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection. Terrorism and Political} Violence, Vol 10, p.29

89

Hoffman, B. (2006) Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press., p.230 90

Woodworth, P. (2001) Why do they kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain. World Policy Journal, Vol. 18, 1, p.6

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20 militants and prisoners amongst the greater Basque society91. The list of legitimate targets of attacks was therefore considerably expanded to include academics, businessmen, jurists, and significantly, journalists92. The section hereunder analyses ETA’s discourse in order to determine why journalists were included in this expanded target list.

ETA against the News Media

"They've cut off my fingers but not my tongue and they will not silence me” 93

Gorka Landaburu

Throughout its existence, it appears that ETA carried out a “sustained and violent campaign” against Spanish and Basque journalists and news media outlets94. Gorka Landaburu, journalist for weekly magazine Cambio 16, was particularly defiant following the letter bomb attack which left him with severe injuries in May 2001. In order to illustrate ETA’s decades-long deadly and

destructive campaign against the media, two tables are provided hereunder. Table 1 and 2 next page depict attacks on journalists and attacks against news media outlet infrastructure respectively95. The tables reveal that ETA’s strategy consisted in actively targeting the media.

91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93

Stables, E. (2004) Terrorism in Spain : Reporters under attack by ETA. The New York Times. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/06/opinion/06iht-edstables_ed3_.html

94 Ibid. 95

Tables created by the author of this thesis based on: El Mundo (2008) Los medios de comunicación, en el punto de mira de la organización terrorista ETA. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/06/08/espana/1212923586.html & El Correo Digital (2008) Cronología de los ataques de ETA a los medios de comunicación. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/20081231/mas-actualidad/politica/cronologia-ataques-medios-comunicacion-200812311134.html

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21 Table 1: Attacks on Journalists by ETA

Name of Target(s) Date of Attack Employer Outcome

Jose Maria Portell June 1978 Director of La Hoja del Lunes & Chief Editor of La Gaceta del

Norte

Killed

Jose Javier Uranga August 1980 Director of Diario de Navarra Wounded Gerardo Huezo April 1981 Journalist at La Gaceta del Norte Unharmed

Carmen Gurruchaga December 1997 Journalist at El Mundo Unharmed

Mikel Muez September 1999 Journalist at El País Unharmed

Carlos Herrera March 2000 Talkshow Host at Radio Nacional

De España

Unharmed

Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle May 2000 Journalist at El Mundo Killed Aurora Intxausti & Juan

Palomo

November 2000 Journalist at El País &

Correspondent for Antena 3 TV

Unharmed

Gorka Landaburu May 2001 Journalist at Cambio 16 Wounded

Santiago Oleaga May 2001 Financial Director of El Diario Vasco Killed

Santiago Silvan & Marisa Guerrero & Enrique Ibarra

January 2002 Delegate at Radio Nacional de

España & Delegate at Antena 3 TV

& Vice-President of Grupo Correo

Unharmed

Table 2: Attacks on News Media Outlet Infrastructure by ETA

Targeted News Media Outlet Date of Attack

Radio de San Sebastian October 1978

Agencia Efe July 1982

Diario de Navarra November 1982

Canal Gasteiz September 1995

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22

Cadena Cope June 2005

Radio Nacional de España February 2006

El Correo June 2008

Euskal Irrati Telebista December 2008

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23

Hypothesis One: Terrorist groups target journalists for collaborating with ‘the enemy’

ETA statements and documents discovered during police raids or disclosed following attacks provide a considerable amount of evidence to support this hypothesis. A recurring theme found in these documents is ETA’s accusation of the news media as collaborators of an oppressive Spanish state. On several occasions, ETA accused journalists of being “traitors”96

and of playing an active role in the perceived repression of the Basque people by the state: “Journalists take their orders at the Interior Ministry in Madrid” and are “accomplices of the oppressors of the Basque Country”97 . As early as the 1970s, Jose Luis Zalbide, one of ETA’s first leaders, wrote a book entitled Iraultza or revolution. In his book, Zalbide described the Spanish state’s apparatus of domination - the government, the education system, the economy, and the mass media98. He further defined one of the objectives of the Basque revolutionary struggle as “the destruction of the apparatus of the Spanish state in Basque national territory”99

. According to him, the mass media were an extension of the oppressive arm of Franco’s authoritarian regime and sought the destruction of the Basque language100.

ETA’s internal magazine Zutabe (in English: ‘Column’), reveals the terrorist organisation’s perception of the media. In an issue dated from 2005, the magazine stated that the overwhelming majority of news outlets had become “an active part of the state’ strategy against the Basque Country”101

. What is more, ETA suggested that former Interior Minister Jaime Mayor Oreja and his chief of press had “created a solid network of ‘journalist-policemen’ to execute a media strategy against the Basque Country102”. Thus, for ETA, the media was perceived as “an effective instrument of war against Basque resistance”103

. ETA considered that journalists were “at the

96

Observatorio da Imprensa (n.d.) PAÍS BASCO: A imprensa como alvo do terror. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br/artigos/mo270320021.htm

97 Ibid.

98_{Clark, R. (1984) The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980. The University of Wisconsin Press, p.64} 99

Zalbide, J-L. cited in Ibid. 100

Ibid., p.65

101_{EspacioDir (2006) ETA arremete contra periodistas y medios de comunicación en su último Zutabe.} Retrieved 4 November 2015, from http://www.espaciodircom.com/index.php/medios/42-medios/3082 102_{ABC (2001) ETA dice que Interior usa los medios de comunicación como ‘arma de guerra’. Retrieved 4} November 2015, from http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-22-03-2001/abc/Nacional/eta-dice-que-interior-usa-los-medios-de-comunicacion-como-arma-de-guerra_19348.html

103

El Mundo (2006) Afirmaciones de ETA sobre los periodistas y los medios de comunicación. Retrieved 4 November 2015, from http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/02/12/espana/1139718186.html

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24 forefront of the Interior Ministry’s campaigns (…) to prolong the conflict permanently”104

, and as such were the “spokespeople of the war ministry (sic) seeking to impose their Spanish project through force”105

. Framed as active members of perceived repression by the Spanish state, journalists were accused of “increasing the repression, avoiding a negotiating settlement,

marginalising the Patriotic Left, as well as negating the rights and the very existence of the Basque Country”106

. Furthermore, the Zutabe magazine accused journalists of “hiding the repression of the armed forces, condoning torture, being the spokesmen of the state for the dispersal of Basque political prisoners, and of inciting the Civil Guard”107

. As a word of warning, the magazine

concluded that those working to promote conflict in the Basque Country would “have to suffer the consequences of confrontation”108

.

It was therefore through its magazine and statements like the above that ETA justified the ‘legitimate’ targeting of journalists.

According to Gabriel Sanchez, who has written on ETA’s targeting of journalists, the terrorist organisation’s legitimisation of violence against the media can be explained according to five tenets:

• “The media imposes the nationalism of the occupying state;

• The media imposes the linguistic and cultural complex of the occupying state;

• The media stifles and suffocates the nation-building efforts of the occupied people. By imposing its linguistic and cultural criteria, it destroys the occupied people’s chance of generating and developing their own knowledge;

• The media mobilises and directs orders to the reactionary bases of society which hold the power of the state in the occupied territories;

104_{ABC (2001) ETA deice que Interior usa los medios de comunicación como ‘arma de guerra’. Retrieved 4} November 2015, from http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-22-03-2001/abc/Nacional/eta-dice-que-interior-usa-los-medios-de-comunicacion-como-arma-de-guerra_19348.html

105 Ibid. 106

EspacioDir (2006) ETA arremete contra periodistas y medios de comunicación en su último Zutabe. Retrieved 4 November 2015, from http://www.espaciodircom.com/index.php/medios/42-medios/3082 107_{El Mundo (2006) Afirmaciones de ETA sobre los periodistas y los medios de comunicación. Retrieved 4} November 2015, from http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/02/12/espana/1139718186.html

108

EspacioDir (2006) ETA arremete contra periodistas y medios de comunicación en su último Zutabe. Retrieved 4 November 2015, from http://www.espaciodircom.com/index.php/medios/42-medios/3082

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25 • The media prepares, orders and justifies the repression, in all its forms, against those opposed to

the invasion”.109

Perhaps the clearest illustration of ETA targeting journalists they perceived as agents of Spain’s authoritarian regime is found in the murder of Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle. De la Calle was an outspoken critic of ETA’s use of violence in their campaign for Basque independence110. In his articles, the journalist chastised ETA for using terror tactics comparable to those of Franco111. In a message published following the shooting of De la Calle, ETA stated that the journalist “under the disguise of opinion, has called for the arrest, torture, and death of Basque citizens, using the fascist slogan ‘Go Get’em’ and the hypocritical ‘Enough’ slogan”112

. These slogans had been used by demonstrators in the 1990s who opposed ETA and who called on the Spanish government to destroy the organisation113. ETA’s message further accused the journalist of working for and supporting the Spanish state, claiming that De la Calle had spread “all his hatred and venom in the perpetuation of the military occupation that represses us”114. Moreover, the message accused the journalist of calling “for the oppression of the Basque country and the continuation of conflict, despite efforts by ETA to unilaterally suspend its actions”115

.

In May 2001, the financial Director of El Diario Vasco Santiago Oleaga was shot dead by ETA. Two representatives of the terrorist organisation were interviewed in the months following Oleaga’s death, who stated that journalists are “employees of a foreign state and its armed forces disguised as journalists (…). They promote the war (…) they do not want peace”116

. In addition, the two members justified attacks on the media stating that “freedom of expression remains a right to

109_{Sanchez, G. (2011) ETA: ‘JO TA KE’ a la Prensa. Cuadernos de Periodistas. Retrieved 4 November} 2015, from http://www.apmadrid.es/images/stories/13-25%20ETA-13%20pag.pdf, p.17

110

Committee to Protect Journalists (n.d.) Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://www.cpj.org/killed/2000/jose-luis-lopez-de-la-calle.php

111

Committee to Protect Journalists (2001) Attacks on the Press 2000: Spain. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/2001/03/attacks-on-the-press-2000-spain.php

112

El Pais (2000) ETA asume los asesinatos de López de Lacalle y Pedrosa. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://elpais.com/diario/2000/06/12/espana/960760809_850215.html

113

Whitfield, T. (2014) Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country. Hurst & Company, London, p.83

114_{El Pais (2000) ETA asume los asesinatos de López de Lacalle y Pedrosa. Retrieved 26 October 2015,} from http://elpais.com/diario/2000/06/12/espana/960760809_850215.html

115 Ibid.

116_{Sanchez, G. (2011) ETA: ‘JO TA KE’ a la Prensa. Cuadernos de Periodistas. Retrieved 4 November} 2015, from http://www.apmadrid.es/images/stories/13-25%20ETA-13%20pag.pdf, p.20

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26 attain”, and claimed that “by targeting pseudo-journalists and news media who are in favour of the oppression of the Basque Country, freedom of expression is enhanced”117

.

Euskal Irrati Telebista (EiTB), the leading communications group in the Basque Country, was also

specifically targeted by ETA. Following the bombing of the group’s headquarters in Bilbao in late 2008, ETA explained in a statement that EiTB had been targeted for practising “political apartheid” and for “taking orders from Spain”118

.

The findings above therefore demonstrate that ETA targeted journalists they perceived were collaborating with the Spanish state. For ETA, the news media was playing an active role in the repression of its members and was a key element of the oppressive arm of the state. Consequently, journalists became ‘legitimate’ targets for the terrorist organisation. The thesis will now turn to examining the second hypothesis, namely that terrorist groups target journalists in response to ‘negative’ portrayal and reporting in the media.

117

Cited in Ibid. 118

Reporters Without Borders (n.d.) Predators - ETA. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://en.rsf.org/predator-eta,42478.html

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27

Hypothesis Two: Terrorist groups target journalists in response to ‘negative’ portrayal and reporting in the media.

As Table 1 above makes clear, specific journalists were targeted by ETA. Jose Maria Portell was the first journalist to be targeted and killed by the organisation, right amidst Spain’s transition process from Franco-ism to democracy. Portell was a renowned journalist in the Basque country and an expert on ETA, having written two books on the organisation119. The eminence he acquired whilst working on ETA led the Spanish government to appoint him as intermediary between the terrorist organisation and the government in 1977120. Following his death a year later, it was established that Portell had been included in a hit-list of the terrorist organisation121.

ETA released a statement following his death, calling Portell an agent of the Spanish state122. Furthermore, it stated that the journalist had been “a specialist in intoxication”123

. ETA justified his death by charging him of “using his prestigious career, as well as his privileged methods, to

discredit, calumniate, and ultimately attack ETA”124

. The terrorist organisation simultaneously addressed a warning to several other journalists and media outlets in the process: “we warn publicly (the media) that if they persevere in their anti-ETA politics, we will be forced to act accordingly to defend ourselves from their attacks, with the sole instrument which circumstances permit us to use - the armed struggle”125

.

In 1995, an internal document originating from the Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista, the Socialist Patriotic Coordinator (KAS)126, was published by several newspapers. The document, entitled

119

Grech, M. J. (2011) Begoña Urroz, la primera víctima de ETA, Portell y nueve víctimas más. Libertad Digital. Retrieved 3 November 2015, from http://blogs.libertaddigital.com/in-memoriam/begona-urroz-la-primera-victima-de-eta-portell-y-nueve-victimas-mas-9894/ 120 Ibid. 121_Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123

Landaburu, A. (2008) ETA mató al mensajero. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://elpais.com/diario/2008/06/28/paisvasco/1214682000_850215.html

124_Ibid. 125

Ibid. 126

The KAS was a committee of strategic coordination involving radical nationalist movements of the Basque Country, of which ETA was a member. Fernandez-Soldevilla, G. (2014) Los orígenes de KAS, la Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

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28 ‘Txinurriak’, the Basque word for ‘ants’, referred to journalists as ‘Txakkuras’, or ‘dogs’127

. It also stated that the media formed part of the ‘three-p’s’ trident of policia-politicos-periodistas, or police-politicians-journalists128. In effect, Txinurriak was an open suggestive invitation for the

assassinations of journalists. It blamed the media for hiding “the reality of the suffering in the Basque country at the hands of the State”, for its “constant harassment and destruction of the independence movement” and for being “a fundamental bulwark” in the State’ strategy129

. It was further stated that if the news media continued to systematically act as “weapons of war of the State”, words of warning would be replaced by blood130

. It is useful to quote Txinurriak at length to demonstrate the document’s focus on the media:

“Those who condemn and imprison members of the Patriotic Left have specific names and

surnames, sleep and live well. (…) There has been a lack of measures taken to deal with journalists. (…) The responsibility that some of them bear in the repression is clear, and there are great

emotions against them. (…) We cannot go from doing nothing directly into armed struggle (…) instead of launching an armed struggle, we must first create the dynamics of denunciation and pressure through other forms of struggle, in order to gather solid support before the armed struggle eventually takes place. (…) The role played by the media in the repression needs to be denounced (…) we cannot allow them to go freely in the Basque country and cause harm”. (…) A journalist who causes harm should know that he is doing so against a political project and against the future of a people. (…) That is something that must be measured, we can either assume the costs that it can incur or we let them work calmly knowing that their work has political costs for us.”131

In the aftermath of the EiTB headquarters bombing in 2008, the terrorist group explained that EiTB’s reporting of the separatist movement had been damaging as it referred to ETA as ‘terrorists’ rather than ‘soldiers’132_{. Moreover, journalists were accused of misrepresenting the region’s politics} and of neglecting the issue of violence by the Basque police. In addition, ETA sent an implicit warning to EiTB’s journalists: “we are not going to tell journalists how they should do their work. We are making a clear appeal to those in charge of EiTB to work in a responsible way”133.

ETA’s statements and documents reveal that the second hypothesis can indeed be confirmed. Carmen Gurruchaga, herself the target of a bomb by ETA, suggests that the terrorist organisation

127

Barberia, J.L. (1995) Un documento interno de KAS abre la puerta a los atentados de ETA contra periodistas. El Pais. http://elpais.com/diario/1995/01/27/espana/791161223_850215.html

128_Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131_Ibid. 132

Stables, E. (2004) Terrorism in Spain : Reporters under attack by ETA. The New York Times. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/06/opinion/06iht-edstables_ed3_.html

133

Reporters Without Borders (n.d.) Predators - ETA. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://en.rsf.org/predator-eta,42478.html

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29 attacked journalists “to stop critical reporting on ETA”134

. The analysis above has demonstrated that ETA was engaged in a violent campaign aimed at stifling freedom of speech by scaring journalists away from criticising its struggle for Basque independence. The organisation sought to silence journalists who did not tell the story the way they wanted it to be told. Targeting journalists was therefore part of the strategy of ETA, whose actions were particularly discriminate135. Journalists became legitimate targets for ETA as part of its objective to achieve Basque independence. As ETA itself stated, “the purpose of our actions is to change the position of the media and these journalists (…) in this conflict: that they shift from asking for war to asking for solutions”136

.

The analysis of ETA, an ‘old’ terrorist organisation, reveals that both hypotheses could be confirmed. The thesis will now turn to the second case study, namely of IS, a ‘new’ terrorist organisation. Following a brief introduction to IS, it will then analyse the terrorist organisation using the two hypotheses.

134

Committee to Protect Journalists (2001) Attacks on the Press 2000: Spain. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/2001/03/attacks-on-the-press-2000-spain.php

135_{Van den Broek, H. (2004) BORROKA—The Legitimation of Street Violence in the Political Discourse} of Radical Basque Nationalists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:4, p.732

136

Alfaro, E. (2001) El pecado de la ceguera. El Pais. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://elpais.com/diario/2001/05/25/espana/990741626_850215.html

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30 Case Study Two: The ‘New’ Terrorism - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS)

The origins of IS date back to 1999, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad (JTWJ)137. It was not until 2004, however, that al-Zarqawi turned his JTWJ group into a significant force, notably by uniting several Sunni factions138 in order to overthrow the Iraqi government, expel the Western invasion and create a sectarian war between Sunni and Shia139. Al-Zarqawi also pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda, in turn renaming JTWJ to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)140. AQI expanded its objectives to combat US forces in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2006, following the death of Al-Zarqawi, a new commander was established and AQI was once again renamed, this time to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)141. Since 2010, the terrorist organisation has been led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and, in April 2013, the organisation was renamed the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or the Levant)142 (ISIS or ISIL). In June 2014, ISIS declared itself a

caliphate under the leadership of its caliph al-Baghdadi, and the terrorist organisation today refers to itself as the Islamic State143.

As a caliphate, IS purports to be ruling over all Sunni Muslims144. Its radical interpretation of Islam, Salafist-Jihadism, has a global outlook and aims to enforce Sharia law wherever it gains power145. IS has been accused of gross human rights violations and has distinguished itself through the

brutality of its terrorist campaign. The group has attracted thousands of foreign fighters, with nearly one-fifth being Western European nationals or residents146.

137

Friedland, E. (2015) Special Report: The Islamic State. The Clarion Project. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/islamic-state-isis-isil-factsheet-1.pdf, p.7

138

Anjarini, S. (2013) The Evolution of ISIS. Al-Monitor. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/11/syria-islamic-state-iraq-sham-growth.html#

139

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2014) The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_EvolutionofISILRelationships_FactSheet_June2014.pdf, p.2 140

Ibid., p.1 141_{Ibid., p.2}

142_{Or al-Sham, the Levant, Ibid., p.2} 143

Friedland, E. (2015) Special Report: The Islamic State. The Clarion Project. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/islamic-state-isis-isil-factsheet-1.pdf, p.6

144_Ibid. 145_{Ibid., p.13} 146

Loveluck, L. (2015) Islamic State: Where do its fighters come from? The Telegraph. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11660487/Islamic-State-one-year-on-Where-do-its-fighters-come-from.html

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31 IS Against the News Media

“IS has been putting a lot of pressure on us to stop [reporting] (…) The threats come in different

forms but they happen most days. If a suspect is caught in the street, they will be killed in front of everyone.”147

(Abu Mohammed, Founder of news source ‘Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently’148 ) Iraq and Syria have been described as the most dangerous countries to work in for journalists149. While Western media largely focused on the beheadings of Western journalists (Foley, Sotloff, Goto), local journalists in Syria and Iraq have payed a heavy toll at the hands of IS. Journalists working in areas controlled by IS face intense violence, pressure, and intimidation to do their job150. As IS seeks full control of information within its areas of influence, many local journalists have been kidnapped and/or killed. Moreover, foreign journalists are reluctant to enter these areas as the risk of kidnapping is extremely high. Consequently, Reporters Without Borders have described areas controlled by IS as “black holes of information”151_{. ‘Official’ documents by IS leadership to} its fighters have called for all unauthorised media personnel to be eliminated152. In essence,

journalists face wide-scale cleansing and there have been numerous reports of public shootings and beheadings of journalists by IS.

147

Massih, N. (2015) How Islamic State uses killings to try to spread fear among media. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/blog/2015/07/how-islamic-state-uses-killings-to-try-to-spread-f.php

148

A member of this news media organisation was beheaded by IS in the Turkish city of Urfa in late 2015. Abu Mohammed. (2015) Speech of Abu Mohammed, One of the founders of Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, for the Parliament of the Netherlands – 4 November 2015. Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently. Retrieved 20 December 2015, from http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/?p=1529

149

Beiser, E. (2013) Syria, Iraq, Egypt most deadly nations for journalists. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/reports/2013/12/syria-iraq-egypt-most-deadly-nations-for-journalis.php

150

Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) James Foley's killers pose many threats to local, international journalists. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/2014/08/james-foleys-killers-pose-many-threats-to-local-in.php

151_{Reporters Sans Frontières (2015) Les zones contrôlées par le groupe EI, véritables ‘trous noirs’ de} l’information. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://fr.rsf.org/irak-les-zones-controlees-par-le-groupe-23-10-2014,47146.html

152

Journalistic Freedoms Observatory (2015) ISIS kidnaps 14 journalists and media workers in Mosul, and issue another new ‘wanted list’. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.jfoiraq.org/isis-kidnaps-14-journalists-and-media-workers-in-mosul-and-issuing-another-new-wanted-list

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32 As the areas controlled by IS are particularly dangerous for journalists and some attacks may have gone unreported, it is difficult to estimate the extent of the persecution of journalists153. IS,

however, has without a doubt “proven to be one of the most dangerous forces for the press across the region”154

. Table 3 next page includes several specific attacks against journalists by IS155 . It should be stressed that this table is by no means complete and provides only a fragmented view of IS’ clampdown on journalists and media personnel in Iraq and Syria. The table nevertheless reveals that IS has conducted a consistent and widespread cleansing of journalists in the areas it controls.

153

Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) James Foley's killers pose many threats to local, international journalists. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from https://cpj.org/2014/08/james-foleys-killers-pose-many-threats-to-local-in.php

154_Ibid. 155

Table created by the author of this thesis based on: Al-Ajili, Z. (2015) ISIL knife cuts the throat of journalists… and disturbing information from the areas of conflict. Journalistic Freedoms Observatory. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

http://www.jfoiraq.org/isil-knife-cuts-the-throat-of-journalistsand-disturbing-information-from-the-areas-of-conflict & Muhammad, D. (2015) Islamic State executes dozens of Iraqi journalists for uncovering atrocities. ARA News. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

http://aranews.net/2015/09/islamic-state-executes-dozens-of-iraqi-journalists-for-uncovering-atrocities/ & Hetzer, R. (2015) 2015 threatens to end as deadliest year on record. International Press Institute. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://www.freemedia.at/newssview/article/2015-threatens-to-end-as-deadliest-year-on-record.html & Henley, J. (2014) Victims of Isis: non-western journalists who don’t make the headlines. The Guardian. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from

http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/oct/19/victims-of-isis-non-western-journalists-dont-make-headlines & Reporters Without Borders (2015) Mosul Journalists are dying amid resounding silence. Retrieved 26 October 2015, from http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/iraq_mosul_report_.pdf & Ng, K. (2016) Ruqia Hassan: Isis executes first female citizen journalist in Raqqa, confirmed by 'Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently'. The Independent. Retrieved 8 January 2016, from

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ruqia-hassan-isis-executes-first-female-citizen-journalist-in-raqqa-confirmed-by-raqqa-is-being-a6797036.html

(33)

33 Table 3: Attacks on Journalists by IS

Name of Target(s) Date of Attack Employer Outcome

Yasser Faisal al-Jumaili

December 2013 Freelance Cameraman Killed

Qais Talal February 2014 Correspondent for Sama Mosul Channel Killed

James Foley August 2014 Freelance Journalist Killed

Steven Sotloff September 2014 Freelance Journalist Killed

Raad Mohamed Al- Azaoui

October 2014 Cameraman and Photographer for Sama Saleh

Aldeen TV

Killed

Mohanad al-Aqidi October 2014 Sada News Agency Unknown

Kenji Goto January 2015 Freelance Journalist Killed

Ahmed Hasku February 2015 Journalist at Mosul Today Killed

Thaer al-Ali April 2015 Editor-in-chief of Rai al-Nas Killed

Firas al-Bahri May 2015 Journalist Killed

Yahya Al-Khatib August 2015 Journalist Killed

Ikhlas Ghanim September 2015 Journalist Killed

Naji Jerf December 2015 Journalist at Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently Killed

Ruqia Hassan January 2016 Freelance Journalist Killed