The impact of new wars on water infrastructure : the case of Donbas

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University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc Human Geography

First supervisor: Prof. Joyeeta Gupta

Second supervisor: Dr. Eric Chu

Master thesis

The Impact of New Wars on Water Infrastructure:

– The Case of Donbas –

Student: Aliaksandra Baravikova Studies: Environmental Geography:

Governance for Sustainability Student ID: 11123869

E-Mail: aleksandra.borowikowa@gmail.com

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List of figures

Fig. 1: War and pre-war drivers affecting water infrastructure...8 Fig. 2. 'New wars' and the characteristics of infrastructure………... 9 Fig. 3. Cumulative impact: the vicious cycle (combination of direct and indirect impacts) leads to services decline and risks to public health……….. 20 Fig. 4. The scheme of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal (1957)…. ………27 Fig. 5. The intensity of damage to the water infrastructure of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas (June 2014-June 15, 2016)………..42 Fig. 6. Damage to the water infrastructure of the Siveskyi Donets Donbas canal (as of 15.06.2016)………..43

Appendices

Appendix I: The list of news websites (in Russian and Ukrainian languages) used for research on water infrastructure in Donbas...59 Appendix II: Warfare damage to the water infrastructure of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal... 60

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List of Abbreviations

ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance

CL Contact line

DPR Donetsk People's Republic GCA Government controlled areas

ICRC The International Committee of the Red Cross IHL International Humanitarian Law

JCCC Joint Centre for Ceasefire Monitoring LPR Luhansk People's Republic

NGCA Non-government controlled areas

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SDD Siverskyi Donets Donbas

UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEA United Nations Environment Assembly

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund US AID United States Agency for International Development

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Abstract

This case study research explores the ways the armed conflict in Donbas (Eastern Ukraine) between Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatist groups has affected water infrastructure in the region since 2014. The study argues it is essential to consider the characteristics of infrastructure along with the changing nature of warfare which becomes increasingly urbanized, protracted and intrastate. The interplay of these charac -teristics creates a particular set of outcomes that current legislation and policies fail to address by focusing only on direct damage from hostilities and neglecting indirect and cumulative impact on hardware, institutions and water resources. Furthermore, they do not consider the crucial qualities of infrastructural networks, such as their intercon-nectedness, complexity, vast scale, and spatial heterogeneity. For instance, damage to any part of power lines may have impact on the whole electricity supply system, lead ing to power outage at the water treatment plant which in turn may affect water provi -sion in settlements that are located far away from the site of occurrence.

The thesis provides the concrete examples of this interplay between new wars and water infrastructure in the case of Donbas. There, direct and indirect damage to water infrastructure from the hostilities that play out mostly in and around urban areas has already resulted in the decline in water provision. This decline has been unevenly dis -tributed across space: the settlements around the contact line, as well as those without back up water reservoirs have been particularly vulnerable. The war has aggravated the drivers of the pre-war water problems in Donbas: physical artefacts of infrastruc-ture have become further deteriorated, and the disruption of normal functioning of plants and mines have lead to even greater contamination. Furthermore, water gov-ernance has become much more incoherent, as some of its institutions had terminated cooperation for political reasons, while the lack of control and monitoring has been blind to unsustainable practices of water use. The ongoing conflict and the fact that one of the belligerent parties is a non-state actor makes it particularly difficult to ad-dress the damage to water infrastructure.

The thesis also has a number of theoretical implications for political ecology (1), infrastructure studies (2), and studies on hydraulic infrastructure and state power (3). First, it demonstrated that in war previously existing inequalities in water access re -main and become exacerbated; furthermore, even if water was not a reason for con-flict, it may eventually become a source of tensions between the belligerents. Second, even if objects of water infrastructure have been deliberately targeted, a more nuanced

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when the belligerent parties share the infrastructural networks. Also, the moments of infrastructural breakdown during an armed conflict may become a useful vantage point for understanding society in war. Third, it was demonstrated how the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal, the major source of water in the region, was exemplary of the communist project of transforming nature and society through the large-scale hy-draulic projects. The recent plan to construct the desalination plant in the Ukrainian Mariupol is seen as an important step to disconnect the Ukrainian territories from the canal which is managed by the separatists. This suggests that hydraulic infrastructure in conflict situations has important symbolic meaning and allows the government to secure the monopoly on water provision in the country. For this reason, examining hy-draulic infrastructure in conflict situations may provide an intriguing perspective on international relations and state politics.

Keywords: war, new wars, water infrastructure, infrastructural power, Donbas,

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Acknowledgements

I hereby would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr. Joyeeta Gupta, for her support and guidance. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Eric Chu for being the second reader.

I would furthermore like to thank my family and my friend Ira for her invaluable help during my stay in Amsterdam.

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1. Introduction

1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction: water and war in focus

Water has a wide repertoire in the war settings. Although water resources have often been viewed as a source of conflict (USAID, 2014; Wolf, 2007), it is increasingly ac-knowledged that water can also be a victim of war, its weapon (Zeitoun, Eid-Sabbagh, & Loveless, 2014) or serve as a tool for peace-building and cooperation (Kooy, Wild, & Mason, 2015; Swain, 2015; Weinthal, Troell, & Nakayama, 2011.) This study argues, however, that in war water seldom plays only one role; on the contrary, its reper -toire can encompass various contradictory characters. It is no wonder, then, that in the analysis of the effect of the armed conflict on water infrastructure in Donbas all the above mentioned roles come into play.

The Donbas region in situated in the eastern part of Ukraine. In April 2014, two self-proclaimed republics – the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) – were formed on the territory of the Donetska oblast (province) by the pro-Russian separatist forces in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. Since then, the violent conflict has escalated several times, despite the pro-tocols signed at the Minsk agreements. Currently, the situation may be described as a protracted or frozen (see 5.2.1) conflict with the hostilities between the Ukrainian army and the separatist groups are concentrated across the relatively stabilized front line. The conflict has acutely affected the water infrastructure and water resources in Donbas, in particular those of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal, the major source of water in the region. As a result, the access to water has been identified as one of the most pressing issues (OSCE, 2015; UNICEF, 2016).

The choice of the infrastructural prism to approach water in this study is stipulated by the fact that infrastructure networks are crucial elements not only in modern cities, but also in contemporary wars that are becoming increasingly urbanized (3.2). The changing nature of war and the crucial role of infrastructure in modern life are the two considerations that underlie this research. They have been studied from both theoret-ical and policy perspectives. These perspectives are outlined below (1.2-3), together with gaps in knowledge, objectives of study, and primary research questions. After that, the key terms are presented (1.4) and a roadmap for the thesis is provided (1.5).

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1. Introduction

1.2 Policy perspective: a need for a new paradigm

The policy perspective on water infrastructure and war that has informed this study was formulated in the influential report “Urban services during protracted armed con-flict: a call for a better approach to assisting affected people” published by the ICRC (The International Committee of the Red Cross) in September 2015. This report argues that current mechanisms of humanitarian assistance which operate along the 'reliefre -habilitation-development' continuumand are designed for traditional interstate wars that are in decline, fail to address a new type of armed conflicts (ICRC, 2015). These conflicts typically occur in urban areas that depend of highly complex and vast net-works of infrastructure; these conflicts increasingly often involve non-state actors and tend to become protracted (3.2). Therefore, the report argues for a necessity of a new paradigm that would take into account the challenges that arise both from the nature of conflict and complexity of infrastructural networks (ICRC, 2015).

The conflict in Donbas is mentioned by the authors of the report as an example of protracted armed conflicts, but, unlike the cases of Iraq and Gaza, was not further de-scribed. This thesis intends to fill this void. Taking the suggested paradigm as a start-ing point, it investigates the impact of warfare on the water infrastructure in Donbas

In so doing, it does not aim to identify the shortcoming of existing legislation or propose to the international community new mechanisms for water protection (as has been done, for example, in Bothe, Bruch, Diamond, Jensen, & Michael Bothe, 2010; Weir, Kellay, & Menhinick, 2015). The relevance of this study is that it presents a comprehensive analysis1_{of the effect of warfare on water infrastructure in a particular}

context and proposes policy recommendations for the local stakeholders. The first re -search questions is the following: How and through what processes has the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine since 2014 affected water infrastructure in the basin of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal?

It is hoped the results of the inquiry into the case of Donbas may be generalized and help to improve our understanding of the specificity of war context for water infra-structure. So far, as the ICRC (2015) report indicates, these aspects have received only limited attention. To address the knowledge gap, this thesis considers both pre-war

1 _{The issue of access to water in war-torn Donbas was covered in several detailed reports}

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1. Introduction (chapter 4) and war drivers (chapter 5) that affect broadly defined water infrastructure (hardware, institutions, and water resources (see 1.4.1).

1.3 Theoretical perspective

To better understand the specificity of warfare context for water infrastructure, this thesis will also address the changing nature of war and the complexity of infrastructure from a theoretical perspective, using the insights from infrastructural studies and polit-ical ecology, as well as from the literature on relations between hydraulic infrastruc-ture and state power. The ways these approaches contribute to the understanding of the problem are discussed below (1.3.1-3), along with additional knowledge gaps and a theoretical research question.

Before that, however, it is necessary to provide some clarification for the term 'new wars' which is present already in the title of this thesis and which represents here the changing nature of armed conflict (see a general definition of the armed conflict in 1.4.2). This term was suggested by Mary Kaldor (1999) to describe a type of warfare that has proliferated after the Cold War and replaced traditional state-versus-state wars in open terrain. The term invoked contentious debates on whether organized violence in the twenty-first century is really different from the wars of the past (Hills, 2004; Kaldor, 2013). However, as Kaldor herself argues (2013), new wars should be understood “not as an empirical category but rather as a way of elucidating the logic of con -temporary war that can offer both research strategy and a guide to policy.” In line with Kaldor’s argument, this research explores how such logic is manifested through the ef -fect of war on water infrastructure (3.2) and also makes some theoretical (6.3) and policy propositions (6.4).

1.3.1 Infrastructure studies

Origins and key ideas: The burgeoning literature on infrastructure studies comes

from a wide range of disciplines, including science and technology studies (STS), political ecology, and anthropology (Larkin, 2013; Mcfarlane & Rutherford, 2008). All these various approaches share at least two important assumptions. First, at the centre of their research they put not people but objects; second, they acknowledge that infra -structure is inherently political. In everyday life infra-structure is typically invisible – at least for the more privileged parts of society – and is perceived as highly reliable and stable. The scholars of infrastructure challenge these assumptions in their research (Furlong, 2014; Meehan, 2014). For them, infrastructure is “sunk into and inside of

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1. Introduction other structures, arrangements, and technologies” (Star, 1999), it simultaneously re-flects and reproduces social relations (Graham & Marvin, 2001). More specifically, in-frastructure demarcates both literally and figuratively which points in urban contexts are connected and which are not, and thereby who can and should be integrated within the city, and who should be left outside (Rodgers & O’Neill, 2012).

Why used in this research: The infrastructural breakdown is often seen by scholars

as a moment when the social relations underlying infrastructural networks become the most tangible (Graham, 2012). It can be argued, then, that studying infrastructure provides an interesting perspective for analysing the society we live in.

What needs to be explored: There is, however, a slim body of literature on

infrastruc-ture in the times of war (the exceptions are discussed in 3.2.3) that would (1) address the above mentioned specificity of war context from a theoretical point of view and (2) explore how infrastructure reflects and reproduces social relations in a war-torn soci-ety.

1.3.2 Political ecology

Origins and key ideas: Developed largely in 1970s and 1980s, political ecology is a

discipline that explores the complexity of ways that “human groups know, access, and struggle over the environment in multi-scale or networked power relations” (Robbins, 2005, cited in Carse, 2016). It combines the concerns of ecology and political eco-nomy (Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: p. 17) cited in Walker, 2005), arguing against “apolitical perspective and depoliticising effects” of mainstream approaches to ecolo -gical research and practice (Le Billon, 2001). Political ecologists have extensively written on water issues. For them, water is both political and biopolitical. It connects individual bodies to each other and to broader processes, which is controlled not only through formal regulation, but also self-policy (Bakker, 2012). Water may generate political conflict, as it crosses political and jurisdictional boundaries, creating competi-tion between different human groups and economic sectors (Bakker, 2012; Gandy, 2004). Political ecology challenges the naturalisation of water scarcity and argues in -stead, similarly to the assumptions of infrastructure studies, for a recognition of social and power relations that underlie water production and distribution, but are also pro -duced by them (Kaika, 2006; Loftus, 2009; Swyngedouw, Kaïka, & Castro, 2002).

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1. Introduction

Why used in this research: Political ecology provides an important understanding of

the political nature of water and, similarly to infrastructure studies, draws attentions to the social and power relations that shape access to water.

What needs to be explored: While the issue of conflict is common within political

ecology (this discipline has even been defined by Joan Martinez Alier, cited in Esco-bar, 2006, as “the study of ecological distribution conflicts”, or conflicts over access to and control over natural resources, especially in response to neoliberal globalization), little research has been done on the relations between water and the armed conflict from the political ecology perspective (Le Billon, 2001; Unruh, Heynen, & Hossler, 2003). It could be argued, however, that studying access to water resources is times of war is not less important than doing do in peace.

1.3.3 Hydraulic infrastructure and state power

Origins and key ideas: The notion that hydraulic infrastructure is deeply

interconnec-ted with the state power goes back at least to Karl Wittfogel, who in 1957 explained the rise of centralized authority in despotic regimes through the emergence of dams, canals, and irrigation technologies (Meehan, 2014). Since then, scholars from different disciplines have demonstrated how hydraulic infrastructure legitimises, represents and sustains very diverse political orders and may play a huge symbolic role in nation- and state-building (Mann, 2008; Menga, 2014; Mollinga, Obertreis, & Bichsel, 2016)

Why used in this research: The construction and further development of the

Siver-skyi Donets Donbas canal represents an interesting case of connections between large-scale hydraulic infrastructure and state power.

What needs to be explored: So far, inquiry into relations between hydraulic

infra-structure and state power has been conducted predominantly in peace, while their nature in the war context remains unexplored.

The theoretically grounded research question thus becomes: How do characterist-ics of water infrastructure manifest in new wars? Its scope is broad: it addresses the properties of infrastructural networks discussed by infrastructure studies, the politics of access to water which is of interest for political ecologists, and also the relations between hydraulic infrastructure and state power. The answer to the research question posed may contribute to these fields and address the knowledge gap identified above.

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1. Introduction

1.4 Key terms

Based on the theoretical and policy literature, this thesis has adopted the following un -derstandings of the two key terms.

1.4.1 Water infrastructure

In this study, water infrastructure includes technical artefacts (such as water treat-ment and pumping stations, water and wastewater pipes), technologies (e.g. water chlorination), institutions for water governance (organizations, like public utilities, but also the regime for water governance), as well as flows of water. Such a view on infra-structure is based on the current understanding it as “being socio-technical, rather than merely technical” (Mollinga et al., 2016) which has been largely inspired by the re-search in large technical systems (LTS) first introduced by Hughes in 1983 (Carse, 2016). The socio-technical understanding allows for a comprehensive analysis of the dynamic relations between water, infrastructure and society in both peace and war.

1.4.2 Armed conflict

According to the ICRC definition, armed conflict is a conflict which concerns govern-ment or territory and is characterized by the use of armed force. The international hu-manitarian law distinguishes between international conflicts which involve at least two states, and international armed conflicts between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups (the case of the conflict in Donbas). According to the Geneva convention common article 3, armed conflict differs from other forms of viol-ence such as riots and sporadic forms of violviol-ence by a certain level of intensity of the violence and the level of organization of the parties2_.

1.5 The structure of the thesis

In Chapter 2, I briefly introduce the methodological considerations for this research. Chapter 3 – the literature review on new wars and water infrastructure – provides a theoretical grounding for the empirical analysis. Chapter 4 explores the development of water infrastructure and the drivers for waterrelated problems in the prewar Don -bas. Chapter 5 examines the warfare impact on water infrastructure in the basin of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal and the characteristics of water infrastructure in war settings. Finally, Chapter 6 presents a synthesis of the main findings and answers to the research questions; it discusses theoretical and policy implications and identifies the directions for the future research.

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2. Methodological considerations

2 Methodological considerations

2.1 Introduction

The current chapter provides methodological reflections on conducting the literature review and using the case study research design. First, the literature review methodo -logy is presented. Second, the conceptual frameworks and units of analysis are dis-cussed. Third, the choice of the case study design and the case under examination are explained. Fourth, the chapterelaborates on collecting and analysing the data, as well as integrating them with the insights from the literature review. Finally, it reflects on the methodological limitations and ethical considerations of the research.

2.2 Literature review methodology

Relevant research concerning water infrastructure and armed conflicts was identified by searching the online scholarly databases, namely the Web of Science and Google Scholar, as well as the library of the University of Amsterdam. The policy papers were obtained primarily from the organisation websites, such as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the ICRC, the UNICEF (United Nations In-ternational Children’s Emergency Fund), ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Ac-countability and Performance), and US AID (United States Agency for International Development).

As the literature review covers three large topics – new wars, characteristics of in -frastructure and relations between hydraulic in-frastructure and state power, a wide range of search terms and in different combinations were used. The former two topics emerged by exploring the arguments about the changing nature of war and the com-plexity of infrastructure (1.1); the latter topic was formulated while looking into the political meaning of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal through history.

2.3 Conceptual framework and units of analysis

2.3.1 Conceptual frameworks

To answer the empirical and theoretical research questions, this study employs two conceptual frameworks. The first conceptual framework (Fig.1) refers to the empirical question. It is based on the assumption that to understand the effect of warfare, it is first necessary to learn about the drives of water-related problems that existed before. Therefore, the framework contains the pre-war and war drivers that include both human activities (e.g. hostilities or industrial overuse) and institutions (e.g. legal mech -anisms or environmental incentives). Institutions are understood in this framework not

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2. Methodological considerations only as organizations which are “material entities that typically figure as actors in so-cial practices”, but as “the rules of the game that determine the character of these prac-tices” (Young, 2005). Furthermore, as warfare affects both water infrastructure and pre-war drives, the diagram includes a link between pre-war and war drivers.

Following the definition of infrastructure presented in section 1.4.1, the framework includes not only hardware, but also institutions and water resources. Such under-standing of infrastructure allows to analyse the cumulative impact of warfare which is created by incremental damage to all these elements and may lead to the irreversible degradation of water supply (3.3; 5.2).

Fig. 1: War and pre-war drivers affecting water infrastructure

Source: own creation

The second conceptual framework is designed to analyse the technical and political characteristics of infrastructure in the war settings. It has been derived from the literat-ure review on new wars and infrastructliterat-ure (2.2; 3). As Figliterat-ure 2 demonstrates, this framework includes three elements: (1) the new war settings (the list of its characteristics is no case exhaustive, but they were identified as relevant for analysing water in -frastructure). Inside these settings, two concepts are located: (2) infrastructural charac-teristics and (3) the relations between infrastructure and state power. Using the insights from the empirical research, this study intends to describe the connections between these three elements.

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2. Methodological considerations

Fig. 2. 'New wars' and the characteristics of infrastructure

Source: own creation

2.3.2 Units and subunits of analysis

As Yin (2003) argues, most qualitative studies have more than one level of data collec -tion unit, and these levels are connected by the nested rela-tionship. This observa-tion is applicable to this research as well. The field setting – the basin of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal – represents a broader level which contains a narrower level – water in -frastructure which, as was mentioned in 1.4., consists of various physical artefacts, technologies, institutions and flows.

Although the canal’s infrastructure, as will be described in the Chapter 4, is formed up by a huge number of elements, this study examines only some of them. What con -cerns the artefacts, a comprehensive list of the objects damaged (see Annex 2) has been created based on the information from the official website of the local water util ity company. Therefore, these are the artefacts that have been included into the ana -lysis. What concerns institutions, two major institutional organisations in the basin of

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2. Methodological considerations the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal were examined: the Voda Donbasa (Water of Donbas) water utility company and the Siverskyi Donets river basin management organisa -tion. What concerns flows, the Siverskyi Donets river which feeds the Siverskyi Don-ets Donbas canal and the canal itself are analysed. Finally, although the technologies have received much less attention in this study, the role of chlorination is mentioned in 5.2-3.

2.4 Research design and case selection

This is a qualitative single case study which examines the widely defined (1.4) water infrastructure in the basin of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal. This basin now in-cludes the territories of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Ukraine. Before April 2014, these areas constituted the Donetska province of Ukraine. Choos -ing the scale of the water basin instead of focus-ing on a s-ingle city allows to explore the spatial heterogeneity, complexity and interconnectedness of infrastructure. The Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal was chosen for a simple reason: it is, in fact, the only major source of water in the Donetska province. People and industries on both sides of the border are highly dependent on it. To provide some illustration of water infrastruc-ture in the urban context, the case of Donetsk has been used. This city, which is con-sidered to be an informal capital of the Donbas region, was chosen for the two main reasons: it is a large city with a developed network of infrastructure and it has played an important role in the armed conflict.

The choice of the case study design was stipulated by the fact it is particularly well suited to provide “in-depth understanding of the complex social phenomena occurring in a bounded context” (Miles and Huberman (1994), cited in: Baxter, Susan Jack, & Jack, 2008) – here, the effect of the armed conflict on water infrastructure in Donbas.

Moreover, as argue George and Bennett (2005:4–5), cited in: Baxter et al., 2008), case studies are strong methodological instruments for evaluating conceptual validity and sensitivity of concepts in particular contexts, deriving new hypotheses, exploring causal mechanisms, modelling and assessing complex causal relationships. All these tasks are relevant for this study, as was explained in the introduction.

This study looks at the impact of warfare on water infrastructure from different per -spectives (and not, for instance, exclusively assesses damage to physical infrastruc-ture), and thushas exploratory nature. According to Yin's (2003) classification, it is characteristic of situations in which “the intervention being evaluated has no clear,

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2. Methodological considerations single set of outcomes.” Following the classification suggested by Stake (1995), the case under study may be described as both (a) intrinsic and (b) instrumental. The em -pirical research question is aimed at better understanding the case of Donbas (a), but it is hoped that the insights gained may contribute to the general comprehension of water infrastructure in the war context (b).

2.5 Collection and analysis of the data

2.5.1 Data collection

Using multiple data sources, suggests Yin (1993, 2003), is the hallmark of case study research. It enhances data credibility and allows for a holistic understanding of the phenomenon under study. He mentions six main data sources: documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artefacts, direct observations, and participant observation. For security reasons, this research did not involve the visiting of Donetsk; in the ab -sence of physical artefacts and both forms of observation, all sorts of documentation, both historical and recent, along with interviews become the main sources of evidence.

Data gathering consisted of two phases. The first phase included the analysis of policy reports, official documents, research papers, and media coverage. It was used to identify the potential objects and issues for closer examination and to understand the general public discourse around the topic.

A comprehensive search was made of Internet news resources in the Donbas re -gion, as well as other news websites in Ukrainian and Russian languages. I examined the previously published materials on water infrastructure and subscribed for the up-dates. The same strategy was applied for the websites of the authorities and organisations related to water supply, as well as the international aid and nongovernmental or -ganisation. A list of the key websites used is provided in the Appendix 1.

In the second phase, to get deeper and richer data, but also to triangulate the results from the first phase, six semi-structured interviews were conducted (via Skype and e-mail). The respondents were the following: the deputy director of the Siverskyi Don-etsk river basin management organization, a representative of the Ukrainian environmental NGO that has been conducting ecological monitoring in the area since the be -ginning of war and published a special report on this issue in 2014 (Melen’-Zabramna et al., 2015), journalists (both Ukrainian and foreign) who have been writing on social impacts of war and on the water provision in the region; people who live in the area

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2. Methodological considerations under study. These interviews were audio recorded, later transcribed and coded, as will be elaborated below.

2.5.2 Data analysis

According to Yin (2003, pp.111-115), there are three general strategies for analysing case study evidence: relying on theoretical propositions; thinking about rival explana -tions, and developing a case description. The primary strategy he recommends and which is applied in this study is using the theoretical propositions that guide data col -lection and place limits on the scope of the study. In this case, the theoretical proposi-tions come from the literature (chapter 3) and the two conceptual frameworks de-scribed above (2.3.1). After the theoretical propositions have been formed, a patter-matching technique was used. It compares empirically based patterns with predicted ones. If the patterns coincide, it strengthens the internal validity of a case study (Yin, 2003). To analyse the empirical data, the documents and transcriptions of the inter views were coded in the Atlas.ti using the thematic coding approach. The themes iden -tified were compared to the theoretical propositions, as well as between the two sources of data (documents and interviews).

2.5 Limitations and ethical considerations

As a consequence of conducting the research from abroad, this study encountered a number of limitations. First of all, I had to rely only on the documented evidence and the information provided by my respondents, without a possibility to triangulate them via personal observation. Although I attempted to avoid the biasing of study and there-fore tried to approach the respondents who might have had different views on the topic, I did not manage to reach the authorities of the Donetsk People's Republic and the ideological supporters of the DPR.

Although in almost any study a researcher may face the difficulties of distinguish-ing between true and false information, in the highly politicized context of war this task has turned out to be especially challenging. Depending on their political orienta tion, media and reports may provide quite a different picture of the same event (for in -stance, on who was responsible for shelling of the Donetsk Water Treatment Plant, or did the cooperation between the separatists and the government of Ukraine on recon -structing railways start or not). Moreover, based on the interviews it may argued that many things are not reported at all. Infrastructure networks are seen as strategic ob -jects, and therefore obtaining information about the unreported, about the ‘silent

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ar-2. Methodological considerations rangements’ and illegal practices3_{is very difficult from the distance but could have}

also been a problematic undertaking on the ground.

Another limitation is that the situation in the conflict area is changing fast. It means that sometimes information received three weeks ago may be seen in a different light today. Moreover, one of the inherent limitations of the case study approach is the lim-ited generalizability. In fact, even in the other self-proclaimed republic in the Donbas region – the Luhansk People’s Republic, which has followed more or less the same political scenario, the situation may be quite different. I do hope, however, that some of the insights may still contribute to the understanding of water infrastructure in war.

To avoid any harm to the participants of this research, their confidentiality and an-onymity is respected. Also, it is important to conduct a research in an independent manner, present different opinions and acknowledge the position of the researcher. Al -though, as was mentioned above, I did not manage to reach the respondents from the DPR side, their official sources of communication (websites of utility companies, Min-istries, State and City Councils) were carefully scrutinized (see 2.5.1; Annex 1). Lan-guage use, especially in this case, can be highly politicized, and therefore this aspect was treated with great consideration while conducting interviews and presenting the results.

2.6 Note on Transliteration and Translation

For the geographical and proper names, the ALA-LC transliteration scheme for the Ukrainian language has been used. All translations from Russian and Ukrainian texts are my own.

3 Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure

The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate how certain characteristics of new wars re-late to the characteristics of infrastructure. It is guided by the following questions: 1. Why do new wars pose a particular risk for water infrastructure? 2. How can we de -scribe wartime damage to water infrastructure? 3. How do individuals and institutions respond to this damage? 4. Why is hydraulic infrastructure important for the state?

The chapter begins by discussing the specificity of contemporary warfare and elab-orating on the concepts of ‘new wars’, ‘frozen conflicts’, and ‘infrastructural warfare.'

3 _{Some of the accounts of these events were provided by journalists:}

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure Identifying the characteristics of warfare that might have impact on infrastructure helps to identify the potential drivers of the water-related problems (Q1) in wartime, as well as different types of warfare damage (Q2). Then, it examines the responses to this damage (Q3). It is followed by the discussion of the characteristics of infrastructure that become especially tangible in the moment of its disruption (Q1). Finally, the rela -tionships between hydraulic infrastructure plays and the state are discussed (Q4).

3.2 'New wars' as drivers of infrastructural damage

3.2.1 Defining 'new wars'

Armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War, particularly in Africa and Eastern Europe, are sometimes described as 'new wars' (Kaldor, 1999). This idea has its op-ponents who say that the goals and strategies of the new wars are not so different from the old ones (Hills, 2004) or that contemporary organized violence is too privatized and criminalized to be properly described as wars (Kaldor, 2013). There are also pro-ponents of this concept: for them, it “reflects both the heightened complexity of many violent conflicts involving multiple nonstate belligerents and the difficulties of char -acterizing the range of modern warfare” (Hanson & Machlis, 2008).

This thesis will not go further into the debates about the validity of the term, but will rather use the concept of new wars to analyse the logic (Kaldor, 2013) and complexities of contemporary armed conflicts. There are many possible points for compar -ison the 'old' and the 'new' wars; for instance, it is suggested that the goals of the new wars are about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars. Also, these wars are more decentralized in terms of their military organiz -ation and financing, being heavily dependent of external resources (Kaldor, 1999, 2013)

However, given the scope of this study (see 1.1), only the following aspects of new wars are explored: the rise of non-state actors, urbanisation of war and its protracted nature.

3.2.2 Rise of non-state actors

One of the fundamental changes in new wars concerns the belligerent parties. Nowadays, interstate conflicts are decreasing, while the incidence of intrastate viol -ence is increasing (Francis, 2011; ICRC, 2015; Weir et al., 2015). This includes both

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure informal warfare4_{, where at least one party is a non-state military (}_{armed groups or} private military contractors),and ‘grey area’ warfare which involves the elements of organized crime (Francis & Krishnamurthy, 2014; Hanson & Machlis, 2008). In new wars, the distinctions between war(commonly defined as “violence between states or organized political groups for political motives”), organized crime (“violence under-taken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain”) and largescale violations of human rights (“violence undertaken by states or politically or -ganized groups against individuals”) (Kaldor, 2013) often become blurred.

What does it mean for water infrastructure: Perhaps the most significant implica-tion of the involvement of non-state actors is that it complicates the efforts to develop and reinforce laws and norms regarding the protection of resources and objects of in -frastructure in wartime settings, as well as to define responsibility for wartime damage and establish cooperation for addressing it (Weir et al., 2015). Furthermore, Francis (2011) suggests that “informal and grey area warfare are far more likely to involve in-tentional or inadvertent degradation of the environment, are less likely to involve high-technology post-modern military applications such as high-precision missiles that may limit the extent and scale of the damage; and their environmental impacts are less likely to be well-documented, researched, mitigated or recovered from.”

3.2.3 Urbanization of war

It has been recognized among both proponents and opponents of the new wars concept, as well as in the policy literature5_{(Gould et al., 2014; ICRC, 2015; Cosgrave,}

2014) that modern warfare becomes increasingly urbanized. It implies the change of military strategies, as urban environments are very complex and challenging due to the presence of the non-combatants and different from open terrains where many wars of the past took place (Graham, 2009; Hills, 2004); cities and towns are “never neutral environments,” and it is argued that their social, political, and economic characteristics can both catalyse or ameliorate existing conflicts (Hills, 2004). Moreover, some suggest that “urban contexts are potentially more vulnerable in times of emergencies, ow

-4 _I_{f one part is a professional army and the other is an insurgency or resistance movement, it} is called “asymmetric warfare”, as their relative military power, strategy or tactics often differ significantly (Hanson & Machlis, 2008).

5 _{Until quite recently, however, the urban context has been largely overlooked, as the focus of aid}

agencies was predominantly on the rural areas. As a result, “there are many effective technologies for use in a rural or camp setting, but relatively few for use in urban settings.” (Cosgrave, 2014)

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure ing to this dynamism coupled with comparatively fewer coping strategies and higher reliance upon services” (Gould et al., 2014).

It also means that everyday spaces of urban life become “strategic battlefields of our era” and potential areas for terrorist attacks (Coward, 2006, 2009; Graham, 2006). The concept of 'new military urbanism” offered by Graham (2010) describes “the paradigmatic shift that renders cities' communal and private spaces, as well as their infrastructure – along with their civilian population – a source of targets and threats.” It implies that new wars produce “potentially boundless, continuous land -scapes of conflict and risk” (Graham, 2013): the unpredictable threat may be coming from any direction and be targeted at any part of urban life.

What does it mean for water infrastructure:In urbanized environment (not only in cities, but also in tows and villages) infrastructure is important because it links area and its population, or actually “constitutes society as a whole,” as was put by the US power theorist Edward Felkner in his reflection on the experience of the US army in 1991 war with Iraq (Graham, 2006). As was already mentioned in the introduction (1.3.1-2), his opinion is shared by many scholars who see infrastructure as a key ele-ment of modernization and the constitutive eleele-ment of the city, arguing that “infra-structure networks are prerequisites to any notion of modern 'civilization'” and “the embodiment of Enlightenment dreams of the social control of nature through advances in technology and science” (Gandy, 2004).

Although it is generally agreed that infrastructure occupies an important place in contemporary warfare, there are, however, different interpretations of it. For instance, Hills (2004) argues that since the mid-1990soperational objectives have been usually understood in terms of control rather than devastation, “either because power-genera-tions plants, water-supply systems or police stapower-genera-tions have an operational significance not found in other operations, or because there is utility in keeping cities working.”

Graham (2006) offers another perspective. The deliberate targeting of infrastructure deployed by state and non-state fighters alike he describes as ‘infrastructural warfare.” For him, the forced denial of flow and circulation serves as a “powerful political and military weapon” (Graham, 2006). He elaborates on how such targeting becomes a distinct and widespread military strategy that causes longlasting deterioration of infra structure and may lead to the severe public health crises and general “forced demod ernisation” of society. He illustrates it using the case of Iraq, where the sanitation in

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-3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure frastructure was constantly damaged by bombing electricity infrastructure (this 'cas-cading effect' will be discussed in 3.4.2); it resulted in the acute increase in water-borne diseases. This destruction, Graham (2006) argues, is legitimized by new military doctrines as a necessary and supposedly “nonlethal” means, but in the long run it kills much more people than hostilities do, particularly affecting “the old, the young, and the ill” (Graham, 2012; Gorostiza, March, & Sauri, 2015).

3.2.4 Protracted conflict

Contemporary wars become almost permanent, boundless in time, and sometimes they are labeled as ‘low-intensity conflict’, ‘netwar’, or ‘the long war” (Graham, 2009, 2010; Kaldor, 1999). And as wars turn into long-lasting and low-intense, it is increas-ingly difficult to distinguish between war and peace, conflict and post-conflict. Even when the violence pick has declined, post-conflict rarely means that “violence and strife have ceased at a given moment in all corners of a country’s territory” (Brinker-hoff, 2005). Or as Conca and Wallace put it: “Peace in this context can be thought of as a continuum ranging from the absence of violent conflict to, in its most robust form, the unimaginability of violent conflict” (Conca & Wallace, 2009). Moreover, as was noted above, targeting infrastructure can produce long-lasting effects which may be felt long after the pick of hostilities and pose significant challenges for country's re -covery.

The concept of ‘frozen conflicts’ exemplifies the protracted nature of contemporary warfare. This is the case when after the violent conflict one of the military parties has “established effective control over specific territories and setting up de facto state in-stitutions”, but this military outcome is not recognized neither by the defeated party not by the international community, and therefore the conflict is not considered re -solved (Nodia, 2004). Frozen conflicts may be seen as a feature of new wars, but this term has been extensively used on its own. And similarly to the idea of new wars, this definition has also been contested. Some scholars have argued the adjective ‘frozen’ is misleading, as “it suggests an absence of political activity, whereas in most, if not all, ‘frozen conflicts’ the opposite is true” (Clancy & Nagle, 2009). However, the usage of this term can be justified “as far as all the parties involved agree not to challenge the effective regime of military-political control as shaped after the last ceasefire, without recognising it as legitimate”, and the instances of sporadic violence do not change the

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure situation (Nodia, 2004). Not getting into the debates over terminology, this study con-siders this term useful to describe a particular stage of a conflict.

What does it mean for water infrastructure: Due to the constant damage to

infra-structure networks and/or the risk of it, the lack of finance and unstable governance, water infrastructure in the wartime becomes increasingly deteriorated (and often it was so already before the conflict) (USAID, 2014). Also, the short-term needs (e.g. imme-diate repairs) are usually prioritized over the more long-term ones, however beneficial they might be (J. F. Pinera, 2012). In the above mentioned case of Iraq, for example, such situation lasted for decades, making any serious interventions impossible (Gra-ham, 2006). All together, it creates the cumulative impact, which will be discussed in the section below. What concerns damage to water resources, in such 'long wars' it is usually low-intense, chronic and is generally not addressed.

3.3 Types of warfare damage and response to it

In the literature reviewed, different classifications of warfare damage to water infra -structure are presented. Any element that makes up water infrastructure – hardware, institutions, technologies, or water resources can be affected by the armed conflict dir-ectly (e.g. a water tower pierced by a tank shell, or chlorine shortages due to sanc-tions)6_{. They can be also affected indirectly, for instance when the stuff of local utility}

company is not showing up for work because access is unsafe, or when the collapse of environmental governance allows for – or pushes people and industries towards more unsustainable practices of water use (Weir et al., 2015; Zeitoun et al., 2014).

Moreover, the warfare damage may be differentiated from the legal point of view. In their analytical framework of water and armed conflict, Zeitoun et al. (2014) distin-guish between indiscriminate (arising from the indiscriminate attacks, prohibited by International Humanitarian Law, which are not directed at a specific military object-ive) and discriminate damage (“arising from attacks with specific military objectives, signifying intentional or targeted destruction”) to water resources, infrastructure, water sector institutions, and transboundary water conflict and cooperation. This legal cat-egorization of warfare damage is important as it has direct implications for the degree

6 _{Due to technological advancements, more hi-tech and often remote types of warfare have}

emerged. In theory, they are more targeted and therefore less destructive (see also Francis's comment in 3.2.1). For this reason, they are sometimes being legitimized in comparison to more low-tech and destructive weaponry (Smith, 2002). However, the discussion of more

high-tech tactics goes beyond thescope of this thesis, as the war in Donbas is fought by

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure of protection guaranteed by international laws and norms (Zeitoun et al., 2014). The protection of water resources is arguably even more problematic, and one of the reas ons for that is the “restrictive and unclear” definition of the impermissible environ -mental damage (Bothe et al., 2010).

Over time, incremental direct and indirect impacts may develop into the cumulative impact which reproduces “vicious cycles” of damage, causing the irreversible deterior-ation of all the elements of water infrastructure and significantly increasing risks to public health (ICRC, 2015). Below (Fig. 3), a visual representation of the cumulative impact and the “vicious cycles” of damage is provided.

This kind of impact is often too technically difficult or too expensive to address, and therefore is often neglected in restoration programs (ICRC, 2015). In general, the response to warfare damage to water infrastructure is focused on direct impacts. It is commonly manifested through investments into hardware reconstruction, although the reconstruction of institutions is increasingly seen as an important goal as well (Pinera, 2012; Pinera & Reed, 2011). Although it is often recommended to “involve communit-ies where public infrastructure is being constructed” (US AID, 2014), the response to water-related problems that comes from below and outside institutions is rarely dis-cussed. There are, however, a few examples described in the literature. For instance, in Gaza people have responded to the conflict and breakdown in water governance by “digging their own domestic or agricultural wells and tapping without licence into the municipal networks, thus exacerbating the reduction in the quality of the aquifer wa-ter.” (ICRC, 2015). Such responses may be seen as a kind of indirect impact of war-fare, and should be taken into account as well.

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure

Fig. 3. Cumulative impact: the vicious cycle (combination of direct and indirect impacts) leads to services decline and risks to public health.

Source: ICRC 2015 (p. 10)

3.4 Characteristics of water infrastructure in war settings

3.4.1 The role of infrastructural breakdown

One of the primary and the most visible effects of armed conflict on infrastructure is the disruption of its normal functioning. As was briefly mentioned in introduction (1.3.1), infrastructure studies tend to highlight the moments of breakdown and disrup-tion as powerful ways of “really penetrating and problematising those very normalities of flow and circulation, revealing urban infrastructure systems to be much more than the technocratic engineer’s stuff configured in value-free ways to serve some notional public good often imagined” (Graham, 2012, p. 3).

When infrastructure fails, its inherent characteristics, that are normally hidden, be -come revealed. Some of them are discussed below.

3.4.2 Complexity and interconnectedness

Modern cities rely on increasingly complex and large-scale infrastructures that provide essential urban services. These services can be disrupted by adverse effects on any of the components that make up the service: critical people (e.g. maintenance staff), crit-ical hardware (e.g. infrastructure and equipment) and critcrit-ical consumables (e.g. fuel,

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure It means that each of these elements is crucial for the seamless functioning of infrastructure. The scholars of infrastructure challenge the common assumption that infra -structure networks are robust and always reliable systems: often the smallest obstacle — such as a slight alteration leading to an extra button having to be pressed — can cause frustration and prevent them [systems] from being used” (Star, 1999, cited in Eriksson, 2016). For her, the “magnification process pertaining to the scale of infra-structures is not visible if we only look at a single user with a given system, but must be understood as part of the complex and delicate process of weaving together sys-tems, tasks and organizational structures.” (Eriksson, 2016)

This observation may be extrapolated to the whole network of different infrastruc-tural systems. Although infrastructures are usually considered separately, they are “ ac-tually woven together in all sorts of muac-tually dependent ways” (Graham, 2012. p. 18). Such interconnectedness sometimes causes the so-called “cascading effect” (Howe et al., 2016; Sims, 2010), when damage to one of the infrastructural systems may easily affect another.

This theoretical argument is also supported by policy literature. For example, the ICRC report (2015) provides a good illustration of the cascading effect: “a damaged electrical transformer can immediately shut down the supply of water to an entire neighbourhood or hospital, greatly reducing the quality of the public health service and drastically increasing the risks posed to public health and well-being.”

3.4.3 The vast scale of infrastructural networks

Infrastructural networks that sustain urban life (e.g. electrical power plants, supply routes, water and wastewater treatment plants) usually extend far beyond the city. It means that even very distant hostilities can have dramatic effect on urban dwellers (ICRC, 2015).

The scale, complexity and interconnectedness of infrastructural networks not only make them particularly vulnerable to warfare damage, but also complicate the process of restoration (Cosgrave, 2014). Moreover, the provisions of IHL (International Hu-manitarian Law) do not account for these peculiarities: the law provides object-spe-cific protection and “does not expressly acknowledge the interconnectivity or the in-creasing complexity, and thus vulnerability, of essential services in urban areas” (ICRC, 2015).

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure 3.4.4 Spatial heterogeneity

In urbanized areas infrastructures are not only very complex, but may also differ significantly across space. For example, within the same city there may be a mix of: 1) the formal areas of different density, that are planned, designed and serviced by roads, power, water and sewerage; 2) partially developed, but typically unplanned peri-urban areas which have some services, like there may be piped water to stand-posts, but no piped sewerage and 3) shanty towns with no public services (ICRC, 2015).

This heterogeneity often implies various levels of connectivity: in less formal parts of the cities there is likely to be at least some decentralized systems (e.g. wells), and therefore they may be exposed to different kinds of damage. The distinction between the serviced and unserviced areas, the RedR report (Cosgrave, 2014) argues, is important for humanitarian response because different cases may require different technolo -gies. For instance, the methods to support the unserviced and partially serviced areas may be closer to those used for rural population: “the serviced city will benefit from household water connections, and the other areas from public standposts or water tankers” (Cosgrave 2014).

The spatial heterogeneity of infrastructure is also manifested in the presence of back-up systems or alternative sources of supply for different groups of population: just beyond the borders of the “main nodes and enclaves of the globalized corporate economy... service interruptions and disruptions often expose a stark lack of alternat -ives” (Graham, 2012, p. 15). Therefore, it may be argued that infrastructures act as “material channels of particular regimes of injustice and simultaneously reenforce them” (Rodgers, 2012) not only in peace (1.3.1), but also in war.

3.4.5 Precariousness

When the inner workings of infrastructure networks upon which everyday life relies are only penetrated by specialists and are completely hidden to its users, their success -ful functioning becomes blackboxed and taken for granted, ‘stabilised’7_{, “essentially}

immune to change or external influence” (Furlong, 2011). Due to the alleged completeness and perfect order, infrastructural networks are seen as a “symbol of the com -plexity, ubiquity, and the embodied power of modern technology” (Graham, 2012, p.

7 _{It could be argued, though, the assumptions about invisibility and stability hold true only}

in the Western context. In many places (countries or communities within countries or cit-ies) where access to water is a continuous struggle and negotiation — at least for the mar-ginalized groups of people, infrastructure is not necessary normalized and taken for

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gran-3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure 8). Moreover, infrastructural megaprojects, such as huge electrical generating stations, elaborate water treatment or desalinisation complexes act as “symbols of urban and national arrival, power, status, and kudos” (Graham, 2012, p. 4). This quality of infra-structure will be further discussed in sections 3.5, 4.4 and 5.3.4.

However, some scholars suggest that infrastructures are much less stable as it is usually believed: “infrastructure networks are, in effect, always precarious achievements, and not so much a static product but a processes that have to be worked to -ward” (Graham, 2012). The precariousness of infrastructure also implies the need for constant support, repair and maintenance (Graham & Thrift, 2007).

Furthermore, infrastructures are “shaped by, yet also exceed, the intentions of their builders” (Carse, 2016). For example, in her study of water theft in Tijuana Meehan (2013) describes how technologies do not always perform as expected, and sometimes even small interventions by the residents into the 'fixed' water networks may 'unblackbox' them and “transform the power geometries in which [water technologies] are em -bedded.”

3.5 Hydraulic infrastructure and state power

As was argued in the introduction (1.3.3), the Wittfogelian idea of the relationship between large-scale hydraulic infrastructure and the rise of despotic regimes has been revisited by many scholars. Although – or precisely because – this assumption has been heavily criticized (e.g. for being “too rooted in technological determinism, empir -ically too selective in its attention to certain states, and ideolog-ically too motivated by anti-communism” (Worster, 1985; cited in Mollinga et al., 2016), it was followed by quite a substantial body of research on water infrastructure and state power.

In their introduction to the special issue on water, infrastructure and political rule in the Water Alternatives magazine, Mollinga et al. (2016) present a comprehensive re-view of the main approaches to this issue. A brief summary, supplemented by some ad-ditional examples, is provided below.

(1) Hydroengineering constructions have played an important role in imperial, co -lonial and postco-lonial regimes, actings as tools for imperial integration, production and manifestation of colonial power.

(2) Water infrastructure may be a crucial part of the nationbuilding project. For in -stance, land reclamation in the Oder Marshes or the 'correction' of the Rhine were

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure “formative for and indicative of” the Prussian-Russian nation-building from the 18th_to

the 20th_{century (David Blackbourn, cited in Mollinga et al., 2016).}

(3) In socialist and post-socialist settings large-scale infrastructure was been not only symbolic for nation-building, but also had ideological meaning, being used to realize “socialist visions of remaking landscape and society” (Mollinga et al. (2016), see also Menga, 2014, and 4.4.2).

(4) Water infrastructure is sometimes seen as one of the major vectors for the organ-isation of society by the state. While Wittfogel described the role of infrastructure in creating despotic regimes, Mann introduced the concept of infrastructural power which reflects the institutional capacity of a central state to penetrate civil society and logistically implement decisions across territories (Mann, 2008). For him, infrastruc-tural power is opposite to despotic power which means the ability of the state elite to impose their will on civil society: infrastructural power is characterized by capability to monitor and receive information, while despotic power is defined by ability to pun -ish (Mann, 2008). Further developing the concept, Soifer (2008) suggests three ways of its conceptualization: infrastructural power as the capabilities of the central state (resources potentially at its disposal), as the territorial reach of the state (or subnational variations in power), and as “weight of the state” — resources actually deployed and the effects of the state on society.

Moreover, this strand of research has described how non-state actors, such as hy-dropower corporations and international investors, start to participate in the process of state-making, for instance through dam building.

Although this literature review did not reveal any paper that would specifically dis -cuss the relations between hydraulic infrastructure and state in war context, the above mentioned approaches may become useful starting points for further research.

3.6 Summary

Water infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to warfare damage for the following reasons. First, new wars increasingly often play out in urbanized areas that are highly dependent on complex, interconnected, vast, spatially heterogeneous and precarious infrastructural networks. Even a small obstacle can affect the whole system. Second, armed conflicts tend to become protracted and almost boundless in time. It means fur -ther deterioration of infrastructure and creates difficulties for addressing the damage.

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3. Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure Third, new wars are typically intrastate and involve non-state actors. The current mechanisms for protecting water infrastructure do not address these peculiarities.

To effectively address wartime damage, it is important to acknowledge different types of it. Infrastructure can be targeted deliberately, but it can also experience indir ect impact from hostilities. Over time, incremental impacts create the cumulative im -pact which may cause irreversible deterioration of water infrastructure. Traditionally, institutional response has been focused on direct damage to physical artefacts, but the need to address indirect impacts and to involve local stakeholders into the reconstruc -tion process is increasingly recognized. However, the individual response, which sometimes may involve unsustainable practices and therefore exacerbate damage, is still usually neglected. Finally, hydraulic infrastructure is important for state because of its symbolic meaning and ability to organize the life of society. There are numerous examples of these in different political contexts and regimes.

4 Water infrastructure in Donbas before the war

To understand the peculiarity of the war context, it is first necessary to have a good grasp of how did water infrastructure develop, what were the tools for governing water and the drivers of water problems before the war. To do so, this chapter traces the his-tory of water infrastructure in Donbas since the 19th_{century, when the region started to}

grow due to the rapid industrialization, until the beginning of war in April 2014. The chapter is guided by the following subquestions: 1. Why and in which ways was the construction of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal important for the Soviet authorit -ies? 2. How did human activity and tools of water governance affect water infrastruc-ture in Donbas? The chapter is strucinfrastruc-tured as follows. First, it presents general hydrolo-gical characteristics of the region (4.2). Second, it discusses the history of the canal and water provision in Donetsk, thereby analysing the relations between hydraulic in-frastructure and state power (4.3). Third, it discusses water problems in Donbas using the above presented conceptual framework (4.4). Finally, the key insights of the chapter and insights to the subquestions are presented (4.5).

4.2 General information and hydrological characteristics

Donbas is a historical, economic and cultural region in eastern Ukraine. It historically encompasses two oblasts: Donetska and Luhanska (provinces equivalent to the Euro

The impact of new wars on water infrastructure : the case of Donbas

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc Human Geography

First supervisor: Prof. Joyeeta Gupta

Second supervisor: Dr. Eric Chu

Master thesis

The Impact of New Wars on Water Infrastructure:

– The Case of Donbas –

Table of Contents

List of figures

Appendices

List of Abbreviations

Abstract

Acknowledgements

1 Introduction

2 Methodological considerations

3 Literature review: on 'new wars' and water infrastructure

4 Water infrastructure in Donbas before the war