Challenges for the transition to renewable energy : the case of offshore wind in the Netherlands (1970-2016)

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Challenges for the transition to renewable energy:

The case of offshore wind in the Netherlands (1970-2016)

MSc Political Science: Political Economy

Final Research Paper: Energy and Geopolitical Economy in Eurasia June 23rd_{, 2017}

Author: Supervisor:

M.T. (Marijn) Popma dhr. Dr. M.P. (Mehdi) Amineh

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Abstract

This thesis provides a study on the energy transition in the Netherlands with a focus on the influence of the institutional structure for offshore wind development and implementation. It is argued that the Dutch power-wealth structure is protected by the incumbent economic regime through their involvement in the policy-making process. While the large-scale implementation of offshore wind power in the Netherlands yields a great success in the Dutch energy transition, it also inclines a continuation of the old power configuration within the existing institutional structure. This exemplifies the tendencies in Dutch energy and climate policies to dismiss measures to support break-through options.

Keywords:

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Acknowledgement

This research is the result of five months of research and a steep learning curve, both on an academic and a personal level. First and foremost my thanks go out to Dr. Mehdi Amineh for his inexhaustible dedication, support and feedback during this research project. If it had not been for him, I would probably not have finished on time because only his encouragement could ever make me work night and day. I chose to stick with the same professor for my Master’s thesis as the one during my Bachelor’s thesis because I’m convinced of his method of teaching and supervising. His approach is one in which he left me plenty of room to orient myself and discover my own approach, while also taking the opportunity to take matters into my own hands, to become acquainted with the guild of science, and to genuinely challenge myself intellectually. Furthermore, I want to thank all interviewees and their respective institutions for the time they invested in my project. Besides all the relevant information and new insights, these people provided me with advice and helped me to make the relevant connections with other organizations and people in the field. Moreover, I am very grateful to Thor Rydin who proofread my thesis. Lastly, I want to thank my family and friends for their

encouragement and unreserved support during the whole process.

Marijn Popma June 23rd, 2017

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Maps

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Map 2: The European Union (28 Members)

Source: http://www.majorindependence.com/map-of-the-eu-countries/map-of-the-eu-countries-5-which-countries-use-euro-map-eurozone/

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List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 2.1 Population of the world and major areas, 2015 and projections 29

Table 2.2 Main origin of primary energy imports 34

Table 2.5 Energy dependency rates of EU Member States 34 Table 3.1 Installed wind power in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2004 45 Table 4.1 Export destinations and import origins of the Netherlands 57

Figures

Figure 1.1 The multilevel perspective on societal transitions 22 Figure 2.1 Average annual rate of population change by major area 30 Figure 2.2 OECD and Non-OECD annual GDP growth between 2012 and 2040 31 Figure 2.3 The Global Car Fleet, 2015 and 2035 predictions 32 Figure 2.4 Energy mix of the European Union (2014) 33 Figure 2.5 Energy dependency rates of EU Member States 34 Figure 2.6 Electricity production per capita by fuel type (2013) 35 Figure 2.7 Share of Total Primary Energy Supply in the Netherlands by fuel (2014) 36

Figure 3.1 Share of renewables in total energy consumption 50 Figure 4.1 Offshore wind power in the Netherlands, operational and planned 55

Figure 4.2 Gas revenues of the Dutch state 58

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List of Abbreviations

ALARP As Low as Reasonably Possible

bcm Billion cubic meter 

bbl/d Billion barrels per day 

CBS Statistics Netherlands

CCS Carbon Capture and Storage

CDA Dutch Christian Party

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CO2 Carbon dioxide

D66 Dutch Democratic Reform Party

EC European Commission

ECN Energy research Centre of the Netherlands

EIA Energy Information Administration  

EU European Union

EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading System

EZ Ministry of Economic Affairs

FD Financieel Dagblad

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FtM  Follow the Money

GDP Gross Domestic Product 

GW Gigawatt

I&M Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment

IEA International Energy Agency 

IOC International Oil Company

IOGP International Oil and Gas Producers

IPE International Political Economy 

IR International Relations

IPW Integral Wind Program

kW Kilowatt

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MW Megawatt

MWh Megawatt per hour

NAM Dutch Petroleum Company

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NIMBY Not In My Backyard (syndrome)

NMP National Environmental Action Plan

NOGEPA Dutch Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Association

NOW National Research Program Wind Energy

NVDE Dutch Association for Sustainable Energy

NWEA Dutch Windenergy Association

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OWEZ Offshore Windpark Egmond aan Zee

P2G Power-to-Gas

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 

PvdA Dutch Labor Party

R&D Research & Development

ROI Return on Investments

SDE(+) Stimulation of Sustainable Energy Production

SEP Cooperating Electricity Production Companies

SER Social and Economic Council

SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterpirises

TNC Transnational Company

UN United Nations

US EIA U.S. Energy Information Administration

Vamil Tax relief scheme for environmentally friendly investment

VNO-NCW Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers VROM Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment

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Chapter 1: Research Design

1.1 Introduction

With the commitment of 196 countries to the Paris Agreement of the United Nations in 2015 a historical step has been taken towards the combat of climate change. As a member of the European Union, the Netherlands is bound by the ambitious objectives laid down in the agreement. Offshore wind power will play an important role to make the transition to a low-carbon sustainable economy. Capacity of offshore wind is steadily scaling-up and costs are dropping at fast pace. The production of wind power is

becoming ever more cost-efficient and is now able to compete with conventional fossil fuels. To make a successful transition from fossil energy to alternative energy, however, some major obstacles will have to be overcome. Because of the different characteristics of renewable energy, such ‘socio-technical’

transitions entail the mutual restructuring of some key subsystems in our modern economies and the compatibility of production means, infrastructure and political and economic institutions. We see that while the EU is on track to meet the 2020 target of 20 percent renewable energy, the Netherlands is strongly lagging behind to reach its far lower national binding target of only 14 percent. Having one of the most fossil-intensive economies in Europe significant steps will have to be taken to genuinely incite structural change in the Dutch energy system.

1.2 Research Question and Objectives

The central question of this thesis is: “What are the challenges for the development and implementation of offshore wind energy in the Netherlands (1970-2016)?” The research is further divided into five sub-questions, all of which explain one or more of the respective challenges subject to this research that allow us to gain a comprehensive understanding of the problem to offshore wind power development and implementation. These are:

1. What is the energy situation of the Netherlands and the European Union? 2. What is the role of fossil fuels in the Dutch economy?

3. What is the transition governance framework of the Netherlands within the context of the energy and climate strategy of the European Union?

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According to Loobach (2008), a transition occurs when the socio-technical regime level, the landscape level and the technological niche level align. This study examines to what extent these three scale levels align in the case of the transition to renewable energy sources in the Netherlands and the consequences of the country’s pathway for the future development of the transition. The aim of this thesis is threefold. First, the thesis attempts to provide a picture of the current state of development of the energy transition and whether the development and implementation of offshore wind energy is to be regarded as a success or as a failure. The second objective is to identify some key challenges as well as possibilities for offshore wind at the current state of the energy transition of the Netherlands. Third, and last, unraveling the complex interaction between economical, institutional and technical structures allows to identify the role of interest groups in the policy-making process as well as the key structural determinants influencing the transition pathway of the Netherlands.

1.3 Social Relevance

Successful development and implementation of renewable energy in modern day societies has the

potential to solve some of the key problems of our time. First and foremost, the transition to low-carbon energy could be one of the greatest contributors to tackle modern externalities related to climate change. Some of the most imminent problems of our time, such environmental degradation and increasing migration flows, can, at leas partially, also be traced back to the increased use of fossil fuels and global warming resulting thereof (Mommers, 2017). The way we choose to set up our energy systems will, therefore, determine to a greater extent than ever what the future will look like. Second, a successful transition to renewable energy would reduce our dependency on imports from unstable or politically unfriendly regimes in the Greater Middle-East and Russia. The European Union is dependent for over half of its primary energy consumption on import from abroad. Increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix can provide for energy security, make our energy situations less prone to price volatility, and enhance the geopolitical strength of the European Union. Third, a leading position in the international markets may emanate as a result of the development of innovative techniques and related export

products. Finally, the energy transition can provide employment for a large number of people in the new economy.

1.4 Delineation of the Research

The thesis provides an analysis of Dutch offshore wind power development between 1970 and 2016. The last three decades of the 20th_{century provide some important institutional history with regard to policy}

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to understand the policy choices that were made after the energy transition was introduced as a policy concept by the Dutch government in 2001 and the first offshore wind parks would become operational. Special attention is reserved for the scaling-up process of Dutch offshore wind capacity after the Energy Agreement in 2013, as well as current economic, technological and institutional developments.

The Netherlands is chosen as a case study for the study of sustainability transitions because of the slow pace of installed capacity and backward position relative to other EU Member States. Moreover, the Netherlands provides an interesting case because of its scale and complex economic system. Lastly, the traditional role of the Netherlands as one of the only resource-rich country within the European Union makes the country a particularly interesting case for the study of sustainability transitions.

1.5 Literature Review

Numerous studies have been conducted on sustainability transitions in the past decades, of which a great part has its origin in the Netherlands. As a result of the country’s pioneering role with regard to

‘transition governance’ in the early 2000s, the Netherlands fulfilled an important role in the development of relevant literature to describe the layout, the processes and the outcomes of the policy approach. Scholars in the Netherlands studied the energy transition from several perspectives. The greatest part of the literature is dedicated to the conceptualization of the ‘socio-technical’ transition, which describes transitions focussing on societal change and the important roles for technological development may herein play. This literature is subdivided into several approaches that all have their own particular focus to the energy transition. While some have looked more closely at transition management as the guiding policy framework (Rotmans et al., 2001; Loorbach, 2007, Kern & Smith, 2008), other scholars provided a framework for policy analysis called the multi-level perspective on socio-technical transitions (Geels and Schot, 2010; Geels, 2004; Smith et al., 2010). A third key focus in the transitions literature has been technological

innovation and niche management (Wieczorek et al., 2015; Verhees et al., 2015). Their succes notwithstanding, many other theoretical approaches have also made contributions into different dimensions of socio-technical change, of among others actor-network theory, evolutionary economics (Van den Bergh, 2007) and ecological modernization (York & Rosa, 2003; Mol et al., 2014).

Many of the literature focuses on the lock-in effects and path dependencies that occur at the system level of and hinder the transition of the fossil-based economy. In a study on onshore wind power development, Breukers and Wolsink (2007), reviewed state-business relations during the implementation

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ecological goals. A focus on large scale applications of wind power and a strong focus on regime actors by government agencies left insufficient space for opportunities at local levels (Breukers & Wolsink, 2007: 92-93). A similar argument is brought forward by Kern & Smith (2008). Their critical investigation of the implementation of the ‘Transition Management’ model as the guiding policy framework for the energy transition risks being taken hostage by the incumbent energy regime. The governance model furthermore has a tendency to undermine original policy aspirations for radical innovation of the energy system.

Other extensive work has been done on matters relating to technological innovation and niche development. Verbong (2001) was the first to provide a detailed overview of wind power policies in the Netherlands in relation to the development of technological development and wind power

implementation. One of the latest studies by Verhees et al. (2015) explores how technological

innovations can break out of their ‘niches’ when a government employs an effective policy framework is employed. Shielding, nurturing and empowering (SNE) activities in offshore wind energy in the

Netherlands are scrutinized and show what role policy can play in constraining or enabling these activities over the past four decades. Shielding is the activity in which pressures from mainstream selection

environments are held off from a particular innovation; nurturing means that the technological and/or economic performance of the shielded innovation is improved; and, empowering entails the innovation is scaled up under existing selection criteria whilst the shielding is gradually deconstructed. Ultimately, the shielded innovation will change the existing selection criteria. Verbong, Geels & Raven (2008) analyzed the long-term policies of different renewable energy technologies in the Netherlands, including wind, solar, hydro and biomass. The authors argued that there was a large gap between policy goals, of which plenty have been set, and actual policy measures to reach the goals. The authors payed particular attention to the social networks and learning processes within the innovation journeys of the respective technologies.

Comparative analysis on energy transition explained how institutional settings of a country can influence its renewable energy portfolio. With regard to offshore wind energy, Kern et al. (2015) analyzed the influence of actor networks on niche empowerment in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The authors tested two types of empowering trajectories for the two wind resourceful countries. The ‘fit-and-conform’ trajectory concerns making niche innovations competitive within an unchanged selection environment. The ‘stretch-and-transform’ trajectory, on the other hand, helps transform the mainstream selection trajectories to open up new pathways for niche innovations. Their evidence shows that actors often pursue both strategies simultaniously. Relatively small changes in the selection environments of the technologies might lead to the large-scale distribution of them, but have not proven to structurally change

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the existing energy systems. Another interesting finding regarding the Dutch energy system is that the country lacks a genuine ‘system builder’ capable of mobilizing a coalition of private and public actors. Such an institution would provide a power base that is capable of driving and reinforcing institutional changes necessary for large-scale offshore wind implementation (2015: 353).

This thesis presents a historical analysis of offshore wind power development, which incorporates the insights from technological innovation, transition management and socio-technical transitions, while also taking account of the insights from the liberalist school of International Relations theory. The novelty of the present study can be found in the addition of a meta-perspective on

institutional change. This perspective complements the existing literature in that it explains the structure of the Dutch economy within an international setting and the historical dynamics affiliated with the process of sequential industrialization and the capitalist structure of state-society complexes. These dynamics constitute the preceding stage to the institutional settings that can be identified in the Dutch transition process and allow us to connect macro-economic trends and policies at the global and regional level with renewable energy policy in the Netherlands.

1.6 Theory and Concepts

This research engages with two theories, each providing a different framework in which to approach the research question. Both theories describe system level developments. They do, however, at different levels of aggregation. First, International Political Economy (IPE) explains macroeconomics of policy making. It implies that developments and events at the global level influence policy-making at the regional and national levels. As such, IPE is able to describe the key features that drive renewable energy policies. Second, transition theory emphasizes the multi-level and multi-phase nature of the energy transition and offers a framework to understand the Dutch policy-making process. Moreover, transition theory enables one to identify impediments, possibilities as well as favorable circumstances required in order to direct a successful transition.

International Political Economy & International Relations Theory

The approach and conceptual foundations of this research originate from the perspectives of

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ideal types are designed to describe the extent to which ruling and governing groups are separated from one another within a given state rather than that they assert the polar opposition of two complexes.

The ‘authoritarian state-society complex’ applies to states in which the state class or political class has relatively strong control over the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Rival factions and interests may still exist within the political economy but it is the state’s class that determines the long-term strategic orientation and is able to constrain civil society groups in their capacity to

articulate their interests. Examples of the authoritarian state-society complexes in the current global order are the People’s Republic of China, Russia and Iran.

This is fundamentally different from the ‘liberal state-societies’ that characterize most advanced industrialized countries. In fact, such societies have a strong capitalist class and significant middle-income groups. Markets are relatively self-regulating and civil society cannot simply be overruled by within-system demands. Corporations (e.g. gas companies) are privately owned and governments remain at arm’s length. The configuration of state-business relations in the modern liberal economies is characterized by a strong civil society that has access to the policy-making process through peaceful competition. With regard to the energy transition, competition takes place between proponents and opponents of the energy transition. The role of their respective interest groups is crucial for the policy orientation of the Netherlands and, thus, for our energy systems. This, however, by no means implies that the state has no role in the transition because the government remains indispensable in its facilitating role, such as financing projects, take away risks of to correct for market failures.

Scarcity Model

According to Amineh and Guang, Energy security is “the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable and/or affordable prices, without an unacceptable or irreversible impact on the environment” (Amineh & Guang, 2014: 506). Energy security has become a significant concern for the European Union and China. The major powers both have limited domestic reserves and are eager to diversify energy supplies, mainly through their involvement in new pipeline connections.

These endeavors stem from the problem of resource scarcity. Population growth, rising per capita income and the lack of affordable substitutes make oil, gas and coal the primary resources to give an answer to the rising demand in the next decades. At the same time, and as a consequence of the rising global demand, the amount of fixed stock reserves of fossil fuels that can be extracted with current

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technology is declining. Consequently, the prices of fossil fuels are highly volatile, as has been demonstrated in the recent past with prices dropping below thirty USD per barrel of Brent Oil. Moreover, the unequal division of resources around the globe led major consumer regions to secure their access to these resources through power projection so as to anticipate to the dwindling of stocks. The goal of power projection is twofold. On the one hand, power projection is necessary to keep their economies running and to protect the domestic power-wealth structures of the respective state-society complexes. On the other hand, power projection allows these powers to control the trade flows, strategic investment, and transport routes of fixed stock reserves and oil and gas in particular (Amineh en Houweling, 2007: 374-375). Such strategies of power projection reflect the geoeconomic as well as geopolitical logics that underpin the strategies of the Netherlands and the European Union in their domestic as well as their external energy supply security strategy. A transition to domestically produced, low-carbon renewable energy could mitigate this pressure.

Power projection has become an essential element for modern state-society complexes to maintain economic and military power. The geographical expansion that it involves is a prerequisite for advanced economies to feed industrial sectors with constant and sufficient flows of energy, make strong-society complexes and set the rules of the game in global politics. It is vital therefore, for both the Netherlands and the European Union, to gain a strong position in the global energy markets. Yet, on the other hand it also becomes clear that in order to protect the domestic power-wealth structures of

countries and regions with low resource endowment, self-sufficiency is going to play an increasingly important role in the securing of sufficient supplies of energy.

Transition Governance

The research elaborates on existing literature on the energy transition. A long-standing tradition has been to incorporate ‘transition theory’ in these analyses, which has been developed to better understand the policy practice of ‘transition governance’. The concept of an ‘energy transition’, to start with, is commonly used in scientific research as well as in national policies of some countries. Much of the literature on energy transitions describes such a transition in terms of the conditions that are necessary for change rather than a desired end-state. The term is also used to describe and explain a historical shifts at the national and global level. The historical literature connects energy transitions with some major social changes that have taken place from the 19th century onwards, such as the processes of

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systems. They come about when dominant structures in society (regimes) are put under pressure by external changes in society, as well as endogenous innovation (Loorbach, 2010).

The multi-level perspective of socio-technical transitions

In order to analyse the Dutch energy transition it is important to take account of the different scale levels as well as their interference. In the multi-level perspective of socio-technical transitions (figure 1.1) three basic scale levels are distinguished: [1] the socio-technical regime level (focal regime at the meso level), [2] the technological niche level (alternatives and innovations at the micro level) and [3] energy landscapes (long-term trends at the macro level). A transition takes place when developments at the three levels align, according to the literature (Loorbach et al., 2008).

Figure 1.1: The Multilevel Perspective on Societal Transitions

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Socio-technical regimes are the starting point for transition studies (figure 1.1). They consist of “a set of technologies embedded in a social, political, and institutional context with its associated regime-specific set of rules, procedures, habits and practices” (Shackley and Green, 2007: 223). Energy infrastructures are telling examples of the socio-technical nature of such a regime. On the one hand, they are technical, because they require a core set of technologies for production and transportation; on the other hand, they are social, because of the necessity for rules of the game that structure political, economic and social interactions and constrain the behavior of individual actors (North, 1990).

Actors ultimately link the various technologies, the rules of the game and market practices together. These might be technology suppliers, industry incumbents, government policy makers or private actors (Scholten, 2010). The dynamic stability of these regimes leaves room for change only to the extent for which the flexibility of the institutions allows. When there is no institutional flexibility,

technical and social elements can closely intertwine over longer periods of time and subsequently cause lock-in effects and path dependencies at the regime level (Shackley & Green, 2007; Scholten, 2010). Incremental changes at the regime level do not, however, imply a transition at the system level. Lock-ins can make the regime unresponsive to changes outside their own discourse and practices. A more radical transition, i.e. at the system level, would require changes emerging outside of the regime (at the landscape or niche level) sufficiently powerful to force the creation of a new regime (Scholten, 2010).

The energy landscape “provides the dominant assumptions, values and deeply rooted socio-economic trends at a given period of time” and “reflects the dominant perception of ‘problems’ and the way to resolve those problems” (Shackley and Green, 2007: 222-223). Moreover, it is the constant

external environment in which the socio-technical regime operates but of which the actors are not able to exert direct control over or adapt to their interests. On the contrary, changes at the landscape level do have profound impacts on the stability of socio-technical regimes. Those changes can be the result of supply and demand fluctuations, environmental awareness and consumer preferences, demographic composition, available technologies, climate change, institutional liberalization, and financial crises. Besides their influence on regimes, they can also exert influence on the development of technological niches.

Transition management is ultimately aimed at the development of innovational practices. The technological niche-level is the level at which “new technologies emerge and some develop, protected from the full effects of competition with the dominant technologies in the socio-technical regime” (Shackley and Green, 2007: 224). The technologies that are developed in a niche environment can

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feature of niches is that they can be surrounded with new social networks of actors that are in support of the particular innovations.

Finally, Rotmans et al. (2001) distinguish between four phases of change within an energy transition. First, in the ‘predevelopment phase’ a dynamic equilibrium existsand the status quo does not visibly change. The landscape does, however, change slowly and processes of bottom-up innovation increase. In the second phase, the ‘take-off phase’, the process of change gets under way and the state of the system and its regime begins to shift. Third, the ‘breakthrough phase’ is the phase wherein visible structural changes take place through an accumulation of socio-cultural, economic, ecological and institutional changes that react to each other. During the acceleration phase, there are collective learning processes, diffusion and embedding (or institutionalization) processes. Lastly, in the ‘stabilization phase’ we see that the speed of social change decreases as a new dynamic equilibrium is reached (Rotmans, 2001). Change is non-linear during transition and its pace can be different in each phase. This may be the case, for example when the developments and events have a reinforcing effect on each other (Loorbach et al., 2008: 3).

1.7 Brief argumentation and hypothesis

This thesis starts from the assumption that energy security is the key driver behind the development of low-carbon renewable energy resources. Because global demand for fossil fuel increases, and competition for these resources is getting fiercer, countries and regions with low resource endowment choose to develop their own resources to secure the continuous availability of energy for their economies. It will be argued that the structure of the Dutch economy is determined to a great extent by the strong reliance on fossil fuels and strong underdevelopment of renewable energy. Moreover, it is argued that the institutions that were installed to guide the energy transition are not always favorable of that same

transition. Consequently, renewable energy policies may favor the interests of businesses over the interests of environmental movements or other pressure groups. The policy choices that were made in the past could, therefore, shape the decisions made in the future as they are vulnerable to

path-dependencies and lock-in effects at the socio-technical regime level. Transitions at the system level may therefore be blocked or impeded. Within the boundaries of the Dutch political and economic system, it is argued that the competition among civil society groups determines the course as well as the outcomes of the energy transition process. This is a consequence of the economic structure of the Netherlands and the interests of the state. The capabilities of interest groups opposing the energy transition to organize

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themselves and exert influence on the policy-making process impedes the influence of interest groups that are in favor of the energy transition and their capacity to establish new social networks among actors. Transition theory builds on the idea that social, economic, cultural and political forces shape

technological innovation. Actors and their activities form an integral part of the empirical work about transition management and governance issues. Grin (2011: 79) argues that agency plays a pivotal role during particular episodes of a transition and determines the pace of its progression. Technology suppliers, industry incumbents, policy-makers, NGOs and consumers all exert influence on the energy transition. Technology suppliers can be further subordinated in universities, R&D departments and knowledge institutes, while industry incumbents can be found on the whole production chain from production, trade, storage, distribution and retail (Scholten, 2010). Moreover, in the Dutch political system can be differentiated into state, regional and local government levels.

Classification of actors can be done in numerous ways. Fischer and Newig (2016) distinguish between systemic typology (niche, regime and landscape actors), governance typology (different levels of governance), supportive and opposing actors; and institutional typology (state, market and civil society actors). In this research I choose to follow the latter typology. State, market and civil society actors are suitable actors of study when examining socio-technical transitions. Actors of the socio-technical regime form the linkages between the various technologies, formal and informal rules, and markets, as is described by the multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions. Those actors can be business incumbents, technology suppliers, government policy makers or private actors (Fünfschilling, 2014: 38; Scholten, 2010).

Hypothesis 1:

The dominance of fossil fuels and large industrial consumers in the Dutch economy will remain a structural barrier to the development and implementation of offshore wind energy in the Netherlands. Due to the institutional environment (absence of subsidies, lack of attention, obstruction by lobbies) societal actors may find it hard to counter the interests of business incumbents.

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institutional environment leaves ample room for new actors so as to provide for niche development, innovation of renewable energy technologies and the construction of new social networks among actors.

1.8 Data & Methods

This research uses a qualitative research design. This kind of analysis is well equipped for single case studies because the findings tend to be oriented to the contextual uniqueness and significance of the aspect of the social world being studied (Bryman, 2015: 375). Moreover, the inductive view on the relationship between theory and research, whereby the former is generated out of the latter, allows for flexibility in the research design. ‘Thick description’ may provide for external validity but is generally weak within qualitative analysis. Internal validity, on the other hand, is considered to be strong but rival interpretations of a causal finding are possible (Ibid, 2015: 46).

The qualitative data are partly derived from book chapters and peer-reviewed journals specialized in issues relating to the environment, energy, sustainability and economy and politics. They provide the key logics for the argumentation in this thesis and explain the most important processes for the analysis of the current global en domestic energy situations as well as describe the current processes in offshore wind development and implementation. Moreover, domestic as well as European policies are explored through documents of government departments and specialized agencies of policy-making and executive bodies.

The literature is complemented by first-hand accounts of the policy process as well as the interests, roles, and conduct of stakeholders to the energy transition. The accounts are derived from semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews allow for exploration and an open view, while also keeping the focus on the key issues to be addressed (Kern, 2011). The interviewees who participated in this research have been carefully selected based on their position and the institute or company to which they are affiliated. Interviews, eight in total, have been held with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, TU Delft, the Dutch Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Association (Nogepa), Gasunie, Royal Dutch Shell, the Netherlands Wind Energy Association (NWEA) and with a former member of the Dutch House of Representatives (2003-2016) and leader of the governing political party PvdA between 2012 and 2016. The interviews were conducted in the course of two months. Strategic behavior of actors might have influenced the results in particular on issues such as business strategies or sensitive information about the present governement formation.

Lastly, the arguments and logics that are presented are commonly buttressed by quantitative research. These data were derived from specialized energy agencies, private oil companies, international organizations and statistical agencies of the Dutch government and have been of particular importance to

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enhance the strength of the arguments, to provide in-depth analysis of global trends and transition processes, and to connect used theories with material foundations.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the energy profile of the Netherlands. The consumption patterns of key industries and households as well as the type of energy that is predominantly produced, expose the problematic position held by the Netherlands within the energy security concept and common strategy of the European Union. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the development and implementation of offshore wind power in the Netherlands between 1970s and 2016. The Dutch transition governance framework proliferated in the early 2000s is scrutinized and placed within the context of the emerging energy and climate governance framework of the European Union. As such, the chapter provides an historical and institutional analysis of offshore wind power development and implementation, which provided the basis for the current scaling-up process since 2013. Chapter 4 examines more closely the state-society-market complex of the Netherlands and identifies some of the key challenges to this specific complex as well as possible solutions for the energy transition in the Netherlands. After analysing the political and economic considerations of the Dutch state, the chapter provides an analysis of the interests and influence of market actors and societal actors on the energy transition. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the research and provides the answer to the research question.

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Chapter 2: Energy Profile of the Netherlands

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the Dutch and European energy situation and answers the first sub-question of this thesis: What is the energy situation of the Netherlands and the European Union? The energy profile of the Netherlands is analyzed within the context of the energy situation of the European Union so as to reveal the problematic situation of the Netherlands within the Union’s energy structure and corresponding policies (chapter 3). Pargraph 2.2 shows that the demographic and economic processes at the global level necessitate major consumer regions and countries around the world to develop an integrated energy security concept. Dynamics of population growth, rising per capita income and technological advancement in developing countries and regions induce resource scarcity on the global level and put pressure on the international energy markets. Paragraph 2.3 looks at the energy situation of the European Union. The demographic and economic processes lead to import dependency and affect the energy security situation of the European Union. Lastly, §2.4 describes the patterns of consumption and production in the Netherlands. These patterns show that the Netherlands is heavily reliant on fossil fuels to sustain their economy and exposes the discrepancy between the energy needs of the European Union and the Netherlands.

2.2 Global political economy and energy demand

According to Amineh and Guang (2014), energy security refers to the urge for sufficient quantities of energy at all times and at reasonable and affordable prices, without an unacceptable or irreversible impact on the environment. The concept takes a central role in the political agenda of major consumer regions around the world. Concerns about energy security grew stronger as the effects of globalization and transnationalization1_{of energy markets are became increasingly visible. Global energy demand increased}

uninterruptedly for the past two centuries and is predicted to increase by another 30% between 2017 and 2040 (IEA, 20162_{). Moreover, 81.2% of the total primary energy supply currently consists of fossil fuels}

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three key dynamics can be distinguished: population growth, rising per capita income and technological development.

Table 2.1: Population of the world and major areas, 2015 and projections

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015).

In the past fifty years, the size of world population rose from just over three billion in 1960 to 7.3 billion as of mid-2015. According to the United Nations medium-variant projection of 2015, world population will continue to rise in the coming decades to 8.5 billion in 2030, 9.7 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion in 2100 (Table 2.1). This major increase is in large part accounted for by the immense population growth in the global east and south. In the east, China and India respectively inhabit 1.38 and 1.31 billion people. The two countries combined make up 36 % of total global population.

Figure 2.1: Average annual rate of population change by major area

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Moreover, while China’s population size growth will cease by 2022, India is expected to surpass China that same year and to further grow up to 1.7 billion in 2050. Yet Africa will be the biggest contributor to population growth. Population growth in Africa peaked around 2010 with rates of 2.5%. Until 2050 this rate will not drop below 1.5%. As a consequence, the continent will contribute for more than half of total global population growth up until that year (Table 2.1 and figure 2.1).

Europe currently accounts for 10% of total world population but does not cover any of the projected population growth. In fact, population size in Europe is expected to decrease in the coming decades (Figure, 2.1). Europe is still, however, the second largest consumer region in the world. Economic development, measured in GDP, is another key indicator of energy demand growth (Asafu-Adjaye, 2000: 622). According to EIA data, the world’s GDP will increase by 3.3% annually between 2012 and 2040. There are huge differences, however, between the levels of development as well as growth rates among countries and regions across the globe.

Figure 2.2: OECD and Non-OECD annual GDP growth between 2012 and 2040

Source: US EIA, 2016

Figure 2.2 shows that while average growth rates in OECD3_{countries are 2%, non-OECD countries}

experience growth rates that are more than double those of OECD countries. Outliers can again be found in China and India. Looking at China, we see that GDP has been growing with 10% each year. That means a doubling of the economy every eight years (Morisson, 2015: 5). While the 7.4% growth in 2014 was the lowest figure in twenty-five years, China surpassed the GDP of the US that same year (US EIA, 2016).

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The same trends are to be found in India, where GDP quadrupled in the ten years between 2005 and 2015. In the coming three years, growth rates are expected to remain stable at an average of 7.3% annually (World Bank, 2017). In the medium term, until 2040, average growth rates of 4.7 and 5.5 are forecasted for China and India respectively (Figure 2.2). Moreover, these growth rates have profound impacts on the living standards of the people in these developing regions and the domestic demand for industrial goods. The pace of the economic development in some of the most populous regions in the world does not only lead to exponential growth of industrial productivity, but also to new export markets for these goods now that people from lower social classes are able to afford these goods. For example, the global car fleet will more than double in non-OECD countries, and relatively few of the newly produced cars will be powered electrically (see figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3: The Global Car Fleet, 2015 and 2035 predictions

Source: BP 2017

Besides the detrimental environmental effects, the increasing fossil fuel dependence of our modern economies leads to scarcity of these fixed stock resources. On top of the demand-induced scarcity the availability of fixed stock resources will also decline in numerical terms with the current state of

technology. Low oil prices make investments in upstream oil and gas less profitable for investors and far more risky.

Moreover, unprecedented transnationalization of the global political economy constituted a social space that transcends national borders and changed the interactions between as well as the composition of actors across national borders, according to De Graaff (2011). This is the result of the spread of industrial capitalism, were we see that the awareness and urgency for energy supply security is increasing. For example, the influence of the OPEC-backed National Oil Companies (NOCs) is becoming stronger

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and the emergence of these state-owned enterprises further increases competition over the control of resources in resource-rich areas around the world. Traditional private-owned International Oil

Companies (IOCs) as well as the liberal state-societies of their origin will need to provide an answer to this growing competition. As a result of this type of resource nationalism, the structure of the global energy markets is transforming and liberal-state societies have to come up with an appropriate and effective answer to the structural scarcity this imposes on their societies and enhance the call to secure energy from abroad (De Graaff, 2011: 263).

2.3 Energy situation in the European Union

This holds particularly true for the European Union. With a population size of 0.51 billion the European Union accounts for 6.7% of the world population. The region is world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods and services and covered 22% of world’s GDP in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). High living standards and energy intensive industry make the EU one of the major consumers of energy globally. Coal, oil, and gas account together for 72% of the energy consumption (figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4: Energy mix of the European Union (2014)

Source: European Commission (2016). Energy Statistical Pocketbook

Alternatives meet the remaining demand; nuclear and renewable energy meet 14% and 13% of the energy demand respectively (IEA, 2014b). Domestic supplies are insufficient, however, to meet this the

domestic demand. The EU is a net-importer of energy and supplies over half of its energy demand with resources from abroad. Oil and gas are the two largest contributors to this figure, with respective dependencies of 90% and 66% of the total amount of the respective fuels consumed (Eurostat, 2016).

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than half of its consumption on only three suppliers, namely Russia, Norway, and Algeria. With regard to natural gas, currently the primary fuel for the European Union, we see a dependency of 69.1% on only two states, Norway and again Russia (Eurostat, 2016).

Table 2.2: Main Origin of Primary Energy Imports Solid fuels Crude oil Natural gas

Russia 29.0% Russia 30.4% Russia 37.5%

Colombia 21.2% Norway 13.1% Norway 31.6%

United

States 20.5% Nigeria 9.1% Algeria 12.3%

South-Africa 9.9% Saudi _Arabia 8.9% Qatar 6.9%

Other 19.4% Other 38.5% Other 11.7%

Source: Eurostat, 2014

Figure 2.5: Energy Dependency Rates of EU Member States

Source: Eurostat, 2016

Looking at the EU Member States individually, we see a picture arise in which there are strong

differences in the level of energy dependency (see figure 2.5). Some countries would be strongly harmed in case of supply disruptions. In case of a situation in which Russia decides to shut off gas supplies to Europe, this could severely harm the economies of the European Union and of some countries with high import dependency ratio in particular. Six of the European Member States currently have Russia as their

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could add to the risk of structural scarcity over the coming years.

In addition, there are strong differences between Member States with regard to their preferred fuel type for electricity generation, which may translate into diverging interests within the Union (figure 2.6). Germany, for example, presents itself as the frontrunner in the European energy transition. The Germans have been involved in renewable energy from the beginning and have always received sufficient political and public support to reform their energy systems domestically. The country opts for a quick turnaround in Europe. And while the share of renewables is being increased with great ambition, the country is currently abandoning its nuclear fleet (IEA, 2013).

Figure 2.6: Electricity production per capita by fuel type (2013)

Source: EC, 20154

The ambitious approach of Germany does not go, however, without criticism from other Members (LSE, 2013). France, having the world’s second largest nuclear fleet regards the fuel as an important means to achieve carbon-neutrality. The fact that domestic electricity production consisted for 78% of its

consumption last year adds greatly to this, although there are plans now to cut nuclear back by 50% by 2025 (IEA, 2016d). Poland, to take another example, has abundant reserves of coal and the country’s electricity production relies for about 90% on domestic coal-fired plants, which it is obviously not willing

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can be obligated to abandon the exploitation of domestic energy resources or consume the energy resources of its own choice (LSE, 2013). These divergences between the Member States’ interests are by no means new, but have made it rather complex to secure the EU’s energy needs while satisfying the individual needs of all the respective Member States.

2.4 Energy situation in the Netherlands

The divergence of Member States’ interests holds particularly true for the Netherlands. A look at the production and consumption patterns provides us with a clear reflection of what the country’s interests are with regard to energy in general and the deployment of renewable energy in specific. The energy mix of the Netherlands is strongly dominated by fossil fuels, currently representing over 90% of total primary energy supply (figure 2.7). According to IEA data of 2015, energy consumption consists for 39% of natural gas and almost the equivalent for oil with 37%, thereafter followed by coal contributing 15% to the energy mix. Hydro, geothermal, solar and wind have been rather negligible in the energy mix compared to the abundant presence of fossil fuels in the energy mix. Accounting for 5%, biofuels perform best among the renewable resources. By contrast, wind energy accounts for only 1% of total consumption in 2014 (IEA, 2015).

Source: IEA, 2015

Looking closer at domestic consumption industry and transport clearly the largest consumers within the Dutch economy. Together these sectors account for almost sixty percent of total final consumption in

39%

37% 15%

5% 1% 1% 2%

Figure 2.7: Share of Total Primary Energy Supply in the Netherlands by fuel (2014)

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petrochemical industry comprises half of industrial consumption in the Netherlands. Other large industrial consumers include iron and steel production and the food processing industry. Fossil fuels are essential for Dutch industry, with coal contributing 10.5%, oil 18.8% and gas 34.9% to this figure. Only 1.1% industrial production is driven by renewable energy to foster industrial production. We see a similar dominance of fossil fuels, and in particular natural gas, in non-industrial sectors, such as agriculture and forestry (71%), commercial and public services (46.9%) and households (70.5%). With regard to transport, we see that oil has a strong monopoly, being the dominant fuel for international aviation as well as for road transport. Currently, renewable energy powers only 3.6% of all road transport in the Netherlands.

Total production of primary energy in the Netherlands amounted to 58.415 kilotons of oil equivalent in 2014 and covered 76% of gross inland consumption that year. The contribution of renewable resources to inland energy production was approximately 8% in 2012. Biofuels were the best performers among them, accounting for 6.1 percent of total primary energy production, while

contributions of solar, wind and geothermal energy barely add up to 2% of the total production mix. Lastly, nuclear heat contributes another 1.8% to total primary energy production (IEA, 2014: 19). 86% of domestic resources is derived from domestically produced gas. Because gas has been abundantly available since the 1960s, after Europe’s largest field was found in the northern province Groningen, the

Netherlands has traditionally been a net-exporter of natural gas and had a significant trade surplus of 21.230 Ktoe in 2012 (IEA, 2014). However, a decline in domestic gas production is visible. While gas production averaged 75 billion cubic meters between 2003 and 2013, the government reduced production to 66 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2014 and to 51 bcm in 2015. Due to earthquakes in Groningen, the extraction of natural gas was limited further to 24 bcm this year. It is expected that the reduction of gas production will decrease more steeply after 2025 because of the dwindling of reserves that can be extracted from the

Groningen gas fields in a cost-effective way. Moreover, the Netherlands is expected to become a net-importer of gas between 2030 and 2035 (Schoots et al., 2016: 120). Until that time, however, the Netherlands intends to remain the most important trading hub for natural gas and aims to become the ‘gas roundabout’ of Europe

[Appendix 7]. The harbor of Amsterdam serves as a major gas hub for storage, blending and transshipment (EIA, 2016). Although the Netherlands does not hold significant reserves of liquid fuels it remains an important actor in the market due to the major petroleum refining and storage center at the Port of

Rotterdam. Refining capacity of crude oil was 1.2 million barrels a day (mb/d) in 2016. The Netherlands has a storage capacity of 210 mb/d in 2014 (EIA, 2016).

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2.5 Policy responses of the European Union and the Netherlands

Dutch renewable energy policies are embedded in the governannce framework of the EU, in which the European Commission (EC) is playing the central role. As the executive body of the EU, the EC has the primacy in the development of climate and energy policies and has been actively involved in drafting the climate agreements of Kyoto (1997) and Paris (2015). In the Paris Climate Agreement amitious targets were set for the European Union in addition to previously stated goals. The EU expressed its ambition to become a competitive low-carbon economy and aims to reduce GHG-emissions between 80% and 95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels (UN, 2015).

Long-term perspectives for climate and energy future of the EU were first established in 2000, when the European Commission adopted the Green Paper ‘Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply’. The Green Paper was a response to Europe’s growing energy dependence and incited public debate on the energy supply security of the EU in general (EC, 2000). Moreover, in 2006 the commission published the revised document in which a common European energy strategy was officially set out, with the purpose to decrease dependence on foreign suppliers and to reposition itself in the global energy markets in which the competition over resources was further increasing. The main aim of the strategy that would form the energy security concept of the EU from that moment was to provide for “the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products and services on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), while contributing to the EU's wider social and climate goals”. The strategy constituted the key objectives of sustainability, competitiveness, and energy security that would serve as the guiding principles of future energy and climate policy from that moment on (EC, 2006).

Moreover, these principles have become the pillars for the development of renewable energy in particular. The EU wanted to move to a sustainable energy system in which competitive renewable and other low carbon energy resources were developed. According to the European Commission, competitiveness fosters investment in clean technologies and fuels. Ultimately, the EU aims to be at the cutting edge of technological innovation globally, while reducing import dependency and serving energy security simultaniously. This focus on competitiveness of energy has become a guiding policy tool for the development of renewable energy in the Netherlands, as will be further elaborated in the next chapter.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter explains that economic development and accompanying structural changes lead to the transnationalization of energy markets and energy scarcity at the global level. Looking at the energy situation of the Netherlands and the European Union, a different picture emerges. At the European level

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natural resources run out and the EU is forced to import over half of primary energy consumption. Because energy imports originate from just a few countries and loses terrain in the international markets due to trends of resource nationalism. As a result, the EU faces the risk of structural scarcity imposed by politically unfriendly regimes. The diverging interests of the Member States made it harder for the EU to defend its energy interests and to speak with a single voice. Increasing the share of renewable energy provides a solution to the energy situation of the EU, because it reduces import dependency and increases self-sufficiency.

Against this background, the energy situation of the Netherlands is problematic, in particular because of the dominance of fossil fuels in the Dutch energy system. First, the Netherlands has vast domestic gas reserves in the province of Groningen and the North Sea. The position of the Netherlands as a net-exporter of fossil fuels is problematic with regard to the sustainability ambitions of the EU. Because of the abundant amounts of natural gas available under domestic soil incentives for a quick transition have been missing. The strategic geographical position for energy trade adds to this. The country holds a strategic geographical position for energy trade and serves an important gas hub in Europe. The Netherlands has a major role in the energy industry as ‘gas roundabout’ of Europe and as a main port for oil refining and shipping to the European hinterland as well as to destinations across the Atlantic Ocean. Lastly, the Dutch economy is fossil fuel based. Whilst finding itself among the largest European exporters of fossil fuels, Dutch households, industries and transport all owe their functioning to the availability of fossil energy. The next chapter explains how the Netherlands organized the

development of renewable energy from its own energy transition concept within the common energy and climate strategy presented by the European Union.

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Chapter 3: Governing the energy transition in the Netherlands

3.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to explain how the governance framework for the energy transition emerged in the Netherlands as part of the broader climate and energy strategy of the European Union. An answer to the third sub-question of this thesis will be provided: What is the transition governance framework of the Netherlands within the context of the energy and climate strategy of the European Union? The focus of the policy analysis will be on the relations between the state and business for the development and implementation of offshore wind power. The following paragraph (§3.2) introduces the climate and energy governance framework of the European Union and highlights some of its constituent parts. It is explained that Dutch energy and climate policies are increasingly dependent on European regulations. Paragraph 3.3 describes the development and implementation of offshore wind power in the Netherlands between 1970s and 2000. Among others, it is argued that the Netherlands had a monocentric government model during this early period of wind power development. The system characterized by the favoring of big players by the government as well as the encouragement of large-scale projects rather than bottom-up revolution. Paragraph 3.4 critically reflects on the years between 2001 and 2013. The adoption of

‘transition governance’ as policy project marks a period in which the centralized system is being replaced by a more polycentric model, where more actors are allowed to be involved in the energy transition process and collaborative policy process. Paragraph 3.5 continues to explain some of the support schemes that have been in place since the start of the transition governance project until the take-off of large-scale wind power implementation in 2013.

3.2 Climate and energy policy framework of the European Union

A variety of policy instruments has been used to implement renewable energy policies in the European Union after the adoption of the common strategy that was set out in the Commission’s Green Paper (2006). These instruments aim for change at the regional scale of the EU, as well as at the domestic scale of the respective Member States. The objective of finding secure, sustainable and competitive energy was first pursued in the policies enacted by the ‘Climate and Energy Package’. This long-term policy

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levels, 20% of EU energy from renewables, and 20% improvement of energy efficiency (EC, 20175_{). To}

provide for a gradual and stable movement towards these European targets, the ‘Effort Sharing Decision’ aims for 55% reduction of the GHG-emissions in the EU by means of national targets of the Member States that would be implemented at their discretion. To provide for a gradual and stable movement towards these European targets, the ‘Effort Sharing Decision’ aims for 55% reduction of the GHG-emission in the EU by means of national targets of the Member States. The GHG-emissions would be steadily limited according to a linear trajectory in the period between 2013 and 2020. The sectors involved include housing, agriculture, waste management, and transport (excluding aviation) (EC, 20176_{). Targets vary}

significantly from country to country because of different starting points of the Member States as well as their genuine capabilities to increase the share of renewable energy in their domestic energy mixes. This means that while some countries may have targets of only 10% renewable energy (e.g. Malta) others may opt for almost half of their energy mix consisting of renewable (e.g. Sweden), as long as the combined efforts of the Member States equal the 20% emission reduction target of the EU as a whole (EC, 2017). Having a shared competence with regard to the implementation of renewable energy policies, the Netherlands is obliged to implement European regulations in a manner that is in line with the Union’s guidelines. An individual target of 14% renewable energy in the energy mix was set for 2020 under the Effort Sharing Decision. The target of 16% renewable energy was set in addition to this target. According to ECN, meeting these targets will require large-scale solar and wind power generation (ECN, 2014). Moreover, the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) covers the other 45% of GHG-emissions reductions in the EU. The major market of emission allowances aims to reduce the emissions of large-scale facilities in the power and industry sectors as well as the aviation sector in a cost-effective manner. The selling and buying of emission allowances makes it more attractive for companies to investment in clean, low-carbon technologies, while at the same time providing for flexibility in these sectors to adapt to technological and economic change, so as to cut emissions in the most cost-effective way (EC, 2017). According to the Commission (2011), clear prices signals and a predictable investment climate are essential. The system also takes into account the economic and technological dynamics that the

productive sectors need to adapt to the market. The EU ETS makes it possible to transfer emission rights to parties that need them most and can be sold by parties to which it is the easiest to reduce emissions. As such, the system could play a pivotal role in driving the low-carbon technologies into the market. The instrument provides space for the power sector to adapt its investment and operational strategies to new

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technologies and changing energy prices [Appendix 2].

3.3 Institutional biases created during early offshore wind power development

Numerous events have shaped the governance framework currently employed in the Netherlands. Offshore wind energy was first considered a viable policy option in the 1970s, motivated by

environmental concerns as well as by the possibilities to set up an export industry for wind turbines (Breukers & Wolsink, 2007: 93). The oil crisis of 1973 raised awareness about the danger of fossil fuel dependence from abroad, which would be a direct incentive to consider more closely the development of domestic offshore fossil fuels. A first study by the ‘Industriële Raad voor de Oceanologie’ (IRO), which was responsible for the offshore drilling activities, was optimistic about offshore wind power. Wind power from plants as far as 15 km offshore had genuine potential to contribute to the Dutch energy supply in the form of electricity and/or hydrogen, according to the IRO, and wind plants with distances of 15 km offshore would be technological feasible. Even though nuclear and fossil fuel had significantly lower costs, the working group argued that the creation of new jobs and possibilities of technologies as an export product were compensating factors (Verhees et al., 2015: 818-819).

But the progression of offshore wind power development and implementation proved disappointing. The first National Research Program Wind Energy (NOW) was established in 1976. The program, however, assigned only two percent of its budget to the development of offshore wind. The government was apprehensive about supporting offshore wind development, mainly because the costs of offshore technologies would be double for the same onshore capacity. Some great benefits that one could attributed to offshore energy, such as the availability of space on the sea bed, the relative absence of horizon pollution and noise, and the minimal environmental risks compared to onshore wind power, could not counter the economic argument. At least as long as no problems loomed on the spatial horizon of onshore wind power implementation. The second NOW program (1981-1984) did not have offshore wind as its central focus either; due to the economic thinking of the government no more than two percent of the entire budget was allocated and eventually spent on the contribution of ECN to an international program on a wind energy conversion system (Verhees et al., 2015: 819). The many environmentally concerned organizations that wanted to engage in the development of turbines and the implementation of wind energy projects were denied access, because the government preferred to create

Challenges for the transition to renewable energy : the case of offshore wind in the Netherlands (1970-2016)