20/06/2016
Student Number: 11128119 Supervisor: Julia Bader
Seminar: Power Transition in the 21st Century: The Rise of China in IR
Master Programme: Political Science: European Union in the Global Order Centre: Graduate School of Social Sciences
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China is the biggest emitter of CO2 to the atmosphere and the Chineseenvironment has seriously deteriorated in the last decades. At the same time, the EU has claimed and taken a leadership role in international environmental governance. So, influencing Chinese environmental policies should be an important goal for the EU. Therefore, this thesis follows this research question: how can we understand Chinese adoption of environmental policies? Two possible explanations are assessed: the influence of the EU and the influence of domestic factors. The former is based on the ‘EU External Governance’ framework; and the latter on Liberal understandings, and focusing on the ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic Regimes’. To do so, this thesis process-trace the rationales behind the adoption of the three pillars of modern Chinese environmental policies: the Decision on Enhancing Scientific Development and Environmental Protection (2005), the Circular Economy Promotion Law (2008), and the reform of the Environmental Protection Law (2014). The findings indicate that domestic factors enable the adoption of environmental policies and, at the same time, enable the influence of international actors. Then, the EU can influence Chinese policies, and there is proven evidence of effective European influence.
Key words: Chinese environmental policies; Chinese domestic factors; EU environmental leadership; EU external governance.
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1. Looking for Chinese environmental policies rationales ... 4
2. Theoretical debate: or external influence or domestic factors ... 7
2.1. The EU’s influence on China’s environmental policies ... 7
2.2. Chinese factors explaining environmental policy adoption ... 8
3. Matching the EU influence with domestic factors ... 11
3.1. Theoretical framework ... 11
3.1.1. EU External Governance ... 11
3.1.2. Liberal theories of IR ... 14
3.2. Hypotheses ... 19
3.3. Alternative explanations ... 20
3.4. Theoretical expectations and operationalization... 21
4. Research design: process-tracing of fundamental policies ... 24
5. ‘Decision of the State Council on Implementing Scientific Outlook on Development and Streng-thening Environmental Protection’ of 2005 ... 28
5.1. The chronology of events ... 28
5.2. Influence of the European Union ... 34
5.3. Influence of regime stability calculations ... 38
5.4. Alternative explanations ... 40
6. ‘Circular Economy Law’ of 2008 ... 42
6.1. The chronology of events ... 42
6.2. Influence of the European Union ... 46
6.3. Influence of regime stability calculations ... 48
6.4. Alternative explanations ... 50
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7.1. The chronology of events ... 52
7.2. Influence of the European Union ... 56
7.3. Influence of regime stability calculations ... 61
7.4. Alternative explanations ... 64
8. The findings: domestic factors precede the EU influence ... 65
9. Conclusions ... 68
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The People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’) is the world biggest emitter of CO2 to the atmosphere (PBL 2014). It is precisely the emission of such gasesthat has been scientifically proved to be one of the main causes behind the global climate change. Furthermore, China has already experienced some effects of climate change in its rainfall regimes, which have mutated into drought in the North and floods in the South-East. But climate change is only one part – though important – of the environmental threats that the world, and particularly, China are facing.
The environmental situation of China has seriously deteriorated in the last decades (Beyer 2006; Chunmei & Zhaolan 2010, p.1702; Harris 2005, p.6). For instance, most of China’s cities daily deal with excessive air pollution; pollution of rivers and lakes poses a big threat to the water safety of the country; and, many soils that should be used in agriculture are not safe anymore because of the high level of heavy metals pollution. These are only some examples of the direct effects that the current production system has on the environment.
But environmental degradation also has important indirect effects in the country. Citizens who daily breathe polluted air are suffering high rates of lung cancer and other respiratory illnesses (CCICED 2013a, p.11). The reduction of arable soil has put even more pressure on the already difficult task of giving basic food to 1.3 billion Chinese. Water pollution and water scarcity impact also the daily life of Chinese people. The economic losses due to environmental degradation are estimated between 3.5% and 6% of the yearly GDP. Moreover, all these problems have made Chinese people more ready to demonstrate because of environmental issues, which may eventually destabilize China’s society, risking the Communist Party of China’s control of the country. Therefore, strengthening
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China’s environmental protection is a ‘must’ for the Chinese government and for the international community.At the same time, it is widely accepted that the European Union has claimed (and taken) a leadership role in international environmental governance (Kelemen 2009, p.21; Cock 2011, p.89; Wurzel & Connelly 2011; Holzer & Zhang 2008, p.221; Ling 2015). Due to the collective action nature of climate change and other environmental problems, the EU influence on China’s environmental policies should be seen as crucial in order to claim this global leadership role. Influencing the main air polluter of the world and redressing the environmental situation of China should be one of the top goals of any global environmental leader.
The historical records show an increasing cooperation between China and the EU about climate change and environmental issues since the 2000s. Actually, in 2005 they signed the EU and China Partnership on Climate Change (European Commission 2005), which strengthened the existent dialogues and furthered new projects and cooperation venues in several environmental areas (Torney 2012). Moreover, there is a strong trade relation between China and the EU: the EU is China’s biggest trading partner and China is the EU’s 2nd biggest one.
Presumably, there seem to be enough channels that enable European influence on China’s environmental policies. Therefore, it makes sense to analyse what kind of influence the EU has had on China.
Hence, this thesis aims to explain the rationales behind China’s adoption of environmental policies. To do so, this thesis follows this research question: how can we explain Chinese adoption of environmental policies?
This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature on EU-China environmental relations by applying the framework of EU external governance, which has been rarely applied beyond the EU neighbouring countries. Moreover, it will be compared with domestic explanations in order to understand the real influence of both factors. The results of a research like this may help to understand the rationales behind the adoption of environmental policies in one of the key countries in the fight against climate change and environmental degradation. Moreover, it will show the real influence and leadership role that the EU plays in environmental governance. Besides, it will point out what are the crucial factors
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that lead to Chinese environmental protection, helping policy-makers to focus their efforts on the relevant issues.In the chapters to follow, I will first review the existing literature on the topic, which usually focus only on one factor and do not compare them. Then, I will explain the theoretical framework based on the ‘EU external governance’ theory to explain the EU’s influence; and liberal theories will be used to explain domestic factors, focusing on the ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic Regimes'. Subsequently, I will present the research design based on process-tracing of events. This will be followed by the empirical analysis of the most important environmental policies that China has enacted since 2005. And finally, I will conclude that even though domestic factors are at the origin of Chinese environmental policies, the EU has also had an influence on the configuration of such policies.
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Research into the EU’s influence on China’s environmental policies has not been a long story. Actually, most of the authors analysing this phenomenon have done it after the signature of the EU and China Partnership on Climate Change, in 2005. Nonetheless, the debate has been prolific and has been dominated by two theoretical schools, liberalism and social constructivism, and there are common findings between these perspectives.By contrast, when looking at the domestic factors that may have driven the adoption of environmental policies, the literature is dominated by more descriptive papers, such as policy analysis ones. In this chapter, I will proceed to show what the main arguments and findings on the topic at stake are to conclude that a comprehensive comparison of domestic factors and the EU influence is missing.
Even though the debate about the EU’s influence on Chinese environmental policies has been tackled from distinct theoretical perspectives, there are two shared findings. Firstly, there is a widespread sense that the EU has had some kind of influence on China’s environmental policies and projects. However, there are competing narratives about what the driver of European influence is. For De Matteis (2010) and Carrapatoso (2011), the institutional dialogue has facilitated norm diffusion into China, while Cock (2011) identified the leadership role of the EU in climate change as the main cause. On the other hand, Scott (2009) pointed at compatible economic interests as the driver behind the EU’s influence on Chinese environmental policies. Nevertheless, there are also exceptions, like
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Holzer and Zhang (2008), who qualify the results as scarce because a lack of trust in the current EU-China cooperation.Secondly, the other main shared finding between liberals and constructivists is that domestic factors play an important role in the adoption of policies. Nevertheless, the two perspectives point at different rationales. For liberal authors, the Chinese government’s quest for political and economic stability, and the resulting preservation of political control, is the main rationale for adopting environmental policies (Holzer & Zhang 2008; De Matteis 2010). By contrast, constructivist authors focus on immaterial factors, such as shared norms and values, as the key filters that enable norm diffusion into China (Torney 2015, p.108; Carrapatoso 2011, p.178). However, in the social constructivist camp there is also disagreement on the preeminence of domestic factors. Whereas Torney (2015) and Carrapatoso (2011) agree that Chinese climate policy should be understood mainly as domestically driven, Cock (2011) upgraded the EU’s role in China as a necessary ‘catalyst’ to speed up policy changes in line with European priorities.
Nonetheless, most of the discussed papers focus their attention on projects included in the EU and China Partnership on Climate Change, such as the Clean Development Mechanism, the Near Zero Emission Coal and Clean Energy Technology. I aim to show that, even when this is a good starting point for the analysis, they are agreed projects between the EU and China and cooperation and influence were essential to them. Besides, they only represent a tiny part of the Chinese environmental policies.
Therefore, we need to broaden the scope of the research in order to have a better understanding of the EU’s influence (if any) on China’s environmentalism. The literature focusing specifically on China’s environmental policies takes this broader scope, as is shown in the following section.
There is consensus among social scientists that China’s environmental framework and bureaucracy are rather young and originated with the attendance
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of China to the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972 (Beyer 2006, pp.185–186; Ross 1998, p.810; Wang 2010, p.1207; Zhang et al. 2007, p.2). From then on, China has been expanding and improving the protection of its environment.The literature identifies a high number of consequences of environmental degradation and climate change in China. Some of the most commented ones are: health problems and high pollution-related mortality, mass migrations due to environmental degradation and pollution, popular protests focusing on environmental problems and economic losses that range from 3.5% to 6% of yearly GDP (Beyer 2006; Economy 2014; Wiener 2007; Zhang & Wen 2008). However, there is no agreement on what the main driver of Chinese environmental policies is and, besides, there is a widespread belief that China’s government is primarily interested in economic growth (Wang 2010, p.1206; Chunmei & Zhaolan 2010, p.1705; Liu & Diamond 2008, p.37; Wiener 2007, p.1821). The economic priority leaves the protection of the environment in a secondary role, which usually explains the lack of effectiveness of environmental policies. Nevertheless, the literature is consistent on depicting China as a key country in the global fight against climate change and environmental degradation (Beyer 2006, p.186; Wang 2010, p.1206; Wiener 2007, p.1807).
Even so, there are few studies that analyse international actors’ influence on China. One of the few contributions in this line was made by Zhang et al. (2007, p.2) who discovered that the Chinese government always tries to learn from developed countries when developing its environmental policies. By contrast, Ross referred to a broader influence of the international community by “disseminating scientific knowledge and expanding awareness of environmental harms” (1998b, p.813).
Given that most of the papers are close to policy analysis, there are many explanations of the historical evolution of policies, analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of particular laws and studies about policy implementation. However, some authors have identified the rationales behind specific policies. This is the case of the Circular Economy Law, which has been implemented as a result of environmental domestic challenges, increasing global pressure on China
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about CO2 emissions, shortages of energy and sources, and green barriers ininternational trade (Su et al. 2013, p.216). In the same line, Wiener identified the domestic incentives of China for reducing emissions, which are “domestic climate change impacts, domestic co-benefits in the reduction of other pollutants, energy independence, and national security” (2007, p.1816).
All in all, the existing literature shows that there is some kind of European influence – even though with different intensities in the distinct fields– on Chinese policies, while, at the same time, there is a wide array of possible domestic factors driving the implementation of environmental laws. However, there is a research gap in the comparison of these two factors. There is the need of contrasting the real influence of the EU against domestic factors in a comprehensive way. That is why this thesis aims to tackle this question by using a wide framework that captures different ways in which the EU influences China, while comparing it to domestic factors, and focusing on the three most relevant policies of the last decade.
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In order to analyse the complex reality behind the adoption of China’s environmental policies, this thesis will draw its theoretical framework on two distinct theories. This strategy will allow me to investigate two different explanations of the same phenomenon. So, the analysis of the EU’s influence on China’s policies is built on the ‘EU External Governance’ framework, based on Institutionalist theories; while the explanation of domestic factors is based on liberal theories of IR.Drawing on Institutionalist theories, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) established the ‘EU External Governance’ framework in order to analyse the expansion of the EU rules to third-country jurisdictions. Even though the theory was initially conceived as a tool to understand the European external governance in the neighbouring countries, I argue that this perspective is also well-suited to research the effect in non-neighbouring countries such as China. Given that this thesis aims to understand the rationales behind Chinese environmental policies adoption, and one of the proposed explanations is the EU’s influence, it is relevant to use a comprehensive framework that identifies the relevant mechanisms of the Union for rule expansion in spite of more general theories that do not focus on this phenomenon.
To begin with, I will describe the foundations of the framework and the causal mechanisms that will be employed in this thesis. Firstly, we need to understand
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that rule expansion “take[s] place when parts of the acquis communautaire1 are extended to non-member states” (Lavenex 2004, p.683). So, this part of the research has to focus on parts of the EU’s law that have been adopted by China. If there is no common part between Chinese and EU policy, one should dismiss the possibility of any EU influence.The theory establishes three different modes of external governance that may drive rule extension – hierarchy2, network and market –, however, we only need
to focus on those that are at stake in the relationship with China, namely networks and markets.
When talking about network governance, we look at a relationship between formally equal actors that share a “strongly institutionalized and unified system of ongoing horizontal co-ordination”, which are voluntarily established, process-oriented and based on functional expertise (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, pp.797–798). In this case, rule expansion is the consequence of policy coordination between the two jurisdictions.
The mechanisms that favour rule expansion in the network mode of governance are: socialization, social learning and communication (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Bauer et al. 2007 in Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, p.798). Socialization means that “collective understandings and intersubjective meaning structures strongly influence the way actors define their goals and what they perceive as rational action” (Börzel & Risse 2000, p.8) while social learning is the process in which “actors are socialized into new norms and rules of appropriateness” (idem, p.9). Finally, communication is defined as the process of “voluntary information exchange and mutual learning” between policy-makers of different polities (Schimmelfennig 2012, p.7).
1 Acquis communautaire: the total body of European Union law applicable in the EU. It includes “all treaties, EU legislation, international agreements, standards, court verdicts, fundamental rights provisions and horizontal principles in the treaties” (EUABC 2016)
2 Two reasons rule out the hierarchy mode of governance for the case of China: this mechanism only applies when there is a subordination of the recipient’s jurisdiction to the EU – e.g., candidate countries –, and the EU external environmental policy follows a functionalist extension type, which means that within a specific policy area there are “flexible and functionally specific governance systems” that develop its own external dimension and excludes the possibility of a hierarchy mode (Lavenex 2014, p.888). None of these two dimensions apply to the EU and China relation. Therefore, only the network and market modes of external governance are likely to play a role in rule expansion to China.
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Furthermore, an enhancement of EU rule’s legitimacy in third countries is likely to increase the effectiveness of rule expansion. Such enhancement may occur by deliberative processes, co-ownership and density of interaction (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, p.798). Hypothesis H1a stems from this causal mechanism:On the other hand, market governance implies “competition between formally autonomous actors” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, p.799). In this case, rule expansion is the consequence of competition that originates in EU market regulations.
There are four distinct mechanisms that may lead to regulatory adaptation: market competition in an institutionalized market under the principle of mutual recognition; competitive pressure in the absence of mutual recognition; EU’s rules externalization; and/or lesson-drawing in a third country that considers the EU’s rules to be appropriate solutions to their problems (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, p.799). Hypothesis 1b is based on this causal mechanism:
Given the fact that the EU-China relation on environmental issues follow a functionalist extension type of external relations, it means that the actors on the European side are technocrats – of national, European and international levels – acting in trans-governmental networks, and private transnational actors that lobby on economic or normative grounds (Lavenex 2014, p.888). These actors may play a role in both network and market modes of governance. Moreover, it should be born in mind that the different modes of external governance at stake in each case are not exclusive and they may be combined, reinforcing each other.
H1a: Chinese environmental policies are driven by the network mode of the EU external governance.
H1b: Chinese environmental policies are driven by the market mode of the EU external governance.
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Therefore, the ‘EU External Governance’ framework helps me to focus on the two modes of the EU external governance that are at stake in EU-China environmental relations: networks and markets. Besides, it shows that coordination and competition may be the two causal mechanisms that lead to EU rule expansion. However, domestic factors could be (also) crucial in the adoption of Chinese environmental policies. In the following sub-section I will describe the chosen framework to analyse the domestic drivers of China’s policies.Liberal explanations are well-suited to investigate the domestic rationales behind the adoption of Chinese environmental policies. There are concretely two characteristics that make Liberalism a relevant choice for this thesis. On the one hand, the state is perceived as a non-unitary actor, allowing the researcher to analyse the different actors and institutions that play a role in the policy-making process. On the other hand, it identifies the aggregation of domestic interests as the causal factor in policy outcomes, something that enables the research on domestic policies in contrast with resource-driven and internationally-oriented explanations, like realist ones. Putting it in Moravcsik’s words, “the state-society relations […] have a fundamental impact on state behaviour” (1997, p.513). Therefore, taking a – broad – liberal perspective will direct this thesis into the right direction to explore the possible domestic factors behind the topic at stake.
Even though China is an autocracy, and, by definition, not a liberal state, one should not make the mistake of confusing liberalism as an ideology with Liberalism as an IR theory. Liberal assumptions are as suited to explain policy-outcomes in a democratic state as they are in an autocracy. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. demonstrated with the ‘Selectorate Theory’, domestic factors such as the institutional build-up and the allocation of political power in the society – ranging from a democratic system to a single-party regime – “explain the differences in policy choices across all regime types” (2003). It means that even autocratic leaders have to somehow respond to key constituencies while they need to keep the general population at bay. I will proceed to set the core assumptions of the liberal IR theory before focusing on specific explanations of domestic factors.
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In his seminal article Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics (1993), Andrew Moravcsik conceptualised the three core assumptions of the liberal IR theory. Firstly, the fundamental unit of analysis in liberal theories are societal actors – namely individuals and private groups – rational and risk-averse on average. They seek to promote their interests under constraining factors such as material scarcity, conflicting values and different levels of influence (idem, p.516).Secondly, domestic society – or some subset of it – is represented by the state on the basis of societal interests. Therefore, state’s policies are constrained by identities, interests and power of individuals and groups, which push the government to make decisions consistent with their preferences (idem, p.518; Putnam 1988, p.434). Institutions, always in conjunction with preferences, should also be seen as another causal factor behind governmental actions (Milner 1997). Lastly, interdependence is seen as the third crucial factor that determines state behaviour (Moravcsik 1993, p.520).
All in all, taking a liberal perspective allows the researcher to understand international relations as a level game (Putnam 1988; Milner 1997) or a two-stage process (Moravcsik 1993), where the international and the domestic level are connected but distinct. Due to their focus on domestic factors behind Chinese environmental policies, liberal theories have the right tools to analyse China’s domestic level.
To do so, different strands of liberalism have come with distinct explanations, depending on the factors they stress. Ideational liberalism, reminiscent of social constructivism, understands that domestic social identities and values are the basic determinants of state preferences (Moravcsik 1993, p.525). Commercial liberalism, in contrast, focuses on economic calculations of powerful private actions to understand policy choices (idem, p.528). Lastly, Republican liberal authors look at the “mode of domestic political representation” as the determinant factor (idem, p.530). These factors undoubtedly direct our attention to relevant explanations, but lack the concretion required for this study. Therefore, this thesis will focus on a theory that makes more concrete predictions on the domestic level.
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In order to find causal mechanisms that may explain a domestic-driven process of environmental policy adoption, this thesis will focus on the ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic Regimes’ as introduced by Gershewski in 2013.The ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic Regimes’ theory claims to explain the stability of all autocracies using what has been labelled the ‘three pillars of stability’: legitimation, repression3 and co-optation4 (Gerschewski 2013, p.14).
The choice of this framework in order to research the causal mechanisms behind domestic factors is motivated by two reasons. On the one hand, Chinese environmental policies may have been motivated by the government’s quest for stability (Wiener 2007, p.1807). On the other hand, the leadership of the People’s Republic of China – an autocratic regime – aims to maintain the control of the country in the foreseeable future. To do so, Chinese leadership uses the three pillars of stability. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that the adoption of environmental policies may fall in the logic of furthering the regime stability, especially taking into account the big environmental problems – and its effects on the society and the economy – that the country faces.
According to this framework, an appropriate development of the pillars over time is able to “thwart the danger of regime breakdown”, which could come from ordinary citizens (in the form of popular uprisings and rebellions), oppositional actors (in the form of organised resistance), and/or intra-elite splits (which might deviate from the current leadership’s course) (Gerschewski 2013, p.18). The pillars should be understood as an institution in behavioural terms, i.e., as behavioural patterns.
The pillar that is more likely to be at stake when dealing with Chinese environmental policies is legitimation. It is defined as “the process of gaining support” (ibid). Its function is “guarantee active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the population” (ibid). It has to be achieved using the two kinds of support that autocracies can gain: specific support and diffuse support.
3 Repression is defined as the “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities” (Davenport 2007, p.2 in Gerschewski 2013, p.21).
4 Co-optation means “the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite” (Gerschewski 2013, p.22).
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With the specific support we understand a performance-oriented type of support that stems from the fulfilment of demands. These demands may be oriented to economic development, physical security, the maintenance of the internal order and social security (idem, p.20). The same idea is behind the ‘utilitarian justification’ of the Chinese regime developed by Guo, who distinguished two concepts in it: ‘benefiting the people’ (li min) and ‘equality’ (jun fun) (2003, p.6). Consequently, a performance crisis, defined as “a slowdown of growth, a rapid deterioration of stability or governance, or some form of national disgrace” (Gilley 2008, p.272) may hurt this kind of legitimacy. Something that China’s leadership needs to avoid in order to remain in power. Given the difficulty of empirically differentiate specific and diffuse support5, I will focus more on specific supportduring the analysis.
There is consensus in the literature that the Communist Party’s legitimacy has relied – among other factors – on economic growth since the Deng rule (Chen 1997, p.423; Guo 2003, p.21; Gilley 2008, p.271). However, the same economic growth – that now seems to decline6 – has been the main cause behind
environmental degradation and climate change effects and might be ballasting Chinese economy. Moreover, many authors have concluded that legitimacy based on economic growth – called ‘eudaemonic legitimacy’ by Chen (1997) – also creates long-term problems. Nonetheless, the history of the CCP shows that the Chinese leadership “can strengthen the CCP’s political legitimacy by reinventing itself” (Guo 2003, pp.21–22). Indeed, a “potential crisis of legitimacy is one of the top concerns of the political leaders in Beijing” (Guo 2003, p.1). Environmental policies might be one answer to this concern.
Given the nature of the policies at stake, I consider both repression and co-optation two pillars that are unlikely strengthened by the adoption of
5 Diffuse support is a long-term-oriented type of support and is based on what the regime “actually is or represents” (Easton 1979, p.444 in Gerschewski 2013, p.20). Diffuse support may have different sources such as religion, nationalism, traditional claims, charisma of autocratic leaders and rally-around-the-flag under external threats (Gerschewski 2013, p.20). Guo (2003, p.3) labelled this concept as ‘original justification’. Diffuse support might decline because of value change, when “what comes into question are the basic standards against which the regime has always measured itself” (Gilley 2008, p.272). To a certain extent, concepts like ‘scientific development’ and the ‘harmonious society’ might be two attempts to incorporate environmental issues into the diffuse support of the regime. Nonetheless, the genesis of these terms falls out of the scope of this thesis.
6 BC News, 2016. China economic growth slowest in 25 years. BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35349576 [Accessed April 4, 2016].
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environmental policies. Even though the number of environmental demonstrations has increased in the last years (Economy 2014), Chinese environmental policies are unlikely to strengthen the repression pillars. To the extent that environmental degradation is a prominent driver of domestic protests, environmental policies may ease pressure to use repressive tools (which is often costly), and not the other way round. However, I will indicate the causal mechanisms behind these two pillars in order to keep an open eye to any evidence that could suggest that they have influenced China’s policies.The function of the repression pillar is channelling public demands in a harmless way for the regime. There are two kinds of repression: (a) high intensity and (b) low intensity coercion. (a) High intensity coercion refers to “visible acts that are targeted either at well-individuals like opposition leaders, at a larger number of people, or at major oppositional organizations” and may take the form of repression of mass demonstrations, campaigns against parties, and (attempted) assassination or imprisonment of opposition leaders (Gerschewski 2013, p.21). On the other hand, (b) low intensity coercion is directed at less important groups and take more subtle forms like the use of surveillance apparatus, low intensity physical and non-physical intimidation and the curtailment of political rights (ibid). Conversely, co-optation’s function is the inclusion of intra-elite players – such as military and business elites of strategic importance – into the regime (Gerschewski 2013, p.22)7. It has to be done by maintaining the balance between
subordinate actors avoiding any of them becoming too strong, while tying them all to the regime. Analytically, this pillar seems the least-related to environmental policies. The elites are unlikely to live in places severely affected by environmental degradation because they should have the money and influence to choose healthy and nice locations to live. Although, Chinese policies might pursue a co-optation of environmental organizations if they are perceived as a (potential) threat to the regime. The analysis will reveal whether it is a relevant factor or not.
7 The ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic Regimes’ only considers intra-elite players to be relevant enough in order to be co-opted. This understanding stems from Bueno de Mesquida’s concept of ‘member of the selectorate’ needed to form a ‘winning coalition’ (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). Therefore, other actors or groups of actors, such as the middle classes, are not included in the analysis because they are not seen as powerful enough to be in the selectorate (the group of actors that effectively decides who holds the power in an autocratic state).
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Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is based on the three pillars of stability:In sum, the ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic Regimes’ shows three different causal mechanisms that may be at stake when dealing with environmental policies adoption by China. However, I expect that the legitimation pillar plays a much bigger role than the other two, given the nature of the policy at stake.
This thesis has two hypotheses, which stem from the ’EU External Governance’ and the ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic States’, and have been presented separately in the previous section. These are the following:
The dependent variable in both hypotheses is ‘Chinese environmental policies’, which means the combination of laws, rules and norms that refer to the physical ecosystem, but can also take into consideration the social and economic dimension of it. This thesis will focus only on policies that have been adopted after the signature of the EU and China Partnership on Climate Change (European Commission 2005).
The independent variables are ‘the network mode of the EU external governance’, ‘the market mode of the EU external governance’ and ‘domestic factors’. In ‘the network mode of the EU external governance’, socialization, social learning and communication are at stake and one should focus on policy
H2: Chinese environmental policies are driven by regime stability calculations.
H1: Chinese environmental policies are driven by: H1a: the network mode of the EU external governance.
H1b: the market mode of the EU external governance.
H2: Chinese environmental policies are driven by regime stability calculations.
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coordination tools between the EU and China that lead to rule expansion. While ‘the market mode of the EU external governance’ refers to the market competition, competitive pressure, EU’s rules externalization and lesson-drawing. On the other hand, ‘regime stability calculations’ refers to the actions directed to enhancing the three pillars of autocratic regimes stability, which are legitimation, repression and co-optation.There are alternative explanations of China’s environmental policies that point out at other factors that might be relevant as well. Commercial liberalism usually explains influence on other countries through market interdependence and economic-calculations. So, the bigger the interdependence between the EU and China, the more likely that the EU could influence Chinese policies. Besides, domestic factors could be explained by expected economic gains thanks to the implementation of such policies. However, the use of a broad framework like this prevents me from tracing the actual influence that the EU has on Chinese policies, and focuses too much on economic explanations, leaving other relevant domestic factors such as legitimation aside. Furthermore, interdependency and the effect of international trade are already included in the market mode of governance.
On the other hand, numerous authors have dealt with the same topic from a social constructivism perspective (Torney 2015; Torney 2012; Cock 2011; Xiaojun 2010; Wiener 2007). Constructivist explanations focus on the resonance of the EU’s norms with China’s domestic conditions – material and immaterial – as the crucial factor that determines the adoption of EU’s environmental policies. However, such a standpoint leaves some mechanisms such as the markets out of the picture. Moreover, it requires an in-depth analysis of Chinese actors’ beliefs in order to assess domestic explanations, something that is out of the scope of a thesis like this.
Another possible explanation, which does not refer only to one school of thought, is that Chinese environmental policies have been influenced by other non-EU actors such as international organizations, international conferences or other
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countries. Given that the aim of this thesis is to test the claimed EU leadership on environmental issues, it falls out of the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it will not be discarded and have been included as possible alternative explanations in the operationalization of variables, in Table 1.In sum, this thesis will analyse the rationales of Chinese environmental policies drawing on two distinct theories, ‘EU External Governance’ and the ‘Three Pillars of Stability in Autocratic States’, in order to comprehend the importance of the EU and domestic factors.
When it comes to theoretical expectations, for H1 I expect to find traces of the EU environmental acquis communautaire in China’s policies and evidence of network and market modes of governance. When it comes to H2, I expect to find evidence of regime stability calculations driving Chinese leadership implementation of environmental policies, especially in the case of strengthening the legitimacy pillar.
In order to effectively test the hypotheses, I have derived an array of empirical observations that have been operationalized in Table 1 (on the following page). After that, the next chapter will show how the research is designed using this theoretical framework.
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Table 1 Operationalization of variables
Hypothesis Observation Empirics
H1 Parts of the EU acquis in Chinese environmental policies. (Necessary condition) Presence of EU policies, regulations, norms, rules, targets or projects in Chinese policies.
H1a: network
mode of the EU external
governance
Cooperation and coordination venues.
(Low relevance) Presence of dialogues, summits and common projects among EU and Chinese actors related to the policies at stake.
(Higher relevance) Focused on specific environmental policies.
Socialization with EU rules by Chinese actors.
(Low relevance) High interaction between EU and Chinese actors. (High relevance) Chinese actors following EU rules after taking part in networks.
Observance of EU rules as legitimate by Chinese policy-makers.
(Low relevance) Chinese policy-makers explicitly referring to EU policies as inspiration.
(High relevance) Mention of the EU policy as legitimate, ethical or moral.
H1b: market mode of the EU external governance
EU market regulation in a field with EU-China interdependence
(Low relevance) Standards and prohibitions adopted by the EU in fields related to the policies at stake.
The higher the interdependence of the market, the higher the likely impact of EU regulations.
Lesson-drawing: Observance of EU rules as appropriate for Chinese policies
(Low relevance) Adoption of EU rules or norms after successful implementation in the EU.
(High relevance) Reference to the EU rules or norms as effective and/or example for Chinese policies.
Competitive pressure for Chinese producers due to EU regulation.
(High relevance) Changes in Chinese companies’ market strategy (e.g., prices) because of EU regulation.
Adaptation of Chinese producers due to EU regulation
(Low relevance) Chinese producers willingly adopting EU standards, norms or rules
(High relevance) Chinese producers acknowledging the adoption of EU standards, norms or rules because they want to access the EU market.
H2 Chinese leadership seeks to gain specific support by
addressing socio-economic development.
(High relevance) Presence of cost-benefit calculations in the policy-making process (Wiener 2007)
(High relevance) Economic gains as a policy goal.
(Low relevance) Future international Chinese leadership in environmentalism and/or green energy/technology as a policy goal.
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Chinese leadership seeks to gain specific support by addressing physical security.
(High relevance) Chinese actors relating national security to the policies at stake.
(High relevance) Policy adopted as a response to an environmental disaster.
Chinese leadership seeks to gain specific support by addressing internal order and social security.
(Low relevance) Preventing climate change and/or environmental damage as a policy goal
(High relevance) Direct link between political stability and climate change and/or environmental damage. (Wiener 2007)
(High relevance) Food security (Zang 2009) as a policy goal. (High relevance) Energy security (Zang 2009) as a policy goal.
(Low relevance) Health co-benefits of improving the environmental situation as a policy goal.
Chinese leadership seeks to gain diffuse support.
(Low relevance) Link between the policy at stake and religion, nationalism, traditional claims, leader’s charisma and rally-round-the-flag under external threats.
(High relevance) Environmental policies used to legitimate the Communist Party.
Chinese leadership seeks to reinforce repression. (High relevance) Evidence of a linkage between the policy at stake and repression to opposition groups or individuals.
Chinese leadership seeks to reinforce co-optation. (High relevance) Evidence of economic/political benefits because of the policy at stake to a specific group of people linked to the power.
Alternative explanations
Influence of International Organizations (IOs), International Conferences (ICs) and/or other countries
(Low relevance) Reference to IOs, ICs and/or other countries in the policy justification.
(High relevance) Mention of IOs, ICs and/or other countries as the causal factor for policy adoption.
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To examine the hypotheses, I use a process-tracing analysis for every chosen policy. The choice of this method allows me to explore the rationales behind each policy by carefully analysing the actions and statements that led to the adoption of the policy. Given that interviewing involved Chinese actors is out of the possibilities of this thesis, a close look at the official’s actions, statements, secondary literature and media reports can show which were the relevant causes. However, one must bear in mind that the risks of incurring in a “confirmation-bias” when using this method; something that may be overcome by thoroughly analysing alternative explanations (Bennet & Checkel 2012, p.30).Even though there is scepticism about qualitative research generalization, this thesis does not give up the goal of generalization. And it aims to do that by the choice of the cases. The three policies at stake are widely understood in the literature as being the most important policy changes in China’s environmental protection.
The Decision of the State Council on Implementing Scientific Outlook on Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection of 2005, the Circular Economy Law of 2009, and the revision of the Environmental Protection Law of 2014, are three landmarks that have shown the direction of Chinese policies. The Decision specified for the first time the environmental protection as the policy goal and enabled the policy changes that came afterwards, while the Environmental Protection Law is the founding law for the protection of the environment, from which other laws and norms derive. On the other hand, the Circular Economy Law is one of the world’s most ambitious law trying to implement a sustainable mode of production (Mathews & Tan 2011, p.436), which is also an important landmark for China. Therefore, sound results about the three most important
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policies in China may be able to show the big picture of China’s environmental policies, which might be taken as a good starting point to investigate other specific policies.The time scope of the selected cases goes from 2000 up to 2014. It has been delimited this way because the Partnership on Climate Change between the EU and China was signed in 2005, so it is conceivable that the European influence – if any – on Chinese policies should have been stronger since the signature of the Partnership and the establishment of several dialogues and common projects. However, given that process-tracing implies a sound and parsimonious analysis of events temporality, the empirical observations go back to 2000 in order to understand the rationales behind the Decisions. On the other hand, the research scope ends at 2014 because that year the Environmental Protection Law was revised. Given that there have not been major environmental policies adopted after this one, it has easily pointed the end of the time scope.
The data analysed in made up by naturally occurring and secondary data. The importance of the context in studies like this one (Ritchie & Lewis 2003, pp.56– 57) emphasises the need for primary data, in order to reconstruct the atmosphere that enabled the policy adoption. Nevertheless, the reader should always keep in mind the limitation of the thesis, especially when it comes to resources and scope. Another important constraining factor is that the author cannot speak Chinese, so all the data gathered is in English.
However, the collected data should be regarded as sound and meaningful for the research at stake. There has been special carefulness in the data collection, paying attention to the trustfulness of the sources and looking for the most direct source possible. Therefore, the data consist of official statements; diplomatic minutes and communiqués; official organisms’ reports; academic literature; and media articles and reports. The most recurring sources are: the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) official site, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) official website, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) official webpage, China Climate Change Info-Net, and the EU Official Documents website.
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Before starting the assessment of the possible causes behind the policies, a final word has to be said about the CCICED. It is a high-level non-profit international advisory body approved and recognised by the Chinese government and formed by high level Chinese and international experts – coming from EU countries, Japan, Canada, Australia, Norway, the UN, multinational companies and international NGOs – in the fields of environment and development.It was established in 1992, and since then, it has played an important role mainly through early warning policy recommendations. As it was acknowledged in the report of 2002, the CCICED is a unique venue for sharing ideas with a wide section of the Chinese society, and it has the strength of directly dealing with China’s leadership because “its members include Ministers from virtually all key agencies, and that it reports directly to the highest levels of the government” (CCICED 2002).
Moreover, top level Chinese officials, such like the Premier and the minister of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) usually assist to the CCICED meetings. So, I assume that if the top leaders of China attend the Council’s meetings and meet its members, is because the Chinese leadership does not disagree with their recommendations. In an autocratic country like China, it is difficult to imagine the top leadership going to an advisory body that goes against the leadership’s intentions.
The analysis included in this thesis shows evidence that many policy recommendations made by the CCICED have been included in the three policies analysed, something that might mean that there is a considerable level of influence of the Council on Chinese environmental policies. This also resonates with the CCICED study about its influence on Chinese policies (2013b, pp.14– 20), which summarizes up to 13 policies that have been implemented after the Council’s recommendation.
Therefore, the reports made by this organism have been carefully analysed because of the direct connection the Council has with Chinese top officials. It has been used as a proxy that may show us what the rationales behind Chinese policies are.
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In the following three chapters the process-tracing method is used to analyse the rationales behind the Decision, the Circular Economy Law and the revision of the Environmental Protection Law.28
Since China shifted its economic structure and started developing its market economy – always officially tagged as ‘socialist’ – the country has also adopted a number of policies directed to prevent or control environmental damage. The Environmental Protection Law of 1989, the Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution of 1996 and the Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution of 2000 are good examples of these policies. However, the implementation of such environmental policies has rarely been effective. Instead, the main goals of the Chinese government were poverty eradication and economic development, leaving environmental issues in a secondary term, as it was publicly acknowledged by the head of the Chinese Delegation at the 6thConference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Jiang 2000).
The huge task of transforming a communist economy into a market-based economy, and the interconnected aim of rising living standards, have overshadowed any environmental consideration for a long time. The Premier Zhu Rongji, in his report on the outline of the 10th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, also stressed the fact that the main goal of his government was economic development through adaptation to a market economy, leaving little room to the environment. When Zhu mentioned “sustainable development” in his speech, environmental issues were listed the
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last of the three policies included: family planning, natural resources protection and use in production, and ecological conservation and strengthening of environmental protection (Rongji 2001).Even though the CCICED recognised that poverty alleviation and basic human needs remained urgent priorities, it started raising the relevance of environmental problems for China’s future economic growth. The report already mentioned in 2001 high levels of indoor and urban air pollution, increasing acidification and climate change effects. The CCICED recommended the Chinese government to take energy choices “early on” in order to secure sustainable development and economic growth, ensure energy security, safeguard public health and the environment, and achieve national equitable distribution of energy (2001).
One year later, in November, 2002, the CCICED increased the level of its warnings to the Chinese government, and started to change the linkage between economic development and the environment. To Arthur J. Hanson, the then lead expert of the Council, sustainable development included the following three social dimensions: poverty reduction, environmental justice and human ingenuity (2002, p.1). Moreover, Hansons’s report also raised two other issues relevant to this thesis. He reported that “China appears to be well positioned to take a global leadership role in sustainable development” and made reference to the European Union as one of the relevant actors world-wide in environmental issues (idem, p.3). Hanson also stressed that actions had to be taken soon, before the window of opportunity closed.
At the same CCICED meeting, the Working Group on Environmental Economics introduced two concepts that were taken up in the Decision afterwards. These are: the gradual implementation of environmental pricing incentives – which may range from pollution taxes, regulations or direct pricings – based on the principle of full cost recovery (CCICED 2002, p.8), and the need to develop “green accounting” systems, which may help in policies’ evaluation (idem, p.14). The report stated that most environmental problems were mainly “combined consequences of many relative small-scale activities” (idem, p.2). Moreover, the report also advocated for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) to be made also for major economic policies, while recognising that reducing poverty was the most critical economic and social issue in China.
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In the beginning of 2003, we can find some of the first documents that start to include the environment in the development strategy of China. As an example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ submission on the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which estimated climate change impacts for China’s ecology as well as for the socioeconomic system. As a result, China’s position aimed to include climate change fight as a part of the greater sustainable development strategy (2003). In June 2006, the Chinese ambassador to the US emphasised in a speech that even though the eradication of poverty and economic development were still the state’s priority, climate change issues were of “great importance” (Jiechi 2003).In September 2003, the Law on the Environmental Impact Assessment came into effect, marking an important landmark because it forced the inclusion of environmental issues within the planning of big projects. Two months later, the CCICED met with the presence of the Premier, Wen Jiabao. The reports prepared for this meeting stand out because they made explicit the risks that China faced because of the environmental degradation.
Most of the foreseeable consequences of inaction may directly affect the legitimacy of the regime. Some of the challenges that China was facing were: severe public health problems and environmental damages; the growing impact of climate change effects in China; very large economic losses – of about 7% of GDP – and estimated increases – up to 13% of GDP in 2020; severe unemployment problem (CCICED 2003b; CCICED 2003a). Moreover, both reports remarked the urgency of acting.
Among these reports, the Strategy and Mechanisms Study for Promotion of Circular Economy and Cleaner Production in China (CCICED 2003a) is of particular interest, because it incremented the awareness around economic growth and introduced some ideas that would resonate afterwards in the Decision.
Firstly, there is a big warning about the legitimacy of the regime. According to the CCICED, rapid economic growth while sustaining social stability could only be achieved through a sustainable development strategy, because following the established economic concept would increase the consumption of resources and
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pollution, countering the goal of a well-off society. ‘Circular economy’ is seen as a triple-win economy, which combines economic growth, environmental protection and social employment.Secondly, there is a need to develop comprehensive and scientific indicators to measure the advance towards a well-off society, dismissing GDP as an inappropriate indicator. And thirdly, the CCICED recommended that the National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) guided the policy design and application. And fourthly, green procurement at governmental level is seen as a proper action to promote green consumption.
The same month, in November 2003, the EU and China upgraded their Dialogue on the Environment to a Ministerial level (Paulo Noguera 2011). It meant a step further in the EU-China environment relations. However, they were delayed with respect to other countries. For instance, in December 2003, Japan, South Korea and China already celebrated the 5th Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting.
Some members of the EU also regularly hold meetings at the ministerial level with China, while the Union itself did not have such mechanism.
Nevertheless, in 2004 Chinese leadership already noticed that they had to pay attention to the public demands in environmental issues. The case of the Nu River exemplifies it. The government had planned to build 13 dams on this river in Yunnan province, but after strong NGOs and media protests, the premier Wen Jiabao had to put it on a hold (Carter & Mol 2006, p.337). The leadership needed not to go directly against public opinion in order to keep their legitimacy.
In September 2004, the Forum on Framework for Calculating Resources, Environment and Economy in China was held, which produced the Framework for Calculating Green GDP Based on Environment (MEP 2004). One month later, there was an EU-China meeting with the Chinese vice minister and the president of the EU Environmental Council, in which global climate change issues were discussed. Another similar meeting took place in February 2005 (MEP 2005a).
In March 2005, Chinese official statements on environment started to deviate from the ones of the early 2000. In a speech delivered by Liu Jian, vice chairman of the NDRC, he recognised that China was vulnerable to climate change negative impact in both ecological and socioeconomic systems and advocated
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for the linkage of poverty eradication with climate change fight. This last idea is particularly important, given that the official standing of Chinese officials in 2000 was about prioritising economic development, letting environmental issues as secondary. At the end of March, the minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), Xie Zhenhua, met the new EU ambassador to China (MEP 2005b).However, the run-up to the Decision was not a calm period in the streets. From 2000 to 2005 there were also some remarkable cases of citizen protests against pollution or against projects harming the environment. Some of them, even escalated into violent bursts that might have hurt stability. For instance, in July 2000 a protest in the village of Anqiu, Shandong province, caused the death of one policeman, one hundred injured people and twenty detainees (Economy 2003). Nevertheless, in 2005 one of the biggest episodes of protest and rioting took place.
In April 2005, villagers and farmers from Zhejian province were involved in an episode of rural protests that has been later known as the “April 10th incident”
(Deng & O’Brien 2013, p.536). Between 20,000 and 40,000 peasants protested against pollution caused by 13 chemical plants in their fields, which “had ruined their agriculture livelihood” (Lum 2006, p.5). Protesters damaged more than 50 police cars with rocks and fire, in a violent episode that left about 100 police officers and 200 villagers injured (Economy 2007, p.48; Deng & O’Brien 2013, p.536; Watts 2005). After that, the Chinese government sent 10,000 members of the People’s Armed Police in order to appease the situation. Finally, the demands were attended and the chemical plants were closed, even though the protest leaders were arrested (Lum 2006, p.5; Economy 2007, p.48).
Five months after the grave incidents of Zhejian, the EU and China Partnership on Climate Change, on September, the 2nd, 2005. The Partnership established
Zero Emissions’ Coal and other clean energy sources as the main goals, aimed at reducing the energy intensity of both China and the EU, wanted to reinforce the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and intensified the exchange of information and experience in market-based mechanisms to tackle climate change – with an explicit reference to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (European Commission 2005).
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One month before the adoption of the Decision, the annual meeting of the CCICED was held, with the participation of the minister of the SEPA, Xie Zhenhua, and the Premier, Wen Jiabao. The meeting main report made these remarks: China’s growth cannot be sustained in the long run because of its environmental and social costs; market forces alone cannot perform regulatory functions related to environmental protection and poverty alleviation, so the government has to do it through Environmental Fiscal Instruments; 2003 was the first time in 20 years that poverty increased in China, and was mainly triggered by environmental disasters caused by economic activities. Besides, poor regions are more environmentally fragile and, therefore, “poverty in China is environmentally-conditioned” (CCICED 2005a).Moreover, the environmental situation was also responsible for economic losses. Estimated costs of environmental pollution in 2003 amounted to 15% of GDP, that is why reforms had to be implemented as soon as possible because the government “is at its strongest” financial capacity and could absorb it (ibid). Charging prices with the real social and economic costs of pollution is one of the main recommendations. However, one of the biggest setbacks for the Chinese leadership was going to come from an industrial accident that same month.
In November 2005, a petrochemical plant of the Jilin Petrochemical Corporation in Jilin Province exploded, and leaked about one hundred tons of toxic substances to the Songhua River (UNEP 2005, p.4) that “formed an 80-km long pollution slick belt flowing downstream” (Xue & Zeng 2010, p.441). The incident became salient because of the huge environmental damages and because the Songhua River flows into Russia and the pollution generated a diplomatic conflict (Wang 2013). Due to the salience of the accident, Premier When Jiabao directly inspected the place (MEP 2006). Moreover, the accident provoked the resignation of the minister of SEPA, Xie Zhenhua, due to his resistance to provide information until public unrest forced the government to openly explain what happened (Carter & Mol 2006, p.330). Zhou Shengxian replaced Xie as minister of SEPA.
One month after the accident in the Songhua River, in December 2005, the Decision was finally adopted.
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The chronology before the adoption of the Decision shows that there were interaction between China and the EU, but to establish whether these interactions have influenced Chinese decision-makers (and if so, how much) we need to establish whether Chinese legislation actually shows similarities to the EU environmental acquis communautaire. This is a necessary first step in order to capture the presence (or not) of EU policies, regulations, norms, rules, targets or projects in Chinese policies. In this case, the presence of EU norms in the Chinese policy and the evidence of network modes of governance hints at an effective case of rule expansion.There are obvious overlaps in the Decision with the EU environmental acquis communautaire. These commonalities go from the basic principles of the policy to some specific actions taken by the Chinese government. For instance, the Decision incorporated the principles of precaution, control pollution at source, tackling environmental issues through technical innovations and the establishment of investment mechanisms as basic principles of the policy. These ideas were already established in the EU acquis in legal texts like the Treaty of the European Union and the Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.
When it comes to specific actions, the Decision incorporated some regulations similar to those in the EU acquis. For example, the implementation of an Environmental Assessment Impact (EIA) for development and construction plans, was already present in the EU law through the Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment. On the other hand, the encouragement of environmentally-friendly cars overlapped with the Directive 2000/53/EC on End-of-Life Vehicles. Another interesting example is the inclusion of a system of trading pollution rights in China, which may have been inspired by Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community.
Table 2 summarizes the overlaps between the EU environmental acquis communautaire and the Decision:
