Studentnumber: 10342834 e-mail: s19dekker@ziggo.nl
University of Amsterdam Department of Sociology Gender, Sexuality and Society
Supervisor: Margriet van Heesch Second Reader: Marie-Louise Janssen Amsterdam July 2017
Unseen Gendered Lives
How Non-Binary People in the Netherlands Manage
Their Gender Expression in Different Social Contexts
Acknowledgements
I would like start by thanking the people who contributed to this thesis. First of all, my gratitude goes to all my participants for their time and openness. Thank you for sharing your stories with me. Each of you had many more interesting things to say then I could address in this thesis. It was a pleasure meeting everyone of you.
I am further grateful to my teachers. I want to express my sincerest gratitude to Margriet for her supervising. Thank you for the all the encouragement, reassurance, feedback and help with finding participants. Also, thank you for the uplifting thesis seminars at various places in Amsterdam. Also to Marie-Louise, thank you for your feedback and your time.
I also like to acknowledge some friends who have been of help. To Rachel, thank you for all the effort you took to recruit participants for me and suggestions where to find them. You have been of tremendous help. I am also grateful to Alex for taking so much time to review my draft for spelling and grammar errors and his suggestions for phrasing and argument. It is still not perfect, but your review helped a lot. Additionally, I want to thank Gizem and Rose for their advice on the informed consent form, as well as their counsel on various minor difficulties.
Finally my gratitude goes to all the other friends and family members who have been supportive over the last few months
Table of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 3
1.1 “Have you found what you were looking for, lady?” 3
1.2 Methods: Data gathering 7
1.3 Methods: Data analysis 10
1.4 Background 11
1.5 Proceeding from here on 14
Chapter 2: Previous Research and Theoretical Approaches 15
2.1 Different approaches 15
2.2 Performativity and intelligible genders 16
2.3 Transgender discourses 19
2.4 Transgender gender expression and identity gaps 21
2.5 Conclusions 24
Chapter 3: Gender Narratives 26
3.1 Narrating gender identity 26
3.2 Non-binary narratives 27
3.3 Labels 33
3.4 Genders and bodies 35
3.5 Conclusions 36
Chapter 4: Gender Expression in Different Social Contexts 38
4.1 Gender expression 38
4.2 Social contexts 39
4.3 Strategies and attitudes 48
4.4 Conclusions 54
Chapter 5: Conclusions 55
Bibliography 58
Appendix 60
Appendix A: Informed consent form (English) 60
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 “Have you found what you were looking for, lady?”
I walk into a clothing shop at the Kalverstraat, one of the busiest shopping streets in Amsterdam. I am wearing a skirt. This is a deliberate choice as I feel more comfortable shopping for women’s clothes if I do not look like a cisgender man. I look around a bit. I make short eye contact with the employee at desk opposite to the entrance, but then turn my head and walk to the right. I pass different clothing sections and pause at the shelves with the women’s jeans. I have not bought any jeans in several years and never before in the women’s section. I am a bit nervous and avoid eye contact with other people. I browse through the shelves and try to make sense of the new terms such as ‘skinny’ and ‘straight’, and ‘low waist’ and ‘high waist’. I pick a pair of jeans and walk to the fitting rooms. I notice some female customers looking at me, but I continue avoiding eye contact.
When I walk out of the fitting room an employee asks me: “Have you found what you were looking for, lady?” I feel conflicted about the part where he calls me a lady. I can see that this person is trying to acknowledge my gender. I am obviously not a cisgender woman so the fact that the employee addresses me as a lady is probably not an intuitive response. However I am not a woman; I am non-binary. Yet I am hesitant in pointing that. I feel that it could come across as nitpicking and I do not want to discourage him. I thank him and say that I will look a bit further.
In the clothing shop I experienced different issues. First I had already adapted my clothing for this situation. I wore a skirt because it made me feel more comfortable in the women’s section of a shop than when I look like a cisgender man. I had previously shopped in the women’s section in men’s clothes and it felt a bit awkward. People looked at me strange and I had employees assuming that I was buying these clothes for someone else. One time an employee even asked me whether the dress I was about to take to the fitting room was for myself (as if I was going to fit a dress for someone else).
By wearing a skirt, I show that I am transgender and hope that it is seen as some sort of justification for looking for women’s clothes. Depending on the social context I plan to be in I have to consider what I want to wear and whether it is worth the trouble. Transgressing gender norms can feel great, but it can also lead to awkward situations and possible having to
face prejudice and harassment. On some occasions, I feel the need to hide being transgender, while in other occasions I feel the need to prove that I really am transgender.
The second remarkable issue of the example of the clothing shop is the fact that the employee assumed I was a woman. I obviously transgressed certain conventions of a masculine presentation and was therefore placed in the category of women. This shows a binary way of thinking, which can make it difficult to express myself as non-binary. In my experience, most of the time people will not even consider the possibility that someone can be neither a woman nor a man, even if they are uncertain about someone’s gender. I noticed that physical characteristics give away the sex I was given at birth, and people will assume that I belong to that category. It happened to me often that people identified me as a man without a second thought, even though I was wearing conventional women’s clothing. Others have addressed me as a woman when they see me in women’s clothing as they assume that I am a trans woman1, like the employee in the clothing store did.
In this thesis I will explore the following question; how do non-binary people in the Netherlands manage their gender expression in different social contexts? In order to answer this question I will use three sub-questions. How can non-binary gender expression be conceptualized? How do non-binary people narrate their identities? How do non-binary people adapt gender expression to different social contexts? each of these sub-questions will be answered in a different chapter.
This research is important because it will contribute to a body of knowledge about non-binary people as a group on its own. The way non-binary people express their gender is particularly interesting as it almost impossible to be recognized as a such. Trying to create a hybrid appearance might be an option, but not every non-binary person would like to present themselves in that way. Then again, in my experience people categorize me as either a man or a woman, no matter what I am wearing. Previous research about the ways transgender people manage their gender expression in different situations has primarily focused on the gender expressions of binary trans people (Nuru 2014) and (Wagner et al. 2016). Though non-binary people face similar challenges in society as other trans people, it is worth exploring what challenges they face specifically as non-binary people. Other research has shown that there are differences between the experiences and practices non-binary trans people and binary
1 I write ‘trans woman’ here with a space between the two words, instead of ‘transwoman’ or ‘trans-woman.’ A
trans woman I know, once told me told me that she disliked the other to ways of spelling it was often used to suggest that trans women are specific type of women, usually as opposed to ‘real’ women. Because I do not want to suggest this I choose for this way of spelling it. The same goes for ‘trans man’, ‘cis man’ and ‘cis woman’ and the plurals of these words.
trans people (Factor & Rothblum 2008). Using a qualitative approach, this research further aims to give a voice to non-binary people as a marginalized group, by staying close to the way they describe their experiences.
I will use the term ‘non-binary’ for everyone who identifies their gender (or lack of gender) as not exclusively female or male. This includes a variety of identities such as genderqueer, bigender, agender, polygender etc. In some non-Western cultures non-binary identities have been part of cultural for centuries such as hijra from South Asia, Native American two-spirit or Native Hawaiian Māhū.2 I use ‘transgender’ for everyone that does not or only partially identify with the gender they are assigned at birth. ‘Cisgender’ on the contrary refers to everyone that does identify exclusively with the gender they were assigned at birth. Given that sex registration requires everyone in the Netherlands to be assigned female or male at birth3 this will mean that non-binary people are transgender by definition
and I will therefore talk about non-binary people as transgender people. It should however be noted that not all non-binary persons necessary identify as transgender.
I will treat non-binary people as a group on their own as opposed to research where they are researched alongside binary transgender people (McLamore 2015, Factor & Rothblum 2008, and Wagner et al. 2016). This does not imply that the group is uniform. It is, by definition, an umbrella term that encompasses various identities. Furthermore, everyone is influenced by individual experiences and other social identities, like class, race, sexual orientation, age etcetera, always play a part. These social identities all entail systems of oppression. The way these different systems of oppressions shapes the lives of individuals and groups is called intersectionality. The concept was fleshed out in academics by the work of the American philosopher and critical race theorist, Kimberlé Crenshaw, although the interaction of different systems of oppression shapes people’s social position and experiences was already theorized about for a long time among Black feminists (Weldon 2008: 194).
2 In this thesis however I will not discuss any these of non-Western identities as none of the participants
identified with any such identity. It is furthermore questionable to analyze these identities solely as gender identities as they are often linked to various religious, cultural and sexual practices as well. For example hijra cultures in India for example hold often their own religious practices that combine elements from Hinduism and Islam (Ung Loh 2011) and hijra could just as well be analyzed as a religious identity next to be being a gender identity. Similarly I am aware that ‘intersex’ can be the gender identity for people with an intersex variation. Intersex as an identity would then be considered non-binary according to the definition above. However In this research I will focus on non-intersex identifications as analyzing the challenges that intersex people face goes far beyond gender identity/expression and I think I could not to justice to the complexities of that within the limited scope of this thesis.
3 The only exception to this is if the sex of a child can not be determined after the child is born. Article 19d of
the First Civil Law Book states that in such a case a preliminary birth certificate has to be made which states that the sex could not be determined. After 3 months the birth certificate is replaced by another if the sex is determined by that time. If the sex is still not determined the birth certificate will state that the sex is undetermined.
When I say gender expression I mean a wide range of ways by which people express or hide their gender identity. It is not limited to the way people manage their physical appearance like clothing, hair make up, prosthetics or more permanent physical alterations by means of hormones or surgery that people take to make their bodies more align with how they wish to be and express themselves. I will also focus on behavior through which people express or hide their genders and the way people communicate their identities.
Gender expression does not imply that there has to be a fixed gendered self. People do not have to have fixed or consistent gendered feelings in order to express them and people can experiment with gender expression; trying out new things to see how it feels. Gender expression can have political aspects as well. By adopting certain gender expressions one can try to challenge gender norms. People can express their gender in different ways at different times and gender expression can coincide with other expressions. For instance, a man can wear a suit to work, simultaneously aiming to express his masculinity and professionalism. On a date he might want to express his masculinity through different clothes, while simultaneously aiming to be attractive to his date.
Social contexts can entail a variety of social situations and relations. It can refer to a particular place and time when one is interacting with other, but it can also refer to certain social spaces in general, for instance on the streets, in the train or in public bathrooms. It can also refer to relational contexts, such as the social context of a family, or a group of coworkers. Neither a social group nor a place is in itself a fixed social context. For example being with friends in one’s house is a different social context than being with friends in a restaurant. Being with friends in a restaurant is a different social context than being in that same restaurant alone. The space, as well as the people in it, all contribute to the social context. However one can sometimes generalize about spaces or relations without having to analyze every interaction. To get an idea of the social contexts of a family one does not necessary have to know how the social context is influenced by every possible social space or in combination with every other social group or individual.
In order to answer my research questions I used data that I collected from interviewing eleven persons who identified as non-binary and who lived, or had lived, in the Netherlands while identifying as non-binary. In the next two sections I will elaborate on the methods I used to gather and analyze the data.
1.2 Methods: Data gathering
This thesis presents a qualitative research about the gender identities and expressions of non-binary people in the Netherlands. The presented data are collected by means of semi-structured interviews that were recorded with a digital audio recorder. The interviews were guided by five main questions, but most of the questions arose in response to what the participant had to say.4 I set out to find participants through snowball sampling. That meant that I started by reaching out to binary friends of whom I knew that they knew other non-binary persons. I asked them whether they knew people that might be willing to participate in this research or knew where I might find these people. From then on I asked participants the same question. Also, my supervisor helped by introducing me to three participants. Snowball sampling is a useful form of sampling when the research population is unlikely to be reached by probability sampling (Bryman 2016: 415). As non-binary people only make up a small part of the Dutch population (though exact numbers are unknown), randomly asking people whether they are non-binary and want to participate in this research would probably not have gotten me far. A further advantage of snowball sampling is that participants are often introduced to the research by someone they trust instead of a researcher that is a stranger to them (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 2011; 100-101).
Besides snowball sampling, I also made use of opportunistic sampling, meaning that if an occasion occured where I could possible find participants I would give it a try. I had met one of my participants for example very briefly a year before the research. We had not been in contact ever since, but by chance I came across something she posted in a Facebook discussion. I further found participants through Facebook groups directed at non-binary and queer people. These groups were ‘Non-Binary Gender Inclusion Project NL’ and ‘Creatief met Queer’. The former I found on my own, while the latter was suggested to me by a friend. In both groups, I first asked the moderators of the group whether it was okay to put a post in the group asking for participants. In ‘Creatief met Queer’ that was no problem, while in ‘Non-Binary Gender Inclusion Project NL’ it was okay after I explained that I was non-binary myself. Being non-binary myself seemed to make people more willing to talk to me in other occasions as well.
The downside of these methods is that I primarily found participants that were young, White and highly educated, while I wished to include participants of various ages and backgrounds. At some point more White and young people were interested in participating
4 I have chosen to use the term ‘participant’ over ‘respondent’ or ‘interviewee’. The later two merely indicate a
then there was room to interview. I later started asking explicitly for potential participants that were not White or in their twenties. This brought me in contact with four more persons of color whom, in the end, I could not interview. One person seemed initially interested but did not find it worth the trouble as the research would not directly help the non-binary community by influencing policy. For the other three, it turned out we were not able to pick a date due to busy schedules and in one instance due miscommunication. Because this was particularly in the last month of the research there was less flexibility possible in scheduling interviews. Of my people I did interview, most were in their twenties, two were in their thirties and one was in her early fifties. Ten of the participants had participated in (but not necessary completed) an academic education at some point in their life and one person was doing Higher Professional Education. Ten persons had a Dutch nationality and one person had a Belgian nationality. Nine of the persons were White and two persons were Black.
Participants were asked to pick a time and location they felt comfortable with to conduct the interview. Three of the interviews were conducted at the homes of participants, four in restaurants or cafés and one in a park. Two more interviews were done through Facebook video chat as circumstances would not allow us to meet in person. I suggested to my participants that the interview would take between one and two hours. In practice the shortest interview took roughly fifty minutes while the longer interviews were more than double that time.
I started out with the idea that all participants would remain anonymous. For the analyses of the research there is no need for to mention participants by name. I further reasoned that people might share more if their identities would remain anonymous. My emphasis on anonymity was however problematized by my supervisor later on. She suggested that automatically assuming participants would want to be anonymous could reinforce a taboo around non-binary identities, as if being non-binary is something to be ashamed of. Obviously this is certainly not an idea I wish to reinforce. After some thinking, I decided to make it optional not to be anonymous. At this point however I had already conducted six interviews. I informed the people I already had interviewed about the new option. Unfortunately some participants interpreted my message about the new option as if I tried to convince them to go public. This was certainly not the case and it would be a gross ethical failure to retrieve information from someone with the promise that the information would remain anonymous and then afterward try to persuade them to give permission to make it public. I then did my best to explain that I introduced this new option only for people that may have felt that the emphasis on anonymity sends the message that non-binary identities are something to be
ashamed of and that if they had not felt this way there was now reason to change anything about previous agreements.
In order to guarantee anonymity, I took the following measures. First I created an informed consent form.5 As is specified in the also specified in the informed consent form the records and transcripts of the interviews would not become public and the only people that would be able to access the records and transcripts would be me and in some occasions my supervisor. However, as some of the participants knew my supervisor, I promised them that I would not share the record and/or transcript of their interview with my supervisor without discussing this with them first. Furthermore I have tried to leave out any information that could make it easy to identify participants. Since some of the participants knew each other, I asked them after the interview whether there were parts that I should treat with extra care.
Given the nature of the research I also had to consider how to make sure I would not misgender my participants while referring to them. Participants are referred to with their preferred pronouns, or at least one of them if they were okay with more than one. To the participants that remained anonymous, I referred to them with pseudonyms. However names are often gendered and not everybody has the same gendered associations with the same names. For instance, I am still going by the name Sander, which is the name I was given at birth. Sander is a masculine name, but because it is the name I have been used to my whole life, I am still using it. I would however be very displeased if I would be given a masculine pseudonym by someone else. In order to not misgender any participants accidentally, I decided that I would let the participants choose their own pseudonyms if they wanted to. Because it can take a while for people to make up a new name for themselves that matches, or at least is not in conflict with, their gender identity and I did not want to lose too much interview time with this, I created a list of suggestions that I took with me to every interview. I created the list with a brief internet search for gender-neutral names. Still, not everyone might want a name from the list or a gender-neutral name at all for that matter. Additionally the gender-neutral names my quick internet search presented me showed a Western bias.6 I therefore made clear that the list was only meant for suggestions and that the participants could also pick a name that was not on it. Some participants were indifferent. In that case, I would pick a name and asked them if that name was okay.
5 This informed consent form is included in the appendix. Appendix A contains the English version and
Appendix B contains the Dutch version. As all the participants spoke Dutch I only used the latter version.
6 I have considered changing this by adding more non-western names to the list. However as I would not know
the cultural significance of these names, it would be appropriative for me to suggest them to others. Also the changes that a participant was of a specific cultural background were very small. As it were only suggestions anyway I decided to leave it as it were.
I transcribed the first three interviews fully. As transcribing was extremely time-consuming I switched to a slightly different method. I would still write down what the participants roughly said, yet I did not let myself be bothered by the exact wording. My writings would resemble the words of the participants more closely, or literally, when I thought the passage would be relevant later on, while I would merely summarized pieces I was confident that I would not need. At the beginning of each question and in the middle of answers if they were I noted the time on the recorder so I could easily look it up in the records when I was to use the passage. Before I used any data in my thesis I always checked the audio records again.
1.3 Methods: Data analyses
In this thesis I will analyze the interviews by close reading and comparing the data from different participants with each other looking for similarities and differences. I will further relate what participants say to theories. I identified certain discourses in the narratives of the participants. Additionally I will relate certain ways in which the participants expressed their gender in specific contexts to the researches of the American communication scientists Audra Nuru (2014) and Phillip E. Wagner, Adrianne Kunkel & Benjamin L. Compton (2016), who identify different strategies that transgender individuals use to manage their gender expression in specific social contexts. I will explain more about these theories later on. In doing so, I would show similarities or differences between what the participants described and what the theories described. I will not use theory to make speculative claims about participants’ intentions or thoughts or declare their perceptions to be illusionary or otherwise false. This is not a psycho-analytic research.
In my analysis I will try to be accountable for my own position. The American Philosopher Donna Haraway argues that scientists should account for how their knowledge claims are situated and embodied (Haraway 1998). This is contrary to the traditional scientific ideal that science should aim to discover the objective truth. Haraway argues that this traditional ideal is not only epistemologically impossible, but also obscures the way scientific knowledge claims are ridden with ideologies that favor dominant groups and naturalize social hierarchies. No longer aiming for a single objective version of the truth should however not lead to a relativism in which anything goes. Instead Haraway argues for an understanding of knowledge that is partial. This means that one has to acknowledge and evaluate how one’s knowledge is influenced by their social contexts. It does not mean that one’s partial knowledge can be deduced from one’s social identities, as epistemologies based on simplistic
identity politics suggest (Idem: 585). These identities certainly play a role in how one’s knowledge is situated, but an identity in itself does not offer a critical view. People can extend their partial knowledge by sharing in dialogue with other people that have other partial knowledges. For social sciences this means that people studied should be perceived as agents with partial knowledge of their own (Idem: 592). Ultimately, sharing partial knowledge does not give one a more complete view of the truth, but it fosters understanding and being accountable for one’s knowledge claims. In this thesis, I will follow Haraway in that I try to be accountable for how my knowledge is situated.
In my analyses I will also make use of personal experiences. My own experiences will not be the primary subject of analyses: that will be the experiences of the participants. I will use my own experiences to introduce topics, like I did earlier in the introduction, and occasionally I will relate my own experiences to the experiences of the participants to provide additional information on the topic. In this sense this research is partly autoethnographic. The American social scientists Coralyn Ellis, Tony Adams and Arthur Pochner state that:
When researchers do autoethnography, they retrospectively and selectively write about epiphanies that stem from, or are made possible by, being part of a culture and/or by possessing a particular cultural identity.
(Ellis et al. 2011: 3)
I do write retrospectively and selectively about my own experiences that stem from me possessing the social identity that I am researching. My own experiences as a non-binary person have had a great influence in how this thesis was created. Nonetheless my personal experiences are situated my own social background. Other non-binary people have different experiences. I will use my experiences primarily to illustrate and will not claim that they are universal, or even typical when they are on their own.
1.4 Background
To this day the sex registration by the Dutch law only acknowledges two genders; women and men.7 Political debates about legal recognition of the identities of transgender people go back to the early 1960’s. These political debates were closely tied to medical debates. In 1959 the first sex change operation was conducted in the Netherlands which was condemned by the majority of Dutch medical circles (Orobio de Castro 1993: 65). At that time the paradigm in
7 With a the exception when medics are unable to define the sex of a child as I mentioned in the third footnote.
However this exception to the binary sex registration has nothing to do with recognition for other genders than the binary ones, but only the inability of the system to sort everyone into the two binary genders.
medical science was to condemn transsexuality8 and perceive it as an delusion. Doctors were supposed to treated it as an delusion and should certainly not mutilate healthy bodies with sex reassignment operations. In 1965 an influential advisory report of the Gezondheidsraad (Health Counsel) condemned sex reassignment surgeries and this was practically the end of these surgeries in Netherlands until the early 1970’s (Idem: 67). By that time attitudes towards transsexuality changed in medical circles. To treat transsexuality, which was still seen as a medical condition, sex reassignment surgery was considered a better therapeutic solution than helping people to overcome their delusion. In 1977 the Health Counsel revised their attitude towards transsexuality in a new report (Idem: 75). Sex reassignment surgery then was aimed to match the ‘natural’ sex one wished to become as closely as possible and the patient had to live the gendered heterosexual life that was expected of someone of that sex. If one did not expressed the intention to do this, one was denied the sex reassignment. In this period several transgender individuals succeeded in legally changing their sex, but these sex changes were considered case by case as the law did not entail concrete criteria and the cases depended on the arguments of the involved medical people. This changed in 1985, when the conditions for changing one’s legal sex became defined in Dutch law under Article 28 of the First Civil Law Book. These conditions stated that one had to undergo a number of medical interferences, which entailed removal of reproductive organs.9 Parental laws were based on couples with a male father and a female mother and transsexuals that reproduced would disrupt this order.10 These conditions specified by the law from 1985 were in conflict with the human rights of transgender people (Human Rights Watch 2011) and after years of lobbying by transgender rights organizations the law was changed in 2014. From then on individuals who are sixteen or older can change the sex on their passports when they have the approval of an expert. These experts can be doctors or psychologists.11 The state still only recognizes two sexes: female and male. Transgender and Intersex organizations are currently trying to convince the government to drop sex registration all together, primarily because it erases the experiences of non-binary people.12 They presented their arguments in the report M/V en verder (Brink & Tichelaar 2014).
8 At that time the term transgender was not used and transsexuality was only considered possible in relation to
the binary gender by the medical science.
9 Transgender Netwerk Nederland (n.d.).
10 Still transgender people changing their legal sex disrupted the ideal of the male father and the female mother.
Although one could legally change their sex, one could not change their legal parental relationship towards their children. For example, trans man that had children before he transitioned, would still legally be the mother of his children, despite being legally a man. He would legally be a male mother (Orobio de Castro 1993: 78).
11 Transgender Info Nederland (n.d.). 12 Transgender Netwerk Nederland (n.d.).
Most of the documented history of transgender people in the Netherlands concerns binary transgender persons.13 There are some exceptions though. For example, in 1999 the Dutch writer Tim de Jong published Man of Vrouw: Min of Meer. In this book he describes the stories of 22 individuals in the Netherlands who do not identify themselves as solely female or male. At that time people that did not identify with the gender they were assigned at birth, but not fit the classical transsexual narrative were usually referred to as ‘transgender’, ‘transgendered’ or ‘transgenderist’. The umbrella term transgender was broader at that time than it is commonly used these days, and referred to all kinds of gender non-conforming individuals. In mainstream uses of the term nowadays has become more or less synonymous with what used to be called transsexual (Bornstein 2016: xv). In LGBT+ circles however it is commonly defined similarly to the way I define it in this thesis; as an umbrella term that includes everyone who does not (solely) identify with the gender they were assigned at birth. Though the umbrella term ‘transgender’ has become less inclusive since the 1990’s the terminology to describe gendered and sexual feelings and identities has expanded. There are now numerous identity labels (Mardell 2017: 6-15). Some labels describe fluctuating identities, like genderfluid. Others refer to the intensity or lack of gendered feelings, like agender. Some identities are unitary, while others encompass different genders or gendered aspects, like polygender. Some relate to masculinity and/or femininity, like androgyne, while others are something else all together, like maverique.
There has been previous research on the gender expressions of non-binary people have been researched in addition to binary transgender people, such as the researches of Nuru (2014) and Wagner et al. (2016) I mentioned before. Though non-binary people are mentioned in these researches, they are not treated as a separate group and the focus lies with binary trans people. The American psychologist Rhonda Factor and the American professor in Women’s Studies Esther Rothblum (Factor & Rothblum 2008) put a more explicit focus on non-binary people (though they employ the term genderqueer) and analyze them as a separate group. They compare various practices of trans women, trans men and genderqueer people with each other. Factor and Rothblum however do quantitative research and do not explore in depth the reasons why non-binary people opt for certain practices. In several studies the term ‘genderqueer’ is used for gender identities that are neither solely male or female and is in that way synonymous to the way I use ‘non-binary’, (McLamore 2015), (Factor & Rothblum 2008) and (Wagner et al. 2016). There is no consensus about the differences between the
13 Although one can wonder what extend of the documented transgender individuals made their stories more
terms, but the term ‘genderqueer’ comes with more political connotations than ‘non-binary’ being associated more explicitly with non-conformity14.
1.5 Proceeding from here on
In the next chapter I will explore how the gender identities and expressions of non-binary people can be conceptualized. I will discuss theories and previous research that are useful to analyze the way non-binary people express their gender in different social contexts. In the third chapter I discuss how non-binary people in the Netherlands narrate their identities. I will analyze the way the participants narrate their identities. I will discuss how they describe their identities and how they came to identity that way. In the fourth chapter I will explore how non-binary people manage their gender expression to certain social spaces this is perceived by others. I will discuss what considerations non-binary people have in adopting certain gender expression in specific social spaces. In my fifth and final chapter I will give a summary of my findings and discuss what conclusions to draw from that. I will further discuss the limitations of my conclusions and give suggestions for future research
Chapter 2
Previous Research and Theoretical Approaches
2.1 Different approaches
In this chapter I will explore how gender expressions of non-binary people can be conceptualized. I will discuss theories and previous research that could be useful in analyzing the way non-binary people in the Netherlands express their gender in different social contexts. I did comparative literature research of English publications in the field of social science and philosophy, where I have looked among publications published from the 1980’s up to 2017.
I will first discuss the work of the American philosopher and queer theorist Judith Butler. Her theory of gender performativity criticizes essentialist ideas that conceptualize gender as expressing an innate gendered or sexed essence and states that gendered subjects are constantly constituted and reproduced through repetitive actions. These actions constitute a collective system of thought, a discourse, which makes certain gendered behavior and identities normal, while constraining alternatives. I will initially draw upon her earlier work, like her book Gender Trouble (1990), but I will also use discuss parts of her later book Undoing Gender (2004), which elaborates certain nuances in relation to her earlier work. I stay with discourses in the third section where I look at discourses that exist within transgender communities. I will discuss the analyses of the Norwegian social scientist Katarina Roen and the American philosopher Talia Mae Bettcher, who both identify a tension between two conflicting discourses among transgender people (Roen 2002) (Bettcher 2014). I will relate this to the concept of transnormativity as presented by the American sociologist Austin H. Johnson (Johnson 2016).
In the fourth section I will look at the researches of Nuru (2014) and Wagner et al. (2016) that has been occupied with the ways transgender people express their gender in different social contexts. Both researches draw upon the Communication Theory of Identity which was set out by American communication scientist Michael Hecht. His theory aims to create a framework were identity is understood in communication with others. Hecht and Jung distinguishes four frames of identity (Jung & Hecht 2004: 266). These frames are personal identity, which refers to the way a person self identifies, enacted identity, which is the identity one expresses to others, relational identity, which refer to the way people identify in relation to other people and communal identity, which refers to the way communities construct collective identities. These frames interact closely with each other, but there can be
inconsistencies between them. Hecht and Jung speak of identity gaps (Idem: 267). Nuru and Wagner et al. have used the concept of identity gaps to analyze different strategies transgender people employ to manage their identity in different social situations. They analyze what gaps occur and which strategies are used in response. In the final section of this chapter I will explain how I will use these theories in the remaining part of this thesis.
2.2 Performativity and intelligible genders
Judith Butler argues that gender is performative. Gender is constituted through the repetitive actions of individuals. Gendered act imitate previous gendered acts and create collective gendered meanings. Drawing on Michael Foucault’s theory of discourse, Butler argues that gendered acts together constitute a discourse. (Butler 1988: 525). A discourse is a system of thought that entails ideas, beliefs, norms and practices, that structure subjects and how they think of the world. Gendered acts bear and collective meanings produce and reproduce the discourse. This discourse structures the way people think of gender and what gender practices and identities are deemed intelligible. To be intelligible means that it is considered to make sense within the discourse (Butler 1990: 148). Innate gendered nature and sexed bodies are ideas within the discourse that legitimize and uphold other beliefs about gender differences. Identities and practices that are not deemed intelligible are policed by lack of recognition, ridicule, discrimination and violence.
According to Butler there is no such thing as a sex that exists independent from how gender is done (Butler 1988: 522). Bodies are not female or male in themselves, but is are given gendered/sexed meaning through a series of social practices. This gendering of bodies does not predate gender, but is on the contrary established by gendered acts. In this way gender conceals its socially constructed origin by making it seem like it is natural aspect of the body (Idem: 522). Discourses of gender, sex and sexual desire are mutually constituting each other. Butler calls this mutual constitution of gender, sex, and sexuality the heterosexual matrix (Butler 1990: 5). Gender is naturalized by the assumption of a stable sexed bodies. Bodies are given sexed meaning while referring to heterosexual intercourse. In reference to heterosexual intercourse, gender and sex become conceptualized and naturalized in a way that binary oppositional and hierarchical (Idem: 151). Gender than is assumed to be an expression a sexed nature and result in sexual desire for the opposite sex/gender. What deviates from these expectations is deemed unintelligible.
Intelligibility is constituted over time. The Italian philosopher Cinzia Arruzza elaborates on the role of temporality in Butler’s work. Gender norms originate from the
repetition of practices that bear gendered meaning (Arruzza 2015: 35). What is deemed intelligible can change over time, but no change appears out of nowhere. Every gendered act is influenced by the by previous acts, but because the construction of gender is not a one-time event nor is it a deterministic causal process with fixed outcomes, but it entails a instability that allows change to happen (Idem: 36).
Butler’s prime example to illustrate gender performativity is drag. Butler states that drag “fully subverts the distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity” (Butler 1990: 137). Butler analyses drag as a conscious performance done by men imitating femininity. As it is men doing femininity the conventional idea of a true gender identity expressing themselves in corresponding way is subverted. In imitating femininity drag queens use already existing conventions of femininity and in this way drag shows the imitative nature of gender, which is constantly reproduced through the imitation of previous gender practices (Idem: 137).
It should be noted that this analyses of drag only focuses on a few aspects of drag. Although it is true that drag is a performance that it can not be simultaneously does not mean that it is therefore not expressive. Drag can be way to explore gender expression or express themselves in a way one can not in one’s daily life. Drag performances can be part of specific LGBT+ subcultures and practicing it can in that sense be an expression of belonging to that subculture. Drag neither has to be an imitation of a gender that one is not themselves. There are both trans and cis women that are drag queens as well as there are both trans and cis men that are drag kings. Further, a rising phenomenon is non-binary drag performed by non-binary people15.
Nonetheless Butler states that gender is not a performance in the way drag is. She contrasts performativity with performance (Salih 2002: 56). A performance implies a deliberate act, which presumes a preexisting subject. Gender performativity however is not an individual choice nor is it something that is imposed on the subject. According to Butler there is no preexisting subject that chooses to perform gender or on which gender imposed, but gender constitutes gendered subjects. Gender than is what is performed and not an internal aspect of the performer. At some point Butler takes this reasoning to the point were she seems to deny that there even is a gender identity.
There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that very identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results. (Butler 1990: 25)
When saying that there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender, Butler does not mean to deny the existence of a gendered self entirely, but she denies that gender expressions are expressing an innate stable identity that is not performatively constituted.
Agency is not absent in Gender Trouble, but it is plays a minor role in the way she explains gender and the focus lies on the way gender is reproduced by repetition of routinely gendered behavior. Though these theories have explanatory value how gender operates over time and how certain gendered acts are normalized while other are deemed unintelligible. To analyze individual gender performativity however as the discourse is not a fixed system with predictable outcomes and individual ideas and intentions always play a role. Especially when analyzing the gender performativity of gender non-conforming and transgender individuals there has to be a focus on the personal ideas and intentions because no one is has learned not to conform out of habit and non-conformity is often met with resistance. Kate Bornstein even states that the term ‘transgendered’ was originally used as a very broad umbrella term “for anyone for whom the management of gender consumes a great deal of their day to day attention” (Bornstein 2016: xv), making gender management a central experience.
Although Butler does not deny the lived reality of the gendered self, in Gender Trouble she is primarily concerned with it as a metaphysical reality. In Undoing Gender Butler pays more attention to the lived reality of gender selves and the process of self-determination of one’s gender (Butler 2004). While in Gender Trouble Butler argues to subvert stable identities, in Undoing Gender Butler discusses more nuances in her attitude towards stable identities.
… it seems crucial to realize that a livable life does require various degrees of stability. In the same way that a life for which no categories of recognition exist is not a livable life, so a life for which those categories constitute unlivable constraint is not an acceptable option. (Butler 2004: 8)
So using identities does not have to presume essentialism and using stable categories to some extent is even necessary in life. The problem with identities is the way they are involuntarily ascribed to people.
But I would suggest that more important than any presupposition about the plasticity of identity or indeed its retrograde status is queer theory’s claim to be opposed to the unwanted legislation of identity. (Idem: 7)
What is oppressive in this case is that people are pushed into identities by others while these identities may conflict with one’s own self-perceptions and desires. Self-determination is therefore important. Self-determination however should not be perceived as a project that happens completely independent of the social environment.
One only determines “one’s own” sense of gender to the extent that social norms exist that support and enable that act of claiming gender for oneself. One is dependent on this “outside” to lay claim to what is one’s own. (Idem: 7)
The way someone can think of themselves is shaped and constrained by the instrumentations of thought that are available to them and the way one can express themselves is constrained by the norms of the social context. What is important for those marginalized by the mainstream discourse are new discourses that can make their identities and expressions intelligible. This is what transgender and various other queer persons do according to Butler when they enter the political field.
They make us not only question what is real, and what “must” be, but they also show us how the norms that govern contemporary notions of reality can be questioned and how new modes of reality can become instituted. (Idem: 29)
So they question aspects of the mainstream discourse and show alternatives.16 In the next section I will say more about the alternative discourse discuss theorists that identify different types of transgender narratives. These narratives can be seen as alternative discourses that make transgender identities intelligible.
2.3 Transgender discourses
In her article "Either/or" and "both/neither" Katarina Roen discusses reasons why transgender persons opt to pass or not. She contrasts transgenderism with liberal transsexuality politics (Roen 2002: 502). Transgenderism is a political view inspired by postmodernism, while liberal transsexuality politics relies on modernist psychiatric arguments. The ‘neither/both’ standpoint, which Roen associates with transgenderism applies to the narratives and expressions of people who do not necessary identify as either a man or a woman and do not
16 To speak of new or alternative discourses does not mean that they exist in isolation of the dominant discourse
wish to pass as either a conventional cisgender woman or man. The ‘either/or’ standpoint on the other hand, which Roen associates with liberal transsexual politics, applies to those who do wish to pass for either a cisgender woman or man (Idem: 502). The distinction Roen makes between the neither/both standpoint and the either/or standpoint shows similarities with the distinction Talia Mae Bettcher makes between the ‘beyond the binary’ model and the ‘wrong body’ model (Bettcher 2014 383-384). The beyond the binary model is rooted in social constructivism and frames being transgender as being oppressed by a rigid gender binary. It favors transgressing gender norms and is inclusive to a variety of gender non-conforming people. The wrong body model on the other hand is rooted in medical science and present transsexuality as medical or psychological condition, a mismatch between one’s true gender and one’s body. It favors gender conforming behavior over and draws clear lines between who is a truly transgender and who is a mere cross-dresser.
Bettcher’s wrong body model is similar to what Johnson calls transnormativity. Transnormativity is “a regulatory normative ideology that structures interactions in every arena of social life” (Johnson 2016: 466). It is similar to hetero- and homonormativity. Johnson does not discuss cisnormativity, but I would argue that transnormativity relates to cisnormativity the way homonormativity relates to heteronormativity. Heteronormativity entails norms of what is considered acceptable and normal for sexual relationships. Normal acceptable sexual relationships then are heterosexual, involve romantic attraction, are monogamous and result into marriage and reproduction. Homonormativity entails for norms of what is considered acceptable and normal for homosexual relationships. It drops the heterosexual norm of heteronormativity yet upholds the others. Normal acceptable homosexuals relationships then involve romantic attraction, are monogamous and result into marriage, possible with children. Cisnormativity entails norms of what are considered normal and acceptable genders. Normal acceptable genders are men and women, each being born with a matching sexed body and behaving according to conventional gender norms. These genders are perceived as natural. Transnormativity drops the norms that one has to be born with a certain sexed body to be a certain gender, but idealizes striving towards the sexed body that is conventionally related to that gender by means of surgery and hormones. It further frames gender as binary, idealizes conventional gender norms and passing for cisgender persons of the same gender. It further naturalizes these norms by upholding with medically inspired essentialism. It is both empowering as well as restricting sets of ideals that privilege some identifications and behaviors while marginalizing others. It empowers transgender individuals that live up to transnormative standards while marginalizing those who do not.
It should be noted that what Roen and Bettcher describe are generalizing models of narratives that explain tensions within transgender communities. In practice the beliefs of transgender individuals do not fall into these neat two models. Certainly not everyone who feels uncomfortable with their body (partially or whole) wishes to pass or upholds the wrong body model or the either/or position. The American transgender rights activist and gender theorist Kate Bornstein has transitioned, but is put forward by Bettcher as an icon of the beyond the binary model (Bettcher 2014: 384). Bettcher herself too is a transgender person that does not fit in the two models as she criticizes both models for not fitting well with her own experiences and views. She criticizes the beyond the binary model that frames all transgender people as outside the binary, for dismissing the identities of binary transgender people and relying on very narrow notions of what is a woman and what is a man. The wrong body on the other hand is criticized by Bettcher for failing to account for the social construction of gender and creates a hierarchy between the ‘true transsexuals’ and the ‘mere cross dressers’ which perpetuates discrimination towards the latter. Also Psychiatry has changed on the last decades and also treats non-binary identities (Richards et al. 2016). With that there is now also a medical account of non-binary genders. It should also be noted that not every narratives relies necessarily on either social constructivism or psychological or otherwise medical accounts. For instance, one can believe in an inborn gender identity without having to grant authority to psychological and medical sciences. Neither is the wish to pass necessary connected to either of the models as there can be various reasons why one might wish to pass. In the next section I will elaborate more on passing and other ways in which transgender people deal with their gender expression.
2.4 Transgender gender expression and identity gaps
There has been previous research done to the gender expression of transgender people and how this relates to specific social contexts. Audra Nuru investigated how transgender persons manage their identities in based on coming out narratives. She employs the Micheal Hecht’s Communication Theory of Identity in order to do so. Though Nuru applies this theory specifically to gender identity, the theory itself can be applies to all kinds social identities. Communication Theory of Identity aims to explain how identity operates in communication with others. Identity is seen as something that is communicated, contrary to theories that frame identity as a product of communication or communication as a product of identity (Jung & Hecht 2004: 266). Identity then is not just something that solely resides in the individual.
Social roles are internalized through communication and so shaping the identity, while identity is also communicated to others with social behavior.
In order to explain this, Jung and Hecht identify four frames of identity. The first one is personal identity, which consists of an individual’s ideas a person has of themselves. The second frame is enacted identity and refers to the identity a person performs. This frame is not simply an expression of the first, but is considered as identity in itself (Idem: 266). The third frame of identity that Jung and Hecht mention is relational identity. Relational identity comes in four levels. On the first level a person’s identity is partly shaped by the way other see them. On the second level people identify themselves by their relationships with others, for example as a friend, a partner, a family member etcetera. On the third level identities exist in relationships to other identities. People have various identities and they relate to each other. On the fourth level relationships can be units of identity in themselves. A couple for instance can be a relational identity on its own (Idem: 267). The fourth frame of identity is communal identity. This identity goes beyond individuals and is the identity of groups and collectives.
In relation to gender identity, the personal identity consists of the way a person perceives their own gender. It consists of an individuals personal feeling about their gender, the terms in which they think about their gender and what these mean to them. The enacted identity is the way a person expresses their gender and engages in gendered behavior. Relational identities are the way people form gendered relationships with other and are recognized by others. One can be a partner, husband, wife, sibling, brother, sister, etcetera. Communal identity can consist of being a woman, man, genderqueer, non-binary, genderfluid etcetera. One can have a very personal meaning to each of these terms, but as far as the identity that one shares with other and one belongs to a group, it is a communal identity.
The different frames interact closely with each other. For example how one understands their own gender (personal identity) is influenced by how society defines women, men, or non-binary people for that matter (communal identity). How one feels about their own gender, influences how one enacts gendered behavior (enacted identity), which also influences the way others perceive the persons gender and form social relations with them (relational identity). All frame are interdependent. Nonetheless tension between the different frames of identity exist. These are called identity gaps (Idem: 267).
To explain how identity gaps work I come back to Nuru as these identity gaps play an important role in her analyses of transgender coming out narratives. Nuru discusses three types of identity gaps. The first identity gap she discusses is a gap between the personal and the enacted frame of identity (Nuru 2014: 286). For example, on the personal frame of
identity one can be a woman, while on the enacted frame of identity one performs a masculine role.17 The second identity gap Nuru discusses is between the personal and the relational frame of identity (Idem: 288). On the personal frame of identity one be non-binary, yet one might still have gendered relation to others relation to others that does not comply with that. In the eye of their parents they might still be their son for example. The third identity gap Nuru discusses is between the enacted and the relational frame of identity (Idem: 291). One might try to express a masculine gender in way that aims to be recognized by others as such, yet others might still recognize them as a woman.
Nuru further analyses how transgender persons deal with these identity gaps. She distinguishes four ways or strategies in which that transgender persons do that. These are closeted enactment, disengagement, passing, label changing. Nuru associates each of these strategies with a specific kind of identity gap, though she states that the use might not be limited to that particular identity gap as the different identity gaps are interdependent and strategies be employed simultaneously (Idem: 286).
The first strategy Nuru discusses is closeted enactment, which she associates with an identity gap the personal and the enacted frame of identity (Idem: 287). Closeted enactment means that the someone expresses their gender in certain ways only in private or in specific spaces that safe. This strategy is often employed by persons who fear negative reactions from other people about being transgender. The second strategy is disengagement. Nuru associates disengagement with identity gaps between the personal and the relational frame of identity. Disengagement means that one deliberately withdraws from contexts where one has to interact with people that respond in an undesired way to the fact that one is transgender. For some people this might mean that they reduce contact with certain friends or family members, while others might even end the relations altogether. Nuru further discusses passing as a strategy which she also links a personal-relational gap. Passing consist of performing a gendered appearance and behavior in such a way that one passes as a cisgender person of the same gender. The last strategy Nuru discusses is label changing, which she associates with identity gaps between the enacted and the relational frame of identity. This entails
17 It can come across to some that saying that one is a woman on the personal frame of identity, while not on the
enacted frame of identity is a way of misgendering by suggesting that one is not really a woman when taking all frames in consideration. I like to note here Communication Theory of Identity approaches the frames of identity as phenomena and not as a way to determine what someone really is. The theory itself does not privilege any frame of identity as more or less real than another, nor does it say that someone’s real identity is some sort of syntheses from the four frames together. Though Communication Theory of Identity might be neutral in the matter, I am not. I do privilege the personal frame of identity to define what one’s gender is, independent of the other frames. I will try to use language that reflect this when I talk about the different frames. That is for example why used the verb ‘being’ for the personal frame while ‘performing’ for the enacted frame.
communicating to other people that one wants to be referred to with new pronouns, new labels or a new name (Idem: 291).
Wagner et al. (Wagner et al. 2016) build on the research of Nuru, but while Nuru analyzed coming out stories from the internet, Wagner et al. did in-depth interviews with 19 transgender persons. In addition to the four strategies Nuru discussed they identified a fifth strategy which they called ‘hyper-engagement’. They associate hyper-engagement with a personal-relational identity gap, just like disengagement and passing. The strategy however is very different from disengagement and passing. While disengagement and passing are characterized by avoiding conflict, hyper-engagement entails being explicitly open over one’s identity and engaging in critical dialogue about. Wagner et al. note that this strategy often had an educational motive (Idem: 264)
While Nuru and Wagner et al discuss how transgender people employ these strategies to deal with tensions created by the identity gaps, it should be noted that not the strategic language can be a bit misleading. Some of the ways transgender persons engage with their gender, which they mention are not necessarily strategies to overcome tensions. Adopting a new name or new pronouns can feel very gender affirming for oneself. The same can be said about label changing for that matter. Though some people opt to pass because it reduces the transphobia they have to experience, for others passing for a cisgender person of the same gender is a goal in itself. It should further be noticed that passing is not be an option for everyone. Some bodily characteristics make it difficult for transgender persons to pass for a cisgender person of their gender. this goes especially for people that do not have access to certain legal and medical interventions (Begun & Kattari 2016: 55).
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have discussed previous research and theory that relate to non-binary gender identity and gender expression. I began with Butler’s theory on discourse and how this makes some gendered practices and identities intelligible, while others are deemed not intelligible, policing the way in which other forms of gender can be lived or even be possible. I will argue that this concept of intelligibility can be useful to analyze some of the challenges non-binary persons face, as well as some other experiences. While looking at the way the experiences of the participants will reflect discursive narratives I will relate this the transgender discourses that I discussed in the third section of this paper. Although nobody’s own narrative or experiences with other transgender narratives fit neatly in the discourses Roen and Bettcher described, I will show that are similarities.
Butler’s analysis of gender performativity on the other hand is primarily concerned with criticizing the idea that there is pre-existing subject behind the performativity that gender is and arguing how this subject is itself constituted. Agency is of minor concern. This paper however aims to explore the ways non-binary persons express their gender in different social contexts and why. The agent behind the expressions is central in that. This agent may be socially constituted, but the exact metaphysical nature of the agent is not the concern here. To approach participants as agents with their own partial knowledge is essential according to Haraway (Haraway 1988: 592). Otherwise the researcher reduces the participants to phenomena merely there to be explained by the researcher, upholding the illusion of the objective disembodied researcher who is separate form the social world which they research.
In analyzing the way non-binary persons express their gender in different social contexts I will relate to the researches of Nuru and Wagner et al. as they do focus on the agency of transgender people. They analyze the tensions transgender people experience in relation to other and how they deal with this. Although both Nuru and Wagner et al. used ‘transgender’ as an umbrella term similar to the way I use it and the research of Wagner et al. included some genderqueer people, they primarily discuss the experiences of trans women and trans men. In this research I will focus on solely non-binary persons and, as I will show later on in my analysis, this will make bit of a difference in the way passing and closeted enactment can be identified among the gender expression of the participants. Yet before I will analyze the gender expression of the participants in different social contexts I will first introduce the participants and how they narrate their genders.
Chapter 3
Gender narratives
3.1 Narrating gender identity
I was twenty years old when I first heard of the term ‘non-binary’. Someone had stated in class that they identified as such. At the time I did not dare to ask them about it, but I would spend the next months reading a lot about non-binary identities on the internet. For me it was a revelation. I can not recall to have ever been particularly fond of being a boy and it had actually been bothering me from time to time since I was eleven. However, I had decided that I was not transgender as I could not relate to the transgender stories that I was familiar with at the time, which were about binary transgender persons who felt that they were born in the wrong body. I had not even considered that there might be something such as being non-binary. And not only was it possible, there were so many ways of being non-non-binary.
In this chapter I will answer the following question: how do non-binary persons in the Netherlands narrate their gender identity? To answer this question I will draw on the information I gathered from the interviews. I will explore how the participants described their genders and how they came to identify this way. I will analyze this by close reading what they said in the interviews and indentifying similar themes among them. In the next section I will introduce all of the participants. What one’s gender means to them is at the basis of one’s experiences related to gender and how one expresses their gender. Everyone’s perceptions of their gender are therefore important in the sections that follow. In later sections of this and the next chapter however, I will not discuss each participant every time, but only mention selections of examples. It would take to much space to discuss everyone’s experiences and perceptions on every topic and not all topics were discussed in every interview. In these selections, I primarily focus on similarities and variations between the experiences and perceptions of the participants.
After discussing how the participants described their genders, I will devote two more sections to exploring two specific themes in more depth. In the third section I will explore reasons why and how the participants used labels to describe their genders and in the fourth section I will explore how the participants’ gendered perceptions of themselves related to the perceptions they had of their bodies. In the fifth and final section of this chapter I will draw conclusions from what I explored in this chapter.
