Amsterdam Business School
Performance indicators and job performance:
The moderating role of job tenure
Name: Dongni Zhao Student number: 11089350
Thesis supervisor: Sjors van der Heide Date: 20 June 2016
Word count: 12005
MSc Accountancy & Control, specialization: Control
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Statement of Originality
This document is written by student Dongni Zhao who declares to take full responsibility
for the contents of this document.
I declare that the text and the work presented in this document is original and that no sources other than those mentioned in the text and its references have been used in creating it.
The Faculty of Economics and Business is responsible solely for the supervision of completion of the work, not for the contents.
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Abstract
According to various studies, performance indicators can increase job performance. This study focuses on how this job performance elevation occurs, using the moderator of job tenure. Survey data from 82 pairs of employees as well as their managers are analyzed using linear regression. The result shows that there is a positive relationship between both non-monetary incentive performance indicators and non-monetary incentive performance indicators and job performance. We discuss the practical implications of these findings, including the limitations of this study’s design. For longer job tenure, non-monetary incentive performance indicators have positive influential to job performance, while monetary incentive performance indicators are neutral to job performance. No specific relationship between different types of performance indicators and job performance under lower job tenure.
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C
ontents
1 Introduction...1 2 Theory...6 2.1 Literature review...6 2.1.1 Agency theory ...62.1.2 Performance measurement system and performance indicators use...7
2.1.3 Job tenure...10
2.1.4 Human capital theory...11
2.1.5 Motivation and job design theories...12
3 Research Methodology...13
3.1 Research Design...13
3.1.1 Respondents...14
3.1.2 Survey instruments...14
3.2 Variable measurement...15
3.2.1Sample selection and data selection...15
3.2.2 Variable reliability...18
3.2.3 Statistic analysis...17
4 Results...19
5 5.1 Summary of
finding...30
5.1 Implications for theory development...31
5.3 Limitations of the present research...33
Reference...37
Appendices...44
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Abstract
According to various previous studies, performance indicators can increase employee job performance. This study concentrates on how this job performance elevation occurs, using the moderator of job tenure. Survey data from 82 pairs of employees as well as their managers are analyzed using linear regression. The result of the survey analysis indicates that there is a positive relationship between both non-monetary incentive performance indicators and monetary incentive performance indicators and job performance. We discuss the practical ramifications and meanings of these findings, including the limitations of this study’s setting. For longer job tenure, non-monetary incentive performance indicators have positive influential to job performance, while monetary incentive performance indicators are neutral to job performance. No specific relationship between different types of performance indicators and job performance under lower job tenure.
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1. Introduction
There are plenty of clues that during these years, the average job tenure of employees in different kinds of organizations tends to be decreased (Wadsworth & Gregg, 1994). Employees no longer expect life appointment of their jobs in their employee relationships because they have to face with frequent layoffs and restructuring of the organization. (Sullivan & Arthur, 2006) That is to say, in job market, employees prefer to alter their job types and change work environment. In 1988, Stout, Slocum and Cron have already published the research about job motivation and career advancement, however, there has not been much attention to be focused to the influence of job tenure on job performance of the employees (Ng & Daniel, 2013). At the same time, although there have been a large number of studies on job performance, hardly any of them have identified how the effects of job performance of the employees are accomplished related to job performance. This is the main reason that leads me to consider whether the productivity or efficiency of an employee will be influenced by his/her job tenure. The reason why I use job tenure but not the
organization tenure is that job tenure is different from the definition of organizational tenure. Due to the fact that employees who have changed their job all-too-frequent within an organization, may have longer tenure within an organization or a firm but could still have shorter tenure in a specific job. What’s more, in 2010, Thomas has already filled the gap between job performance and organizational tenure. That is to say, there is inconclusive evidence accounted for whether devote oneself on a specific job for a long period of time improves, or decreases job performance and reduces the productivity of the employee. Up to now, there have been two opposite theoretical opinions on how employee job tenure may have influence on job performance. Human capital theory holds the opinion that there is a positive relationship between job tenure and employee job performance. The theory explains that when job tenure is increasing for employees, their skills and knowledge are improved as well, so does their job performance (Feldman & Ng, 2013). That is to say, when employees who hold longer job tenure have improve their skills of working, the difference
2 of salaries between those employees and others came out. Another theory, the model of attraction– selection–attrition, also agrees that employees who performance not as good as others will be forced to leave their jobs in the early period of their careers within an
organization (Feldman & Ng, 2013). After competing and selection within a firm among the employees more skilled professors could be more likely to keep their position and hold longer job tenure (Schneider, 1987). In 2005, Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson explained that “Employees who achieve high Person-Organization fit are likely to perform better because they work in organizational environments where their values match with those of the company’s culture and their skills match the organization’s demands.” However, in contrast, job design theory gives an opposite opinion. The main explanation of the theory indicates that when job tenure becomes longer, employees are lack of enthusiasm of
working, and this leads to a result that they perform poorly during their working time (Hackman, 1978). Which is to say, longer job tenure would do harm to the self-motivation of the employee and result in emotion of dissatisfaction of their work (Hackman, 1978). As a result, longer lengthy of job tenure would harm the working efficiency of the employee. In 1984, Orpen addressed that when employees keep their job tenure in a long period, it is hard for them to participate in the working details. 5 years later, in 1989, Murphy also found that, employees usually have a “transition stage” for their jobs. During this period, employees absorb new skills and knowledge to improve their abilities, and they also have stronger intrinsic motivation to realize their goals. After this stage, they came to “maintenance stage”, where employees turn to be bored and less ambitious after they finish the work, which they have already been familiar with. The relative researches analyses claims that comparing to age, tenure reflect more of the job-related conditions. As a result, when consider the determiner, tenure is a more vital factor than the age of the employee (Avolio et al., 1990; Giniger et al., 1983; Schwab & Heneman, 1977). Based on two competed theories, my thesis will discuss whether job tenure has the influence of job performance of the employees or not. If so, does it have a more positive or negative influence on job performance? Related to performance indicators, control systems often consist of a compensation system and the performance indicators. The performance indicators gives the direction and the ambition for
3 employees, and the compensation system provide the incentives to reach the ambition goals. In 1989, Banker & Datar also indicates that high-quality performance indicators are more likely to leave an accurate and fairly evaluation, because they are more sensible and verifiable. In 1965, Anthony released his research named “planning and control systems”, through which it is the first time public got to know the concept of performance measurement, which was described in the article as “the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organizations’ objectives” (Anthony, 1965). Through this definition, performance measurement was described as a coercive supervisory tool to make sure that employee could effectively integrated organization resources to achieve the organizational goals. This research enlightened another researcher, David Otley, who summarized a more clear definition of performance measurement, addressed, “the framework of performance measurement and performance management evaluates the results of usage of management accounting and control systems” (Otley, 1999, p363). This article has been used to help establish control practices that are applicable to the business contexts within following decade. Based on his theory, performance measurement system was used by top management to assist control systems within an organization.
However, following researchers started to explore other function of performance measurement system apart from control tool. After 5 years, Anthony and his colleague cooperated together and developed the concept of performance measurement into a broader conception. They considered that the development of performance measurement by
managers of the organizations is the process to implement organization strategies (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2004). They stated that as the time goes by, performance measurement in the modern business world should also include planning, coordinating, communication and evaluating information, decision making and influencing people to change their behavior in addition to the original purpose. This has enlarged the function of performance
measurement. With the newly discovered definition, the role of performance indicators was no longer restricted as control function of organizational management because it also
4 contained processes such as coordination and communication, which means during the performance measuring process, managers not only provide one-way feedback, but also receive feedback from employees to make decisions and conducting evaluation as well (Bisbe and Otley, 2004). In 1980, Wanous stated “Internal work motivation, feelings of mutual acceptance, achievement of organizational dependability and commitment, job involvement, and job security tend to replace earlier concerns of the newcomer” (Wanous, 1980). And these are all related to the non-monetary performance indicators. Actually this variation in the structure of incentive and supervisory mechanisms could be classified in the intrinsic psychological satisfaction to be during the working field. Sociologists and psychologists tend to conclude that employees would take an extent of pride in their works. However,
monetary-incentive performance indicators may destroy this “psycho-social compensation”. Deci (1971) and Nisbett (1973) have both provided evidence for this definition, because “the exchange relation between employer and employee becomes much more narrowly economic, destroying most or all of the potential for social exchange.”
To resolve these mixed findings about performance measurement systems, job performance and job tenure, I decided to use performance indicators, which is the monetary and non-monetary incentives performance indicators to measure the job performance of employees, and I will use the job tenure as the moderator.
This paper contributes to discover the influence of both non-monetary incentive
performance indicators and monetary incentive performance indicators to job performance of the employees, though the findings companies could effectively use performance
evaluation system to measure the performance of their employees. The paper also
contributes to the relationship between job performance and job tenure of the employee, and using the corresponding routines to combine different kinds of performance indicators together in order to motivate employees working efficiently. It is thus important from a managerial perspective to understand how job tenure would influence the performance indicators employees would like to receive, not only how job tenure affect the working experience and efficiency of the employee.
5 This study uses the employees as respondents who are from different industries, fields, organizations and jobs to examine the link between performance indicators and job performance. I will be involved in dr. Groen ’s project ‘Enabling Employees’ which will conduct survey research on a more operational level, specifically a survey among business unit managers and employees.
So my research question is:
Is there any relationship between use of performance indicators for monetary incentive and non-monetary incentive and job performance while using job tenure as a moderator?
Research model is as follows:
6 Figure 1 depicts the hypothetical model of my research. First I hypothesize that the two kinds of performance indicators, non-monetary incentives and monetary incentives have positive influence on job performance. Next, job tenure is also hypothesized to related to performance indicators and job performance as a moderator. Below, I will illustrate on the theory from which I derived the hypotheses.
2 Theory
2.1 Literature review
In the first part of this section I will give a sketch of the illustration of knowledge regarding agency theory, Human capital theory, performance measurement system and performance
indicators use, motivation and job design theories and job tenure. Based on this theoretical framework I will present my hypothesis in the second part of this section.
2.1.1 Agency theory
Basic agency theory addresses the problem that arises when firm-owners (principals) delegate authorities of working to managers (agents). The agency theory is considered as one of the most important theory of accounting (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002). The theory predicts goal conflicts between the principal and agent, because people will always act to increase their own wealth (self-interest). What is more, agents hold information and knowledge, which are not reached by principles, and this brings information asymmetry between the two parties. So the problem rises when one party (agents) is being paid by another party (principals) but agents does not always acting in principals’ best interest. This means the existence of conflict of interest between agents and principals, which is an important assumption in the development of the agency theory. To be more specifically, employees have other self-interests which does not always align with the organization’s interest. For instance, employees may end to devote themselves a couple of times to their own work, whereas this employee is quite important for his/her organization to achieve the goals (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002). If the principal choose not to involved in the transaction (which may be costly to the
7 agents) and delegate the decision right to the agent, it would lead to a suboptimal outcome which can make the benefit become lower. Agency theory, claims that performance incentives lead to better employee job performance has been doubts based on a large number of researches, which show the information asymmetry. So agency theory gives us the source that why performance indicators are needed when evaluating the job performance of the employee.
2.1.2 Performance measurement system and the use of performance indicators
Performance measurement systems are treated as information systems that are used to evaluate both individual employees and organizational performance, as it is one of the mechanisms to used to align the interests between agent and principal. A performance measurement system helps the organization to find out if there is a room for their employees or team to improve their performance based on the evaluation system (Goh, 1998). A performance measurement system can also help employees to make better decisions and explicit the duty of the employees (Hall, 2008). A performance measurement system could present the effectiveness and efficiency of a working process under the goals or targets setting (Lohman et al, 2004). And what is more, a performance measurement system can aid in the carrying out of a strategy (Aranda &Arellano, 2010.p332) by setting goals, which are aligned with the strategy. Performance measurement has a positive effect on job
performance because it generates cognitive benefits, for instance, better understanding of job priorities, development of effective task strategies and motivation gains (Kleingeld et al., 2004. P842).
A performance indicator is a type of performance measurement and it evaluates a specific process or the conditions of an organization. Organizations use performance measurement systems to perform multiple roles, including communicate the company’s strategic
objectives, motivate employees to help the company achieve its strategic objectives, evaluate the performance of managers, employees and operating units, help managers allocate
8 resources to the most productive and profitable opportunities, provide feedback on whether the company is making progress in improving processes and meeting the expectations of customers and shareholders (Atkinson Young, Management Accounting 6th Edition.p18). What is more, according to self-determination theory, purely extrinsic motivation (which refers to the monetary incentives) was no longer enough to stimulate the performance of employees. As a result, only financial measures were not sufficient to measure and manage the performance. Management of the companies needs to think of a new path, or a method combined with pure financial performance to motivate their employees working efficiently. Gagne and Deci in 2005 addressed the definition of autonomous motivation. It refers to people’s perception of having a choice to do something or not, whereas controlled
motivation refers to the feeling of being pressured to do it (Gagne & Deci, 2005. p337). In 2008, Wouters implemented a case study to examine the importance of enabling role of performance measurement. He drew a conclusion as “The key objective was to have a performance measurement system that was not only intended for top management of logistics control but one that employees at all levels would find helpful in their work and enabling to achieve performance improvement” (Wouters, 2009, p 64-68). In other words, Wouters found out that it is very important for management accounting to accept the reality that the process of business development has lead to the performance measurement system being perceived by employees as a self-motivation tool for their work, rather than as primarily a control device being used by the management of the organization. To be more specific, it should be an intrinsic motivation for employees to help themselves make progress and improve their working performance during the period they engage in working. More importantly, involving employees in information-processing, decision-making or problem-solving activities is generally associated with higher employee satisfaction (Wagner, 1994. p315). For employees who have better job satisfaction, they will receive higher employee commitment correspondingly, and their working quality is also higher (Mukherjee & Malhotra, 2006). In 2005, Gagne & Deci considered that employee extrinsic motivation, which controlled by the organization or the management would do harm to employee job performance, while intrinsic autonomous motivation would improve job performance on the
9 other hand. As a result, non-financial performance indicators appeared as less controlling, less concrete but more autonomy and self-motivated. In a nutshell, the development of performance measurement systems leads to the two kinds of performance indicators
appeared, which are widely used nowadays: monetary incentives performance indicators and non-monetary incentives performance indicators.
Monetary incentives are including provident fund, bonus, rewards based on performance evaluation, gratuity, etc. While employees of all over the organization prefer to have full freedom during their working, flexible working hours, appreciation letters, special assignments, friendly greetings, e-mails etc., and solicitation of advice, these are all suggestions as non-monetary benefits (Shaji & Deci, 2005. p342). Hal, in 1976, addressed “the new employees tend to be preoccupied with establishing their own identities and becoming a helpful, necessary, and important part of organization.” Schein (1971) indicated that for a purely new employee of an organization, the most important thing is to make some contributions to prove their abilities in order to be approved by most of the empirical members. Norris & Niebuhr, in 1984, addressed that “new employees tend to learn more about how to work in the organization and also how to work with one’s superior, and comprehending the working of the performance appraisal system of the organization.” At this level of tenure, new employees are likely to care more about their abilities to perform the job tasks due to “differences in personal versus organizational expectations”. (Norris & Niebuhr, 1984. p171) That is, employees focus on the performance evaluation as a sign to measure if he/she works well in their works.
The selection of performance indicator depends on organization’s objectives and their interest. Traditionally, performance measurement systems rely heavily on monetary performance indicators that consist of monetary units in an operational system or an organization. Currently, non-monetary indicators within organizational performance
indicators systems have been used to provide managers with the relevant information about employee’s performance and overall company situation. Most importantly, non-financial performance indicator system contributes to the alignment of organizational strategy and
10 employee's interest because they support learning and communicating process more
comprehensively compared with the monetary perspective of performance indicator system (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). Non-monetary incentives are more involved employees in
activities, which are generally aligned with better employee satisfaction and give them more autonomy motivation to complete the work well. And higher employee satisfaction is positively related to employee commitment (Mukherjee and Malhotra, 2006, p449).
Employee commitment and their sense of job satisfaction could help the organization lower their turnover rate. What is more, these items could also help the organization to keep core skills and knowledge within the organization (Tett and Meyer, 1993). This will improve working efficiency of the employee, motivate them to perform well and help the
organization increase its profit and benefit as a whole. With performance indicators I related the most frequent items, which used to quantify employee job performance, including both non-monetary incentive performance indicators and monetary performance indicators such as employee satisfaction, working efficiency, the quantity of work finished in a period of time, and quality indicators. Employee job performance is defined as the extent to which employees meet their job requirements according to their manager (Podsakoff & Mackenzie, 1989. p775-802). Based on the theory above, it leads to my first hypothesis:
H1: Both monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives performance indicators have a
positive relationship with employee job performance.
2.1.3 Job tenure
Work experience refers to “events that are experienced by an individual that relate to the performance of some job” (Quinones et al., 1995). We define job tenure as the length of time as an employee is in a position. Job tenure is also distinct from one who works in a department of an organization for a certain period of time. That is because the employee may be in different positions in one department after a period of time, which refers to the chance of promotion. Different positions in one department could act different job roles
11 and responsible for different kinds of the tasks. Job tenure is distinct from organizational tenure, which is defined as duration of employment with a given company, because employees who have changed jobs frequently within an organization may have high tenure within a firm but still have low tenure in a particular job (Ng & Feldman, 2013. p306).
2.1.4 Human capital theory
In 1964, Becker explained that “human capital theory suggests that one’s earning potential in the labor market reflects one’s knowledge, skill, job experience and potential productivity”. Human capital is an integration of resources—all the knowledge, talents, skills, abilities, experience, intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom possessed individually and collectively by individuals in a population. These resources are the total capacity of the people that represents a form of wealth, which can be directed to accomplish the goals of the nation or state or a portion thereof. Individuals can accumulate human capital through both formal education and work experience (Myers, Griffith, & Daugherty, 2004; Singer & Bruhns, 1991; Strober, 1990). Human capital theory addressed that an employee’s job-related skill and job related knowledge could be related to his/her potential earning. And his/her working experience and working efficiency could also reflected by his/her potential salary. The theory of human capital addressed that employees who have long tenure can perform better, because they have gained more knowledge, which is related to their jobs and careers. (Becker, 1964) In turn, longer job tenure can also be a positive signal about the working experience and productivity of an employee. This leads to a chance of promotion for employee who holds longer job tenure.(Brown, 1989; Sicherman & Galor, 1990). What is more, it could also be a positive opportunity to hold higher wage which are to retain the individual (Jacobsen & Levin, 2002). It is positive signals to organizations about employees’ knowledge and skill levels (Sicherman & Galor, 1990. p169-192). In 2013, Ng & Feldman also suggests “human capital theory suggests that longer job tenure is a positive signal to the labor market about an employee's value.”
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2.1.5 Motivation and job design theories
It is possible to argue that the gains associated with greater human capital might be offset by losses of intrinsic motivation and feelings of boredom over time (Ng & Feldman, 2013. p307). To be specific, the motivation and job design literatures suggest that employees who hold longer job tenure have the feature that their working task tends to be simple. As result, employees would have not much motivation to finish this kind of repeated work (Hackman, 1978 Loukidou, Loan-Clarke, & Daniels, 2009). That is, employees with low intrinsic
motivation were tended to be made more mistakes and have lower job performance due to they have already gained all the master skills and knowledge to charge them. Stewart, in 1999, did the research and found that employees who had lower level of self-motivation and achievement orientation in the stage of maintenance as their behaviors of working are more likely to be repeated after they mastered their core knowledge of working. Fisher, in 1993, defined job boredom as ‘the extent to which individuals find their jobs tedious’, which means that employees are lack of motivation to achieve the goals for the organization. That is to say, the feelings of employees of boredom may influence deeply in their job attitudes and job performance. Negative job attitudes will harm the efficiency of an organization and lower organizational commitment. One employee’s attitude may have negative influence other members of the same organization as well. Employee job performance, according to Podsakoff & Mackenzie, refers to “the extent to which employees meet their job
requirements according to their managers.”
However, my research is not only focusing on the relation between job tenure and job performance. Due to the influence of performance indicators (both monetary incentive performance indicators and non-monetary incentive performance indicators), job tenure is only a moderator to measure job performance. So based on the two theories above, my second hypothesis is:
H2: Job tenure moderates the relationship between performance indicators and job
13 H2a1: For longer-tenured job incumbents, non-monetary incentives performance
indicators are positively correlated with job performance.
H2a2: For longer-tenured job incumbents, monetary incentives performance indicators
are neutral correlated with job performance.
H2b1: For shorter-tenured job incumbents, monetary performance indicators incentives
are positively correlated with job performance.
H2b1: For shorter-tenured job incumbents, non-monetary incentives performance
indicators are neutral correlated with job performance.
3 Research Methodology
3.1 Research design
First of all, the surveys are designed of pairs of managers and a random sample of one of their employees. As my research is focused on the employee job performance and their job tenure, then I would use the results of the employee surveys to test my hypothesis. From the survey, both non-monetary incentive performance indicators and monetary incentive
performance indicators set by the managers. These performance indicators may come from the departments in which the employees stay, or come from the whole organization and represent the evaluation system as a whole. For employee job performance, the results come from the self-reported with the evaluation of the employees themselves. Second, with the construct sources used in the questionnaire I can operationalize my hypothesis. And last but not least, I consider that the survey research is well suitable to examine effects of the
14 monetary incentive performance indicators and non-monetary performance indicators at business unit level for measuring their job performance.
3.1.1 Respondents
The original survey shows the pairs of managers and employees who have met the following selection criteria: (a) they must have worked together in their current functions for at least one year; (b) the non-managerial employees had to have jobs in line positions at the lowest hierarchical level of their organizations; and (c) the manager had to use performance measures to assess the employee’s actual performance (Groen, 2015). All potential respondents, employees or managers, were asked to complete an online survey
questionnaire. There are two surveys designed for either employees or managers. Different surveys sent to different positions, either employee or manager. I would choose the result from the employee survey to analysis my theory. The initial survey resulted in 84
respondents of effective replies, and after filtration, ineffective respondents are excluded. As a result, the 82 valid respondents are kept, and I will use these statistics to analysis.
3.1.2 Survey Instrument
According to Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Lee in 2003, the following ways of setting could guarantee the accuracy of the testing analysis and prevent common method bias. First, all of the independent variables were based on the employees’ self- reports, while as for the dependent variable employee job performance is measured by surveying the employees. For independent variable, performance indicators of both monetary incentives performance indicators and non-monetary incentives performance indicators from the result of employees refer to the performance measurement of their department and organization. For the
dependent variable, job performance refers to employee’s own performance, which means that the results from the survey of employees are their self-evaluation of their own
15 model itself, and it is used as the confidentiality of the answers. Conventional thinking may be canceled by adjusting the orders of the survey, and this will guarantee the veracity of the survey results. What is more, each block of the survey contained only items that concerning the same construct, which led to higher-quality data because it helped the respondents to understand the meaning of the items better (Frantom, Greem & Lam, 2002). And different blocks of the question groups are liable to analysis with my work. Last but not least, by adding a separate introduction to the questions concerning each construct in order to reduce common method bias.
The survey questionnaire has three versions: Dutch, English and Chinese. The original version of the survey is Dutch, and then it is translated into English and Chinese. For the Chinese version, my colleague Liu, Yan, Yang and I are responsible for translating it from the English version together. To guarantee the validity and reliability of the language, we also translate each word from Chinese to English. As a result, there might be a little difference between each version of the survey because of the language discrepancy, this could not be avoided, however, the difference is not that much. All the items had a 7-point fully anchored Likert scale: totally disagree, disagree, moderately disagree, agree nor disagree, moderately agree, agree, and totally agree.
3.2 Variable measurement
3.2.1 Sample selection and data selection
The independent variables in this research are the performance indicators, which is including monetary incentive performance indicators and non-monetary incentive performance indicators. The
dependent variable in this research is employee job performance. And the moderator variable is job tenure.
16 In order to measure the independent variable performance indicators, the employees and their
managers have to answer several questions on a seven-point Likert scale. I will choose block 4 to determine the two types of performance indicators for employees.
The monetary incentive performance indicators is measured as “My manager attaches very high
importance to the performance indicators in determining potential salary increases” and “My manager attaches very high importance to the performance indicators in determining
potential bonuses or extras”. In the following part, these two items are referred to as item1 and item2.
The non-monetary incentive performance indicators are measured as “My manager attaches very high
importance to the performance indicators in increasing my chances of promotion”, and “My manager attaches very high importance to the performance indicators in increasing my authority within the organization.” In the following part, these two items are referred to as item3 and item4 correspondingly.
For measure the dependent variable employee job performance, I will use Block 7 (from the
survey questionnaire of employees) to measure employee job performance. In Block 7, the
respondents are asked to imagine that there is someone who is always with him/her in all the working situations. And this person would therefore know him/her thoroughly in all kinds of situations. This can improve the fairness and objectivity when employee is done the self-evaluation for the job performance. The dependent variable employee job performance is involves
in the questions of: “ He/She always performs all tasks that are expected of him/her” (item5); “He/She always performs all essential duties” (item6); “He/She always fulfills all responsibilities required by his/her job” (item7); “He/She always engages in all activities that will directly affect his/ her performance evaluation” (item8); “He/She always meets all formal performance requirements of the job” (item9); “He/She always completes all duties specified in hi/her job description” (item10); “He/She never neglects aspects of the job that he/she is obligated to perform’’(item11).
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3.2.2 Testing for Moderation Effects
As moderate variable in this research I use job tenure. To test for moderating effects, I would
adopted a regression procedure, recommended by Steel and Kammeyer-Mueller in 2002, that has been found to be more reliable and robust than other moderation testing methods（Ng & Feldman,2013）. These regression-based moderator tests have been used successfully in previous research studies (e.g., Wright & Bonett, 2002). To illustrate this moderator testing procedure, I would use the term of job tenure. Specifically, I used average job tenure, which is 7.22 years in our survey as the basic line, to predict the correlation coefficients for the employee job tenure–job performance relationship in a weighted least squares multiple regression. If the person whose job tenure are above the average, i.e., above 7.22 years, in the sample is a significant predictor of a relationship between non-monetary incentive performance indicators and a dimension of employee job performance, then it suggests that higher job tenure
(HIGH_JT) moderates that relationship. On the other hand, if the persons whose job tenure are below the average, i.e., below 7.22 years, in the sample is a significant predictor of a relationship between monetary incentive performance indicators and a dimension of employee job performance, then it suggests that lower job tenure (LOW_JT) moderates that relationship. In
block 15, question “for how many years have you been working in your current position” is used to measure the moderate variable job tenure of the employee.
3.2.3 Statistical Analyses
Description for basic survey information
Table 1. Descriptive table
Characteristic Employees with
response of
Number of employees with
18 manager (N=82) each item (N=82)
Gender % Male 53.7% 44
% Female 46.3% 38
Education % Primary education 1.2% 1
%Lower vocational education 2.4% 2 %Intermediate general education 1.2% 1 %Intermediate vocational education 8.3% 7 %Higher general education 11.9% 10 %Higher vocational eduacation 29.8% 25 %Scientific education 45.2% 38
Mean (SD) 1.308 5.98
Job Tenure Mean (SD) 6.315 7.22
The basic characteristics of the respondents of corresponding employees are shown in Table 1. The total number of employees who responded to the survey is 84. The gender
proportion from the table shows that, there are 44 male respondents, and 38 of the
respondents are female. There are 2 employees that their genders are unknown. So the valid number of employees is 82. There are seven level of education, which are the same of the setting of the managers’, and the mean education level of managers is 5.98. For primary education, there is 1 employee, and this is the same number of individual with intermediate general education. For lower level vocational education of the employees which done the survey, the number is 2. There are 7 employees who have the intermediate vocational education level. For higher general education level, there are 10 employees. For higher vocation education level, there are 25 employees. And the number of employees who hold the highest education level-scientific educational level is 38. The age of respondents range
19 from 18 to 62, the average age is 32.82 years old. There is one employee that do not know the age of him. Job tenure is range from year 0 (employees who have already started to work in an organization but job tenure has not been enough to 1 year.) to year 30 and the average job tenure of employees is 7.22 years.
4. Results
Variables convergent and discriminant validity
Table 2. Varimax rotated component matrix
PIs_MI PIs_NonMI JOB_PER
Performance indicators 1 (PIs_MI) .879 Performance indicators 2 (PIs_MI) .864 Performance indicators 3 (PIs_NonMI) .924 Performance indicators 4 (PIs_NonMI) .774 Job performance 1 .867 Job performance 2 .894 Job performance 3 .732 Job performance 4 .651 Job performance 5 .772 Job performance 6 .813
20
Job performance 7 .727
Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommend to statistically controlling for common method bias. So I followed the bias-check recommendation of Podsakoff and Organ (1986), which I
conducted a principal component analysis with the Eigen value > 1 criterion on all the items completed by the same person. The varimax rotate solution in Table 2 shows three factors corresponding to the three constructs. The component matrix of both monetary-incentive performance indicators and non-monetary incentive performance indicators tell that each two of the items load onto the corresponding factor, i.e., the non-monetary incentive performance indicators and monetary incentive performance indicators of employees. The component matrix of
job performance tells that indeed the seven items load on to the same factor, job performance.
All the items loaded highest on their own construct. Together the results confirm the convergent validity, and this means this study’s results cannot be explained by common method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
Variable Reliability
From the above section, I explain that the survey gives each of the two questions for non-monetary incentive performance indicators and non-monetary incentive performance indicators, and also gives seven questions measuring employee job performance. Before test these variables, to ensure that these questions all reliably measure the corresponding latent variables, I run the Cronbach’s alpha test using the reliability command. For the variable
employee Job Performance, from table 3, it shows that the Cronbach’s alpha in this case is high
for employees (0.867). Through testing the reliability of Job Performance, we can see that the
extent of items that are supposed to measure a single construct, in this case, is the dependent variable, actually strongly measure one and the same thing. At the same time, I conduct the reliability of the variable Performance indicators for both monetary incentive and non-monetary
incentive for employees. The Cronbach’s alpha for non-monetary incentive performance indicators in this case for employees is 0.886, for monetary incentive performance indicators is 0.892. (See Table 3) Through testing the reliability of performance indicators of both monetary
21
incentives and non-monetary incentives, we can see that the extent of items that are supposed to
measure a single construct, in this case, is the independent variable, actually strongly measure one and the same thing.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and linear regression model
Latent variables a N M SD MIN MAX F-value
Monetary PIs 0.892 1.526* Item1 82 4.73 1.81 1 7 Item2 82 4.77 1.91 1 7 Non-monetary PIs 0.886 1.077* Item3 82 4.66 1.94 1 7 Item4 82 4.65 1.73 1 7 Job Performance 0.867 Item5 82 5.70 1.06 1 7 Item6 82 5.81 1.04 1 7 Item7 82 5.88 0.94 1 7 Item8 82 5.32 1.35 1 7 Item9 82 5.59 1.10 1 7 Item10 82 5.68 1.04 1 7 Item11 82 5.61 1.15 1 7
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
To find the bivariate relations between the variables, I conduct Pearson and Spearman correlations, and create the correlations for employees to see if each of the two variables tends to change together (between independent variable and dependent variable;
independent variable and moderator variable; moderator variable and dependent variable). For employees the Pearson correlation between employee job performance (JOB_PER) and
22
performance indicators (PIs) is 0.590, the Spearman correlation is 0.594, which means a strong
correlation between the two variables. This result shows a linear relationship when a change in performance indicators is associated with a proportional change in employee job performance. As
for employee job performance (JOB_PER) and job tenure (JOB_TENURE), the Pearson
correlation is 0.100 and the Spearman correlation is 0.090 for statistics of employees, which means a weak correlation between these two variables. As for performance indicators (PIs) and job tenure (JOB_TENURE), the Pearson correlation is -0.123 and the Spearman correlation
0.010 for data of employees, which indicates a quite weak correlation between the two. The results lead me to conduct assumption testing continually.
Assumption testing
Independent variables linear regression analysis
I use the method of linear regression that examines how the effect of both two kinds of performance indicators, monetary incentive performance indicators and non-monetary incentive performance indicators on the dependent variable-employee job performance (JOB_PER), which is
refer to hypothesis 1. I compute the two separate variables, PIs_MI, as for monetary incentive performance indicators and PI_NonMI, as for non-monetary incentive performance indicators of the
independent variable-performance indicators (PIs). It is necessary to do that due to the reason that two different kinds of performance indicators have different influence in job performance, financial measurement is more likely linked to control function of the employee performance while non-financial measurement is more linked to intrinsic motivation of the employee. They may have different influence on the condition of
employee’s job performance. So, I use the regression analysis to test the hypothesis that two kinds of performance indicators of monetary-incentive performance indicators (PI_MI) and non-monetary incentive performance indicators (PI_NonMI) commitment positively affect employee job performance for the statistic of employees.
23 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and linear regression of the measurement model, which is to discover the relationship between two types of performance indicators and employee job performance. To look for the relationship between performance indicators (PIs)
and employee job performance (JOB_PER), I conduct the linear regression analysis. From the last
column of table 3, for non-monetary incentives performance indicators, F-value is 1.077, correlation
is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed), which means that non-monetary incentives performance indicators has a positive relationship with employee job performance. For
monetary incentives performance indicators, F-value is 1.526, correlation is significant at the 0.05
level (1-tailed), which means that monetary incentives performance indicators has a positive relationship with employee job performance. As a result, it means that both monetary incentive performance indicators and non-monetary incentive performance indicators are correlated to the
dependent variable employee job performance. In conclusion, both monetary incentives performance indicators and non-monetary incentives performance indicators have a positive relationship with employee job performance, this approves hypothesis 1.
Moderated regression analysis
Table 4. ANOVA model
Independent variable Dependent variable Moderator Model F
H1
Performance indicators (PIs)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
PIs 0.858*
H2 a1
Non-monetary PIs (Pis_NonMI)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
Longer job tenure (HIGH_JT)
PIs_NonMI * HIGH_JT
1.585*
24
Monetary PIs (PIs_MI)
(JOB_PER) (HIGH_JT) HIGH_JT
H2 b1 Monetary PIs (PIs_MI)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
Shorter job tenure (LOW_JT) PIs_NonMI * LOW_JT .477 H2 b2 Non-monetary
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
Shorter job tenure PIs_MI* LOW_JT
.380
PIs (PIs_NonMI) (LOW_JT)
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
To test for moderating effects, I adopted a linear regression procedure, because that has been found to be more reliable and robust than other moderation testing methods. The results are shown in Table 4. From my case, the moderator is job tenure (JT). The means of job tenure for the employees is 7.22 years. To investigate the relationship between the relationship between performance indicators and employee job performance which is
moderated by employee job tenure, I divide employee job tenure into two groups, one group is shorter job tenure and other one is longer job tenure. As a result, I set the shorter job tenure is below 7.22 years, and the transforming variable is LOW_JT; Longer job tenure is considered above 7.22 years, and the transforming variable is HIGH_JT.
To find out the influence of job tenure on moderating performance indicators on two types of employee job performance, I combine four variables through performance indicators and job tenure.
There are monetary incentive performance indicators and long job tenure
(PIs_MIxHIGH_JT), monetary incentive performance indicators and short job tenure (PIs_MIxLOW_JT), non-monetary incentive performance indicators and long job tenure (PIs_NonMIxHIGH_JT) and non-monetary incentive performance indicators and short job tenure (PIs_NonMIxLOW_JT).
25 To illustrate moderated regression analysis, I based on the following hypothesis: the effect of performance indicators on employee job performance depends on job tenure: the longer job tenure
(HIGH_JT), the stronger the effect of non-monetary incentives performance indicators (PIs_NonMI)
on employee job performance (JOB_PER). Monetary incentive performance indicator (PIs_MI) is neutral employee job performance (JOB_PER). On the contrary, the shorter job tenure (LOW_JT), the
stronger effect of monetary incentives of performance indicators ((PIs_MI) on employee job performance
(JOB_PER), the non-monetary incentive performance indicator (PIs_NonMI) is neutral employee job performance (JOB_PER).
The forth column shows the models of each hypothesis. For hypothesis 1, the model is just testing the influence of performance indicators to employee job performance, which is already illustrated in the above section.
As for hypothesis 2, model 2a1 predict that under the longer employee job tenure (above
7.22 years), non-monetary incentive performance indicators has a positive influence on employee job performance, i.e., finding the relationship between PIs_NonMI* HIGH_JT and JOB_PER.
Model 2a2 predict that under the longer employee job tenure, monetary incentive
performance indicators has no influence on employee job performance, i.e., finding the relationship between PIs_MI* HIGH_JT and JOB_PER.
Model 2b1 predict that under the shorter employee job tenure (below 7.22 years), monetary
incentive performance indicators has a positive influence on employee job performance, i.e., finding the relationship between PIs_MI* LOW_JT and JOB_PER.
Model 2b2 predict that under the shorter employee job tenure, non-monetary incentive
performance indicators is neutral on employee job performance, i.e., finding the relationship between PIs_NonMI* LOW_JT and JOB_PER.
The fifth column shows the F value of the ANOVA. First of all, I perform the linear
regression for PIs_NonMI*HIGH_JT (Model 2a1) and PIs_MI*HIGH_JT (Model 2a2) with
26 (above 7.22years), the extent of non-monetary performance indicators and monetary performance indicators related to employee job performance (H2a). For PIs_NonMI*HIGH_JT, F-value is
1.585, correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). Two degrees of freedom are 1 and 16. While for PIs_MI*HIGH_JT, F-value is 0.344 under the significance of 0.166. Two degrees of freedom are also 1 and 16. That is to say, non-monetary incentive performance indicators and monetary incentive performance indicators have a difference influence on employee job performance moderated by longer job tenure. As a result, in the longer job tenure, non-monetary incentive has a positive influence in employee’s job performance, however, monetary incentive of performance indicators is neutral to the job performance of employee. This approves the hypothesis 2a1 and 2a2.
And then, I perform the linear regression for hypothesis 2b, that is, two variables
PIs_NonMI*LOW_JT (Model 2b1) and PIs_MI*LOW_JT (Model 2b2) with the dependent
variable JOB_PER for the data of employees, to see under the condition of shorter job tenure
(below 7.22 years), the extent of non-monetary performance indicators and monetary performance indicators related to employee job performance (H2b). For PIs_NonMI*LOW_JT, F-value is 0.380,
under the significance of 0.240. Two degrees of freedom are 1 and 54. The result shows an insignificant relation between non-monetary incentives performance indicators and job performance of the employees under the condition of low job tenure. Hypothesis 2b1 is rejected. While for PIs_MI*HIGH_JT, F-value is 0.477 under the significance of 0.293. Two degrees of freedom are also 1 and 54. This result also indicates an insignificant relation between monetary incentives performance indicators and job performance of the employees under the condition of low job tenure. Hypothesis 2b2 is rejected as well. Both of the results show that the effect of monetary and non-monetary incentive performance indicators has also not much different influence for low job tenure of employees. As a result, hypothesis 2b is rejected. The reason to explain the results might be that for employee who has just worked within a shorter period of time in a department of an organization, either monetary incentive or non-monetary incentive is quite important for the employee. That is to say, the employee seeks for salary increasing and bonus during his/her working, while promotion chance and
27 authority of the organization are also motivations for employees to performance well under the shorter job tenure.
Conclusion for this section: based on the results among 82 employees of the survey, for longer job tenure, non-monetary incentive performance indicators have positive relation with employee job performance; monetary incentive performance indicators are neutral to employee job performance. Hypothesis 2a is approved. For shorter job tenure, no difference is found between non-monetary incentive performance indicators and monetary incentive performance indicators. Hypothesis 2b is rejected.
Control variables analysis
Table 5. Construct Variances (in parentheses on the diagonal axis) and correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Monetary PIs - .768** .217** .186* .204 .365 .109
2 Non-monetary PIs .768** - .166* .063 .293 .279 .191
3 Employee job performance .217** .166* - .196 .088 .691 .119
4 Job Tenure .186* .063 .196 - -.147 .446** -.010
5 Education level .a .204 .293 .088 -.147 - -.046 -.081
6 Age .365 .279 .691 .446** -.046 -
7 Gender .b .109 .191 .119 -.010 -.081 -.147 -
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
.a. 1=primary education; 2=lower vocational education; 3=intermediate general education; 4=intermediate vocational intermediate; 5=higher general education; 6=higher vocational education; 7=scientific education.
28 As various age, gender and education level of employees may have different job performance during the process of working, and to prohibit these factors, which would influence the result of the research, I set age, gender and education level as three control variables to see if the found relations with employee job performance can be explained by demographic differences. I assumed that nationality and industrial type have no influence of the result. The reasons are as follows: first of all, the relationship between performance indicators and job performance is existed among different kinds of industrial types and various of
countries. Secondly, these two variables basically have no influence on the moderator variable-job tenure. Thirdly, our respondents of the survey are from different countries and working for different kinds of organizations. It is not easy to divide specific nationality type and industry type for the respondents based on the number of the survey. Under the above considerations, I only set age, gender and educational level as the control variables for this research.
As can be seen from Table 5,that the correlation between monetary incentive performance indicators and job tenure is 0.217,which is significant at the 0.01 levels. The correlation between non-monetary incentive performance indicators and employee job tenure is 0.166, which is significant at 0.05 levels (1-tailed). It shows that the strength of the relations are similar to those of the main model, and it also approves hypothesis 1. The other correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) is job tenure and age. This makes sense because that if the job tenure of employees is increasing, their ages are increasing for sure. So the older the ages of the employees, the longer job tenures they would be. There are no any other significant correlations between education and job performance, gender and job
performance, or age and employee job performance.
Table 6. Linear regression model
Independent variable Dependent variable Model 1 Model 2a1 Model 2a2 Model 2b1 Model 2b2 Model 3
29
H1
Performance indicators (PIs)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
.858*
H2 a1
Non-monetary PIs (Non-MI)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
1.585*
H2 a2 Monetary PIs (MI)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
.344
H2 b1 Monetary PIs (MI)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
.477
H2 b2 Non-monetary PIs (Non_MI)
Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
.380
Control education level Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
.132
Control age Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
-.280
Control gender Employee job performance (JOB_PER)
.245
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
Table 6 shows the standardized linear regression weights and model for adding three control variables based on table 4. From the last column, model 3 shows the relation between control variables: education level, age and gender and employee job performance. As can be seen from the last column, the F-value of control variable educational level, age and gender are 0.132, -0.280 and 0.245 correspondingly. None of the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed), which means that none of the relations indicate a significant level. In sum, with a couple of exceptions, the relationships between control variables gender, age and
30 education level have non-influence on the relationship between monetary incentive
performance indicators and non-monetary performance indicators and employee job performance.
5. Discussion
5.1 Summary of findings
Is there any relationship between use of performance indicators for monetary incentive and non-monetary incentive and job performance while using job tenure as a moderator? This dissertation reports answers to this interesting question by integrating several theories and providing empirical results. In this part of the discussion I indicate the contribution of the theory and method used, and also on the empirical answers reached in the studies I performed.
In the first study-based on the survey results of 82 employees in different nationalities and different industries-I developed a theoretical model which explains whether there is a relationship between monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives performance indicators and employee job performance. I found that the system of performance measurement to be applicable as a basis of this theoretical model. After I related performance indicators of these employees to their job performance, I found that the results showed a positive correlation between performance indicators and employee job performance. That is to say, if monetary incentive increased, such as an increasing of the employees’ salary, bonuses and extras, they would have a better job performance. Also, if their promotion chances or authority increases within the organization-theses are related to the increasing of non-monetary incentives, the employees of the organization show a better job performance as well. As a result, both monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives have a positive relationship with employee job performance.
31 The second model is based on the model developed in the first study. The theoretical model used job tenure as a moderated, and the theory of human capital to be applicable as a basis of this model.
The second study is built on the basis of theoretical model 1, which is adding employee job tenure as a moderator to discover the relation between performance indicators and job performance. Under this circumstance, we could statistically check the preference of employees who holds different job tenures on two types of performance indicators during their working. After the analysis, for relatively shorter job tenure, both monetary incentives performance indicators and non-monetary incentives performance indicators are found no difference on influence of the employee job performance. While for longer job tenure, non-monetary performance indicators seem to have positive influence on employee job performance, while monetary performance indicators are neutral to their job performance. The results are basically accorded with my predication, and it also consists with the facts. Both monetary incentive and non-monetary incentive performance indicators make employees to have stronger motivation to perform well during their working. This result could enough the organizations to improve the performance measurement system and their job evaluation system to make their employees work more efficiently. What is more, according to my results of the research, for employees who have longer job tenure, they may prefer monetary incentives than monetary incentives. Organizations could use non-monetary incentives such as promotion to encourage this kind of employees consciously if they have a better job performance and achievements. Not only could this behavior benefit the employee and motivate him/her to do the work better, but also can stimulate the other employees of the organization to perform well.
5.2 Implications for theory development
The results indicated that the positive relationship between performance indicators and job performance. The research shows that for both monetary incentive performance indicators
32 and non-monetary incentive performance indicators, they both have a positive correlation with employee job performance. Moreover, using job tenure as a moderator, controlling for the respondents’ age, gender and education level, the relationship between types of
performance indicators and job performance are not strong enough. These findings have implications for the following inter-related streams of research: performance indicators, job tenure, and job performance.
From the paper of Ng and Feldman in 2013, they found that there has been little theoretical work on job tenure per se. The relationship between job tenure and job performance is not clear due to the fact that now there are two competing theoretical research on how job tenure might affect job performance. Human capital theory holds the opinion that there is a positive relationship between job tenure and employee job performance. The theory explains that when job tenure is increasing for employees, their skills and knowledge are improved as well, so does their job performance (Feldman&Ng, 2013). That is to say, when employees who holds longer job tenure has improve their skills of working, the difference of salaries between those employees and others came out, however, in contrast, job design theory gives an opposite opinion. The main explanation of the theory indicates that when job tenure becomes longer, employees are lack of enthusiasm of working, and this leads to a result that they perform poorly during their working time (Hackman, 1978). By considering both theories, I conduct the analysis between performance indicators and job performance, which using job tenure as a moderator. The results approve that under longer job tenure, non-monetary incentive performance indicators have a positive relation with employee job performance. Non-monetary incentive performance indicators relate to intrinsic motivation of the employees, because promotion and authority often lifts the confidence and self-pride of an individual. It seems that it supports the job design theory, in which employees indeed need some incentives to improve their efficiency of working when they hold longer job tenure. Still, the findings for shorter job tenure indicates that much more research is needed on the mechanisms through which job performance are involved.
33 The current study also has implications for job performance. Brett & Stroh, 1997, indicates that lengthy job tenure hinders one’s career advancement. My study has shown that the lengthy job tenure is not related to greater job performance, so as that it is as a moderator between performance indicators and job performance. One possibility is that no matter for longer or shorter job tenure, non-monetary incentives and monetary incentives performance indicators are both necessary to improve job performance. Another possibility is that
sometimes the performance indicators for both monetary incentive and non-monetary incentive are combined together to encourage employee’s incentive, and the boundary is quite vague. As a result, longer or shorter job tenure may have unclear impact on the relation between performance indicators and job performance.
5.3 Limitations of the present research
The current study has several limitations. First of all, there are only 82 effective pairs of effective managers-employees in the meta-analysis who were at the end of job tenure distribution. Stronger effect sizes may reveal if having a larger sample of managers-employees pairs. Secondly, the testing result for each variable might be not accurately enough. For independent variable-performance indicators, different employees might have different understanding of monetary-performance indicators and non-monetary
performance indicators. That is to say, it is possible that some incentives they have received might be ignored during they fill in the questionnaire. As for dependent variable-employee job performance, it evaluated by the employees themselves. This would lead to a result that it is possible that they may underestimate their job performance or overestimate their
performance, due to the fact that they have no reference to compare during the period they do the survey. As a result, the data of the survey could be bias. Thirdly, the number of previous research studies was not much, particularly those involving job tenure as a
moderator. As I only combine the variables between non-monetary incentives and monetary incentives performance indicators and longer and shorter job tenures, I did not test the
34 relationship between performance indicators and other variables which could be affecting job performance, I have no reason to expect that my results would be stable with larger data sets and other situations appears. What is more, the longer and shorter job tenure only depend on the current respondent pairs, and the dividing method for defining “shorter” and “longer” is quite simple. So the results here remain rather suggestive than conclusive.
35
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