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A CRITIQUE OF PETER SINGER’S ‘ONE WORLD’ AND 'ONE WORLD NOW' AND HOW THE GLOBALJUSTICE DEBATE CAN BECOME A GLOBAL DEBATE S.T. Ishwardat (11425997)
Supervisor: Mr. P.A. Raekstad
MASTER THESIS POLITICAL SCIENCE: POLITICAL THEORY UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM
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Table of contents
Acknowledgements ... 3
1. Introduction ... 4
2. Racism and race ... 9
3. Analytical framework ... 11
3.1 The Racial Contract ... 11
3.2 Eurocentrism ... 15
3.3 Epistemicide ... 17
4. Singer’s conception of Global Justice ... 18
4.1 One atmosphere ... 18
4.2 One economy ... 19
4.3 One law ... 21
4.4 One community ... 22
4.5 Conclusion ... 24
5. The Racial Contract in One World (Now) ...26
5.1 Socio-political contract ... 26 5.1.1 Democracy ... 27 5.1.2 International institutions ... 29 5.2 Moral contract ... 33 5.3 Epistemological contract ... 35 5.4 Exploitation contract ... 38 5.5 Concluding summary ... 40 6. Ubuntu ...42 6.1. Cosmopolitanism ... 43 6.2 Distribution ... 46 6.3 Concluding summary ... 47 7. Conclusion ...48 8. Reference list...53 Appendix A ...56
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Paul Raekstad, for his guidance and support in writing this thesis.
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1. Introduction
‘Instead, they say they “regret” that the slave trade happened. Forget regret. We want them to take responsibility. - Umberto Brown Too White, too Western, too Eurocentric, imperialistic: these are often heard critiques to Western political philosophy1. It is often criticized for having only minimally considered and
continuing to minimally consider wrongdoings to nonwhite peoples. Western political philosophers still majorly rely on ideas of philosophers who did not recognize racism as a political system, or even those who endorsed racism (Mills, 2015). Furthermore, Charles W. Mills (2015) argues that many key framings that are used in Western political philosophy are legacies of colonial heritage, which should be rejected. Relying on these notions without contesting their foundations is argued to cause an implicit racial bias. In support of this criticism, Mills ( 2015) exposes three main problems in the canon of political philosophy2. Firstly, global
Euro-domination and the resistance against it are treated as unimportant themes, by being discussed only minimally. Secondly, non-Western philosophy appears to be unworthy of inclusion. It is deemed unconvincing and improbable to hold that there are no non-Western writings worthy of political philosophy, which indicates the likelihood that political philosophy draws an incomplete picture (Graness, 2015; Mills, 2015). Finally, a discussion of race, racism, colonialism, imperialism and slavery is absent. The focus of political philosophy raises questions on who benefits from the way the terms and conditions are defined.
Mills (2015) argues that the absence of a discussion of the issues above in Western political philosophy is problematic because it is a denial of the political status of the themes discussed above. The white demographics of the profession are given as a possible explanation of this neglect. The unacknowledged but privileged position of whites is taken as the norm while the nonprivileged position of nonwhites is disregarded. This is a result of the reality that whites and nonwhites continue to be confronted with different issues. The racist consequences of, among others, expropriation, slavery and colonialism fell on nonwhites and therefore did not pose a direct problem to whites. This problem persists with the expressions and understanding of racism today.
1 Western political philosophy in this thesis refers to the philosophy based on ideas originating from Europe,
generally coming from Europe and European settler states. Notwithstanding, a Europe or European settler state based philosopher can write about non-Western philosophies.
2 Blackwell’s Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy; Steven Cahn Classics of Political and Moral
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In the book the Racial Contract, Mills argues that racism is a political structure, meaning that it is a "particular power structure of formal or informal rule" (Mills, 1997; p. 3). ‘Political’ in this conceptualization refers to a broad understanding of the political, extending to the extra-parliamentary. This understanding includes social processes which shape the character of society, including institutions, human interactions, and group psychology (Haslanger, 2000a; Mills, 2000). Racism is based on an ideology of white supremacy, which is “the system of domination by which white people have historically ruled over and (…) continue to rule over nonwhite people” (Mills, 1997; pp. 1-2). These problems of exclusion lead to an incomplete conceptualization of the political sphere, as it excludes a crucial part of colonial history and political divisions3. Mills
furthermore argues a non-ideal approach to political philosophy is necessary to conceptualize racism. He states that to understand the ideal, the non-ideal must be demystified and condemned. The non-ideal informs the ideal theory, by giving it an understanding what the ideal should not be (Mills, 1997; p. 5).
Zooming in on global justice, a specific field in political philosophy, the same neglect of racism as in political philosophy is found. Rawls’ ideas have taken a central position in this debate. He argued that his defined first principles are barely applicable on a global scale, because of the absence of a transnational basic structure (Rawls, in Mills, 2015). However, Mills (2015) argues that this assertion is incorrect, as there was and is a network of organizations that was regulating global activities, and there were and still are power relationships such as a legacy of colonialism. Another view on global justice is argued for by non-Rawlsian theories, that seek to address the prescriptions for global justice. Nevertheless, these ideas as well marginalize colonial history and racial exploitation (Mills, 2015). The contemporary global justice debate is further criticized for its disconnect form the real-world debate. This debate has attempted to hold the West accountable, but this is generally being avoided by Western governments themselves (Butt, 2009). Graness (2015) further critiques the debate on global justice held by European and American theorists for failing to incorporate views and concepts from other regions of the world. The failure to do so provokes the doubt if the established concepts can transcend regional and cultural horizons.
These critiques on political philosophy and global justice reveal a critical problem in these fields: the ability to present an accurate argument. Since global Euro-domination, non-Western theories, and racism are not addressed, this raises doubts of whether these theories can present a racially just argument. This is because their exclusion leads to an incomplete conceptualization of
3 For example the political divisions in the relationships between the ruler and the ruled, colonizers and colonized,
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the political sphere, and provokes doubt on the claim to be global. Considering this critique of Western political philosophy and Global Justice, I critically engage with one of the theories in the global justice debate, particularly Peter Singer's writings on the ethics of globalization in One World (2002) and One World Now (2016)4. Singer stresses the need for a global approach
because of our interconnectedness in terms of the atmosphere, economy, and human rights. These factors stress the need for a global approach to move to the recognition of the idea we live in one world. Therefore, Singer makes a proposal with utilitarian focus, to ensure a global approach on climate change, economic justice, international law, and a different view on the obligations people have towards each other. Singer’s “ethics of globalization” take a central place in the global justice debate. Yet, while other global justice writings have been critiqued on issues of racial privilege, Singer’s conceptualization has steered clear of these critiques. Grounded on the general criticisms on political philosophy and global justice, I assess if these criticisms also apply for One World (Now). The research question of this thesis is therefore:
“Is Peter Singer’s account of global justice as presented in One World and One World Now racially just?”.
Based on the above explained critiques on political philosophy and global justice, I hold that without sufficiently considering racial injustices an international theory or political philosophy cannot present a racially just argument, because it will lack the necessary means to address racial injustice. To move beyond the Eurocentric, Western, and imperialistic conceptions of political philosophy, Mills presents two necessities (2015). Firstly, the recognition that white supremacy has existed historically and continues to exist; and secondly, the recognition of non-Western political traditions. Therefore, I assess the research question in two ways, to analyze whether and how the argument in One World (Now) presents a racially biased argument. The first part of the analysis seeks to reveal a racial bias through an engagement with the One World (Now), the second part seeks to geographically broaden the theory and to provide possible solutions to the problems. The first part of the assessment is grounded on Charles W. Mills’ (1997) explanation of the Racial Contract, complemented with John M. Hobson’s description of Eurocentrism. These theories form a framework to identify a racial bias in the theory. The identification of a bias will lead to the establishment of a political space necessary to address these injustices. A racially biased theory is unable to address racial injustices, as it does not possess the necessary understanding of racism as a political system. The second part of the analysis is based on Dennis
4 One World Now presents a revised and updated argument of One World. Where the argument of both books are
the same, I will abbreviate the titles to ‘One World (Now)’. The arguments I discuss in this thesis are shared by both books, unless stated otherwise.
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Masaka’s (2017) explanation of the notion of Epistemicide, which describes the omission and silencing of knowledge of dominated peoples. Therefore, this part of the analysis has two goals. Firstly, it seeks to geographically broaden the theory by presenting a non-Western conceptualization of global justice, which I secondly use to address the problems arising in the first part of the analysis. I discuss a conceptualization of global justice through the lens of ubuntu ethics. Extending the global justice debate beyond merely Western political traditions is necessary to recognize non-Western political traditions, and to provincialize instead of centralize European traditions (Chakrabarty, 2008).
The goal of this thesis is to establish a conception of global justice that is racially just, as well as to assess if it is possible to form a conception that is truly global rather than Western. Based on the assessment of One World (Now) according to this framework, I will argue in this thesis that Singer is unable to provide a conceptualization of global justice that is racially just. This is because Singer does not sufficiently address racial privilege to be able to present a racially just theory. He fails to identify the racial privilege of the Racial Contract. Ubuntu philosophy can present a different angle on how the problem of racial privilege can be assessed. By its focus on the establishment of humane relations and the importance of the community, I will argue that ubuntu is able to address the problematic power relation between whites and nonwhites that the Racial Contract establishes.
The scientific relevance of this thesis is that is criticizes a theory of global justice that has steered clear of critiques on its racial bias. It is unique by pointing out the weaknesses in this theory, and subsequently providing possible solutions to them. This thesis also presents a new application of the theory of the ‘Racial Contract’5. The new application is based on the combination of this
theory with Eurocentrism and Epistemicide. Further, this thesis presents a new application of the ‘Racial Contract’ by applying it on a non-contractarian theory. The combination of the ‘Racial Contract’ with Eurocentrism and Epistemicide provides for a new and extensive way to assess the Racial Contract in Singer’s theory of global justice. The relevance of this thesis also consists of its ability to geographically broaden the scope of global justice, by considering ubuntu philosophy. The social or political relevance of this thesis is the critical engagement with these theories. One World (Now) plays a central role in the global justice debate, and has an extensive reach beyond academia. It is therefore of great importance to assess if the theory is racially just. The application of the ‘Racial Contract’, in combination with Eurocentrism and Epistemicide, provides for an interesting framework that can be applied to assess other theories as well.
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In this thesis, I do no seek to answer a question of guilt, but to uncover the racist ideology inherent to the argument. It rather seeks to show how racial injustices came about and how they are part of an existing political structure. Furthermore, I do not seek to argue that the conceptualization of global justice as presented in One World (Now) is a plausible account. Consequently, I do not intend to argue that the theory presented in One World (Now) will be a preferable and plausible account of global justice if it becomes racially just. Further, I will not include or address problems other than the problems relating to racial justice, such as criticisms to Singers account of cosmopolitanism or utilitarianism.
This thesis proceeds in chapter 2 by defining race and racism. In chapter 3, I present the analytical framework. There, I explain the theories of the Racial Contract, Eurocentrism and Epistemicide. In chapter 4, I give a general overview of Singer’s argument and proposals in One World and One World Now. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of One World (Now), according to each partial contract that constitutes the Racial Contract. Based on the problems that I identify in this chapter, I present in chapter 6 how ubuntu can possibly provide solutions.
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2. Racism and race
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it.
– W.E.B. Du Bois Racism is defined by Grosfoguel (2016) as a global hierarchy of superiority, along the line of the human. This line has been produced politically, culturally and economically. People below the line of the human are the subhumans or non-humans, for their humanity is questioned (Fanon, 1967). Above the line are the humans who are recognized socially in their humanity, as human beings. Therefore, these humans enjoy access to rights, material resources, and social recognition (Grosfoguel, 2016). Contemporary racism primarily takes a form of cultural rather than biological superiority and inferiority, as the latter is deemed less acceptable (Cole, 2016). Racism therefore deal with categories of humans, with a superiority or inferiority status. I add that racism necessarily deals with an idea of race, because racism has distinctive characteristics from other systems of domination, such as sexism and classism (Haslanger, 2000b). Gender, class, and races are oppressed in common, but do not face a common oppression. The characteristics and expression of each oppression is different (Mills, 1997; p. 138). This is illustrated accurately by Mills in the example that “Neither white women nor white workers have as a group (as against principles individuals) historically made common cause with nonwhites against colonialism, white settlement, slavery imperialism, jim crow, apartheid” (Mills, 1997; p. 138, italics in original). To understand racism, it is important to understand what race is. Most scholars agree that ‘race’ is a social construct, meaning that it is a product of social thought and relations (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Races do not share “robust, biobehavioral essences” (Mallon, 2006; p. 525), nor are they objective, inherent or fixed, and do not correspond to a biological or genetic reality (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). The shared physical traits of people of common geographical origin are real, but constitute an extremely small portion of their genetic endowment. These physical traits have little or nothing to do with the human and higher-order traits that are attached to the concept of race (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). I define race as a non-objective, non-inherent and non-fixed social construct, based on shared physical traits of people of common geographical origin or culture, which does not correspond to a biological or genetic reality. Race is based on a different idea than other social oppressions, which, as explained above, expresses itself in a different structure (racism). Nevertheless, race is a fluid notion, as it is objective, non-inherent, and non-fixed. Therefore, I will not define specific indicators of this idea, such as cultural or bodily characteristics. Although race is not biologically or genetically real, race is a
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social reality. Even though the conceptualization of race is dependent on time and location, I hold that racism exists globally. This is because the way members of specific groups are socially positioned in the hierarchy of humans and subhumans. The physical markers serving as the foundation of this position, globally stand in a similar relationship to each other, which entails that generally whites take the position on top of the hierarchy (Haslanger, 2000b; Mills, 1997).
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3. Analytical framework
Yet in articulating their opposition with arguments invoking the privileges of white supremacy, they revealed how defenseless they remained (…) to the pernicious ideological influence of racism
– Angela Y. Davis This chapter discusses three concepts that form the framework for the analysis of Peter Singer’s conception of global ethics: The Racial Contract, Eurocentrism and Epistemicide. These conceptualizations serve as a base to address the issues arising from the critiques to political philosophy and global justice. I first discuss the notion of the Racial Contract, which is a critique on the racially biased conceptualization of social contract theory and a conceptual device to visualize race as a political system. Secondly, I discuss Hobson’s methodology of the conceptualization of Eurocentrism. Thirdly, I discuss the notion of Epistemicide, which presents a more detailed account of the shape and origins of the Racial epistemological Contract. Mills (2015) argues that to reveal the colonial legacy of Western political philosophy, the Eurocentric bias within this discipline should be identified. Using the theories of the Racial Contract and Eurocentrism as a foundation of the analysis of Singer’s One World (Now) aids in identifying the racial bias in this theory, in chapter 5. The theory of Epistemicide stresses the urgency of geographically broadening the epistemology of among others political philosophy, which will be done in chapter 6.
3.1 The Racial Contract
The social contract describes a nonmaterial but nevertheless real contract (agreement) between members of a society, who agree to structure their society and politics in a certain manner. Traditional social contract theory generally tries to provide answers to two sorts of questions. It answers to factual questions about how a society and a government work, and to normative questions dealing with the justification of socioeconomic structures and political institutions (Mills, 1997). Mills (1997) argues that racism is an unacknowledged political system which constitutes part of the core of the social contract, and social contract theory is therefore racially biased. In this subchapter, I explain the ‘Racial Contract’ and why it is necessary to understand the social contract. The ‘Racial Contract’ refers to the theory (the critical examination) of the Racial Contract itself. Further, I address how the Racial Contract has come into existence, and address its current shape. Finally, I explain the several contracts that form the Racial Contract. The book ‘The Racial Contract’ begins by stating: “White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today” (1997; p. 1). The Racial Contract is a
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theory and explanation of racism and global white supremacy as a real world political system. Mills (1997) outlines a theoretical framework deemed necessary to situate the discussions of race and racism, and to challenge the racial assumptions made in White political philosophy. It is a critique of social contract theories, which are mostly ideal theories. Social contract theories generally describe a society and government that is formed justly and acts morally. Ideal social contract theory usually takes the “freedom and equality of all men in the state of nature” as an assumed objective moral foundation to the theory (Mills, 1997; pp. 15-16). Contrary to most social contract theories, the ‘Racial Contract’ is a non-ideal theory which “explains how an unjust, exploitative society, ruled by an oppressive government and regulated by an immoral code, comes into existence” (Mills, 1997; p. 5). Mills argues that the moral foundation that is usually held by social contract theory is misleading, because racism and racially structured discriminations have been the norm (a rule) instead of a deviation from the norm (an exception). By maintaining the traditional foundation of social contract theory, racism is made into a personal moral failure, while it is actually ingrained in the political system. The morality in the Racial Contract is therefore color-coded, as it restricts the possession of freedom and equality to white men and thereby places nonwhites lower on the moral ladder. The freedom and equality of white man is the norm, while nonwhites suffering from racism are suffering from personal moral failures. A non-ideal view is necessary to challenge white supremacy and racial privilege, and to recognize racism as a political system. Ideal social contract theory can therefore not come up with the necessary means to challenge this political system, because racism does not exist in ideal social contract theory (or only exists as a deviation). Recognizing and understanding the Racial Contract within the social contract is necessary to correct for its existence in the social contract (Mills, 1997).
The Racial Contract constitutes race as a structure of exclusion, in which people of color are regarded as less than equal to white people (Pateman & Mills, 2007). It is a political system where “white people have historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule over nonwhite people” (Mills, 1997; p. 2). Racism in the understanding as a political system means that it is a particular power structure, that consists of formal or informal rule. Furthermore, racism is expressed as a socioeconomic privilege, the norming for the distribution of material wealth and opportunities, as benefits and burdens, and as rights and duties (Mills, 1997; p. 3). The Racial Contract is defined as a:
“set of formal or informal agreements or meta-agreements (…) between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth designated by (shifting) “racial”
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(phenotypical/genealogical/cultural) criteria C1, C2, C3… as “white,” and coextensive (…) with the class of full persons, to categorize the remaining subset of humans as “nonwhite” and of different and inferior moral status, subpersons, so that they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white-ruled polities (…)” (Mills, 1997; p. 11)
Mills (1997) argues that the social contract is actually a contract between whites over nonwhites, which thereby constructs race as a group identity. Race signifies the status of superiority and privilege of whites, and of inferiority and subordination of nonwhites. In essence, the contract thus creates an opposing relationship between two groups, whites and nonwhites. Whites are the beneficiaries but not necessarily signatories of the contract, while nonwhites are the objects of the contract. Because the social contract has been written and designed by whites whose racial privilege was taken for granted, the contract serving as a justification of the government of a state is actually racially biased. The social contract is therefore a Racial Contract. The social contract privileges the whites while the bodies, lands and resources of nonwhites are exploited and equal socioeconomic opportunities are denied to them6.
Mills holds that race is a social construct, which ‘decolorizes’ Whiteness. The Racial Contract shows that Whiteness (with an upper-case W) is a set of power relations instead of only a color. After all, in another world there might as well have been another constitution of the racial hierarchy. However, as white racism is “the contingent outcome of a particular set of circumstances”, in our world racism refers to white/nonwhite relations (Mills, 1997; p. 127). The Racial Contract is global, because even though there are local variations of the Contract, whites are the global representatives of civilization and modernity and are on top of the social pyramid (Mills, 1997; p. 30). The Racial Contract is historically locatable in European colonialism, where Europeans globally dominated the world and which served as the creation of the modern world along a racially hierarchical polity. This is an important realization, firstly because these historical expressions of racism generate current injustices; and secondly because it helps to understand how to restore or repair what has been lost (Boucher, 2015). The Racial Contract is real because the world has been shaped by historical White supremacy, and it is global as it divided the world between developed “men” and underdeveloped “natives” (Sartre, 1961).
While in the past the Racial Contract took an explicit form, as with the subsidiary contracts of expropriation, slavery and colonialism (Mills, 1997; p. 24-27), the contract now exists informally.
6 Mills asserts that even though the ‘Racial Contract’ distinguishes between whites and non-whites, race is not the
only axis of social oppression. He is not denying there are other forms of domination and subordination such as gender or class (Mills, 1997; p. 137).
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There are still unofficial local agreements privileging whites over nonwhites, but the main form the contract currently takes is by failing to address racial privilege (Mills, 1997; p. 73). Not addressing racial privilege has several effects: it takes the existing “color-coded configurations of wealth, poverty, property and opportunities” for granted; it upholds the idea that “formal, juridical equality is sufficient to remedy the inequities created on a foundation of several hundred years of racial privilege”; and it assumes that challenging that foundation is against the terms of the social contract (Mills, 1997; p. 73-74). This color blindness of the theory further grounds white privilege. The proposition I defend in this thesis is therefore:
P 1 = Racial privilege must be assessed to correct for the existence of the Racial Contract in the social contract
Parts of the contract
Like the classical models in contractarian theory, the ‘Racial Contract’ contains a socio-political and a moral contract. Additionally, Mills argues the epistemological7 and exploitation contract are
also part of the social contract. The contract is socio-political by explaining the origins of government and the political obligations of the people in a society to it (Mills, 1997; p. 9). It is a moral contract because it is the moral foundation of the moral code that has been established for society, and by which the citizens are supposed to regulate their behavior (Mills, 1997; p. 10). The Racial Contract is an epistemological contract as it prescribes “norms for cognition to which its signatories must adhere” (Mills, 1997; p. 11). This latter part of the contract takes the form of a natural law, through which we determine how to understand the world (both facts and values) (Mills, 1997; p. 17). It is important to recognize the epistemological contract in the social contract, as the understanding of the world of the Racial Contract diverges from the reality prescribed by the social contract. Hence, it is harder to understand the Racial Contract because the social contract provides an incomplete way to understand the world: “an agreement to misinterpret the world” (Mills, 1997; p. 18, italics in original). The last part of the contract is the exploitation contract. Mills argues that although social contract theory is presented as primarily moral and political, it is economic in a background sense. This is because a partial goal of leaving the state of nature is “to secure a stable environment for the industrious appropriation of the world” (Mills, 1997; p. 31). In the analysis of One World (Now) I identify these four contracts in the theory, and expose the racial bias within. The notions of Eurocentrism and Epistemicide support revealing the Racial Contract.
7 Mills argues that “the orthodox social contract also tacitly presupposes an ‘epistemological’ contract, and that for
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3.2 Eurocentrism
Western philosophy and International relations theory is often charged for having a Eurocentric focus. In Orientalism (1978) Said draws a link between Eurocentrism and international politics, which he argues to be imperialism. John M. Hobson (2012) presents a revised and expanded account of previous Eurocentric and Orientalist methodologies, like Said’s. Eurocentrism refers to international theory8 promoting a parochial or provincial9 defense of Western civilization that
is presented as universal. ‘East’ and ‘West’ refer to the constructs defined by a “rationality/civilizational divide or a rationality/racial divide” rather than by geography10
(Hobson, 2012; pp. 22-23). As opposed to most modern Eurocentric international theory, Hobson applies a broader definition of imperialism. It is defined as “an exploitative and/or repressive mode of intervention exercised either through formal or informal control”11 (Hobson,
2012; p. 27). He argues that international theory does not explain international politics in an “objective, positivist, and universalist manner”, but rather constructs of a series of Eurocentric conceptions of world politics (Hobson, 2012; p. 1). The Western ideal of world politics thereby becomes the highest, or ideal normative of world politics. He argues it is of importance to critically assess the historical foundations of international theory from a non-Eurocentric angle, to reflect on the question whose interest the theory is furthering. We should therefore reflect on what intellectual history forms the basis of the theory, and identify if a Eurocentric or other type of metanarrative underpins it. Identifying the metanarrative of a theory uncovers the hidden discourse(s) of power and prejudice, which helps to adequately understand international theory and prevents to “continue to reproduce this discourse of power” (Hobson, 2012; p. 15-16). Understanding and revealing Eurocentrism helps to understand the Racial Contract, because it enforces the Racial Contract by constructing a Western ideal and thereby hiding the discourse of power.
Hobson differentiates between two conceptualizations of Eurocentrism that he calls “Eurocentric institutionalism” and “scientific racism”. Within these two types of Eurocentrism Hobson differentiates between imperialist and anti-imperialist conceptions. Scientific racism has majorly disappeared from post-1945 international theory, but is relevant to understand
8 Although Hobson does not provide a specification of ‘International Theory’, the term seems to refer to a
multi-disciplinary understanding of world politics. It can therefore include theories from (but not limited to) political science, economics, law, philosophy.
9 This entails that the defense is narrow-minded, solely focused on the West and Western ideas, which are treated as
universal
10 Hobson takes ‘East’ to correspond to Latin America, Africa and Asia and ‘West’ to correspond to Europe and
North America (Hobson, 2012).
11 For a more detailed account on the different notions of imperialism, and Hobson’s description of the different
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Eurocentric institutionalism. All four variants of Eurocentrism share a separation of the notions of West and East, where the West is argued to possess purely virtuous and/or progressive properties which the East does not have. Post-1945 Eurocentrism has also taken a more subliminal form12, where the properties are hidden from the immediate view13. To build his
theory, Hobson analyses a wide range of theories, using a broad timeframe between 1760 and 2010. Scientific racist theories emphasize genetic or biological factors to explain ‘race behavior’ in the West and East. Imperialist scientific racism, named offensive racism, views non-Western or non-Aryan races as a threat to Western or Aryan races. Anti-imperialist scientific racism, or defensive racism, views imperialism as a disruption of the natural progress all societies are argued to make (Hobson, 2012). In Eurocentric institutionalism, an institutional or cultural focus is employed to differentiate between the West and East. Most theories using this conceptualization believe that “all humans and all societies have recourse to universal reason and that all are capable of progressing from savagery/barbarism into civilization” (Hobson, 2012; p. 5). Imperialist Eurocentric institutionalism, named paternalist Eurocentrism, awards Western societies with a pioneering agency and Eastern societies with a conditional agency. Pioneering agency entails that Western societies can auto-generate or auto-develop into modernity, while conditional agency means Eastern societies are viewed as unable to do this. This grants legitimization to the West to engage in an imperial civilizing mission, to deliver the “necessary rational institutions to Eastern societies” and to help in their progressive development into modernity (Hobson, 2012). Anti-imperialist Eurocentric institutionalism, named anti-paternalist Eurocentrism, similarly assumes the necessity for a same auto-development into civilization, but contrarily argues that this auto-development will evolve naturally and spontaneously. In this understanding, the East is granted a derivative agency, where societies will develop by following a natural and universal Western path (Hobson, 2012). Anti-paternalist Eurocentric conceptions therefore view imperialism as a hindrance to both Western and Eastern societies. For the most recent theories established between 1989 and 2010, Hobson argues that although theorists have tried to distance themselves from Eurocentrism and scientific racism14, the theories in this area
are not more tolerant. The post 1989 theories have almost directly returned to manifest Eurocentric forms. This claim is grounded on the finding that ‘development’ of Eastern states is still measured according to Western ‘development’. In these theories, there is a push for Western
12 As opposed to ‘manifest’ or explicit (Hobson, 2012)
13 This happens by using sanitized equivalents to terms such as ‘imperialism’ and ‘civilization versus barbarism’.
Imperialism is commonly named ‘American or British hegemony’ and the distinction between civilization and barbarism is commonly named ‘modernity versus tradition’ or ‘core versus periphery’ (Hobson, 2012)
14 By (re)presenting the nineteenth century “as more racially intolerant and imperialist than it was so that post-1989
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state forms through programs of the International Monetary Fund; there are unequal ‘free trade’ agreements; a push for domestic legal systems according to Western principles; and a push for humanitarian intervention followed by a Western idea of state reconstruction (Hobson, pp. 325-236).
In this thesis, I apply Hobson’s conceptualization of Eurocentrism to address the Racial Contract in Singer’s ethics of globalization. This conceptualization can support the identification of the Racial Contract, because of its focus on international theory. Like Hobson, I apply Eurocentrism as an understanding of the defense of Western civilization and a promotion of a Western discourse. This allows to identify the metanarrative that underpins the theory, to assess if the theory includes specific discourse(s) of power and prejudice, and to prevent continuing this discourse.
3.3 Epistemicide
A different explanation of the shape and the origins of the epistemological contract is provided by the notion of Epistemicide. It can be defined as the “silencing of the knowledge paradigm of dominated peoples” by the hegemonic cultures, and is tightly linked with colonial rule (Masaka, 2017; p. 66). The epistemologies of the global South are undermined by patterns of power that are a result of colonialism, which is referred to as coloniality. This defines “culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations” (Maldonado-Torres, 2007; p. 243). Epistemicide is a hegemonic relation between the global North and global South, additional to the hegemonic relation in politics and economics. Masaka (2017) argues that it is a foundational problem that should be solved in the global justice debate, if this debate seeks to establish an equal relationship between North and South. The silencing op epistemologies is reinforced and continued today, as the global North has a hegemony on knowledge. Masaka argues that knowledge from the global South should be restored, and the idea that the global North claims “sole authorship of civilization” also should be challenged (2017; p. 68). If the problem of Epistemicide is not solved, the claim to global justice is illusory, because it is undermined by the coloniality of knowledge. Epistemicide enforces the Racial Contract by silencing the knowledge of the dominated peoples. This notion adds to the understanding of the Racial Contract, as whereas the epistemological contract of the Racial Contract describes how the social contract prescribes an epistemology, Epistemicide explains the necessity to understand what has been omitted from the epistemology.
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4. Singer’s conception of Global Justice
When white people say ‘Justice’, they mean ‘Just us.’ – Black American folk aphorism This chapter presents the argument of Peter Singer’s in One World (2002) and One World Now (2016), and therefore his position in the debate on global justice. In One World and the revised edition One World Now, Singer presents a cosmopolitan and utilitarian argument for global justice. He argues that the basic unit of our ethical thinking should be the idea that we live in one world (Singer, 2016; p. viii). He argues that the world has become increasingly connected and uses examples of major global events and institutions to illustrate the need for global justice. The argument is divided in four themes or moral standards, for each of which I discuss their main argument in this chapter. These themes are: one atmosphere, one economy, one law, and one community. The thesis of One World (Now) is to show that “how well we come through the era of globalization (…) will depend on how we respond ethically to the idea that we live in one world” (Singer, 2016; p. 15).
4.1 One atmosphere
Singer argues there is a need for a global approach to environmental problems, because we live in one atmosphere with the effects of environmental damage transcending national borders. According to Singer, this global approach should satisfy a requirement of equity or fairness. He argues for a principle of “equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the capacity of the atmospheric sink”15 (Singer, 2016; p. 54). This principle is derived from a time-slice principle16
rather than a historical principle17. Singer proposes to set national allocations of carbon output
tied to the projected population growth per country in 2050, and to allow for trading of these emission rights. This requirement departs from the proposition that there is no justification for anyone to have a greater claim to a part of the global atmosphere than anyone else. Using the time-slice principle based ‘equal per capita’ principle is argued to be preferable because of the simplicity of the principle, which makes it more suitable as a political compromise, and because it is likely to increase global welfare. Using a historical approach to fairness would require a heavier burden on developed nations to compensate for the environmental damage that has been done.
15 A metaphor for limits of the atmosphere to absorb and process the pollution released into it
16 Based on Nozick (1975). “a time-slice principle looks at the existing distribution at a particular moment and asks if
that distribution satisfies some principles of fairness, irrespective of any preceding sequence of events” (Singer, 2016; p. 32)
17 Based on Nozick (1975). From a historical principle, no judgments can be made on the justness of a given
distribution by merely looking at the present situation. The history preceding a situation must be studied and taken into account (Singer, 2016; p. 32)
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Singer deems it unlikely that the developed nations would agree on a historical approach, while the main point of the principle is to produce the best outcome for the atmosphere. Allowing for emission trading in the proposed ‘equal per capita’ principle answers to two objections. Firstly, the utilitarian objection that different countries have and need a different energy use depending on their climate. Therefore, an equal per capita approach which is not tied to a specific population would cause undue hardship, because of different climates and therefore different energy use. Secondly, it tackles the concern that developing nations would start producing inefficiently and emit more greenhouse gasses per unit of economic activity, because of being tied to a specific population. According to Singer, there are three remaining objections to his proposal. The scientific objection that it is scientifically impossible to measure emission accurately for all countries. An ethical objection to the proposal is that when emission trading is allowed for, governments of corrupt and poor countries can use it to further their own benefits. An additional ethical objection is considered in One World Now, which is that emission trading can become a new form of speculation and will therefore not help in reducing emissions (Singer, 2016; p. 58). Singer argues that this objection that emission trading is ethical if emissions are reduced. Nevertheless, it should be considered a warning in the development of a trading scheme.
4.2 One economy
The second theme of the book takes trade and international borrowing as a main point of analysis. Singer argues that trade and international borrowing cannot be politically neutral, and that in permitting trade and borrowing a government takes an ethical stand. He rejects the assumed neutrality of a trade between countries, while at the same time a country disapproves of the regime of the other country. It is argued that in the case a government has no legitimate authority over a territory, there is no ethical justification for trading with or borrowing to that government. Legitimacy in Singer’s sense is tied to a level of democracy18 and support from the
people. Therefore, Singer argues that trade pacts between democracies or a blacklist of illegitimate governments would be a powerful means to promote the value of democracy, and thereby increase the legitimacy of a state, which thus ensures more ethical trade. However, Singer does not favor total trade boycotts on a country, because such an intervention could be very harmful to individual citizens of that country.
18 The conception of ‘democracy’ as used by Singer seems to be a conception of electoral democracy, as he is
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There are four charges that are commonly made against the WTO, and which can be used as assessment criteria for the WTO and economic globalization. These charges are 1) that it prioritizes economic considerations over concerns for other issues; 2) that it reduces the scope of national sovereignty; 3) that it is operating undemocratically; and 4) that economic globalization increases inequality. The first charge is supported by a critique on the WTO’s product/process rule19 and the narrow interpretation used of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade20. However, in One World Now Singer concludes that the WTO has dealt with the
critiques and concerns of protestors and some member states (Singer, 2016; p. 89). The second charge made against the WTO is that it reduces national sovereignty because of the content of the agreements. Additionally, the substantial costs of refusing to take part and the constant pressure to remain in the WTO once a country becomes a member, make it almost impossible not to enter WTO or to leave the WTO. Singer concludes from his assessment of the WTO that while it “does not violate national sovereignty in any formal sense, the operations of the WTO do in practice reduce the scope of national sovereignty” (Singer, 2002; p. 90). However, the decrease of sovereignty alone is argued to not be a reason for condemning the WTO, because the benefits of joining might outweigh the costs. Further, Singer argues there are no alternative means by which states can get the same benefits (2016; p. 93). The second charge to the WTO is therefore judged as acceptable. The third charge that the WTO is operating undemocratically is supported by three arguments. Singer first criticizes the WTO on the procedure requiring unanimous consent; second the WTO dispute panels and Appellate Body for not being responsible to the majority of members or the majority of the planets adult population; and third for being disproportionately influenced by the major trading powers. The first two critiques are accepted in One World (2002), but not considered anymore in One World Now (2016). Concerning the last criticism, in One World Now Singer concludes that measures have been taken to eliminate the domination of the Quad21. However, he argues that it remains a constant
struggle to ensure that developing countries also can protect their interests as adequately as richer states (Singer, 2016). The forth charge, claiming that the WTO increases inequality, is rejected. Singer considers research that concludes that human development indicators have improved and that the largest part of the poor has not become poorer. Nevertheless, Singer argues there are
19 In previous WTO rulings the fact that a similar product can be the outcome of a different (harmful) process has
been deemed irrelevant, thereby undermining environmental protection (Singer, 2002; pp. 60-65)
20 According to Singer “the most natural reading of this article would give a country several grounds on which it
could prohibit the importation of goods obtained in ways that threaten dolphins [case example] or cause great suffering to animals” (Singer, 2002; p. 66). However, the article is treated as a method of last resort: “all other avenues for achieving the desired objective must have been exhausted before an import prohibition can be adopted” (Singer, 2002; p. 68).
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undesirable consequences to inequality, such as causing an unequal balance of (political) power, and by undermining the self-esteem of people with lower incomes. For these reasons, in One World Now Singer concludes that the WTO should promote a system of regulation, that "promotes minimum standards for environmental protection, worker safety, union rights, and animal welfare" (Singer, 2016; p. 111). The necessary transformation of labor practices can be accomplished by strengthening ideas of corporate social responsibility and consumer awareness.
4.3 One law
The theme of law emphasizes the need for an international law, and focuses on the universal prohibition of genocide and crimes against humanity. Singer argues that international and national policymaking alone is not enough to secure peace, and that there is a need for international criminal law and law enforcement on a global level. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is praised as the institution able to enforce this law. Singer furthermore argues it is important to develop mechanisms to promote peace and to reduce the risk of war between nations, as well as to have a mechanism to make potential perpetrators to fear the consequences of their actions. Military intervention should only be used as a method of last resort. These interventions have been allowed in the past, and Singer argues that the only body that can justifiably develop a procedure for interventions is the UN. According to the criteria of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, military action is justifiable in the case of a large-scale loss of life, or in the case of large-scale ethnic cleansing. In the light of the UN’s responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, Singer discusses three claims to assess whether a humanitarian intervention violates the non-intervention principle22. These claims are that an intervention is justified 1) if there is a threat of
international peace because of a violation of human rights; 2) if there is a threat to international peace because of the existence of tyranny; or 3) if crimes against humanity are committed. Singer refutes the first two claims to justify an intervention, because the first is based on the fictive idea that a certain act is a threat to international peace, and because the second is based on an unproven theory. The second claim is based on the thesis that democratic states are the best guardians of peace, because no war has every occurred between democratic states. Singer states that this theory is unproven, but that a more cautiously states argument can be made: that democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other in comparison to undemocratic states. The third claim is argued to be a sound basis for taking the responsibility to protect. To propose an alternative to the dilemma of sovereignty and the non-intervention principle, Singer
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adds a fourth, more far-reaching strategy for human rights protection. He argues that a government should prove that it is legitimate according to an alternative view of legitimacy. This entails that “a regime that seizes power by force is not legitimate unless it gains from the people it rules a freely expressed indication of popular support” (Singer, 2016; p. 156). If a government does not meet this requirement it is unable to show it is legitimate. Singer argues these governments should therefore not be allowed to take its place within the UN, and the non-intervention principle will not apply (Singer, 2016).
To the critique that intervening in countries for human rights protection is a form of cultural imperialism, Singer states we should reject moral relativism. Singer argues that the moral relativist argument (morality is relative to one’s own society) makes it is impossible to move outside of one’s morality, or to express a transcultural or objective moral judgment about anything (Singer, 2016; p. 163). According to Singer, cultural imperialism should be avoided, but in a way that also allows for moral arguments to move beyond the boundaries of cultures. We should therefore among others recognize, appreciate and preserve the value, diversity and wisdom of cultures, and recognize that Western culture has no monopoly on wisdom. Sensitivity to other cultures should be urged, as well as “understanding for what gives them self-respect and a sense of identity” (Singer, 2016; p. 164). Additionally, Singer argues there are rational arguments in ethics which are independent of any particular culture, such as reciprocity.
Besides the role of the UN in international law making, peace promotion, and military interventions, Singer (Singer, 2002) raises three points of critique to reform the organization: the intervention capacity; the Security Council; and the General Assembly. Firstly, Singer argues the UN has a right and duty to intervene in case of genocide and crimes against humanity, and to effectuate this the UN needs a sufficient military force. Secondly, Singer argues the Security Council of the UN needs to be reformed. The current veto arrangement needs to be replaced with a special majority rule, consisting of a two-third or three-quarter majority. Finally, Singer suggests acting more strongly against undemocratic governments by replacing the General Assembly by a revised assembly, for which a proportional number of delegates are elected in each country in elections supervised by the UN.
4.4 One community
Singer argues that for ethical reasons the idea of living in ‘one world’ as opposed to living in a nation-state should become the moral standard. He argues that our moral obligations towards people outside of our community are as big as those to people within, and that the special duties we might have towards certain people should be justified from an impartial perspective. This
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entails that a judgement should be universalizable, meaning that the speaker must hold on to the judgement in both real and in hypothetical situations, and in case of both benefit and loss (Singer, 2016; p. 179). This argument posits that the value of a human being’s life and experiences are determined neither by race or nation. Singer poses that if we accept this idea, we cannot favor our fellow citizens over others and therefore our duties towards other human beings should be accepted. The argument that people have special obligations to their ‘own kind’, or their compatriots, is therefore rejected. According to Singer there are impartial justifications for special obligations that we have towards people near to us, such as family, lovers, friends, those who have rendered services to us, and neighbors. The justification for these obligations are based on evolutionary arguments23, historical evidence of the difficulty to
eradicate favoritism24, the fulfilment one gets from being attached to others25, and on gratitude or
reciprocity26. Notwithstanding that special obligations towards certain people might exists and
can be justified, Singer holds that these obligations cannot be impartially justified for obligations towards compatriots.
Singer rejects seven different arguments in favor of special obligations towards compatriots. First, he argues that in the case of strangers, who can be either inhabitants of the same nation-state or another, it makes no moral difference to what the location of this stranger is whether we have obligations towards them. Secondly, loyalty to a certain group is rejected if it is used as a justification for moral wrongdoings without the person’s reflection on the situation. Thirdly, Singer argues that reciprocity between compatriots27 does not validate non-reciprocity towards
non-compatriots, because non-compatriots can adopt the same values and traditions on which the relationship of reciprocity of compatriots is based. However, in One World Now Singer adapts this standpoint, and states that the obligation of reciprocity can be justified to a limited extent (2016; p. 196). Fourthly, Singer argues that the nation-state is an imagined community28,
which cannot serve as a justification for reciprocity among members of the nation-state, because nationalism is descriptive rather than prescriptive. Fifthly, Singer rejects the defense of
23 Such as the relationship between children and parents as such that if these parents do not care for these children,
they would be less likely to survive (Singer, 2016; p. 186)
24 Such as “utopian social experiments” such as with children born to members of Israeli kibbutz, where parents
nonetheless showed a particular love and affection for their own child (Singer, 2016; p. 185)
25 “Loving relationships, and relationships of friendship […] are also, for most people, at the core of anything that
can approximate to a good life” (Singer, 2002; p. 162)
26 “The intuition that we have a duty of gratitude is not an insight into some independent moral truth, but
something desirable because it helps to encourage reciprocity, which makes cooperation, and all its benefits, possible” (Singer, 2002; p. 165)
27 Which is based on a shared identity, originating from shared values and tradition
28 A community that only lives “in the minds of those who see themselves as members of the same nation. Though
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obligations to compatriots because it would be an efficient administrative device29, because when
wealth is unequally distributed in the world we do not gain maximum utility. Sixthly, the same argument applies against the argument that it may be more important to promote justice within than between states30. Singer replies that the issues we are faced with increasingly affect the entire
planet, hence a state-centered approach would be less effective. Singer argues that in a globalized world oppressive relationships also cross borders, which increases our duties towards non-compatriots. It is therefore more urgent to decrease absolute poverty rather than focusing on those living nearby in relative poverty. Finally, Singer critiques the focus on nation-states in Rawls’ ‘The Law of Peoples’, for the lack of focus on obligations to individuals in other countries. Instead, Rawls asserts that “well-off societies have significant obligations toward struggling societies”, which are obligations of the first to help the latter become well-ordered (Rawls, in Singer, 2016; pp. 205-206). Well-ordered is defined as a society designed to advance the good of its members, and which “is effectively regulated by a public conception of justice” (Rawls, in Singer, 2016; p. 205). Singer argues that it may or may not be a long-term goal to change “the culture of societies that are not effectively regulated by a public conception of justice”, but argues that there should be an emphasis on the larger need to respond to the current urgent needs of “desperately poor people” (2016; pp. 205).
Because of the argument on the idea of ‘one community’ and our moral duties, Singer argues that the citizens of developed nations in the world ought to be concerned about the low numbers of foreign aid that developed nations give to fight poverty. Therefore, these citizens should support organizations who work to aid those in need, regardless of their location. These organizations should be supported by everyone with spare income, who should contribute at least 1% of their annual income. To Singer, anyone who does not meet this standard, is conducting a serious moral wrong.
4.5 Conclusion
By showing how the world and our societies are connected and dependent on each other, using environmental, economic, legal and ethical arguments, Singer seeks to show what are duties are in this world. Singer pressurizes the idea of state sovereignty and argues for a multi-level or global approach to the ethical dilemmas discussed. There are four main arguments in the book.
29 For the reason that it is more efficient for states to look after their own citizens
30 Based on Christopher Wellman. Because (1) “political equality within a society may be adversely affected by
economic inequality within a society, but is not adversely affected by economic inequality between societies” (2) “inequality is not something that is bad in itself, but rather something that is bad in so far as it leads to oppressive relationships, and hence we are right to be more concerned about inequality among people living in the same nation than we are about inequality between people living in different countries who are not in a meaningful relationship with each other” (3) the comparative nature of wealth and poverty (Singer, 2016; pp. 198-199)
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Firstly, to set national allocations of carbon output tied to a specified population, and to allow for trading of these emission rights. Secondly, to promote the value of democracy by among others establishing trade pacts between democracies or blacklisting illegitimate governments. This is because trade and international borrowing cannot be politically neutral, and trading with unjust or illegitimate governments is unjust. Thirdly, for the United Nations (UN) to enforce international law and to promote peace, using military intervention as a method of last resort. Finally, Singer argues there is no impartial justification to give preference in aiding unknown compatriots. Citizens of the developed world need to be concerned about the low numbers of foreign aid that developed nations give to fight poverty, and everyone with a spare income should give at least 1% of their income to foreign aid. In the concluding remarks of the book, Singer poses that it is our task in the twentieth century to strengthen institutions for global decision making. However, he does not favor a world government, because this carries a risk of turning into tyranny or a self-aggrandizing bureaucracy. Instead, it is preferred to strengthen global institutions, and to make these effective and responsive to the global problems we are facing and responsible for the people they affect.
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5. The Racial Contract in One World (Now)
In human relationships, the western world can feel foreign to the black man. – Frantz O. Fanon In this chapter, I present my argument to which of Singer’s arguments in One World (2002) and One World Now (2016) are problematic according to the framework of the Racial Contract and Eurocentrism set up in chapter 2. For this analysis, I use the distinction between the different parts of the Racial Contract: the socio-political, moral, epistemological and economic contracts. These sections provide for a broad and systematic analysis of the manifestation of the Racial Contract in One World (Now). I use the problematized concepts of political philosophy (Mills, 1997, 2015) and international theory (Hobson, 2012) as parameters to identify which subjects in Singer are problematic. By using these theories, I seek to capture a broad range of problems that should be dealt with to correct for the existence of the Racial Contract. The problems that I identify enforce the Racial Contract in Singer because of their Western, White, and Eurocentric bias. The theories of the Racial Contract and Eurocentrism strengthen each other because they seek to reveal bias in the theory. Where the Racial Contract focuses on political philosophy, Eurocentrism focuses on international theory. Singer’s theory for a global ethic has characteristics of both notions, and using these provides for a broad analysis of the theory. In this chapter I address the concepts that are most problematic according to the theories, and go into the details of the specific problematic argument in One World (Now). The problematization of One World (Now) shows whether this theory presents a racially biased narrative.
5.1 Socio-political contract
The Racial socio-political Contract explains the origins of government and the political obligations that citizens of a society have accordingly. As the Racial Contract is an explanation of racism as a political system, the Racial socio-political contract thus presents a racially biased narrative of the socio-political contract. I address two issues in Singer’s theory that are part of the Racial socio-political Contract: Singer’s notion of democracy, and the focus on international political institutions. Mills argues that although formal colonization is in the past, the global economy is still dominated by former colonial powers, their offshoots, and by international institutions (Mills, 1997; p. 36). In this argument of the global economy, Mills focuses on economic institutions and the distribution of wealth. In this subchapter, I only focus on the governmental aspect of international institutions, and not on the economic aspects. I follow Harold D. Lasswell by claiming that political and economic questions are tightly linked, as he did by famously titling his book “Politics: who gets what, when, how” (Lasswell, 1936). However, to
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explore both the political and the exploitation Racial Contract I treat these questions separately in this chapter.
5.1.1 Democracy
The value of democracy takes a central place in One World (Now) and is discussed in relation to the global economy and international law. Concerning the global economy, Singer analyses the relation between trade, legitimacy and democracy by assessing several international institutions such as the WTO, the European Union, and the Warsaw Declaration. From this assessment, he concludes that democracy is generally seen as a great value and shared globally, since there are many signatories to democratic values through these institutions. Singer is sympathetic towards initiatives promoting the value of democracy through for example membership criteria or boycotts. He argues that democracy increases legitimacy of governments and thereby of trade and international borrowing. Singer maintains that it is difficult to define democracy, and argues accordingly that a minimalist conception is needed. Democracy is also discussed in relation to international law, where Singer argues that military intervention as a humanitarian intervention is acceptable as a method of last resort. Humanitarian intervention should be allowed in case at least one of three claims is satisfied31, one of them referring to the absence of a democratic
government (Singer, 2016). However, Singer refutes this claim and argues that the mere absence of democracy is insufficient to justify a military intervention. Nevertheless, Singer proposes an alternative view on legitimacy, entailing that a regime should prove it has gained freely expressed support from its people. This alternative view should solve the dilemma of sovereignty and the non-intervention principle.
I followingly argue that Singer’s argumentation on democracy is Eurocentric paternalistic. Firstly, it is Eurocentric institutionalist and not scientifically racist, because Singer applies an institutional/cultural focus to differentiate between democratic and non-democratic countries. Hobson discusses that the push for democracy often is a push for a Eurocentric concept (2012). I argue that this is also the case in Singer’s argument, because he argues for a notion of democracy based on the notion as applied at international institutions such as the WTO and the UN. Governance at these institutions have historically been dominated by European and North American countries (Mills, 1997; Stiglitz, 2003). Therefore, I deem it unconvincing to hold that these countries have not had disproportionately more influence in determining the terms of a
31 These three claims are: “1. That the violation of human rights, even in one country, is itself a threat to
international peace. 2. That the existence of tyranny itself constitutes a threat to international peace. 3. That the rights of domestic jurisdiction retained by the states in Article 2(7) do not extend to committing crimes against humanity, nor to allowing them to be committed within one’s domestic jurisdiction” (Singer, 2016; pp. 151-152). I only discuss claim 2 here because only this claim deals with the notion of democracy.
