Two states In need : the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations

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Two States In Need: The Recent

Intensification of Turkey-Russia

Relations

Master Thesis Political Science’

Name: Ferit Bahceci Professor: A. Freyberg-Inan Second Reader: Professor S. Rezaeiejan

Title: Two States in Need: The Recent Intensification of Turkey-Russia Relations E-mail: ferit91@hotmail.com

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Introduction

"Today's loss is linked to a stab in the back delivered to us by accomplices of terrorists. I cannot qualify what happened today as anything else, our plane was shot down on Syrian territory by an air-to-air missile from an F-16. It fell on Syrian territory 4 kilometers from the Turkish border. It was flying at 6,000 meters 1 kilometer from Turkish territory when it was attacked." (Putin, 2015)

Speaking at the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi on 24 November 2015, Russian president Putin reacted furious after Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet, near the Turkish-Syrian border. After decades of peaceful cooperation and economic integration, Turkey and Russia were on the brink of a new conflict. Yet, not one year later, on 10 October 2016, Turkey and Russia signed the strategic Turkish Stream pipeline and agreed to resolve the Syrian War (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). A brief look at the bitter, and conflicting history of Turkey-Russia relations, teaches us how important good relations between Turkey and Russia are for stability in their perspective regions.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an explanation of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, through the backdrop of the alliance theories brought about by neorealism. In this vein, neorealism is only used as an instrument to help answer the research question. Since security and assessing security plays a central role in the scholarly study of international politics, this study aims to contribute to the realm of alliance literature with a newly investigated case that examines the alternation of conflict and cooperation between Turkey and Russia.

The scope of this thesis is limited to the formation of an alliance on the premises that multipolarity has been the structural norm in contemporary international politics. Turkey and Russia are two of the countries that have developed themselves economic and political. Both countries are regional powers whose relation with the West is strained. In addition, both countries are dependent on one another in terms of trade in energy and regional stabilization. However, Turkey-Russia relations have historically been based on competition and great wars (Ozbay, 2011). For more than five centuries the two countries have maintained a complicated relationship. Their opposition during the Cold War is one of many examples of their hostile attitude towards one another. However, despite their differences, a transformation process is now bringing the two countries toward partnership and collaboration, as illustrated by the fact that both countries signed the agreement on Turkish Stream, the construction of an offshore pipeline from Russia to Turkey, on October 10 2016 and by the fact that Turkey and Russia agreed on draft nationwide ceasefire in Syria (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). The current global economy is stimulating intensifying economic interaction among regional powers. Therefore, it is interesting to examine the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations to gain more insight on how emerging powers behave in a multipolar world. Therefore, the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations

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constitutes a useful case study for examining this transformation and for examining the conditions under which regional powers ally with each other to balance a potential hegemon or instead compete.

Research Question and Methodology

What explains the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations?

The scope of the in-depth empirical investigation conducted in this thesis is limited to Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards. There are several reasons for the application of this scope. Firstly, the literature already provides overviews and incentives that define Turkey-Russia relations through the ages. However, the literature does not provide explanations of the recent intensification of relations between both countries, which has had serious affects. It is therefore scientifically relevant to examine this case. Secondly, both countries are emerging regional powers whose policy is not necessarily based on Western values and both may seek to cooperate with each other to form a bloc against the West. This case, therefore, contributes to the debate on how emerging regional powers will formulate their grand strategies vis-à-vis with other major powers and with each other. Thirdly, analyzing the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia, both key players in the Syrian War, will clearly highlight agreements that can contribute to promoting the Syrian peace process. It is therefore also of immediate social relevance to examine this case.

This study surveys the available literature on alliance formation and formulates propositions of alliance formation in multipolar systems. The theoretical framework, will draw heavily from Glenn Snyder’s (1984; 2007) assumption that the two main motives for forming an alliance are that (1) states will form alliances to increase their security position, and (2) states will ally in order to avoid isolation. Following from this principle, security benefits of alliances are determined by three factors: the intensity of threat posed by an adversary or its coalition, the urgency of prevention of an alliance between the partner and the opponent, and the elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state. This theory will be used to help explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. The empirical evidence in the chapter one and three will be drawn from empirical evidence reported in the existing studies of Turkey-Russia relations and other relevant sources of information, such as official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with Russian and Turkish public servants, news articles, media reports, primary literature and secondary literature.

By using a systemic theory like neorealism, several other factors that could influence Turkey-Russia relations are excluded. The state or individual level do not count for neorealists. However, by examining Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2002 onward this problem can be circumvented. Since 2002 the AK-parti has held power in Turkey. Russia, in turn, did not experience a regime change in this period. This provides a set-up in which domestic politics can be deemed to have remained relatively

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stable as a possible source of explanation for foreign policy shifts. This allows us to focus more on external factors, as they stand in the focus on neorealist theory.

In order to answer the research question, this thesis will be divided into two parts. The first part will contain an overview of Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2002 onwards. The year 2002 is chosen since then the Adalet Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) took power. From this year on there was no regime change in Turkey nor in Russia. This means that changes in policy are less likely to have resulted from domestic power shifts and can more easily be attributed to external factors, such as those identified by neorealism. Analyzing Turkey-Russia relations from this period onward will therefore give a clear overview of the relations between both countries and their chosen policies from a structural realist perspective. When te theoretical framework has been clarified, a link can be made with the current relations. The second part, and main focus of this thesis, will contain an in-depth analysis from the period 2011 onward. Several important events mark this period that have had great influence on the recent evolution of Turkish-Russian relations; they will be laid out briefly below.

The Syrian War

The emergence of the Syrian war marked as a significant obstacle in Turkey-Russia relations. While the Kremlin strengthened its relation with Syrian President Assad, the Turkish government supported the rebels by giving them financial and military aid. The policy of both countries resulted in a situation in which Russian aircraft were bombing Turkey backed rebels. The tension between both countries reached its boiling point when Turkey shot down a Russian jet after it violated Turkish airspace near the Turkish-Syrian border on 24 November 2015. Following the incident Russia rapidly approved a raft of severe sanctions. Russia banned the imports of Turkish fruit and vegetables, poultry and salt, holiday charters of Russians to Turkey and construction projects with Turkish firms in Russia . In addition, Russia suspended developments on Turkish Stream.

Russian annexation of Crimea

Following the Ukrainian rejection of the Europe-Ukraine Association Agreement a great movement of protest against former president Viktor Yanukovych emerged, called the Euromaidan protests (Kuzio, 2015). The violent protests and Western pressure forced Yanukovych and his minister to flee Ukraine. This development sparked a political crisis in Crimea that resulted in the Russian annexation of the Peninsula. After the annexation, the West imposed sanctions on Russia, which had a negative effect on Russian relations with the West. Turkey opposed the Russian annexation because Crimea is home to a community of Tatars, who are ethnic and linguistic kin to the Turkish people and opposed potential Russian annexation of the peninsula (Paul, 2015). After the annexation Turkey has established close ties with the Ukrainian government (Paul, 2015). This has naturally led to tensions with the Russian government.

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Turkish Stream

Energy is one of the main areas of cooperation between Turkey and Russia. Their geographical proximity and the lack of energy in Turkey along with Russian abundance of energy underline the importance of trade between the two countries (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). On December 1 2014, during a visit of president Putin to Turkey, the Russian Gazprom and the Turkish company Botas Petroleum signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the construction of an offshore pipeline from Russia to Turkey, called Turkish Stream (ibid.). After Turkey downed a Russian jet near the Turkish-Syrian border on 24 November 2015, the project was stopped (Giuli, 2015).

Failed coup attempt in Turkey

On 15 July 2016, a coup d’état was attempted in Turkey against state institutions, including the government of president Erdogan (BBC, 2016). During the attempt, carried out by a faction within the Turkish armed forces, president Erdogan urged the Turkish people to rise up against the coup. More than 300 people died and more than 2,100 people were injured during these events, due to the protests on the streets and its chaotic organization.

After the coup president Erdogan declared a state of emergency for a duration three months. The state of emergency allowed the government to bypass parliament when implementing new laws (ibid.). Because of this, thousands of people have been arrested or sacked. This has been the subject of criticism from both Western countries and domestic groups. The heavy-handed crackdown towards his opponents was strongly criticized by NATO, giving Erdogan the incentive to seek more cooperation with Russia, as Turkey expressed its satisfaction with the unconditional support president Putin lent to the Turkish government after the failed coup attempt. Turkey’s foreign minister Çavuşoğlu said on Haberturk TV on 25 July 2016: “We thank the Russian authorities, particularly President Putin. We have received unconditional support from Russia, unlike other countries,” highlighting the lack of Western support. As after the coup Ankara was eager to restore its relations with Moscow, president Erdogan wrote president Putin a letter in which he apologized for downing the Russian fighter jet. The apology was received in good order and both countries sought rapprochement, which resulted in lifting sanctions and continued talks on Turkish Stream.

Structure of the thesis

Chapter one Historic overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 2011: The present-day relations

between Turkey and Russia are the product of numerous developments in the past. Periodic occurrences of conflict and collaboration have alternated, which makes it important to gain knowledge of the fundamentals that marked Turkey-Russia relations until the period under thorough investigation here, which begins in 2011. Hence, this chapter will outline Turkey-Russia before this period, whereby the elements become clear that are of importance in Turkey-Russia relations.

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Chapter two Theoretical framework: The theoretical framework provides an in-depth analysis and discussion of the theoretical perspective used and the theoretical expectations guiding this study. On the level of the international system, neorealism will be used to theorize the behavior of states. Next, I will outline more specific literature on strategic partnership in keeping with neorealism. When this is outlined, I will translate neorealist expectations to provide explanations for the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations and formulate concrete propositions for my research.

Chapter three Analysis: This chapter describes the empirical findings. First, I will examine each individual event that had a major impact on Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards. In doing so, I will outline all relevant facts that influenced Turkey-Russia relations, which ultimately led to their recent intensification. Second, I will look at the recent intensification, while examining the actions of all relevant actors. This in turn, enables me to examine the joint and unilateral process by which alliance members try to keep the partnership alive and advance their own interests with it. This enables me to develop valid explanations of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. Finally, I will discuss the findings and answer the research question

Chapter four Conclusion: The final chapter provides a short overview of the master thesis and

attempts to discuss the findings. Furthermore, I will discuss the limitations of this thesis and make suggestions on further research.

Now that the purpose of this thesis, the research question, methodology and structure are outlined, I am ready to examine the historic overview of Turkey-Russia relations. Hence, the following chapter will outline the history of Turkey-Russia relations and discuss the elements that are of importance in Turkey-Russia relations.

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Chapter one: Historic overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 2011

A glance through history shows that Turkey and Russia are linked through a partnership with peaks and valleys. The historical, cultural, and ethnic bonds and geographical position of Turkey and Russia have always had a large impact on the stability in their perspective regions. Throughout the past 500 years, the Russians and Ottomans fought 13 bloody wars, exchanged tribes and developed cordial relations. The present day, relations between Turkey and Russia are the product of numerous developments in the past. Periodic occurrences of conflict and collaboration alternate, which makes it important to gain knowledge of the fundamentals that marked Turkey-Russia relations until the period under thorough investigation here, which begins in 2011. Hence, this chapter will outline Turkey-Russia relations before this period, whereby the elements that are of importance in Turkey-Russia relations will become clear.

1.1 Brief overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 1990

For more than 5 centuries the Turks and Russians fought wars and disputed the control over the Black Sea. The first conflict between Turkey and Russia dates from 1676-1681 and was sparked by Russia to establish a warm-water port on the Black Sea (Akturk, 2014). This was the beginning of a series of wars fought between the Russian empire and the Ottoman empire between the 16th_{and 20}th_{century, and which}

to this day has left its traces in the Black Sea region. It is unquestionable that for the previous three centuries (1676-1991), Russia was the most important security threat for the Ottoman empire and post-Ottoman Turkey. The Russo-post-Ottoman wars led to the downfall of the post-Ottoman Empire, when in March 1878 Russia concluded the Treaty of San Stefano with Turkey. This treaty freed the Balkans from Turkish rule and created an autonomous Bulgaria under protection of Russia. It is interesting to notice that both sides used the war to protect their national interest. For example, once the Russian expansion in the early nineteenth century, Circassians, Crimean Tartars, and Nogai located on Russian territory, had to find refuge to save themselves from the Russian aggression. These tribes fled to the Ottoman empire and constituted a valuable source of human capital for a country that fought its wars, remained in a weak and vulnerable economic position and faced problems with separatist movements (Kaya, 2005). The newcomers contributed in two ways: as a source of manpower for the Ottoman army and as a buffer against separatist movements (Kaya, 2005). Russia, in turn, conquered the Caucasus, dominated the Balkan Peninsula and gained control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphurus. In doing so, Russia retained access to the world trade route.

The Russo-Ottoman Wars lay at the basis of a new conflict during the first World War. On 2 August 2014, the Ottoman empire signed a secret treaty of alliance with Germany (Taylor, 1974). The main objective for the Ottoman Empire was the repossession of territory in the Caucasus, which was conquered by the Soviet Union during the Russo-Ottoman Wars (Taylor, 1974). On 5 December 1917,

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an armistice was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Russians and the war between both sides ended with the Treaty of Kars signed in March 1921 (Taylor, 1974). During the Cold-War, tensions between both sides sparkled again, when Russia forced Turkey to allow Soviet shipping to flow freely through the Turkish Straits. With Turkey’s refusal to the Soviet Union’s request, tensions arose in the region leading Turkey toward the United States and NATO (Howard, 1970). Given three hundred years of rivalry and conflict, makes it even more interesting to examine the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

1.2 Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era

Russian expansionism focused on access to naval locations and after the integration of Central Asian, Caucasian and Siberian peoples, the state focused on the policy of Russification. However, everything changed since the Perestroika in the mid-1980s, and consequently the division between the Westerners and Eurasianists (Patomaki and Pursiainen, 2005). While the Westerners believed that Russia could become a European democracy, Eurasianists assert that Russia is inter-connected by geographical, historical and cultural independence that has formed its identity and territorial presence (O’Loughlin, 2001). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin’s election as first president of the Russian Federation the relations between Russia and the West were generally considered to be quite warm. However, with Vladimir Putin’s election in 2000, who represents a moderate form of Eurasianism and continued distancing from the Westerners, who dominated Russian politics from 1991 to 1994, the Russian foreign policy underwent a major change. Putin clearly set out the problems Russian faced and acknowledged that Russia needed little assistance from the West, but instead should rely on Russians themselves to solve their problems.

“Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first time in 200-300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states. We are running out of time to remove this threat.” (Putin ,2000)

Given the need for direct action, president Putin accepted the penetration of Western ideals of private ownership and universal democratic values. Building further on this, president Putin outlined three core values that define his policy: a strong state, patriotism and social solidarity (O’Loughlin, 2001). In doing so, Putin aimed to develop a strong state power in Russia that is built on democratic values that consequently will bring Russian prestige back in international politics (Goldman, 2008).

Since the election of president Putin, the Western world was concerned that the Kremlin aimed to rebuild the sphere of influence in what the Kremlin called ‘near abroad’ (Rutland, 2008). The fear of Russian democracy grew, seeing it as in retreat with the arrest of the wealthy oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003, and Putin’s unwillingness to withdraw troops from Georgia and Ukraine, and the Russian

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intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election in 2004 (Rutland, 2008). These developments were the first sign of a new East-West divide since the end of the Cold War.

In June 2000, Russia presented its official foreign policy doctrine. Surprisingly there was no mention of its energy-plan while the foundation of the Russian economy is built upon energy trade with its neighboring countries and the Western world. Russia’s energy concerns and the related security consequences can be divided in four categories: competition in the Caspian Basin and former Soviet republics, Russian policy regarding the Persian Gulf, emerging trade possibilities with East-Asia, and its energy exports to Europe (Jaffe and Manning, 2001). Russia’s determination in becoming an energy superpower are starkly unilateral, since Russia has not been willing to cooperate with OPEC. The given that Russia uses its energy sources as a tool to influence its role in international politics stoked anxiety and driven countries to seek alliances to counterbalance its dependence on Russian oil and gas (Rutland, 2008). From the scientific literature on international politics it appears that due to Russian foreign policy the country is isolated on the international stage without a strong power as it ally (Goldman, 2008; Rutland, 2008). However, with president Putin in power, Russia’s foreign policy proved to be effective. Russia’s oil-export earnings grew 130% in the first half of 2000 compared to the previous year (Rutland, 2008). Russia’s energy exports represent more than 20% of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP), and about 55% of its total hard currency earnings (Rutland, 2008). Consequently, its annual GDP Annual Growth Rate showed positive numbers from 2000 to 2008. However, the economic crisis in 2008 hit the country’s energy sector and it became painfully obvious how dependent Russia is on its energy export.

In conclusion, after he came to power in late 1999, Vladimir Putin has sesignaled interest in developing a powerful and self-confident Russia. According to scholars like Tsygankov (2016), Secrieru (2006), Lo (2008), Rutland (2008), Mankhoff (2009), and Jaffe and Manning, (2001), president Putin’s foreign policy was aimed to reconstruct Russia’s identity and a strategy for restoring Russia’s power position in international politics. With Putin in power, Russia constructed a foreign policy based on economic recovery, international trade, modernization and a recreation of Russia’s identity (Tsygankov, 2016: 139). Furthermore, president Putin was keen to promote trade twith the European Union and the United States. And yet, despite the Russian objective to encourage relations with the West, president Putin cannot be typified as a pro-Western president. It is true that deepening economic cooperation with the West resulted in energy agreements and Western investments in Russia. But simultaneously, the economic growth resulting from this policy reflects Russia’s power position and has opened the path to defend Russia’s interests in international politics more forcefully (Tsygankov, 2016). Russia’s foreign policy, consequently, became more independent and self-assertive.

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1.3 Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of independent states in the Caucasus, Eastern-Europe and Central Asia presented the possibility for Turkey to increase its influence and signal its interest in becoming a regional power. As a result, Turkey expanded its power in states with people of common historical descent, like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Onis, 2001). The increasing interest of Turkey in this region resulted in the so called Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) (Aras and Akpinar, 2011). Evidently, this organization was supported by the West and came at the expense of Russia’s power position in the region. Despite Turkey’s increase in power at the expense of Russia and the remaining distrust and hostility inherited from the Cold War, the two countries came closer to each other in the 1990s. The main reason for this is that the perceived threat from Russia towards Turkey reduced because the Turkish economy grew stronger than the Russian economy throughout this period. The Turkish GDP contained in 1990 about ten percent of Soviet GDP, while in 1999 Turkish GDP contained about eighty percent of Russia’s GDP (Akturk, 2013). According to influential scholars on this topic, like Onis (2016) and Akturk (2013), this was a vital feature that contributed to Turkey-Russia relations throughout the post-Cold War period.

The Europeanisation process, whose foundations were laid back in September 1959 with Turkey’s application for associate membership of the European Economic Community, continued in the post-Cold War era after a chaotic period in the 1980s (Bardakci et al., 2016). Turkey applied for full EEC membership in April 1987, which was confirmed by the Commission in December 1989 and finalized in March 1995 by the Association Council (Bardakci et al., 2016). However, the decision of EU leaders at the Luxembourg Summit in 2007 to decline the candidate status, was a major setback for Turkey’s aspirations in becoming an EU member. Moreover, resulting from the war with Kurdish separatist groups, Turkey started a cross-border operation in Northern Iraq called Operation Steel between 20 March and 4 May 1995 (Muftuler-Bac, 1996: p.262). The European Parliament opposed this operation and passed resolutions against Operation Steel on 26 April 1995 (Muftuler-Bac, 1996: p.263). Overall, it can be said that during this period relations between the EU and Turkey stagnated.

However, after the AKP took power in 2002, the accession process continued and on 13 December 2002 the Copenhagen Summit decided to open accession negations with Turkey. Yet, Turkey had to improve its the rule of law, human rights including the protection of its minorities as described in the Copenhagen political criteria for membership (Bardakci et al., 2016). The AKP-government showed serious progress to satisfy these conditions whereby the European Council on 17 December 2004 decided to open accession negations with Turkey. Nonetheless, from this time on relations between Turkey and the EU have faced difficulties. Firstly, the EU had accepted Cyprus as a member, which is a setback in Turkish perspective. Secondly, the probability of EU membership for Turkey reduced due to critical voices from leading EU leaders, like Germany and France and further reinforced trough the rejection of the EU constitutional treaty by France and the Netherlands (Bardakci et al., 2016). Thirdly, the increased

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domestic problems in Turkey has given the EU more ground to criticize the accession progress which eventually led to the Commission’s decision to suspend talks with Turkey in December 2006 (Bardakci et al., 2016)

From this time on, relations between the EU and Turkey stagnated due to several reasons. Firstly, when the AKP was re-elected in 2007, its policy been undoubtedly the subject of serious criticism within the country as well as from outside. The criticism voiced concern that the party was undermining the secular constitution and trying to realize an Islamic state. Secondly, in October 2008 the Ergenekon trials started, in which 86 members of the military and security establishment stood accused of launching a military coup against the government (Bardakci et al., 2016). However, despite growing concerns the Europeanization process continued. The AKP government implemented changes in its policy against the Kurds and sought to cooperate with Armenia by signing a peace accord in Zurich, in October 2009. In addition, on 12 September 2010 the AKP won a landmark referendum on constitutional reform whereby the parliament increased its control over the army and judiciary (Bardakci et al., 2016). In sum, Ankara’s desire in becoming an EU member stagnated since the end of the second year of the AKP government. Although the country proved that it suited some of the EU requirements, the likelihood of accession is very small.

1.4 Turkey’s foreign policy under the rule of the AKP

It is virtually impossible to discuss the foreign policy of Turkey since the AKP took power in 2002, without a reference to Ahmet Davutoglu. As one of the few academics in the government of AKP, Davutoglu played a central role in the development of Turkey’s new aspirations in international politics. According to Davutoglu (2001) Turkey is not a regional power but a central power due to its history and strategic position. He emphasizes that Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country, and hence can exercise influence in all these areas and consequently claim a global strategic role. In his view, Turkey should develop a proactive policy corresponding to its historic and geographic depth, inherited by its Ottoman legacy (Grigoriadis, 2010). To achieve that objective, Davutoglu (2001) classifies two conditions. First, Turkey should solve its domestic problems by finding a solution for the Kurdish question, as well as the polarization between the Islamist and secularist movements in the country. In doing so, the social cohesion and the functionality of the state will be protected. Second, Turkey should resolve all the bilateral disputes that distorted its relationship with its neighbors. In what he calls the “zero-problem policy with neighbors”, Davutoglu (2001) contends that for Turkey to become a central power, it needs to develop cordial relations with all its neighbors. Furthermore, developing good relations with all rising global powers, such as China, Russia, and India, is of great importance to achieve this plan (Grigoriadis, 2010).

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1.5 Turkey-Russia relations in the post-Cold War era

As argued, the start of the twenty-first century marked for both countries a period of political transformation and economic development. In line with the Davutoglu doctrine, the Turkish government made significant changes for improving relations with Russia after Erdogan took office in 2002. Economic trade between the two countries began to grow, and the AKP government pursued deepening economic and energy ties to open the way for cooperation also on political and security questions (Aras, 2009). The strong economic development of both countries, alongside with a shift in their foreign policy, resulted in buoyant relations between the two countries. Throughout this period several important events mark Turkey-Russia relations, as outlined below.

1.5.1 Trade, Energy and Tourism

By the turn of the 21st_{century, after five centuries of war, rivalry and competition, Russia had become}

an important trading partner of Turkey. The number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey grew quickly and Turkish universities worked closely together with Russian universities. The most important feature of Turkey-Russia relations in this period is the deepening economic interdependence between both countries. The bilateral economic relations comprise three main aspects: trade, energy and tourism. The trade volume between Turkey and Russia expanded from 5.1 million dollars in 2002 to 34 million dollars in 2011 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016). In addition, the two countries are interdependent on one another with respect to energy. In the period 2002-2011, Turkey and Russia agreed on two energy deals. First, the Blue Stream project, a gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey, on which Turkey is largely dependent due to international sanctions against Iran, another potential energy supplier (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016) In addition, on 12 March 2010, Turkey and Russia came to an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant Buyukcelli, Mersin province (Akkuyu Nukleer, 2011). With respect to tourism, Turkey is heavily dependent on Russian visitors (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). The number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey in 2009 was more than 3 million, second only to the German tourists (WTTC, 2015). The contribution of the tourist sector to the Turkish GDP was about 11% and supported more than 8% of all jobs during the period 2002-2011 (WTTC, 2015). Turkey, therefore, is quite heavily dependent on Russian tourists (WTTC, 2015).

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Figure 1:

Turkey’s exports and imports with Russia (in million dollars)

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016

In a world of increasing energy demand, the global competition over access to and control of energy resources has been strengthening. On the hand, Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas and consequently the development of Blue Stream underlines that both sides are willing to cooperate on large-scale projects. On the other hand, Turkey’s desire in becoming an energy-hub as a transit country increased competition with Russia over energy issues (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009). For instance, when the United States organized a meeting in 1999 with Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, who entered force in 2006, Russia was against the pipeline because it wanted to control all energy resources in the Caspian Sea through Russia (Bacik, 2006). The steps and choices made by the United States to develop a pipeline based on American perspectives, were therefore considered to be hostile by Russia. In contrast, the United States supported the pipeline because it would reduce Russia’s political influence in the Caucasus and would further isolate Iran (Bacik, 2006). In this vein, Russia is heavily dependent on cooperation with Turkey in order to sustain and further development of its energy policy. Especially when taking into account that Russian energy exports represents more than 20% of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP), and about 55% of its total hard currency earnings (Bacik, 2006).

1.5.2 The Caucasus

Throughout their history, the Caucasus always has been a sensitive issue in Turkey-Russia relations. Yet, since the AKP took office in 2002, both countries came closer than ever to reaching stabilization in the Caucasus. The main reason for this is the Davutoglu doctrine, in which the foreign minister of Turkey advocates for zero-problems with all neighbours. However, the conflict in Georgia in 2008 posed

0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 imports exports

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a problem for Turkey-Russia relations. Turkey was confronted with a critical test of its neutral stance on critical issues between Russia and the West when US warships passed through Turkish waters to aid the Georgian army (Devrim and Schulz, 2009). In addition, Turkey has supported Georgia on the political and economic level since the collapse of the Soviet-Union (Devrim and Schulz, 2009). Despite this, Turkey succeeded in remaining neutral and was involved in peace efforts. During the War, president Erdogan stressed the importance of Turkey-Russia relations: “America is our ally and Russia is an important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy-program from Russia. We act in accordance to our national interest. We cannot ignore Russia” (NTV, 2008). Therefore, Turkey launched an initiative for stabilization in the Caucasus called the Caucasus Stability and Corporation Platform (CSCP) (Devrim and Schultz, 2009).

From Turkey’s establishment of the CSPS the following can be deduced. First, the CSPS demonstrated Turkey’s engagement in the region without the involvement of the West (Cornell, 2012). Yet, the plan was welcomed by the European Union and widely supported by all member states (Cornell, 2012). In addition, Turkey’s authorization for US warships to sail through Turkish waters reveals that Turkey is still a reliable ally of the West. However, the proposed CSPS includes only three Caucasian states, Turkey and Russia; neither members of the European Union nor the United States are included within this program (Kaya and Cornell, 2012) Therefore, Turkey’s involvement in the Caucasus and the notion of the CSCP would seem to imply that Turkey is shifting from a pro-Western foreign policy to a more autonomous foreign policy in keeping with its neutral stance.

1.5.3 Concluding remarks and possible threats

In conclusion, since Russian president Putin and Turkish president Erdogan came to power Turkey-Russia relations have improved. Both countries developed and became stable independent regional powers. In addition, it appears from the above analysis that both countries developed an independent and self-confident foreign policy since the appointment of president Putin and president Erdogan, respectively. Yet, despite their closer relation, some possible threats remain. First, with Putin in power, Russia’s growing economic, political and military strength is giving it a greater role in international politics. Turkey, therefore, has more reason to fear a powerful state like Russia. Second, a stronger Russia will seriously challenge the balance of power in Europe and gives the EU more reason to fear Russia. This might cause problems for Turkey-Russia relations, as, as the War in Georgia shows, it will remain very difficult for Turkey to take a neutral stance in conflicts between the EU and/or the US and Russia especially since it is of course NATO member. Moreover, following the global economic crisis in 2008, the economic growth stalled in both countries. It is, therefore, interesting to investigate how both sides developed their foreign policy from 2011 onwards.

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Now that the fundamentals of Turkey-Russia relations are clarified and the basics of Turkey’s and Russia’s foreign policy have been highlighted, I can outline the theoretical framework which I will use to guide my empirical research into the period from 2011.

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Chapter two: Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis and discussion of the theoretical perspective used and the theoretical expectations guiding this study. On the level of the international system, neorealism will be used to theorize the behavior of states. Next, I will outline more specific literature on strategic partnership in keeping with neorealism. When this is outlined, I will translate neorealist expectations to provide explanations for the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations and formulate concrete propositions for my research.

2.1 Introducing neorealism

Neorealism has been one of the most influential theoretical schools in International Relations. The most cited scholar of this theory is Kenneth Waltz, whose Theory of International Politics (1979) has laid the foundation of neorealism. In this thesis, the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations will be studied from a neorealist theoretical perspective.

For Waltz (1979), a theory is a mental picture of a certain domain that explains which are the most important parts of the domain and which causal forces are at play between those parts. The function of a theory is to explain the causal mechanism(s) behind a correlation. Waltz (1979) asserts that a theory must be parsimonious and generate testable prediction. However, he rejects the idea that a theory is falsified if one case does not correspond to its predictions. Waltz (1979) states that a theory must be subjected to different empirical tests to examine whether it produces right predictions, arguing that these tests must be constructed in a difficult way to discover the limits of the theory.

In his work, Waltz (1979) describes that his theory is built on two simple assumptions. First, he argues that states are the key actors in international politics and they operate in an anarchic system, characterized by ‘the absence of a central authority to enforce states’ adherence to promises or agreements’ (Milner, 1991). The core assumption that anarchy is the defining characteristic compels states to make security their highest objective, and accumulating relative power is the means to accomplish this goal (Waltz, 1979). In this theory, states are rational actors who shape policy based on a cost-benefit analysis. Per this theory, strategic alliances can (but do not have to) emerge as nations form alliances to counterbalance against those who would accumulate preponderant power, in the most extreme case hegemony. In this vein, the changing balance (relative power) between countries can be seen as forcing states to change policy to maintain their relative power position.

Drawing on the core assumption that anarchy is the structure of the international system and self-help the modus vivendi resulting from this, neorealist scholars sketch strategies on how to survive in different situations of power polarity (Lebow, 1994). During the Cold-War, neorealist attributed the stability in international politics to its bipolar structure. According to neorealist thinking, a bipolar system is less

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war-prone because the two great powers are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths and reliability of opposing coalitions (Waltz, 1979). Consequently, the bipolar system reduces uncertainty and security calculations are easier to make. Therefore, the two regional hegemons will engage in internal balancing, which means that they will be concerned with domestic military build-up (Waltz, 1979). In contrast to the behavior of states in a bipolar system, in a multipolar or unipolar system states will engage in external balancing, which means that they will form alliances to counter a stronger power (Waltz, 1979). In a multipolar world, alliances need to be made to realize a stable balance of power. In a unipolar world, states will feel threatened by the unconstrained power of the hegemon and aim to balance it.

The end of the Cold-War posed a challenge for neorealist thinking, as neorealist had attributed the stability of international politics to its bipolar structure (Waltz, 2000). When in 1990 the international system of world politics shifted from a bipolar system to a unipolar (in Waltz’s perspective) system, without the emergence of a great war, neorealist assumptions came under pressure, as neorealism argues that without the outbreak of war the structure of international politics cannot be changed (Waltz, 1979). At first, Waltz (1993) denied that the world was shifting from a bipolar system to a unipolar system, arguing that Russia could maintain its power position due to its nuclear technology. However, in a later stage, Waltz (2000) recognized that the world had been shifted to unipolarity. He added that a unipolar structure is doomed to be short-lived, as in a unipolar system states will feel threatened by the unconstrained power of the hegemon and aim to balance it (Waltz, 2000). A multipolar system or possibly another bipolar stand-off are likely to result after a relatively short time.

In sum Waltz reasons that alliances will always be aimed at another state or alliance of states and the target is to gain relative power at the expense of the other to ensure one’s security position. Waltz (1979) defines power in terms of the distribution of capabilities, so that any actor’s power depends on the amount of power of the others. He argues that power can be measured based on a state’s territorial size, size of population, military strength, economic capability, resource endowment, and political stability. These factors in comparison with those of other states define the power position of a state or alliance. This balance of power theory has influenced the current debate on strategic alliances tremendously, as other influential scholars such as Glenn Snyder (2007) and Stephan Walt (1987) have based their work on the claims Waltz has made.

However, by defining the structure of international politics as anarchic, with states as like-units who only shape their policy in terms of security, several other factors are excluded. For explaining strategic alliances between countries, it is according to this perspective irrelevant what ideology states embrace, or which regime-type dominates, and aspects such as culture and religion are not considered. The domestic characteristics and politics of states and their potential allies are in other words considered largely irrelevant to their decisions regarding alliance-making and –breaking. This is clearly a simplification of reality. However, by examining Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2002 onward

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this theoretical limitation is to some extent neutralized. Since 2002 the AK-parti has held power in Turkey. Russia, in turn, did not experience a regime change in this period. This provides a set-up in which domestic politics can be deemed to have remained relatively stable as a possible source of explanation for foreign policy shifts. This allows me to focus more on external factors, as they stand in the focus on neorealist theory, and makes neorealist a more plausible theoretical perspective to apply to this case.

2.2 Strategic Alliances

Forming strategic alliances is an interesting field of study in International Relations. The neorealist assumptions presented above present the overall incentives on which states are presumed to base their foreign policy and in which situations states may decide to enter a strategic alliance. However, to answer the research question there is additional need for more specific literature on what explains the timing and nature of specific strategic alliances.

2.2.1 Strategic Alliance Definition

Before outlining theoretical claims on strategic alliances there is need to define the term ‘strategic alliances’. Despite the fact that the emergence of a strategic alliance is a prominent topic in the study of International Relations, there is no unifying definition. The two most commonly used definitions are those from Walt and Snyder. Walt (1990) defines strategic alliances as a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states. Snyder (2007) defines strategic alliances as formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own partnership. Even though Snyder (2007) describes in his definition that strategic partnership must be military-orientated, he does not rule out that strategic partnership can occur to achieve other purposes. Waltz (1979) points out that the concept of a strategic alliance implies that states have some but not all of their interests in common and emphasizes that alliance strategies are always the product of compromise, since the interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them are never identical. In this thesis, the definition of Walt and Waltz will be adopted, because cooperation between Turkey and Russia is of course not so much military as economic and political. By applying a broad definition like Waltz’s, the strategic alliance between Turkey and Russia can be best examined. Now that this issue has been clarified, I can describe and explain strategic partnership from a substantive point of view.

2.2.2 Establishment of Strategic Alliances

“It is impossible to speak about IR without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name. For the same reason, it has always been difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis” (Liska, 1962). With this quote, George Liska starts his work Nations in

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Alliance (1962), in which he examines the formation of strategic alliances and which to date remains the leading treatment in the study of strategic alliances.

Liska (1962) argues that alliances evolve in order to reduce the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure which threatens the independence of a state. He describes two characteristics that may promote strategic alliances. First, he argues that an alliance is a specific international relationship because it is an agreement for the achievement of a specific objective (Liska, 1962). Second, Liska (1962) contends that the emergence of an alliance is prompted by opposition to an outside party. Regardless of the type of alliance (military or non-military), cooperation between states exists to take a common stand on a variety of issues to form a bloc against opposed states, and in this way, generate more security. When the security of states is threatened and the plausibility of war becomes sufficiently intense, then states will form an alliance to ensure their security position. In sum, Liska (1962) argues that alliances are created for a state’s specific purposes and cooperation between states is a result of conflict with rival states. In addition, Liska (1962) points out that the power of factors related to trade is weaker for the emergence of an alliance, due to fears of economic interdependence, and therefore alliances are primarily formed against threatening states and not to gain economic advantages. By in this way emphasizing security concerns as the driving force for the establishment of strategic alliances, Liska’s argument has come to be popular and exert a strong influence in neorealist theory.

As it now has been clarified that Liska’s work is in line with basic realist tenets, it becomes necessary to explain the underlying factors which allow an alliance to exist and function, according to this theory. Liska (1962) presents three main explanations for the arising of an alliance: (1) The protection that comes from the formed alliance outweighs the external threat; (2) the opportunities that come from the formed alliance outweigh the political costs that emerge from the alliance; and (3) the status enlargement that comes from the formed alliance outweighs possible losses of independence resulting from the alliance. All three explanations have not necessarily to be the case, since the main argument holds that states will form an alliance to ensure their security position against an external threat. Liska’s analysis of the establishment of strategic alliances can be attributed to the nature of international politics in the 1960’s. In his work, he provides an in-depth analysis of the Warsaw Pact and Western alliances. His conclusion is that Western countries need to find premises for existence beyond the ideological status-quo because an alliance will be intensified when states follow the principle of the formation of strategic partnership: consistently allocate relative power. Because Liska is one of the first scholars who examined the establishment of strategic alliances based on neorealist claims, many other authors build upon his work (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Walt, 1990; Snyder, 2007). For the sake of better understanding this line of reasoning, the following section will outline the claims of Snyder (2007) made in his work Alliance Politics. By doing so, a broader picture of the establishment of strategic alliances will be provided which in a next step will enable this thesis to establish plausible neorealist propositions to explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

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2.2.3 Alliance Politics

Drawing on the core assumptions that Liska made, Snyder (2007) asserts that alliances emerge in the pursuit of a common goal: the deterrence of conflict with an outside party. Snyder (2007) bases his predictions and presumptions on the neorealist model, as he argues that states act rationally and the primary interest of states is to survive in the international system. In addition, Snyder (2007) explains that his theory is based on neorealist theory but enlarges that theory by introducing a stronger focus on decision-making processes.

Just as neorealist theory more generally, the alliance theory developed by Snyder (2007) is based on the perceived primacy of the need for survival in the anarchical system. In such an anarchical system states, must be consistently concerned about their security, because they are surrounded by other states which have capabilities to attack and dominate them (Snyder, 2007). Thus, states have the need to protect themselves in several ways, one of which is the establishment of strategic alliances. By doing so, states remove the anarchic fear between the allies. In contrast, forming an alliance is perceived to stimulate anarchic fear in other states against which the alliance is directed. The formation of an alliance, therefore, is intended for mutual defensive purposes and is perceived to promote counter alliances due to the insecurity and fear originating from the anarchical system. Moreover, since in the anarchical system there is no central power that can force states to keep their side of the bargain, the existence of a strategic alliance will depend on the self-interest of the involved parties. Hence the value and survival of any alliance are sensitive to the possibility of the partner’s defection (Snyder, 2007).

The relationship between states in the anarchical system include their conflicts and their common interests. Snyder (2007) makes a division between strategic interests and interests. According to him, strategic interests are interests defined in power and are valued not for themselves but for their influence to the defense or advancement of other interest in the future. Examples of strategic interests are the protection of national territory, and energy sources, to the extent these possessions contribute to the relative power and security of a state. In contrast to strategic interests, particular interests are valued for their inherent and immediate material and military value (Snyder, 2007). In addition, strategic interests are strongly influenced by the polarity of the international system. In a bipolar system, the strategic interest of the two superpowers are mostly determined by the power structure itself. In the multipolar system, on the other hand, strategic interest differs with the formation of an alliance. In a multipolar system, which is the norm in this thesis, the balancing of perceived strategic threats forms the basis for an alliance and the matching of particular interests fosters alignment.

Now that it has been clarified based on which factors states generally form their foreign policy, according to neorealism, it is necessary to outline when and why states will enter an alliance. For Snyder (2007), states will establish alliances based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. The benefits are counted chiefly in terms of increased security. This broad concept is subdivided by Snyder (2007) into (1) enhanced deterrence of attack on oneself; (2) enhanced capability for defense against attack on oneself;

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(3) enhanced deterrence of attack on ally; (4) prevention of alliance or alignment between the partner and the opponent; (5) elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state; and (6) increased control or influence over the allied state. In contrast, the principal costs of alliance are (1) the risk of coming to the aid of the ally; (2) the risk of entrapment in war by the ally; (3) the risk of counter alliance; (4) hindrance of alternative alliance options; and (5) general limits on freedom of action.

2.3 Propositions

Based on the theoretical claims made in the work of Waltz (1979), Liska (1962) and Snyder (2007) on the emergence of strategic partnerships, the following propositions can be drawn up:

1. States will form alliances when there is a common external threat and forming an alliance is perceived to enhance deterrence of attack and enhance capabilities for defense against attack on oneself.

2. States will form alliances when there is a common external threat and forming an alliance is perceived to make the emergence of an alliance between the partner and the opponent less likely. 3. States will form alliances when there is a common external threat and forming an alliance is

perceived to reduce the possibility of attack by the allied state.

In keeping with the theoretical framework, the main condition for forming an alliance is an external threat, the alternative explanations for the forming of an alliance are only of importance when there is an external threat and do not have to be the same on both sides. In other words, the formulated propositions do not have to count for both Turkey and Russia. The existence of an external threat lays the foundation for the alliance between states and the emergence of an alliance between the partner and the opponent may foster one side whereas the other was pushed by the possibility of attack by the allied state.

Now that the theoretical assumptions of neorealism and key neorealist literature on strategic alliances are clarified, we can translate those to the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. The first proposition leads me to explore whether the West posed a substantial danger to the power position of both countries. By forming an alliance both Turkey and Russia might enhance the deterrence of a possible Western attack. The second proposition leads me to explore if the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations might have emerged due to the possibility of an alliance between the partner and the opponent. This possible alliance would undermine the power position of one of the partners and should, therefore, be prevented by forming an alliance with the other. The third proposition suggests that the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations might have emerged to eliminate a possible attack by the allied state. In this vein, due to Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet and opposed views on Ukraine and Syria, both countries might have engaged in a strategic partnership to avoid the possibility of attack by the allied state. Before the analysis can be done, the propositions need to be further specified for my empirical analysis.

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2.3.1 Empirical propositions

1. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to a clearly identifiable direct common threat coming from the West; the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations is perceived by one or both sides to enhance deterrence of attack and enhance capabilities for defense attack one itself.

To test this proposition, I need to define what constitutes a ‘clearly identifiable direct threat’. The level of threat facing a state depends on the distribution of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and, most importantly, the perceived intentions of the other (Snyder, 2007). Therefore, I need to assess whether Russia and/or Turkey viewed the West as a direct threat. To examine this, I will analyze official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with public servants, primary literature and secondary literature. If from the empirical research, it appears that one or both countries viewed the West as a possible threat seeking to take power or overturn the regime in their own territory then this proposition receives support as providing at least partial explanation of the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia

2. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to fears of an alliance between the partner and the opponent which could undermine the relative power position of Turkey and/or Russia

To test this proposition, I need to examine whether one or both countries were eager to prevent an alliance between the partner and the opponent. Based on official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with public servants, primary literature and secondary literature, I will describe how both countries viewed a possible alliance between the partner and the principal perceived sources of danger. In addition, I will analyze how partnership between the partner and the opponent could negatively influence the other partner. Moreover, I will examine if Turkey after the intensification with Russia withdrew its support for EU-membership and instead sought cooperation in pro-Russian alliances like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. If from the empirical research, it appears that an alliance between the partner and the other is refused by the other partner and would undermine the power position of the other, then this proposition receives support as providing at least partial explanation of the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia.

3. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to the fact that forming an alliance would eliminate the possibility of attack by the allied state.

To test this proposition, I need to examine whether one or both countries wanted to prevent an escalation of conflict by forming an alliance. Based on official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with public servants, primary literature and secondary literature, I will examine if the countries wanted to prevent escalation of problems and reduce the risk of a possible attack by forming

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an alliance. If from the empirical analysis, it appears that one or both countries viewed one another as possible threats applying the language of war, in the run up to the Turkish Stream agreement, and if there is also evidence that tying the other closer to oneself served the goal of reducing the likelihood of an escalation of this conflict, then this proposition receives support as providing at least partial explanation of the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia. Notably, these propositions are not mutually exclusive, I might find support for all three, either on different sides of the relationship or also on the same side.

To examine these propositions, I will examine each individual event that had a major impact on Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards: the Ukraine crisis, the Syrian war, Turkey’s downing of a Turkey-Russian fighter jet, the failed coup attempt, and ultimately the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. In doing so, it becomes clear which incentives prove to be the most important and useful to explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. Now that the assumptions of neorealism are outlined

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Chapter three: Analysis

The analysis conducted in this thesis aims to examine the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, from a neorealist perspective. To realize this, I will follow three paths of analysis. First, I will examine each individual event that had a major impact on Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards. In doing so, I will outline all relevant facts that influenced Turkey-Russia relations, which ultimately led to their recent intensification. This is in line with Snyder’s (2007) claim that during the formation phase, prospective allies bargain over their strategic and particular interests. Thus, by examining the critical events and developments before the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, it becomes clear which strategic and particular interests laid the foundations for their recent intensification. Following the examination of each individual event, the second path of analysis will include the analysis of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. This path will look at the recent intensification, while examining the actions of all relevant actors. This in turn, enables me to examine the joint and unilateral process by which alliance members try to keep the partnership alive and advance their own interests with it. This enables me to develop valid explanations of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. Finally, the last part of this chapter provides answers to the propositions developed in the previous chapter. Notably, all three paths of analysis are informed by neorealist theory, as set out in the previous chapter.

3.1. Part one: The formation phase

As mentioned in the first chapter, Turkey and Russia came closer to one another after the Cold-War. The distrust between the two countries decreased, while both countries developed an independent and self-assertive foreign policy and became economic partners. However, in the period 2011 onwards, Turkey-Russia relations were confronted with substantial problems, as the Ukraine crisis and the Syrian War posed serious threats to Turkey-Russia relations. In the face of uncertainties caused by war, global security threats and economic problems, Turkey-Russia relations came under heavy pressure. This section provides an in-depth analysis of the events that influenced Turkey-Russia relations during this period.

3.1.1 The Russo-Ukraine crisis

The first geopolitical crisis that negatively influenced Turkey-Russia relations is the Ukraine crisis, which started on 21 November 2013 (Kisacik and Kaya, 2016). Since the country gained independence on 1 December 1991, it has been one of the most fragile areas of the global geopolitical landscape, particularly, after eight CEE countries became EU members on 1 May 2004 and Ukraine became the new frontier of the EU (Kuzio, 2010).

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To ensure secure, stable and safe borders the EU developed the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Through this project, the EU works with its southern and eastern neighbors to accomplish close political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration (European Union 2016). As explained by, e.g., Hill (2002) and Smith (2005), efficient and secure borders are essential to protect the EU and stimulate trade. In addition, another major war at the European frontier, like the Balkan-War in the 1990s, would threaten the credibility, perhaps even the very existence of the EU (Smith, 2005). Through the ENP, the EU cooperates with Ukraine with the purpose of bringing Ukraine closer to the EU. However, given that Ukraine is divided in two groups: pro-Western and pro-Russian, its foreign policy has shifted from time to time. When pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych won the elections in 2010, relations between Ukraine and the EU became strained. November 2013 marked a series of events that led to the ousting of Yanukovych, a domestic war, and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. First, Yanukovych refused to sign the European Association Agreement (EAA), choosing instead to follow a pro-Russian path by joining the Customs Union with Russia, whereby it was agreed that Russia would buy $15 billion of Ukrainian Eurobonds and lower the costs of Russian energy supplied to Ukraine (Kuzio, 2017). In response to the rejection of the EAA, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to protest this development. The so-called Euromaidan protests led to the eventual ousting of Yanukovych and his replacement with the pro-European Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The political shift from Russian to European led to tensions across the whole country. On the Crimean Peninsula, pro-Russian forces took over power, which resulted in a referendum on the status of Crimea on 16 March 2014. The official result of this referendum was a 99.7 percent vote for the integration of the peninsula into the Russian Federation (Kuzio, 2017). Following the Russian annexation of the peninsula, a new conflict between the West and Russia emerged.

3.1.2 Relations between Russia and the West after the Ukraine crisis

By introducing the ENP, the EU has successfully entered the region which Russia considers to be the sphere of its vital national interests. To move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West has been a cause of tensions and jeopardizes the peace and economic cooperation between Russia and the West (Mearsheimer, 2014). Since the mid-1990s, Russia has expressed concern about NATO enlargement, and in recent years Russia has made it clear that it would inhibit Ukraine’s efforts to join the West (Mearsheimer, 2014). According to Charap and Darden (2014), whose arguments are based on neorealist theory, Russia’s annexation of Crimea can be explained by two main reasons. First, the regime change in Ukraine was perceived by Russia as a direct threat to Russian interests in Ukraine. Russia considered the regime change as a Western plot to install a loyal government in Kiev that included leaders who would rescind Russia’s basing agreement in Crimea and subsequently move Ukraine towards EU and NATO membership. Mearsheimer (2014) agrees and contends that the logic behind the annexation of Crimea is a rational one, since great powers are always sensitive for potential threats near their border. The second explanation is a far more threatening interpretation of Russia’s foreign policy

Two states In need : the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations