Development of a Defense Technology
Acquisition Portfolio Management Framework
Raney Almehmadi
orcid.org/0000-0003-1440-0032
Dissertation accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree
Master of Engineering in Development and
Management Engineering
at the North-West University
Supervisor: Prof. W Den Heijer
Graduation: 2019
5
!
DEDICATION
I wholeheartedly dedicate this dissertation to …
To my Paradise path, who blessed me with their prayers all the time and continually
provide moral, emotional, and spiritual support … my Parents.
To the one who made my life fabulous and gave me all the love, strength, endless support
and encouragement … my wife Reem who sacrifice two years of her educational life just
to be with me and support me.
To the Falcons who drew my ambitious sky … my brothers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the following people:
I wish to thank my supervisors Prof. Harry Wichers and Prof. Willem Den Heijer for their support and guidance throughout this project. I truly admire their passion for the subject field, their enthusiasm is a true inspiration. I would like to thank them for their patience and hard work towards the end of this dissertation. Their professionalism in the working environment and dedication to ensure that work of a high standard is delivered are admired.
I wish to thank my friends and collegues at Rheinmetall Denel Munition for their support and cooperation during the period that I stayed in South Africa.
I wish to thank my colleagues from Saudi Arabia for your support and assistance.
ABSTRACT
Defense acquisition system (DAS) is one of the most important aspects of defense systems and requires an efficient and effective strategy for implementation. DAS has been reformed in the defense industry in an evolutionary way. The critical assessment processes are required to have the ability to develop a variety of defense acquisition strategies. The best practices approach for the DAS strategies are those that have the ability to identify and recommend various solutions for gaps and shortfalls in operational military capabilities. The current defense industrial situation in Saudi Arabia requires a formal defense acquisition system which is not yet available. Meanwhile, the officials in the newly established General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI), are busy developing a formal DAS to acquire the needed capabilities that satisfy the national objectives.
Therefore, this research proposed a new integrated framework for decision-making purposes in selecting proper projects to fill the technological gaps in the local defense industry in Saudi Arabia. This research combines models, elements and metrics used for technology acquisition in the defense sector. The researcher has named his deliverable, the Defense Technology Acquisition Portfolio Management (DTAPM) framework.
Relavant literature was identified and analysed by using elements in the DTAPM. The approach to developing this framework was based on the “adapt to adopt” concept. The researcher adopted valid user models then adapted them for the usage to the benefit of Saudia-Arabian needs. An approach guarantees that efficient defense acquisition management decisions can be made, by virtue of connecting the strategic decision-makers to the technical managers, in order to facilitate the technological portfolio management.
The resulting framework was exposed to and verified by experts. The usability and validation will be tested by implementing the DTAPM in the future.
Keywords: technology acquisition, portfolio management framework, defense acquisition system, technology space map, technology management, strategic planning
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ... 1
1.1 Background ... 1
1.1.1 Importance of technology ... 1
1.2 Technology in the Defense Industry ... 2
1.2.1 Pre-industrial world Defense ... 2
1.2.2 A sea change in Defense ... 2
1.2.3 Defense Technology Management ... 2
1.3 Saudi Ministry of Defense (MOD) ... 3
1.3.1 The AFED Conference and Exhibition ... 5
1.3.2 The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) ... 7
1.3.3 The General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) ... 7
1.4 Problem statement ... 9
1.4.1 Understanding the challenge ... 9
1.4.2 Identifying the research problem ... 9
1.5 Research aim and objectives ... 10
1.6 Research methodology ... 10
1.7 Ethical considerations ... 10
1.8 Scope and limitations of the study ... 11
1.9 Major contributions ... 11
1.10 Summary ... 11
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY ... 12
2.1 Introduction ... 12
2.2 Management framework ... 13
2.3 Portfolio Management (PfM) ... 14
2.4 Technology Management ... 15
2.4.1 Technology Acquisition ... 16
2.4.2 Technology (Pull-Push) model ... 17
2.5 Technology Space Mapping (TSM) ... 19
2.6 Defense Acquisition System (DAS) ... 20
2.6.1 Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) ... 23
2.6.2 Capabilities Gap Assessment (CGA) ... 25
2.6.3 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) ... 25
2.6.4 Make vs Buy (Trade-off) Analysis ... 26
2.7 Maturity Assessment ... 27
2.7.1 Technology readiness level (TRL) ... 28
2.7.2 Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) ... 30
2.7.3 Integration Readiness Level (IRL) ... 31
2.8 Conclusion ... 33
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ... 34
3.1 Introduction ... 34
3.2 Research design ... 34
3.2.1 Problem Identification ... 35
3.2.2 Situation Analysis ... 36
3.2.3 Solution Proposal Foundation ... 36
3.3 Research Tools ... 38
3.3.1 “Adapt to adopt” concept ... 38
3.3.2 Conceptual Synthesis ... 39
3.3.2.1 The Strategic Components of DTAPM ... 41
3.3.2.2 The Technical components of DTAPM ... 44
3.4 Research Verification ... 47
3.4.1 Interviewees selection ... 48
3.4.2 Interview questions ... 51
3.5 Summary ... 53
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION AND FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT ... 54
4.1 Introduction ... 54
4.2 The DTAPM framework ... 55
4.3 Technology Acquisition in DTAPM ... 57
4.4 Technology Acquisition Channels ... 58
4.5 The verification of DTAPM ... 61
4.6 Interview feedback discussion ... 62
4.7 Summary ... 67
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION ... 68
5.1 Introduction ... 68
5.2 The complexity of the Defense Industry ... 69
5.3 Major Readiness Objectives ... 70
5.4 Interviewed experts’ contribution ... 71
5.5 Recommendations ... 72
5.6 Future work ... 73
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Framework vs Methodology Comparison ... 13
Table 2: Technology Management Tools ... 15
Table 3: Technology Push and Pull: Relative Technology Dominance Perspective ... 18
Table 4: Technology Push and Pull: Relative Market Dominance Perspective ... 18
Table 5: Comparison of the Acquisition Models Employed in Turkey ... 22
Table 6: Technology Readiness Levels Definition ... 28
Table 7: Manufacturing Readiness Levels Definition ... 30
Table 9: Weapon System Hierarchy ... 46
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Saudi Defense Sector Demand ... 4
Figure 2: Putting project portfolios, programmes and projects in the context ... 14
Figure 3: Technology Acquisition Channels ... 17
Figure 4: TSM indicating the system hierarchy and system life cycle ... 19
Figure 5: US DOD Acquisition life cycle ... 21
Figure 6: Memo from the Secretary of Defense that began JCIDS ... 23
Figure 7: JCIDS analysis process ... 24
Figure 8: Simplified diagram of major CBA inputs, analyses, and outputs ... 24
Figure 9: A Model for National Objectives Related with the Decision Factors ... 27
Figure 10: Degree of Difficulty ... 29
Figure 11: Research process diagram ... 35
Figure 12: US DOD Acquisition Life Cycle ... 39
Figure 13: US DAS phases (purple blocks) in DTAPM ... 41
Figure 14: MSA-based decisions Technology Acquisition Options (in blue colour) ... 41
Figure 15: TRL in DTAPM ... 42
Figure 16: Technology Push-Pull Model (green coloured) in DTAPM ... 42
Figure 17: Analytical studies documentations (yellow marked) in DTAPM ... 43
Figure 18: Joint Operations Needs and National Strategies (coloured) in DTAPM ... 44
Figure 19: TSM (blue coloured) in DTAPM ... 45
Figure 20: Acquisition levels in TSM ... 45
Figure 21: Maturity Metrics linked to TSM in DTAPM ... 47
Figure 22: Research Verification Process ... 48
Figure 23: DTAPM ... 55
Figure 24: Acquisition, procurement and purchase relationship ... 57
Figure 25: International Defense Partnership Model ... 59
Figure 26: Technology Transfer Channels Chart ... 60
Figure 28: Strategic Part in DTAPM ... 63
Figure 29: Technical part in DTAPM ... 64
Figure 30: DAS in DTAPM ... 66
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFED Armed Forces Exhibition for Diversity of Requirements & Capabilities AoA Analysis of Alternatives
APAs Additional Performance Attributes CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate CBA Capabilities-Based Assessment CGA Capabilities Gap Assessment DAB Defense Acquisition Board DAS Defense Acquisition System DIS Defense Industrial Strategy DOD Department of Defense
DTAPM Defense Technology Acquisition Portfolio Management EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development
FAA Functional Area Analysis FNA Functional Need Analysis FSA Functional Solution Analysis
GAMI General Authority of Military Industries ICD Initial Capabilities Document
IP Intellectual Property
IRL Integrated Readiness Level ITT International Technology Transfer JOC Joint Operating Capabilities KPPs Key Performance Parameters KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia KSAs Key System Attributes
MIC Military Industries Corporations MOD Ministry of Defense
MRL Manufacturing Readiness Level MSA Materiel Solution Analysis
NASA The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NDS National Defense Strategy
NMS National Military Strategy NSS National Security Strategy
NTT National Technology Transfer NWU North West University
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer OS Operations and Support
OSAs Other System Attributes PD Production and Deployment PfM Portfolio Management PIF Public Investment Fund PrM Programme Management QA Quality Assurance
R&D Research and Development
R&D3 Degree of Difficulties to proceed to the next level of TRL RDT&E Research and Development / Test and Evaluation SAMI Saudi Military Industries Company
SPA Saudi Press Agency SRL System Readiness Level TA Technology Acquisition TCE Technology Critical Elements TD Technology Development TDm Technology Demonstration TI Technology Integration TM Technology Management
TMRR Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction TRA Technology Readiness Assessment
TRADOC The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRL Technology Readiness Level
TSM Technology Space Map TT Technology Transfer
TTO Technology Transfer Office US United States
WBS Work Breakdown Structure
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Importance of technology
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Industrial Revolution marked a major difference between nations. This difference lasted for generations and was a transition from hand-production to machine hand-production. Moreover, it linked theoretical science to the human lifestyle by bringing all the innovative technological ideas into useful products which made life better for humans. Technology is “the use of science in industry, engineering, etc., to invent useful things or to solve problems” (“Merriam-Webster,” 2018). Technologies that have been cultivated in countries deliver strong nations’ structure to their organisations in the form of rising their economy and power basis.
Additionally, it had a very positive impact on people’s daily lives. Technology has an important effect on business operations. No matter the size of the enterprise, technology has both tangible and intangible benefits that will help the business grow economically and produce the results that customers demand. Technological infrastructure affects the culture, efficiency and relationships of businesses. It also affects the security of confidential information and trade advantages (“SBDC,” 2018).
Technology has made a significant development in various fields of armaments. The amazing and successive technological developments have led to the emergence of new generations of weapons, or to the increased capacity and effectiveness of others. This has led to differences in the power balance between nations. Cultivating the technological capabilities through a Technology Acquisition process is a massive project and very risky and takes years to accomplish its goals. However, it can effectively succeed if it is well managed.
1.2 Technology in the Defense Industry
1.2.1 Pre-industrial world Defense
More than a thousand years ago, the sword, arrow and spear were the main elements of the military equipment. The invention of cannons has influenced the form and methods of wars and even societies in general in ways that almost no other weapon has done. During the 7th century, the Chinese invented gunpowder. Armies quickly learned about this powder, which today can be used in bombs, mines and other weapons. The gunpowder was transported to Europe in the 13th century, probably via the Silk Road and Central Asia (Andrade, 2016).
1.2.2 A sea change in Defense
In recent decades, the world has witnessed the development of defense technologies into powerful techniques that led to the transfer of armies from one era to another. Countries are competing for the best technologies in order to become dominant and to protect their citizens and resources. This started with the industrial revolution when the first warship was powered with steam in 1860. And still, the flow of new inventions has not stopped. As science evolved, the engineering disciplines improved. In the defense industrial history, the engineering branch grew from mechanical engineering (steam power), civil engineering (canals), to electrical engineering up until aeronautical engineering. In the twentieth century, the defense industry has seen the development of more complex weapon systems. This complexity necessitates the defense project managers used a discipline that integrates all the engineering branches in a single architecture “System Engineering”. (Edgar, 2016)
1.2.3 Defense Technology Management
Technology management (TM) is crucial to today’s organisations. It includes knowledge management and innovation, and the utilisation of the available technological capabilities. Organizations, in order to manage their technology development portfolio, should employ an integrated framework to ensure timely technological investment decisions and capability development (Foden & Berends, 2010).
Managing technology in defense is about acquiring and developing the required technology for the needed development in capabilities. This may be achieved through the following:
• Technology development (TD);
• Technology demonstration (TDm); and/or • Technology Integration (TI).
All of the above are considered Technology Transfer (TT). Many authors have defined TT from different aspects – some consider it a technology adoption, meaning the scientific technology moves from the academic sector to the marketplace. While other authors define it from the business aspect and consider it a technology acquisition, which is buying the right to use the technology from the developer/owner of the technology. These obscure definitions for TT, confuse the researchers in this field. Before going further, this paper will redefine some definitions for clarity purposes. In order to obtain a clear picture of the two confusing definitions, we need to recognize the maturity of the aimed technology. This recognition will be obtained through a metric called Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
In the defense industry, the industrial situation is very complicated due to the complexity of the systems. Technology management and its tools such as; technology maturation assessment, technology watch, technology roadmapping, technology make-buy, technology risk management and technology acquisition have been used widely in the defense sector as well as other sectors. This research aims to develop a framework to manage large technology programs in the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense (MOD).
1.3 Saudi Ministry of Defense (MOD)
In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), thriving long-term economic investments is one of the first goals of the new Saudi Vision 2030 (“Saudi MOD,” 2018). Although oil and gas are the fundamental pillars of Saudi Arabia’s economy, diversifying the investments is vital for sustainability. This approach can be achieved by implementing massive transforming projects to acquire needed technologies to stimulate the Kingdom’s economy during prospering in the post-oil era.
In 2016 Saudi Arabia was placed third in the world in terms of military spending. The 2019 fiscal budget allocated approximately $56 billion for the military sector. Notwithstanding this massive expenditure, the share of localised military spending does not exceed 2% of the Kingdom’s current total spending on armament, maintenance and related spare parts.
Figure 1: Saudi Defense Sector Demand
There is a strong outlook for the security and defense sector as Saudi Arabia continues to invest, sign contracts with international firms, and increase Joint Ventures for the design, assembly, manufacturing and maintenance of military equipment. The Saudi Arabian defense sector has a 1.8 per cent forecasted compound annual growth rate (CAGR). Local employment in this sector related to government expenditure is expected to grow steadily at a 1.3 per cent CAGR (Figure 1). Continued growth of the sector reflects the region’s geopolitical situation. The announced aim for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) that aligns with the new vision is to increase this percentage from two to fifty per cent by 2030. This technological leap in such a short timeframe is not easy to reach, but it can be accomplished with effective strategies that are enhanced in many ways (USSABC, 2017).
Behind just being one of the most significant importers of military materiel, the KSA also wants to become to one of the world’s largest weapons manufacturers and is now investing in its capabilities.
In response to this urgent need, the MOD has launched the “MOD development program” and has set the following strategic objectives (“Saudi MOD,” 2018):
1. develop and achieve joint operating capabilities (JOC); 2. improve MOD performance;
3. modernize weaponry and armament;
4. optimize spending efficiency and nationalize industrialization; and 5. nurture morale of MOD staff and improve individual performance.
From these objectives, we can recognise that the first objective is the most critical one that influences the remaining objectives. Evolving and achieving the joint operations capabilities will result in the performance improvements and modernisation of the weapon systems and support the national industry. Consequentially, also improving MOD performance.
These objectives necessitated taking massive steps toward the stated goals; to be among the 25 largest arms producers in the world. The MOD already initiated these steps and launched the Armed Forces Exhibition for Diversity of Requirements & Capabilities (AFED), the Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) to support this drive.
1.3.1 The AFED Conference and Exhibition
In February 2018, The Ministry of Defense had organised (for the fourth year), the Armed Forces Exhibition for Diversity of Requirements and Capabilities (AFED), in order to display the requirements of the shareholders, as well as capabilities of local and international industries and research centres. This initiative is part of the means to accomplish the aims of Vision 2030 and the application of the Kingdom’s movement towards a strong and effective strategy to localise primary and supplementary industries, which covers equipment, spare parts and materials.
The first exhibition was held in Riyadh in 2010 with the participation of branches of the Ministry of Defense only. The second exhibition was held in Dhahran in 2012 with the participation of branches of the Ministry of Defense, and the participation of Aramco, SABIC and Saline Water Conversion Corporation as strategic partners to provide
investment opportunities to the private sector in the manufacturing of materials and spare parts.
In 2016, the third exhibition was held in Riyadh with the participation of the branches of the Ministry of Defense, General Directorate of Civil Defense, Military Industries Corporation (MIC), Saudi Oil companies, Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Company, Saline Water Conversion Corporation and Saudi Electricity Company to provide investment opportunities for the sector.
The AFED (2018) covered all military sectors (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the National Guard, Ministry of Interior, State Security Presidency, Royal Guard Presidency, MIC) (80,000) investment opportunities to manufacture the materials and spare parts needed by the beneficiaries in front of businessmen, companies, institutions and national factories. Also participating in the exhibition were the Saudi Company for Military Industries and many government agencies, national factories, economic balance companies, state-owned investment funds and agencies and universities and research centres, as well as King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology and many international companies that have contracts with the Ministry of Defense.
The importance of the exhibition is the meeting of both beneficiaries and participating companies to proffer their requirements, as well as the local and international companies to showcase their manufacturing capabilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thus, it will contribute to encourage the development of investment encouragements and develops the industrial atmosphere in general, and raise the stature of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on a global scale and be esteemed among developed countries.
Maj. Gen. Eng. Attiya al-Malki, the General Director of the General Directorate of Local Manufacturing Support at the Saudi Ministry of Defense; pointed out that the total number of the locally manufactured parts did not exceed 182 items in 2010, but through the direction and support of the government, the number of products manufactured locally reached about 5,427 items in 2017, more than 65 million pieces of these items were made with the help of more than 12 local projects in Saudi Arabia (“Al Arabiya,” 2018).
1.3.2 The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI)
On 17 May 2017, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) announced the launch of a state-owned military-industrial company aimed at contributing more than 14 billion riyals ($3.7 billion) to the Kingdom’s gross domestic product by 2030. The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is part of the kingdom’s 2030 Vision. SAMI aims to become one of the world’s top 25 defense companies by 2030 (“Arab News,” 2018).
The company will seek to localize 50 per cent of total government military spending in the Kingdom by the year 2030, up from just 2 per cent now and will seek to provide over 40,000 employment opportunities by 2030, the PIF - the Kingdom’s top sovereign wealth fund - said in a statement (“Reuters,” n.d.). By partnering with universities, SAMI will provide students with apprenticeships and careers in cutting edge technologies, which were previously unavailable in the Kingdom (“Arab News,” 2018).
1.3.3 The General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI)
In August 2017, the Council of Ministers chaired by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah directed the establishment of the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI). Prince Mohammed bin Salman directs its board of directors with members including the Minister of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources; the Minister of Finance; the Minister of Commerce and Industry; the Chairman of the Board of the Saudi Company for Military Industries; representatives from the Ministries of Defense, Interior and National guard; and three experts in the field of military industries. The formulation of the new authority arose after Saudi’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) announced the launch of a state-owned military-industrial company in May 2017 (“Gulf Business,” 2018).
The official Saudi Press Agency (SPA) mentioned that; the new General Authority for Military Industries has been handed eleven tasks (“Gulf Business,” 2018):
1. Proposing policies, strategies and regulations relevant to the military industries’ sector and complementary industries.
2. Managing the military procurement operations of arms, ammunition, equipment, supplies, military uniforms, maintenance and operation contracts for arming the security and military authorities in the kingdom and participating in the examination
and acceptance of products and services to ensure compliance with the required specifications.
3. Issuing manufacturing licences for the public and private sectors, local and external, for the establishment of military industries and complementary industries in the kingdom and establishing the relevant controls and procedures.
4. Setting specifications for military industries and complementary industries
5. Establishing monitoring mechanisms for the military-industrial sector and its complementary industries and following up their application.
6. Managing and developing the economic balance programme for the military industries and negotiating with foreign companies to transfer technology and increase local content.
7. Managing all research and development operations in the military industries, including the allocation of research and development budgets, technology transfer and management of research and development projects, utilising research centres and universities – internal and external – and establishing research centres as needed.
8. Coordinating with the relevant authorities to match the outputs of education and technical training with the needs of the military industries sector and working to attract technical expertise to the industry.
9. Developing incentives for the development of the military industry sector.
10. Supporting local manufacturers by transferring technology, considering the distribution of projects among local companies, promoting the sector internally and externally, contributing to the rehabilitation of local manufacturers, providing infrastructure and supporting the export of domestic military products.
11. Building strategic partnerships with the public and private sectors locally and internationally to achieve their objectives.
With all the previous efforts of initiating conferences and establishing new industrial entities under the newly founded general authority, researchers are still looking forward to finding means and approaches to accomplish the new national ambitious intentions. The researcher was trying to understand the root cause of the problem, while all the financial resources go towards purchasing and procurement processes to acquire foreign products. In the next point, challenges will be highlighted, the research problem will be stated, and a research question will be formulated.
1.4 Problem statement
1.4.1 Understanding the challenge
Saudi Arabia's changes in the defense sector called for a new military doctrine and strategy, considering the role played by the Kingdom regionally and internationally, and in line with the threats and rapid changes in the region. According to the new strategy, the armed forces will modernise their military capabilities with high-tech weapon systems that are granted by military superiority. The new MOD model aims to increase transparency by separating powers and responsibilities and by carrying out clear controls. Analysts believe that these changes, which focus on the modernity, will inspire the youth and developmental spirit of the Ministry of Defense, and also provide evidence of Saudi Arabia's drive towards engineering the innovation and informatics that are the heart of the modern military industry.
As mentioned before, the announced aim for MOD that aligns with the new Saudi vision is to increase the expenditure on the local contents from two to fifty per cent by 2030, which is needed to improve Saudi military planning, budgeting & fiscal management, and military operations. There is an urgent need for the transfer of newer technologies to compete and assimilate the critical technologies that will satisfy the needed requirements. However, all the previous technology transfer efforts were know-how machinery transfer. This approach did not cultivate the required technological capabilities aligned with the kingdom’s strategy/vision, which need to be raised from the indigenous capabilities. Moreover, the contractual agreements in the previous technology transfer projects were agreed upon between the Department of Projects and the manufacturers and approved by financial departments without technical oversight.
1.4.2 Identifying the research problem
In order to manage and control different technological projects, there is a need for an effective acquisition system in order to achieve the strategic objective of having an indigenous self-sufficient defense industry that delivers needed capabilities demanded by warfighters. However, the problem is that the MOD still needs to have a formal Defense acquisition system (DAS), right here it would be well to point out that the purpose of this study is proposing a framework aiming to help in the management of the technology acquisition portfolio in MOD.
1.5 Research aim and objectives
This work aims to contribute to the new movement in the MOD to enhance the indigenous capabilities as described in the previous sections. In light of the stated research problem, this research aims to develop a strategic framework for decision-making purposes in selecting proper projects to fill the technological gaps in the local defense industry in Saudi Arabia. This will assist to find the appropriate approach to fill the identified gaps and develop the local contents and enhance the national economy.
1.6 Research methodology
In order to complete this study, the following method was applied.
Firstly, a critical literature study was conducted. The literature study served as a basis for: i. understanding the available defense acquisition systems;
ii. identifying limitations within this field of study;
iii. determining the critical elements of the defense acquisition systems; and iv. identifying useful metrics to assess the elements.
Secondly, a framework was modelled for the strategic level in the MOD, in order to evaluate the capabilities gaps, to select the best practice programs to fill the gaps, and to oversee the progression of the selected programs. Then, in order to obtain the industry’s perspective applicable to the developed framework, interviews were conducted with experts in the defense industry field. This stage also served as verification to evaluate the framework. The developed framework was then adjusted according to the feedback from the interviews, and finalized.
1.7 Ethical considerations
According to the knowledge of the author, there were no ethical implications during or as a result of this study and the rules and regulations set out by NWU were carried out.
1.8 Scope and limitations of the study
• This paper represents the view of the author and does not indicate any official position.
• This study proposes a strategic tool to identify the technological gaps, and it does not discuss the cost or the human factors or any non-materiel solutions.
• I assume that there are no restrictions (political/financial/manpower) for the Saudi government to acquire defense technologies.
• The validation process of the framework of the study is not in the scope of this research.
• The implementation of the work will not be discussed due to the lack of input data.
1.9 Major contributions
The major contributions of this study are:
• the support of the MOD development program;
• the proposal of an effective tool for the decision-makers in the MOD;
• the minimization of the localization gap through the application of strategic planning methods; and
• the contribution to the new national vision in Saudi Arabia.
1.10 Summary
This study endeavoured to review models and tools used in the defense industry and proved its validation. Previous efforts conceptualized how to manage and control major project portfolios. In the next chapter, literature is reviewed to explore some effective practices in the defense sector.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to discuss and review the literature relevant to the used models and tools to develop the deliverable of this study. Reviewing similar previous work was not possible because of the military sensitivity, and it was very hard to obtain literature with frameworks developed for the defense industry, as they are not available and classified as confidential.
The discussion will review the theoretical and practical sides of the framework that this research intends to develop. The theoretical part will conclude; management framework, portfolio management, and technology management. The practical part will discuss the two models used in technology management such as the Technology (Pull-Push) model and Technology Space Map (TSM). The practical discussion will also focus on the defense acquisition system and its related documentation and some needed analysis like Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA), Capabilities Gap Assessment (CGA), Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and Make-Buy Trade-off analysis. Also, this chapter will review some useful well-known metrics in the maturity assessment like; Technology Readiness Level (TRL), Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL), Integration Readiness Level (IRL), and System Readiness Level (SRL). This study aims to analyse specific models and tools and establish relationships between them so as to develop a strategic framework that hopefully will help the decision-makers to identify the technological gap in the local defense capabilities. The framework will be representing the first brick for establishing a new tailored DAS for any Ministry of Defense in any country. It aims to provide a broad view of the current situation. A framework should be flexible and allow for creative adaptation. This is in contrast to the procedures or methodology that has to be more prescriptive and rigid to phases and tasks. Confusion exists between the framework and the methodology, and the role of every approach and how to demonstrate them. This chapter will first review the question: what is a management framework?
2.2 Management framework
A conceptual framework is an interconnected set of elements or ideas (theories) about how a particular phenomenon functions or is related to its parts. The framework serves as the basis for understanding the causal or correlational patterns of interconnections across events, ideas, observations, concepts, knowledge, interpretations and other components of experience (Svinicki, 2010). The management framework which this paper aims to develop has been described by Zoughaib (2017) as follows:
Frameworks exist to provide structure and direction on a preferred way to do something without being too detailed or rigid. They are powerful because they provide guidance while being flexible enough to adapt to changing conditions or to be customised for your company. Framework A creates a structure of what to do but rely on the doer to determine the best way to get the “what” done. A framework is a loose but incomplete structure which leaves room for other practices and tools to be included but provides much of the process required. Zoughaib (2017) also proposes a comparison of framework versus methodology (Table 1).
Table 1: Framework vs. Methodology Comparison
Attribute Framework Methodology
Structure Flexible Prescriptive
Allows for creative adaptation Phases, tasks, methods, techniques and tools
Standard What, “When” to do What, When and How to do
Provide Phases and Steps Yes Yes
Consistent Outcome Predictability
Low High
Can be Tailored Yes Somewhat
Level of Expertise needed to use effectively
High Medium
Effort level to implement Medium High
Ease of governance and compliance
High Low
Provides Metrics of Estimation Yes Yes
2.3 Portfolio Management (PfM)
To distinguish between portfolio management (PfM) and program management (PrM). one needs to understand what they are. Steyn (2015) presents a good distinction to avoid confusion (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Putting project portfolios, programmes and projects in the context
Before focusing on project portfolios, programs and projects it is necessary to start with the strategy of an enterprise. The enterprise strategy presents a vision of where the organization wants to be in the future. Therefore, the enterprise strategy is placed at the top of the pyramid. As you go up the pyramid from the bottom (project to the programme to portfolio) then the budget, life expectancy, complexity and interdependencies all become greater. Programs can also reach across several or all the business units in the enterprise. Therefore, portfolio management means managing non-related projects/programs that contribute to the organization’s strategic objectives. Program management is managing related projects that are delivering the same desired outputs and goals.
2.4 Technology Management
Technology management is a collection of management tools that assist organizations in managing their technological assets to create competitive advantages. Effective technology management requires integrating multiple activities and tools (Foden & Berends, 2010).
Foden and Berends (2010) believe that in order to manage their technology development portfolio, organizations should employ an integrated framework to ensure timely technology investment decisions and capability development. A framework modelled to manage technological projects can be structured in several stages. Table 2 illustrates the breadth of tools used in the technology framework.
Table 2: Technology Management Tools (Foden & Berends, 2010). Framework Stage Tool Description
Identification and Monitoring Technology
Networking Exploratory tool for increasing external environment awareness through participant networking.
Technology Watch
Identification of organisation’s critical established, competing and disruptive technologies.
Make-the-Future Inward-facing technology opportunity identification aligned with product development programs.
Technology Maturity Assessment
The assessment of the position of a technology’s maturity along its S-curve/life cycle.
Technology
Benchmarking Internal benchmarking of technology alternatives with the organisation + benchmarking against competitors. Selection and Approval
Make-the-Future Selection Inward-facing technology opportunity down-selection aligned to new product drivers.
Technology
Roadmapping Convergence of inward and outward-technology opportunities aligned to market and product drivers to enable selection of R&D programs.
R&T Funding
Approval Technology investment decision-making for technology opportunities presented by Technology Roadmapping.
Capability Development: Development Research, Acquisition & Adaptation, and Exploitation & Review stages
Technology
Make-Buy Make or buy decision-making for development of down- selected technology program capabilities. Capability
Acquisition Definition, launch and management of technology programs aimed at developing technology maturity through R&D.
Technology Readiness Scale
A gated process against which current technology maturity can be gauged and managed.
Protection Technology Risk
Management
Management of risks arising from R&D technology programs.
Knowledge
Base Protection Capture of valuable knowledge such that it can be re-used Intellectual
Property (IP) Protection
Protection against unauthorised transfer of IP outside of the organisation.
This paper will generate a framework which by adapting similar tools from the above table, such as; Technology Acquisition, Push-Pull Model, Technology Space Mapping, Technology Maturity Assessment and Make vs Buy analysis.
2.4.1 Technology Acquisition
There is an African proverb that says ‘latecomers eat bones’. This is always the biggest concern for developing nations as technological latecomers; their catch-up journey makes them lag behind the developed nations. Many studies argue that the key elements for the technological catch-up are the indigenous efforts and the overseas technology transfers. Nonetheless, the firm is acquiring technology, whether it is “Technology Development” or “Technology Transfer”. The acquisition of indigenous technologies and scientific capabilities have become and will continue to become, of ever greater importance for countries attempting to successfully catch-up to critical technologies (Mazzoleni & Nelson, 2007).
Technology acquisition is a significant process that requires integrated efforts. Organizations considering implementing such practices, have found many different ways and channels to accomplish these kinds of projects (Majidpour, 2017) introduced the traditional technology acquisition channels (Figure 3) which are sorted based on internal (make) or external (buy) technology sources.
Figure 3: Technology Acquisition Channels
These wide channels illustrated by (Majidpour, 2017) almost cover all the possible means to acquire technologies. The comparison between buying or developing the technologies shows major implications on the national economy (Topcu et al., 2015).
Authors have used the terms “Technology Acquisition” and “Technology Transfer” interchangeably and this may mislead researchers. This paper aims to redefine some definitions, in order to ensure that the readers and the writer are on the same page.
2.4.2 Technology (Pull-Push) model
The primary difference between a pull or push scenario is solving a problem versus accommodating a solution. In the pull scenario, the focus is on solving a problem by providing a technical answer to a market need (which can be either anticipated or existing). In the push scenario case, the focus is on identifying a market need to accommodate an existing technical solution (Oversteegen, Barneveld, Leermakers, & Lyklema, 1999).
The common description of this model is “Technology-Push and Market-Pull”. However, some authors have defined the terms from either a technology or market point of view. Oversteegen et al., (1999) have defined the terms as: “technology push has been historically defined by an innovation-cycle-driven culture focused on marketing/technology management analysis. In this context, the R&D division of a firm
brings an idea from the invention stage to its fruition in the commercial markets”. The not-so-typical technology pull is best described as the reaction to demand in the market. The desire for more efficient technologies by customers creates incremental improvements in these technologies that may eventually lead to a critical mass of innovations and possibly too radical improvements.
On the other hand, the market pull has been historically defined by marketing. The marketplace dictates the products that are to be supplied by a firm. In order to meet demand, a firm must constantly strive to increase performance and customer satisfaction. Market push is also a not-so-traditional term that addresses the creation of markets through marketing-driven efforts that, along with technology pull, can lead to the creation of technological standards that define and enable the emergence of new markets (see Tables 3 and 4).
Table 3: Technology Push and Pull: Relative Technology Dominance Perspective Market Pull Market Push
Technology Pull --- Technology Satisfying Market Seeding
Technology Push Market Satisfying
Technology Seeding
---
Table 4: Technology Push and Pull: Relative Market Dominance Perspective
Market Pull Market Push
Technology Pull --- Technology Satisfying Market Seeding
Technology Push Market Satisfying
Technology Seeding
---
The DTAPM framework presented in this dissertation also helps to strike a balance between technology-push/pull for manufacturing organisations.
2.5 Technology Space Mapping (TSM)
One of the essential aspects to be considered in the management of technology is the transfer of the most appropriate technology to the organisation. (Grange & Buys, 2002). Technology space maps are a method of clarifying complex technical issues in such a manner that officials can quickly and easily gain a broad outlook of the current and future environment from a technologist’s perspective (Simjee, 2008).
Pretorius (2001) offers a real-world application for the value of technology space maps, designating that evaluating a firm's technological capability is vital in maintaining its competitive position in global markets. De Wet (1992) proposed the concept of a technology space map as a tool for simply communicating technical issues. For the corporate strategy to encircle the technological issues communication loops between the officials and technologists are necessary.
TSM is the description used most in the subject of technology. It consists of two dimensions specifically, system life cycle and system hierarchy. Nevertheless, the technology space map can be customized for specific needs in order to provide information that is essential for a specific organization or industry. The TSM is illustrated in Figure 4 (De Wet, 1992).
The TSM can be applied in a variety of technology management conditions. It provides an audit of the present status of the technological capabilities within a firm and provides a means for the planning of future requirements in line with an organization's goals and objectives. Furthermore, the TSM provides a holistic vision of a company thereby allowing for technology gaps to be identified and provides a platform for these gaps to be addressed (Simjee, 2008).
2.6 Defense Acquisition System (DAS)
DAS is the management process by which the Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users. It consists of phases containing major activities and associated decision points, during which a system goes through research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); production; fielding or deployment; sustainment; and disposal as shown in Figure 5 (US DODD 5000.01, 2007).
In a broader context, defense acquisition could be defined as a process of defense products’ life cycle management from the moment requirements are defined, through research and development, manufacturing or purchasing, use in operations, exploitation and maintenance, to disposal. In a more restricted context, defense acquisition is related to the process of acquiring defense products whether by producing or purchasing them—in order to generate defense capabilities that are appropriate to the defense missions and level of ambition outlined in a nation’s defense policy. In both contexts, defense acquisition plays an essential role in achieving the goals set forth in a larger defense policy, since it is intrinsically related to the development of defense capabilities, which are the basis of the armed forces’ missions and task implementation in the national, regional, and global contexts (Caforio, 2018).
Figure 5: US DOD Acquisition life cycle
Although this definition was defined by the US DOD representing technology development, there are different approaches for the DAS worldwide. Many countries are looking at the big picture of acquiring the needed technologies. In this context, five main acquisition models mainly used by defense systems acquisition authorities are listed.
1. Direct Procurement 2. Production under License 3. Joint Production
4. International Consortium 5. Indigenous Development
Topcu et al. (2015) have summarised the above DAS models from the Turkish experience perspective. They presented a good comparison of each model against certain criteria (Table 5).
Table 5: Comparison of the Acquisition Models Employed in Turkey Contribution to the National Economy Eligibility Criteria (Requirements) Supply Cost Supply Time Supply Risk Life Cycle Cost Technology Acquisition Direct Procurement --- + +++ +++ +++ --- --- Production Under the License -- + ++ ++ ++ -- -- Joint Production Model ++ ++ - + + ++ ++ International Consortium + + - - + + + Indigenous Development +++ +++ -- -- - +++ +++
As the Table 5 shows, the indigenous developments are contributing positively to the national economy even though it is risky and takes a lot of time and cost. In contrast, the direct procurement has the least contribution to the national economy and has no risks and save money and time.
In Japan the situation is different. The acquisition should be based mainly on domestic development, that will be directly connected to foster and maintain defense production and technology bases of Japan in the case that such equipment are difficult to be introduced from overseas because we should not depend on other countries to introduce them (MODJapan, 2016).
Back to the adopted DAS from the US DOD, this section will review the essential elements in the US DAS; Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA), Capabilities Gap Assessment (CGA), and Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). Some maturity metrics and trade off analysis also will be discussed.
2.6.1 Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA)
Before 2002, the US DOD had a “requirements process” to determine needs. However, there was widespread dissatisfaction with this process, as evidenced by the memo issued by the Secretary of Defense shown in Figure 6 below (US DOD JCIDS, 2015).
Figure 6: Memo from the Secretary of Defense that began JCIDS
Predictably, a considerable amount of activity followed (led by the decision to banish the word “requirement” from the new process). This effort resulted in three principles that form the foundation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS):
• Describing needs in terms of capabilities, instead of systems or force elements. • Deriving needs from a joint perspective, from a new set of joint concepts.
• Having a single general or flag officer oversee each DOD functional portfolio. The CBA is the JCIDS analysis process (Figure 7) that includes three phases: the FAA [functional area analysis], the FNA [functional needs analysis], and the FSA [functional solutions analysis]. The results of the CBA are used to develop a JCD based on the FAA and FNA or ICD based on the full analysis (US DOD JCIDS, 2015).
Figure 7: JCIDS analysis process
Figure 7 shows the major elements of a CBA: The Functional Area Analysis (FAA), the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), and the Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA). Figure 8 reduces Figure 7 to the simplest depiction possible.
2.6.2 Capabilities Gap Assessment (CGA)
A capability gap is the inability to execute a specified course of action. The gap may be the result of no existing capability, a lack of proficiency or sufficiency in an existing capability solution, or the need to replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap (US DOD JCIDS, 2015).
Rubemeyer, Noble, and McKeague (2013) prepared a technical report for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Centre. They proposed a gap assessment method that addresses some important questions: (1) How much capability is good enough? (2) Is the gap mitigated? (3) If so, by how much?
Also, they distinguish between qualitative, quantitative and industrial capabilities. • The qualitative gap is a capability gap that does not have a quantifiable attribute
or has a quantifiable attribute in which technical, performance or operational study data are unavailable.
• The quantitative gap is a capability gap that has a quantifiable attribute and associated technical performance, or operational study data available for the comparison of alternatives.
• Defense industrial capabilities are the skills and knowledge, processes, facilities, and equipment needed to design, develop, manufacture, repair, and support DoD products. Defense industrial capabilities include private and public industrial activities.
2.6.3 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
The AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, suitability, risk, and life-cycle cost of alternatives under consideration to satisfy validated capability needs (usually stipulated in an approved ICD). Other definitions of an AoA can be found in various official documents (US DODD 5000.01, 2007).
The purpose of the AoA is to help decision-makers understand the trade space for new materiel solutions to satisfy an operational capability need while providing the analytic basis for performance attributes documented in follow-on JCIDS documents.
The results of these analyses can serve as the basis for addressing requirements sufficiency issues such as (OAS, 2016):
• Identifying the sensitivity of specific assumptions, parameters, measures, or other variables that, when altered, significantly change the relative schedule, performance, and cost- effectiveness of the alternatives—in other words, what are the cost, schedule, and performance drivers?
• Recommending changes to validated capability requirements that appear unachievable, operationally unnecessary, or undesirable from a cost, schedule, risk, or performance point of view.
• Identifying critical or essential parameters and attributes that have the potential to be Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), Key System Attributes (KSAs), Additional Performance Attributes (APAs), or Other System Attributes (OSAs). • Identifying the point at which further investment provides little additional value
for specific alternatives.
• Identifying areas where additional investigation is likely warranted, and why. • Identifying the capability requirement threshold/objective values that require
further exploration.
2.6.4 Make vs Buy (Trade-off) Analysis
At the national strategic level, “Make vs Buy” decisions are be adapted to “local manufacture vs import” decisions. Öncü, Oner, and Başoğlu (2003) have raised questions, such as: should a country buy a new system or modernize the existing one? Moreover, should a country import new systems, or should countries finance local development and manufacture needed systems? Their research concluded that there were no studies about “local manufacture vs import”. Those strategic decisions initiate them to develop a multi-criteria decision model for military systems acquisitions and have it used by Turkish decision makers (Figure 9). This model depicts the important factors affecting decisions. It was developed from a questionnaire to people who work in various stages of the procurement cycle in the Ministry of National Defense and Turkish Land Force Headquarters.
Figure 9: A Model for National Objectives Related with the Decision Factors
Zenz (1976) believes that the “make vs buy” problem arises as a result of unsatisfactory vendor performance, poor quality, delivery problems, unreasonable vendor price increases, the addition of a new products or substantial modifications of an existing one, changes in sales volume and related variations in plant capacity, reduced sales, and idle plant, equipment and manpower. The economists consider the “make vs buy” issues from a cost perspective, but the real strategic vision requires officials to see the big picture and consider the development of the indigenous capabilities for their national interests.
2.7 Maturity Assessment
In recent years there have been a lot of interest in metrics such as the Technology Readiness Level (TRL), System Readiness Level (SRL), Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL), Integration Readiness Level (IRL) and other metrics as avenues to measure maturity and readiness of systems and technologies. The right maturity assessment techniques at the right time can enable government agencies and contractors to produce products that are cheaper, better, and made faster by closing knowledge gaps at critical decision points (Azizian, Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2009)
2.7.1 Technology readiness level (TRL)
In 1974, NASA had to conceive of a scale to measure the maturity of their technology, and they formally defined the scale in the 1990s which consequently gained widespread acceptance. This is known as the Technology Readiness Level (TRL). TRL is a useful metric in the decision-making process of selecting new technologies; it is a maturity scale from the start until the end product. This scale has strong points, as well as its precise controls. The definition of every level is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Technology Readiness Levels Definition
TRL Definition 1 Basic principles observed and reported
2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment
7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration
9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations *Source: US DOD
“The movement from a certain level of readiness (TRLX1) to another level (TRLX2)” is the Technology Transition, while the degree of difficulty to move on was characterized by NASA with a five-level scale symbolized with (R&D3) shown in Figure 10. Accordingly, if we want to be precise about the technology transfer definition, we can define it as the ownership transfer of a TRL(X). Therefore, we can clarify the vague definitions of the two concepts previously mentioned as follows.
Technology Transfer: is licensing intellectual property (IP) of a particular technology at a certain readiness level TRL(X) to the party who has the resources and desire to develop, use and exploit this technology from that readiness level to an advanced readiness level of this technology.
If the licensing IP is in the level between TRL1-TRL3, we are talking about technology development from the start between the academic sectors such as universities, R and D centers and scientific institutions. While, if the IP is in the level between TRL4-TRL6 we are talking about technology adoption from an academic side to the industry sector, while if the readiness level of the technology has developed further, the selling IP will move between the industry sectors as a technology acquisition, whether it is a national transfer or international technology transfer (ITT).
According to Sauser, Gove, Forbes, and Ramirez-Marquez (2010) the benefits of using TRLs include that it:
• provides an ontology by which stakeholders can evaluate component technologies;
• provides for a component TRA;
• initiates a discussion among the stakeholders to consider other factors; • provides a mechanism whereby the process can be easily repeated
during development;
• is easy to understand and use; and
• conveys a great deal of information in a project's status and its relative risk in the lifecycle of the project.
TRL1 TRL2 TRL3 TRL4 TRL5 TRL6 TRL7 TRL8 TRL9
Figure 10: Degree of Difficulty
2.7.2 Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL)
The basic goal of all acquisition programs is to put the required capability in the field in a timely manner with acceptable affordability and supportability. To be successful, the two key risk areas of immature product technologies and immature manufacturing capability must be managed effectively. Manufacturing readiness metrics in combination with technology readiness metrics can help acquisition program managers deal with these risks (Manufacturing Readiness Level ( MRL ) Deskbook, 2011). The definition of every level is shown in Table 7.
MRLs have been recognised as providing a common language and standard to: • Assess the manufacturing maturity of a technology or product for its future
maturation.
• Understand the level of manufacturing risk (Morgan, 2008).
Table 7: Manufacturing Readiness Levels Definition
MRL Definition
1 Basic manufacturing implications identified 2 Manufacturing concepts identified
3 Manufacturing proof-of-concept developed.
4 Capability to produce technology in a laboratory environment.
5 Capability to produce prototype components in a production relevant environment.
6 Capability to produce a prototype system or subsystem in a production relevant environment.
7 Capability to produce systems, subsystems, or components in a production representative environment
8 Pilot line capability demonstrated; ready to begin low-rate, initial production 9 Low-rate production demonstrated; capability in place to begin full-rate
production
10 Full-rate production demonstrated and lean production practices *Source: US DOD
2.7.3 Integration Readiness Level (IRL)
Integration Readiness Level is a metric that is used to evaluate the integration readiness of any two TRL-assessed technologies (Sauser et al., 2010). They believe it is critical to consider physical properties of integration such as interfaces or standards but also interaction, compatibility reliability, quality performance, and common ontology when the two pieces are integrated. Sauser et al. (2010) stated in their paper the strengths and weaknesses of this IRL.
Its strengths include:
• It is based on open, widely accepted standards (ISO/OSI). • Technology readiness is included in the overall assessment.
• Subjective assessment is made on technical data (however, this can also be considered a weakness).
Its weaknesses include:
• Requires a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)/System architecture to be complete and accurate before the assessment.
• Requires a TRL assessment before the IRL assessment • Lacks the ability to assess criticality and R&D effort
• Requires a more quantitative algorithm to reduce integrations into a single assessment for complex, net-centric systems.
• IRL does not evaluate cost and schedule.
2.7.4 System Readiness Level (SRL)
Authors (Magnaye, Sauser, Ramirez-marquez, & Acquisition, 2009; Sauser et al., 2010) have discussed the expansion of the TRL and the maturity scale concept to the system approach. Tetlay and John (2009) believe that SRLs have been developed as a project management tool to capture evidence, and assess and communicate system maturity. They defined SRL as a set of nine steps from concept in-service across a set of systems engineering disciplines. The rationale behind the SRL developed by Sauser, Ramirez-Marquez, and Tan (2008) is that in the development lifecycle, one would be interested in addressing the following considerations:
• Quantifying how a specific technology is being integrated with every other technology to develop the system.
• Providing a system-wide measurement of readiness.
The SRL is not user-defined, but is instead based on the outcomes of the documented TRL and IRL evaluations through mathematically combining these two separate readiness levels, a better picture of overall complex system readiness is obtained by examining all technologies in concert with all their required integrations (Magnaye et al., 2009). 𝑆𝑅𝐿 = 𝐼𝑅𝐿 𝑥 𝑇𝑅𝐿 {𝑆𝑅𝐿1 𝑆𝑅𝐿2 𝑆𝑅𝐿3} = . 𝐼𝑅𝐿// 𝐼𝑅𝐿/0 𝐼𝑅𝐿/1 𝐼𝑅𝐿/0 𝐼𝑅𝐿00 𝐼𝑅𝐿01 𝐼𝑅𝐿/1 𝐼𝑅𝐿01 𝐼𝑅𝐿112 𝑥 . 𝑇𝑅𝐿/ 𝑇𝑅𝐿0 𝑇𝑅𝐿12 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑅𝐿 = 1 𝑛< 𝑆𝑅𝐿/ 𝑚= + 𝑆𝑅𝐿0 𝑚= + 𝑆𝑅𝐿1 𝑚= ? = 1/𝑛0[𝑆𝑅𝐿 /+ 𝑆𝑅𝐿0+ 𝑆𝑅𝐿1] Where; CDEF GH = 𝑆𝑅𝐿 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 1 , ‘n’= number of technologies
2.8 Conclusion
Whilst the essence of this literature review was studying different models and tools that have been used in many different applications; it has shown obviously that all the discussed models and tools have been used effectively in the defense industry. This usability drives the researcher to use it as the elements of the intended framework that he will develop in the next chapter.
Portfolio management, technology management, technology space mapping, defense acquisition system and its phases and documentations, and maturity assessment metrics. Bringing it all together and visualize the global picture; The researcher believes that those elements have conceptual relationships, since some of them have already been used in the defense acquisition system, and others have been used as supportive tools to enhance the efficiency of this system. The notion of developing conceptual relationships is to develop an integrated framework serving as a strategic road map for the technological projects’ portfolio.
Recalling the problem statement of this research, this framework will work as an effective tool to manage and control different technological projects, that need an effective acquisition system, to achieve the strategic objective of having indigenous self-sufficient defense industry. The next chapter will discuss the reviewed models and identify a relationship that will require synthesis and model the defense technology acquisition portfolio management (DTAPM) framework. That the author believes it will help in identifying the gaps in technological capabilities and provide an appropriate approach to fill those gaps.
Therefore, the problem to be solved in this research is; the lack of a formal defense acquisition system in MOD applicable to KSA.
