A national capital choking in water
An analysis on the flooding problem in Jakarta Utara
Written by: Alexander J. van Dorssen 10253890
Supervisor:
Dr. Dennis Arnold
!
Preface
This bachelor thesis is the final part of my bachelor Future Planet Studies at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. The bachelor program focuses on changes that are necessary to achieve an environmentally and socially accountable society in the future. The flooding problem in Jakarta Utara is a prime example of a societal problem that needs urgent solving. Having lived in South East Asia for over 10 years, Jakarta Utara presented the perfect study field for me to utilize my academic capabilities that I have gained during my three-year bachelor program.
Abstract
Situated naturally in a low-lying floodplain, Jakarta Utara has always had a history of flooding events. Recent anthropogenic developments, however, have lead to a significant increase in flooding events, the worst of which being in February 2007. The poor people of Jakarta Utara were the worst affected during this flood who mainly reside in the Kecamatan’s Penjaringan and Cilincing. This is mainly due to the fact that they primarily reside in slums along rivers and coastal regions that are particularly vulnerable to flooding. In that same year in November, Jakarta Utara was also confronted by flooding from the sea when a high tide over-topped the sea wall causing high waters up to 1.5m without any rainfall occurring. This was primarily caused by increased land subsidence. To solve the current flooding problems in Jakarta Utara a consortium of Dutch companies have put forward a substantial coastal defence initiative, the NCICD program, which aims to provide a solution for the long-term protection of Jakarta Utara against flooding from the sea by means of building a giant sea wall. However, the complex governance and decentralised decision making in Indonesia hamper the realisation of the program. In addition, the program poses significant challenges to be financed, as the central government does not provide much financial backing and leaves most of the financial sponsoring to the private sector. The urban poor of Jakarta Utara benefit from the NCICD program through increased job opportunities and flood safety. However, the NCICD program does not provide sufficient housing accommodation for the urban poor of Jakarta Utara, as most of the reclaimed land will be sold for profit to developers and richer Indonesians to finance the construction of the sea wall.
!
Content
Preface 2 Abstract 3 Content 4 1. Introduction 6 1.1 Historical Background 6 1.2 Problem Definition 7 1.3 Context 8 1.4 Research Questions 11 2. Research Methods 122.1 Data Collection the 2007 Flooding Problems in Jakarta Utara 12 2.2 Data Collection Dutch Mitigation Strategies 12
3. Theoretical Framework 13
3.1 Social Resilience Theory 13
3.2 Urban Poor Definition 14
4. The 2007 Flooding Problems in Jakarta Utara 15
4.1 General Overview 15
4.2 The six Kecamatan’s of Jakarta Utara 20
4.2.1 Penjaringan 20 4.2.2 Pademangan 20 4.2.3 Tanjung Priok 21 4.2.4 Koja 21 4.2.5 Kelapa Gading 22 4.2.6 Cilincing 22
4.3 A New Type of Flooding in Jakarta Utara 23 4.4 Social Resilience to the Flooding Problem in Jakarta Utara 25
5. Dutch Mitigation Strategies 28
5.1 The Dutch Approach 28
5.2 The NCICD Initiative 29
5.2.1 Urgent Matters 29
5.2.2 Urban Design and Land Reclamation 31
5.2.3 Water Management 32
5.2.4 Social-Economical Aspects and Housing 33 5.2.5 Mobility and Infrastructure 34
6. Discussion 36
6.1 Decentralisation in Indonesia 36
6.2 Financial Aspects of the NCICD Initiative 37 6.3 Building Resilience for the Urban Poor of Jakarta Utara 38
7. Conclusion 40
Acknowledgements 41
Abbreviations 42
References 43
!
1. Introduction
1.1 Historical Background
Due to its naturally flood-prone location and seasonal rainfall intensity, Jakarta has had a long history of coastal and riverine flooding (Ward et al., 2013). The earliest historical records of flooding in Jakarta were found to be from the 5th century AD. Hindu settlers established a trading port in the 5th century AD, which was later named Sunda Kelapa, along the mouth of a river of what is now Jakarta Utara (Steinberg, 2007). The strategic position between the mouth of the river and the Java Sea provided excellent trade opportunities for the settlers. The volcanic soil and sufficient precipitation made the area also agriculturally productive (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001). However, the settlement was vulnerable to flooding as it was situated in a low-lying river basin with an average elevation of just seven metres (Abidin et al., 2009). An inscription dated from 403 AD tells the story of the digging of an 11km long canal to protect the settlement against flooding (Anggara, 2014).
During the Age of Discovery, the Portuguese were the first to trade with Sunda Kelapa. In the 17th century, the Dutch East Indian Trading Company (VOC) largely demolished the established settlements and rebuilt it as Batavia. Instead, they constructed fortified headquarters and warehouses to fulfil their commercial ventures (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001). To combat the flooding problem the Dutch dug a network of canals much like a geometric matrix that characterises many Dutch cities. Governor General Jan Pieterszoon Coen dreamt that Batavia would one day become the “Amsterdam of the tropics” (Anggara, 2014). Of the many uses that these canals provided, it also served as a solid waste dump of the city, which resulted in widespread outbreaks of malaria (Steinberg, 2007).
Batavia remained under Dutch control until December 1949 when it was renamed to Jakarta and became the capital of independent Indonesia (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001). Since then, Jakarta has undergone massive expansion southwards and into the low-lying areas west and east of the city. The centralisation of the economy during the Suharto regime (1967-1998) drove many low-income Indonesians to the capital (Kurniawati, 2009). Mass-urbanisation ensured that its population ballooned from a mere 0.87 million in 1949 to roughly 9.5 million in 2010 (Firman, 2011). This period also saw the expansion of ‘Kampungs’ in Jakarta: clustered informal settlements severely prone to flooding that are mostly inhabited by the urban poor. It is estimated that 60% of Jakarta urban population currently reside in Kampungs (Steinberg, 2007).
1.2 Problem Definition
Jakarta changed dramatically during recent decades of rapid economic growth and is simultaneously being shaped in two directions. On the one hand, it is an increasing prosperous modern city with a growing presence in the global economy. On the other hand, Jakarta is confronted with the negative effects of a fast growing population and challenges of providing for poor urban settlers (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001). With an estimated population in 2011 of approximately 9.5 million people, Jakarta is by far the largest city in South East Asia (Firman, 2011). As of 2011, the metropolitan area of Jakarta, “Jabodetabek”, has a population of almost 28 million, making it one of the largest urban agglomerations in the world (Firman, 2011). Jakarta is a city of extraordinary contrasts between unrelenting poverty and extreme wealth and prosperity.
Even though flooding in Jakarta dates back nearly 1600 years, the flooding problems of the last two decades have been at an unprecedented scale. The displacement of 432.000 people in the DKI Jakarta during the flooding of 2007 shows how vulnerable the informal poor communities are to flooding. The flood of 2007 affected 70% of the DKI Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota) and killed 48 people (Kondisi Banjir, 2007). Although many laws and regulations are in place to deal with the flooding problems in Jakarta, the implementation and law-enforcement is severely lacking (Ward et al., 2013). Firman et al. (2011) state that Jakarta lacks an agency to manage the laws and regulations that are put forward by the government. There is a lack of planning across policy sectors. The Coordinating Body for Jakarta Metropolitan Region Development (BKSP) for example, is tasked to monitor development in the metropolitan region of Jakarta. However, the BKSP has no authority over implementation, which makes it powerless in coordinating development programs (Ward et al., 2013).
The flooding problem is at its worst in Northern Jakarta “Jakarta Utara”. Here, the flooding comes from two directions: from the sea and from water accumulation in drainage systems and rivers (Steinberg, 2007). Potential sea level-rise, high tides and land subsidence are at the heart of the flooding related problems from the sea. In some areas in Jakarta Utara, subsidence rates are between 20-25 centimetres a year (Abidin et al., 2009).
The accumulation of water in drainage systems and rivers in Jakarta Utara is partly natural and partly man-made. The wet season runs from December to May with the most intense rainfall occurring during the months of January and February (Brinkman & Hartman, 2008). Past flooding problems in Jakarta Utara, most often occurred during these months. High intensity short rainfall storms cause quick accumulation of water along the Ciliwung River and other distributary canals that flow into the Jakarta Bay (Brinkman & Hartman, 2008). Along these water canals and
!
coastal areas, the majority of the city’s urban poor illegally reside, often living in poorly built houses (Wagemaker et al., 2011). This renders them vulnerable to flooding from rainwater accumulation along the riverbanks, as well as flooding from the sea (Baker, 2012). The level of exposure of the urban poor of Jakarta Utara to (man-made) natural hazards is thus extremely high. From an anthropogenic point of view, a lack of carrying capacity of flood control infrastructure, uncontrolled garbage dumping and reduction of rainwater absorption due to urbanisation and deforestation block the water outflow and worsen the situation (Steinberg, 2007). The problem is so serious that there are doubts about the sustainability of Jakarta Utara and, for that matter, Jakarta as a whole. There have even been studies in the past that have looked at the possibility of relocating the capital to another place in the Indonesian archipelago (Kuiper, 2013).
1.3 Context
Jakarta is located in Indonesia on the north west coast of the island of Java (see figure 1). It is the commanding centre of urban Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world with 242 million inhabitants as of 2013 (World Population Statistics, 2013). Jakarta has a tropical climate with an average annual temperature of 27°C and a total territory comprising 661 km2 (Phanuwan et al., 2006). The DKI Jakarta is a province divided into five different cities called “Kota”: Jakarta Barat (West), Jakarta Selatan (South), Jakarta Pusat (Central), Jakarta Timur (East) and Jakarta Utara (North) (see figure 2). Furthermore there is a separate regency called Thousand Islands (Kepulauan Seribu); a groups of 105 islands located 45 kilometres north of Jakarta Utara in the Java Sea (Cybriwsky, 2001).
All the emphasis in this thesis will be on Jakarta Utara as it is situated vulnerably between the Java Sea and the outflow of at least 13 rivers, making it prone to flooding (Steinberg, 2007). On top of that, Jakarta Utara experiences high rates of land subsidence (Abidin et al., 2009). Numerous projects, however, are planned to protect Jakarta Utara against future flooding problems, making this an interesting area to study (Kuiper, 2013). Jakarta Utara is divided into six sub-districts or “Kecamatan”: Penjaringan, Pademangan, Tanjung Priok, Koja, Kelapa Gading and Cilincing (see figure 3). These Kecamatan’s are further divided into 32 sub sub-districts called Kelurahan’s. The total population of Jakarta Utara is 1.69 million people as of 2013 with a population density of 11.220 per km2 (BPS, 2013). Its administrative headquarters are in Tanjung Priok (BPS, 2010).
DKI Jakarta
Fi gu re '3 :'ST U D Y 'A R E A :'t h is 'm ap 's h ow s' th e' si x' Ke ca m at an ’s 'o f'J ak ar ta 'U ta ra '( A d m in is Ja k ar ta 'U ta ra ,'2 0 1 4 ).
formulated:
- How can Dutch water companies tackle the flooding problem through sustainable solutions that will benefit the urban poor of Jakarta Utara?
By sustainable solutions is meant: meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs (Giddings et al., 2002). The goal of these sustainable solutions is to create a prosperous social, economical and ecological society. Building collective goods to tackle the flooding problem are highly necessary for the urban poor of Jakarta as they are not resilient enough to cope with the flooding problem on their own. In the context of Jakarta, dykes are particularly important in stopping the flooding problem from the sea (Kuiper, 2013). Increased river catchment areas and increased dredging activities are important in stopping the flooding problem from inland (Steinberg, 2007).
In this thesis, two sub questions will be used as guideline to answer the research question formulated above. For the first sub question, the 2007 flooding event was specifically chosen, because it is one of the most recent flooding problems to have hit Jakarta Utara with widespread damage. For the second sub question, special emphasis will be given on how Dutch water companies want to tackle to flooding problem in Jakarta Utara. The Dutch have been specifically chosen, because they are world renowned for their contribution in water related projects and hold strong cultural ties with Indonesia from previous colonial times.
- How have the urban poor of Jakarta Utara been effected by the major flooding problem of 2007?
- What are the proposed mitigation strategies by Dutch water companies to tackle the flooding problem of Jakarta Utara?
With the help of these two sub questions the overlying research question will be answered in the conclusion chapter of this thesis.
!
2. Research Methods
This thesis is a qualitative literature study written in Amsterdam far away from Jakarta Utara. It is largely dependent on the analysis of academic articles, reports and statistical data all derived from books and the Internet. The research methods for chapters four and five are given special emphasis below as they cover the two sub questions of this thesis.
2.1 Data Collection the 2007 Flooding Problems in Jakarta Utara
In chapter four the main units of analysis are the urban poor of Jakarta Utara. Nearly all data in this chapter is done through purposive data collecting (Bryman, 2012). Academic articles have been selected based on relevance that will allow the sub question to be answered. Besides academic articles, newspapers articles of the 2007 flooding have also been used to add valuable insights to the damaging effects of the flooding. It should be noted that only the Jakarta Post and the Jakarta Globe have been used, as they are the only English newspapers published in Jakarta. The statistical data on Jakarta Utara is mainly derived from two governmental agencies: the BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik) and the AJU (Administrasi Jakarta Utara). A 412-paged statistical book on Jakarta Utara by the BPS, Jakarta Utara Dalam Angka (2013), gave light to the social-economic conditions of the people in Jakarta Utara. I have translated some of the data tables and graphs by the BPS and email exchanges with Indonesian officials from the BPS from Indonesian Bahasa to English using Google Translate.
2.2 Data Collection Dutch Mitigation Strategies
The main units of analysis in chapter five and part of the discussion are the Dutch water companies who are active (or are most likely going to be active) in Jakarta Utara. Since a large part of chapter five is focused on a future situation, almost no academic articles are used here. The NCICD initiative (National Capital Integrated Coastal Development), presented by the Dutch Minister of Infrastructure and Environment (Melanie Schultz van Haegen) at the start of April 2014, is one of the pillars in this chapter. Besides that, newspaper articles, one semi-structured interviews and several email exchanges with key figures in Indonesia and the Netherlands have been used, as well as other reports related to the proposed NCICD program. The semi-structured interview will be held with a management consultant who has been leading consulting engagements in South East Asia for over 15 years. Furthermore, the Liveable City Expert Meeting (LCEM) at the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague on the 1st of April 2014 and the Netherlands Water Partnership Meeting (NWPM) on the 11th of June 2014 in Rotterdam gave valuable insights in development projects currently proposed for Jakarta Utara and other parts of Indonesia. One of the main focuses during these two meeting was the NCICD program in the Jakarta Bay area.
3. Theoretical Framework
The main theory utilised in this thesis will be the social resilience theory, which will be explained below as well as its contribution to answering the research questions. Also the definition of “poverty” will be touched upon.
3.1 Social Resilience Theory
It was in 1973 when the term resilience received a new insight coined together by C. S. Holling. At the time he only distinguished one broad type of resilience: ecological resilience. A natural, undisturbed system is likely to be continually in a transient state; a system where a certain equilibrium is present. As human economic demands increase, populations within this system move away from this equilibrium (see figure 4). He defined ecological resilience as being the amount of disturbance that an ecosystem could withstand without changing self-organized processes and structures (Holling, 1973).
Figure'4:'An'illustration'on'the'resilience'theory'(Adger,'2000).''
Later in the year 2000 an article by Adger (2000) made a comparison between ecological resilience and the new theory of social resilience. He was one of the first scientists to make a comparison between the two. Adger (2000) defined social resilience as the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change. For the inter-linkages between ecological and social resilience, Adger (2000) stated that resilience in natural systems provides the capacity to cope with surprises and large-scale changes. This in turn allows innovation, coping with change and social learning in social institutions. Thus, the resilience of social systems is related in some way to the resilience of the ecological system on which social systems depend.
Social vulnerability is one of the key configurations linked to social resilience. It is the exposure of groups to stress as a result of the impacts of environmental and
!
political change (Adger, 2000). The stresses are often related to the underlying social-economical environment in which the group exists. A lack of income and resources is often the bottleneck for a group to adapt to environmental change. An example of this would be the urban poor of Jakarta Utara having to cope with the external stresses of the looming danger of flooding. The tipping points for these poor communities before disaster strikes have to be brought into context. The degree to which the urban poor of Jakarta Utara can build capacity for learning and adaptation, forms a big part of their resilience against flooding (Folke et al., 2002). Rich communities generally have a very high resilience to flooding as they have well-built houses and mostly reside on high land (Texier, 2008).
As stated in the problem statement, the consequences of the flooding problem are felt unevenly across social groups, the poor being less able to insulate themselves from them (Avriana et al., 2009). Measuring the social resilience against flooding for the urban poor of Jakarta Utara is therefore highly necessary. This theory will be particularly useful in answering my first sub question as this question deals with the effects of the flooding problem in 2007 on the urban poor of Jakarta Utara. How resilient the urban poor of Jakarta Utara have been in that flood will be put into perspective. Also in the discussion chapter this theory is useful. Management that builds resilience can sustain social systems in the face of surprise, unpredictability and complexity (Folke et al., 2002). A city becomes more resilient when the population has built-in systems that enable them to respond to extreme events (Newman, 2010).
3.2 Urban Poor Definition
The term poverty is widely used among institutes and organisation around the world. There is, however, not a common agreed definition of what poverty is. The UNDP (United Nations Development Program) for example define poor people as those who have a daily income of less than $2 (Avriana et al., 2009). Here, a so-called “poverty line” reflects the minimum level necessary for a person to meet his or her basic needs. The level of basic needs varies across time and societies. Different poverty lines are therefore used according to a countries social norms and values (BBC Home, 2014).
In this thesis the definition by the BPS Jakarta will be used, since most of the statistics are derived from this institute. The poverty line by the BPS is based on the total living costs to satisfy 2100 calories daily food intake and to meet other basic needs such as clothing, housing, health and education (Avriana et al., 2009). The BPS also refers to poor people as those who live in dirt-floored houses less than 8m2 (Avriana et al., 2009). In the DKI Jakarta, there are approximately 400.000 people classified as poor and 300.000 considered near poor (Firman et al., 2011).
4. The 2007 Flooding Problems in Jakarta Utara
In this chapter the 2007 flooding problem of Jakarta Utara will be put into perspective. Firstly, a general overview will be given about the flooding event of 2007. Then, each Kecamatan within Jakarta Utara will be individually analysed using mainly statistics and newspaper reports. Focus will then be turned towards a new type of flooding, which occurred and affected parts of Jakarta Utara in November 2007. Lastly, the social resilience of the poor communities within Jakarta Utara will be discussed.4.1 General Overview
In the last two decades, many floods have hit Jakarta Utara, but the flooding event of 2007 was the most disastrous of them all. At the start of February 2007, heavy rainfall fell to the south of the DKI Jakarta in Depok and Bogor regions, causing the Ciliwung and Pesanggrahan Rivers to overflow, particularly in the downstream low lying areas of the DKI Jakarta (WHO, 2007). There were no signs of warning, or any indications, that the water level was alarmingly high in the upstream areas around Depok (Brinkman & Hartman, 2008). The poor absorption ability of the soil south of the DKI Jakarta caused by widespread deforestation, funnelled the terrestrial rainfall to the nearby rivers causing massive accumulation of water in a very short space of time. Furthermore, water-clogged canals in the DKI Jakarta caused by uncontrolled garbage dumping worsened the situation (Steinberg, 2007).
The flooding event of 2007 started on the 2nd of February and lasted for two to three weeks. More than 432.000 people were displaced in the DKI Jakarta with a total of 48 casualties (see figures 5 & 6). In Jakarta Utara specifically, 11 people died. The main cause of death was electrocution and drowning (WHO, 2007). The amount of people displaced peaked on the sixth day until slowly declining during the proceeding fortnight. The total economic cost of the disaster was estimated at 453 million US dollars. This figure does not include the enormous economic damage done to 1200km2 of cropland in West Java and Banten province (Steinberg, 2007).
! ! ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Casualties)per)Kota)in)2007)flooding)of)Jakarta)
Casualties)
Jakarta&Pusat& 3& Jakarta)Utara) 11) Jakarta&Barat& 17& Jakarta&Selatem& 1& Jakarta&Timur& 16& Total& 48& ' Figure'6:'Number'of'casualties'in'Jakarta'per'Kota'during'the'flooding'event'of' 2007'(Kondisi'Banjir,'2007'–'modified'for'own'use).Waterborne diarrhoeal disease and enteric viruses are generally of major concern during and after a flooding event has occurred (Phanuwan et al., 2006). Cholera, dysentery, rotavirus and typhoid fever are the main diseases that occurred during the flooding event of 2007 in Jakarta Utara (Syam, 2014). Jakarta Utara also experienced a severe outbreak of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever (DHF) due to the fact that mosquito’s thrived in the stagnant water (Ngan, 2007). The number of patients treated for diarrhoeal disease and DHF in Jakarta Utara were far greater than any other Kota in the DKI Jakarta (see figure 7 & 8). Note the astonishingly high number of patients in Jakarta Utara in both graphs.
Figure'5:'A'graph'showing'the'amount'of'people'displaced'in'the'DKI'Jakarta' over'a'13Oday'period'during'the'flooding'event'of'2007'(Kondisi'Banjir,'2007'–' modified'for'own'use).'
! Figure'8:'This'graph'shows'the'amount'of'patients'being'treated'between'14th'to' the'18th'of'February'2007'in'the'DKI'Jakarta'and'surrounding'neighbourhoods' with'DHF'(WHO,'2007).' !
The organisations that distribute and receive flood warning information in Jakarta Utara are mainly the BMKG (Badan Meteorologi Klimatologi dan Geofisika), PU DKI (Pekerjaan Umum Pekerjaan Umum Daerah Khusus Ibukota) and BBWSCC (Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai Ciliwung Cisadane). They mainly use telephone, radio and television to communicate, but speaking in a mosque or the conventional door-to-door are methods that are also used to spread information (Wagemaker et al., 2011). During the 2007 flooding event, however, the early warning system did not reach all of the people in the affected areas. In fact, during a survey by the Jakarta Flood Management (2007) most respondents revealed that they did not receive any Figure'7:'A'graph'that'shows'the'amount'of'patients'being'treated'between'the'14th'to'
the'18th'of'February'2007'in'the'DKI'Jakarta'and'surrounding'neighbourhoods'with'
!
information before flooding began. Those who did receive information complained about the lack of crucial details. No details were given on how high the floods were going to be and how long the flooding was expected to last for. Due to the unexpected nature of the event, many people in Jakarta Utara lost their belongings on the 1st floor (Wagemaker et al., 2011). Besides the lack of flood warnings, public anger was also vented at the inadequacy of emergency assistance and the failure of long-term planning (Steinberg, 2007). The Governor of Jakarta at the time, Sutiyoso, promised after the flooding event of 2002 that essential flood controls measures would be taken to ensure it would not happen again. These measure, however, were not up to the task during the flooding of 2007. In February 2007, the Jakarta Post proclaimed in an editorial: “it is simply unforgivable for a governor to see two major floods hit the city, and on both occasions leave citizens helpless”. Such helplessness was particularly felt by slum dwellers in Jakarta Utara:
“I remember the last big flood of 2007. It was about 10 p.m. and suddenly the water level rose up to our chests. We all rushed out, trying to save ourselves. We built tents in the streets. When the water subsided, we all came back here. Where else could we go?” – Sarini in Muara Kali Adem, Penjaringan, Jakarta Utara (Kurniawati, 2009).
Sarini is one of the many thousands of people living in illegally built slums along the Kali Adem Estuary. Across Jakarta Utara more than 43.480 households, or approximately 150.000 people, live in such slums mostly along rivers and canals that are particularly vulnerable to flooding (Kurniawati, 2009). These slums consist of self-constructed houses built with limited materials and they lack sanitation, access to clean water and electricity (see figure 9). Because most of these slums are illegally built on public land, a hostile relationship exists between the slum dwellers and local authorities. Due to the constant threat of demolition and flooding problems, no incentives are given to the slum dwellers to invest in infrastructure (Indrakesuma, 2011).
It is clear that poor people in slums along rivers and coastal regions in Jakarta Utara are particularly vulnerable when a flooding event occurs. This vulnerable group becomes even poorer if there are changes in the environment in which they live in. If a flood occurs, they have nowhere else to go (Firman et al., 2011). Figure 10 shows the areas where slums and the flooding of 2007 overlapped. As can be seen, the vast majority of Jakarta Utara was affected by the flooding event in 2007 (in blue). Below the blue, numerous orange and red patches can be observed that symbolise the presence of slums. ! ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' Figure'10:'A'map'showing'an'overlap'between'slum'areas'and'the'areas'that'were' flooded'in'the'2007'flooding'event'(Baker,'2012).'
!
4.2 The six Kecamatan’s of Jakarta Utara
4.2.1 Penjaringan
Penjaringan is the second largest Kecamatan of Jakarta Utara with an area of 35.49km2 and a population of 289.928 (BPS, 2013). It has the greatest concentration of poor people with 55.000 residents being classified as poor. The Kelurahan “Penjaringan” in Penjaringan, has the largest slum in the DKI Jakarta (figure 9) (IDRC, 2006). This was the worst affected area during the flooding event in 2007 (Firman et al., 2011). Limited sewer networks, inconsistent solid waste collection and inadequate waste disposal sites contribute to the poor environmental services in Penjaringan (IDRC, 2006). During the flooding event of 2007, the water level in Penjaringan reached 2 metres in some location causing widespread damage to the 1st floor of houses and slums (Hadipurwanto, 2007). There are, however, are a few water catchment areas located within Penjaringan. The lake (waduk) north of the Pluit Polder is a good example. This lake serves as a water catchment zone and pumps water directly into the sea. Another pump located in the same Pluit Polder (Pompa Cideng) pumps water from the polder to the nearby Banjir Kanal Barat (BKB). This canal drains water from the Ciliwung River to the sea (van der Sleen, 2013).
4.2.2 Pademangan
Pademangan is the smallest Kecamatan of Jakarta Utara with an area of just 9.92 km2
and a population of 162.591 (BPS, 2013). During the flooding of 2007, many parts of Pademangan were inaccessible by car due to roads being inundated by water. The largest integrated tourism area in South East Asia, the Taman Impian Jaya located in the Kelurahan Ancol, experienced severe financial losses due to fewer tourists as a Figure'11:'Left:'Rowing'boat'in'Pluit'Village'Shopping'Mall,'Penjaringan.'Right:' Man'rescuing'dog'in'Pluit,'Penjaringan'(Sundjojo,'2014).'
result of the flooding. Due to Pademangan’s coastal proximity and massive land subsidence in the last 30 years (up to 1.5m), it is severely prone to flooding from the sea (Muhari et al., 2014). It is often the case that the surrounding water levels of the rivers are lower than the mean sea level. More on this type of flooding will be discussed in section 4.3. Developers in Pademangan, such as BP Ancol, have taken measures against the flooding disaster by building canals and well designed drainage systems. These measures, however, are only benefiting the high-income groups and not the middle to low-income groups (Firman et al., 2011).
4.2.3 Tanjung Priok
Tanjung Priok has a large population of 399.678 in an area of 25.28km2 (BPS, 2013). Many residents in Tanjung Priok claimed that they did not get financial compensation from the government for their family’s losses, although Governor Sutiyoso’s laywer revealed otherwise (Jakarta Post, 26 June 2007). Tanjung Priok is also home to Indonesia’s largest seaport: the Pelabuhan Tanjung Priok. During the flooding event in 2007, the port reported significant financial losses that are attributed to the delayed transport of goods in and out of the port (Putra & Siregar, 2014).
4.2.4 Koja
At 27.822 people per square kilometre Koja is the most densely populated Kecamatan in Jakarta Utara. Koja has a population of 314.949 who inhabit an area of 11.32km2
(BPS, 2013). During the flooding event in Koja the water level varied between 10 and 135cm, causing public transport to come to an almost complete standstill and leaving cars stranded in the water (Hidayatullah, 2007). Furthermore, Koja hospital became severely overcrowded, having to treat nearly 200 babies suffering from diarrhoea (New York Times, 11February 2007).
Figure'12:'Flooded'road'in'Kemayoran'area,'Pademangan,'Jakarta'Utara' (Sundjojo,'2014).
!
4.2.5 Kelapa Gading
Kelapa Gading is the Kecamatan in Jakarta Utara with the least amount of people with a population of 126.367 in an area of 16.12km2 (BPS, 2013). In Kelapa Gading there are a number of reservoirs that help relieve floodwaters, mostly in de Kelurahan Kelapa Gading Barat. However, despite being a well-developed area with several reservoirs, shopping malls and hospitals, the flooding event of 2007 still caused severe damage to the area. In some areas the water level rose up to 2 metres (Hadipurwanto, 2007). Even in such an upper class neighbourhood as Kelapa Gading, the flood warning system by the local housing security was virtually non-existent (BBC, 4February 2007).
4.2.6 Cilincing
The most eastern Kecamatan of Jakarta Utara, Cilincing, has a population of 399.966 in an area of 42.54km2 (BPS, 2013). It is the most populous Kecamatan of Jakarta Utara. Together with Penjaringan, Cilincing has the highest population growth rate in Jakarta Utara (BPS, 2013). Between 2000 and 2010 Cilincing had an average annual population growth rate of 1.99% (BPS, 2013). The Kelurahan “Kalibaru” in Cilincing is one of the poorest localities in the DKI Jakarta (Firman et al., 2011). The flooding event of 2007 was comparable to that of Penjaringan and Pademangan. Coastal proximity and lack of spatial planning caused widespread havoc among poor communities in Cilincing (Firman et al., 2011). Due to being less built-up than other Kecamatans of Jakarta Utara, Cilincing has become the location of many reservoirs and flood diversion canals. The East Flood Canel (Banjir Kanal Timur) and a 56-hectare reservoir in the Kelurahan “Marunda” are examples of these flood mitigation measures (Dewi, 2014). Some of the local population of Cilincing are concerned that the flooding problems in other parts of Jakarta are simply being diverted towards Cilincing (Jakarta Post, 9 January 2010). If their claims prove to be true in the coming years, it is another sign of a poor region in Jakarta Utara being affected the most during a flooding event.
Figure'13:'Flooded'channel'in'the'Cempaka'Mas'area,'Kelapa'Gading,' Jakarta'Utara'(Bialoglowy,'2007).
4.3 A New Type of Flooding in Jakarta Utara
Due to the wet season, January and February are usually the months when Jakarta Utara experiences extreme flooding events (Brinkman & Hartman, 2008). Moderate flooding, however, occurs regularly throughout the year, stalling traffic, damaging houses and disrupting the flow of business. Even a slight drizzle can drastically reduce vehicle mobility resulting in hours of traffic (Baker, 2012). In November 2007, a new type of flooding affected Jakarta Utara. On several locations along Jakarta Utara’s coastline, a high tide over-topped the sea wall causing high waters up to 1.5m for several days across Jakarta Utara without any rainfall occurring (NCICD, 2014). Most damage was done in Penjaringan where the 2.2m high tides caused heavy traffic congestions on airport toll roads and cancelled several flights at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (Brinkman & Hartman, 2008). The over-topping of the sea wall confirmed what some researchers had been warning for: Jakarta Utara is subsiding at an average rate of 7.5cm a year (NCICD, 2014). Coastal defences for the protection against flooding from the sea are subsiding further and further into the sea. High tides in combination with land subsidence cause yet another flooding problem for the Jakarta Utara region. This new type of flooding is largely unique to Jakarta Utara as most of its territory lies below sea level (Firman et al., 2011).
Maximum spring tides levels vary over time. This is caused by the fact that the moon’s orbit around the sun is elliptical. As a result, the distance between the moon and the earth changes from one month to the next. It takes 18.6 years for this cycle to repeat itself (Brinkman & Hartman, 2008). Clearly in November 2007 this cycle was at its peak. This periodicity of 18-19 years can clearly be seen in figure 14.
Tidal Water Level 1920-2020
The elliptical orbit of the moon and the resulting peak tide is a natural occurrence. Land subsidence on the other hand is influenced partly by humans. The main factors causing land subsidence in Jakarta Utara are: excessive ground water Figure'14:'A'graph'showing'the'tidal'water'level'over'a'100Oyear'period.'The'tidal' constituents'of'Tanjung'Priok'were'used'(Brinkman'&'Hartman,'2008).'
!
extraction, load of building and constructions, natural consolidation of alluvium soil and tectonic activities (Abidin et al., 2009). Excessive ground water extraction is the main concern here as increased population and economic growth have led to increased construction and hence increased water need, as most new buildings use ground water access as source for their drinking water instead of being connected to the general water grid. In Jakarta Utara unfortunately, most water consumption is fulfilled by ground water extraction (Abidin et al., 2009). When water is extracted from beneath the earth it deepens the piezometric water level inside the middle and lower aquifers. This causes the land above it to subside (Abidin et al, 2009). Figure 15 shows the level of land subsidence in the DKI Jakarta. It is clear that the further north, the larger the subsidence is.
Land Subsidence DKI Jakarta 2002-2005
!
Figure'15:'A'map'showing'the'level'of'land'subsidence'in'the'DKI'Jakarta'between' 2002'and'2005'(Brinkman'&'Hartman,'2008).'
After the flooding event in November 2007, the existing sea wall was reinforced, but due to the staggering subsiding rates this sea wall is already at a critically low level. If a storm or severe high tide were to occur, the sea wall will not be able to hold back the water any longer (NCICD, 2014). Land subsidence will also cause drainage problems during the wet season, damage to buildings and more saline ground water. This is detrimental to those who depend on ground water for their daily water supply (Abidin et al., 2009). Up to 4 million people and 25% of the DKI Jakarta will be affected by flooding from the sea within the next 15 years if no action it taken
according to Brinkman & Hartman (2008). In figure 16 a future scenario is illustrated regarding land subsidence and tide levels. The flooding event of November 2007 is pictured in the middle. Between November 2007 and November 2025 the land in Jakarta Utara is expected to subside at least 50cm (this is a rather conservative estimate). In November 2025 the next peak of the cycle will occur resulting in a maximum spring tide that will rise 80-100cm above the current sea wall, causing disastrous flooding in Jakarta Utara (Brinkman & Hartman, 2008). Sea level rise due to climate change is also taken into consideration.
4.4 Social Resilience to the Flooding Problem in Jakarta Utara
The Government of the DKI Jakarta sees the poor communities partly responsible for the flooding problem in Jakarta Utara. The poor communities contribute to the poor drainage of continental waters to the sea by throwing their waste into the river, causing widespread clogging of the water canals and rivers. Although these poor communities may seem to worsen the magnitude of the flooding problem, they are also the most effected by it. Poor and rich communities are usually both affected by a flooding event. The big difference, however, between the two is the resilience, or coping capacity, of its inhabitant. Poor people in Jakarta Utara are more heavily impacted than the higher income groups. This is mainly due to the fact that poor people occupy poorly built houses situated along flood-prone location such as riversides, have their economic activities out on the street and have insufficient Figure'16:'A'illustration'showing'the'severity'of'the'flooding'problem'from'the'sea' for'Jakarta'Utara'in'a'“business'as'usual”'scenario'(Brinkman'&'Hartman,'2008).'
!
Duration
Water+depth+(cm) <"1"day
1"'"3"days
3"'"7"days
>"7"days
10"'"50
Normal
Normal
Disturbing"but"
still"manageable
Disturbing"but"
still"manageable
51"'"100
Normal
Disturbing"but"
still"manageable
Disturbing"but"
still"manageable
Unmanageable
101"'"200
Disturbing"but"
still"manageable
Disturbing"but"
still"manageable
Unmanageable Unmanageable
201"'"300
Unmanageable Disastrous
>"300
Disastrous
financial reserves to deal with the damage and losses caused by the flooding (Wagemaker et al., 2011). However, with nowhere else to go, poor people in frequently flooded areas consider the flood a routine event rather than a disaster and adapt their lives to “live with the flood” (Wagemaker et al., 2011). This resilient attitude is linked with the characteristics of the severity of the flooding event itself. In a small survey, 87 inhabitants of the Kampung Melayu were asked about their perception on flood intensity (see figure 17). A flood only becomes “unmanageable” when its depth is more than one meter deep and stays for 3-7 days or more.
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Figure'17:'Community’s'perception'on'flood'intensity'(Wagemaker'et'al.,'2011–' modified'for'own'use).'' !
! Another factor contributing to the “live with the flood” attitude is that people from poor communities in Jakarta Utara face many other risks and dangers in their daily lives. Flooding is a seasonal phenomenon and they do not consider this the main danger. Instead economic, social and political risks are of greater importance (Texier, 2008). Considering that most of the people in poor communities have their means of production at home (little or no use of banking systems), they have to take the risk losing their means of production in a flooding event. Furthermore it is much cheaper for poor communities to settle in flood-prone areas than anywhere else. They have chosen to accept the danger the floods pose to their daily lives (Texier, 2008). From a political point of view, most people from poor communities are forced to stay due to their illegal status. Most people from poor communities do not have any Jakartanese ID. As a result, poor communities have very limited access to resources and public services. Illegal inhabitants, for example, are often deprived of any official waste management system, resulting in mass dumping of their waste into the river. If they
were not to get rid of the waste, outbreaks of leptospirosis and bird flu could potentially occur as a result of vermin and pest proliferation (Texier, 2008).
In summary, the vulnerability of people in poor communities in Jakarta Utara is mostly a result of social and economically related factors. Using the theory of social resilience, the social resilience of poor communities within Jakarta Utara is exposed to shock brought about by economic strife, environmental changes and governmental policies (Firman et al, 2011). Poor communities are far more vulnerable than rich communities. This vulnerable group becomes even poorer if there are great changes in the environment in which they live in. Both of the DKI Jakarta’s Kelurahan’s with the highest concentration of poor households are located in Jakarta Utara (see figure 18). These two “Kelurahan’s” (sub sub-districts) are located in the Penjaringan (Penjaringan) and Cilincing (Kalibaru). Land subsidence, sea level rise and the outflow of several rivers make these two localities one of the most flood-prone locations in the whole of the DKI Jakarta. Any external shock such as a natural or non-natural disaster and the communities within those localities will most likely be the first to suffer (Firman et al., 2011).
Poor Households per Kelurahan DKI Jakarta
Figure'18:'It'is'clear'that'Jakarta'Utara'holds'the'largest'proportion'of'poor'households.'The' Kelurahan’s'in'Penjaringan'and'Cilincing'are'the'poorest'of'them'all'(circled'in'yellow)'(Firman'et' al.,'2011).'''
!
5. Dutch Mitigation Strategies
From the previous chapter, it is clear that Jakarta Utara needs to strengthen its resilience against flooding in the future. This chapter will put emphasis on the Dutch mitigation strategies that have been proposed to protect Jakarta Utara and the rest of the DKI Jakarta from flooding. Attention is first turned towards the Dutch historical know-how about water management and dredging related projects. The NCICD initiative will be at the heart of the next section and will form the majority of this chapter. Lastly, some critical remarks will be made relating to the NCICD initiative.
5.1 The Dutch Approach
The Netherlands have a long history in protecting themselves against the sea and other water related problems, as almost a third of the country is located below sea level (Van Koningveld et al., 2008). Dike constructions in the Netherlands already begun in 1000 AD. Structural measures were historically used to reduce the probability of flooding (Ward et al., 2013). During colonial times in the Dutch East Indies, many canals were dug in Batavia (Dutch colonial name for Jakarta) to ease the flooding problem. A huge dam was built in 1725 to divert waters from the Ciliwung River westwards through the Western Canal (Ward et al., 2013). More recently, the devastating flooding of Zeeland in the Netherlands in 1953 triggered the construction of the Delta Works, which is a series of sluices, levees, dams and storm surge barriers connecting the islands of Zeeland and South Holland (Van Koningsveld et al., 2008). After the 1993 and 1995 Meuse floods, however, the Netherlands oriented its flood risk management more towards spatial planning by “giving room to the river and sea” (Ward et al., 2013).
The Dutch expertise in water management has been implemented in many complex challenges around the world to overcome the threats of flooding and after effects of natural disasters. After the enormous amounts of economic damage caused by hurricane Katrina in 2005, New Orleans sought advises from the Dutch water companies Arcadis & Royal Haskoning on how to redesign and strengthen their levee system to protect New Orleans against future flooding (Royal Haskoning, 2011). Even more recently in 2013, Arcadis was asked by the New York Government to deliver a feasibility study on a huge land reclamation project in the East River. This “Seaport City-project” intends to protect New York City against future flooding as well as providing more housing accommodation for New York City’s citizens (Volkskrant, 3October 2013).
Besides water management, the Dutch are also highly experienced in dredging. The Dutch dredging company Van Oord, for example, is responsible for a huge land reclamation project off the coast of Dubai. 300 islands will be reclaimed
through land reclamation, that together will represent the world map. More than 300 million cubic metres of sand will be needed for this project (Müller, 2005). Between 2001 and 2003, Van Oord also reclaimed land for the neighbouring Palm Jumeirah project (Müller, 2005). Another example is the dredging of a new access channel to the harbour of Bronka near St Petersburg. The Dutch dredging company Boskalis received an order worth 130 million euro’s in September 2013 to dredge a six kilometre long channel containing a turning basin and several moorings (NOS, 2013).
5.2 The NCICD Initiative
The NCICD initiative aims to provide a solution for the long-term protection of the DKI Jakarta against flooding from the sea. By means of a giant sea wall (the Great Garuda), the project also intends to solve the current connectivity problems in West-Java, address many of the current environmental problems and create urban space for development and housing accommodation (see figure 19) (NCICD, 2014). The NCICD program is designed to protect the whole of the DKI Jakarta, but Jakarta Utara will be the Kota that will most likely benefit the most from this project, since all proposed offshore development projects are along the coastline bordering Jakarta Utara. The project is the result of the long-term cooperation between the governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands in the field of water management. The government of the Netherlands financed the initial proposal, while The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs acted as the executing agency. The Dutch consultancy firms that have been working on the details of this plan are Grontmij, Witteveen+Bos, Deltares, Kuiper & Compagnons and Ecorys (Dutch Water Sector, 2014). If the project is given the go ahead, the construction will last approximately 20 years for an estimated cost of more than 40 billion US dollars (Indonesia Investments, 2014).
5.2.1 Urgent Matters
The flooding problems in Jakarta Utara are currently so severe that short-term actions are highly necessary in order to make the NCICD program a success. Firstly, the current sea and river defences have to be strengthened and heightened by at least 1.5m to avoid overtopping. These measures are especially needed in the Kecamatan’s of Penjaringan and Pademangan. Secondly, land subsidence has to be slowed down. As was mentioned before, land subsidence in recent times is largely caused by excessive ground water extraction. To tackle this, ground water extraction should be stopped and replaced by piped water supplies. If nothing is done to stop land subsidence, solutions to tackle the flooding problems in Jakarta Utara will become difficult and expensive. Thirdly, the improvement of Jakarta Utara’s water quality is essential. Due to pollution by organic materials and human waste, the current rivers in Jakarta Utara are low in oxygen and high in heavy metals, creating toxic conditions for both aquatic life and humans. Improving the water quality is crucial in creating an attractive, viable and healthy waterfront for Jakarta Utara (NCICD, 2014).
Fi gu re '1 9 :'A n 'illu st ra ti on 'o f't he 'N CI CD 'in it ia ti ve '(N CI CD ,'2 0
form of a bird, the Garuda. Garuda is the Indonesian word for eagle and it is the national symbol of Indonesia. In the eyes of the developers of the NCICD initiative “the great bird will spread its wings to protect Jakarta”. The plan is to reclaim the tail and sell the land first, in order to generate income from real estate. This is followed by the creation of the outer sea wall accompanied by the head, core and wings of the Great Garuda. In total an area of 1.250ha will be created for infrastructure and urban development (NCICD, 2014).
The tail section of the Great Garuda will consist mainly of residential buildings as well as sport, leisure and entertainment facilities. Due to the proximity of the current city of the DKI Jakarta, the tail section will also be used as the focal point for road traffic and public transport. To the south of the tail section, two islands will be reclaimed where innovative architectural design and business creativity will play a prominent role (LCEM, 2014). The core section and the head of the Great Garuda will form the central business district (CBD). The core section will comprise of commercial developments with retail, leisure, cultural and entertainment components. On the ground floor each commercial tower will boast an array of publicly accessible function, such as restaurants and shops. All floors above the ground floor will consist of offices and residential apartments. The head will the most visual part of the whole Great Garuda since it is surrounded by water on all sides. It should therefore become the strongest image of the Great Garuda waterfront by showcasing the cultural heritage of Indonesia and Jakarta where each citizen feels special and proud of (LCEM, 2014). Lastly, the wings of the Great Garuda will provide housing accommodation for citizens and infrastructure for the local fishing communities. The Garuda Wing Park Neighbourhoods will be primarily residential area where greenery is a dominant feature. Along the wing tips of the Great Garuda new fishing ports and communities will be built to provide the traditional fishing communities of Jakarta Utara with income. There is also the possibility of harvesting fish in the newly created waduk (LCEM, 2014).
Due to DKI Jakarta’s current lack of urban greenery, the Great Garuda will incorporate green-spaces into its spatial planning. A study by Vreke et al. (2006) shows that the proximity of greenery contributes significantly to the mental health and productivity of a population, as well as the attractiveness of the CBD. Green-spaces in the Great Garuda include a large city level park, urban block parks, mangroves, wetlands and nature reserves (NCICD, 2014).
!
5.2.3 Water Management
Once the outer sea wall is built, a large lake (waduk) will be created in the Jakarta Bay area. Drainage waters from 7 of Jakarta’s rivers will flow into the lake that has to be pumped when the maximum storage capacity of the wakuk is reached (see figure 20. The location of the outer sea wall is primarily determined by the required storage capacity of the large waduk, but it is estimated the retention basin of the waduk will be around 75km2 (NWPM, 2014). The waduk will offer a considerable amount of storage space as the water level can fluctuate up to 2.5m. When excess water enters the waduk, the pumping will have to be performed by the world’s largest pumping station that will have to pump 730m3 per second (NCICD, 2014). Besides flood safety, the waduk will also create space for land reclamation and storage capacity for bulk water supply for Jakarta Utara. Combining bulk water supplies with other water sources (for example the sustainable use of ground water), the waduk can provide Jakarta Utara and all the reclaimed land of the Great Garuda with year round piped water. All wastewater and runoff from roads in the Great Garuda will be collected and treated. Besides that, rainwater will be funnelled to parks, green zones and mangrove areas until it eventually reaches the waduk or sea (NWPM, 2014).
Separate from the NCICD program, the newspaper article by Ali (2010) suggests two other steps that Jakarta Utara could take to solve the water resource problems. Firstly, encouraging the private business to carry out their domestic wastewater treatment. Secondly, restoring all existing water bodies for source of domestic water supply.
5.2.4 Social-Economical Aspects and Housing
Economic damage caused by flooding will be eliminated when Jakarta Utara protects itself against future flooding. The social-economic conditions for people living along the coastline will then also drastically improve. By the year 2020, about 935.000 working spaces across the DKI Jakarta will directly be saved from flooding (NCICD, 2014). Furthermore, land reclamation for the NCICD program alone will create an additional 550.000 jobs. The fishing communities in Jakarta Utara, however, have to adjust to a changed environment if the NCICD program is given the go ahead. The Great Garuda sea wall will block direct access to the fishing ports and saltwater aquaculture will disappear in the newly created fresh water waduk. As was mentioned before, however, fishing ports will be created on the wingtips of the Great Garuda to allow fishermen to continue their commercial ventures (LCEM, 2014).
On the housing front, the NCICD program wants to create a social mix of lower, middle and upper-class residential areas (see figure 21). High-end apartments are mostly located inside the CBD, while the high-class residential areas are located on the southern sides of the two wings. Other neighbourhoods on the Great Garuda are a mix between middle-class and low-class residential areas. The low-class residential areas are located near the fishing communities on the wings tips, while the middle-class residential areas cover the remaining areas of the wings of the Great Garuda (NWPM, 2014).
!
5.2.5 Mobility and Infrastructure
Currently, the DKI Jakarta is experiencing major traffic congestions due to the significantly increased car and motorcycle ownership. The urban transport systems in Jakarta have not kept up with the demand. According to Arditya (2011), there are more motorized vehicles in the DKI Jakarta than people: 11.3 million motorized vehicles compared to the city’s population of 9.5 million. Therefore the NCICD program will incorporate efficient transport infrastructure into the Great Garuda to reduce traffic congestion. Firstly, the outer sea wall will be used as a completion of the outer ring road of the DKI Jakarta. The Northern section of the ring road will also be used for the Tangerang-Bekasi Highway that will connect the province of Banten and East Java. Furthermore, the tail section of the Great Garuda will be connected by a highway to Jakarta Utara. All highways in the Great Garuda will function as toll-roads (LCEM, 2014). Secondly, the NCICD program will strongly contribute to a transport modality shift: from cars and motorcycles to use of public transportation. This is only made possible if the transport system is efficient and widespread. Therefore, a light rail train (MRT) will connect the CBD on the Great Garuda to the rest of the DKI Jakarta. Additionally, a high-speed train connection between Cilegon and Banyuwangi by the Indonesian Government is proposed, which would be able to operate parallel to the Tangerang-Bekasi Highway (NCICD, 2014). Bus routes along the main roads in combination with the MRT will form the majority of public transport in the Great Garuda. The busses will operate on special car-free lanes to make the system efficient. The idea of car-free bus lanes has already been successfully implemented by the Trans-Jakarta bus system in the DKI Jakarta, especially in Jakarta Utara and Jakarta Pusat (Tambun, 2012).
The NCICD program also takes into account the developments of the seaport in Tanjung Priok and a proposed relocation of Soekarno-Hatta International Airport. Although the expansion plans by the DKI Jakarta for the seaport of Tanjung Priok is an autonomous development outside the scope of the NCICD program, the project will prioritize an open connection to the sea for the seaport. The Tangerang-Bekasi Highway Bridge will therefore have a 70-meter clearance to provide large containerships with access to the sea (NCICD, 2014). The DKI Jakarta is also considering building a brand new international airport, as the existing Soekarno-Hatta International Airport is already experiencing a shortage of capacity. The DKI Jakarta has reserved a special area in the eastern part of Jakarta Bay for this purpose (Natahadibrata, 2014).
5.3 Critique
Although the project described above looks convincing and well-thought through, there are a few critical remarks that have to be mentioned. Firstly, all mangrove forest in and around the proposed NCICD program will become subject to the influx of fresh
water from the newly created waduk. This will accelerate the degradation of the mangrove forests as it is made impossible for mangroves to compete with less saline tolerant species (LCEM, 2014). Another problem with the newly created fresh water waduk is that it will lead to the disappearance of all marine species considering their reliance on salt water. Larger reef fish and pelagic fish species will start to migrate elsewhere to better suited habitats (NCICD, 2014). Secondly, an article by Simamora (2007) claims that buildings higher than six floors in Jakarta Pusat caused land subsidence by 22 and 75cm over a two-year period. He argues that this might be the same case if high-rise buildings are built on the Great Garuda. Thirdly, there is a possibility that the sand reserves in the proximity of the DKI Jakarta might not be enough for the 300 million m3 is needed for the NCICD program. Transporting sand from distant sources will raise the total costs of the project considerably (NCICD, 2014). Lastly, the lengthy 20-year duration of the NCICD program might be subject to delays and decreased financial return. A slow down in economic growth during that period will impact the speed of the realisation of the NCICD program. A slow down in economic growth will also result in decreased financial return due to the falling demand for real estate (especially offices) (NWPM, 2014).
!
6. Discussion
The NCICD program might be the answer to Jakarta Utara’s flooding problems, but realising such a large-scale development project in Indonesia is a challenge on its own. Attention is first turned towards the effects of decentralisation policies in Indonesia on the NCICD program. The following section will discuss the various financial implication of the NCICD program. The last section will bring forward the importance of resilience building for the urban poor of Jakarta Utara and how this will integrate within the NCICD program.
6.1 Decentralisation in Indonesia
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the fall of the strongly centralized regime of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia underwent a process of large-scale decentralization, transferring various responsibilities to regional and local governments (Silver et al., 2001). One of the main reasons behind this was to ease tensions, quite the complaints and satisfy the political forces of the all the 34 provinces of Indonesia, particularly the provinces of Aceh and Papua (Matsui, 2003). This process has ensured that local governments are largely responsible for local matters such as sanitation and flood protection. Most local governments, however, lack the resources and technical expertise to deal with these issues (IDRC, 2007). This is definitely the case in Jakarta Utara and the DKI Jakarta in general. Moreover, there is little enforcement of well-meaning laws to create a safer and more secure society. Commitment by local governments appears to be lacking, despite all political rhetoric and promises. It seems that to a certain degree that local governments display a high level of self-centered behavior, going after narrow regional interests (Baker, 2007). Many flood mitigation programs by different research institutions in Jakarta Utara are also severely fragmented with virtually no integration in risk assessments among these research institutions (Firman et al., 2011).
The decentralized governance structure in Indonesia makes it tough for large-scale programs like the NCICD program to become reality. In order to make the NCICD program a success, all governmental institutions need to collaborate together on effective and sufficient efforts to deal with the flooding problems in Jakarta Utara. There should be widespread stakeholder engagement, resulting in one cohesive vision to tackle to flooding problems from which Jakarta Utara and the whole of the DKI Jakarta would benefit. Furthermore, the Indonesian National Police should stand strong and make sure that certain laws by local and national governments are enforced.
6.2 Financial Aspects of the NCICD Initiative
Financing the NCICD program with revenues generated through urban development and other sources of revenue, preferably by the private sector, is one of the project principles. The main benefits and revenues that will be generated through the realisation of the NCICD program are flood protection, transport, land reclamation and port development (NWPM, 2014). Flood protection increases safety, which in turn leads to higher property, profit and income taxes for the government. Transportation generates income through toll-revenues and the selling of MRT-tickets. Land reclamation will generate income through the sale of land and built property. Lastly, the development of the port will generate revenue though the sale of developed land and increased ship call duties (NWPM, 2014).
However, the sheer size of the NCICD program and its many dependencies makes the structure of this project complex and the financing challenging. Indonesia has a fairly low debt to GDP ratio (Gross Domestic Product) of about 30%, so in theory, the Indonesian Government would be able to self-finance part or even the large majority of the NCICD program (Personal interview, A. van Dorssen, 2014). Bank Indonesia (BI), however, is running a very careful and conservative monetary policy. The Indonesian Government and Bank Indonesia have so far not prioritised the NCICD program high enough on the agenda to change that policy, so they have left a large majority of the financing of infrastructure investments to the private sector. The private sector on the other hand, is very reluctant to invest in infrastructure projects in Indonesia, because the Indonesian government does not want to give any guarantees. Furthermore, the regulations in Indonesia change a lot and also the court system is very weak, making it difficult to enforce certain claims, should they arise, through courts. Therefore, there is a big backlog in infrastructure investment of approximately 400 billion US dollars that should have taken place since Suharto left in 1998 (Personal interview, A. van Dorssen, 2014).
Currently, there are a number of export agencies and sovereign funds from South Korea and Japan who want to provide soft loans to Indonesia. However, these funds expect in return that the Korean and Japanese companies get their fair share of the construction of the NCICD program. Therefore the overall funding of the NCICD program is best undertaken in phases, whereby each phase will need to attract investors and lenders, who are likely to demand a careful balance between the funds provided and the share of the construction involvement of their companies (Personal interview, A. van Dorssen, 2014). Another reason why financial institutions are currently reluctant to lend money towards the NCICD program is the current uncertain political environment. On the 9th of July 2014 Indonesia will hold new presidential elections. Any major decision on the implementation of the NCICD program will be left to the new government. Current major of the DKI Jakarta, Joko Widodo, is up against the businessmen Prabowo Subianto who previously held
