The blurred cContinuum of technocracy and democracy : utilising Foucauldian Governmentality techniques to re-examine the Eurozone crisis response mechanisms and their democratic accountability

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The Blurred Continuum of

Technocracy and Democracy

Utilising Foucauldian Governmentality techniques to re-examine

the Eurozone crisis response mechanisms and their democratic

accountability

Andreas Cosma

Supervisor: Dr. Julien Jeandesboz

Second Reader: Dr. Stephanie Simon

Master Thesis Political Science: European Union in a Global Order

University of Amsterdam

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Student Information

Name: Andreas Cosma Student Number: 10599959

Email Address: andreas.cosma@outlook.com Degree Programme: MSc Political Science

Specialisation: European Union in a Global Order Research Project: Europe, Boundaries, Orders

Supervisor: Dr. Julien Jeandesboz Second Reader: Dr. Stephanie Simon

Word Count: 17,181

Submission Date: 15/07/2015

Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank Dr. Julien Jeandesboz for his comments, advice and guidance throughout the process of researching and writing this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Stephanie Simon for reading my thesis. Finally I would like to thank my family for their love and support throughout these last few months.

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List of Abbreviations:

 ECB – European Central Bank  EC – European Commission

 EFSF – European Financial Stability Facility  EMU – European Monetary Union

 EP – European Parliament  EU – European Union

 ESM – European Stability Mechanism  IMF – International Monetary Fund  IPE – International Political Economy  GDP – Gross Domestic Product

 OMT – Outright Monetary Transactions  MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

 TSCG – Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU (also referred to as the Fiscal Compact)

Abstract

:

The measures taken to combat the Eurozone crisis and the role played by the troika of IMF, ECB and European Commission have raised a number of concerns over the perceived technocratisation of European economic

governance, at the expense of democratic accountability. This thesis considers debates over democratic accountability by utilising Foucauldian tools of

governmentality combined with a genealogical approach to re-examine the altering institutional landscape of Eurozone governance and the particular rationalities and mentalities present at the meeting point of democracy and technocracy.

Key Words:

Eurozone Crisis; Democratic Accountability; Troika; Parliamentary Inquiries; Governmentality; Genealogy; Foucault.

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Ch. 1 - Introduction

“The more decision-making over economic issues moves to the European level, the more democracy needs to move with it.

This is not just because democracy is a core value of the EU. It is because making policy without adequate representation and accountability does not work. So we need to deepen our economic union and our political union together. And this means strengthening the channels for genuine European

democratic legitimacy, like the European Parliament.

Inevitably European democracy will be different. Voters in any one country may initially fear that they have less influence over decisions than at present. But it is

my belief and certainly what has happened in the monetary policy area that in giving up some formal sovereignty, people will gain in effective sovereignty.”

Mario Draghi speech at the inauguration of the new European Central Bank (ECB) Headquarters in Frankfurt (18th March 2015)

---

"They want capitalism without democracy, we want democracy without capitalism"

Blockupy Protest Rallying Call in Frankfurt – (18th

March 2015) (Emphasis my own)

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The above two quotes, one an excerpt from Mario Draghi’s speech

inaugurating the new European Central Bank headquarters in Frankfurt, and the other the rallying call for the Blockupy protests taking place outside the building represent the very dichotomy which this thesis shall examine. The thousands of protestors that gathered in Frankfurt were largely formed by left wing

movements from Germany and other parts of Europe, bolstered by the electoral success of parties in the South of Europe opposing the austerity measures forced on the region, like SYRIZA in Greece and PODEMOS in Spain. The rise of these parties and the popularity of the protests reflect an increasing number of people’s concern over the focus placed on austerity in the Eurozone crisis response and the growth of a view that the measures taken have lacked accountability to the people of Europe. In contrast to this in Mario Draghi’s speech one can see a view found in the outward facing statements of the troika of IMF, ECB and European Commission. According to this claim, while there have been alterations in European economic governance since the crisis that involve some surrendering of sovereignty by the Eurozone member states, the movement of democracy to the European level along with decision making will result in more ‘effective sovereignty’. Draghi’s view is one that presents further integration of the Eurozone economies as integral to ensuring Europe does not return to its “dark history” (Draghi, 2015) and to avoiding the perils of half measures with the ERM crisis of the early 1990’s seen as a lesson from which “countries realised they could not integrate in part and benefit in full” (idem.). Such a view would contend that the altered institutional architecture of the Eurozone has been a result of flaws exposed by the Eurozone crisis, and will allow for the development of accountability at the European level eventually through channels like the European Parliament.

The financial crisis of 2007-08 and the sovereign debt crisis that developed in the years that followed have led to a number of reforms in European Economic Governance, particularly for the Eurozone states. The development of the temporary European Financial Stability Facility and

European Financial Stability Mechanism presented a shift away from previous policies resisting the possibility of bailing out ailing economies based on Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. This shift was further

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emphasized by the creation of the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with headquarters in Luxembourg and the establishment in the

intergovernmental Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance in the European Monetary Union (TSCG) of a stricter approach to rules on fiscal policy providing evidence of a further move towards fiscal integration. The changes that have occurred in the Eurozone have also redefined and created new concerns over the democratic legitimacy and accountability of these measures both socially and in academia, with Rittberger’s recognition that “the

precariousness of the ESM’s and Troika’s social legitimacy is reflected in the rampant criticism faced by the latter in the public and media (and which is restricted not only to the debtor countries)” (Rittberger, 2014: 1181) an

acknowledgment of this trend. As well as being illustrated by the number of anti-austerity protests staged in various EU member states this trend can be seen the success of extremist and Eurosceptic parties in 2014’s European Parliament elections that has even led to the creation of the Europe of Nations and

Freedom parliamentary group, noted for being the second Eurosceptic grouping within the EP and for the strong belief of its members that decision making should mainly be refocused on the national level.

From proclamations of the Eurozone being ‘saved’ by the European Central Bank’s announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions

Programme to renewed doubts over its ability to withstand a potential exit by Greece following impasses in talks over the Greek debt, it is clear that there is no obstacle-free path towards achieving pre-crisis growth levels and easing the social unrest in the Eurozone. Considering the developing academic and

societal debates surrounding the measures taken in response to the Eurozone crisis have often focused on the rising influence of technocratic structures and individuals and the effect this has on democratic accountability, I believe it is important to examine the points at which democratically elected actors interact with technocratic actors and consider the particular rationalities and

understandings of democracy that come about at these points. This thesis therefore aims to ask to what extent the measures taken in response to the

Eurozone crisis reflect a technocratisation of European Economic Governance and how does this become challenged by arguments for more democratic

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accountability in (European) Parliamentary enquiries. In order to do so this

research employs Foucauldian notions of genealogy and governmentality to query the particular rationalities and political imaginations these measures are built on and convey. In addition to this the thesis aims to further delimit and question the ongoing discussions over democratic accountability of these measures and technocratisation of Eurozone governance by examining the ‘meeting point’ of technocracy and democracy. This meeting point is examined through an inquiry held by the European Parliament that resulted in two

resolutions being adopted, one on the role and operations of the troika since the crisis and the other on the employment and social aspects of this role.

Furthermore an enquiry by the British House of Lords into the actions of the troika and developments since the crisis will also be used to illustrate

differences in the way this debate is presented and understood at the national level. The focus here will be on how debates over Eurozone governance since the crisis and its democratic accountability are expressed and reflected in the inquiries, with both the role of the European Parliament as a democratically elected body representing the citizens of Europe and the growth in the factions of Eurosceptic MEP’s, both from the political left and right, after the latest elections likely to make this ‘meeting point’ even more relevant to the wider debate. Mario Draghi’s association of the achievement of more ‘effective

sovereignty’ and ‘democratic legitimacy’ with the strengthening of the European Parliament certainly seems to suggest that the new mechanisms will open up new spaces for contestation of influence by the European Parliament and other democratically accountable actors, and in examining the inquiries into the Troika the way that this claim is reflected in the statements of the

parliamentarians will be examined as well as the response of the troika institutions representatives to such contestation.

In order to consider how debates over European democratic

accountability and the technocratisation of European Economic Governance have taken this prominent role in academic circles and public debate we must first examine the measures themselves. It is important therefore for this thesis to consider to what extent the measures taken to overcome the Eurozone crisis reflect this perceived technocratisation. In keeping with the lines of Foucauldian

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analysis, questioning the particular rationalities and political imaginations reflected in the language of these measures can prove a useful exercise in furthering our understanding of the nature of these measures and how they came to develop in the way they did. This examination will illustrate the main argument of this research which is that these developments represent a discursive privileging of one particular solution to the Eurozone crisis, and in turn one particular way to run current and future Eurozone economy that raises new and rewrites existing concerns about the troika, the EU and the Eurozone’s democratic accountability which in turn become intertwined with particular conceptions of how a ‘democratic’ EU or Eurozone should be.

In terms of academic contribution, this thesis aims not only to contribute to the spread of inquiries informed by the Foucauldian concepts of genealogy and governmentality to new areas but also to question some of the academic debates over democratic accountability in Europe and illustrate issues with their assumptions and focus. In more specific terms the thesis aims to contribute to the research agenda prevalent in the work of Haahr and Walters on

approaching discourse in European Integration using Foucauldian insights as tools and a continuation of the ideas promoted by Walters regarding the importance of combing the use of concepts of governmentality with a

genealogical sensibility (see Walters, 2012, Ch.4). The academic relevance, as well as the societal relevance of this research and its findings will likely be more significant depending on the outcome of the current impasse regarding Greek debt restructuring and the renewal of a bailout programme in Greece. Should the fears of a Greek exit from the Eurozone be realised, the attitudes of the programmes and institutions considered in this thesis are likely to be seen as a factor in defining the Greek and European position and the events of the period leading up to such an exit would be put under significantly more scrutiny and consideration, rendering scholarly work of the type present in this thesis as even more relevant and important.

The thesis is structured in three parts. The first part that includes the two following chapters introduces the theoretical debates and methodological concerns that both frame the research present in the thesis, and outline the

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approach taken in performing the research. Following this is a chapter focusing on examining the rationalities and mentalities of specific measures taken in response to the Eurozone crisis as part of a genealogical approach. The next chapter focuses on examining the discourses prevalent in Parliamentary

enquiries into the troika using insights from Foucauldian governmentality. In the final part of the thesis some concluding remarks will be offered related to the findings of the two previous chapters along with reflections on the way the research was performed and relations between these findings and the prevalent theoretical debates discussed in chapter 2.

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Ch. 2 - Democratic accountability,

legitimacy, and the Eurozone crisis

As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the financial crisis that has taken place in Europe and the institutional developments and interactions that have developed in response to it have become not only a central concern in the media, but have played a large part in the development of Eurosceptic

movements both on the right and left of national and European politics. Many of these movements have focused their criticism on a perceived lack of

accountability for the measures adopted in response to the crisis and those who put them in place. This chapter will examine the debates that have developed focusing on issues of democratic accountability and the EU, particularly since the crisis, and clarify the theoretical outlook and underpinnings of the empirical analysis present in the later chapters of this thesis. Establishing a theoretical basis for how the issue of democratic accountability of EU measures, and in particular in measures associated with economic governance has been discussed allows for the questioning of the foundations involved in these different understandings as well as the establishment of what an approach rooted in Foucauldian governmentality techniques can help to add to or illustrate in the debate.

The Eurozone crisis and the development of the troika as a supervisory mechanism for widely unpopular regimes of austerity have added fuel to existing discussions of a democratic deficit in the European Union. Debates around European Integration have, particularly in the last two decades, increasingly involved the idea of the European Union experiencing a

‘democratic deficit’. From arguments of the Danish referendum of 1992 rejecting the Maastricht treaty representing a threat to the legitimacy of the European Community and a distance developing between Brussels and the ordinary citizens (Featherstone, 1994; Obradovic, 1996) to criticisms focused on the institutional architecture of the EU and how reform could increase its

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they understand and confront the causes and effects of this perceived ‘deficit’. Furthermore, the nature of the troika as an institutional arrangement involving organisations whose own accountability in their individual practices has been part of the debate over democratic accountability at the European level prior to the crisis only serves to further complicate such questions.

2.1 European Integration Theories and the Democratic Deficit

The following sections will examine the main scholarly debates that exist in work surrounding European democratic accountability. As mentioned in the introduction this thesis will aim to address the topic of democracy and

accountability in the Eurozone crisis responses in an alternative way to many of these approaches, viewing it in terms of certain democratic problematizations that in turn create specific perceptions and understandings of what ‘Europe’, the ‘EU’ and in particular ‘democracy’ at this level represent to the individual

discussing them. By examining these different problematizations together and illustrating how they become reflected and shape attitudes in parliamentary enquiries on the response to the Eurozone crisis, the analysis present in this thesis will aim to delimit the discussions over these responses and their impact on issues of democratic accountability in the EU.

2.1.1 - Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

As the two classical theories of European Integration Studies, Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism represent for many a starting point in understanding both how the European Union developed in a certain way and also the issues that have come about during the process. Although recognised as no longer central to debates on European integration in the way they have been in the past (Ioannou et al, 2015: 164) the “old rivals” of European Integration Theory (idem.) are still considered by many as “important reference points in a theoretical understanding of the EU” (idem. ; Mattli and Stone Sweet, 2012). By examining the way that Neofunctionalist and Liberal Intergovernmentalist scholars, as well as those of the various schools of thought present in this chapter, interact with and understand the concept of democratic

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accountability, I will illustrate the various intricacies and conceptions that have developed in examinations of European democratic accountability, particularly since the crisis, in order to then demonstrate the boundaries and unclear nature of this debate.

Neofunctionalism’s reliance on mechanisms of spillover where close coordination between Member States in one policy area would encourage the integration of other areas of policy as key to understanding the dynamics of European Integration has been described as a weakness when it comes to understanding the “limits imposed on integration, like the absence of a fully-fledged fiscal union” (Ioannou et al, 2015: 165) (Ioannou and Niemann

2015:213). Criticisms of the approach are wide ranging and it is a reflection of Neofunctionalism’s fall from dominance that, as a former proponent of it argued in 2004, “with few exceptions, virtually no one currently working on European integration openly admits to being a Neofunctionalist” (Schmitter, 2004: 45). Despite this though, even Andrew Moravcsik, a scholar recognised as the ‘single teacher’ of the ‘school’ (Schimmelfennig, 2004: 75) of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and one of neo-functionalism’s most active critics recognised that Haas was right in predicting the EU would not “become a success by pursuing the federalist strategy of public debate, elections, and other techniques for building democratic legitimacy” (Moravcsik, 2005: 377). Rather Moravcsik stresses the EU has “established itself by helping to meet concrete functional challenges within the context of the power that national governments delegated to or pooled in it” (idem.) and through this achieved more popular legitimacy than “more direct federalist or realist strategies might have been expected to generate” (idem.). The belief held by neo-functionalists that the process of integration is in many ways inevitable and not a conscious choice, due to the effects of centralisation, spillover and the empowerment of supranational entrepreneurs allows for legitimacy to be sourced from

successfully meeting the challenges that are better dealt with at a supranational level. Consistently meeting these challenges in non-political, non-controversial areas at first allows for the EU to achieve the kind of democratic legitimacy that paves the way for further integration and growth into other areas.

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Among his contemporaries in the school of Liberal Intergovernmentalism Moravcsik has been one of the most outspoken critics of arguments discrediting the European Union for having a ‘democratic deficit’ (see Moravcsik, 2002; Moravcsik, 2005). Moravcsik argues public and scholarly concern over this issue is largely a result of “a tendency to privilege the abstract over the concrete” (Moravcsik, 2005: 621) in comparing the EU to an ideal democracy type without considering the constraints relevant to the EU’s multi-level context and the “real world practices of existing governments” (Moravcsik, 2005: 605).

The events of the Eurozone crisis have led to renewed attempts to apply neo-functionalist and liberal Intergovernmentalist frameworks in order to explain certain trends and developments both in their own individual respects (see Schimmelfennig, 2014; 2015; Ioannou and Niemann, 2015) but also as part of wider examinations synthesising different approaches for their relative benefits (see Ioannou et al, 2015). The application of Neo-Functionalist logic to analyse European economic integration during the crisis is recognised as a difficult case, due to the economic being considered an “area of ‘high politics’” (Ioannou and Niemann, 2015: 197) central to state’s national sovereignty and too

politicized to become victim to integration measures driven by functional logic often seen as occurring in more depoliticized areas. Despite this Ioannou and Niemann examine the process of economic integration as it has occurred since the Eurozone crisis by subjecting it to inquiry based on Neo-functionalism’ logic of functional, political and cultivated spillover to argue that “if functional

pressures are not resolved through further integrative steps, this can promote crises, which in turn cause further functional pressures during the process of crisis management, thereby eventually triggering the necessary steps of integration (Ioannou and Niemann, 2015: 202). Neo-functionalism’s focus on the importance of supranational decision making defined by participants seeking agreement through compromises involving upgrading common interests (Ioannou and Niemann, 2015: 197), while useful in analysing the dynamics of integration, can also reduce an issue like democratic accountability to that of a bargaining chip or trade off mostly prevalent in the European

Parliament’s involvement in such negotiations (Ioannou and Niemann, 2015: 210) rather than a wider goal of the different institutions involved.

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Andrew Moravcsik has argued that “within the multi-level governance system prevailing in Europe, EU officials (or insulated national representatives) enjoy the greatest autonomy in precisely those areas – central banking,

constitutional adjudication, criminal and civil prosecution, technical

administration and economic diplomacy – in which many advanced industrial democracies, including most Member States of the EU, insulate themselves from direct political contestation. The apparently ‘undemocratic’ nature of the EU as a whole is largely a function of this selection effect.” (Moravcsik, 2002: 613). This statement, made in an article where Moravcsik acknowledges the increased independence of the ECB when compared to national banks and points out this may be an issue worthy of caution (Moravcsik, 2002: 621) is particularly interesting when compared to Moravcsik’s attitude to the same issue in the years since the Eurozone crisis (Moravcsik, 2012). After the impact of the crisis has been felt, Moravcsik argues that the ECB’s relative independence compared to national banks is a “problem […] without any obvious technocratic or democratic justification” (Moravcsik, 2012: 66) but rather is justified based on political reasons, related to German concerns and creating a “system tilted towards German priorities: low inflation, austerity and the repayment of

creditors” (idem.). Furthermore Moravcsik finds that a result of this problem is that “a more balanced Eurozone, in which as much is required of Germany as of debtor countries, is not just a pragmatic necessity; it is a democratic imperative” (Moravcsik, 2012: 67) while acknowledging at the same time that a potential collapse of the Eurozone would “be because of an abundance of democracy as much as a lack of it” (idem.) whereby the requirement for governmental consent from democratically elected governments to impose new measures and the difficulties of gaining popular approval for such measures in democracies could affect the possibilities of a long term solution for ‘Europe’s woes’ (idem.).

2.1.2 - Institutions, Democracy and the Crossroads between

Economic and Political

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The adoption of approaches labelled as the ‘new institutionalisms’ of political science, including sociological, historical and rational choice

institutionalism (Pollack, 2004: 137) in European Studies has certainly expanded the field, and has even led to them being seen by some as increasingly forming the “dominant approaches to the study of European Integration” (Pollack, 2004: 153-4). Vivian Schmidt, in examining the

development and increasing influence of insitutionalist approaches to the study of Europe, finds that “each of the three institutionalisms (rational choice,

historical and sociological) […] offers a different perspective on political reality, each with different objects, goals and standards of explanation, each with different advantages and disadvantages” (Schmidt, 1999: 3) In terms of contributing to debates over legitimacy and democratic accountability,

particularly since the onset of the Eurozone crisis, these approaches have often tied the debate to legitimising mechanisms of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy with the former seen by such scholars as “mostly about the quality of the EU’s representative bodies and electoral processes, and how this serves to ensure EU legitimacy” (Schmidt, 2010:16) and the latter linked “to the performance of the policy decisions of its ‘non-majoritarian’ forms of institutions” (Schmidt, 2010:6) such as the ECB and ECJ.

The establishment of a European Monetary Union, and in particular the Second and Third Stage of this process, which brought with them the

institutional architecture and single monetary policy respectively that define the Eurozone area, has redefined a number of existing debates and raised new concerns surrounding democratic accountability in the EU. Verdun argued for a democratic deficit in the institutional design of EMU (Verdun, 1998) as a result of “the absence of parliamentary accountability […] lack of transparency in the decision making process [...and…] the asymmetrical development of the monetary integration process compared to the political or budgetary and fiscal integration process” (Verdun, 1998: 126), concluding that “the European

Integration process is full of incomplete package deals” (Verdun, 1998:127) and “it is to be hoped that sooner rather than later the mode of governance in the EU will be transformed once again” (idem.) to address these issues of EMU’s flawed institutional design. In fact, in examining the institutions created in

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response to the Eurozone crisis, seen by many as a result of the flaws she had identified, through the lens of Historical Institutionalism, Verdun uses the

concept of critical junctures, arguing the creation of EMU represented one such juncture which “constrained member states when making the next decisions about macroeconomic and monetary policy-making in the Euro Area” (Verdun, 2015:231) as did the sovereign debt crisis which led to the establishment of institutions and agreements like the European Financial Stability Fund; the European Stability Mechanism; the Six-Pack and Two-Pack; and the Fiscal Compact. Verdun argues these “were built on previous institutions or were inspired by structures that had been created before” (Verdun, 2015:232) rather than developing more major institutions as had been foretold by those who stressed EMU’s institutional flaws (Verdun, 2015:225)

As well as new institutional developments in the EMU, the onset of the Eurozone crisis has also led to an increase in the crossovers between the economic and the political. The political and economic ties that already exist between the countries within the EU and the Eurozone as well as the effects of globalisation on increased interdependence of worldwide economies has allowed discussions over economic policy to become increasingly intertwined with political concern. This has also been the case in academia as increasingly in the field of Political Economy, even prior to the Eurozone crisis; concerns were raised and debated consistently about whether or not the Eurozone represented an Optimal Currency Area (Arnold & Verhoef, 2004). Democratic Accountability and Legitimacy and how these should be maintained within the structures surrounding EMU have also been issues debated even prior to the onset of the Eurozone crisis (Sadeh et al, 2007). The suggestions that “some ‘democratic override’ must be built into EMU, allowing for effective external review of the ECB and of the finance ministers of participating countries (the Eurogroup), as well as potential sanctions for extreme cases of departing from the preferences of a broad set of societal interests” (Sadeh et al, 2007: 740) seem particularly relevant when one considers the criticisms both of these organisations have faced throughout the crisis. Sadeh et al. placed the success of future reform of EMU squarely on balancing increased efficiency in decision making processes with the maintenance of legitimacy (Sadeh et al, 2007: 740).

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2.1.3 - Discursive Institutionalism and Schmidt’s ‘Forgotten

Problem’

Scholarly approaches focused on examining the substance of discourse and how it affects people’s conceptions of ideas, institutions and political life in general have largely been associated with the Post-Structuralist schools of thought analysed in the next section of this thesis, but examining discourse is also a concern that has influenced the work of one of the most influential scholars in the ‘Institutionalisms’, Vivian Schmidt. Furthering the findings of the three ‘new institutionalisms’ of rational choice, historical and sociological, Schmidt identifies an increasing “turn to ideas and discourse” (Schmidt, 2010:1) in these and suggests classifying such findings as a fourth new

institutionalism she calls Discursive Institutionalism which she argues would be about “the communication of ideas or ‘text’ but also about the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated via discourse” (Schmidt, 2010:4). This kind of approach informs her research where she argues the excessively intergovernmental nature of Eurozone crisis

management has resulted in a reduction in both input and output legitimacy, where too much focus on “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the Numbers” (Schmidt, 2015:90) through increasingly stringent and restrictive measures like the Six-Pack, Two-Pack and Fiscal Compact without further political integration or policies that both work and appeal to citizens, has driven the issue of democratic legitimacy to be essentially ‘forgotten’ (Schmidt, 2015).

By choosing to examine the discursive side of institutions and placing importance on the analysis of this dimension, Schmidt and other discursive Institutionalists take a step towards bridging the distance between mainstream approaches to European integration and post-structuralist theories. Such approaches though have been seen as insufficient in taking into account questions of power and politics and how these relate to and interact with discourse (Miorelli & Panizza, 2013), something which some post structuralist scholars and particularly those influenced by Foucauldian analytics give a lot of focus to as illustrated in the next section of this chapter. By ignoring the

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actor’s identification with particular identities (Miorelli & Panizza, 2013: 307) Schmidt’s explanation of institutional change can be seen as limited in its scope, particularly in comparison to the types of analyses operationalising discourse in terms of its embeddedness in relations and technologies of power.

2.2. Post-Structuralist Approaches, Critical Scholarship and

Foucauldian Governmentality

The previous section has illustrated how a number of mainstream theoretical approaches to European integration, both within classical and contemporary debates have interacted with and discussed the concept of democratic accountability in the EU. This section focuses more on the insights prevalent in critical scholarship and the approaches that are grouped under the label of Post-structuralism. Post-structuralist scholars are noted for their varied rejections and criticisms of mainstream ideas, in particular the given-ness of underlying structures that they often see as historically defined and therefore liable to be the victim of bias in meaning. By focusing on the destabilisation and destructuring of meanings and concepts, research in this vein allows for the exposition of the underlying assumptions of many norms in Western political thought, opening up the space for wider critique based on issues such as gender or class.

When examining the growth of critical approaches inspired by the school of Post-Structuralism in academic work on the Political Economy, Penny Griffin argues such approaches provide a “direct challenge to conventional rationalist accounts of/in IPE”(Griffin, 2011: 43) by offering “powerful tools to understand the relations of power that drive our socio-economic systems” (idem.). Both in the study of Political Economy and in International Relations, Post-structuralism and critical approaches have grown in influence from “a dissident movement” (Merlingen, 2013) to one that came to challenge the “almost consensual, rationalist ‘neo[-realist]-neo[-liberal]’ position” (Wæver, 2004: 202) in

International Relations. In the field of European Integration Studies the rise of such approaches has been less prominent, although increasing use of

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approaches operationalising discourse analysis in particular to identify how certain conceptions of Europe develop and become contested (cf. Diez, 1999; Wæver, 1990) has informed existing studies on EU governance. This trend has helped to establish a new ‘programme’ investigating the ways in which the European project itself acts as a producer of discourse (Wæver, 2004: 207) and how conceptions of ‘Europe’ becomes constructed amid these discourses (see Haahr and Walters, 2005)

In terms of relevance to the research undertaken in this thesis, both insights related to the operationalisation and interpretation of discourse to form critiques of widely accepted ‘realities’ as well as the development of ideas focusing on the issue of democratic accountability in the EU as part of a wider depoliticisation and technocratisation will be important. Arguments that consider European democratic accountability in this way form part of the wider field which the research present in this thesis aims to demonstrate the limits of and as analysed in the next chapter, Foucauldian insights form a large part of the methodological approach in this thesis therefore the following sections aim to illustrate how scholars from these areas have differentiated themselves from traditional approaches and brought new insights to the debate over democratic accountability.

2.2.1 - Critical IPE, Ordoliberalism and embedded Neoliberalism

In the years following the Eurozone crisis, discussions in the field of Critical Political Economy have often focused on questioning many of the assumptions made both by scholars in IPE and European Integration theories. Many of the scholars in this field preface their research with the view that orthodox integration scholars’ theories had failed to identify the factors leading to financial crisis (Ryner, 2015: 275). Ryner criticizes existing European

Integration and IPE scholars for not acknowledging the cause of the crisis as “the consequence of an unstable and anemic version of finance-led

accumulation” (ibid.: 287) bust also for “not appreciating the political rationality of EA(Euro Area)-crisis management” (idem.) which he appropriates to an

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“ordoliberal iron cage […] deeply and structurally embedded […and…] likely to continue to produce, the highly unstable and anaemic socioeconomic dynamics that are likely to be extraordinarily harsh in Europe’s periphery” (idem.).

Furthermore Ryner argues that the increased demands on welfare states due to the crisis and the damage suffered by these during the crisis due to the

imposition of regimes of austerity has created a social crisis that “given what research has told us about the importance of the welfare state for relieving such pressures and for rendering democracy compatible with capitalist markets” (ibid.: 288) raises doubts over the “prospects of an ordoliberal European project retaining legitimacy” (idem.)

As well as Ryner’s ‘ordoliberal iron cage’ the measures taken in response to the crisis have been seen by many critical IPE scholars as

evidence of the persistence of socially embedded neoliberalism (Cahill, 2011: 482) (van Apeldoorn, 2008) in EU policymaking which Van Apeldoorn sees as a “hegemonic project inasmuch as it seeks to advance neoliberalism through a strategy of incorporating, and ideologically neutralizing, rival projects” (Van Apeldoorn, 2008:22). The project is defined as hegemonic through its discursive goals of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘social cohesion’ being split in their promotion, with the former promoted at EU level and the latter a responsibility of the Member States (idem.), a fact which Van Apeldoorn argues is a core contradiction of this embedded neoliberalism, with increasing neoliberal measures likely to expose the “incompatibility of the Polanyian principles of ‘economic liberalism’ and ‘social protection’” (idem.). Furthermore, Van Apeldoorn links the legitimacy of this embedded neoliberal system to the

association between economic liberalism and social protection, concluding that “as embedded neoliberalism continues to hollow out the (national) non-market institutions in which it is supposed to be embedded, and makes its commitment to the principle of social protection equally hollow, it loses its attraction to those social forces whose incorporation was so critical to its rise to hegemony

[…and…] in the absence of a coherent alternative, the upshot of this may well be that we will witness a growing rejection of the European project increasingly fusing with rising nationalism, xenophobia and various populisms” (Van

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2.2.2 - Technocratisation and Depoliticisation

The German ordo-liberal and Anglo-American neo-liberal traditions of structuring economic decision making are grouped together by some critics like Huw Macartney who argues “rhetorical differences between the two traditions mask the fundamental reconfiguring of social relations in favour of capital that has characterised processes of neoliberalisation” (Macartney, 2013:9) and finds concerns in both traditions over “the distortive potential for democracy”

(Macartney, 2013:15). Macartney argues that both the process of European Integration, and responses to the Eurozone crisis have been largely informed by “a neoliberal political project” (Macartney, 2013:22) which emerged following “crises of accumulation in the 1950’s” (idem.) and “sought to establish a free market while insulating policy making from democratic demands” (idem.) via depoliticisation of the economy. The onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007, and the developments preceding it are seen by Macartney as evidence not of a failure of this project but rather of its incompletion at the time, as increasingly the EU and the IMF raised concerns over slow implementation by Member States and the need to ‘move up a gear’ (Macartney, 2013:20) once the crisis developed further and the need for bailouts and mechanisms to confront the situation at hand became clear.

Critical analysis of the EU’s actions taken to combat the crisis has also linked developments to previously observed trends at the national level such as the ‘hollowing out’ of the state through public sector reforms (Radice, 2014:323) observed by Rhodes in the UK (Rhodes, 1994). One of the trends observed as part of these reforms of “loss of functions by central and local government departments to alternative service delivery systems (such as agencies)” (Radice, 2014:323) represents a trend of depoliticisation not dissimilar at an international level to the “assumption of troika control in the European

periphery” (ibid.-324) where the troika institutions assumed “powers of veto over national fiscal policy as a condition for providing loans” (idem.)

Post-structuralist scholars and particularly those in the field of critical IPE have been active in observing these developments of technocratisation and depoliticisation at the EU level since the crisis. This thesis does not aim to

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discredit any of their findings as many are based on exploiting similar methods to those undertaken in this thesis. The central theoretical underpinnings of this thesis are based on ideas and methods of Foucauldian analytics, which have had widespread influence in many areas of post-structural scholarship in a number of scholarly fields. The strong focus on power relations in Foucauldian analytics and how these are expressed in society via language and discursive practices allows for the exposure of more nuanced narratives, and examining the particular rationalities these are built on in order to illustrate the mentalities that develop trends like technocratisation. The following section examines the influence of Foucauldian concepts on studying the EU, and defines the

theoretical concepts that inform the research undertaken in this thesis.

2.2.3 - Governmentality and Foucauldian approaches to the EU

The work of Michel Foucault on power relations, the practice of government and the importance of discourse has largely influenced the

methods with which many post-structuralist scholars in particular conduct their research. His concept of Governmentality as “a certain mentality […that…] had become the common ground of all modern forms of political thought and action” (Rose et al, 2009; 6) is one that has evolved through its application in various areas of research into a field of study representing ”much more than a footnote to or a commentary on Foucault” (Walters, 2012:7), a point Walters makes by illustrating the “ways that these studies have diverged from the project Foucault himself undertook” (idem.). This differentiation made between regarding the ideas associated with Governmentality as tools of political analysis and those of a ‘complete’ social theory have allowed for the evolution of this type of research from primarily being used to analyse liberalism and neoliberalism as methods of government (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 3) to its application “in a multitude of different practical sites, distant from the lofty concerns of political philosophy” (Rose et al, 2009: 16).

In the field of studies related to the European Union and European Integration there have been only limited applications of Foucault’s hypotheses on power and governmentality, with the first to do so explicitly being Haahr and

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Walters’ ‘Governing Europe’ which stressed Governmentality as combining “discourse analysis with a focus on the history of governing” (Haahr & Walters, 2005:5) and approached it as “a tool kit rather than a theory” (idem.) with these tools employed in the identification and contextual analysis of certain points in time as part of a genealogical approach on the ways that Europe is imagined and governed and the particular “regimes of thought and practice” (Haahr & Walters, 2005:14) that make these possible. The value of applying a

governmentality perspective to the EU therefore is found in its lack of requirements for predefining stable concepts like “democracy, state, [and] society (Favell & Zimmermann, 2011: 494), instead allowing for the “variable definition and operationalization of such entities through discourse and practice [to] become the core of the analysis itself” (idem.).

In one of their chapters Haahr and Walters examine the debate over the EU’s supposed democratic deficit using such methods, treating the entirety of the discussion as a discursive field they name ‘Un/Democratic’ Europe (Haahr & Walters, 2005:66) and examining it in ways inspired by Foucault’s assertion that “it is sometimes more important to interrogate limits rather than work within the boundaries which they offer to us (ibid.:-67). In doing so their analysis illustrates how a Foucauldian perspective differs from “those analyses which measure the current state of democracy in Europe according to some external, perhaps even universal normative yardstick, and articulate proposals for reform against this criterion” (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 66). This analysis is achieved by first illustrating how the lack of a common understanding of “the democratic character of European integration” (Haahr & Walters, 2005:68) opens up the ‘field of problematizations’ as an object of analysis which they proceed to explore from “the perspective of specific governmental practices and

technologies of power that have been operative” (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 69) in the development of this field and that of the different discourses within which these are situated.

An approach like Haahr and Walters allows for the identification and analysis of otherwise under-considered or unconsidered elements of the debate such as the way that technologies of de-differentiation like the Treaty of

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of supranational rights directly linked to European citizenship “ work to create political space for a European democracy to exist by “producing new subjects through denaturalizing a political order which previously confined rights to the national sphere” (Favell & Zimmermann, 2011: 495). Similarly they point to technologies of differentiation which “produce difference as salient and as proper grounds for qualifying, limiting, or in other cases marginalizing or

excluding individuals and groups from the polity” (Haahr & Walters, 2005:73) as well as technologies of agency and proximity which they argue are used by the EU “in a bid to enhance its democratic profile” (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 77) by fostering citizen involvement and interaction with the EU as well as their exposure and closeness to it. Examining questions of democracy at this level proves useful in exposing both the ‘polymorphous’ nature of European

democracy (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 78) due to the plethora of technologies each operating with different goals and rationalities as well as the wide range of discourse that encompass this space.

The instability that can be seen as defining the space they are analysing is something Haahr and Walters attribute to its continuous unsettlement “by counter-discourses and social forces which it cannot successfully assimilate or neutralise” (Haahr and Walters, 2005:86) such as a discourse of nationalism that defines “the EU as its negative Other” (idem.) and often perceives the EU’s technologies as instruments in the creation of an unwanted European state where the institutions are unrepresentative of the people they govern. The low and declining voting turnouts in European Parliament elections, an issue that has often been brought up as a marker of the EU’s perceived lack of democratic legitimacy, is described in this context among a number of expressions of

subjects ‘refusal’ to “assume the identity of European citizens” (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 87) which form a wider social force. The defining of these actions as “(non-)acts” (idem.) is key as it illustrates the ambiguity of such an action as not participating in these elections which can be presented as a conscious decision of rejection or refusal, but to deem it such carries certain ‘normative judgements’ including “the assumption that people should be interested and engaged in the EU” (Haahr and Walters, 2005: 89) and ignores the possibility that such an (in)action could be due to any number of factors.

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This chapter has illustrated both the dominant scholarly debates over European democratic accountability in mainstream and critical scholarship .Furthermore it has shown through an analysis of the work of Haahr and Walters in particular the value offered by utilising Foucauldian tools of

governmentality combined with a genealogical approach to reconsider existing debates and concepts in EU scholarship. The methodological underpinnings of the research undertaken in preparing this thesis are largely inspired by similar approaches in understanding how to operationalise the tools of governmentality and genealogy to examine both the developments since the Eurozone crisis and how issues of democratic accountability in response to these measures are considered at the ‘meeting point’ of democracy and technocracy. The following chapter outlines the way that this research will utilise these concepts as well as further analysing the value they offer to this examination.

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Ch.3 – Governmentality, Genealogy

and the discourse of Parliamentary

Enquiry

The previous chapter has examined both the academic debates

surrounding democratic accountability and legitimacy of the European Union, particularly in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis and the arguments more prevalent in critical scholarship surrounding technocratisation and

depoliticisation in European economic governance since the crisis. Furthermore I have also established the value offered by approaches rooted in the

Foucauldian concept of Governmentality, one that along with that of Genealogy is central to the design of my own research. The following chapter outlines the way that my research has been constructed introduces the ‘tools’ that will be utilised both in my analysis of shifts in European economic governance since the Eurozone crisis, the particular imaginations and rationalities reflected in these shifts, and the way that these are understood and discussed in parliamentary enquiries.

In terms of methodology this thesis takes a similar approach to that of Haahr and Walters in their 2005 book Governing Europe who, as discussed in the previous chapter, operationalise Foucauldian concepts of Governmentality alongside a genealogical perspective to explore “both the diverse political dreams that have framed means and ends of integration and the political technologies that have made ‘Europe’ a calculable, administrable domain” (Haahr & Walters, 2005: Preface). Studies in governmentality have become strongly and almost exclusively linked on the level of methodology to the “discourse analysis of policy papers, official publications, legal texts, speeches and so forth” (Favell & Zimmermann, 2011: 494) along with a focus on “the materiality and technical aspects of discourses” (idem.). This thesis follows in this tradition by employing the “particular combination of concepts and methods” (Walters, 2012: 111) of Genealogy and Governmentality that Walters chooses

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to not only stress as key in “connecting them (Governmentality concepts) to actual research practices” (Walters, 2012:110) but also in countering some negative tendencies that have presented themselves in the later applications of Foucauldian governmentality, particularly those with a reduced or even no stress on genealogical framing. With this in mind, the thesis employs

Foucauldian governmentality insights, genealogical framing and examination and a focus on the materiality of discourse, focusing on parliamentary enquiries into responses made to the Eurozone crisis to provide insights into the altering landscape of European economic governance and delimit the established scholarly debate over democratic accountability and legitimacy in this context.

3.1 - Governmentality: Operationalizing the Toolkit

In utilising the insights associated with Foucauldian Governmentality, the logic applied in this thesis, much like in the work of Haahr and Walters among other scholars, is to consider these as a tool kit rather than an a unified theory (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 5). In doing so, different understandings of

governmentality can be applied to research themes in a more fitting way providing for the opening up of ‘useful analytical possibilities’ (idem.) The four tools or ways of understanding governmentality identified by Haahr and Walters, each of which they link to a specific research theme which the tool can

especially contribute to are: “1) a particular form of critical and reflexive political analysis which focuses on mentalities of government; 2) an historicized

investigation of changing forms of government; 3) a thematization of the relationality of power and the identity of the governed; 4) a concern with the technologies of power” (idem.) Walters groups the interdisciplinary field of application of the concepts of Foucauldian Governmentality to wider contexts under the title of ‘studies of Governmentality’ (Walters, 2012: 46), using the analogy of software versions to illustrate the usefulness of regarding

Governmentality as a “set of analytical tools” (Rose et al, 2006:18 in Walters,

2012:45) that evolve and develop dynamically, with new ‘versions’ having the

task of “patching, troubleshooting and upgrading” (Walters, 2012:45) in order to ensure the continued viability of the entire intellectual technology.

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The use of these, among other ‘tools’ associated with governmentality, in this thesis will be evident in both of the following chapters dealing with empirical analysis. In the first the aim will be to denaturalize through a genealogical approach the presentation of regimes of austerity imposed in response to the Eurozone crisis as temporary methods aimed at averting further disaster by examining the way the ideals represented by these have become

institutionalised in agreements like the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU. Michel Foucault’s own definition of governmentality as an ‘ensemble’ of “institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections” (Foucault, 1991: 102) that “allow for the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as it principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (idem.) renders it in my view a very appropriate context for analysing the shifts in European economic governance since the Eurozone crisis and the role of the troika mechanisms in these shifts. With this in mind, examining the development of new measures to deal with the crisis and their institutionalisation in terms of their methods of shaping power relations and defining those governed by these measures is a particularly interesting prospect, as they are heavily influential on political economy and can be considered, in this context, as apparatuses of security that define a certain ‘image’ of Europe to be governed in a specific way. By examining developments that have occurred since the Eurozone crisis as ‘events’ in the governmentalisation (Haahr & Walters, 2005:17) of European economic governance, one can gain a more critical and rounded understanding of the ‘Europe’ that is being imagined by these measures and how this is

expressed discursively.

Following on from this analysis of the measures taken in response to the crisis will be an examination of how these measures are conceived, and

critiqued in parliamentary inquiries, both at the European and national level. A perspective rooted in the utilisation of governmentality insights allows for the interrogation of power relations and how they are reflected in discussions where democratically elected parliamentarians interact with and bring to task

technocratic entities and their representatives, something particularly relevant considering the debates surrounding democratic accountability and legitimacy in

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the EU, the European Parliament’s central role in these debates and the widely documented rise in Euroscepticism, particularly in European parliament

elections since the crisis.

3.2 - Genealogy and a focus on the contingent

One of the main aims of William Walter’s 2012 book on Governmentality is to stress to fellow researchers that the ‘critical edge’ of applying tools from this toolbox is ‘blunted’ when ‘detached from historical/genealogical methods of inquiry’ (Walters, 2012). Avoiding the “perils of ‘applicationism’” (Walters, 2012: 110) is seen by Walters as a key issue in applying the set of tools and concepts framed under Governmentality with a good solution to this being, in his view, the connection of a genealogical approach to the use of governmentality tools in analysis. At the basis of a genealogical approach lies the view that “to capture the specificity and the exceptionality of the past we need to pay close attention to its own forms of political reason and governmental practice” (Haahr and Walters, 2005:23).

As an approach, genealogy differs from traditional historical

examinations by its focus on constructing ‘specific lineages of difference’ (Dean, 1994:52 in Haahr & Walters, 2005:16) that allow the genealogist “to place the present in a slightly less familiar light, and thereby, to open up a critical space around its ‘given-ness’” (Haahr & Walters, 2005: 16). Similarly in this thesis, applying a genealogical approach to the changing landscape of European economic governance since the Eurozone crisis allows for the

‘de-familiarisation’ of the intellectual and political landscapes (Walters, 2012: 114) that form the established understandings shaping how such measures are interpreted. As a result of this de-familiarisation from the continuous in favour of the contingent, new observations can be made and in turn discourses evolving as a result of these events such as those prevalent in the enquiries examined in this thesis can also be considered in a different light. With this in mind,

measures taken in response to the crisis can be considered separately from contexts that would read them as steps in a certain path, whether this is

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other vision of the future of Europe that assumes with it certain ways that this ‘Europe’ is imagined and governed. This denaturalising effect is not unique to a genealogical approach among other historical approaches, but it is the

‘radicalisation’ of this effect in the case of genealogy’s “insistence on a

discontinuous history” (Biebricher, 2008: 367) that allows for the criticism and even rejection of “the totalising claims of some Marxist schools” (idem.) which equally aim to denaturalise the existing perceptions but do so with certain perceptions of “the overall logic of the course of history” (idem.).

Aside from its rejection of a ‘continuous‘ nature or course to history, a genealogical approach is also defined by its concern with the “’endlessly

repeated play of dominations’, assuming that ‘the forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny […] but respond to haphazard conflicts” (Foucault, 1996: 371 in Biebricher, 2008: 368) where “even underneath a legally pacified surface of societal relations lies the incessant dynamics of struggles and conflicts” (Biebricher, 2008: 368-9). Power therefore is diffused in ‘frameworks of meaning’ and the role of the genealogist in “writing history […] involves deciphering the links between changes in discourses and dispositifs as well as the dynamic of societal struggles lurking behind the former” (Biebricher, 2008: 369) while embracing “her embeddedness in power relations” (idem.) . The acceptance of this ‘embeddedness’ forms one of the most distinct

characteristics of a genealogical approach as it allows for the abandonment of “traditional claims to objectivity and reasonable argument” (idem.) accepting that one’s own view of history is one among others and is inherently affected by diffuse power relations intertwined with any conception of ‘truth’.

In examining the influence a Foucauldian genealogical approach offers to analysing power relations in the human science of accounting, Hooper and Kearins argue the ‘fascination’ with this approach partially originates from its ability to “straddle the radical humanist/radical structuralist divide” (Hooper & Kearins, 2002: 736) and offer an alternative to “either more pervasively

functionalist/behaviouralist […or…] more critical structuralist explanations (such as Marxism)” (idem.). It is in this vein that a genealogical approach will benefit my own research, as it will allow me to denature and question the assumptions

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of both traditional European integration theories and those of critical scholarship while not requiring the development of a complete historical analysis stressing a particular course to historical events.

3.3 - Discourse and the Meeting Point of Democracy and

Technocracy

Academic work that is rooted in the insights of Foucault and in the examination of mentalities of government and those who govern has become heavily associated with the analysis of policy papers, speeches and legal texts as items expressing these mentalities through their discursive practices and traditions. This thesis will not delineate from such a tradition and in its

questioning of the boundaries of discussions of democratic accountability and legitimacy in the EU post-crisis will utilise such an analysis focusing on official documents of agreements made since the crisis, as well as documents and speeches associated with Parliamentary enquiries on the developments since the crisis and the role the troika mechanisms have played in these.

The title of this section speaks of the ‘meeting point’ of Democracy and Technocracy, an idea that for obvious reasons cannot be narrowed down to one point or interaction in a literal sense. In lieu of this, and in order to examine and delimit the assumptions of critical scholars who stress the depoliticisation and technocratisation of European governance as a consistently observed process this point becomes for the service of this thesis, an enquiry by the European Parliament into the roe and operations of the troika that resulted in two

resolutions being passed and also an enquiry by the British House of Lords EU Select Committee. The European Parliament enquiry deals with the role and operation of the Troika in the countries where austerity programmes have been implemented as well as the social impact of this, and resulted in two resolutions focusing on these two issues. The enquiry will be used to illustrate and examine the way that both Parliamentarians, as the democratically elected

representatives of the people of Europe reflect on the actions taken in response to the crisis, and the power relations prevalent when they deal with the

technocratic representatives of the European Commission and the troika. On the other hand the British House of Lords EU Select Committee Inquiry on the

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‘Euro Area Crisis and the Fiscal Compact Treaty’ will be analysed to identify differences in the way that measures are interpreted at a national level and how different discourses at the two levels define the institutions involved with the troika in certain ways. These particular enquiries were selected due to their nature as extensive examinations of the measures made in response to the crisis and the interactions between the technocratic actors representing the institutions of the troika and democratically elected parliamentarians. Insights from the enquiries will be specifically utilised to delimit dominant discussions on democratic accountability by reflecting on and analysing the parliamentarian’s interaction with these concepts in terms of the troika mechanisms and the altering landscape of European economic governance and how these are operationalised in the enquiries. Furthermore in the analysis of the enquiries I will be aiming to identify the how technologies and discourses prevalent in the genealogical analysis of the measures developed to deal with the crisis become contested or further established when brought under investigation by

Parliament. As well as the treaties and agreements involved in altering the landscape of European economic governance since the crisis, and the reports and debates associated with the Parliamentary enquiries analysed, the

empirical research of the following chapters will be informed by the use and analysis of other selected primary sources.

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Ch. 4 – Re-examining the Landscape

of European Economic Governance

The previous chapters have focused on illustrating the nature of debates surrounding democratic accountability in European (economic) governance and the way that these have developed and altered over time. They have also established the value offered by an approach rooted in Foucauldian governmentality techniques to expose and interact with rationalities and mentalities of government, especially when studying alterations in institutional arrangements and power structures. This chapter will focus on the examination of selected institutional developments that have occurred since the onset of the crisis in Europe in terms of both the rationalities they are built on and convey as well as the particular conceptions of Europe they can be seen as defining and governing. Specifically the developments focused on will be the treaty

establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a safeguard and provider of financial assistance to Eurozone member states in financial difficulty, the agreement of the Fiscal Compact or Treaty on Stability and Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the EMU, and the establishment of the ECB’s

Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. The aim of this will be towiden our understanding of the nature of these new elements of European economic governance and follow this with an examination of how issues of democratic accountability become operationalised in parliamentary enquiries as well as how the parliamentarians as democratic representatives of Europe’s citizens interact with this altering landscape. This will be used to illustrate the limits of the debate over a European Union democratic deficit, particularly in terms of economic governance, both in traditional and in some critical scholarship.

By considering the shift that has occurred in European economic governance since the crisis in terms of the practices of governmentality and observation that have developed in treaties establishing the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability Mechanism, furthermore, one can gain a more rounded understanding of the particular conception of Europe such measures

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illustrating issues of power and subjectivity. The success therefore of the new institutional arrangement and nature of economic governance depends on the willingness of the Member States themselves to become the bearers of

subjection and, in much the same way a member of society internalises the rules of conduct to become self-disciplined rather than requiring the coercion of the state to act in a certain way, internalise the rules of the Fiscal Compact and conduct themselves in certain ways as a result of these rules. While this thesis does not aim to examine the way that these measures become internalised in the behaviour of nation states, the rules based nature of the ESM and Fiscal Compact treaty and the defined consequences for non-adherence to the rules when partnered with the fact that all current Eurozone Member States and any future applicant have and will have to be committed to these certainly suggests self-discipline is a key element.

In summing up Foucault’s analysis of the development of a mentality of governmentality at the level of national government, Del Giorgi argues that the “transition from sovereignty to governmentality marked the definitive absorption of a capitalist economic rationality by the science of government” (Del Giorgi, 2006: 70). Del Giorgi quotes Foucault’s claim that the “political economy […] develops when it is realised that the resources-population relationship can no longer be fully managed through a coercive regulatory system” (Foucault, 1997: 69 quoted in Del Giorgi, 2006: 70). While Foucault’s focus when analysing and identifying governmentality practices was largely on the national and

subnational levels that these mentalities become expressed at, he would be in no way averse to linking these practices to changing mentalities and practices of international organisations, particularly those with as much influence over their ‘subjects’ as the EU. In fact the growth of practices of governmentality as a result of the realisation that a coercive regulatory system was insufficient for the management of the resource-population relationship can be mirrored in the development of new practices, and shifts in mentalities of governing the Eurozone. The fact that the Eurozone represents a supranational extension of the field of political economy in its members places it as a particularly fruitful area for analysis focusing on practices of governmentality.