The Arab uprisings and renewed European democracy agendas

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THE ARAB UPRISINGS

AND RENEWED

EUROPEAN

DEMOCRACY AGENDAS

Student: Dick Broggel

Begeleider: dr. Paul van Hooft

Tweede lezer: dr. Sebastian Krapohl

Januari 2015

Masterscriptie Politicologie – Internationale Betrekkingen

Universiteit van Amsterdam

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Introduction

The Barcelona Declaration in 1995 was a plea in which the European Union and all of its members united behind the universality of human rights, prosperity and

democracy. It was the EU’s ambition to spread these values to its southern neighboring region and hoped to develop a sustainable and peaceful relationship that would benefit both. The Barcelona Process, which is the name of the process that would fulfill the Union’s ambitions, was the first effort in the history of the EU to conduct a coordinated foreign policy towards the Middle East. Two main factors contributed to the inception of the Barcelona Process. One is the Algerian failed liberalization and civil war that started in 1990, which made EU policy makers aware of challenges that accompanied instability in its neighboring countries. A second prominent issue was the faltering Middle Eastern peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. It induced the EU to promote multilateralism in the broader region as a pacifying approach of which the EU saw itself as an experienced actor (Cavatorte 2014:620).

The European Mediterranean Partnership was the foremost policy instrument that stood on the basis of the Barcelona Process and has endured several changes to patch all of its voids along the line. It has also been updated to address new

circumstances and threats, but the ultimate goal of the EMP has always been the same; to bring peace and stability to the neighboring countries and provide the EU as a whole security. The partnership had three pillars: the creation of an economic free trade area, political cooperation and cultural exchange. Several problems were associated with the partnership and stimulated reform and adjustments, but the most profound problem and an inherent element of the program’s aim is the so called democratization stabilization dilemma.

Democratization and human right have always been an important part of the political cooperation pillar within the EMP, but has never been the ultimate goal. It is where security interests get precedence over the democratization aims of the EMP. The dilemma is two folded. The first stem arises from the instability that is accompanied with a strong push for democratic reforms and with that possible spillovers that concern European security. The second threat accompanying democratic reforms in the eyes of

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5 the EU is the “problem” of political Islam which, for decades, constituted the largest part of political opposition in the region (Mikhelidze 2009:151). While the EU has been called a normative power in its efforts to promote democracy and human rights, its lack of effectiveness and ambiguity towards these issues in the Middle East has excavated the Union’s moral leverage. The democratization stabilization “dilemma” is just another expression of the EU’s two sided face as a true normative power. The democratic peace hypothesis assumes that democratization will have a moderating influence on domestic and international affairs and therefore be an antidote to the soft security problems the EU is encountering from its neighbors. In relation to the Middle East the bottom line is that democratization in the Middle East is a means to the EU’s security interests and when they intersect democracy of the other is less important than the security of the self, i.e. the EU.

Another problem that is stipulated in the literature of the EMP and other common European foreign policy initiatives is the lack of coherent policy aims and variability in the efforts on the side of the EU member states. Different views and interests of the member states have contributed to a series of policies that lacked coherence and have been less effective for that reason. In this respect the agreement between France and Germany on policy initiatives is indispensable. It is said that if these two member states cannot agree on a common policy it is deemed infeasible (Behr 2008:91). This feature of EU policy will prelude the forthcoming research. The democratization stabilization dilemma could also be the outcome of differentiation between member states about underlying themes of the dilemma.

In this paper the term Arab Uprisings will be used for the period that started with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and is still unfolding. The term

uprisings seems a better reflection of the chaos, tragedies and setbacks during that

period than the Arab Spring is. While these uprisings have irrevocable initiated change in the region, it is still uncertain what the outcomes will be and how the EU will cope with them exactly. The immediate reaction of the EU towards the region wide call for

democracy has been modest to say the least. In part it was a reaction that was in line with the ambivalent character of the EMP. On the other hand the EU might have been surprised by the sudden revolts and had to reposition itself and its ideas about the

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6 region. While the end of the period that started with Bouazizi is still not in sight there might be an undercurrent at the European continent that is breaking with its past course. The aim of this research is to bring forth any differences between foreign policies of Germany and France before and after the Arab Uprisings. The central point of focus will be the democratization stabilization dilemma. The assumption is that the two countries differ from each other due to their different identities which are partly shaped by their interests, cultural strategies and perceptions they have of the region.

The main question that this research is trying to answer is:

“To what extent have the Arab Uprisings influenced the foreign policies of Germany and France towards the Southern Mediterranean with respect to the democratization stabilization dilemma?”

Literature

The Barcelona Process started in 1995 as a multilateral forum for the

management of regional and bilateral relations of the EU and the Middle East. It was an effort to bring the two regions in closer relation with each other and set mutual goals for prosperity, democratization and security. The Barcelona Process is the name of the entire forum, while the Euro Mediterranean Partnership handles the bilateral relations of the EU and its partners in the region. The objective of the Barcelona Process stems from European concerns about regional spillovers that are related to an unstable and violent neighborhood like the Middle East. The European Mediterranean Partnership was the foremost framework in which Euro-Mediterranean (Euro-med) relations have been conducted and pursued three main objectives. “[…] 1) establishing a common area of peace and stability through a reinforcement of political and security dialogue; 2) creating a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership, and the gradual establishment of a free trade zone; and 3) a rapprochement between

peoples around the Mediterranean through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Asseberg 2009:4)”. Democratization of neighboring countries has always

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7 been regarded by the EU as one of the means of bringing stability and peace to

adjacent regions with the ultimate goal of European security. While bringing security at the borders of the European Union by democratization is still the objective, the foreign policy frameworks through which that should be accomplished have changed since.

In an attempt to address the shortcoming of the EMP two new policy initiatives has been established. In 2003 the EU started off with the ‘European Neighborhood Policy’ which tried to break with the former EMP without trying to substitute it. The European Commission stated that the ENP “should not override the existing framework of EU relations with the southern Mediterranean partners. Instead, “wider Europe” would supplement and build on existing policies and arrangements” (EU commission 2003:15). According to Del Sarto and Schumacher the new policy initiative towards the

Mediterranean differed at four important points with its precursor. First of all the ENP abandoned the principle of regionality and “[…] replaced it with differentiated

bilateralism” (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005:21). Although Del Sarto and

Schumacher underline the fact that the EMP already contained some bilateral elements, but that the overall character of the EMP was a one size fits all approach, an often heard critique (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005:22, Seeberg 2010:6, Manners 2010:40). The crux of that critique was that the partner countries simply were too diverse to be treated in the same way, with the same instruments and with the same pace. A second change from the EMP to the ENP is the principle of conditionality. Where the EMP was based on the principle of negative conditionality in terms of reform incentives. The ENP is based on positive conditionality and can be seen as the

harbinger of the ‘more-for-more’ (Schumacher 2011:109) mantra that is siding with EU policies anno 2014. The third change Del Sarto and Schumacher are signaling in their article is the more interest motivated framing of the ENP. According to them the ENP is much more debated in terms of EU interests as security and welfare than ever before. Lastly they foresee troubles with the individual benchmarking of the ENP for individual partner countries. The individual benchmarking will “[…] compromise the EU’s

traditional ambition of being an even-handed broker in the Middle East peace process” (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005:24). So on the one hand Del Sarto and Schumacher welcome the individual benchmarking, because it enables the EU to justify the degree of

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8 integration of a country in Europe’s internal market. On the other hand it means it will bias the EU’s relation with Israel in comparison with other Mediterranean states because that state will be more effective to seize the opportunities of an open market due to their industrial capabilities. Another advantage Israel has over Mediterranean states are related to the conditionalities Europe is setting for granting access to its internal market such as the level of democratization and the rule of law which are in favor of Israel.

Since 2008 Sarkozy initiated another program that was aimed at the relation of Europe and the Mediterranean called the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). It was created out of the idea that the asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean partners was causing a void within the transition of policy goals and effective policies. At first the UfM almost stranded on skepticism of other European member states, because their first take of this renewed France plan was that France was trying to be the foremost and influential European state in the Middle East. A role France is feeling historically comfortable with (Seeberg 2010:288). In the end the UfM got accepted and implemented as part of the broader Barcelona Process and sided with the EMP and ENP that were still in place. The actual differentiation of the UfM in relation to its predecessors is its character of de-politicization and technocration of the

cooperation between the EU and its neighbors (Seeberg 2010:289). The conclusion of Seeberg is that once again EU is failing with its renewed policy approaches and on top of it the EU is omitting its ambitions to promote democracy and human rights within the UfM. (Seeberg 2010:301)

With nineteen years passed since the beginning of the Barcelona Process the overall conclusion of analyses on this common EU foreign policy to the Middle East is that it has failed in bringing its objectives any closer. According to the literature the policies the EU enacted in the Barcelona Process did not bring its goals much closer (see for example Seeberg 2010, Cavatorte 2014, Behr 2008, Jünemann 2007). The lack of political will between member states seems to harm the policies by failing to unite and encounter the Middle East in a meaningful way. Other impediments stemming from member state discrepancies are crippling EU’s common foreign policy in such a way that its practical utility has been leveled to the bare minimum.

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9 Another persistent gap that is amplified in the literature is the divergence

between EU foreign policy and member state actions. Michelle Pace is an author that has been most clear about it. She states that while the supposedly normative, long running EU push for democracy in the MENA is slow and regressing at worst due to inherent paradoxes and contradictions in the making of a policy with no clear, defined vision. She continues: “The stubborn position of some of the core EU member states remains that they have other prioritized interests – security and economic - such that cooperation with authoritarian regimes on antiterrorism enforcement actions and ensuring secure access to oil prevail. Moreover, EU member states remain wary of unpredictable and possibly rapid, political change driven by non-state actors in the region because EU member states are risk averse” (Pace 2009:49).

Other problems are related to unforeseen or even opposing effects. An example are the economic reforms in the region the EU has prescribed. The paradigm of

neoliberalism is a concept within EU policy to the Middle East that foresaw to bring economic prosperity. For the European Union economic liberalization correlates with political liberalization which is the ultimate goal of the Barcelona Process. According to Dillman though (2010:64-68) the push for economic liberalization in the Middle East has caused effects that are empowering the current elites instead of mobilizing the middle class. While the Maghreb as a whole seems to have benefited from economic

liberalization, the necessity to push these measures despite domestic opposition made the MENA governments more authoritarian (Powel 2009:6). In addition, only the elite benefited from the reforms leading to the Arab uprisings’ anti-neoliberal ethos (Chomiak and Entelis 2011:12).The end of the transitions that have been started by the Arab Uprisings are still taking place. The Arab Uprisings were not foreseen by the EU, its policy makers or theorists, but as Huber states it will change the region and it will bring new opportunities for the EU to enact in a way that it might be the normative power it first was (Huber 2013:98).

Analyses to what extent the EU has changed its policies in reaction to the Arab Uprisings have been made. Thomas Behr recognizes three themes that will have impact on the relation between the EU and the outcomes of the Arab Uprisings. The first is the end of neoliberal paradigm. According to Behr the revolts led by Egypt and Tunisia were

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10 fuelled by high unemployment, growing inequality and faltering education systems. He continues by pointing out that new governments are denouncing economic policies of their predecessors and demand a shift towards a more sustainable development. Another theme that is current within the theme of Arab revolutions is the state of civil society. According to Behr it is a common truism that the Arab Spring “[…] has broken the wall of fear and vitalized Arab civil society across the region” (Behr 2012:8). He says that most analysts have argued that this new dynamism favors a democratic transition, but that civil society has also been fragmented and sectarian to an extent that it might lead in some cases to civil strife. In current affairs state weakness instead of state power is a problem. A third theme is the dominance of political Islam, albeit of different kinds, it might present a problem for the EU’s normative agenda and clash with

European norms and values. On the other hand there are also signs that political Islam is been pushed out of the arena of public debate as is the case in Tunisia (Redissi 2014:285). But with respect to the European fear of political Islam a lot of criticism has already surfaced as being one-dimensional, as in stereotyping and ignorant. Other surfacing problems in the region according to Behr is the rise of nationalism, leading to heightened mistrust of western policies and NGO’s. And he concludes by stating the region in general is increasingly polarized if you take in review the Sunni and Shia competition, Iran and revolutionary republics versus reforming monarchies. So while the Arab Uprisings have been widely received as a positive development it has set in

motion more currents than were visible at first.

The bottom line of European failure is the absent of political will to engage the region in a thorough way. Underlying differences of member states seem to cripple the engagement of the EU with the Southern Mediterranean (i.e. Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria). Bilateral relations with partner countries in the Southern Mediterranean, apart from the multilateral fora of the EU, seems to intersect with goals that have been set within the EU. Reliance on oil have made members less stringent towards human rights abuses and perceived economic reforms within the EMP had opposing effects. Overall individual member states’ foreign policies have not always been in line with the EU. Above all the Euro crisis has made the EU focused on itself instead of a region it was trying to reform for such a time already. Now that dust on the European continent has

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11 somewhat settled and new eras as well as problems in the Southern Mediterranean has come to the front I wonder how the EU will approach its Southern Neighbors.

With respect to the Barcelona process, the Arab Uprisings and member state differences within EU common foreign policies, the democratization stabilization dilemma seems to take a pivotal place. In light with the literature about the Barcelona Process so far, my research will try to contribute to a few things. First of all it is

important to see whether the European member states are willing and capable to adjust policies in light of the new political landscape the Arab Uprisings have created. The EU as an actor has tried for many years to transform the region but has failed so far due to incompetent policies and the fear of destabilizing the region contributing to an insecure neighborhood. Will this new environment change the perspective of EU member states accordingly and will it be any closer to the goals of the Barcelona Process that are in place for so many years now. Secondly, while the literature implies member states to have different views and interests to the region as being one of the reasons that policies are not effective. I wonder by what elements the dilemma is surrounded and decipher if member states have any different views on these elements. So far only Thomas Behr has tried to address the dilemma within the EU, but did so before the Arab Uprisings.

Theory

Within the realm of literature that writes about the foreign policy instruments of the EU that are targeted at the Mediterranean region, the most significant contribution has been on the debate whether the EU is a normative power or that it responds to traditional realist interests. Considering the two positions the conclusion is that while the EU handles a normative discourse the practical manner of its policies are serving realist goals. It is even said that the weakness of both the EMP and ENP are coming from: “the contradiction between the EU’s unethical realist goals and its normative rhetoric.”

(Cavatorte 2014:621) While the debate on the nature of EU’s power and goals is fading it seems that there is a rise in the literature that is trying to grasp the EU’s policies and goals in a more meaningful and practical manner. The majority of articles written nowadays on the subject is taking constructivism as an important start to handle the

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12 nature, effects and relations of the EU with its counterparts in the MENA region.

According to Khaliq the way the European Union is acting towards the Middle Eastern Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian people for example shows that the EU is behaving pragmatically. While the EU is not setting aside its normative or realist position, it is pragmatism that often provides the EU with an easier way out. Khaliq states that this kind of pragmatism informs the EU about how to “think of itself, project its external relations and how it is capable of adapting to challenges and circumstances each MENA state offers” (Khaliq 2010:713-715).

It is this pragmatism that is formed upon a constructivist take of reality that will also shape the basis of my own research. Germany and France are two of the most important member states within the European Union. The way both countries see themselves in relation to the EU and other regions will determine their foreign policy accordingly. Differences between them can lead to differences within EU policies and consequently dilemma’s such as the democratization stabilization dilemma. In imitation of controverting fundaments of EU, being marked as either realist or normative, the same could apply to Germany and France. In the literature Germany for example has been qualified as a normative power, while France has more often been qualified as a realist power (see for example Powel 2010, Bicchi 2006, Pace 2007). On the other hand the proximity of France to the Middle East in comparison with Germany could contribute to such an equation as well. It might be relatively easier for Germany to push for a more normative agenda, while France, due to its proximity would be more fearful of those negative spillover effects that are coming from the southern neighborhood. In a general sense the reason for the EMP to falter is because France favors a different strategy to the Middle East than Germany does. Where do these differences come from? How does these differences contribute to the democratization stabilization dilemma and did the Arab Uprisings effected these differences?

If the EU and its members are sincerely considering change and democratization as viable and ultimate goal, the Arab Uprising should have been an incentive to act accordingly. The foremost reason for such a change of action should have been the cry of the region and its people for a right of self-determination and prosperity that has been denied for so many years. If the European Union and its member states are the civilian

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13 normative power they claim to be, the Arab Uprisings would have been an opportunity to back that position with action. At the time when Gaddafi was ousted by NATO forces, the EU should have stayed until a provisional government with a monopoly on violence would have been in place. The slip backwards by the elimination of Morsi by Egypt’s military SCAF should have been avoided by the international community.

One of the concerns of the democratization stabilization dilemma was chaos and possible spillover effects. The Arab Uprisings have taken that hurdle and leveled a playing field or vacuum the EU and its members should have acted on as a traditional normative power it stated to be at the beginning of the Barcelona Process. In other words it would be counterproductive to enforce policies that would try and undo the first outlines of the uprisings and try to resolve chaos by restoring old power entities as they were familiar to the European Union and by that trying to establish stability at the

expense of democracy. But maybe these changes have taken place, but are taking time to evolve.

It is at this crossing where the research question is constructed. Have the Arab Uprisings caused any significant change in the policies of both France and Germany? The Arab Uprisings could have been perceived as a chance to finally adjust the policies of the two European countries to be more in line with the demands of the sovereign people in the Southern Mediterranean instead of its authoritarian and despicable caretakers.

C o n s t r u c t i v i s m

Constructivism examines the role of norms and identity in shaping international political outcomes. Deliberation, discourses, norms, persuasions, socialization,

argumentation and ultimately identity are concepts that will define the social constructed reality through which the interests of political actors will be determined. Constructivist scholars are positivist in epistemological orientation and strong advocates in bringing other theoretical frameworks into their perspectives. Among these, the qualitative, process-tracing case study is their typical methodological starting point (Checkel 2006:5).

Within the context of the Arab Uprisings and shaping state interest the following excerpt is useful, while it has such a strong normative connotation: “Although

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14 collectively shared understandings of reality are hard to change, it is possible to change them. Constructivism emphasizes the role of agency, the capacity of actors to redefine interests and preferences. Recent research has indeed convincingly demonstrated how different types of actors –inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental

organizations and transnational advocacy networks – can exert ‘moral influence’ on state interests and contribute to major changes in norms and behavior (e.g. Finnemore 1996;Price 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Constructivism thus proposes that socially constructed variables hold the status of basic causal variables that shape preferences and outcomes (Finnemore 1996: 15; for a discussion of ideational causation, see Ruggie 1998): moral persuasion leads to norm spread, causing changes in preferences and interests that result in behavioral change.” (Elgström 2011:459)

The idea that the Arab Uprisings have changed the way German or France see their relationship with the MENA or themselves as an independent actor is about

constructing or altering identity for which constructivism seems to suit this contemplated approach. The idea is that Germany both have difference views of the Southern

Mediterranean, other experiences with the region and have contrasting perceptions of their own role as a state towards the southern neighborhood.

S t r a t e g i c C u l t u r e

State security is one of the most important responsibilities of a state within the international system, but when all security issues have been met Constructivism can be a way of interpreting reality and effect a state’s foreign policy. So outside the

parameters of state security, it is Constructivism in which past experiences are enclosed and through that process alter foreign policy accordingly. Within Constructivism,

Strategic culture is a concept in which certain historical relevant experiences are responsible for a state’s identity and by that its course of actions.

Strategic culture is a domain of theory which argues that differences in strategic options available to a state are derived from a specific set of historical experiences and “[…] are influenced to some degree by philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.” (Johnston 1995:34). Strategic culture as an explanatory concept has found its birth in the Cold War period at a time when American scholars tried to explain differences between American and Soviet nuclear tactics.

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15 Johnston is stating that the concept provided “intellectual justification for the refinement of nuclear war fighting strategies in the United States” and was loosely defined and based on gross assumptions about American and Soviet societies. He writes for example that “The former Soviet military was said to exhibit a preference for preemptive, offensive uses of force that was deeply rooted in Russia’s history of external expansionism and internal autocracy. The United States, on the other hand, tended to exhibit a tendency towards a sporadic, messianic and crusading use of force that was deeply rooted in the moralism of the early republic and in a fundamental belief that warfare was an aberration in human relations.” (Johnston 1995:32)

Since the birth of the concept much has changed according to Johnston and in his article ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’ he is setting out a useful and

comprehensive overview of the concept as it evolved over time in three phases. The first generation emerging in the early 1980s focusing primarily why the Soviets and the Americans thought differently about nuclear strategy. It is this generation that according to Johnston used the concept in a simplified and uncontestable kind of way. He starts off by pointing out the main problem of the concept that relates to the definition of strategic culture. When paraphrasing David Jones in which variables encompass a country’s strategic culture Johnston writes that there is a: “macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno cultural characteristics, and history; a societal level consisting of social, economic and political structures of society; and a micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil military relations.” (Johnston 1995:37) The concept was to gross and didn’t provide any clear cut ways to

operationalize strategic culture in a way that it was a meaningful and differentiated itself from other theories in security studies at that point. Another set of concerns that doesn’t seems to be addressed in the first generation are the sources when considering a nation’s culture.

The second generation that Johnston is distinguishing within the theoretical formation of the concept has its own merits and flaws. He states that this particular group of scholars starts from the premise that there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what they actually do. For the second generation Johnston argues that strategic culture is a tool of political

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16 hegemony; “it establishes widely available orientations to violence and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative enemies.” (Johnston 1995:39) For Johnston the main problem with second generation thinkers of strategic culture is that they leave a void at the precise relation between strategic culture and the way it influences behavior. He states that scholarship and leadership suggests a dialectical relationship between strategic culture and operational behavior; elites too are socialized within a country’s strategic culture. Therefore the extent to which they can make

decisions is constrained by “symbolic myths” created by them and their predecessors. Johnston point out that it means elites can’t escape the discourses in which they are operating and therefore cross national differences should be expected to an extent that their discourses vary (Johnston 1995:40).

Theorists that count themselves to a third generation debating strategic culture tend to be more rigorous and eclectic in the conceptualization of ideational independent variables and more narrowly focused on dependent variables according to Johnston. Things as military culture, political-military culture or organizational culture are used as independent variables, but according to him they all take the realist edifice as target and try to explain strategic choices where materialist interests are coming short in explaining these choices (Johnston 1995:43).

Some strengths within this generation according to Johnston are stemming from the fact they leave out behavior as an independent variable contradicting the first generation. Another variation between these two generations is that third generation scholars do not necessarily see strategic culture coming from deep historical roots, but it can also be influenced by recent experiences leaving more room for variation and to be less deterministic. It are these assumptions that sets me on the track of third

generation scholars to conduct my own research. While I underline the vastness of culture I do not think it is as robust as for example first generation strategic culturists are stating. In my opinion culture can change, but gradually and is influenced by changing environments which will unleash new interest, ideas, perceptions and possibly norms. Which is line with the theoretical approaches of the wider paradigm of strategic culture Constructivism. Like third generation culturists I see strategic culture as one of many variables that can influence behavior in state affairs. Without differentiating, at this point,

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17 between the amount of impact each variable has in the decision making process. The democratization stabilization dilemma can been as just an expression of contradicting interests that are coming from state concerns that stem from a different history and therefore different identities. In line with third generation strategic culture which aims to target explanations that realists have trouble explaining the case of the Arab Uprisings is interesting. The democratization stabilization dilemma can also be perceived as a dilemma that is balancing on different kind of interests. On one side there is a normative concept of democracy, although with an ultimate realist interest of a stable region. On the other side there is the straightforward concept of stability in which democracy plays the second fiddle. Which elements within the dilemma can’t be explained from a realist perspective and which elements can’t?

R e a l i s m

In its core realism takes the international state system as an anarchic system, there is no overarching nominator that has the ultimate power to determine the course of state action. Realism takes the state as the principal actor within the international system and because the system is anarchic and it is the state’s responsibility to secure its survival while it is under constant threat of other states (Dunne and Schmidt

2011:86,87).

To be able to survive in such an environment it is an absolute necessity for a state to accumulate power. In its abstract form power associates with two points. “First, power is a relational concept; one does not exercise power in a vacuum, but in relation to another entity. Second, power is a relative concept: calculations need to be made not only about one’s own power capabilities, but about the power that other state actors possess.” (Dunne and Schmidt 2011:94)

So for a state to be absolute certain it will survive in an anarchic system it needs to build up enough power in relation to another entity to be sure the other entity will not threaten its existence. The ability of a state to acquire power capabilities or power, can relate to several things that ultimately increase your power. In that way there are certain interests or sources of power a state can try to pursue. These sources can be anything and will relate to the power a state has over others in infinite ways. In its most simple form power is military power. Other sources of power can be financial, so a state will be

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18 able to support its military or technologic advancement, so it will provide a state with military technological capabilities that will outstand others or give the state an economic compatible advantage. Another source of power can be alliances. States can form alliances with other states to be sure they have enough power to withstand a mutual enemy of threat.

In the case of the democratization stabilization dilemma several elements can be seen as being realist because they contribute or threaten a state’s security. The spread of violence or terrorism from unstable regions can be felt in its closest proximity. France therefor can have a different perception of threat than Germany has and possibly other strategies towards stability. Migration is another element that can be perceived as a threat to state security because it is associated with factors that can cause a society to destabilize. Migration can cause societal instability because it can cause xenophobia to rise or immigrants will not integrate very well in a society causing more cleavages and instability. Other elements of security accompanied with migration are possibly

threatening social security and welfare state philosophy because migrants might not be willing to pay taxes if they do not feel that others share the same values. Finally a state’s internal security might be at risk while crime rates among immigrants are higher than among native population and different criminal and even terrorist networks might use illegal migration channels to penetrate a country (Kicinger 2004:2).

Research design

“To what extent have the Arab Uprisings influenced the foreign policies of Germany and France towards the Southern Mediterranean with respect to the democratization stabilization dilemma?”

The focus of the research will be on the underlying elements that constitute the democratization stabilization dilemma within the EMP. The hypothesis is that these elements are coming from differences of identity between France and Germany as part of their strategic culture. The reason Germany and France are selected is because of their importance within the EU. Their standing towards specific policies are perceived to

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19 be decisive and without their consent common EU policies will not be viable (Behr

2012:91).

In its origin, the ‘dilemma’ is an effect of two contradictory goals within the EMP; democracy and stability. It is a dilemma that expresses because the outcomes of democratic transitions will conflict with EU’s aim for a stable neighborhood. The EU perceives an agenda for democratization threatening because unstable and chaotic transitions could increase the likelihood of direct effects such as violence, migration and terrorism. Indirectly the European Union has also perceived political Islam as a possible threat because of the impression political Islam disapproves Western values and

democracy (Jünemann 2007:271; Behr 2008:4).

While Germany and France are thought of as indispensable contributors to EU foreign policy and at the same time antagonists in the way they mingle in the Middle East is interesting to know in what way they are contributing to this dilemma and if it has changed in comparison to their practices prior to the Arab Uprisings. Therefor it is

necessary to distinguish between elements that contribute to the dilemma. I perceive the dilemma on two different relational spheres of analysis. First I differentiate between state-to-state relations and state-to-society relations. Within the level of state-to-state relations cooperation with other states within the context of the European Union or the Southern Mediterranean will be included. More specifically the fact that member states can travel different paths of engagement apart from the EU can be an indication they have a bias towards multilateralism or unilateralism. On this level of analysis I will also incorporate a state’s tradition of engagement with the Southern Mediterranean. Thirdly the policies that apply to the Southern Mediterranean that contribute to a state’s stability will be included on this level. I will differentiate on these policies within the paragraphs of ´Democratization’ and ‘Stabilization’.

On the state-to-society level analysis the perception of political Islam and the role of civil society that Germany and France have will be the variables to conclude in what ways these visions have altered before and after the Arab Uprisings.

How is this to be measured? To answer this question an analysis will be made of the strategic culture of Germany and France on the variables of historic state relations, their policies on democracy promotion and political Islam. The period before the Arab

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20 Uprisings start with France’s first political engagement with the region since their

occupation of Egypt. The turning point in this research are the Arab Uprisings that started symbolically with the self-inflammation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December the 17th_{2010 and will introduce the second period of analysis (Al Jazeera 2011a, 2011b).}

The focus of the research on the end of the Middle East will be the countries that have taken part in the Arab Uprisings or what I have been calling the Southern

Mediterranean; Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria. All these countries have taken part in the uprisings to some degree with different outcomes. In general Tunisia is the most promising country in its political transformation, while Egypt have slid somewhat back into its old ways. Libya is still in a state of chaos with numerous violent groups

threatening the state’s internal stability and Algeria’s state regime seems to be untouched and successfully crashed its uprisings.

For the part of the respective strategic cultures of France and Germany I will rely on existing literature and quantative variables. Other sources are strategy papers or ‘Whitepapers’ of German and France governments before and after the Arab Uprisings to see in what way they are engaging with elements of the democratization stabilization differently and possibly coping with the characteristics of the Uprisings.

Another important indicator for democratization are funds that are dispersed through Official Development Aid and are aimed structures that contribute to

democracy. Richard Youngs (2006) has applied the same method and he is comparing these funds in the years far before the Uprisings. To see whether the Uprisings have influenced the contribution of Germany or France with respect to democracy it is possible to compare the amount of funds in this specific area. The funds that are compared are named Government & Civil Society which are in favor of an agenda that pushes for democracy instead of stability. These subjects will be outlined in its deeper context in the next two paragraphs. Finally another element of the research consists of interviews held with representatives of the German and French government at the EU to determine how they perceive the outcomes and demands of the Arab Uprisings in

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D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n

In this paragraph the elements that will contribute to a democracy agenda will be outlined. First democratization at the level of state-to-state relations will be set out and secondly the same will be done at the level of state-to-society relations.

In her article ‘Democracy and Conceptual Contestability’ Milja Kurki is writing about the way the European Union has considered the concept of democracy towards its promotion onto the Middle East. She states that the EU has a preference for a liberal democracy and it is this kind of democracy the EU promotes when encountering

countries in its European Mediterranean Partnership. She states that liberal democracy promotion entails: “[…] certain key liberal democratic procedures – encompassing electoral processes and institutionalization of rule of law, freedoms of expression, press and association. Increasing agreement also exists on the view that these ‘procedural’ aspects of liberal democracy promotion should go along with encouragement of respect for ‘liberal democratic cultural values’, such as belief in rights of the individual,

toleration, consensus-building, and the legitimacy of liberal democratic procedural governance (Smith 1994; Burnell 2000; Obama 2006; Diamond 2008)” (Kurki 2010:363).

Behr is adding some other elements that the EU prescribes as merits of deep

democracy in his article about European democracy promotion after the ‘Arab Spring’

(Behr 2012:8). One of these elements is about a people partnership that focuses on civil society cooperation and development as an essential part of this process. Civil society has been a substantial part of EU’s democracy promotion before, but since the Arab Uprisings there seems to be a renewed interest for the concept with a critical eye to the connections it has with the government of the partner country. According to Behr the EU is more aware of the need for civil society organizations to be independent from the government for it to have the dynamics valuable towards democracy. Finally in

accordance with other scholars such as Dillman the EU and its members should seek to promote inclusive growth instead of exclusive. Inclusive growth is economic growth aimed at sustainable development and socio-economic equality for middle and lower classes instead of a unbridled focus on liberalization of markets that attributed oversees

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22 governments with more freedom and agility to cope, through co-optation (see Albrecht et al. under ‘Stabilization’), with pressures that contested their internal legitimacy.

When we set out the funds that are associated with Government & Civil Society provided by the OECD, these funds contribute to the following concepts within state society relation and are in line with aspects of focus described by Kurki and Behr;

 Democratic participation and Civil society  Public finance management

 Anti-corruption organizations and institutions  Legal and judicial development

 Elections

 Legislatures and political parties  Human rights

 Women’s equality organizations and institutions (OECD 2015)

S t a b i l i z a t i o n

On the other side of the spectrum of democratization is the authoritarian regime and stability. In the case of the suggested research, policies that are labeled as

promoting stabilization should be aimed at keeping the regime in place. One could argue that not challenging the regime or withholding from interfering witch its politics is one way of contributing to its stability. These kind of politics could be interpreted as a passive form of contributing to a state’s stability. To point out what other kind of

measures in certain policies will contribute to regime stability it needs to be determined what instruments such a regime is using for that effort. An article of Albrecht and Schlumberger is giving insights about how a regime is being able to do so what instruments are sustaining them. The article they write, is about the regime change in the Middle East and starts with the statement that every political system in the Middle East is repressive and authoritarian in nature. The circumstances under which these regimes are contested and through which forces regime change is induced, comes forth out of two long term variables. One is economic and the other is political. The likelihood of political change is mounting when economic resources are becoming scarcer. From

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23 this point their second premise follows, which states that in times of scarcity regimes are screening with democratic and neoliberal policies to retain legitimacy and power. It is therefore that legitimacy is in the eyes of Albrecht and Schlumberger is at the core of every non-democratic regime, because in its nature of not being democratic it needs to find other sources of legitimacy or rely on repression to keep power. (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2010:372) In examining legitimacy and its sources Albrecht and Schlumberger are differentiating between internal and external legitimacy. Internal legitimacy is referring to the support a regime is getting from its domestic society. In this case the legitimacy consists of a combination of allocative power through international rent income, such as oil and gas, but also from donor aid. Other concepts are based on religious identities or other collectivist ideologies such as “revolutionary” identities, as is the case of Libya for example or pan-Arabic identities. (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2010:376) The external dimension of legitimation strategies is linked to structural global ideologies as liberalism and democracy and the amount of support a country is getting by international actors or states.

Besides legitimacy regimes in the Middle East other proven methods are

coopting politically relevant elites. They are the pillars of the political process according to the two scholars. A regime can simply reward loyal elite members by keeping them at their post, while other are changed from position to position on a regular basis. With these tactics the state is trying to stay on power and withholding elite members from developing an independent power base within the governmental structure.

The channels and mechanisms for Middle Eastern regimes in these positions to change elites have altered as well because of reforms initiate in line with EMP

requirements. The outcome of these factors according to Albrecht et al. is shown by the fact that elites nowadays are ascending from private-sector businesses made possible indirectly by liberal reforms. “In turn, many elite members with a bureaucratic or military background have started to run private businesses.” (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2010:379) Albrecht et al. underline that for a part or in times regimes are depending on aid and that it so far has been Western aid in most of the cases. It is not unthinkable that these regimes might rely on other ideological grants than on Western democratic and neoliberal ones they received so far, but it does show that these states are not as

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24 independent as they look and reforms accompanying their grants are effecting there way of conducting politics and even changing its elites members.

So a few important issues are accompanied with state stability. That is external legitimacy and state structures that enables elites to stay in power by dispersing money and power.

Pre Arab Uprisings

In this chapter I will start off with the analysis on Germany and France in the period prior to the Arab Uprisings on three different variables. First I will set out the strategic cultures on the state-to-state level; multilateralism vs unilateralism, the degree of engagement with the Middle East and finally their mutual agenda on democracy and its outlooks. Within these paragraphs focus will be on the relevant views of state-to-society elements such political Islam, civil state-to-society and human rights. The hypothesis that is followed within the chapter is that differences on the perception of cooperation has hindered Germany and France to work on a mutual frame in the context of the European Union. France’s history of engagement within the Southern Mediterranean differs from Germany in a substantial way. The ‘natural’ focus of both members states relate to their mutual geographical position. Finally an assessment of their democracy agenda over time will be made in a qualitative and quantative way.

G e r m a n y’ s c u l t u r e o f m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m

The end of the Second World War (WWII) is one of the most essential moments in the modern history of Germany with a substantial impact on German society. The war had drawn some substantial scars throughout the country of which the most major cities lay in ruins, millions of Germans had lost their lives and almost 12 million people had to flee their homes in Eastern Germany. The chaos in which the country was left was only one side of the effect the end of the War had on German society according to Sophia Becker (2013:13). The other side was characterized by the experience of German society with the end of the war and its aftermath. The unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht (Germany’s army) and the occupation of the allied forces in the years after the war would were a prelude to the antimilitarism and multilateralism that would

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25 characterize German strategic culture (Becker 2013:13). Two underlying mechanisms are worthwhile to mention in this matter. One is that in the last days of the Third Reich the leaders of the NSDAP initiated an aggressive wave of propaganda proclaiming the total war until the very end. The propaganda was sided by the coercion of seniors and children to join the remaining forces in a final suicidal attempt to stop the allied forces. “Klaus-Dittmar Henke describes how this fanatical terrorism against the own population was to a degree a denazifying shock therapy and a healthful lesson about the true character of the regime.” (Becker 2013:15) These experiences and the escape and wave of suicides of leading NSDAP figures, including Hitler himself, upon arrival of the allied forces. These acts delegitimized the heroic ideology the regime once stood for including their militaristic culture. It were these circumstances that led the Germans to a path of multilateralism and international cooperation as the only way to gain leverage on the international stage. Through this form of international cooperation and

multilateralism Germany was forcefully trying to absent itself from another Sonderweg, the separate path Germany took and ultimately leaded to the emergence of the Third

Reich (Becker 2013:17).

The Cold War period that lay ahead “solidified” German’s multilateralism and things started to change for the country with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the

reunification of East and West Germany. It marks the start of what Becker is referring to as the pursuit of continuity in a changed environment. The end of the bipolar system, that characterized the Cold War, introduced another more differentiated international landscape with more intrastate conflicts opposed to interstate. The first occasion where Germany was asked to help out its Western allies was in the first Gulf War. It declined the US’ call for troop deployment and instead contributed in a logistical, financial and rhetoric support of the mission. It even relieved the US from its naval presence in the Mediterranean sea by sending ships so the US was able to move its navy to the mission in the Gulf.

Germany’s preference for multilateralism is still an important factor in today’s foreign policy. The will of Germany to cooperate through the EU is in contrast to the way France is cooperating within the EU and is surfacing in relation to the Southern

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F r a n c e c u l t u r e o f u n i l a t e r a l i s m

Just like Germany reinvented its strategic culture right after WWII so did France. German defeat in WWII, the process of demilitarization and de-nazification in the aftermath of the war and Gemany’s focus on evading another Sonderweg set the country on the road of multilateralism. The fact that France belonged to the “winning” side of the war had a different impact, but did not necessarily injected the French with a winning mood. One could argue that the post WWII traumas didn’t apply to France in the same manner as it did to Germany, but that analogy would be too simple. France also experienced the traumatic effects of the WWII. Above all the occupation of its European rival, combined with the total inefficiency of French resistance to German troops was desolating for a country that once thought of itself as a great power. That diminishing feeling of superiority of the French took another fall when the country was excluded by its allied war victors from the Yalta conference where the future balance of power was settled (Skemperis 2003:18).

Although France was taking hits in reality about their international status the new French strategic culture that was founded directly after WWII during the Fourth Republic remained alike its culture before. The dominant elements of that culture which survived the First and Second World War was the self-image of France as an empire and the grandeur that accompanied such an empire. This contradicted starkly with the position France was given in the international stage of world politics, although one could argue that the French position was not undermined due to its seat in the Security Council. For the French themselves and its elites nothing really changed about the righteousness of France’s status. De Gaulle and his government chose again for an imperialist ideology as a part of the culture to re-establish their legitimacy and the pursuit of France’s recovery. This ideology was linked to the grandeur and prestige of France and French national identity (Skemperis 2013:19). While the attempt of France to re-establish itself pivotal in world power politics the ways through which France thought to accomplish that had devastating effects. Skemperis underlines in this respect the loss of 70.000 French soldiers in the ten year war (1945-1954) in Indochina. Another example of the outdated image of France and its imperial policies, is its struggle to suppress Algeria by military force. The French persistence in Algeria lost broad public support in France

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27 after it became public that French forces were responsible for torturing their opponents. It shows to what lengths France was willing to go to restate its position and how strong that image was settled within its culture.

Two other elements made their way into France’s strategic culture in this period. Skemperis defines these elements as the German partnership and Franco-American rivalry. The idea behind the partnership was that under the leading role of France, there would be a third autonomous power block between the US and the Soviet Union. This block would be formed by European nations, which also included Great Brittain, and would temper US influence in Europe, but restate France’s ambition of being a grand power as the leader of such a block (George 1999:19). These notions of anti-Americanism stayed within France’s strategic culture under de Gaulle’s successors, but less harsh according to Skemperis (2013:21). President Miterand, who was

considered as the most pro-American French president of the Cold War, welcomed for example the deployment of US weaponry on European soil, but not in France. In line with this argument and closer to France interests in the Middle East, Miterand didn’t allow US aircrafts to use French airspace on their way to Libya (Skemperis 2013:21).

The French cold war strategic culture didn’t change in the 90’s according to Skemperis. The politics of grandeur, a special relationship with Germany and anti-American rivalry continued to be the basic elements of that culture and on several occasions had a great impact on foreign policy decisions. The legacy of president Chirac is considered to be a smart update on the basic notion of these elements and taken as a reason for denying its support of the 2003 US war in Iraq.

Yet even when time has entered the 21st_{century France is still very much}

occupied by the idea of regaining its former status. According to Delgado it is the obsession of de Gaulle with France’s grandeur that “[…] still echoes and has roots in the heart of society and in the works of academia. No other country has generated such an extensive literature of this kind.” (Delgado 2011:39) Delgado states that this period of reflecting on France’s diminishing status as super power within the literature has lasted for more than 20 years. The height of that period during the last term of former president Chirac. The election of the next French president Sarkozy was again imbued with a legacy that was based on the revival of France’s status. The obsession of France with

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28 this part of its strategic culture have not always smoothened their paths on the

European continent. The Union For the Mediterranean (UfM) has been an example of such; “The ‘activism’ of Sarkozy was associated with what Brussels has traditionally considered to be France’s main fault – arrogance” (Lequesne 2008:6-7). The strong position of the president in France’s foreign policy and the effects thereof such as the example can be seen as part of the longer tradition its strategic culture. Certainly when we take the UfM into that analysis. French politics in the Middle East has been part of that same tradition and as part of its strategy to reinstate its ambition of an empire and world power.

Although France has been part of European integration in the same way

Germany is, France has always appreciated its status of a powerful state and pursued a foreign policy that was in accordance of that status. This path of a more unilateral

foreign policy, apart from the European common foreign policy initiatives such as the entire Barcelona Process is an example of that.

G e r m a n r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e M i d d l e E a s t

The geopolitical situation of Germany in the late nineteenth century prevented it from developing any colonial ambitions in the Middle East. Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary and Russia imbued it with the interest in preserving the status quo in the Middle East and to prevent a change in the region from disturbing the balance of power in Europe (Behr 2008:86). The low profile on the Middle East for Germany stayed the same in the aftermath of WW II and promoted greater US engagement in the region. On the other hand the then president of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, realized the need to develop a close relationship with the state of Israel as a moral prerogative. This led to a special relationship with Germany and the sibling Israeli state. The Wassenaar

agreement turned Germany into one of Israel’s main aid and trade partners and finally led to a secret arms delivery program. In 1965 the program was revealed and it turned to the worst diplomatic crisis between Germany and the Arab world (Behr 2008:86). The crisis did not lead to a change of relationship between Germany and Israel, but the growing reliance of Germany on Middle Eastern oil did change its stance on the Middle East. A new Middle Eastern policy was, which was simply called Ostpolitik (politics of the East), created by the new German government of Willy Brandt. It was a policy that

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29 was implied with more balance, Ausgewogenheit, and soon became the new paradigm of Germany towards the Middle East. Although balanced, the support for Israel

remained somewhat contradicting the evenhandedness towards other countries in the region. Germany remained supportive to the state of Israel in an uneven fashion when compared to other Middle Eastern countries. It kept on supporting them with arms deliveries, intelligence cooperation and financial compensation for the WWII. On the other hand Germany have also been Iran’s most important negotiating partner in the West ever since even against the reluctance of the US and Israel.

In contrast to France Germany seems to be less discriminating towards Islamic governments and groups. The main focus of Germany in encountering these sort of new forces in the region was the possibility of change and gradual transitions to democracy. Behr states that these kind of approaches subscribes to the notion of Germany being a ‘civilian power’ and has traditionally put a strong emphasis on the promotion of human rights and democracy. According to Youngs, Germany has been among the world’s leading donors in these areas, although he doesn’t provide figures of US aid in his article to support that claim (Youngs 2006:20). For reference see table 2, where US aid has been added for comparison.

While German concerns over Middle Eastern instability and its impact on Europe have been the same as France’s according to Behr, Germany has traditionally relied on other methods to fight it. In this respect Behr give examples of civil society, positive conditionality and public diplomacy as instruments to cope with these views (2013:87). With the end of the Cold War the debates about German’s likely new forms of foreign policy was focused on the question if Germany would change to a ‘normal’ power instead of staying ‘civilian’. At first continuity seemed imminent and Germany stayed away of Middle Eastern politics in general, supported US hegemony in the region and left European linked concerns about Middle Eastern politics over to the French. Over time though German policy makers grew weary of new security challenges posed by Middle Eastern instability reinforced by the eradication of EU internal borders through the Schengen accords (Jünemann 2005:112). German southern borders were now effectively located at the strait of Gibraltar and couldn’t afford it any longer to isolate itself from events happening in the Middle East and leave its security concerns to the

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30 French. Slowly Germany started to change their approach to the Middle East. They stayed, unlike France, more open to Islamic forces and movements, but withhold from their unconditional support to US hegemony. This change was marked by Germany’s open objection from US’ plans to invade Iraq in 2003 (Behr 2012:90/91). The US was no longer regarded as the guarantor for stability in the region, but its actions were seen as fanning regional crises that threatened to spill into Europe. The post 9/11 era pushed Germany, like many other European states, into a securitization agenda. Although the terrorist Islamic threat was growing it didn’t withhold Germany to continue its tradition of dialogue with the Islamic world. The Schröder government that was in power at the time even initiated the Dialog mit dem Islam and instituted that habit. The program is lauded for its innovative strength that comes from its engagement with local Islamic

characterized civil society. Although it is much easier for the EU and any of its members to cooperate with elitist secular partners they are not representative for those societies. Therefor there has been a growing awareness that Islamic civil society has to be

integrated in any political process. Not only because they almost make up for the only political opposition throughout the region and filling the vacuum of incompetent corrupt governments, they are also deeply rooted in society through their charitable

engagement.

F ra n c e ’ s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e M i d d l e E a s t

Within the EU France entertains the oldest and closest diplomatic relations with the Islamic world (Behr 2012:83). Since Napoleon lost his Egyptian outpost to the British in 1801, the French developed a historical emotional band with the region. The French armies that lost the war of Great Brittain were later used by the French government for its expeditionary force in Algiers. Military plans were developed on the basis of the army’s experience in Egypt and even the institutions that were supposed to “govern the natives” were based on the institutions built in the time France was occupying Egypt (Silverstein 2002:2). In this way the French government and its military grew a social connection to North Africa where they maintained protectorates in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Thomas 1998:325). In the early years of the 20th_{century France considered}

North Africa, or Maghreb, as part of their empire that would enable France to be a great power and be able to withhold European powers to threaten France. When the French

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31 were losing battles from the German armies and while they complemented the French armies with soldiers out of their protectorates they realized their survival didn’t depend on them (Thomas 1998:327). This idea of a French empire started to decline in the aftermath of World War Two, but the connection between France and the region of the Maghreb stayed. With the conceded defeat by de Gaulle in the Algerian War of

independence the French empire started to fall. While France’s commitment to a

mission civilisatrice in the Middle East has often been questioned, its historic

engagement with the region gave generations of French policy makers the impression that France has a special role and obligation to the region (Behr 2012:84; Silverstein 2002:4). Any successive government that surpassed since France gave up its

protectorates tried to initiate new policy paradigms through which France Maghreb relations were portrayed. De Gaulle started off with the transformation of France from a “[...] colonial bully to a champion of national independence to secure the benefits for France that it had derived from its colonial Empire; commercial privileges, a claim to Great Power status and a renewed sense of mission in the world” (Behr 2012:84). Apart from its commercial strategic interests French political leaders identified ideological nodes between the Middle Eastern states and the French republican state model as well. Algerian socialism and Iraq Bathism were seen as close relatives to the French governmental system in so far that leaders from the right to the left political spectrum contributed to the formation of close personal ties between French policy makers and ‘progressive’ Arab leaders.

One of the mounting reasons and encouragements of French approach towards secular Arab leaders was the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the emergence of political Islam. According to Behr there are two particular reasons why de Gaulle, who was president at the time and founder of the French politique arabe, took such a stance towards political Islam. First the political generation of de Gaulle saw political Islam as an imminent threat to its progressive Arab allies and French foreign policy in the region. Secondly de Gaulle was imbued with a deep sense of skepticism towards all ideological movements. French therefor support Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and sought to halt the advance of political Islam in the Maghreb. These policies were enforced through the Islamization of France’s Muslim population at home and terrorist attacks on French soil.

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32 This religious motivated form of political ideology was also in stark contrast with the French idea of lacité (the strict division of state and religion) which is another reason why political Islam did not harmonize with France’s view on governmentality. The operationalization of France’s politique arabe was not only based on direct connection with Arab regimes or cultural conditionality, it was also based on a disregard for civil society.

Following the end of the Cold War and the US-led campaign to liberate Kuwait it seemed that France’s standing in the Middle East was over. Its influence in an

increased US dominated region was diminishing and it appeared that France was looking at the process of EU integration as a solution. According to Behr France

pursued several European initiatives to reinforce France’s standing in the region and to guard against its loss of international relevance (Behr 2012:88). However, the election of Jacques Chirac in 1995 as the new French president led to a return to a French Arab policy that was in line with its former tradition invented by de Gaulle. Chirac was

determined to reverse France’s marginalization in the region and to reduce the hegemony of the US in the region. The French presence in the region during the

presidency of Chirac was marked by a revival. More than ever French policies were run by a tightly intertwined network of French and Arab policy makers and businesspeople, which has been established during the Cold War (Behr 2012:88).

The expectations of France’s policy changes regarding the Arab world with the election of Sarkozy was again filled with ambiguity. On the one hand Bernard Kouchner, France’s foreign minister under Sarkozy, promised a break with Gaullist traditions

underlining the pursuit of a humanitarian agenda, economic development and the promotion of democratic principles over French interests. On the other hand there is also a break regarding the Muslim community in France which has traditionally been played by Arab states on the invitation of the French government. Sarkozy and his administration have acknowledged that letting Arab states handle the French Muslim community has increased radicalization of that community. So taking matters into his own hands, Sarkozy established the Council on Muslim Faith which signaled a turning point in state Islam relation at home, but did not alter France’s stance on political Islam abroad. This point is underlined by a statement of Sarkozy reflecting on the Algerian

The Arab uprisings and renewed European democracy agendas