Comparing the Chinese Perspective on the Security
Threat Posed by North Korea Before and After the
Third Nuclear Test: A Framing Approach
By Madeleine Heuer
B.A. (Politics and Administration)
University of Konstanz, 2013
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master in Political Science with a Specialization in International Relations
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Julia Bader
University of Amsterdam
Abstract Abbreviations
List of Graphs
Content
1. Introduction 1 2. The On-‐going Internal Debate on China’s North Korea Policy 4 3. Foundations of Empirical Analysis 8 3.1. Theoretical Framework: Social Constructivism 8 3.2. Analytical Framework: Entman’s Framing Approach 9 4. Methodology 11
4.1. Method and Data 11 4.2. Disadvantages of the Method 12 5. Analysis of Articles about China’s North Korea Policy and the Sino-‐North
Korean Relations 14 5.1. North Korea’s Economic Backwardness: the Root of the Security Threat Posed by North Korea 17 5.2. China’s Top Priority: Regional Stability in East Asia 20 5.3. North Korea: The Troublemaker 31 5.4. The Current Struggle: To Maintain or Adjust China’s North Korea 35 Policy?
5.5. Summary of Findings 39 6. Conclusion 41 References 48
Abstract
China’s North Korea Policy is one of the most controversial foreign policy issues among the Chinese political leadership. While China is often portrayed as North Korea’s patronage in the international media, the third nuclear test conducted in 2013 has in fact triggered a heated internal debate in China on how to deal with North Korea. The main dispute revolves around whether North Korea is a valuable strategic buffer against US containment or a liability that will increasingly lead to the violation of China’s interests. This thesis seeks to identify the perspective of the Chinese political elite on the security threat posed by North Korea and related topics. Additionally, it aims at assessing whether this perspective has changed significantly since the third nuclear test. Based on Entman’s Framing approach, newspaper articles published by The Global Times on China’s North Korea policy and the Sino-‐North Korean relationship have been analyzed. This thesis reveals that several major points distinguish the Chinese perspective on North Korea from others. For example, China views North Korea’s economic backwardness as the root cause of its nuclear proliferation as it constitutes to its perception of insecurity. This explains the broad approach in dealing with North Korea including bilateral efforts, economic engagement, the Six Party Talks and supporting UN sanctions. Furthermore, China perceives the US to be the most influential actor in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear issue. Moreover, the thesis suggests that North Korea is more and more perceived as a burden since the third nuclear test. Therefore, adjusting China’s North Korea policy is increasingly viewed as a viable option.
Abbreviations
CCP Chinese Communist Party
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea GDP gross domestic product
PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China UN United Nations
US United States
Charts
Chart 1: Problem Definition of the Security Threat Posed by North Korea 16 Chart 2: Emphasized Aspects Concerning the Sino-‐North Korean Relationship 19 Chart 3: Problematic Effects and Conditions of North Korea’s Nuclear Proliferation 21 Chart 4: Key Actor in Solving the Security Threat Posed by North Korea 23 Chart 5: China’s Moral Judgment of North Korea before the Third Nuclear Test 31 Chart 6: China’s Moral Judgment of North Korea after the Third Nuclear Test 31 Chart 7: Labeling of North Korea 34 Chart 8: Suggested Remedies to the Security Threat Posed by North Korea 36
1 1. Introduction
In terms of security, stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula have traditionally been a core interest of China due to its geostrategic position (Han 2012, p. 1). Therefore, it has always made sure to maintain control over the peninsula interfering whenever another power invaded the territory, including Japan and the UN (Zhan & Lee 2012, p. 64). This has so far led to four interventions since the 16th century (Han 2012, p. 1).
Motivated by security concerns and the rivaling ideologies dividing the Eastern bloc and the West during the Cold War, the most recent dispute that led to its intervention was the Korean War (Edwards 2010, p. liiff). Even though China’s sphere of influence has since been pushed back to the northern part its strategic interest in North Korea as a buffer against the US remains. In this manner, the potential loss of China’s influence on the Korean Peninsula is generally perceived as an expansion of the US threat to North, East and Northeast China, especially because the Korean Peninsula is regarded as a crucial spot for the US Asian and Pacific strategy of containing the Chinese. In addition to that, if the Northeast area became the focus of Beijing’s security concerns, it would mean a distraction from dealing with Taiwan, southeast marine territory rights and other considerations of strategic interest. Therefore, maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula will remain one of China’s core interests (Zhan & Lee 2012, pp. 65). Pyongyang’s assertive military behavior in the past years, including the sinking of Cheonan and the shelling of the Yeonpyeong islands in 2010, and its increasingly apparent commitment to become a nuclear state since the third nuclear test have considerably raised Beijing’s concerns about the security threat posed by North Korea (Han 2012, p. 1). On the one hand, Beijing has shown its commitment to deal with North Korea’s nuclear issue through hosting the Six Party Talks since 2003, supporting UN sanctions in the aftermath of the second and third nuclear test, and bilateral efforts to dissuade it from pursuing its nuclear plan (Pardo 2012, pp. 339). On the other hand, Beijing has continuously been supporting Kim’s regime, which it has been much criticized for by the international community. Washington has continuously blamed Beijing for not exerting enough influence on Pyongyang,
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pointing out that the survival of North Korea heavily depends on China (Lee 2012, p. 1).
Due to the ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, as much as North Korea’s provocations have been stressed in the international media China’s role has also been highlighted in this context (Lee 2012, p. 1). In the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong, the Chinese government not only abstained from publicly condemning North Korea, it even impeded the UN Security Council from denouncing it (Duchâtel & Schell 2013, p. 13). Moreover, China was not only the first country to offer its condolences to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) when Kim Jong-Il died, but also the first to confirm his successor Kim Jong Un. In addition, Beijing summoned ambassadors from the participating countries of the Six Party Talks just within a few hours after Pyongyang declared Kim Jong Il’s death warning them not to provoke Pyongyang. The personal visit to the North Korean Embassy of Hu Jintao and other top members of the Politburo further signaled the importance of Pyongyang for Beijing to the outside world (Lee 2012, p. 6).
However, what is usually excluded from the international media is the fact that the second nuclear test in 2009 has triggered a heated internal debate among the Chinese leadership on whether China should abandon North Korea, although the decision was made against this proposal. This debate was revived after the third nuclear test. In this sense, the Sino-North Korean relationship remains one of the most controversial foreign policy topics among the Chinese political elite. Chinese experts on Korea have privately expressed that it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve a consensus on how to deal with North Korea as the views on Pyongyang have become more and more pluralistic (Lee 2012, pp. 2).
Considering that Pyongyang’s regime is heavily dependent on China and that various efforts including the Six Party Talks have failed in making Pyongyang give up its nuclear proliferation, finding a solution to the Korean security crisis without Chinese support is unrealistic. Therefore, understanding China’s perspective on and attitude towards the DPRK that shape its North Korea policy are absolutely crucial for all the involved parties to increase the effectiveness of their cooperation. From the perspective of South Korea, deepening its knowledge about China’s perspective
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is also particularly important with regard to its goal of a Korean unification, which is highly unlikely to happen without Beijing’s support. However, China has traditionally regulated debates on its Korea policy (Choi & Kim 2014) and there is a lack of books, articles, documents and other sources that reveal the view of China’s political elite (Zhan & Lee 2012, p. 63).
The aim of this thesis is to assess the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the security threat posed by North Korea by using a framing approach to analyze Chinese media coverage on China’s North Korea policy and the Sino-North Korean relations. Particular attention is given to whether there has been a considerable shift after the third nuclear test as the heated internal debate on Beijing’s North Korea policy indicates. Thus, the main research questions covered in this thesis are:
1. What characterizes the Chinese perspective on the security threat posed by North Korea, differentiating it from others?
2. Has the Chinese perspective on the security threat posed by North Korea significantly changed in the aftermath of the third nuclear test conducted by North Korea?
In order to show what distinguishes the Chinese perspective from others, I have compared it to that of the US as it is a key actor in dealing with North Korea and highly influential with regard to the perceptions of its allies and the international community.
By dealing with this topic through a framing approach, this thesis contributes to the current international debate on China’s North Korea policy in three ways. Firstly, it facilitates the assessment of the different understandings of the security threat posed by North Korea between Beijing and the international community. Secondly, it is conducive to deepening the rationale behind Beijing’s North Korea policy, contributing to explaining the different approaches conducted by Beijing and Washington and its allies. Thirdly, it contributes to assessing the increasingly wide range of options that Beijing considers in dealing with Pyongyang, which are in fact not as narrow as most international observers believe.
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Overall, my findings show that China views North Korea’s economic backwardness as the main cause of its proliferation and nuclear ambitions because it induces its feeling of insecurity. It has therefore pursued a broad approach towards tackling the security threat posed by Kim’s regime based on economic support, bilateral efforts and a multilateral strategy including the Six Party Talks and supporting UN sanctions. This distinguishes Beijing’s understanding and proceedings from Washington, who treats diverse problems related to North Korea as separate issues. Furthermore, two perceptions explain the increasing emphasis on the multilateral approach in the aftermath of the third nuclear test: Beijing’s increasingly perceived lack of influence on Pyongyang and the belief that Washington holds the biggest leverage over Kim’s regime.
Moreover, compared to the period before the incident North Korea is increasingly viewed as a burden, rather than a valuable strategic asset. Thus, adjusting China’s North Korea policy is increasingly perceived as a viable option. This gives hope for Washington and its allies that Beijing may put a bigger pressure on Pyongyang to give up nukes or that it will even be willing to abandon North Korea in the future, although this seems less likely.
This thesis is structured as follows: the next section provides an overview of the on-going internal debate in China on its North Korea policy. Subsequently, I present the foundations for my empirical analysis. At first, I briefly present the theory of social constructivism, which provides the theoretical basis for my analytical framework. I then continue with introducing this framework, namely Entman’s framing approach. Afterwards, I give an account of the methodology and data used for my empirical analysis and discuss the disadvantages of my method. I further proceed with the presentation of my results. In my conclusion I reflect on these findings and formulate implications for how the effectiveness of cooperation with China with regard to dealing with the security threat posed by North Korea can be increased.
2. The On-going Internal Debate on China’s North Korea Policy
Pyongyang’s third nuclear test conducted in February 2013 has further complicated the already tense Sino-North Korean relationship and revived the big debate on China’s North Korea policy in the country and among elites (Bajoria & Xu 2014). In
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the past, the fact that North Korea is a socialist country, the aspect of shared ideology, played a crucial role in establishing and maintaining close relationships with Pyongyang. However, this relationship has been seriously burdened since Kim Jung Il became the leader of North Korea in 1995 due to North Korea’s confrontational and provocative behavior (Shambaugh 2003, pp. 43).
The Chinese have been focusing on convincing North Korea to abstain from nuclear proliferation and instead take a path of economic reform of opening-up similar to China, describing their relationship with Pyongyang with the idiom kukou poxin, which means to urge someone repeatedly with good intentions. However, China seems to increasingly question its influence on North Korea, especially after witnessing Pyongyang’s aggressive and unpredictable behavior since Kim Jong Un has taken over the country including the pre-emptive nuclear strike threats, the execution of Jang Song Taek, China’s primary channel into the North, and its continuation of its nuclear program. This has retriggered the policy debate on whether Beijing should change its North Korea Policy (Xiao 2013). Although there is a lack of consensus among the Chinese elite on how to deal with North Korea, almost all agree that China’s main strategic goal- referring to China’s inner state and its foreign relations- is stability, especially with its neighboring countries, associated with preconditions for its “peaceful development” (Gill 2011).
A minority, also called the abandonment school, argues that Pyongyang has disappointed China too many times and emphasizes that Beijing should not allow North Korea to damage its security interests. This refers to the fact that Pyongyang’s brinkmanship supported the US in deepening its military presence in East Asia, which is clearly against Beijing’s interest. Proponents of this school ask: if North Korea does not respect China’s national interests, why should China support the North Korean regime? Thus, it is contended that China should accept the fact that a change in policy would risk degradation in the Sino-North Korean relationship. There have also been formal suggestions by strategists made in line with the ideas of this school (Xiao 2013). Deng Yuwen, an influential former commentary writer and Deputy Editor of the Central Party School’s journal Study
Times (Xuexi shibao), was suspended for his views expressed in the article “China
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argued that China should give up North Korea and facilitate the unification of Korea. Questioning Pyongyang’s intentions, he outlined a severe criticism of China’s North Korea policy and of Kim Jong Un’s regime rejecting the contention that North Korea provides a useful buffer against US containment. Instead, he illustrated Pyongyang as a dangerous neighbor, which will not pursue economic reforms and does not view China as a friendly ally. Furthermore, he emphasized that once Kim’s regime has developed nuclear weapons it may very well use it to blackmail China (Deng 2013).
In contrast, the majority seems to share the view that China should not abandon North Korea but rather make policy adjustments. You Ji, professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, argues that North Korea constitutes a strategic value for the Chinese as a buffer against US containment despite the troubled relationship between both countries. In fact, many Chinese share this view. Thus, North Korea is perceived as a fault zone regarding the Western encirclement of China, providing geographic and psychological comfort to the Chinese (You 2001, pp. 379). Shen Dingli of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University additionally adds that this enables China to focus more on the issue of Taiwan’s independence because the US will not have enough resources to deal with the Taiwan issue as long as North Korea remains (Bajoria & Xu 2014).
Thus, proponents of this view emphasize that China has a strategic interest in maintaining the status quo or achieving a peaceful Korean unification under the condition that it leads to the withdrawal of US troops on the peninsula, aiming for a Korea that is primarily pro China or neutral rather than pro US or pro Japanese. In this sense, it is argued that Beijing hopes to attain a unified Korea with a better relationship to China than its current relationships to both Koreas. As South Korea may have a major influence on whether China’s long term strategic interests will be met, China has been putting a lot of effort into developing better relations with South Korea. Despite Pyongyang’s objection, this has led to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul in 1992 since there is little doubt that a unification process will be dominated by Seoul (Ji 2001, p. 396). While Sino-South Korean relations have been flourishing, North Korea’s defiance of and
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dependence on China is increasingly being perceived as a burden, rather than a benefit. Despite the fact that Beijing is supporting the North Korean regime, Chinese and North Korean leaders currently barely have anything in common except for geographic proximity. Pyongyang has regarded China’s adjustment of economic reforms and improvement of its relationship to South Korea as a treachery of socialist ideals and betrayal of its traditional ties to North Korea. Thus, North Korea has become politically increasingly alienated from the Chinese (Snyder 2009, p. 2). The Chinese tabloid The Global Times confirmed that Beijing is annoyed and dissatisfied with North Korea and expressed that Beijing should correct Pyongyang’s attitude toward China, stating that „when Pyongyang’s acts seriously violate China’s interests, we will by no means indulge it.“ (The Global Times 2014). In this manner, it is contended that China needs to adjust its North Korea policy by responding to Pyongyang’s radical behavior which harms Chinese interests to make it correct its moves, especially as the regime is dependent on China’s friendliness (The Global Times 2014). This corresponds with a recently published report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Niu & Liu 2013) according to which it cannot be ruled out that China will be willing to abandon North Korea and support Korean unification if this proves to be beneficial to its security interests (Choi & Kim 2014). Overall, the main controversial aspect leading to the disagreement on how to deal with North Korea is whether it is primarily a useful buffer against US containment, or rather a burden. North Korea seems to be increasingly perceived as a liability rather than an asset, leading to suggestions that Beijing should cut its ties with its neighbor. Advocates of this view don’t primarily perceive a Korean unification as a threat but as a chance for pursuing Chinese interests (Choi &Kim 2014). However, this view is currently shared by a minority. The majority still regards the DPRK as a useful strategic buffer against US presence in East Asia. Proponents of this view contend that the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang needs to become a normal state-to-state relationship. Thus, it is argued that Beijing should up- or downgrade the level of the relationship according to its actual needs rather than maintaining a muddled or ambiguous relationship. In this manner, it is emphasized that China may offer what it wants and that North Korea has to respect China’s interests, pointing at a conditional support of the regime (Xiao 2013).
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In sum, there is a lack of consensus on how to deal with North Korea. This is related to diverging evaluations of North Korea’s strategic value. Those that regard it as a valuable buffer against US containment contend that Beijing should not abandon Pyongyang. However, North Korea seems to be increasingly perceived as a burden. Proponents of this view suggest that Beijing should adjust its North Korea policy and point out that it should not continue to support Kim’s regime unconditionally. Some even advocate that China should support a Korean unification as long as it does not lead to a violation of its security interests.
The following chapter deals with the foundations for my empirical analysis. I first present my theoretical framework, social constructivism. I then introduce Entman’s framing approach, which constitutes my analytical framework.
3. Foundations of Empirical Analysis
3.1. Theoretical Framework: Social Constructivism
The fact that the latest two nuclear tests conducted by North Korea triggered a big debate on China’s North Korea policy with no consensus that could be reached reflects that the Chinese interests and the way issues related to the Korean Peninsula are perceived are mutable. The starting point that interests and perceptions are not fixed is based on the idea that scientific knowledge is socially determined, which is one of the main ideas of social constructivism (Detel 2001, p. 14264). In this respect, this theory provides a useful theoretical framework for my analysis of whether Beijing’s perspective on the security threat posed by North Korea has changed since the third nuclear test conducted by the DPRK.
Social constructivism is a theory regarding the social nature of science based on several assumptions. As already indicated, the notion of objective truth in social sciences associated with the separation of objective truth from subjective opinion is denied. Instead, knowledge is understood to be socially constructed. Furthermore, knowledge is regarded as being fundamentally contingent as well as independent of rational methods. Additionally, it is assumed that science can be analyzed in the sense of belief formation or causal processes. Therefore, social constructivism rejects scientific realism and the related claim that universal rational scientific rules and methods exist. Thus, the notion that it is possible to rationally reconstruct the
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history of science as a steady intellectual undertaking continuously improving our scientific knowledge through the application of such methods is also denied (Detel 2001, p. 14264).
Thus, approaches that are based on social constructivism do not allow generalizing results or statements that are transferable to other cases or actors. However, they generally enable a deeper understanding of perceptions, assumptions and attitudes of a particular actor.
3.2. Analytical Framework: Entman’s Framing Approach
Based and operationalized on the grounds of social constructivism, the framing approach within the scope of political communication with an emphasis on media discourses focuses on how particular frames are invoked that contribute to the construction of social reality (Tuchman 1978, p. ix). On the one hand, mass media are regarded as having a severe influence through constructing social reality „by framing images of reality (…) in a predictable and patterned way“(McQuail 1994, p. 331). On the other hand, these effects are simultaneously viewed as limited due the interaction between the media and the audience.
Thus, media discourse is understood as „part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists (…) develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse“ (Gamson & Modigliani 1989, 2). In the sense, the media actively sets frames of reference that the audience refers to when interpreting and discussing public events (Tuchman 1978, p. ix). Simultaneously, preexisting meaning schemas or structures influence how people process information and interpret it. The fact that framing is based on ideas of social constructivism has crucial implications for the conceptualization of framing as a theory of media effects as the analysis of the roles of the media and the audience demands research on the micro- and macro level of analysis. In this sense, it is commonly distinguished between media and individual frames based on the understanding that frames serve as “devices embedded in political discourse” (Sanders 1990, p. 74) referring to media frames, and also as “internal structures of the mind” (Sanders 1990, p. 74) referring to individual frames. Similarly, Entman defines individual frames as “information-processing schemata” (Entman 1991, p.
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7) of individuals, while describing media frames as “attributes of the news itself” (Entman 1991, p. 7).
Concentrating on media frames with an emphasis on political communication treated as an independent variable, Entman focuses on how the media provides the audience with schemas for interpretation of events, pointing out salience and selection as crucial factors. He defines salience as “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (Entman 1993, p. 52). Thus, according to his definition “(t)o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993, p. 52). In this sense, frames focus on at least one of the following functions (Entman 1993, p. 52):
1. Determining the forces which create the problem 2. Defining related conditions or effects
3. Making moral judgments of causal agents
4. Proposing or justifying solutions to the problem and estimating their anticipated effects
Thus, frames draw attention to certain aspects of reality while concealing particular elements, which can result in different reactions of the audience. This is why Entman underscores that framing plays an important role in exercising political power and that “the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power- it registers the identity of actors or interests that compete to dominate the text” (Entman 1993: 55). Therefore, frames are viewed as reflecting the power play as well as the scope of the discourse regarding an issue (Entman 1993, p. 55).
Overall, Entman’s approach focuses on political communication through the use of frames in the media. As he points out that the frames in the news reflect the identity of actors and interests behind them, using his framework for examining Chinese articles should be useful for identifying the perspective of the Chinese political elite on the security threat posed by North Korea.
In the subsequent chapter, I present my method of analysis and illustrate the data that I have used. Furthermore, I elaborate on the disadvantages of Entman’s
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framing approach and briefly outline how I intend to deal with those that are manageable.
4. Methodology 4.1. Method and Data
This paper aims at assessing the perspective of the Chinese government on the security threat posed by North Korea by analyzing newspaper articles published by
The Global Times using Entman’s framing approach. The Global Times is one of two
existing daily Chinese tabloids in English that first started to publicize articles in 2009. It is being published under the official of People’s Daily, a daily newspaper and party organ of the CCP, and specializes in covering international affairs (People’s Daily 2009). In this regard, The Global Times serves as a valuable source for identifying how the Chinese government has perceived and framed issues related to North Korea’s security threat in the past years and whether there has been a shift after the third nuclear test. I concentrate on articles that address China’s North Korea policy and the Sino-North Korean relationship and cover all articles published on these topics since the establishment of the newspaper in April 1st 2009 and May 1st 2014. Overall, 32 articles have been analyzed, including 19 articles from the period before the third nuclear test and 11 from the following period.
For the purpose of assessing the invoked frames, the content of the articles has been classified according to categories corresponding to Entman’s four functions of frames. Each function of frame constitutes a separate subchapter. For the purpose of providing a more detailed and accurate understanding of the Chinese perspective, I have added a few categories in addition to Entman’s four types of frames that support their interpretation. As the goal of this essay is to assess the perspective of the Chinese political elite on the security threat posed by the DPRK and examine whether it has considerably changed since the third nuclear test, the overall outcome of the findings of articles published prior to the incident and those published afterwards have been compared. In order to provide a profound explanation and interpretation of my empirical results, I include findings from other
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researchers who have analyzed China’s North Korea as well as a wide range of literature.
Besides, numerous charts illustrate the main outcomes in the following section. For clarity reasons, only the findings that have been identified by at least 10% of the articles either before or after the third nuclear test have been included in these charts. Nonetheless, all findings are mentioned and at least briefly discussed. Bar charts represent the findings when the classification according to categories is exclusionary, while pie charts portray the outcome of findings when the classification according to categories is not exclusionary. Moreover, all percentages have been rounded to whole numbers as the decimal places are not significant for my findings.
Although the framing approach is a valuable tool for assessing the viewpoint of the Chinese elite by identifying perceptions, attitudes and evaluations on key aspects that constitute their perspective, it is associated with several disadvantages that will be discussed in the following part.
4.2. Disadvantages of the Method
Using The Global Times to assess the perspective of the Chinese government is not entirely unproblematic. Two points have to be considered that are likely to contribute to a discrepancy between the actual perspective of the CCP and how the articles published by The Global Times illustrate the Chinese perspective on specific issues related to North Korea. Additionally, the distinction between diverse actors with particular interests that influence China’s North Korea policy is not possible. Firstly, the newspaper is directly controlled by the CCP. Secondly, it is a Chinese tabloid in English meaning that it is primarily targeted at an international audience. Therefore, a tendency to portray itself in a positive way to the international community is likely to lead to a certain bias. More specifically, the Chinese government is especially anxious to present itself as a peaceful rising nation avoiding conflicts with other countries as China’s emergence as a global power has triggered a heated debate on how China will rise. In this context, particular emphasis has been given on the implications of its rise to the current international system and order generally as well as to US interests. This should be understood
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against the backdrop of the Western perception emerging in the 1990s that China’s rise will challenge the US hegemonic position and thus challenge the international status quo based on the logic of traditional realist International Relations theories. The fact that China’s regime is authoritarian has deepened the concerns about how China will behave when it has become more powerful. In order to counter this negative evaluation of China’s rise, the Chinese political elite represented by Zhen Bijian has introduced the theory of peaceful rise according to which China’s rise will be peaceful as well as beneficial to the rest of the world. In this sense, China has been eager to promote its rise as an opportunity to the world rather than a threat, emphasizing a path of development that is characterized by China’s engagement with the economic globalization. It has further been argued that a peaceful international environment is a necessary condition for China’s development, which is why it will reinforce world peace. In essence, the peaceful rise theory is based on the following liberal argument: due to the process of globalization and the related interdependence among China and the outside world, it is undesirable and unnecessary to pursue a non-peaceful path of rising since its stakes in the current international system are too high (Wang 2009b pp. 1).
Moreover, wishful thinking may also contribute to a bias. Because the CCP may desire for particular aspects to be a certain way, these might also be portrayed in that manner rather than reflecting a more realistic account of its own perception. Of course, both types of biases are not necessarily exclusive. Nonetheless, there is a difference between both types of biases. The tendency to portray oneself in a positive manner is primarily aimed at invoking or strengthening a specific image of oneself and is thus primarily aimed at a particular audience. Instead, the tendency to depict things according to one’s desires rather reflects how one ideally wants something to be like.
I try to identify these types of biases by referring to a wide range of other sources as well as findings of other researchers. Thus, when I suspect a gap between the portrayal of an aspect and the actual perspective of the Chinese political elite, I present the discrepancy and explain what may have constituted the bias.
In addition to that, the articles do not specify which interest groups represent the outlined opinions and evaluations. Often conveying the impression of a unified
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Chinese perspective, the articles frequently simply use the word China, quote statements of the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei, or refer to interviews conducted with or opinions expressed by Chinese scholars on the Chinese perspective on issues related to North Korea. However, in reality diverse actors with various interests influence China’s North Korea policy. These include the internal security apparatus and the military, institutions and individuals affiliated to propaganda and international relations bodies of the CCP, provincial governments from the northeast region of the country as well as companies with increasing economic interests in North Korea (Gill 2011, p. 8). Thus, this approach does not enable a distinction between these diverse actors with divergent interests within the Chinese government that contribute to the variation on how North Korea is perceived and on interrelated opinions on how to deal with North Korea. This contributes to a simplified account of dealing with the Chinese perspective when in fact it would more accurate to speak about Chinese perspectives.
At last, my method does not allow me to directly assess the perspective of the Chinese political elite. Therefore, my empirical results should be understood as tendencies that reflect how it has perceived issues related to North Korea’s nuclear proliferation in the past years.
In the subsequent chapter, I present the findings of my empirical analysis based on Entman’s framing approach, a wide range of literature and findings of other researchers that have enabled me to provide a profound interpretation of my results. The chapter is divided into four subchapters that correspond to Entman’s four types of frames.
5. Analysis of Articles about China’s North Korea Policy and the Sino-North Korean Relations
In this section, I present a comparison of the Chinese government’s perception of key issues related to the security threat posed by North Korea before and after the third nuclear test. Overall, this chapter reveals that the root causes of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are understood to be political and economical in so far as they are perceived to be the struggle for regime survival in a context of considerable economic backwardness. In this sense, North Korea’s nuclear drive is viewed as
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being directly linked to its economic predicament. Therefore, Beijing has pursued a broader approach towards dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions including bilateral efforts, a multilateral framework within the Six Party Talks and economic assistance. Additionally, North Korea is increasingly being perceived as a burden and risk rather than an asset after the third nuclear test, leading to considerably increasing suggestions that China should adjust its North Korea policy. This is primarily due to Beijing’s growing perceived lack of influence on Pyongyang and concerns that Kim’s regime will cause regional instability in East Asia, which it severely wants to avoid.
5.1. North Korea’s Economic Backwardness: the Root of the Security Threat posed by North Korea
In general, there are two different aspects defined as the main problem. On the one hand, North Korea posing a security threat through its nuclear ambitions is depicted as the problem. On the other hand, North Korea’s economic predicament is also presented as the problem in so far as it is regarded as the root cause of North Korea’s nuclear drive and proliferation. Prior to the third nuclear test, both problems receive a somewhat similar amount of attention, while after the incident much more attention is given to North Korea’s nuclear issue. Similarly, the military aspect is much more highlighted in the context of the Sino-North Korean relationship after the nuclear test, whereas previously it was mainly focused on the economic aspect.
16 Chart 1: Problem Definition of the Security Threat Posed by North Korea
Source: author’s own compilation
As the chart above reveals, overall North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is more frequently presented as the problem than its economic predicament. Prior to the third nuclear test 26% of the articles define it as the problem, while this share rises significantly to 73% in the aftermath of the incident. In contrast, only 21% of the articles depict the economic backwardness as the main problem before the event, whereas afterwards only 9% give this account. Thus, while previously North Korea’s nuclear ambitions were only slightly more presented as the main problem in comparison to its economic backwardness, after the 2013 nuclear test it is eight times more frequently depicted as the problem.
Interestingly, all the articles portraying the poor economic state as the problem include the argument that it is the source for North Korea’s nuclear drive. Thus, these articles depict a causal link between both the economic and military aspect and therefore emphasize the importance of China’s economic engagement with North Korea as it constitutes its perception of insecurity. The finding that Beijing views North Korea’s economic backwardness as the source of the security threat it poses is also supported by the findings of Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell (Duchâtel & Schell 2013), majorly drawing upon 50 interviews conducted with Chinese specialists on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea as well as other
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
North Korea's nuclear proliferation
North Korea's economic situation
Before 2013 nuclear test After 2013 nuclear test
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Chinese and English materials. Sukhee Han (Han 2012) comes to the same conclusion, relying on a survey on national consciousness of Korea and China from the Asiatic Research Institute as well as a survey on the Chinese perspective on North Korea and Korean unification conducted by Sunny Lee in 2011 with 47 Chinese experts on Korean affairs, amongst other sources. I myself refer to Lee’s findings several times in my thesis in order to strengthen certain findings that coincide with Lee’s outcome, or to support certain interpretations.
The decreasing portrayal of the economic backwardness as the problem after the nuclear test reflects rising concerns about regional stability and the increasing recognition that solely relying on economic engagement will not be enough to deal with the North’s nuclear issue. This interpretation is highly supported by the rest of my findings that I will discuss in the following chapters.
So far, my findings revealed that Beijing is primarily interested at avoiding any developments on the Korean Peninsula that may lead to regional instability, including North Korea’s nuclear plans, its proliferation or its economic collapse. This outcome is coherent with the strategic principles “no war, no instability, no nuclear weapons” (Duchâtel & Schell 2013, p. 44) often used by Chinese scholars that define China’s policy priorities in relation to the nuclear issue. These strongly emphasize that these should be understood as steps of a gradual process aiming at convincing the North to give up its nuclear plans in exchange for increased security. Thus, the three priorities are regarded as being causally related, with the first two being preconditions for the latter. In fact, China’s economic approach towards North Korea directly results from this policy targeting at alleviating tensions and preventing conflict through encouraging all important parties, including the US and South Korea, to return to the negotiation table. Thus, Beijing tries to use its economic engagement to contribute to an environment beneficial to reengaging North Korea with regard to its nuclear program (Duchâtel & Schell 2013, p. 44). In this sense, Chinese experts on Korea have highlighted three main arguments in support of the assumption that economic engagement serves the purpose of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Firstly, trade and investment contribute to the main perception of Pyongyang’s insecurity being its economic backwardness in comparison to the South. Hence, nuclear weapons are regarded as
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the North’s only leverage to balance against its Southern counterpart (Duchâtel & Schell 2013, p. 53), which has a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita that is 18 times as high (Sedghi & Rodgers 2013). Secondly, prioritizing the nuclear issue and separating it from economic considerations is regarded as counterproductive because it leads to antagonism, whereas incremental economic reform is viewed as a more realistic starting point. Furthermore, economy is regarded as the only area of cooperation in which progress is most likely to be achieved. Based on considerations of pragmatism, proponents of this approach underline that economic engagement is the only feasible alternative, particularly considering the installment of the Six Party Talks. Thirdly, economic engagement is perceived as a mean to at least maintain some influence on North Korea and is related to Beijing’s concern that Pyongyang would directly apply to Washington if it stopped providing it with economic assistance or aid (Duchâtel & Schell 2013, p. 53).
The assumption that the economic backwardness is the root cause of the security threat posed by the North constitutes a major difference in the perception between Beijing and Washington, which does not view a direct link between the two and therefore addresses these issues separately (Han 2012, pp. 16). I will return to this point when discussing the proposed remedies to the problem.
But first, I shall continue with the emphasized aspect with regard to the Sino-North Korean relationship. My findings underline that North Korea’s aggressive behavior and desire to become a nuclear state are increasingly perceived as problematic. This perception is surely reinforced by the growing recognition that Pyongyang lacks the willingness to give up nukes and pursue significant economic reforms. In general, four aspects are highlighted in this context. These include the military, economy, shared culture and history as well as shared ideology.
19 Chart 2: Emphasized Aspects Concerning the Sino-North Korean Relationship in the Global Times
Source: author’s own compilation
The shared ideology as well as the shared history and culture have not been playing a crucial role in defining the Sino-North Korean relationship in the past years. Only about 10% of the articles published before and after the latest nuclear test highlight the shared history and culture. The common ideology is also emphasized in about 10% of the articles prior to the nuclear test, while it is not even mentioned in the following period. Instead, the economic and military aspects are central to the Chinese: whereas previously the economic aspect has been pointed out in the context of the Sino-North Korean relationship in about 53% of the articles, the military aspect has only been stressed in about 42% of them. Contrarily, this aspect clearly dominates portrayal of this relationship in the articles published since the third nuclear test. After this incident 73% of the articles focus on this aspect, while only about 37% of articles highlight the economic aspect.
These findings indicate that the increasing acknowledgment of the Chinese government that its strategy of trying to push North Korea to pursue the Chinese path of economic reform tied to the hope that this would dampen its nuclear drive and aggressive intentions has not been successful. Thus, the enhanced focus on the military aspect can be understood as Beijing’s realization that its efforts to increase its political leverage on North Korea through economic means have failed despite
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Military Economy Shared history
and culture
Shared ideology
Before 2013 nulcear test After 2013 nuclear test
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the growing economic ties between both countries and the continuous provision of aid which have made the North Korean economy increasingly dependent on China. In sum, this section revealed that two main problems with regard to North Korea are depicted in the articles: on the one hand, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, on the other hand, the country’s poor economic state. Both are regarded as being directly linked, as the economic backwardness is understood to be the cause for North Korea’s nuclear ambitions by constituting its perception of insecurity. In this sense, China does not view them as two separate problems but as being causally connected. Furthermore, my findings reveal an increasing emphasis on the military aspect in the aftermath of the third nuclear test. Initially, both problems receive a more or less similar amount of attention. However, after the incident significantly more articles issue North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, while the economic predicament of the country is addressed considerably less. This corresponds with my finding that in context of the Sino-North Korean relationship, there has been a shift from previously more emphasizing the economic aspect to increasingly focusing on the military aspect after the most recent nuclear test conducted by Kim’s regime. Moreover, the shared ideology and common history and culture play no significant role in defining the relationship between both countries.
5.2. China’s Top Priority: Regional Stability in East Asia
The security threat emanating from North Korea is associated with a number of perceived problematic effects and conditions. This chapter confirms my previous finding that Beijing is mostly concerned with the regional stability in East Asia. In addition, the US dominance in Asia and the perceived lack of influence on Pyongyang are further major sources of anxiety.
Understanding which effects and conditions are perceived as problematic is important in so far as they constitute the differentiation between solutions to the problem that are consistent or advantageous with Beijing’s interests, and those that violate its core concerns.
Overall, the following have been listed in the assessed articles:
- Increased dissatisfaction with North Korea among the Chinese population - Regional stability
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- China’s limited influence on North Korea - US dominance in Asia
- North Korean refugees
- Military drills conducted by US and South Korea - International pressure
- Lack of trust between US and North Korea - Lack of trust between China and North Korea
- Lack of compatible mechanism within Six Party Talks between the US and its allies and North Korea
Chart 3: Problematic Effects and Conditions of North Korea’s Nuclear Proliferation
Source: author’s own compilation
My findings confirm that despite the different opinions of the Chinese political elite on how to deal with North Korea, the main strategic foreign policy goal is to ensure regional stability in Asia with particular emphasis on neighboring countries. In this manner, the point that North Korea’s behavior is obstructive to the regional stability of East Asia or that it might further contribute to regional instability in the region is the most frequently highlighted problematic effect both before and after the 2013 nuclear test. Prior to the incident about 32% of the articles emphasize this, whereas subsequently twice as many do so. This is likely to reflect growing concerns about a potential military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, this coincides with a
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Regional instability Limited influence on North Korea US dominance in Asia Dissatisfied Chinese population
Before 2013 nuclear test After 2013 nuclear test
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recent statement of the Chinese Ambassador in America according to which China is most concerned about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the potential of a military clash between both Koreas with regard to the Korean Peninsula as quoted by the Washington Times. This is because a military clash would surely have cross-border effects on China (Sen 2014) such as a massive increase of refugees flooding into China, which is against Beijing’s interests (Bajoria & Xu 2014). Thus, Beijing seems to believe that a military conflict between both Koreas is somewhat likely. In fact, such concerns about a military confrontation are justified. The North has already attacked the South twice in 2010 including the Cheonan sinking and shelling of the Yeonpyeong islands, which severely heightened the tensions between both Koreas. North Korea’s provocative behavior has contributed to escalating underlying tensions after the third nuclear test. In 2013, North Korea unilaterally decided to shut the Kaesong industrial complex for several months, the jointly operated special economic facility on North Korean territory with South Korean companies between North and South and symbol for the cooperation between the two. This year, personal insults on Park Geun Hye, South Korea’s president, by the North Korean media calling her a “crafty prostitute” (Branigan 2014) of her “pimp” (Branigan 2014) Obama amongst other disparaging names have also risen drastically. Furthermore, the DPRK has even threatened America and South Korea with a preemptive attack in the past year (Lederer & Kim 2013, Kwon 2013).
The second most frequently mentioned problematic condition both before and after the 2013 nuclear test is China’s limited influence on North Korea. While formerly about 21% of the articles underline this, 27% stress it after the incident. As already pointed out, China seems to be increasingly dissatisfied that its economic approach in engaging with North Korea has in fact not enhanced its influence on its neighbor to stop its nuclear program and become more peaceful. This finding also indicates a gap between the perceptions of China and the international community with regard to Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang. Particularly Washington emphasizes frequently that Beijing has the biggest leverage over Pyongyang, thus condemning it for not exerting enough influence on it to solve the nuclear issue (Rajagopalan 2014).
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My findings suggest that Beijing disagrees with Washington, assuming that it does not hold the biggest leverage over North Korea. I have analyzed which actor is presented as the key actor in the assessed articles and found that Beijing perceives Washington to be the key actor in solving the security threat posed by North Korea in the period after the third nuclear test.
Chart 4: Key Actor in Solving the Security Threat Posed by North Korea
Source: author’s own compilation
Before the 2013 nuclear test, China was presented as the key actor in 11% of the articles, whereas the US was depicted as it only about half as much. In contrast, in the period after the incident the share of articles portraying China as the most important actor has decreased to 5%, while more than one third of the articles suggest that the US is the key actor.
Lee’s findings suggest that even before the third nuclear test Beijing believed Washington to be the key actor in resolving Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. In this manner, 63% of the participants of his survey believed that the US holds the biggest leverage over North Korea, while less than 46% perceived Beijing to be the most influential actor (Lee 2012, p. 4). These findings confirm the huge gap between the perception of the US and the rest of the international community and China.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
China United States
Before 2013 nuclear test After 2013 nuclear test
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America and China both perceive each other to be holding the biggest leverage in solving North Korea’s nuclear issue.
Beijing’s perceived lack of leverage is comprehensible to a certain degree. Considering the developments regarding the Chinese stance towards North Korea’s nuclear proliferation since the 1990s contributes to understanding this perception. Initially, China relied on buck-passing the issue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation to America throughout the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, blocking UN sanctions on Pyongyang making no efforts to solve the crisis. It was not until towards the end of the decade that China became proactively involved in trying to stop North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. In this sense, China engaged in establishing the Six Party Talks in the aftermath of North Korea’s second nuclear test (Pardo 2012, p. 339). Nonetheless, initially its approach towards this multilateral mechanism was rather passive during the first rounds that took place in 2003 and 2004. The CCP privately and even publicly stated that it regards North Korea’s nuclear proliferation as a bilateral issue to be discussed between the US and North Korea. Thus, although China hosted the talks, the other participants were the ones to offer remedies to the nuclear crisis. However, since the fourth round of the talks held in 2005, China has shown an active involvement in dealing with the crisis, trying to manage the mediation between the different parties by bringing forward its own propositions and producing various drafts until an agreement between them was achieved. This led to a declaration of a joint statement including principles and steps for solving the North Korean nuclear issue (Funabashi 2007, pp. 337).
Even outside of the Six Party Talks, China showed its eagerness to actively manage the crisis. In the aftermath of the first nuclear test conducted in 2006, China started to promote UN sanctions. Additionally, it implemented financial sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, a Chinese bank in charge of considerably North Korean assets. Beijing also responded to the second nuclear test in 2009 with supporting even stricter UN sanctions (Pardo 2012, pp. 343). In 2013, China again supported UN sanctions and also imposed its own ones against North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank by deactivating its banking account and stopping all related transactions (Makino & Hayashi 2013). Although the Six Party Talks have been disrupted since 2009, Beijing continues to
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pursue its approach of multilateralism and cooperation, sticking to its commitments to the framework of the Six Party Talks by repeatedly urging their resumption (Pardo 2012, p. 351). As North Korea has recently threatened to conduct another nuclear test, China has again responded by using diplomatic channels to warn its ally against this undertaking (Rajagopalan 2014) but had to realize that Pyongyang does not care about Beijing’s interests at all, despite the dependence of North Korea’s economy on China.
Furthermore, there are several additional reasons that contribute to Beijing’s perceived lack of influence on its neighbor. Firstly, cutting its economic ties to the North is a risky solution for Beijing, which is why it does not seem to be a viable option for a considerable share of the Chinese political elite. The main reasons for this are that the economic backwardness is viewed as the root of North Korea’s aggressive behavior, which might therefore be reinforced, as well as concerns about the massive inflow of refugees that it would lead to. Secondly, Beijing has tried to use its economic engagement with Pyongyang as a mean to increase its influence on Kim’s regime with the intention to persuade it to employ Chinese-style reforms and give up nukes. However, the fact that North Korea has been ignoring China’s suggestions and warnings has further contributed to this perception. Thirdly, North Korea has declared that its nuclear proliferation is targeted at the US, which it perceives as its enemy and blames for the UN sanctions (Kim 2013). In the context of North Korea’s national security, acquiring nuclear capability is regarded as a low-cost strategic equalizer against South Korean and US forces. Washington in possession of the world’s biggest nuclear arsenal has threatened Pyongyang several times with the use of its nuclear weapons against it since the second half of the past century (Habib & O’Neil 2009, p. 381), and the Bush administration stopped supplying North Korea with oil which had been part of a framework to stop its nuclear proliferation, even declaring it as part of the axis of evil and threatening it with a pre-emptive war (Plesch 2006). Thus, the most cited reason for its nuclear program in Pyongyang's official statements is the necessity to deter its enemy, the US (Habib & O’Neil 2009, p. 381).
In fact, a peace treaty between Washington and Pyongyang would officially end the Korean War. As Kim Jong Il’s first son, Kim Jong Nam’s e-mail correspondence with a
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Japanese journalist reveals, normalizing its relationship with Washington and signing a peace treaty with it is Pyongyang’s primary desire. Thus, many Chinese experts on Korea think that the US is status-quo oriented and therefore unwilling to sign a peace treaty as the current situation serves as a justification for Washington to maintain troops in East Asia, which is decisive for its strategy to contain China (Lee 2012, p. 5). Washington’s behavior has surely contributed to North Korea’s nuclear drive. Therefore, it is comprehensible that Beijing perceives Washington to be the key actor in solving the issue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, while regarding itself to be a coordinator between Washington, its allies and Pyongyang. However, the argument often brought forward by Washington that China holds the biggest leverage over North Korea (Rajagopalan 2014) is not entirely unreasonable. As previously pointed out, the survival of the North Korean state is heavily dependent on China. Different estimates reveal that Beijing supplies up to 90% of North Korea’s energy supplies, 80% of its consumer products as well as nearly half of its food supplies (Lee 2012, p. 1). Moreover, independent experts and western countries frequently criticize China for not properly implementing the UN sanctions it officially supports (Rajagopalan 2014). In this sense, Beijing surely also has an interest to downplay its leverage on Pyongyang and to portray itself as a liable actor in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis. As argued earlier, the Chinese government is eager to portray itself as a responsible member of the international community and to present its rise as beneficial to the world. Another reason for downplaying its influence on Pyongyang is that the CCP is aware that if it stops supporting Kim’s regime it would rapidly lead to an economic crisis and political instability within the country, thereby causing instability in the region. During times of economic trouble and famine in the 1990s, China experienced a massive influx of refugees causing public and social security issues in northeast Chinese provinces. While carrying the costs for North Korean refugees is against Chinese interests, repatriating them would reinforce the international community to condemn this behavior, which would further damage China’s image (Zhan & Lee 2012, pp. 66). More importantly, China also fears possible revenge attacks from its aggressive neighbor (Bennett 2009, p. 28). Therefore, disrupting its assistance and thereby
