Framing Iran and North Korea. A Content Analysis.
Marco Herrouz
Student ID: 10602267
Master’s Thesis
University of Amsterdam
Graduate School of Communication
MSc in Political Communication
Supervised by: Dr. Jonas Lefevere
Abstract
The aim of the present study was to investigate the application of different frames by media outlets (in this particular analysis The New York Times) when covering Iran and North Korea. The time frame has been delimited by two relevant events for the countries taken in consideration, namely
Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to the American Congress on the 2nd of March 2015 and the revelation
of the North Korean Sony hacking to the public by the American Intelligence on the 24th November
2014. The application of two different kind of frames, the so-called “threat frame” and “irony frame” have been tested and led to interesting conclusions. The date of publication of the article and the relative proximity to Netanyahu’s speech represent good predictors of the “threat frame” application for Iran. Accordingly, the closer we get to Israeli Prime Minister’s speech to the Congress and the more Iran is portrayed as a danger.
Besides that, the present study reveals that Iran is generally depicted in the news more as a threat when compared to North Korea, while this latter is represented in a more ironic way.
The present study offers a more recent analysis of the frames used by media and represents a contribution to the already existing academic literature especially when considering the historically important role of Iran from a geopolitical perspective and the rising interest on North Korea as an international political actor, able to influence the world equilibrium are taken into consideration.
Keywords: Framing theories, frame, irony frame, threat frame, Iran, North Korea, DPRK, The New
Introduction
Despite the fact that both Iran and North Korea have been included in the list of countries part of Bush’s so-called “Axis of evil” (Choi, 2010), they seem to be treated differently by mass media. Iran is usually presented as serious threat even though, unlike North Korea, it is not in possession of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, news coverage on North Korea is the most diverse: from the new haircut of its supreme leader to his various troubled sentimental relationships (Hattem, 2013). If the Islamic Republic tried to carry on over the years a program of enrichment of uranium for civilian purposes, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, when it was still led by the deceased leader Kim Jong-Il, tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006. Therefore the North Korean government officially confirmed to be in possession of a nuclear deterrent (Litvak, 2008). Furthermore, we should not forget that North Korea has demonstrated to be part of a network of illicit trade for which it supplies its customers with any prohibited material (Fitzpatrick, 2006), ranging from ballistic missiles to enriched uranium and subsequently rendering the country an additional threat on international level, too. The last Iranian governments, both the former anti-American President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as well as the current moderate and reformist President Hassan Rouhani have always denied the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand the North Korean governments, previously represented by Kim Jong-Il and currently by his son Kim Jong-Un, have turned the country's nuclear program in an instrument of international pressure in order both to ease the burden of international sanctions and to limit the mutual collaboration between its two historical enemies The United States of America and the Republic of Korea (its Southern neighbor).
Nevertheless, a 2013 opinion poll by Gallup showed that Americans are less favorable toward Iran (9% favorable and 87% unfavorable opinion about the country) despite the blatant threat of ballistic missile launches, while North Korea remains the second less favorable (12% favorable and 84% unfavorable) (Gallup, 2013). The same survey revealed that the development of nuclear weapons
by Iran is considered by American respondents as a more critical threat compared to that of North Korea (Gallup, 2013). The difference between the two countries is a small percentage, despite the fact that the aforementioned poll was conducted just before North Korea conducted its third nuclear test (2013). It is also crucial mentioning that this nuclear preparation has been extensively covered by media and therefore presumably raised public awareness about the test. On the other hand, we can compare the Iranian and North Korean situations to a country like Pakistan, which possesses atomic weapons, in eternal animosity with the neighboring India and has an unstable political situation. This latter does not seem to preoccupy public opinion and Western governments in the same way.
According to Robert S. Litvak (2008), this might be due to the fact that Pakistan, as well as India, have been considered by the Bush administration, at a time when the term “Rogue State” was coined, as “responsible states” (regarding Pakistan probably referring to the collaboration offered to the U.S.A. in the fight against terrorism of those years) in “implicit juxtaposition to irresponsible rogue states”, namely Iran, Iraq and North Korea (Litvak, 2008 p.94). Another explanation for the differences in public opinion on Pakistan, Iran and North Korea may be mass media coverage. During the process of disseminating information media outlets do not merely “inform” the audience (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002). By selecting certain news and giving them a different prominence, news media acquire the important and influential role of “agenda setters” focusing the attention of the public on specific events and by flowing sometimes in a certain way of amplification and magnification which can be defined as “media-hype” (Vasterman, 2005).
Media can communicate reality in different ways by using different “frames” and consequently affect differently the perception of the audience (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Furthermore, news stories that present a frame linking an issue (positive or negative) to a foreign nation in a way that suggests a particular evaluative implication, may shape the way the audience judges that nation (Brewer, Graf & Willnat 2003). All this can be applied to the media coverage about Iran and North Korea, where negative events with similar relevance may be framed in different ways (Entman, 1991).
This study will assess the extent to which news coverage about North Korea and Iran contains so-called threat and irony frames
When referring to “news values” , thus which kind of events is more likely to be transformed in news, is worth mentioning that the “reference to something negative” (strongly linked with the “discourse of fear”) has been set as one of the most important criteria by Galtung and Ruge in their 1965 taxonomy (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). The “discourse of fear” which is considered as fundamental part of the “threat frame” included in the study, pervades all the news (Altheide, 1997; Altheide & Michalowski, 1999), but the particular “nuclear threat frame” seems to be applied mostly to Iran (Hastings Dunn, 2007). Though the “reference to entertaining events” (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001), basis of the “irony frame” included in the study, best suits the media coverage of events related to North Korea of which is sometimes hard to distinguish information from infotainment (Hattem, 2013).
The aim of the present study is to investigate which particular frame is applied for each country, offering an example of how Iran and North Korea are portrayed by media.
Relevance
In the specific case of news linked to Iran and North Korea, we can easily recognize the deviant behaviors by the respective governments of the two countries regarding the international regulations both in terms of nuclear proliferation and human rights. Those deviant behaviors justify the fact that the information is worthy of a strong media coverage. The salience for the American context is denoted by a threat possibility coming from North Korea, namely its ballistic missiles able to reach the American Pacific coast. Concerning Iran, the threat is represented by its menace to the very
existence of the state of Israel, of which the United States is the main ally and whose lobbies are very influential in the American political system.
The importance and societal relevance of the study are denoted by the recent developments in bi-later talks between the United States of America and Iran as well as the re-election of the leader of the Likud party Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel, who is strongly convinced that Iran's nuclear program may bring negative consequences to his country. In addition, the available scientific literature lacks of a contemporary study about news media framing differently specific countries, thus the recent media attention given to North Korea as an actor in international politics offers a good starting point for comparisons. The existing literature about framing requires an update by including, for example, studies covering contemporary phenomena. In the specific case, the present study is an interesting contribution offering a different perspective. By comparing those two countries, an additional original point of view has been offered. More precisely by including the comparison between two distinct frames (one, the threat frame, created by the political elites and one, the irony frame, created by news outlets) as well as a very delimited period of time allowing an in depth analysis. From the audience perspective it will be possible to interpret the public perception of events happening in distant and sometimes unreachable countries, taking in consideration the inability to obtain information directly and the inevitable dependence on media coverage. Finally, it will be interesting to understand to what extent a frame (that of “Rogue States”) may have been promulgated in time passing from one decade to another (2003/2015) and from one American administration to another (Bush/Obama) without losing power and despite the fact that the geopolitical context has considerably changed with the rise of the reformist leader Hassan Rouhani in Iran (after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s contested presidency), as well as the taking of power by Kim Jong-Un in North Korea (after the death of the leader Kim Jong-Il). Not to mention the impact of the collapse in oil prices, which represents a key part of the Iranian economy, and the birth of the Islamic State that jeopardizes the balance of power in a very turbulent area as that of Middle East.
Theoretical background
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (from now referred as respectively “Iran” and “DPRK”) have been the subjects, along with Iraq, of the rhetoric of the Bush administration so-called “War on terror” which has been set up one year after the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (Choi, 2010). In his 2002 State of the Union Address speech, George W. Bush framed the three countries as an “axis of evil” in order to justify the military intervention in Iraq. More generally, it provided an extension of the war on terrorism (2010)to bring “new clarity to the U.S. security agenda, signaling the high priority the administration placed on countering links between terrorists and rogue nations that seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to threaten the United States and the world” (Cha, 2002 p.2). It is important to consider the way Bush framed the debate on national security which represents the core of the present study.
The concept of “framing” is essentially important in Communication Science as it involves a communication source (members of the political administration as well as the media) presenting and connoting an issue (de Vreese, 2005). The purpose of framing focuses on the communication process (p.51) and it has been described by Entman (1993) as a technique which selects a certain aspect of the observed reality in order to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”(p.2). A frame in a communication “organizes everyday reality” (Tuchman 1978, p. 193) and framing techniques include two essential aspects: “selection” and “salience”. Selection works by defining a problem, in this particular case represented by the terrorist threat to the Western world. This latter consequently provides a causal interpretation which is characterized by the actors involved in the creation of the problem, thus, Iran, Iraq and DPRK. A moral judgment occurs by representing the three countries as a threat to safety which is followed by a suggested solution for the problem, the “war on terror” itself. On the other hand, “salience” occurs when a particular information is perceived by the audience as important and
meaningful (Entman, 1993), rendering a particular connotation more important than other received information. As stated by Chong and Druckman, the public often has just a “vague notion of many political topics” (Chong & Druckman, 2007 p. 105) and can be easily permeable to alternative conceptualization of an issue for which minor changes in presentation can have large effects on the public opinion (2007). Therefore, framing has an essential place in the process of public opinion formation as it creates a link between the political actors (2007) and the audience by disseminating a certain interpretation of the reality through mass media. The framing communicative process includes two different steps represented by “frame-building” and “frame-setting” (de Vreese, 2005). The first refers to all the factors that have an influence on the creation of the frame and the latter is about interaction with the audience depending on its personal “knowledge and predispositions” (2005 p.53). The “cascading activation model” developed by Entman (2003) offers an explanation of how interpretative frames are “activated and spread” amongst the public. In this particular case, the administrative level (The White House, represented by President George W. Bush together with the Ministry of Defense) has created the aforementioned frame of the “axis of evil” which was subsequently accepted by the other representatives of the elites (the members of the American congress, as well as other non-administration elites). This frame has been spread by mass media, journalists and news organizations, which in turn contributed to the production of news frames that finally reached the public (Entman, 2003). Though, the role of both media and the public is not passive and the acceptance of the governmental frame is not supposed to be taken for granted (2003). This was proved by the revelation of the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, on the basis of which the armed intervention led by the United States had been justified. If, indeed, the “threat” frame has been developed by the political administration for utilitarian purposes, it has been consequently adopted by the media outlets.
News media plays a key role in promoting public discourse by acting as a natural liaison between the political elites and the general audience and by emphasizing the fear in the selection and
presentation of information to readers whose perception of reality can be accordingly affected (Altheide, 1997). This is essentially the reason why media incorporate and spread frames, frequently minor variations in the presentation of an event produce big changes on public opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007). A real “discourse of fear” (Altheide & Michalowski, 1999) pervades the news and it is used both for entertainment-oriented purposes (Altheide, 1997), with clear economic benefits in terms of audience and for supporting “social policies that promote state control and surveillance” (Altheide & Michalowski, 1999 p. 476), as it happened in the United States immediately after the 9/11 attacks. When talking about foreign countries, public opinion is influenced by the representation that is made by governments and news media (Lims & Seo, 2009) because foreign news is “typically beyond a person’s direct experience” (p. 204) and most of the times the public is unable to have an opinion based on direct personal experience.
In the case of the “axis of evil”, three specific actors had a major importance, the U.S. government which has been accountable for the creation of the frame, the U.S. media industry accountable for the delivery of the particular message and the U.S. audience accountable for the reception of the relevant frame (2009). After the military invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States and its allies and the consequent fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the list of “rogue states” was reduced to Iran and the DPRK. Iran was characterized by the Bush administration as a “first-order-threat” (Hasting Dunn, 2007 p. 22) and even after the non-disclosure of the supposed weapons of mass destruction in neighboring Iraq, the attitude towards the country has not improved. As a matter of fact it has deteriorated to the point of defining the regime of the ayatollahs as the “worst threat for the United States of America” in the official document of the National Security Strategy of March 2006 (2007). The decision of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of re-starting a program to enrich uranium for civilian purposes which was taken despite the decision of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) (2006) has created an additional American concern about the Iranian support for Islamist organizations as Hamas and Hezbollah (Zuhur, 2006). Therefore, according to David
Hastings Dunn, the U.S. policy concerning the Islamic Republic, and the respective construction of the “threat frame” connected to it, has been focused on four different aspects. First of all the American prevention from the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the area and even more in countries considered as enemies. Secondly preventing the so-called “nuclear rogue-state behavior” (p. 33) and the consequent belligerent policy agenda. Thirdly preventing “state-sponsored terrorism and regional destabilization” (p.33), such as military aid and logistical support to the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon and lastly endorsing a change of regime in the country itself (2006) with reference to the evident mutual antagonism toward President Ahmadinejad (Zuhur, 2006).
In contrast, North Korea has never been considered by news media as a main danger but mostly as “second menace” after Iran, despite the advancement of its nuclear program was a certainty for the Bush administration, up to the point of considering nuclear-armed North Korea as “immune from U.S. military threat” (p.24). The inclusion of North Korea in the list of official enemies of the U.S. had certainly led to an immediate visibility of the isolated Asian country to the American-International audience (Lim & Seo, 2009), attracting a lot of attention both from the government and the news media. The brand new rhetoric framed President Kim Jong Il’s regime in a way that affected the public interpretation of it as a security threat for the Western World (p. 205). According to Lim & Seo, both the U.S. government and the press, precisely the New York Times, contributed to the development of different frames ranging from “military threat” to the “human rights issue” whose importance was interchanged depending on the political agenda in place in the specific moment (2009). The aura of mystery around North Korea that many times media took advantage of was increased by the inability to directly collect information because of the extreme secretiveness of the country whose regime kept on preventing any possible contact with the outside world or any information leakage.
At this point, a socio-political contextualization is necessary for explaining the different applications of the frame considered in the present study. Zuhur (2006) provides argumentations for the Iran case by reflecting on its relations with USA and the geopolitical situation in the region. The author claims that the strategic position of the Islamic Republic in the Middle Eastern context and its objective of expanding the Shiite influence in the region together with the problematic relations with Israel (2006) led to the creation of the particular frame about the country. In addition to these last considerations, Side and Gross (2013) have investigated a specific tendency on justifying the “war on terror” which is strongly related with a certain kind of stereotypes regarding Muslims. As stated by the authors, the enemy was identified by a specific religion and the attitudes towards Muslims, defined as violent and untrustworthy, were directly associated with Bush’s policies in the Middle East (p. 596).
Conversely all the racial stereotypes about Asians have nothing to do with terrorism and violence. After the 9/11 attacks the American population related “Arabs with terrorism” (Chang & Kleiner, 2003) creating an amalgam “Muslims-Arabs” while stereotypes regarding Asians kept on been focused on their ability with martial arts and intellectual talent above the international average of their youth (p.4).
Research Question and Hypothesis
The following research question is formulated:
RQ: “To what extent are different frames used in The New York Times news coverage of Iran and North Korea?”
The conceptualization of “different frames” takes in consideration the already described “threat frame” as well as the “irony frame” which have been potentially applied to the two countries by the
American newspaper The New York Times in the days between two important events that have
already been mentioned. Namely the 24th November 2014, when the Sony hacking has been revealed
to the public and the 2nd of March 2005, Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to the USA Congress.
In order to investigate the aforementioned research question the following hypotheses will be tested:
H1) The "threat frame" is applied more to Iran than DPRK; H2) The "irony frame" is applied more to DPRK than Iran;
H3) News coverage of Iran appearing closer to the date of Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in the USA Congress (2nd March 2015) uses more the threat frame compared to coverage longer before the speech.
H4) News coverage of the DPRK appearing closer to the date when the Sony hacking was revealed to the public (24th November 2014) uses more the threat frame compared to coverage longer before the disclosure.
Methods
In order to collect data to test the hypotheses, a quantitative content analysis was chosen, meaning “a formal system for doing something we all do informally rather frequently: draw conclusions from observations on content” (Stempel, 2003) and that allowed to make valid inferences by analyzing written texts in articles. A manual content analysis, unlike an automated one, allows a deep understanding of the use of different frames in news articles, which is an essential feature for the present study. The selected approach is the deductive (top-down) one, since the premises (the framing theories) are the starting point of a reasoning which aim to draw logical conclusions and test the formulated hypotheses.
Definition of the concepts and operationalization
To measure the extent to which particular frames have been applied by The New York Times, a series of Yes/No questions has been created taking as a model the framing measure developed in the study by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000).
The operationalization of the “threat frame” is made of Yes/No questions that include: - The potential depiction of the two countries as a threat for peace;
- The potential depiction of the two countries as a nuclear threat; - The potential link of the two countries with terrorism;
- The potential depiction of the two countries as a cultural threat;
- The potential accusation of human right violation towards the two countries;
- The potential depiction of the two countries as capable of unexpected and unpredictable actions;
- The potential depiction of the two countries as an economical threat; - The potential depiction of the two countries as a general threat.
The operationalization of the “irony frame” is made of Yes/No questions that include: - The potential irony towards the two countries and/or their leaderships;
- The potential focus on aspects of private lives of the countries’ leaders; - The potential tone of the article more entertaining than informative; - If potentially serious issues are presented to the public with an ironic tone.
Sample
The media outlet chosen for this study was The New York Times as it represents an internationally recognized example of prestige press (Boycoff, 2004) from which it is expected an extensive coverage of international politics. The selected time frame for the articles that are included in the present study
is one week before the revelation of Sony servers attack by North Korean hackers (17th November
2014), until one week after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at the American Congress (9th March 2015). Both events have been extensively covered by the international press creating a certain kind of “media hype” around the potential threat coming from the two countries. North Korea has been officially considered as the instigator of the attacks against American servers of the company Sony, while Iran has been publicly blamed by Israeli Prime Minister of carrying on enrichment of uranium for military purposes that would threaten the security of the state of Israel and the Middle East balance (Beaumont, Black & Borger, 2015).
The articles have been selected using the following search strings on LexisNexis: - Iran!;
- North Korea!
The total amount of relevant articles is N=517, consisting of 286 articles about Iran, 192 for the DPRK and 39 for both the two countries. Articles in which nothing substantial was said neither for Iran nor for the DPRK were considered irrelevant. For example sport events results as well as book reviews where the countries have only been mentioned in a list of other topics were excluded from the sample. Table 1 provides an overview of both relevant and irrelevant articles retrieved.
Table 1. Sample size concerning the articles found for both countries.
N Percentage
Iran 286 34,0
DPRK 192 22,8
Both Iran & DPRK 39 4,6
Total 517 61,5
Missing 324 38,5
Total 841 100,0
Coding and intercoder reliability
A codebook was designed (Appendix A) using the online software Qualtrics and applied to each article taken in consideration. The research units of the analysis are the articles found on the relevant time period. . In order to test whether the variables included in the study analysis were sufficiently reliable it was necessary to proceed with a so-called “inter-coder reliability test”. In order to carry on the test, an extra coder was trained with the purpose of recognizing the different frames included in the codebook. The different educational and cultural background of the second coder (a UX designer) and the difficulty of understanding and recognizing certain frames as well as historical aspect related to geopolitics in Iran and North Korea (for example different Shiites armed groups which are supported by the Iranian government and that are not explicitly defined as terrorist groups even if considered as such by the international community), have made it necessary to proceed with a second coder training in which many doubts have been resolved. A sample of 60 articles (which represent
around 10% of the total sample included in the study) was used in order to check the inter-coder reliability.
Table 2. Krippendorf’s alpha
Variables Krippendorf’s alpha
Q0 Does the article address Iran and/or DPRK? * .69
Q1 Does the article refers to Iran or DPRK .91
Q4.1 Is Iran depicted as a threat for peace? .76
Q4.2 Is Iran depicted as a nuclear threat? .83
Q4.5 Is Iran accused of human right violations? 1
Q4.6 Is Iran depicted as capable of unexpected and unpredictable actions? .83
Q4.7 Is Iran depicted as an economical threat? ** .65
Q5.1 Is the DPRK depicted as a threat for peace? *** .68
Q5.2 Is the DPRK depicted as a nuclear threat? .86
Q5.4 Is the DPRK depicted as a cultural threat? 1
Q5.5 Is the DPRK accused of human right violations? .86
Q5.8 Is the DPRK depicted as a general threat? .77
Q6.4 Iran: Are potentially serious issues presented with an ironic tone? .78
Q7.3 North Korea: Is the tone of the article more entertaining than informative? .77
* The low Krippendorf’s alpha coefficient of this variable may be due to the fact that coder two had included articles that that were referring to Iran and DPRK, but in a non-geopolitical context (sport events, book reviews).
** The low Krippendorf’s alpha coefficient of this variable may be due to the fact that coder one has taken as implied some macro-economic consequences due to the recent drop in oil prices.
*** The low Krippendorf’s alpha coefficient of this variable may be due to the fact that coders had a slightly different opinion on what could have been considered as a threat for peace compared to the other kinds of “threats” included in the codebook.
Data analysis
A Mokken Scale analysis was carried out in order to check if the aforementioned variables were measuring the same latent concept (the threat/irony frame for Iran/DPRK). In order to do this it has been necessary the use of an additional data analysis and statistical software named “STATA”. If the Loevinger’s coefficient is higher than 0.5 it means that the item fits strongly on the scale
Table 3. Loevinger’s coefficients for Mokken Scale (Threat and Irony frames)
Scale 1 Threat Iran Scale 2 Threat DPRK
Variable Loevinger’s
coefficient
Q4.1 (Threat for peace) 0.8
Q4.2 (Nuclear threat) 0.9
Q4.6 (Unpredictability) 0.54
Scale 3 Irony Iran Scale 4 Irony DPRK
Variable Loevinger’s coefficient Q6.1 (Irony on leadership) 1 Q6.4 (Ironic tone) 1 Variable Loevinger’s coefficient
Q5.1 (Threat for peace) 0.7
Q5.2 (Nuclear threat) 0.5
Q5.6 (Unpredictability) 0.51
Variable Loevinger’s
coefficient
Q7.1 (Irony on leadership) 0.9
Q7.2 (Focus private life) 0.5
Q7.3 (Infotainment) 0.6
- The first Mokken Scale included all the variables that were referring to Iran being portrayed as a threat and only the variables Q4.1 (depiction as a threat for peace), Q4.2 (depiction as a nuclear threat), Q4.6 (unpredictability) had a sufficiently high Loevinger’s coefficient. - The second Mokken Scale included all the variables that were referring to North Korea being
portrayed as a threat and only the variables Q5.1 (depiction as a threat for peace), Q5.2 (depiction as a nuclear threat), Q5.6 (unpredictability) had a sufficiently high Loevinger’s coefficient.
- The third Mokken Scale included all the variables that were referring to Iran ironic representation and only the variables Q6.1 (irony about the leadership) and Q6.4 (ironic tone) had a sufficiently high Loevinger’s coefficient.
- The fourth Mokken Scale included all the variables that were referring to North Korea ironic representation and all of them (irony about leadership, focus on private life of leaders, presence of infotainment, use of ironic tone) had a sufficiently high Loevinger’s coefficient.
The variable measuring the use of the threat frame for Iran “Threat Iran” was made by transforming the variables Q4.1 (the depiction of the country as a threat for peace), Q4.2 (the depiction of the country as a nuclear threat) and Q4.6 (the depiction of the country as capable of unexpected and unpredictable actions) into dummy variables and then creating a sum-scale.
The variable measuring the use of the threat frame for North Korea “Threat DPRK” was made by transforming the variables Q5.1 (the depiction of the country as a threat for peace), Q5.2 (the depiction of the country as a nuclear threat) and Q5.6 (the depiction of the country as capable of unexpected and unpredictable actions) into dummy variables and then creating a sum-scale.
The variable measuring the use of the irony frame for Iran “Irony Iran” was made by transforming the variables Q6.1 (the ironic representation of Iran and/or its leadership) and Q6.4 (the representation of serious issues presented to the public with an ironic tone) into dummy variables and then creating a sum-scale.
The variable measuring the use of the irony for North Korea “Irony DPRK” was made by transforming the variables Q7.1 (the ironic representation of Iran and/or its leadership), Q7.2 (the focus on aspects of the private lives of North Korean leaders), Q7.3 (tone of the article more entertaining than informative) and Q7.4 (the representation of serious issues presented to the public with an ironic tone into dummy variables and then creating a sum-scale.
The two different frames “Threat” and “Irony” applied both to Iran and North Korea identify the dependent variables, while the countries of reference (Q1: Iran, DPRK, both Iran and DPRK) as well the date of publication of the different articles (Q3) represent the independent variables.
(The complete list of variables used can be found in the codebook located in the appendix A).
Testing H1:
For testing whether there is a statistically significant difference in the use of threat frame for Iran compared to DPRK (H1) an independent sample t-test was run .The dependent variable threat frame is ratio level of measurement.
The homogeneity of variance was not violated, Levene’s test was not significant, F (552) =1.07, p= .301. Therefore, the variances in the use of threat frame between Iran and DPRK are roughly equal. There was a significant difference in the average use of threat frame for Iran (M=.26, SD=.25) compared to the average use of threat frame for DPRK (M=.16, SD=.27); this difference 0.09, 95% CI [-0.13,-0.15] was statistically significant t (552) =-4.10, p=.000. Therefore we confirm the hypothesis (H1). Hence, the threat frame is applied more often to Iran than DPRK.
Testing H2:
An independent sample t-test was run in order to test whether the average use of the irony frame differs significantly between Iran and DPRK (H2). The dependent variable irony frame is ratio level of measurement.
In this case the test of homogeneity of variance was violated, Levene’s test was significant, F (554) =159.23, p= .000. Therefore, the variances in the use of the irony frame between Iran and DPRK are not equal. There was a significant difference in the average use of irony frame for Iran (M=.001,
SD=.08) compared to the average use of irony frame for DPRK (M=.008, SD=.18). This difference
0.07 95% CI [0.05, 0.09] was statistically significant t (554) =6.29, p=.000.Therefore, the average use of irony frame for DPRK is bigger than the average use of the same frame for Iran. H2 is confirmed as the results revealed that DPRK is framed on average more in an ironic way than Iran. However, both means appear to be really low and the irony frame has been recognized for a maximum of three of the four variables included in an article dating the 17th of February that was referring to
North Korea. For Iran we had a maximum of two entries for the irony frame in an article dating 26th
February and there has never been found a reference to private aspects of Iranian leaders as well as an entertaining tone. The limitation of the threat frame will be discussed afterwards.
Table 4. Independent Sample statistics for irony frame
Use of irony frame Mean Standard deviation N
Iran 0.01 0.08 325
Table 5. Independent sample t-test for the use of irony frame
Group differences
Mean SD t df p
Use of irony frame 0.07 0.01 6.29 554 .000
Testing H3:
A multiple regression analysis was run in order to test whether Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech in the USA Congress and ironic articles about Iran or its leadership can predict Iran’s depiction as a threat
(H3).Only days between the 24th of November 2014 (the starting point of the coding) and March
2nd 2015 (the day of the speech) were taken into account.
The particular time frame has been selected for testing whether the news coverage of Iran appearing closer to the speech contained more threat frames compared to coverage appearing longer before the speech.
The new recoded variable date (ratio level of measurement) measures the time difference of the published article from the date of the speech and is used as a predictor for the use of threat frame in the coverage of Iran by NYT. The number of articles published before the Netanyahu’s speech was
N=325 articles. The variable related to the “ironic articles about Iran or its leadership” is binary, in
this case is treated as a dummy variable with ratio qualities and it has been included has a constant to check whether it can predict some of the variance in the threat frame.
The multiple regression model with the use of Netanyahu’s speech and the ironic articles about Iran or its leadership as predictors and the use of the threat frame in the coverage of Iran as a dependent variable is significant ( F(2,318) = 20.96, p= .000). This latter means that the regression model can be used in order to predict the use of threat frame in the coverage of Iran by the NYT, though the strength of prediction is weak. Namely, Netanyahu’s speech and the ironic article about Iran or its
leadership can predict 11.6 percent of the variance in the threat frame use of NYT when covering Iran (R²= 0.116). The newspaper’s articles published prior to Netanyahu’s speech b* =-0.002, t=-0.31, p=. 000, 95% CI [-0.003, -0.001] have a significant weak association regarding the use of threat frame in the coverage of Iran by the NYT when controlling for ironic articles about Iran or its leadership. If an article is published one day earlier than Netanyahu’s speech in the American Congress framing Iran as a threat will decrease by 0.02 while holding ironic articles as a constant. In other words, the more an article is published closer to Netanyahu’s speech the more it will use the threat frame when referring to Iran. The ironic articles about Iran or its leadership speech b* =0.14, t=-2.71, p=. 007, 95% CI [-0.003, -0.00] have a significant weak association in the coverage of Iran as a threat. Namely, per every unit (ironic article about Iran or its leadership) that increases in the scale the use of the threat frame regarding Iran increases by 0.29 while controlling for the articles published prior to Netanyahu’s speech. Multicollinearity diagnostics revealed that VIF for both predictors is less than 10 (VIF<10), therefore acceptable tolerance values. The rest of the independent variables are held constant for these effects.
Table 6. Regression coefficients for threat frame in the coverage of Iran
b Stand. Error B b* t p VIF
Constant .33 0.02 17.81 .000
Days prior to
Netanyahu’s speech -0.02 0.00 -0.29 -5.58 .000 1.03 Ironic article about Iran/
its leadership .29 0.11 0.14 2.71 .007 1.03
Testing H4
For testing H4, whether the disclosure of Sony hacking on 24th November 2014 had an impact in the
use of threat frame in the coverage of DPRK by NYT, a multiple regression analysis was run adding “the ironic articles about DPRK” as a control variable (included has a constant to check whether it can predict some of the variance in the threat frame). Also, for this hypothesis the prediction variable date, when the articles were published (Q3/ nominal scale) was recoded as for hypothesis H3 (see section above). The new recoded variable date (ratio level) measures the time difference of the published articles from the Sony incident. The predictor ironic articles about DPRK or its leadership is a dummy variable taking the value 0 for not ironic articles and the value 1 for ironic articles about DPRK/its leadership. The number of published articles from the date of Sony disclosure until the 2nd of March 2015 was N= 230 whereas the number of ironic articles concerning DPRK and its leadership was N=45. The outcome variable threat frame in the coverage of DPRK is ratio level.
The multiple regression model with the use of Sony disclosure and ironic articles about DPRK or its leadership as predictors and the use of the threat frame in the coverage of DPRK as a dependent variable is not significant ( F(2,228) =2.15, p= .119). This latter means that the multiple regression model cannot be used in order to predict the use of threat frame in the coverage of DPRK by the NYT. This is also evident from the coefficients, which are insignificant for both the revelation of Sony hacking b* =-0.05, t= -0.72, p=. 474, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.001] and the ironic articles about DPRK or its leadership b* = -0.12, t= -1.80, p=. 073, 95% CI [-0.170, 0.008]. Therefore, H4 is rejected.
Table 7. Regression coefficients for threat frame in the coverage of DPRK
b Stand. Error B b* t p N
Constant .169 0.03 6.15 .000
Days after Sony
disclosure .000 0.00 -0.05 -0.72 .474 230
Ironic article about DPRK/
its leadership -0.081 0.04 -0.12 -1.80 .073 45
Note: R²= 0.019 and alpha level p<.05
Conclusions and Discussion
This study examined the use of “threat frame” and “irony frame” in the media coverage of Iran and North Korea. Frames are mainly created by political elites and spread by media for providing the audience with a specific interpretation of the reality (Entman, 2010). This particular threat frame dates back to the Bush administration because of the inclusion of Iran and North Korea in the list of
so-called “Rogue States” (Choi, 2010) while the irony framehas a more recent history and it is linked
with media mixing information and entertainment (namely “infotainment”).
The goal of the research was that of investigating whether the two frames had been applied by the selected news outlet, The New York Times, in a non-uniform manner. Additionally, the present study investigated if the application of those frames had been sensitive to two important events for both countries, namely Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at the American
Congress dating 2nd March 2015 and the U.S.A. intelligence revelation of Sony hacking by North Korea dating 24th November 2014. The first event represented the culmination of the anti-Iranian rhetoric by Netanyahu, while the second represented the highest concern by the U.S.A. who interpreted the event as a cause of worry not only for the North Korean ballistic missiles able to reach its Pacific coast, but also for any potential cyber-attacks which have proved to be effectively harmful. The broader relevance of the present study is that of offering an indication on how “old” frames are evolving, how they can still be considered contemporary and about their connotative potential on the reality surrounding us. It is known that “framing” and “connoting” are strongly linked together (De Vreese, 2005) and that the public generally has just a vague notion of (geo)politics (Chang & Druckman, 2007). Consequently, its perception of the reality can be affected (Altheide, 1997; Lim & Seo, 2009) depending on how media outlets process the relevant information. Even more when we refer to events happening in remote places, not only from a geographical point of view, but also a cultural one that we cannot directly experience (Lim & Seo, 2009).
A manual content analysis of articles from The New York Times has been carried out after developing a codebook which allowed recognizing the application of the two frames in the coverage of the two aforementioned countries by the news outlet The New York Times. A number of 517 relevant articles (consisting of 286 articles about Iran, 192 for the DPRK and 39 for both the two countries) had been coded.
The results of the analysis have shown that the so-called “threat frame” has been applied to Iran more when approached the day of Netanyahu’s speech. On the other side, it has been demonstrated that the so-called “irony frame” has been applied by The New York Times more when referring to North Korea.
In line with Altheide and Michalowski’s (1999) study, we had evidence that the “discourse of fear” pervades news concerning both Iran and North Korea as a nuclear threat or a cultural one.
According to the study conducted by Lim and Seo (2009), The New York Times applied different frames when dealing with information from North Korea. A “military threat frame” as well as a “human right frame” have been recognized during the content analysis and the only one missing, when comparing to Lim and Seo’s 2009 study, is represented by the so-called “dialog partner frame” that did not fit into the theme of the present study. The “nuclear challenge” taken in consideration by Hastings Dunn (2007) still pervades the representation of Iran in news media in 2003 as today. Despite the change of the historical context and although relations between Iran and the U.S.A. are improving, the country is still depicted as a nuclear danger. In this very case, the role of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, acting as “antagonist actor” (Gabay & Sheafer, 2009) able to effect the “competition over agenda building and frame building” (p.3), may have influenced the media coverage related to Iran.
Though the study has yielded interesting results, it has a few limitations. A first limitation is represented by the choice of including just one news outlet. The lack of time and additional coders led to the choice of only one media outlet. Therefore, in this case of The New York Times, which represents an example of prestige press and whose quality of information is recognized all over the world, it has been hard to recognize the application, for example, of the irony frame. A probable justification could be that The New York Times, unlike more tabloidized newspapers, tends not to make use of infotainment to attract audience. Due to this reason it was difficult to distinguish the phenomenon, well described by Hattem (2013), for which Iran tends to be represented as a threat by media, while North Korea tends to be portrayed ironically. A good way to bridge the gap would have been that of including one or more media outlets in order to have a wider view about the extent to which the relevant frames are applied by the producers of information. A second limitation in this study is the selected time frame. Indeed the choice of a limited time period of analysis, three and a half months, has proved to be sufficiently effective to test the hypotheses, but if it had been expanded it could have provided even more interesting comparisons. For example, going back to Kim Jong-Un
seizure of power after his father’s death in 2011, it would be interesting to understand which of the two frames had been applied the most: for example the threat one for the uncertainty regarding the change of power or the ironic one due to the curious style of the new leader. Besides that, always regarding the lack of time and resources, a cross-country analysis would have allowed to investigate whether the application of the frames differed between countries. A potential model would be the study by Sheafer and Gabay (2009), which have demonstrated how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is portrayed differently by European and American news media. Accordingly, the following question arises: is Iran depicted as a threat by European media despite the greater geographical and cultural proximity that historically links the two areas? Concerning North Korea and the use of the irony frame expectations were not entirely met and it may have been due to the fact that the Sony hacking, acting as event really harmful for the United States, has limited the use of it. In other words, the hacking-threat frame had apparently monopolized the attention of The New York Times in this particular time frame leaving little room for the use of infotainment as described by Hattem (2013). This has led to a lack of data on the use of irony frame that was most of the times missing in the analysis.
Further research should focus on the revitalization of framing theories as interpretation and simplification of the reality (De Vreese, 2005), which in recent years have been overcome, considering scientific research interest in other topics ranging from social media usage to the influence of emotions in politics. The importance of the topic should not be underestimated and frames that are topical and alive both in the media, politics or advertising shod not be disregarded because the whole world around us is marked by the struggle to prevail in the interpretation of reality. The discourse of fear/threat frame are not only applicable to a context of direct physical danger, as in the case of North Korean ballistic missiles, but to a wider range of situation spacing from immigration policies to economics. The actual debt crisis happening in Greece represents a perfect recent example. Namely, two threats frames have been constructed, that of Alexis Tsipras’ government which is clashing with that of the European Institutions and only one will win the “battle of communication”.
In this specific case the threat of a forced exit from the monetary union competes with the threat of default declaration by the Greek government. The “winner/s” will have the power to considerably define the future of the European Union as a whole ,as the result of the so-called “Iran talks” will influence the situation in the Middle East (just think about the possibility of Iran allied with the United States in fighting the onset of the Islamic State).
Media have a vital role in the democratic process since public opinion is shaped by their representation of the world. Media select, accept, perpetuate and change frames. For this reason framing theories need a further development that takes into account a media-monitoring approach by making scientific researches in the public domain and not only academic material. The role of “watchdog” as a “media monopoly” must be overcome in favor of an inclusion of the scientific world in what can be defined as “watchdog of watchdog” leading to a better understanding of the world around us and, for example, providing an answer to Julian Hattem’s query that inspired this study: “Why do so many people laugh at North Korea but fear Iran?” (Hattem, 2013)
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr. Jonas Lefevere for his helpful guidance and patience. A special thanks to my family, my friends and Jan for their support.
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Appendix A
Codebook
Does the article address Iran and/or DPRK?
1 Yes (continue coding)
2 No, Iran and/or DPRK not mentioned or addressed
3 No, Iran & DPRK only mentioned in a list of other topics (but nothing substantial is said about
the countries).
V1
Does the article refers to Iran or DPRK?
1 Iran 2 DPRK
3 Both Iran and DPRK
V3
Date of the article
DD/MM/YYYY
THREAT FRAME
V4
Is Iran depicted as:
1 A global threat
2 A regional threat (Stability in the Middle East region) 3 A threat for the USA
5 None of the options
V4.1
Is Iran depicted as a threat for peace? (E.g. destabilizing the world geopolitical equilibrium)
1 Yes 2 No
V4.2
Is Iran depicted as a nuclear threat? (E.g. developing its nuclear program for military purposes)
1 Yes 2 No
V4.3
Is Iran linked with terrorism? (E.g. by funding terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon)
1 Yes 2 No
V4.4
Is Iran depicted as a cultural threat? (E.g. as a threat for Western values)
1 Yes 2 No
V4.5
Is Iran accused of human right violations? (E.g. persecuting political opponents)
1 Yes 2 No
V4.6
Is Iran depicted as capable of unexpected and unpredictable actions? (E.g. attacking Israel)
1 Yes 2 No
V4.7
Is Iran depicted as an economical threat? (E.g. influencing the cost of crude oil)
1 Yes 2 No
V4.8
Is Iran depicted as a general threat? (E.g. “…his actions could have repercussions…”, without
specifying which kind and against whom)
1 Yes 2 No
V5
Frames: Is the DPRK depicted as:
1 A global threat
2 A regional threat (Stability in the Korean Peninsula-China-Japan region) 3 A threat for the USA
4 None of the options
V5.1
Is the DPRK depicted as a threat for peace? (E.g. destabilizing the world geopolitical
equilibrium)
1 Yes 2 No
V5.2
Is the DPRK depicted as a nuclear threat? (E.g. developing its nuclear program for military
purposes)
1 Yes 2 No
V5.3
Is the DPRK linked with terrorism? (E.g. by selling to or buying weapons from terrorist
organizations)
1 Yes 2 No
V5.4
Is the DPRK depicted as a cultural threat? (E.g. as a threat for Western values)
1 Yes 2 No
V5.5
Is the DPRK accused of human right violations? (E.g. by mentioning concentration camps
existing in the country)
1 Yes 2 No
V5.6
Is the DPRK depicted as capable of unexpected and unpredictable actions? (E.g. launch of
ballistic missiles against South Korea)
1 Yes 2 No
V5.7
Is the DPRK depicted as an economical threat? (E.g. for South Korea in case there will be
reunification of the two countries)
1 Yes 2 No
V5.8
Is the DPRK depicted as a general threat? (E.g. “…his actions could have repercussions…”,
without specifying which kind and against whom)
1 Yes 2 No
IRONY FRAME
V6.1
Is the article ironic about Iran and/or its leadership (E.g. the author mentions the new haircut of
Ali Khamenei or Hassan Rouhani)?
1 Yes 2 No
V6.2
Is the article focusing more on aspects of the private lives of Iranian leaders? (E.g. the author
mentions eating habits of Hassan Rouhani)
1 Yes 2 No
V6.3
Is the tone of the article more entertaining (see “Infotainment”) than informative? (E.g. more
attention is given to soft news than international politics)
1Yes 2 No
V6.4
Are potentially serious issues presented to the public with an ironic tone? (E.g. by mocking the
country's nuclear potential)
1 Yes 2 No
V7.1
Is the article somehow ironic about the DPRK and/or its leadership (E.g. the author mentions the new haircut of Kim Jong Un)?
1Yes 2 No
V7.2
Is the article focusing more on aspects of the private lives of North Korean leaders? (E.g. the
author mentions eating habits of Kim Jong Un)
1 Yes 2 No
V7.3
Is the tone of the article more entertaining (see “Infotainment”) than informative? (E.g. more
attention is given to soft news than international politics)
1Yes 2 No
V7.4
Are potentially serious issues presented to the public with an ironic tone? (E.g. by mocking the
country's nuclear potential)
1 Yes 2 No
