1
The Energy Union: A
revolution in European
energy policy, or a bold
move of the Commission?
[This thesis researches to what extent the Energy Union
is an effective policy to deal with Europe’s energy challenges. Specifically, this research examines the role
2 University of Amsterdam
Faculty: Faculty of Humanities
Program: Master of Arts in European Studies Track: European Policy
Date: 15 January 2017 Supervisor: dhr. dr. L.K. Marácz Second reader: dhr. dr. E. van Ree
3
Abbreviations:
EU: European Union
SEM: Single European Market LI: Liberal Intergovernmentalism
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community EAEC: European Atomic Energy Community CEEC: Central Eastern European Countries MEP: Member of the European Parliament EEA: European Economic Area
IEM: Internal Energy Market
ACER: European Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators SEECP: South Eastern European Cooperation Process
4
Table of contents
INTRODUCTION... 5
1. CHALLENGES FOR THE EU’S ENERGY POLICY ... 7
1.1
I
NTRODUCTION... 7
1.2
T
HEEU’
S ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION EXPLAINED... 8
1.3
G
EOPOLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THEEU’
S ENERGY SECURITY... 11
1.4
E
NVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES OF THEEU ... 13
1.5
T
HEE
NERGYU
NIONS
TRATEGY... 14
2. THE ‘ENERGY UNION’ TAKING FORM... 20
2.1
I
NTRODUCTION... 20
2.2
T
HEORETICAL APPROACHES FOR STUDYING THEEU’
SE
NERGYU
NION... 21
2.3
L
IBERALI
NTERGOVERMENTALISM... 21
2.4
S
UPRANATIONALISM... 24
3. CASE STUDIES: NATIONAL PREFERENCES OF KEY COUNTRIES ... 27
3.1
I
NTRODUCTION... 27
3.2
G
ERMANY... 27
3.3
F
RANCE... 29
3.4
P
OLAND... 32
3.5
N
ORWAY... 34
4.1 MAIN FINDINGS ... 38
4.1
T
HE LIBERAL-
INTERGOVERNMENTALIST PATH... 38
4.2
T
HES
UPRANATIONALIST PATH... 40
4.3
A
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE APPROACH... 41
CONCLUSION ... 45
5
Introduction
The last decade showed that there has been an increased interest within the European Union (hereafter EU) for external energy security because of the gas crises in 2006, and 2009 and the ongoing territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia more recently. Thereto, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, proposed an initiative to strengthen Europe’s energy security. The subsequent Energy Union was officially introduced on February 25, 2015, which received great support among the heads of all member states. The significance of the project was underlined by Maroš Šefčovič, who’s leading the project and called it the most ambitious energy project ever seen in European history, as it is supposed to transform Europe’s energy system.1 The EU claims to have an unique
character when it comes to energy cooperation, because there is no other example of regional cooperation within this field in the world. However, the question is how effective will this system be, because energy cooperation is mostly a prerogative of the nation state. The necessity of a new energy and climate policy has intensified because of the EU’s import dependence and likelihood of gas supply disruption. Therefore, the EU is at a cross-roads and with the Energy Union, it seems that the EU has made a critical decision as to which direction it is taking.
Consequently, this thesis is going to examine this plan in greater detail. The Energy Union is a reflection of Europe’s comprehensive energy problems. Due to the shrinking production domestically, the EU relies heavily on countries outside the EU such as Russia for its energy demand. Apart from dependency problems and all its consequences, Europe is struggling to establish a robust energy infrastructure. Even though the Commission now understands the severity of the problems, it remains to be seen whether or not the Energy Union is a successful policy to deal with these problems. More specifically, for its success it is vital to understand what the member states attitude is towards the Energy Union, because that will be the main factor to determine its success in the end. Therefore, the research question of this thesis will be: to what extend is the Energy Union an effective policy to deal with Europe’s energy dependency challenges? More specifically, the question will focus on the role of the member state to determine that success. The reason for this research question comes from the fact that the Commission has blown new life into Europe’s energy policy. Previous policies for energy (and climate) such as the 2020 strategy seemed to be not as successful as the Commission desires, and moreover, it was not sufficient to ensure a secure energy supply. Therefore, it of great importance to examine the impact of the Energy Union on security of supply to understand if this new policy is truly revolutionary, or rather a bold move of the Commission.
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, energy governance has become a shared competence between the Commission and the member states. Therefore, the scope of this research focuses on the one hand on the role of the Commission in the process of creating its energy policy, and to which extent this policy
1 The Guardian, Ambitious EU blueprint for energy union to loosen Russian grip on gas’,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/24/eu-blueprint-energy-union-russian-gas-gazprom-maros-sefcovic, accessed 5 February 2016.
6 is becoming increasingly supranational. In literature it is argued that for the Energy Union a policy window emerged for the Commission because of increasing energy import dependence, gas supply disruptions, and the external dimension of dependency on only a few countries. On the other hand, we examine the role of the member state in shaping the Energy Union. Energy policy has traditionally been a national prerogative, but a slight supranational turn has been visible in the last decade.2
However, the assumption is made that there is still a strong intergovernmental character at the core of decision-making in the EU. It seems therefore that further integration in the field of energy can be theorized by using two major European integration theories, namely supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. For these reasons this research will compare and contrast the role of the Commission and that of the member states based on these theories. This will provide a theoretical basis to answer the research question.
From a scientific point of view this research is important for several reasons. First of all, not much literature has been written about the Energy Union. Moreover, earlier research on European energy policy focuses on energy cooperation on a national level within a European and global context, rather than with a specific focus on European cooperation. Secondly, most of this research is limited to sector specific research, such as solar, wind, or nuclear energy or with an emphasis on sustainability or energy efficiency, whereas the Energy Union covers a much broader approach to energy cooperation, including security of supply and climate action. At last, apart from scientific relevance, this study can also be relevant for organizations, private and public institutions, NGO’s and companies that deal with energy or climate matters.
The first chapter will give an overview of Europe’s energy dependency and all its consequences. This includes energy dependency in terms of relying on (fossil) fuels and environmental impact, as well as the implications of relying on (a few) countries outside of Europe, especially Russia. This will be followed up with an overview of what the Energy Union is, and how it is supposed to address the complexity of these challenges. Subsequently, the third chapter will providing a theoretical framework in order to understand the policy mechanisms within the Energy Union and how this is going to take form in the coming years. Based on these theories there will be several case studies to understand how member states perceive the Energy Union. The Energy Union is supposed to provide coherence and establish a secure energy supply within Europe, therefore it is imperative to understand the member states position as we assume that they are key to incentivize integration. It will become clear that member states vary in the way they support the Energy Union based on the state’s ability to cope with energy challenges themselves. Lastly, this thesis suggests that multi-speed integration through regional projects, with supervision of the EU, could solve the discrepancy between supranational and intergovernmental governance.
2 Kacper Szulecki et all, ‘Shaping the ‘Energy Union’: Between National Positions and Governance Innovation
7
1. Challenges for the EU’s energy policy
1.1
IntroductionIn this chapter the multifaceted character of the EU’s challenges concerning Europe’s energy policy will be addressed to provide a clear image of what the EU is dealing with. An overview of the EU’s energy sector will provide evidence of the EU’s major energy dependence including all its consequences. The critical problems of energy dependence and subsequently major environmental problems will be addressed in detail to stress the necessity the Commission is facing for a successful strategy for the Energy Union. To provide a better understanding of the EU’s problems related to energy, there will first be a section that discusses the EU’s energy consumption and its own production of energy sources. Subsequently, there will be an overview of the Commission’s response to these matters.
Integration between European countries first emerged with the creation of the European Community for Coal and Steel and later the cooperation extended towards a common nuclear treaty, Euratom. Hence, by looking at the production of coal and nuclear energy it becomes clear that the EU’s own energy production is relatively limited compared to its consumption demands, which will prove to be much broader than just coal and nuclear energy. As a result the EU imports a great amount of (fossil) fuels from countries outside the EU in order to fulfill those needs. In addition, growing global demand for energy sources, instability in regions where the EU imports its energy from, and increased pollution from using fossil fuels are all factors that jeopardize the EU’s energy security. The Commission’s solutions to these challenges have been translated into the concept of the Energy Union. There will be a section that will provide an overview of the plan of the Energy Union as it is now. In addition, there will be an explanation of the policy targets and of the mechanisms of the Energy Union. This will provide a context that is necessary to understand the following theorization and analysis in the second chapter.
8 1.2 The EU’s energy consumption and production explained
Since the start of European Community, energy has been one of the main pillars of the European integration project. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was constructed in order to uphold peaceful relations between war-torn states. The Community was of key importance because it combined the heavy German and French industries under a common institutional roof that afterwards was extended with collaboration on nuclear energy with a subsequent treaty, which we know as the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC).3
Graph 1: EU's energy consumption 2013
This graph shows the EU’s energy consumption which is to a great extent anchored in the use of fossil fuels such as petroleum products, gas and solid fuels like coal. This is arguably remarkable because Europe’s treaties are founded on the production of coal and nuclear energy, but the most consumed energy sources are petroleum products and gas. Nevertheless, the important question that needs to be explored is what share of the European energy mix is actually produced in Europe, and how this share has changed over time whilst the EU grew in amount of member states. Based on statistics provided by Eurostat, solid fuels (17%), and nuclear energy (14%), are combined merely providing 31% of the EU’s energy consumption. In that sense one might argue that the EU fails to secure its own energy supply. Furthermore, when analyzing the EU’s coal and nuclear energy production remarkable trends appear, which consequently provide more evidence for the necessity of a different approach to energy cooperation in Europe.
9
Graph 2: The EU's production of hard coal
When analyzing the EU production of coal, one of the cheapest energy sources, we see on the one hand that production fell from 1.8 million tonnes from 1990, to less than 100.000 tonnes in 2000. This is because of shrinking industries, caused by the fact that most of Europe’s coalmines are depleted. Inevitably, in 2006, around 40 percent of the EU’s demand for coal had to be compensated by import.4 In addition, because coal is one of the most harmful source of energy for the environment,
some countries decided to close their coal plants. Production of nuclear energy, as the other European energy pillar, covers only 14 percent of the total energy consumption, which is a relatively insignificant share. Furthermore, it must be noted that nuclear energy is only produced in a few countries like France, Belgium and Slovakia, and it plays an irrelevant role for the EU as a whole. Finally, according to Eurostat, the production and use of nuclear power has been decreasing since 2003, primarily due to skepticism in public opinion towards the arguably dangerous energy source.5
Thus, when taking the EU’s energy mix into account we see declining fossil fuel supplies, a downturn in the primary production of coal, and a decreasing production and unpopularity of nuclear energy. This leads the EU towards an unsustainable situation wherein the EU becomes increasingly dependent on primary energy imports from other countries in order to meet its demand for energy. Statistics tell us, that the EU imported 922.8 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 2012, whereas 794.3 tonnes of oil equivalent were produced locally. A tonne of oil equivalent is a unit of energy defined as the amount of energy released by burning one tonne of crude oil.6 This trend continues and the
disproportionate balance between importing large amounts of energy and decreasing production
4 Steve Wood, ‘Europe’s Energy Politics’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, nr.18, p.308. 5 ‘Energy production Europe’,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Primary_production, accessed 6 June 2016.
10 locally can (further) endanger the EU’s energy security in the near future.
The importance of a secure energy supply is one of the most important building blocks for the industrialized world to provide security in EU-countries. In modern day Europe, economies rely heavily on energy. The EU’s extensive energy demand is essential for everyday life, in transport, defense, health and delivery systems, basically in any sector. As a result, any threat or disruption of the energy supply can significantly distort the way of life as we know in Europe. Therefore, it substantiates the claim that an imbalance between the EU’s high level of fossil fuel consumption and the downward trend in the EU’s own energy production raises serious challenges. However, apart from this imbalance, there are also other threats that have to be taken into account when studying energy dependence matters on a more global scale.
Recent studies have revealed other threats to the EU and the world’s energy supply in the form of population growth on the one hand, and an increased pace of industrialization in other regions of the world. Subsequently, the scarcity of energy sources is growing rapidly due to the growing demand for energy in developing economies like Brazil, China and India. The International Energy Agency calculated that fossils fuels now account for 80% of the total energy consumption worldwide. Moreover, they have estimated that growing global demand gives reasons to believe that this trend will continue to dominate the energy mix globally up to 2030.7 This means growing competition over
energy sources, and rapidly increasing scarcity of resources. Therefore, another dimension is added that forms a threat when it comes to securing the energy supply on the long-term for the EU.
The rising demand for energy indicates that the end of a low-cost fossil fuel age is closing in. The EU’s dependence on fossil fuels threatens to disrupt the global economy and subsequently leave an unsustainable ecological footprint as well. This becomes evident with the following statistics. Interpreting energy use in oil equivalents, the EU is the world’s third largest consumer of energy, consuming 1850 million tonnes on a yearly base, whereas Europe’s population accounts for less than 8% of the world’s total population.8 Taking in mind that in Europe there are only a limited amount of
energy sources (left), it is time for the EU to consider how to make the Energy Union a successful policy to deal with these matters.9
7 Sang-Chul Park, ‘Alternative Energy Policies in Germany with particular Reference to Solar Energy’, Journal
of Contemporary European Studies, nr.18, p.323.
8 Steve Wood, ‘Europe’s Energy Politics’, Journal of contemporary European Studies, nr.18, p.308. 9 Population Statistics, ‘
11 1.3 Geopolitical assessment of the EU’s energy security
Apart from having limited resources in Europe’s, there are several other geopolitical developments to take into account when thinking of a new energy policy. Gawdat Bahgat, a political scientist, has identified that geopolitical and economic developments in the first decade of the twenty-first century have intensified Europe’s sense of vulnerability with regards to its energy security. Intensifying ethnic and religious tensions in the Middle East effecting almost all of Europe’s energy suppliers, such as Iraq, Libya, Iran, Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf States, are causing major concern for energy security in Europe, as these countries are important suppliers globally.10 Bahgat is mainly concerned that these
external treats will cause uncertainty on the global energy market, which could drive up oil and natural gas prices on the long-term. In addition, diminishing refinery capacity, shrinking spare capacity and a general climate of low investment could possibly drive up the prices even further.11
Thus, he seems to provide substantial evidence that these regions alone are not sufficient for Europe to rely on to improve its energy security.
Whilst considering other regions for energy sources it is more practical for the EU to import energy from its eastern neighbor Russia. In that regard it makes sense that Russia is currently one of the largest energy suppliers for Europe. However, with political frictions rapidly rising on Europe’s Eastern border, with the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Europe is carefully reconsidering other options. Furthermore, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006, and 2009 over gas prices already highlighted the risk of being dependent on a few energy suppliers and has given the Commission reason to re-asses energy security in the EU. When Russia shut down the energy supply to Ukraine in both 2006 and 2009 it raised the Commission’s awareness of Europe’s vulnerability.
Nonetheless, plans that have come up such as strengthening infrastructure with pipelines and electricity grids to advance flows of energy throughout Europe (gas, and electricity interconnectivity) do not protect Europe sufficiently from external energy shocks, nor helps it to secure the EU’s long-term energy supplies. Besides, it should be taken into account that developing economies will further increase the worldwide demand for energy. Miguel Arias Cañete, of the DG Climate & Energy recognized these problems recently; he pointed out that the global energy map is being redrawn. The global energy demand will increase by over one third in 2040, with China and India together accounting for half of that growth.12 These geopolitical developments highlight the EU’s vulnerability
even more.
10 Gawdat Bahgat, ‘Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities’, International Affairs, nr.5, p.961. 11 Ibid, p.961.
12 Miguel Arias Cañete, ‘Europe’s energy security challenges’,
12
Graph 3: Fossil fuel import EU28 2013
This graph pinpoints the severe dependency on energy imports within Europe. On first sight the graph tells us that as a whole, the EU relies for 53.2% of importing solid fuels, petroleum, and gas from countries outside the EU. Importing these forms of energy costs the EU over one billion euro each day, or over 400 billion annually. The members of the euro zone, usually seen as the strongest performing members of the EU, are for 60.1% reliant on fossil fuel imports. Denmark is the only member that has a negative energy balance but only if gas and petroleum products are disregarded. Malta is the most dependent state with an extreme of 104.1% of imported fossil fuels. Meaning Malta has a surplus for storage or resells. Other excessive importers are Luxembourg and Latvia both 96.9, and Cyprus 96.4%. Finally, taking into account that Russia is the sole supplier of six EU- countries is arguably undesirable. A third of all imported oil and 26% of all gas imports are from Russia.13
All matters considered, energy dependency should arguably be one of the foremost important issues for the EU. This is the reason why the EU made more efforts with the Energy Union, most notably during the Dutch council presidency in the first half of 2016. It became clear that the Commission was highly ambitious to increase the number of suppliers, decrease energy consumption, and also increase Europe’s own supply since security and welfare deeply depends on energy.14
President of the European Commission, Jean- Claude Juncker, framed it bluntly as followed: ‘we have to get out of this dependency trap’.15
13 Tessel Renzenbrink, ‘Energy dependence’,
http://www.energieoverheid.nl/2014/07/29/interactieve-kaart-toont-energieafhankelijkheid-per-eu-lidstaat/, accessed 15 may 2015.
14 European Commission, ‘Energy security’,
http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vhcogpdu91mg/energie_unie_veiligstellen_van_de, accessed May 2015.
13 1.4 Environmental challenges of the EU
Another aspect of being dependent on fossil fuels that receives greater attention nowadays, is the effect on the environment. Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide that was removed from the atmosphere millions of years ago, back into the atmosphere. Henceforth, the worldwide discussion about major climate problems is intensifying because of the growing volume of human activity on the planet, and especially the increasing energy consumption. There is a broad scientific consensus that greenhouse gasses and emissions are already changing the climate and it is most likely to lead towards global disasters in the near future because of global warming.16
The Stern Rapport, seen as the most influential economic report on climate change, showed the serious threats and economic costs of climate change. Until recently, carbon emissions have economically speaking been considered as free by-products of electricity generation. However, the rapport shows that by taking the continuing trend of carbon emissions into account the world’s GDP could be reduced by two-digit figures in the next hundred years. In other words, this basically means that every ton of carbon emissions causes 67 euro in damages, whereas avoiding these costs would only costs 20 euro.17 Therefore, carbon emissions that are released into the atmosphere should be
reduced rapidly if society wants to avoid the cost of carbon emission in the future.
To tackle climate change, it is argued that a transition to a low carbon economy must take place within a century at most.18 A year ago, a Dutch court went as far to order the state to reduce
emissions by 25% compared to 1990 to protect its citizens from the consequences of climate change.19
The fact that a court acknowledges that a state has the obligation to its citizens to cut emissions in order to protect them, emphasizes the necessity of action against climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions as a result of burning fossil fuels are the primary cause of environmental problems and global warming. This happens most notably in the transport sector, which in the EU accounts for 80% of all greenhouse gas emissions.20 A comprehensive climate action strategy should therefore be part of
the Energy Union.
The EU has profiled EU itself to be a frontrunner in tackling climate change and numerous agreements have already been made to ensure that tomorrow’s energy is cleaner and more sustainable. A commitment within the EU has been made to reduce emissions by at least 20%, increase energy efficiency by 20%, and increase renewable energy by 20%, by 2020 and is currently one of the most
16 Sang-Chul Park, ‘Alternative Energy Policies in Germany with particular Reference to Solar Energy’, Journal
of Contemporary European Studies, nr.18, p.323.
17 Nicholas Stern, ‘Cost of Climate change’,
http://www.klimaatportaal.nl/pro1/general/start.asp?i=2&j=11&k=4&p=0&itemid=150&folder=Dossiers&title= Stern%20rapport, accessed 25 May 2015.
18 Steffan Jacobsson et al, ‘The politics and policy of energy system transformation- explaining the German
diffusion of renewable energy technology’, Energy Policy, nr.34, p.256.
19 Arthur Neslen, ‘Dutch government ordered to cut carbon emissions in landmark ruling’,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-government-ordered-cut-carbon-emissions-landmark-ruling, accessed at 26 June 2015.
20 Pekka Voutilainen, ‘Developing energy policy for Europe: A Finnish perspective on energy cooperation in the
14 important policies for the EU.21 However, energy policy in the EU is primarily within the jurisdiction
of member states, which means that they can implement this goal according to national preferences. Consequently, measures taken vary greatly per member state and so do their results. This could be because of what is called a ‘collective action problem’. Governments seem to be withdrawn of taking action and rather wait until other countries have invested in sustainable and efficient technologies for sustainable energy sources.
In the last decade, it has become clear that the most effective way to deal with environmental challenges is a joint approach, which is translated in the Kyoto agreement and more recently in the Paris agreement. The European Union recognizes that it has become more and more important to speak with one voice about environmental and energy problems to ensure a coherent and effective approach.22 If the EU wishes to be a leader when it comes to tackling climate change, economic
growth should be decoupled from energy consumption. This means consuming less energy, while remaining, or even becoming more competitive.23
1.5 The Energy Union Strategy
Now that the challenges of European energy dependence and all its implications have been explained, this section will present an overview of the EU’s response to these challenges with a specific focus on the Energy Union. The Commission’s motivation to initiate a new energy policy will be analyzed and more specifically, the goals and instruments to achieve those will be explained in greater detail. This will be done in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the position of the Commission and subsequently that of the member states towards the Energy Union.
The European Commission acknowledged the need for a new approach to its energy policy and subsequently its climate policy with the introduction of the Energy Union. Vice President of the European Union Maroš Šefčovič, who is in charge of leading the Energy Union project, presented the plan on February 25, 2015 as ‘the biggest energy project since the Coal and Steel Community Treaty’, which was the building block for the European Union’s subsequent creation.24 The concept was
initially launched by Donald Tusk as a response to the crisis between Russia and Ukraine and its implications for gas security, but has later on taken a far wider scope.
The project was advertised by the Commission as a transformation of Europe’s energy system, by providing secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy for all European citizens.25 At the time, the plan was perceived to advance existing EU energy and climate policies on
21 Pekka Voutilainen, ‘Developing energy policy for Europe: A Finnish perspective on energy cooperation in the
European Union’, Energy Law Journal, nr.29, p.121.
22 Ibid, p.127. 23 Ibid, p.130.
24 David Buchan, ‘Europe’s Energy Union plan; a reasonable start to a long journey’, Oxford Energy Comments,
p.2.
25 European Commission, ‘Energy Union Factsheet’,
15 many fronts. Based on a more cooperative and solidarity based approach the Commission made an ambitious attempt to blow new life into its previous policies. In order to understand the actual impact of the Energy Union, this section will also include an overview of the strategic framework of the Energy Union. From this, it will become clear that there seems to be a contradiction over the role of the Energy Union among the member states.
On the website one can read that the Commission’s reasons to propose an Energy Union was primarily because Europe’s energy system faces an ever more pressing need to ensure, sustainable, affordable and competitive energy for all citizens of Europe. This is the Commission’s way of framing Europe’s excessive dependence of what has been described in the previous chapter. The main problem is of course Europe’s dependence on a limited amount of suppliers, especially for natural gas, because gas is generally considered to be the cleanest fossil fuel and hence an important fuel that fits the goals of the EU.
The initial proposal of the Energy Union by Donald Tusk however, had primarily been presented as a plan to strengthen Europe’s energy policy through the means of increasing the amount of common goals and measures to deal with the concerns about a secure gas supply. These specific concerns have emerged during the Ukrainian gas crisis both in 2006 and in 2009, which highlighted the EU’s dependence on Russian gas. Currently, 34% of Europe’s gas imports are from the Russian State controlled company Gazprom, and for some (Eastern) European member states this percentage is considerably higher.26 Around 50% of Europe’s gas runs through the Ukrainian pipelines, which
highlights the seriousness of dependency. The impact of an abrupt energy crisis on countries that are highly dependent on a single gas supplier could entails serious problems.27
Within the EU there are countries that are nearly completely reliant on gas imports from Russia. Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Malta, Latvia, and to a lesser extend also Lithuania import nearly all of their gas from Russia.28 On the long-term, implications for countries such as the Baltic states,
that are dependent on a single energy supplier and, a single supply route, and on a single form of energy, can be harmful for a country’s economy as seen during the Ukraine gas crises. However, for many Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) this has been the status-quo since the Soviet Union. Therefore, many CEEC have placed energy dependence on top of their political agenda.
However, when it comes to energy challenges in Western European countries, the focus in the field of energy is rather different because the problems of energy security are much less serious in these countries. Primarily, because these countries have a much more diversified energy mix on which they can rely when an energy disruption emerges. Consequently, Western European countries focus much more on the practical completion of the Single Energy Market and climate change rather than
26 Ole Gunnar Austvik, The Energy Union and the security of gas supply, Energy Policy, nr. 96, p.372. 27 Clingendael, ‘Security of Supply in Europe’,
http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/files.cfm?event=files.download&ui=9C1DEEC1-5254-00CF-FD03186604989704, accessed 28 October 2016.
16 on security of gas supply. The revised Energy Union that has been introduced in February 2015 showed that it was heavily influenced by these Western preferences. In order to provide a better understanding of the effectiveness of the Energy Union on the security of Europe’s gas supply, we need to study how the policy has taken shape. The question of how the positions and interests of Eastern and Western European states have merged into a common European energy policy needs to be analyzed. Doing so will clarify the intentions and functional significance of the Energy Union.
Table 1: Initial proposal of the Energy Union Strategy by Donald Tusk.29
Initial Policy area dimensions of the Energy Union (Donald Tusk)
Joint negotiating of energy contracts with Russia
Tusk argued that the EU should speak with one voice to Russia’s monopolistic position, and buy gas under a common European body under supervision of the
Commission.
Solidarity Mechanisms
The Energy Union should guarantee solidarity in case of an energy supply crisis.
Building Energy Infrastructure
Storage capacity and gas lines should be built with the (financial) help of the EU to increase flexibility of
the market.
Full use of available resources (including fossil fuels)
The call for a cleaner planet is there, but to achieve that Europe needs safe access to energy resources and
jobs to finance it. Therefore energy production in the EU should be increased, including fossil fuels
Diversification of external suppliers
Europe needs more suppliers for gas and LNG from countries like Qatar, the US, Australia.
Reinforcing the energy community
The EU’s internal market for energy needs institution’s in order to strengthen the market, with special focus eastwards to boost energy not only for
the EU.
The first table, based upon the six pillars Tusk had proposed for the Energy Union, tells us that the initial focus was to deal with (CEEC’) concerns over security of supply, solidarity between member
17 states, concerns over Russia’s monopolistic position in Europe, and strengthening the energy market. Tusk emphasized the ‘stranglehold’ of Russia on the European gas market. With transit routes such as the North Stream pipeline it becomes clear that some member states benefit from Russian gas, such as Germany and countries that are connected to Germany’s infrastructure, whereas other countries are bypassed such as Ukraine and others. These shifting strategies in infrastructure projects causes member states to be played out against one other. Tusk also stressed that many states are vulnerable to disruptions on gas supplies from Russia, and therefore the EU should have an interventionist approach that goes beyond regulation. Hence, the Tusk proposal can be seen as a security of supply approach with joint purchasing of gas contracts as the most ‘game-changing’ instrument.30
When Donald Tusk became the President of the European Council, Political leaders in CEEC hoped that Tusk would follow up on this concept for the Energy Union. However, the challenge of transforming the Energy Union, from what was seen as an Eastern European energy security project, to a unified European policy became too big of a challenge as seen in the second table. This table shows the actual outcome of the Energy Union.
18
Table 2: Actual EU Energy Union Strategy Proposed in 2015.31
Policy area dimensions of the Energy Union (2015)
Security, solidarity and trust
Diversifying Europe’s sources of energy and ensuring security through solidarity and cooperation between member states
A fully-integrated energy market
Enabling a free flow of energy throughout the EU through adequate infrastructure and without any technical or regulatory barriers- an efficient way to secure and give consumers the best energy deal
Energy efficiency
Energy efficiency first - improved energy efficiency will reduce our dependence on energy imports, reduce emissions and drive jobs and growth.
Climate action (decarburization of the economy)
An ambitious climate policy is integral to creating the Energy Union. Actions include the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), strong but fair national targets for sectors outside the ETS to cut greenhouse gas emissions, a roadmap towards low-emissions mobility and an energy policy, which makes the EU world leader in renewables. The EU is committed to a quick ratification of the Paris Agreement, an ambitious new global climate change agreement.
Research, innovation and competitiveness
Supporting breakthroughs in low-carbon and clean energy technologies by prioritizing research and innovation to drive the transition of the energy system and improve competitiveness.
This table provides us with an overview of five different policy dimensions that focus on providing a secure, affordable, and climate friendly policy package for citizens and businesses in the EU. Applying a comparing and contrasting analysis on these tables, identifies that there has taken a considerable shift place in priorities within the framework of the Energy Union. The most striking is certainly the element of security of gas supply and the joint purchasing mechanism, which have been left out and have been replaced with a solidarity based cooperation principle between member states, which is arguably not a very clear policy target. Moreover, instead of fully utilizing available energy
31 European Commission, ‘Energy Union & Climate’,
19 sources, the focus is now more heavily on energy efficiency and climate action priorities.
Now that we have established the shift within the policy strategy, we need to identify the reasons for this shift and more importantly, we need to analyze the implications of this shift for the process of trying to solve Europe’s energy challenges. Regardless of the shift in strategy, any step towards diversifying energy sources and strengthening the internal energy market could be seen as a step forward. However, what this shift shows, and what this thesis aims to highlight, is the gap between Eastern and Western European politics when it comes to energy policy. As mentioned before, some member states benefit from Russian gas contracts and some countries have a relative secure energy supply. As a result, this fragmentation of preferences seems to have heavily influenced the Energy Union as a common energy policy, as it has thus been limited to a working package of both legislative and non-legislative measures within an extensive range of policy areas, but without firm priorities of strengthening Europe’s security of supply.32
The Energy Union’s success will in that sense depend on whether or not the member states will be able to agree on the common principles. The fragmentation of the policy is due to the fact that there are different opinions on what the EU is and what it normatively should be in the perceptions of its members. The CEEC see the EU as a supranational organization that strengthens their position in relation to Russia for energy security, as well as a provider of security in general, whereas western countries perceive the EU as a market driven project in which they are better off with national policies when it comes to energy security. Moreover, Western European countries have matured energy markets and in general their energy supplies are more diverse compared to those of CEEC, and in that sense, their relation to Russia is more detached.33 Joint gas purchases had therefore little support
amongst many member states, as it is also goes against liberal principles to address Gazprom as a unified European monopoly.
32 Ole Gunnar Austvik, The Energy Union and the security of gas supply, Energy Policy, nr. 96, p.378. 33 Aad Correltje, Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: a European Perspective, Energy Policy, nr. 34, p.47.
20 2.
The ‘Energy Union’ taking form
2.1 Introduction
The Energy Union is seen as one of the most substantial proposals for the development of a European energy policy, which seeks to reform Europe’s energy governance. It has been argued that there has never been such a far stretching policy for regional cooperation on energy, nor has there been a policy witch streamlines long-term climate action like the Energy Union does. It highlights that even in turbulent times wherein the EU showed to struggle heavily with both the economic crisis and the refugee crisis, it is still able to profile itself as an actor that’s able to further integrate. However, some still remain skeptical about the significance of the Energy Union, because several matters are still to be solved. The tension between national sovereignty and supranational European cooperation, based on solidarity and cooperation, have been a struggle and it remains to be seen whether or not the Energy Union will cause a spillover-effect. Being able to solve this paradox of EU energy policy has been one of the most challenging matters for the EU.34
It is still not quite clear how the Energy Union will take form, and Szulencki et all conceptualize the Energy Union as an ‘empty box’, in which stakeholders try to put whatever is most important to them. To this point the three objectives of the Energy Union, also described as the policy triangle- security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness- remain unchanged, and the way its goals should materialize is still open. In other words, the Energy Union seems to have not been fully developed into a fully-fledged and comprehensible common energy policy. The fact that the EU has not seized this opportunity is unfortunate, because energy cooperation has been central to European integration from the start. Benson and Russel pointed out that by 2010 the EU have already initiated a total of 350 legal energy policy instruments.35
Nonetheless, energy policy is still predominantly controlled by national policies and remains under strong influence of the member states, even though there has been a slight supranational turn visible in the last decade. Since the Lisbon Treaty, energy policy is no longer an exclusive prerogative of the member state, as the EU received a greater (albeit still limited) role for energy policies. According to Sandoval and Morata’s conceptualization, the Energy Union is the final phase which provides a new setup for energy policy making on EU level, but how the integration of the policy triangle becomes more concrete seems unclear.36 This chapter will provide the theoretical framework
of this thesis by applying two major European integration theories to the emergence and the outcomes of the Energy Union.
34 Kacper Szulecki et all, Shaping the ‘Energy Union’: Between National Positions and Governance Innovation
in EU Energy and Climate Policy, Climate Policy, nr. 16, p.548.
35 David Benson, Duncan Russel, Patterns of EU energy policy outputs: Incrementalism or punctuated
equilibrium?, West European Politics, nr. 38, pp.185-205.
36 I.S Sandoval & F. Morata, European Energy Policy: an Environmental Approach, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
21 2.2 Theoretical approaches for studying the EU’s Energy Union
The implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon is considered as the turning point for the EU’s energy policy. A new framework of governance materialized aiming to ‘decrease existing contradictory
signals between EU and policies and trade-offs of MS linked to the energy triangle and the equivalent policy areas: internal market, external relations and environmental protection’.37 However, this new
framework is a relative newcomer to the field of studying EU policy making, hence the impact of European institutions, most notably the European Commission, and the member states is often still contested. Therefore, there will be an overview provided of two major theoretical approaches that have manifested in the wider literature on European integration, and have all been applied to study energy and climate policies. This will be done in order to understand how the division of competences in energy policy between member states and the EU can possible impact the development of the Energy Union.
Shaping the agenda in an environment of friction between national governments and supranational institutions can be challenging. When it comes to energy issues, the agenda is often shaped as a response to international developments such as energy and climate summits, or armed conflicts between or within states. Policy makers seem to be responding to these specific ‘triggering events’. 38 To illustrate, the Banking Union emerged in the aftermath of the global financial meltdown.
With regards to triggering events in the field of energy it was especially the Ukraine energy crises and the current destabilization of the country by Russia, which can be seen as triggering events which have pushed the establishment of a new concept for energy cooperation. The final form and the content of this policy, however, are still to be filled in. Therefore, this thesis will build upon two theories and their core assumptions to sketch different scenarios of how the Energy Union can be filled in.
2.3 Liberal Intergovermentalism
The first one that will be addressed is Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), which centralizes the concept of member states as the main actors of European integration. The theory underlines the autonomy of member states preferences, which primarily reflects cooperation based on common economic interests between states.39 In that sense LI assumes that member states will only transfer,
and centralize authority to the EU, if it is more (cost) efficient or beneficial in any way to do so on a European level. An important part of this rationalist approach is the bargaining process at EU summits, which emphasizes the role of the European council and thus the preference of the national parliaments.
37 I.S Sandoval & F. Morata, European Energy Policy: an Environmental Approach, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 2012, p3.
38 Jale Tosun et al, Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the Agenda, London: Springer-Verlag, 2015, p.6. 39 A, Moravcsik, F, Schimmelfennig, Liberal Intergovernmentalism in Diez & Wiener, European Integration
22 With regard to the bargaining theory, it is imperative to understand that bargaining power results from the ‘asymmetrical distribution of information’ among the member states. Hence, the better informed member states tend to have the best bargaining position. The best bargaining position is obtained based on three dimensions. The first and most fundamental is the state’s structural power’s such as economic strengths, population size, political stability and administrative capacity. The second, institutional power, can undermine the first because institutional features such as access to veto and rotating presidency of the Council constitutes additional power. The third, is individual power of the chief executive as a negotiator and his or her personal authority, level of expertise, and coalition-building skills.40 Moreover, the member states that have the highest interest, or in other
words, have the most to gain from a specific agreement have less bargaining power, because they have to persuade the other, less motivated, member states that have ‘less’ to gain .41
Moravcsik, possibly one of the most prominent political scientists in the field of liberal theories, explains LI as followed: “ Liberal intergovernmentalism integrates within a single framework two
types of general international relations theories often seen as contradictory: a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and institutional creation.”42
The two primary assumptions within this liberal framework are best explained as followed. The first core assumption of LI is that states are the sole actors of integration. If integration ought to take place, it is because states decided to do so. This means that governments determine the outcome of policy making at all times. In the process of policy making in the EU, states have created fixed goals and preferences before the bargaining and negotiation processes begin. Leaning on this theory, political decisions in Europe are made during a process of negotiating instead of those being ‘enforced’ by a central authority. The second core assumption of LI is that member states are rational actors whose goals are to maximize their preferences during all negotiation processes at all times. This underlines the role of motivation and the willingness of states to push for negations based on the particular relevance, or gain from a particular negotiation.43
Now that the fundamental core assumptions of LI have been explained, it is imperative to understand the theory in the context of European integration. LI is a ‘grand theory’ that tries to explain the main motivation and the responsible actors that incentivize European integration. It is in that regard, that the theory does not aim to explain a specific political policy outcomes, but rather its
40 Jonas Tallberg, ‘Bargaining Power in the European Council’,
www.cesrug.org/uploads/soft/130221/1-1302211U406.pdf, accessed 28 December 2016.
41 Kacper Szulecki et all, ‘Shaping the ‘Energy Union’: Between National Positions and Governance Innovation
in EU Energy and Climate policy’, Climate Policy, nr. 15, p.550.
42 Andrew Moravcisk, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist
Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, nr. 31, p.482.
43 Mark Pollack, ‘International Relations Theory and European Integration’, Journal of Market Studies, nr. 39,
23 underlying drivers. The question that raises, is how can LI explain causal policy outcomes within the context of the Energy Union? To find an answer to this, we must obtain a better understanding of how this theory works.
According to the theory, there are two main phases that take place in the integration process. In the first phase, government officials from a member state come together to determine their national interests and preferences. The national interests will then be communicated towards the European institutions, where after the second phase will start. In the second phase, leaders of national governments will negotiate about specific policies during the Council meetings, in which they aim to utilize their preferences in the best possible way. Following LI, it is here when it becomes clear which member state has the most influence or the best bargaining position on an specific subject.
In other words, this process emphasizes again that supranational organizations have little to no influence on the process of policy making. Pollack argues that institutions have merely been brought to live in order to provide a central platform for the bargaining process, and to provide member states with information, rather than function as an initiator of integration processes.44 So,
what does this mean for the outcome of a bargaining process? Moreover, how does this apply to the framework of the Energy Union and how does this influence the improvement of cooperation in the field of energy and environmental challenges?
One can assume that at least several member states are not in favor of strict environmental targets, because achieving those can be expensive and function as a constrain for economic growth. Moreover, whereas one country can implement measures relatively easy, due to national legislation already being aligned with such goals, this might not be the case for others. Hence, it is rather difficult to understand which countries are the drivers of integration in the field of energy. Andrew Moravcsik argues that during negotiations, the power lies with the parties that are the least dependent on the impact of integration, because the member states that want to make an agreement have to compromise with others.45 In practice this often means that the wealthiest and most self-sufficient countries have
the best bargaining position, because they have relatively little to gain from an agreement compared to the more dependent member states.46
Leaning on the theory of LI, it could be argued that the member states have pushed for further cooperation in the field of energy after a process of gradually converging national preferences, which eventually led to the creation of the Energy Union. Even though the Energy Union is by some perceived as a revolutionary step towards a more coherent energy policy, the concept is still an empty box, because there are no concrete tools or measures taken yet. All matters considered, integration derived within this field give reason to believe that centralization of numerous interests of the nation
44 Mark Pollack, ‘International Relations Theory and European Integration’, Journal of Market Studies, nr.39,
pp.225-226.
45 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist
Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, nr. 31, p.500.
24 states has taken place, which before were under the jurisdiction of the nation state. Before applying LI to the framework of the Energy Union, there will first be an overview of another theory that counters this interpretation of European integration. In this way, we first have an overview of the general assumptions of the theoretical frameworks. The subsequent case studies will provide a platform where these theories can be applied more concretely.
2.4 Supranationalism
A supranationalist perspective focuses in more depth on path dependency and institutional legacy, similar as the functionalist roots of neo- institutionalism. This means that a set of decisions made in the past can predict current decisions. Within the theory of supranationalism the distribution of power between the EU institution and the member states varies between several fields. In some, the European Commission has built up substantial policy-making power, whereas in others the respective member states remained in control. Therefore, we can conclude that each area of policymaking will bring forth differing institutional feedback mechanisms that will shape its own steering methods and competence distribution in EU policies. That being said, once could argue that Europe’s institutions already possess a substantial amount of instruments for realizing the triangle policy goals within the framework of the Energy Union.47
This section will examine the role of the Commission within the context of the policy developments of the Energy Union by building upon the theoretical tools that the theory of supranationalism provides. In current literature it has been argued that a policy framework opened up for the Commission as a supranational policy entrepreneur. As a result of the high level of energy dependency within Europe, a trend of rising energy prices, climate problems and gas supply disruptions, the Commission has gained substantial momentum to take action. Consequently, the Commission made use of these developments by successfully framing energy dependency as problems that can only be dealt with at a European level.48
Princen has pointed out that the growing supranational approach to energy problems has significantly developed over the recent decades. Specifically since the Lisbon treaty. The Commission has over the years actively been developing a European network of experts and stakeholders to increase its expertise. In this way the Commission received support as a European energy policy expert. The Commission has successfully identified the supranational scale of European energy policy -through social constructions- as a necessary solution to deal with the wide variety of energy problems. Social constructions are created by framing. In that sense, the Commission has framed the urgency and obligation to act through constantly highlighting the issue of (energy) dependency of
47 E.L, Boasson & J, Wettestad, EU climate policy: Industry, Policy Interaction and External Environment,
Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, p.14.
48 Tomas Maltby, European Union energy policy integration : A case of European Commission Policy
25 Russia.49
With the creation of the European energy narrative, the Commission has gained credibility as an expert and it influences its member states consequently by acting as a provider of expertise. Because the problem of energy is a collective one, by extension so should the solution be. With regard to path-dependency, one of the assumptions of supranationalism, it is important to understand how this has influenced policy making. Through the continuous process of monitoring, evaluating and making recommendations by the Commission since the 1960s, the Commission has framed supply diversification effectively as a problem that requires a supranational governance as a solution. The ECSC and Euratom are arguably examples of early supranational governance and path dependency. The first one was established as a common project of interest in order to rebuild Europe, and the second one in order to ensure a consistent and equitable supply. Identifying the supranational scale of energy governance as a essential solution to the policy problem is a process which is socially constructed by the Commission, according to the theory of supranationalism. 50
Within this context, recent Commission arguments, have been generally set out as security of supply problems. The cumulative amount of problems such as gas supply disruptions and subsequently dependency problems and its consequences, provided a platform for the Commission to present its expertise. These new dynamics, the result of the 2006 and 2009 crisis plus the Russian conflict in Ukraine, has presented the Commission with a new opportunity to develop, recommend, and lobby for a new energy policy in the EU.51 Thereafter, further integration was recommended.
Similar recommendations were also proposed in the 1990s, however with a lack of urgency at the time, which the current window does have, there was no political will of the member states to take action. The Commission has now emphasized that going on with a ‘business as usual’ model, without significantly improving energy efficiency would increase Europe’s vulnerability. Especially, for dependency on gas, the Commission estimated that by 2020 the EU will be dependent on gas for 76 percent, and 83 percent by 2030.
Path dependency has showed that there is a growing role for the Commission when it comes to competences for a European energy policy. However, the incomplete internal energy market and the remaining tensions between state sovereignty and supranational action clearly demonstrates that there is an intergovernmental logic that remains at the core of energy policy. This undermines the coherence and effectiveness of EU legislation, which weakens measures taken to stimulate supply diversification and also thwarts establishing effective tools to mitigate supply disruptions. The North Stream pipeline is an example of intergovernmental logic, because it clearly shows a demarcation
49 Sebastiaan Princen, ‘Agenda-setting strategies in EU policy processes’, Journal of European Public Affairs,
nr. 18, pp.927-943.
50 A. Niemann, P. Scmitter, Neo-Functionalism: in Wiener & Diez, Theories of European Integration, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.45-66.
51 Tomas Maltby, European Union energy policy integration : A case of European Commission Policy
26 between state preferences of CEEC and North- Western European countries. CEEC are undermined whilst losing its transit route fee’s which results in a loss of political power and a sense of security for their energy supply, whereas Western countries acquire easier access to energy. The extent to which security objectives and economic interest prevail, shows that there is a major contradiction between member state interests, which seems to undermine the Commission’s influence.52 The case studies
will add another dimension to the assumption of intergovernmental logic at the heart of the EU’s energy policy-making competence.
52 Tomas Maltby, European Union energy policy integration : A case of European Commission policy
27
3. Case studies: national preferences of key countries
3.1 Introduction
A growing number of studies have pointed out that the voice of (major) member states play a big role for decision making within the EU, and specifically policy makers at the Commission take into account that they should shape their plans through anticipating member states preferences.53 For this
reason, this chapter will give an overview of the positions of several key member states, and also that of an important partner of the EU for energy security, namely Norway. The countries that have been selected for this research are carefully chosen based on relevance for energy policy making dimensions and the orientations they bring into the debate on energy cooperation within the EU. Four countries have been selected for this research based on their substantial significance they bring to policy-making, and arguably their key role for its success.
The first member state is Germany. Germany is perhaps the most important member state in the EU for European integration in general, but when it comes to energy cooperation Germany has shown to be particularly persistent to make its mark on energy policies, specifically when it comes to the development of renewable energies. On the other hand, the Germany industry is also interesting as a case study because of its energy imports. Secondly, there will be a case study made of France, which is another major political actor for European integration, but differs from the German vision on both energy and climate policies, mostly because of its major nuclear industry. The third study that will be done is on Poland that represents a large part of the CEEC in terms of policy-making when it comes to energy. These are the member states that are struggling with the post-communist economies and coal based industries. Coal mining is important for the Polish labour market and there is an effective lobby that has reached the conservative Polish government. Moreover, with regard to the representation of CEEC, it was Poland who also expressed its concern for energy dependence and the influence of Russia on Europe’s energy policy. The last member state that will be studied is Norway. Norway is not an EU country, but as a close partner of the EU, the country can fulfill an important role within the Energy Union. Norway is potentially a major player for Europe’s energy security, because of its natural resources such as gas and oil but also its renewable energy opportunities (primarily hydropower).
3.2 Germany
Germany is one of the few countries in Europe that has experienced a significant energy transition in the last few decades. No other member state of the EU has experienced such a transition as seen in Germany with its Energiewende. This strategy had been introduced with the main focus of moving away from nuclear energy and (partly) fossil fuels, whilst increasing its share of renewable energy to additionally focus on mitigating climate change. The commitment to this strategy led Germany to
28 position itself with several pre-structured policy commitments in Europe. Despite the fact that Germany has never been an outspoken supporter of the Energy Union, government officials generally showed positive signals towards the developments of the latest energy policy ideas. However, these signals are primarily in favor of plans that support the energy transition within the domestic spheres.54
The German energy transformation is based upon a widely carried consensus in society. As a result of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima and earlier made commitments, Germany opted for more (renewable) electricity in its energy mix. Accordingly, in compliance with the EU targets the German government committed to reduce greenhouse gases with 40% by 2020, compared to 1990, to mitigate climate change and environmental pollution. Germany is one of the frontrunners on this matter in Europe; however they are not on track with their own national targets, which are even more ambitious.55 Despite the fact that Germany has never been an outspoken supporter of proposals for
integration in the field of energy, the Lisbon Treaty was perceived to be a necessary legal tool for the Commission to further integrate Europe’s energy market, and it is also an important way to include environmental concerns into the field of energy policy. In the context of Germany’s long tradition of state intervention in the field of energy, energy security risks have been reduced to a substantial low level. This process of politicization has been fruitful for the creation of a liberal energy market in Germany, which was an important part of its energy policy, and especially for its energy relations with Russia.56
When Juncker’s Commission had introduced its mission statement, the respective Energy Union received a prominent role in the debate of European energy and climate policy. Berlin however, never openly supported the proposal and continued to be a silent observer. From the start, it became clear that Germany had no interest in joint gas purchases or in non- renewable sources such as nuclear energy or coal.57 If there was going to be an Energy Union in Europe, Germany’s preference
would be that the Energy Union would replicate the fundamentals of the Energiewende. Arguably, the only way for Germany to reach a consensus with the Energy Union, is if the framework would not be working against the national transformation process.58
Besides little support and no outspoken voices from Berlin, the role of public support or media reports have also been limited. Furthermore, stakeholders only expressed desires which matched to their own personal interests; this mainly meant having a more nuanced policy towards
54 Kacper Szulecki et all, ‘Shaping the ‘Energy Union’: Between National Positions and Governance Innovation
in EU Energy and Climate policy’, Climate Policy, nr. 15, p.554.
55 K. Westphal & S. Fischer, Energy and Statekraft: A German Perspective: in R. Bleischwitz et al, Reducing
Vulnerability: A Transatlantic Approach to Energy Security, Washington: American Institute for Contemporary
Studies, 2015, pp.7-16.
56 Kacper Szulecki et all, ‘Shaping the ‘Energy Union’: Between National Positions and Governance Innovation
in EU Energy and Climate policy’, Climate Policy, nr. 15, p.554.
57 Sigmar Gabriel, Speech on Germany’s Role on Climate and Energy Policy,
http://www.bmwi.de/EN/Press/speeches,did=638228.html, accessed 30 October 2016.
58 Severin Fischer, The EU’s new Energy and Climate Policy Framework for 2030: Implications for the German
