The leverage of ECOWAS in combatting human trafficking in West Africa

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The leverage of ECOWAS in combatting

human trafficking in West Africa

K.P. (Koen) Schiernecker

Master’s thesis, Political Science, International Relations

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Supervisor: Dr. J.M.J. (Jeroen) Doomernik

Research project: Global Migration

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Abstract

Human trafficking has been a serious problem in West Africa for years. In 2001, ECOWAS put the fight against the issue high on the agenda of West Africa. This study examined what the role of ECOWAS has been in combatting human trafficking since then. In other words, the leverage of ECOWAS on this issue was assessed. This was done by analyzing the dynamics of human in trafficking in West Africa; assessing the efforts and activities of ECOWAS and its member states; and, by assessing the role of the political integration process of ECOWAS. This study argues that ECOWAS is struggling to make a difference on counter-trafficking due to limited political integration efforts of West African states; corruption issues within states; the low levels of development of West African states; and, neocolonial influences. All these factors give shape to the unique West African regionalism.

Key words: ECOWAS, human trafficking, trafficking in persons, counter-trafficking, West Africa, regionalism, regional integration, IGO.

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List of abbreviations

CEAO Communauté Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

FMMWA Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa

ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development

IGO(s) Intergovernmental organization(s)

ILO International Labour Organization

IOM International Organization for Migration

NGO(s) Non-governmental organization(s)

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

SADC South African Development Community

TIP Trafficking in persons

UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine

UNODC United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime

UNOWA United Nations Office for West Africa

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List of maps, tables and figures

Map 1 World map with ECOWAS member states highlighted 6

Map 2 Map of West Africa with ECOWAS member states highlighted 6

Map 3 Benin’s human trafficking routes 32

Map 4 Nigeria’s human trafficking routes 34

Map 5 Togo’s human trafficking routes 36

Table 1 West African (ECOWAS member states) – European colonial links 7

Table 2 Basic information on ECOWAS member states 7

Table 3 ECOWAS timeline of TIP-related policies and activities, from 2001 – 2016 38

Table 4 USDS Tiers placement of ECOWAS member states 44

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Map 1. World map with ECOWAS member states highlighted (ECOWAS 2015b).

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Table 1. West African (ECOWAS member states) – European colonial links (De Beer 2015: 9).

France Germany Great Britain Portugal

Benin Ghana (in part) Gambia, The Benin

Burkina Faso Nigeria (in part) Ghana Cape Verde

Gambia, The Togo Nigeria Guinea-Bissau

Guinea Sierra Leone

Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo

Table 2. Basic information on ECOWAS member states (ECOWAS 2015a; ECOWAS 2015b; UNDP 2015a; UNDP 2015b: 208-211).

Country Population (estimate) Year of independence Official language Life expectancy at birth HDI* (2016) Benin 10.3 million 1960 French 59.6 years 166th

Burkina Faso 17.3 million 1960 French 58.7 years 183rd

Cape Verde 0.5 million 1975 Portuguese 73.3 years 122nd

Gambia, The 1.9 million 1965 English 60.2 years 175th

Ghana 27.0 million 1957 English 61.4 years 140th

Guinea 10.6 million 1958 French 58.8 years 182nd

Guinea-Bissau 1.6 million 1973 Portuguese 55.2 years 178th

Ivory Coast 25.2 million 1960 French 51.5 years 172nd

Liberia 4.1 million 1847 English 60.9 years 177th

Mali 14.5 million 1960 French 58.0 years 179th

Niger 17.1 million 1960 French 61.4 years 188th

Nigeria 174.5 million 1960 English 52.8 years 152nd

Senegal 13.6 million 1960 French 66.5 years 170th

Sierra Leone 6.2 million 1961 English 50.9 years 181st

Togo 7.2 million 1960 French 59.7 years 162nd

* In the Human Development Report, draught by the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP), the Human Development Index (HDI) is demonstrated. The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: 1) having a long and healthy life; 2) being knowledgeable and; 3) having a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions (UNDP 2015a). The HDI is examined among 188 states, meaning Niger (188th_{) is the lowest}

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Not much unlike the global slave trade of earlier centuries, victims of human trafficking nowadays may also travel long distances to their place of exploitation. The processes of globalization have changed the sphere of human trafficking over the past decades (Shelley 2010: 12). The scale of this illicit business is inconceivable. In 2012, it was estimated that 21 million people worldwide are victims of forced labour, trapped in jobs into which they were coerced or deceived and which they cannot leave (ILO 2012). In terms of knowledge and awareness of modern forced labour, only the tip of a disturbing iceberg is showing (ILO 2005; ILO 2012). The trafficking business is said to be a very lucrative one. Human trafficking is among the biggest criminal industries behind drug trade (ILO 2005; UNODC 2011: 33). The fight versus this crime asks for ingenious universal and regional action. Looking at initiatives at the regional level, a proponent of counter-trafficking is present in West Africa in the form of ECOWAS, short for the Economic Community of West African States.

In 2001, ECOWAS introduced an official ‘Plan of Action’ for combatting human trafficking in West Africa, with the unanimous support of its 15 member states (ECOWAS 2001). This study examines the role of ECOWAS, since 2001, in fighting this problem in West Africa. ECOWAS is an intergovernmental organization (IGO) in West Africa – established in 1975 via the Treaty of Lagos – and its initial mandate was promoting economic integration in all fields of activity of the constituting countries (ECOWAS 2015a; ECOWAS 2015c). The founders of ECOWAS soon realised that it was impossible to integrate the sub-region

economically without political integration. Economic integration could not be divorced from political and security issues and therefore cooperation on this level was inescapable (Jaye 2008: 152). The member states that make up ECOWAS are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (see Map 2, p. 7). ECOWAS’s broader vision is: “the creation of a borderless sub-region in which all countries can be self-sufficient” (ECOWAS 2015a).

Dozens of regional organizations have been founded in West Africa and this illustrates two things. Firstly, it illustrates the ambition of West African countries to unite and their eagerness, domestically and regionally, to enhance economic interaction in the sub-region and to fight common threats, like transnational crime (e.g. human trafficking) (Sawadogo 2012: 95-96). Secondly, it illustrates a struggle because apparently many organizations have failed in achieving similar objectives. ECOWAS is the most heavyweight IGO in West Africa. Since 2001,

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ECOWAS has made efforts in combatting trafficking in persons (TIP) in the sub-region. Daniel Eklu, ECOWAS Director of Humanitarian and Social Affairs, said in 2015 that combatting TIP is viewed as a priority topic for the ECOWAS Commission and its member states. “Every day, women and children are trafficked from one location to another by heartless individuals with the motive of exploiting them for selfish gains and exposing them to hardship. This distasteful activity thrives as a result of challenges related to governance, instability, poverty and certain unhealthy traditional practices”, Eklu stated (Eklu 2015). He did not mention male individuals in this remark but males are unmistakably also victims of trafficking. His statement does expose the conviction of many in West Africa that human trafficking targeted at women and children is more of a priority than the trafficking of males.

The region of sub-Saharan Africa (all African countries except for the North African Arab countries) is characterized by a large variety of migration flows, including cross-border movements by refugees, high and low skilled labour migrants, and displaced persons (Adepoju 2005: 75). Human trafficking is an addition to this list. The phenomenon did not move into the spotlight because of statistical data, but rather from the alarm raised by activists, the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nigeria, Togo and Benin in the late 1990s (Adepoju 2005: 75). According to Dottridge (2002), western media has portrayed the problem as one of slavery, rather than ‘mere’ trafficking. The reality of today’s slave trade in most parts of the world is that adults and children fleeing from poverty or seeking better prospects are manipulated, deceived and bullied into working in conditions that they would not choose voluntarily. Following this line of thought, the term ‘trafficking’ is usually more appropriate than ‘slavery’ – although some adults and children do end up as slaves (Dottridge 2002: 38).

The majority of the ECOWAS states have failed to properly develop their economies and this makes the situation of TIP in West Africa all the more complicated (Sawadogo 2012: 95). Empirical evidence demonstrates the peripheral role of West Africa in the world. What West African states have in common is that they have the lowest standards of living in the world (UNDP 2015b: 208-211).

Now, a number of studies are relevant to discuss to get a grasp of what is known about this study’s research topic. Jaye (2008) examined the present regional shared security culture (i.e. the shared ideas and norms on security topics) of ECOWAS and how this has influenced its response to combatting children trafficking. He comes to the conclusion that although the decisions and policies of ECOWAS on child trafficking are influenced by certain shared ideas, norms and principles, a breakdown of collective political will and continuing differences on the

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key security referents and adequate ways of protecting its citizens have led ECOWAS member states to fail in effectively addressing child trafficking (Jaye 2008: 151).

Two different scholars, Haacke and Williams (2008), engaged in a similar type of study. Their study assesses how a shared security culture influenced how ECOWAS has responded to transnational challenges, not specifically investigating the case of TIP. The authors notice an increasingly sophisticated institutional framework by ECOWAS but the organization

experiences problems in respect to the funding, coordination and implementation of policies, laws, etc. They conclude by saying that in order for ECOWAS to develop more leverage, member states will need to abide genuine transformations at the domestic level (Haacke & Williams 2008: 213, 221). Both studies identify a lack of decisiveness and vigour among the ECOWAS member states. The creation of policies and laws is one thing, and the adequate implementation of these measures is a whole other thing.

Regional organizations such as ECOWAS denote the ambition of West African states of unification to improve economic development and to fight their shared threats, such as TIP. Yet, Sawadogo (2012) observes a lack of robust strategic alliances to combat human trafficking. He claims that one of the reasons for this is that West African governments not fully

understand and accept the existence of the phenomenon as a serious regional and international problem (Sawadogo 2012: 95, 110).

Franke (2007) shed light on a different perspective in respect to ECOWAS’s

cooperation dynamics. He conducted a study on the competing regional organizations in West Africa and in his study, he identifies the struggle between the Francophone and the non-Francophone states. He claims that France is an important actor (i.e. stressor) in the West African political integration process. France has maintained strong relations with their former colonies, and in doing so they have stalled West African integration, Franke (2007) claims. Yet, despite the apparent internal struggle, ECOWAS has survived. It thus fared substantially better than many other sub-regional organizations which did not withstand the pressures of constant institutional rivalry (Franke 2007: 39).

In 2011, the United Nations Office for West African States (UNOWA) notes that ECOWAS has established a number of legal instruments and mechanisms in combatting TIP, but these actions have not yet led to the desired results, UNOWA (2011) claims. The

implementation is partial in most of the West African states and thus – ten years after ECOWAS put TIP high on the agenda – few states have managed to implement effective mechanisms to fight against TIP. Despite the magnitude of the phenomenon, the ECOWAS

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Anti-Trafficking Unit does not have sufficient resources to carry out its activities. With the resources that it does have, UNOWA thinks ECOWAS should perform more to let member states harmonise its legislation on combatting TIP (UNOWA 2011: 9-10,12, 44).

The studies described above all point out that ECOWAS appears to be lacking the strength to really make a difference in combatting TIP in the region. This troubled history confirms the rather cheerless sentiment of Nigerian scholar and politician Adebayo Adedeji that a “study of integration efforts in West Africa is inevitably a study in frustration” (Adedeji 1969: 67). Nevertheless, this study undertakes this endeavour. Only a limited amount of studies have given attention to the specific role of ECOWAS in combatting human trafficking in West Africa. What is more, no single study has posed the question of what the leverage of ECOWAS has been in combatting TIP in West Africa since 2001. Furthermore, most of the literature of TIP in West Africa focusses either on the role of international organizations (e.g. UNODC, EU) or on the role of specific states in West Africa. Admittedly, these actors can fulfil important roles in fighting TIP. Nevertheless, ECOWAS is an interesting actor. It can be viewed as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) with tremendous potential and ambitious plans. The organization is just facing serious challenges in achieving its goals.

This study aims to determine what the leverage of ECOWAS is in combatting human trafficking in West Africa. The research question of this study is:

What has been the role of ECOWAS, since 2001, in combatting human trafficking in West Africa, and how can this be explained?

In order to answer this question, this study analyzes the dynamics of human trafficking in West Africa; the efforts and activities of ECOWAS and its member states; the difficulties for ECOWAS; and, the role of the political integration process. Throughout the study, the role of ECOWAS becomes more clear. This study assesses what measures have been implemented, but the study looks further than this. Merely focusing on the concrete measures would provide a narrow viewpoint; other developments cannot be acknowledged. Therefore the political integration process is carefully looked into, as this is a gradual process. Moreover, this study aims to provide more insight into the (potential) role of ECOWAS, and the capabilities of ECOWAS regarding combatting TIP in West Africa. The knowledge extracted from this study can be useful for ECOWAS as well as for similar IGOs, or NGOs, and for individual states when

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The remainder of this thesis is organized in a number of chapters. Chapter 2 provides a conceptual and theoretical framework through which to analyze and understand the

phenomenon of human trafficking (in West Africa) and the role of the political integration process of ECOWAS. The theories of regionalism, pan-Africanism, neoclassical realism and neocolonialism are discussed here. Then, in chapter 3, the methodology of this study is

described by discussing the study’s operationalisation, the sub-questions, the methods of data gathering, and the methods of analysis. Next, in chapter 4, it is described how TIP became an issue to be fought for ECOWAS. The chapter describes relevant historic developments. Chapter 5 illustrates the dynamics of human trafficking in West Africa. Chapter 6, then,

outlines an overview of the activities by ECOWAS regarding counter-trafficking in West Africa. After this, chapter 7 shows an assessment of the devotion to counter-trafficking by West African states. In chapter 8, the difficulties for ECOWAS in combatting TIP are covered. Finally, chapter 9 includes the study’s conclusions and discussion.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

This chapter starts with conceptualizing and defining important concepts to this study. Next, the chapter provides a discussion of the theoretical framework that is being used for the analysis of this study’s factors and outcomes. A satisfying answer to this study’s research question can only be given by looking at the empirics through a theoretical perspective that can help explain why the circumstances and developments are the way they are.

2.1 Conceptual framework and definitions

Human trafficking

‘Human trafficking’ and ‘trafficking in persons’ (TIP) are terms that are used interchangeably throughout the academic literature and within politics, and this study uses the terms similarly. The ‘combatting of TIP’ is also referred to as ‘counter-trafficking’. Human trafficking is defined by the UN as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of

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payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation includes, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN 2000: art. 3a). TIP can result in slavery; therefore it is sometimes referred to as ‘modern slavery’.

Human trafficking can affect people of all ages and from both genders. There are various ways of categorizing the forms of human trafficking. Groody (2001) distinguishes : 1) forced labour; 2) bonded labour; 3) child labour; and 4) sex trafficking (Groody 2011: 18). Firstly, forced labour is the category of TIP with the most victims. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), for every person that is forced into prostitution, nine people are stuck in situations of involuntary servitude. Compelled to work against their will, often through threats of violence or punishment, they are subjected to jobs in agriculture, janitorial work, sweatshops, the service industry, domestic servitude or begging. The second category Groody (2011) describes is bonded labour, this encompasses the process in which migrants incur a transportation debt, owed to traffickers, who demand labour as repayment. Very often the terms and conditions have not been identified in advance, and often the services rendered are not applied to the liquidation of the so-called debt. Thirdly, child labour encompasses the group of children that is being exploited in debt bondage, as child soldiers, in illegal arms trade, in prostitution and pornography, and in other illicit activities. The fourth form of TIP Groody (2011) distinguishes is sex trafficking; this is when people are forced or deceived into sexual activities. This sexual exploitation can overlap with other forms of human trafficking, such as debt bondage. The victims are lured by promises of marriage, employment, education, or better economic opportunities, but they soon find themselves duped into working in strip clubs, pornographic enterprises, and other forms of degrading and dehumanizing sexual exploitation. This is not to say that all prostitutes are victims of trafficking; only the ones coerced into doing so (Groody 2011: 18-20).

In respect to child trafficking, Veil (1998) identified six types of child trafficking in West and Central Africa: 1) child abduction ; 2) payment of sums of money to poor parents who hand over their children on the promise that they will be treated well; 3) bonded placement of children as reimbursement for debt; 4) placement for a token sum/gift for specified duration; 5) fee-based domestic work at parent’s request and; 6) deceiving the parents into enlisting their children under the guise that they will gain education or skill (Veil 1998: 6-8).

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Human trafficking is an incredibly profitable industry, and globalization is widely considered to have aggravated the situation by making it easier for human traffickers to expand to new markets (Jones et al. 2007: 107-109; Groody 2011). New technologies can help seduce the vulnerable, and to target the weak and desperate people, especially people who have few employment options. These people have usually received little education in their lives and thus are forced to get jobs that are typical for exploitation (e.g. agriculture, construction, cleaning, sex industry) (Jones et al. 2007: 107-109; Groody 2011: 16-17). It is said that TIP has become the fastest growing contemporary criminal industry in the world, second only to the illegal drug trade and on a par with the illegal arms industry (ILO 2005).

International criminal networks are becoming more active in the business of human trafficking. Countries dealing with political unrest, or countries having weak or corrupt infrastructures combined with widespread poverty, are breeding grounds for these international criminal networks (Shelley 2005). West Africa neatly fits this description. Traffickers dealing arms or involved in the drug trade are quickly learning the increased value of trafficked humans, one of the only commodities on the global market that can be resold and used again (Feingold 2005). Shelley (2010: 2-3) argues that supply and demand has created a flourishing business for traffickers. Traffickers choose to trade in humans, because there are low start-up costs, minimal risks, high profits, and large demand. In drug trafficking

organizations, profits often flow to the top of the organization. However, with the small-scale entrepreneurship that characterizes much of human trafficking, more profits go to individual criminals, making the business very attractive (Shelley 2010: 2-3). The difficult law enforcement is another advantage for human traffickers. Even in cases of plain abuse – when trafficking is evident – prosecution remains difficult, as main witness usually have no interest in testifying (Doomernik 2013: 125).

Human smuggling

Human smuggling has elements in common with human trafficking, but they are not the same thing (Aronowitz 2009: 6-7). When talking about human smuggling, undocumented migrants typically cross international borders with the aid of guides or smugglers who help transport them from one location to another. Normally, after payment of certain fees, they can freely move and find work, and no fraud is involved in this agreement between the guide and the migrant. This is not the case for victims of human trafficking (Aronowitz 2009: 6-7; Groody 2011: 17). Human trafficking differs from human smuggling in a couple of ways. For instance,

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the issue of consent; the migrant willingly agrees to the process of smuggling. Still, a person’s initial consent to smuggling does not preclude them from later becoming a trafficking victim. Migrant smuggling involves transportation from one destination to another and that is it, but trafficking involves ongoing mistreatment and/or manipulation of the victim. Yet another difference is the issue of profitability. In human smuggling profits are made from the transportation or housing of the smuggled migrants, whereas human traffickers can make money through ongoing utilization of victims (Aronowitz 2009: 6-7; Groody 2011: 17-18).

ECOWAS and West Africa

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an IGO and a regional organization in West Africa with 15 member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (see Map 2). When writing ‘ECOWAS’ in this thesis, the text refers to the IGO as a whole. Opinions, policies or tactics can variate significantly between ECOWAS and its individual member states. When writing ‘West Africa’, the text refers to the ECOWAS member states. Therefore, ‘the ECOWAS member states’ and the ‘West African states’ are terms used interchangeably in this study. Also, West Africa can be referred to as a ‘sub-region’. Non-ECOWAS member states located in the (north)west of Africa (e.g. Algeria, Mauretania, Morocco or Western Sahara) are not included when writing ‘West Africa’.

Francophone, Anglophone and non-Francophone countries

Francophone countries are countries where French is the main native language – and this is logically native of the colonial era. In West Africa, the Francophone states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. When writing ‘Francophone countries’ in this study, the text refers to speaking countries in West Africa alone. Other

French-speaking countries are not included. Anglophone countries are countries where English is the main native language. In West Africa, the Anglophone states are The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. When writing ‘Anglophone countries’ in this study, the text refers to English-speaking countries in West Africa. When writing ‘non-Francophone countries’, the text refers to countries in West Africa which do not speak French. Instead, the main native language of non-Francophone countries is English or Portuguese.

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2.2 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework provides explanations for the analysis of the cooperation efforts of ECOWAS and its member states and for the political integration process of ECOWAS. The theoretical perspectives help explain why ECOWAS is or is not successful in combatting TIP. Like Söderbaum (2002) said: “Theory should add to understanding, explaining, and prediction of reality” (Söderbaum 2002: 36). I argue that the regionalism perspective, as posed by Grant and Söderbaum (2003), is not enough for understanding the role of ECOWAS in counter-trafficking in West Africa. The sub-region of West Africa comprises a unique form of regionalism, and I argue its characteristics can be explained via the usage of a couple of theoretical perspectives: pan-Africanism; neoclassical realism and; neocolonialism.

2.2a Regionalism

Regionalism can traditionally be viewed as the process of the cooperation of states – that share a sense of identity and/or purpose – with the goal of shaping collective action within a

particular geographic region (Ethier 1998: 11). Institutions are usually created in order to shape this process. A lot of regional initiatives ascended in the 1950s and the 1960s; this era of

regionalism is usually referred to as the ‘old regionalism’. Some scholars, for example Ethier (1998: 11), say these initiatives accomplished little, except for in Western Europe. But I believe the judgement of failure is premature. The process of regional cooperation comes in many variations in terms of form and development duration. Anyhow, regionalism theories have a lot to say on regional political integration.

The international economic environment and the power distribution in the world in the 1990s differed dramatically from that of the 1950s-1960s (Ethier 1998: 11). Söderbaum (2003) wrote that, since the late 1980s (after the Fall of the Wall), an explosion can be witnessed of various forms of regionalism and regionalist projects almost all over the world. The European project is perhaps the most debated example with the widening and deepening of the

European Union (EU). However, other regionalism processes can be observed in other parts of the world as well – made visible through the (re)emergence, revitalization or expansion of regional projects and organizations (Söderbaum 2003: 1-2). One of them is ECOWAS. Other examples are ASEAN, short for Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the SADC, short

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for South African Development Community. Olivier (2010: 23) claims that ever deeper regional integration is the only way towards African development, stability and relevance in a

globalised world.

Söderbaum (2003) argues it is important to recognize that this renewed and worldwide trend of regionalism – often labelled as the new regionalism approach (NRA) – is not confined simply to formal inter-state regional organizations and institutions. On the contrary, NRA is characterized by its multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions. It is therefore appropriate to speak of regionalisms in the plural rather than the singular. The variety of regionalism processes are new as well as the theoretical approaches (Söderbaum 2003: 1-2). The regionalism theories attempt to offer explanations for the way states cooperate with other states as well as the way states work with NGOs or IGOs. In other words, the presence of multi-level actors (domestic, international) are being considered. ECOWAS is one of the actors in the web of regionalism in West Africa. The focus in this study is on ECOWAS, because ECOWAS is a significant actor making efforts to boost West African regionalism. Nevertheless, it is assumed in this study that the individual West African states are the dominant actors.

Old regionalism and new regionalism (NRA) have been mentioned in this chapter. What are precisely the differences between old regionalism and NRA? Hettne (2003: 23-24) summarized the differences as follows:

- Whereas the old was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new took shape in a multipolar world order, and in a context of globalization;

- Whereas the old was created with big influence by the leading world powers, the new was a more voluntary process form within the emerging regions, where the constituent states and other actors experienced the imperative of cooperation, an ‘urge to merge’, or the pooling of sovereignty in order to tackle new global challenges;

- Whereas the old was economically inward-oriented and protectionist, the new was often described as being open; being more compatible with an interdependent world economy;

- Whereas the old was specific in regard to its objectives (e.g. forming a monetary union), the new was resulting from a more comprehensive and multidimensional societal process; and

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- Whereas the old was focused on relations between a group of neighbouring nation-states, the NRA formed part of a global structural transformation, or globalization, in which non-state actors are active on multiple levels in the global system too. So, old regionalism is a lot a more state-centric than NRA.

West Africa holds a unique kind of regionalism. The type of regionalism that I consider to be the most applicable to West Africa is a combination between the old and the new

regionalism. The perspectives of pan-Africanism, neoclassical realism and neocolonialism help give shape to this form of regionalism and they are discussed later. Regionalism encompasses many variations and not all differences between them are relevant for the purpose of this study. There are many overlapping ideas as well. The core issue is addressing the unique West African features and this provides the regionalism that helps create a better understanding of the role of ECOWAS in fighting human trafficking in West Africa.

In the Africa context, Grant and Söderbaum (2003) argue that states and IGOs are crucial actors and objects of analysis in the process of regionalism. They still put much emphasis on the importance of NGOs and societal factors. The way Grand and Söderbaum (2003) describe it, is that the state can be an interest group working together with other states and non-state actors for private gain rather than the public good (Grand & Söderbaum 2003: 5). Here, a component of realist theory is grasped, which is further elaborated on later.

Regional integration processes in Europe or South East Asia are not similar to the processes in West Africa. Sure, there can be some resemblance, but it is important to note that Europe or Asia follow different integration schemes than West Africa does (Iheduru 2011: 216-17; Mattli 1999: 41-43, 319). This is why mirroring the several regionalisms is complex, and perhaps, unfair. Therefore this study does not make such an attempt. According to Olivier (2010), multi-dimensional historical, ideological, political, socio-economic and functional factor give form to every single unique integration process. Some scholars say that there is no single theory or approach that can explain all factors and the dynamics they generate (Groom & Heraclides 1985: 178; Olivier 2010: 19). Groom and Heraclides (1985: 178) add to this that “integration is much more a process of becoming than it is a clear outcome or a definite political end state”.

Mattli (1999) takes on an extreme position in the debate, by saying that ECOWAS has failed to make any significant progress towards integration as their stated integration goals and subsequent achievements are far apart (Mattli 1999: 41-42). But under what conditions did ECOWAS fail? How can failure of integration be defined? Iheduru (2011) states that this claim

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ignores theoretical disagreements in the debate present in literature, on whether

generalisations can be made on regional integration due to the institutional variation, or whether an overall logic of regional integration can be attained, let alone specifying the conditions under which deeper institutional levels of regionalisms occur (Iheduru 2011: 217). I follow Iheduru’s (2011) line of thought here. Therefore, regional integration is looked closer at than merely focussing on the gap between the aims and objectives and the actual evidence of regional integration on the ground (Iheduru 2011: 216). In this study, it is assumed that there is a positive relationship between deeper political integration of a regional organization and the leverage of the respective regional organization in countering transnational security challenges (e.g. TIP). In other words, in order for ECOWAS to be influential in counter-trafficking,

advanced political integration is needed.

2.2b Pan-Africanism

The core of pan-Africanism is about the unity and solidarity of all Africans and the unity of the African continent; the sovereign independent African states working in concert towards a better future for the continent. The term pan-Africanism goes by many different definitions. Campbell (2006) framed it as “a quest for unity amongst continental and diaspora Africans, a revival of undeniable so-called African traits and traditions, and finally, political and economic independence”. Pan-Africanism is about solidarity among people with African descent living wherever in the world, a belief in African personality, rehabilitation of African past and African pride (Oloruntoba-Oju 2012: 191). Often, pan-Africanism is referred to as being a movement of ideas and emotions (Legum 1962: 14). Oloruntoba-Oju (2012) adds that the ideals of pan-Africanism can be phrased as “the emancipation of black people in all

locations, and possibly, the political unification of African countries and the creation of a home in Africa for all African people” (Oloruntoba-Oju 2012: 191). The origins of pan-Africanism is said to be American (Da Silva Cunha 1964: 11; Legum 1962). After the American Civil War (1861-1865), in view of the discrimination against, and consequent social subjection of black people, a reaction spread in the USA, with the aim of achieving a statute based on equality of rights, independently of skin colour. Pan-Africanist thought steadily spread throughout the USA, the UK and Africa (Da Silva Cunha 1964: 11-12). Thus, the foundation of pan-Africanism is found in the struggle against slavery, colonial rule and imperialism. This study focuses on West Africa,

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though it is exclusive to only West Africa. In spite of years of colonial subjection, the diverse West African population still holds strong ethnic and cultural links that cut across artificial and arbitrary boundaries (Jaye 2008: 151).

Olivier (2010) wrote that, since decolonisation, regional integration was viewed as the most effective way to reach the end goal of a strong and united Africa. However, not all freshly independent states shared this standpoint. For example, in 1959, Abubakar Balewa, the Prime Minster of the Federation of Nigeria, declared: “The African countries should possess a form of mutual understanding, but the hypothesis of a political union is unrealistic and quite

inconceivable. The African countries that have gained their independence should not renounce their sovereignty” (Da Silva Cunha 1964: 17-18). But Nigeria changed its view on regional

integration gradually after the Nigerian Civil War in 1970. Whereas Nigeria used to be quite conservative, pro-British and pro-Western till then, it adopted a more Afrocentric posture after the Nigerian Civil War (Obi 2008: 188). The role of Nigeria is not be underestimated as it fulfils the role of hegemon in West Africa. In the 1970s, all West African states developed positive sentiments towards regional integration and the role it can play in countering the alarming and persistent challenges of underdevelopment, poverty, marginalisation and transnational crime (Olivier 2010: 17).

The pan-Africanist framework suits well with the formation and development of ECOWAS as the organization attempts to unite West African countries economically and politically. Uniting powers is supposed to lead to a growth of their position in world order and towards full independence from the colonialists (Iheduru 2011). All in all, pan-Africanism is an indispensable approach in understanding West African states with respect to regional

integration. The approach helps explain the normative motives for West African states for committing to ECOWAS. In the context of security politics (e.g. conflicts, trade in illegal arms or drugs, human trafficking), these shared ideas, norms, and ways of thinking are referred to as the shared regional ‘security culture’ by various scholars (Jaye 2008; Sawadogo 2012).

Taking into account the limited developments in the last 60 years of political

integration on a continental scale (African Union), it is fair to question the decisive role of pan-Africanist thinking by African entities in respect to political integration. Are the ideologically inspired declarations of solidarity and inclusiveness, as epitomised by pan-Africanism (Olivier 2010: 17), sufficient pre-conditions for successful integration in Africa? Considering the limited integration there must be more to it. Many scholars are sceptical about the basis of the African Union and they see a more potential in the regional organizations (e.g. ECOWAS, SADC) (B.

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Franke, personal communication, 6 January, 2017; Olivier 2010: 19). But also in West Africa, pan-Africanist thought is not able to explain all developments of regional integration in West Africa. Thus, an additional paradigm is necessary for analysis.

2.2c Neoclassical realism

There is not a monolithic theory of realism; there is not one realism, but many (Dunne & Schmidt 2014: 103). Nevertheless, I focus on some of the core principles of neoclassical realism. Rose (1998), the first scholar to give the label of neoclassical realism, states that in order to understand the way states interpret and respond to their external environment, one must analyze how systemic pressures are translated through intervening variables, such as the perceptions of decision-makers (e.g. leaders) and the influence of external actors (Rose 1998: 152-153). For instance, ECOWAS is an actor that could influence the perception of decision-makers and it could influence the behaviour of states. One could say that neoclassical realists occupy a middle ground between structural theorists and constructivism (Rose 1998: 152-153).

Neoclassical realism’s starting point is an acceptance of the incentives posited by a Waltzian (neorealism) conception of structure exist, but states sometimes do not abide by them (Foulon 2015: 636). The neoclassical realists are sceptical that state behaviour can be explained by merely neorealism’s core assumptions about the state, relative power and the primacy of an anarchical material structure. Neoclassical realism therefore extends the analysis by including intervening variables (Foulon 2015: 636-637). Examples of intervening variables are pan-Africanist thought, or the ECOWAS plan of action against human trafficking.

This study wants to emphasize the importance of features of neoclassical realism like self-interest and survival. The individual states’ well-being is the first priority, also at the expense of others. Normative factors are not to be trivialized, but motives of self-interest by states are also considered crucial factors in this study. In short, this study acknowledges the importance of states in combatting human trafficking. The states are the actors that have to implement laws and legislation, after which the authorities within these state need to execute the new approach. Without the proactive collaboration of states, the situation is not going to change for the better. This study is not in a position to examine all actors with relevance and it focuses on ECOWAS and the West African states, as the goal of this study is to assess to what

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extent ECOWAS has been able to mobilize the West African states in increasing cooperation regarding counter-trafficking.

2.2d Neocolonialism

Neo-colonialism is […] the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.

(Nkrumah 1965: 2)

The theory of neocolonialism provides an additional perspective to this research. Neocolonialism was introduced in 1961, just four years after Ghana had become the first African colony to win its independence (Young 2001: 46). Kwame Nkrumah was the first Ghanaian leader and he wrote on neocolonialism in theoretical terms in his book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperalism from 1965. Nkrumah (1965) claims that the core of neocolonialism is that the state which is subject to it, is theoretically independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. Yet, in reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. Nkrumah explains that neocolonialism can be present via multiple ways. An extreme case would be when military troops would occupy the territory of the neocolonial state and control the government of this state. A scenario that happens more frequent, however, neocolonialist control is exercised through economic or monetary means (Nkrumah 1965: 1-2; Young 2001). The neocolonial state can be forced to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products from elsewhere. This control over government policy in the neocolonial state can be obtained by payments towards the cost of running the state, by the provision of civil servants in

positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power (Nkrumah 1965: 1-2). Kwame Nkrumah’s main point is that neocolonialism describes the situation of former colonies which are still being exploited by its former masters; the former colonists merely use different ways of doing so than in the colonial era. “The result of neocolonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neocolonialism increases rather than decreases the gap

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optimistic, though, by writing: “neocolonialism is not a sign of imperialism’s strength but rather of its last hideous gasp” (Nkrumah 1965: 253).

In addition to Nkrumah’s view on neocolonialism, Robert Young (2001: 45) wrote that Africa may have been the source of resources, like cocoa, coffee, diamonds, gold, timber or oil, but the markets for such commodities were based and controlled in Europa and the USA. The African countries may have accomplished their independence but when becoming

independent it became clear that there was an apparently new form of subservience, to the economic system of capitalist power (Young 2001: 45). Neocolonialism implies a situation in which the postcolonial state remains dependent on its former master, and the former masters continues to act as colonists; exploiting the former colonized states (Young 2001: 45).

Neocolonialist thought provides this research with an insightful perspective on how France played a role in the regional integration process in West Africa. Scholars like Franke (2007) and Oloruntoba (2016) conducted studies on this topic. The influence of France is not to be ignored, as they have more or less stalled the process of integration on the continent in the early days of independence (Oloruntoba 2016: 295), as well as in more contemporary politics (Franke 2007: 39), but less so during the years of President Hollande (B. Franke, personal communication, 6 January, 2017).

Next chapter is the methodological chapter. After this, throughout the analysis part of this study, all theories are covered. Features of the theories of pan-Africanism, neoclassical realism and neocolonialism are all absorbed by the West African regionalism.

Chapter 3. Methodology

3.1 Research question and sub-questions

This study is subdivided into five sub-questions to answer the research question: What has been the role of ECOWAS, since 2001, in combatting human trafficking in West Africa, and how can this be explained?

Sub-question 1: How did TIP become an issue for ECOWAS to be fought? Answering this study’s first sub-question provides insight into the reason why ECOWAS decided to make

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counter-trafficking a big topic. Also, why do the ECOWAS countries collectively want to be fighting this transnational security issue?

Sub-question 2: What are the dynamics of human trafficking in West Africa? Answering this question provides a context to the problem of TIP in West Africa. Human trafficking routes are shown and it is discussed whether the West African states are predominantly source, transit or destination countries for human trafficking.

Sub-question 3: How did ECOWAS attempt to improve the situation of counter-trafficking since 2001? To answer this sub-question, the study discusses the concrete actions that ECOWAS has undertaken in developing and promoting policy measures versus human trafficking.

Sub-question 4: To what extent did ECOWAS member states show dedication to implementing measures? With the help of USDS (United States Department of State) statistics, it is measured to what extent efforts were made by the individual member states on counter-trafficking.

Sub-question 5: How can the difficulties for ECOWAS in combatting TIP be explained? In order to answer this question, an analysis is provided of why it is so complicated to combat human trafficking.

3.2 Data gathering

The study mainly focuses on qualitative data in gaining an in-depth understanding of the case of human trafficking in West Africa and the role of ECOWAS in all of this. For the qualitative analysis of this study, the most important and applicable contributions to relevant debates are being used to make the argument and to develop several theoretical perspectives on the topics of ECOWAS, TIP, and regionalism in West Africa. Primary sources, complemented with secondary literature reviews cover the majority of data.

In order to analyze the plans, policies and implementation of these policies, different study’s, protocols, reports are used – mainly using reports from international organizations and from academic literature. Primary data, delivered by organizations like ECOWAS, UNODC and USDS are used when necessary and possible. In addition to the analysis of written data from reports and such, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with two experts. I have spoken with Dr. Agatha Kolawole (6 January 2017), who works for the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Nigeria. Dr. A. Kolawole is the National Project Officer and she

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works on the topic of human trafficking. Moreover, I spoke with Dr. Benedikt Franke (6 January, 2017), expert on African regionalism, currently working for the Munich Security Conference. He wrote multiple articles and a book on African political integration.

The study mentions some statistics (quantitative data) but these numbers need to be interpreted with caution. The data is prone to being unreliable due to the fact that TIP is an illegal practice and, in underdeveloped countries it is even harder to investigate such processes and activities. For this reason, quantitative data does not fulfil a prominent role in this study. The data is merely used for illustration purposes.

3.3 Operationalisation

In order to establish the leverage of ECOWAS in counter-trafficking in West Africa, the study examines, among other things, to what extent ECOWAS managed to achieve its goals, as formulated in the ‘Initial Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons (2002-2003)’ (ECOWAS 2001; UNODC 2015: 12). The goals are basically measures to be taken, and ECOWAS itself has divided these measures into seven groups: 1) legal framework and policy development; 2) protection and support of victims of human trafficking; 3) prevention and raising public awareness; 4) collection, exchange and analysis of information; 5) specialization and training; 6) travel and identity documents; and 7) monitoring and evaluation. Moreover, the study attempts to look further than verifying how many measures have been implemented, as there is more to regional political integration. What this study does not focus on, are the cases and dynamics of TIP in other parts of Africa, or in any other part of the world for that matter. Merely the leverage of ECOWAS in combatting human trafficking in West Africa is examined. Still, it is important to remember that the crime of TIP is present worldwide and it is definitely not exclusive to West Africa.

3.4 Methods of analysis

This study makes use of qualitative analysis to generate a profound understanding of the processes, context, logics, reasons and challenges of human trafficking in West Africa. The qualitative data is analyzed by means of the literature review, content analysis and interpretive methods – when analyzing the semi-structured interviews. A continuous interplay between

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analysis and theory is used to provide insight into academic debates and empirics. The analysis results in outcomes that are explanatory and investigative in nature.

Chapter 4. Human trafficking on the ECOWAS agenda

This chapter covers the first of the study’s five sub-questions: how did TIP become an issue for ECOWAS to be fought? Relevant developments during the twentieth century are covered to provide an understanding of the evolution of ECOWAS.

Bøås and Dunn (2007) argue that ECOWAS has shown remarkable resilience and

robustness throughout its existence in absorbing changes for which the organization was not

prepared. Dr. Benedikt Franke confirms this by stating that ECOWAS “does have some success stories” (B. Franke, personal communication, 6 January, 2017). It is true, one can argue

ECOWAS achieved a number of important things. For instance, the Liberian Civil War (1989-1996) paved the way for the formation of the first and only West African multilateral armed force, named ECOMOG, short for Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Iheduru 2011: 218). ECOMOG – a military force made up of soldiers from the national armies of member states – was established in 1990 and the ECOMOG intervention contributed to ending the Liberian Civil War. Later, ECOMOG deployed its forces in Sierra Leone (1997) and Guinea-Bissau (1999) to help control and end internal conflicts (Iheduru 2011: 218). In 2001, ECOMOG troops were stationed at the Guinea-Liberia border to stop guerrilla soldiers from infiltrating (Iheduru 2011; 218).

Former President of Nigeria, Obasanjo (2001), wrote that, “very early in the life of ECOWAS, it was appreciated that no meaningful cooperation, let alone integration, could take place within the sub-region without peace and security” (Obasanjo 2001: vii). Yet, there was critique, especially from Francophone states. Despite criticism on ECOMOG, the ECOMOG troops (and UN troops) were active yet again in January, 2017, when Gambia’s leader Jammeh did not accept his defeat in the elections in December, 2016. ECOMOG threatened to intervene to protect the democracy and stability in the region. Eventually, Jammeh went into exile, which made a violent intervention no longer necessary (BBC 2017; Laccino 2017).

Regional giant Nigeria has been the leading state for the entire period of ECOMOG’s existence and consequently Nigeria contributed most of the troops, materiel and financial backing (BBC 2004; Iheduru 2011: 218). Aryeetey (2001) wrote that ECOMOG operations have

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been essentially run by participating countries, and more precisely, by the country that provided most of the resources, namely Nigeria. There is some disagreement on whether ECOMOG has been successful or not. Some say ECOMOG lacked a clear agenda, and at the same time ECOMOG is closely linked to the Nigerian foreign policy priorities (Aryeetey 2001: 38-39). Obasanjo (2001), claims that “because there has been no firm basis in the form of an institutionalized peacekeeping mechanism, ECOMOG badly fell short of its ideals in many ways”, and he said that lessons can be drawn, both good and bad, from the ECOMOG

experience (Obansanjo 2001: vii). Regardless of the critique, the formation of ECOMOG does illustrate that there is a shared sentiment among the majority of ECOWAS states that can be explained as a shared security culture; shared ideas, norms and ways of thinking about security threats (Jaye 2008: 151). Whether the West African states also have the collective will to jointly solve transnational security problems is debatable. Anyway, one could say that these conflicts in the sub-region have led to an unplanned evolution of ECOWAS, as a shift can be identified from its original agenda of commerce and economic cooperation to more complex security challenges (Iheduru 2011: 218).

B. Franke (personal communication, 6 January, 2017) is one of the scholars who claims that ECOWAS has a number of success stories: “ECOWAS has functioning institutions, ECOWAS has a vision people identify with, it works on currency topics, on security topics, on counter-terrorism, […] the annual meetings are usually attended by all member states – even by the heads of state, which does not happen at any of the other regional organizations in Africa”. Basically, ECOWAS is the best alternative there is, he argues (B. Franke, personal communication, 6 January, 2017).

The first effort at integration in West Africa dates back to 1945 with the creation of the currency CFA Franc, which made the Francophone countries in the sub-region a single

currency region. Then, in 1964, the Liberian President proposed a West African economic union, and he was successful to some extent as the agreement was signed by four West African states (Adepoju 2015: 442). The biggest regional integration initiative in West Africa was launched with the 1975 Treaty of Lagos, when ECOWAS was founded (ECOWAS 2015a). This is where the regional institution-building started for the ECOWAS member states. West African states were influenced by pan-Africanist thought and therefore they started to unify against foreign powers and to reinstate pride and identity in African values (Iheduru 2011: 214-215). A new wave for regional initiatives began in 1980, when many regional and continental initiatives for economic and political integration were taken. After the Cold War had ended around 1990,

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1999; Iheduru 2011: 216). The Cotonou Revised Treaty of 1993 transformed ECOWAS beyond its 1975 founding treaty provisions. The ‘renewed’ ECOWAS seeks to accelerate economic

integration, increase political cooperation, create a regional common market and single currency, and prevent regional conflicts (Iheduru 2011: 218).

Then, in 2001, ECOWAS positioned the fight versus TIP high on the agenda. Where did this move come from? The ECOWAS plan of action for countering TIP was inspired by the Palermo Protocol which was designed during the United Nations (UN) ‘Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’ in the year 2000. The Palermo Protocol is the ‘Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children’ and it consists of a wide range of to be taken measures (OHCHR 2000). The adoption of the

Trafficking Protocol in 2000 is widely considered to be the final word in the long-standing impasse over an international legal definition of trafficking (Gallagher 2010: 42). The Palermo Protocol provides a wide framework for states to work on. Since the adoption of the Palermo Protocol, several regional treaties and treaty-like instruments on trafficking have been developed; one of them was by ECOWAS. The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the West African states adopted a ‘Political Declaration and Action Plan Against Human Trafficking’ in December 2001 in Senegal. With this, they committed their respective governments to ratify and implement relevant international instruments that strengthen laws against TIP and in order to protect victims of trafficking (Iheduru 2011: 219).

ECOWAS is mainly being funded by its own member states. Exact figures are not available, but estimates say that between 90-95% of its budget is funded with the community levy by the West African states (Mwiti 2015; Wakili & Salau 2016). Other projects from outside sponsors are not included in this percentage, though. The remaining income amounts from organizations like the UN and the EU. Often, the levy is not being regularly paid by ECOWAS states with Cape Verde, Ivory Coast and Senegal as major defaulters. Nigeria is the IGOs largest financial contributor (paying one-third of the total budget) and in 2015 Nigeria had decided to withhold some of her funds “until we see some meaningful changes in place” because Nigeria thought the resources were being mismanaged by those at the helm of the commission’s affairs (Chukwurah 2016; Mwiti 2015; Wakili & Salau 2016). This problem was resolved in 2016 but it shows the tension of cooperation among ECOWAS states, because similar incidents have occurred before. Or is it just politics?

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Chapter 5. Human trafficking in West Africa

In this chapter, the study examines the question: what are the dynamics of human trafficking in West Africa? Firstly, the relevant attributes of West African are discussed, followed by a coverage of the realities of human trafficking in West Africa. In the latter part, the study covers three case studies (Benin, Nigeria and Togo).

5.1 Attributes of West African states

The countries of West Africa share multiple common features (Adepoju 2015: 441; Rönnbäck 2008: 1): a relative small scale of population (except for Nigeria), high population grow rates, major supplies of natural resources, migration both within and across national borders, low per capita income, the majority of population living in poverty, and deteriorating economic

performance (Rönnbäck 2008: 1; UNDP 2015a). Except for a few (most notably Nigeria, followed by Ghana and Ivory Coast), these countries are not viable economic entities as producers, consumers or trading partners (Africa Ranking 2016; Adepoju 2015: 441-442). Despite economic integration efforts, intra-regional trade remains modest, at 11 percent of export trade (Adepoju 2015: 441, 446). Markets are fragmented, and fiscal and monetary policies are distorted. Infrastructures between states are not well-developed. For instance, the railways, they have track systems and rules and regulations that change across borders

resulting in inefficiency (Adepoju 2015: 441-442). Logically, these factors do not help improving trade. All of this combined with political instability and inter-state border disputes and

conflicts, and the absence of peace and stability in some parts, means that development is problematical, which leads to a sceptical investment environment and a flight of capital (Adepoju 2015: 441-442). It is expected that an improved economic environment, where West African countries are more economically integrated, would help improve this situation. ECOWAS can help increase the interconnectedness between its member states in order to create a healthier West Africa, in every possible way. The situation of counter-trafficking can only really improve when the individual countries are able to operate more effectively and an advanced collaboration would contribute to this.

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mostly weak, and arguably a couple of failed states (e.g. Guinea and Mali) (FSI 2015; UNDP 2015a; UNDP 2015b). What separates strong states from weaker states, and weak states from failed states? Rotberg (2002: 131) claims that every respectable state is expected to provide adequate governance; to protect its people’s safety, prosperity and health; and to instil a sense of national pride. States also need to deliver services and benefits (e.g. infrastructure, medical care, social services, a social safety net and education) that the private sector usually cannot provide. Foremost is the provision of national and individual security and public order. When governments refuse to or are unable to provide such services to all of their citizens, failure looms (Rotberg 2002: 131). Every single ECOWAS member state suffers from some or many of these negative traits. This does not necessarily mean they are failed states, though. Probably most West African states can be placed in the category of weak states.

Rotberg (2002) described failed states as tense, conflicted and dangerous. Generally, failed states share the following traits: a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising hostilities – ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural; civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; poor infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; poor life expectancy; poor education opportunities; preference for non-national currencies; heavy inflation; and food shortages. In contrast, strong states control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods to their citizens. They offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity; they are places of peace and order (Rotberg 2002: 132). The line between a weak state and a failed state can be ambiguous and arbitrary. Still, probably most of the ECOWAS member states can be considered as weak states as they share common traits with failed states, but they do not fail; they survive.

The reason for discussing the phenomenon of state failure and weak states is that it is very relevant in respect to the ECOWAS political integration process and cooperation. It is assumed that governments of weak states are less capable of countering transnational security challenges, such as human trafficking. Also, in times of ever growing globalization, it is

relevant. Weak states and failed states are struggling to hitch on the growing global economy and thus remain more isolated from the world. Even the country with the biggest economy of Africa (along with South Africa), Nigeria, cannot be labelled a strong state. The most powerful and influential country of ECOWAS deals with high levels of poverty, corruption and, since seven years Nigeria is entangled in a violent and complex domestic conflict with Boko Haram

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(Oduah 2017). Nevertheless, Nigeria has been central to ECOWAS efforts to combat transnational threats in West Africa, including human trafficking (Obi 2008: 191).

5.2 The realities of human trafficking in West Africa

The geography of human trafficking in West Africa is as complex as the trafficking routes (Adepoju 2005: 77). In order to understand human trafficking in West Africa better, it is helpful to cover some of its forms, dynamics and trafficking routes. The routes of human trafficking are examined extensively, and sometimes very detailed, in reports developed by the UNODC, UNICEF or ILO. For the purpose of this study it is not relevant to cover all of this, but this chapter does provide a fair basis of knowledge on the matter. Where does recruitment of victims take place, which borders are being crossed, where do trafficked victims often end up working and being exploited? And, what are they subjected to?

The 15 ECOWAS member states share a lot of similarities in respect to the characteristics of trafficking flows. We can distinguish source-, transit- and destination countries for victims of TIP. West Africa is a sub-region where all three categories are present. In a source country (a), victims are being recruited; in a transit country (b), victims are being transported through; in a destination country (c), victims end up working and being exploited. Even though some countries fit the description of one category better than another, most West African countries fit in all three of the possible categories. For illustration purposes, the cases of Benin, Nigeria and Togo are demonstrated as they are representative for the remaining 12 ECOWAS countries. Practically all different variations of TIP are present in one or more of these three states. The majority of the information that is discussed in the case study paragraphs is retrieved from the UNODC (2006; 2016) and USDS (2001-2016) reports.

5.2a Human trafficking in Benin

Benin is a source, transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for women, children, and men subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking (USDS 2009; USDS 2016). A study by UNICEF in 2006 found more than 40,000 children who were trafficked to, from or through Benin. Of the victims, 93 percent was Beninese and 92 percent was trafficked within the

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country itself. And, 43 percent of the trafficked children were subjected to domestic servitude. Of those trafficked within Benin, 86 percent were underage girls (USDS 2009).

Map 3. Benin’s human trafficking routes

Note: A broken line symbolizes trafficking routes into Benin. A solid line symbolizes trafficking routes out of the country. Some of the countries are both transit and destination countries and for this reason the arrow head stops in one country after which another arrow signifies the continuation of the trafficking route (UNODC 2016: 31). The use of broken and solid lines is similar in Map 4 (Nigeria) and Map 5 (Togo).

The majority of identified victims are Beninese girls, subjected to domestic servitude or sexual exploitation in Cotonou (UNICEF 2006; UNODC 2006 30-31; USDS 2016b: 96). USDS (2016b) also reports that children from Benin are forced to work on farms, in commercial agriculture (particularly the cotton sector), in mines, at construction sites, or as street or market vendors. For some Togolese girls, Benin is a destination country where they are exploited in

prostitution. In previous years, cases of sex tourism involving both young boys and girls on the shores of Benin have been reported as well in Benin. In the north of Benin, Koranic teachers sometimes exploit Beninese children in forced begging. Most child victims in Benin originate from the north of Benin and many are transported to neighbouring countries where they end up doing forced labour in mines, markets, farms, etc. Gabon is a frequent final destination for trafficked victims from Benin and for other West African victims (USDS 2016b: 96). In the year

Noteworthy

observations

The USDS observed a shortage of structural improvements in the investigation of trafficking of adults or providing services in order to protect adult victims. Also, Beninese governmental bodies, such as the Ministry of Labour, continue to hinder anti-trafficking progress. The government is failing in investigating alleged government complicity regarding TIP. Worse still, no efforts are made to investigate this. Same goes for steps to reduce the demand for

commercial sex trade or forced labour (USDS 2001-2016).

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2000, a study on child labour in Benin found 49,000 Beninese children (6 – 16 years old) from rural areas working abroad; it is unknown how many of these children were victims of

trafficking (Ouensavi & Kielland 2001: 1). The USDS coverage (2001-2016) of Benin shows a trend of changeability over the years and not a trend of structural improvements. Still, compared to 2001, Benin is – despite the critique – in an improved position in 2016 regarding counter-trafficking, especially in respect to prosecuting child traffickers and building a respectable judicial framework versus TIP. The role of ECOWAS remains vague in this story, but Benin did achieve a number of the goals that were posed in the ECOWAS action plan (ECOWAS 2001).

5.2b Human trafficking in Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world with an estimated population of 175 million people and South Africa and Nigeria are alternately the largest economies of Africa (Africa Ranking 2016; Oluwujon 2008: 23). The country is the most influential ECOWAS

member state and therefore a crucial actor in West African regionalism. Regarding TIP, Nigeria is a source, transit and destination country for women and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking. The FOS/ILO National Child Labour Survey (2003) estimates that there are 15 million engaged in child labour in Nigeria and 40 percent of them are at risk of becoming victims of trafficking – either within the country or externally – for domestic and forced labour, prostitution, entertainment, pornography, armed conflict, and sometimes ritual killings. It is reported that 46 percent of repatriated victims of external trafficking in Nigeria are children, and they are engaged in mainly prostitution (46 percent), followed by domestic labour (21 percent) and forced labour (15 percent) (UNICEF 2007). The USDS (2016) states that the victims are recruited from mostly the rural areas: women and girls for domestic servitude and prostitution and the boys for forced labour in street vending, mining, domestic servitude, agriculture, begging, etc. Young boys in Koranic schools are subjected to forced begging. Other Nigerian women and children are transported to other West African countries, Central African countries, as well as to South Africa, where they are subjected to domestic servitude or

prostitution. Also, the women and children are trafficked to Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia for sexual exploitation or forced labour. Women from other West African countries transit Nigeria to the same destinations (Europe, Middle East); mostly for forced prostitution. Nigeria is a transit point for children from other West African countries. A

The leverage of ECOWAS in combatting human trafficking in West Africa