UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM
CHINA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
PROSPECTS OF SINO-US CONFLICT
Koen Donatz, 12282022
Master thesis Political Science: International Relations
Supervised by dr. J.Y. Gruin
Second reader: dr. J. Bader
Completed in June 2019
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Abstract
This research aims to shed light on the role of international organizations (IOs) in the debate on the prospects for a Sino-US war, by examining the following research question: How does China’s participation in international organizations impact the prospects for conflict with the United States? To investigate this question, Power Transition Theory has been used as theoretical framework. Subsequently, China's degree of satisfaction in fifteen IOs divided across five themes has been examined by looking at four proxies for satisfaction. This research concludes that China's actions in these fifteen IOs demonstrate that China is dissatisfied and increasingly so, which enhances the changes of Sino-US conflict. Particularly in IOs regarding development financing, monetary affairs and international laws and norms, and IOs that operate on a regional scale, China's actions reflect dissatisfaction. Moreover, China does not shy away from operating outside the US-led international order. This is not to say that Sino-US conflict is inevitable, but at the moment China's actions in IOs do seem to make such conflict more likely.
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Table of contents
1. List of abbreviations
4
2. Introduction
5
3. Literature review
8
4. Theoretical framework
13
5. Research design
21
6. Security
28
7. Trade and economic cooperation
35
8. Development financing
42
9. Monetary affairs
49
10. International laws and norms
55
11. Conclusion
62
12. Bibliography
68
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1. List of abbreviations
ADB = Asian Development Bank
AIIB = Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation BRICS = Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa GDP = Gross Domestic Product
G20 = Group of 20
G24 = Intergovernmental Group of Twenty Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development
IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICSID = International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes IDA = International Development Association
IFC = International Finance Corporation IMF = International Monetary Fund IO = International organization IP = Intellectual Property
MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency NDB = New Development Bank
PCA = Permanent Court of Arbitration PTT = Power Transition Theory
SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Organization SDR = Special Drawing Rights
UK = United Kingdom UN = United Nations
UNCLOS = United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNHRC = United nations Human Rights Council
UNSC = United Nations Security Council UPR = Universal Periodic Review US = United States
WB = World Bank
WIPO = World Intellectual Property Organization WTO = World Trade Organization
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2. Introduction
“China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.” -Napoleon Bonaparte (former French general) (Shambaugh, 2016, p.1)
Anno 2019, China has woken up and is moving the world. Between 1980-2010, China’s annual GDP growth averaged 10.97% (The World Bank, n.d.), while China’s military expenditure multiplied twenty times between 1989-2017 (The World Bank, n.d. A). Consequently, the strategic rivalry between China and the United States (US) rose (Zhao, 2015; Buszynski, 2012; Friedberg, 2010), with scholars even speculating about the
possibilities for a Sino-United States (US) war (Allison, 2017; Mearsheimer, 2010; Glaser, 2011). Simultaneously, China has become more active in international organizations (IOs) since the 1980s, as vividly illustrated by China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Pang, Zhou, Fu, 2002; Zhihai, 2011). Though this trend seemed to support Ikenberry’s (2008) claim that China is integrating in the liberal western order, recent developments, such as China brushing aside a Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling over a territorial dispute (Davenport, July 8 2016), also show a certain reluctance of China to integrate. It shows that besides facilitating cooperation, IOs can also be theatres for rivalry (Blake & Payton, 2009). This makes the following research questions relevant:
How does China’s participation in international organizations impact the prospects for conflict with the United States?
Academic and societal relevance
This study is thus not aiming to predict whether China and the US will go to war, but is merely connecting China's actions in IOs to the prospects of conflict. This research question has both academic and societal relevance. As for the former, there is a field of literature on the prospects of Sino-US conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and a body of literature on China’s increasing role in IOs (Zhihai, 2011; Glosny, 2009; Kent, 2002), yet only relatively few scholars, such as
6 Ikenberry (2008), Johnston (2014; 2003) and Ren (2015), have tried to synthesize these two academic fields. Additionally, some scholars (see Foot & Walter, 2010; Chin & Thakur, 2010) examine whether China will try to change the rules of the international order, but here the link between IOs and conflict remains implicit. Hence, it is unclear what China's conduct within IOs indicates about the potential for Sino-US conflict. This research question brings the two academic fields together and shows that IOs are relevant to the question of Sino-US conflict. To the field on Sino-US conflict, answering this question contributes a nuanced view that covers the middle ground between the optimism of liberal institutionalism (see Ikenberry, 2008) and the pessimism of realism (see Mearsheimer, 2010). More specifically, this study gives insight into the potential role of IOs in the Power Transition Theory (PTT), particularly when it comes to assessing state satisfaction (to my best knowledge, only Johnston (2003) and Chan (2004) have done so before, but with very different approaches). The field on China’s role in IOs has been largely focused on economics and international norms (see Chin, 2010), hence this research question sheds light on the security consequences of China’s participation in IOs.
Regarding the societal relevance, if a Sino-US war would occur, this would have disastrous consequences. This study points to specific IOs, and specific patterns of Chinese action herein, and explains how these actions impact the prospects for conflict with the US. Thereby, this study demonstrates how certain actions of China increase and how other actions decrease tensions with the US, which can inform Chinese and American policy makers and diplomats on how China and the US can engage each other more constructively in IOs. For example, the analysis shows that China appreciates IOs that recognize China’s great power status, such as the UN Security Council, while China is frustrated with IOs where China feels underrepresented, such as the World Bank (Foot, 2014; Zhou, August 28 2016; Callaghan & Hubbard, 2016). The US might thus be well off to acknowledge China’s importance in IOs, while China can in return use its increased influence in a constructive manner. By taking such lessons into account, this research can hopefully make a modest contribution to the
preservation of Sino-US peace.
Structure of the thesis and main argument
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: The next chapter contains the literature review, which outlines the field of literature on the potential for Sino-US war and the field of
7 theoretical framework follows, which explains PTT and other important theoretical elements of this research. The research design chapter describes how the themes and IOs used in this research have been sampled and how China's actions in these IOs have been assessed. The subsequent five chapters form the analysis, each chapter representing one theme. The last chapter is the conclusion, which provides the key findings of the research. To briefly
summarize the main argument already, it will be argued that China's actions in IOs generally show that China is increasingly dissatisfied, which heightens the prospects for Sino-US war. This is particularly the case for the IOs in the domains of development financing, monetary affairs and international laws and norms. What is more, China seems to be more dissatisfied when it comes to IOs with a regional (Asia-Pacific) scope and IOs where China is not acknowledged as a great power, and China is more than willing to work around the US-led international order when it feels it has to. The next chapter is the literature review.
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3. Literature review
This chapter reviews the two fields of literature that are the most relevant to this study: 1) literature on the prospects of Sino-US conflict and 2) literature on China's role in IOs. The review ends by presenting the academic gap between these two fields that this study addresses.
Literature on the prospects for a Sino-US war
The first relevant field of literature is on the prospects for a Sino-US war, which spans all main International Relations schools (Friedberg, 2005). As for realism, Mearsheimer (2010) argues that to secure their survival, states will always strive for regional hegemony, while regional hegemons will try to prevent great powers elsewhere in the world from gaining regional hegemony. Concretely, this means China will attempt to become hegemonic in Asia, pushing the US out of the region, while the US has a vested interest in avoiding this (ibid). According to Mearsheimer (ibid), the inevitable result is a Sino-US war. Other realists disagree, with Kirshner (2012) claiming that one of the few ways great powers such as China can jeopardize their survival is by attempting to achieve hegemony. Moreover, even if China would succeed in becoming a regional hegemon, this would not existentially threaten the US (ibid). Subsequently, Kirshner (ibid) concludes that sustaining Sino-US peace will be tough, but not as impossible as Mearsheimer (2010) suggests. Additionally, Glaser (2011) asserts that nuclear weapons, geographical distance and political relations lessen the intensity of the security dilemma between China and the US, allowing for the possibility of a peaceful Chinese rise. Across the board, realism thus paints a pessimistic picture, but leaves room for the possibility of Sino-US peace.
A related theoretical branch that is very present in the debate is Power Transition Theory, which largely forms the theoretical framework of this study. Originating from Organski, PTT is based on the idea that the international environment is hierarchical and managed by the great powers (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). A major war can emerge if a rising power (China) is quickly overtaking the dominant power (US) and if the rising power is dissatisfied (ibid). A more elaborate explanation of the theory will follow in the Theoretical framework chapter. Several studies use PTT to assess the prospects of a Sino-US war, leading
9 to mixed conclusions. Allison (2017) reviews sixteen power transitions over the last 500 years and finds that a major war erupted in twelve of these cases. This makes Allison conclude that a Sino-US war is not inevitable, but very likely (ibid). Similarly, Lim (2015) considers three factors: China’s rapidly increasing military spending, the large domestic differences between China and the US, and China’s growing role in regional security arrangements, and infers that China is dissatisfied, making Sino-US conflict conceivable. However, using a similar
approach Tammen and Kugler (2006) look at five indicators of satisfaction: presence of territorial disputes, military build-up, satisfaction with international rules, ideological disputes with the US and economic interdependence, and conclude that in general China is not
dissatisfied. This is also suggested by Kastner and Saunders (2012), who demonstrate that former Chinese presidents Jiang and Hu and former premiers Zhu and Wen did not travel disproportionally often to certain countries with which close relations would have indicated dissatisfaction, such as other rising powers.
Liberalists, such as Ikenberry (2008), are even more optimistic. Ikenberry (ibid) argues that the US created an unusually dense and sustainable liberal order of rules and institutions after 1945. China will not be able to undermine this order, and has no interest in doing so either, since the order economically benefits China (ibid). Hence, Ikenberry (ibid) predicts that China will integrate in the liberal order, so war will not occur. The economic
interdependence that Ikenberry (ibid) refers to is indeed important according to Tønnesson (2015), but is in itself insufficient to preserve Sino-US peace. Rather, Tønnesson (ibid) makes the argument that economic interdependence and nuclear deterrence will jointly be able to avert Sino-US conflict.
Constructivists generally share this optimism (Friedberg, 2005), but have
unfortunately not been vocal in the debate. It is however worthwhile to mention Johnston’s (2014) book Social States: China in international institutions, 1980-2000. Although Johnston (ibid) makes no direct references to the prospects for Sino-US conflict, he indirectly informs this debate by examining China’s role in international institutions. Whereas China was a newcomer to IOs in the 1980s, Johnston (ibid) makes the case that through the processes of mimicking, social influence and persuasion, China has become more active and constructive in IOs over the decades.
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Literature on China's role in international organizations
The field of literature on China's role in IOs can be divided into three categories. Firstly, there are studies on how China's increased participation in IOs affects global governance and the international order at large. Foot and Walter (2010) evaluate how well China and the US have been complying to global norms in five areas: using force, macroeconomic policy
surveillance, non-proliferation of nuclear arms, climate change and financial regulation, and demonstrate that since the 1980s China’s respect for these international norms has been growing. Chin and Thakur (2010) claim, based on China's role in the United Nations Security Council and the Bretton Woods organizations, that China seeks to integrate further, while it also wants IOs to reform their governance structures. Kent (2002) argues that China uses IOs to advocate for its national interests, but at the same time has been internalizing international norms and is becoming socialized in IOs, which China needs to increase its international status. This first category provides rather broad insights in China’s participation in IOs and mostly emphasizes China’s increasingly cooperative behaviour in IOs. More specific insights can be drawn from the remaining two categories.
Secondly, there is research on China's role in recently established IOs, some of which are led or initiated by China. Chung (2006) describes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for example as “the first multi-lateral security organization largely initiated and promoted by China” (Chung, 2006, p.5). Chung (2006) adds that because China can use the SCO to advance its security interests, it has a vested interest in institutionalizing the IO, contrary to the notion that China favours institutionalizing international economic platforms, but not security initiatives. A China-led IO that has received a lot of attention is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (see Chin, 2016; Callaghan & Hubbard, 2016; Etzioni, 2016). Callaghan and Hubbard (2016) describe for instance how China, fed up with the slow reforms in other development banks, decided to establish the AIIB in 2014, and turned it into a truly multilateral institutions that many countries were willing to join. Chin (2016)
underscores this observation, by noting that the degree to which China will be able to make the AIIB a genuinely multilateral institution, by refraining from abusing its powerful position within the bank, is important to determining the future course of the bank. Interestingly, Etzioni (2016) describes how the US has tried to prevent many of these countries from joining the AIIB, to contain China’s influence. Another IO which recently emerged and in which China has been influential is the BRICS, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Glosny, 2010). Glosny (ibid) describes how China collaborates with the other BRICS
11 countries, thereby not opposing but rather trying to reform the US-led international order, a collaboration that is limited by differences and competition among the BRICS countries. Ren (2015) reaches a similar conclusion when examining China’s role in the G20, arguing that China works within the current international system, but pushes for reform hereof. Chin and Dobson (2015) add that China’s presidency of the G20 in 2016 could be an opportunity to showcase international Chinese leadership.
Thirdly, there is scholarship on China's position in the more traditional IOs. Regarding the United Nations (UN), Morphet (2000) examines China's voting behaviour in the UN Security Council between 1971-1999, and demonstrates how China came to advocate a more active and distinctive view in the Council over time. Additionally, Foot (2014) argues that China prefers working through the UN because of its permanent seat in the Security Council, the acknowledgement it receives for its contribution to peacekeeping, and the institutional framework of the UN, which matches China’s priorities. China’s role in the Bretton Woods institutions has also been covered (see Bottelier, 2007; Wang, 2018; Hopewell, 2015). Bottelier (2007) emphasizes how China and the World Bank have been important to each other. The World Bank’s loans and technical assistance have been important to China’s economic development, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, while working in China taught the World Bank important lessons, such as that the World Bank can stimulate, but never replace the government’s commitment to development (ibid). Wang (2018) outlines how China utilizes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to become a global leader in monetary affairs. At the same time, China is very active in pushing for institutional reforms within the Fund (ibid). The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a different story. Having negotiated for fifteen years before entering the WTO in 2001, China has kept a low-profile in the WTO, leaving the leadership of the developing countries to Brazil and India (Hopewell, 2015). The reason is that China is not keen on receiving more criticism on its controversial trade practices (ibid). Such tensions notwithstanding, this second field of literature is unsurprisingly much more focused on cooperation, as also underlined by Zhihai (2011), than the first field.
The gap between the two fields
The gap in the literature is that relatively few scholars have attempted to bring the two fields of literature together. On the one hand, scholars writing on Sino-US conflict might
12 occasionally make a passing reference to IOs, but have so far not systematically assessed their role in the debate. On the other hand, the scholars examining China's role in IOs do
sporadically acknowledge that China's actions may heighten tensions with the US, but possibilities for conflict with the US are not regularly discussed. This gap might partly be a result of ontological differences, with the field on Sino-US conflict relatively dominated by realist assumptions and attention for power politics, while in the field on China and IOs liberalist assumptions and an emphasis on cooperation are prevalent. This does however not mean that the gap is insurmountable, as shown by the several attempts already made to bridge this gap (see for example Ikenberry, 2008; Johnston 2014; 2003; Ren, 2015). What scholars such as Ikenberry (2008), Johnston (2014; 2003) and Ren (2015) have done well is identifying how China's engagement with IOs can mitigate the prospects for conflict, but what role IOs play in stimulating the prospects for Sino-US conflict remains unclear from their work. Perhaps the research that is closest to what this study sets out to do is Johnston (2003), which also refers to PTT and assesses whether China is a status-quo power or not by looking at several indicators related to China's participation in the international community. However, whereas Johnston's (ibid) indicators are more focused on general trends and less on specific IOs, for this study China's actions in specific IOs matter a great deal. Moreover, Johnston (ibid) is mostly interested in status-quo/revisionism and China's participation in the
international community, whereas this study is mostly interested in satisfaction/dissatisfaction and the prospects for Sino-US war. There is thus definitely more work to be done on bridging the academic gap between these two fields, which this study does by posing the question: How does China’s participation in international organizations impact the prospects for conflict with the United States? The next section outlines the theoretical framework that has been used to answer this question.
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4. Theoretical framework
To outline the theoretical framework orderly, this chapter consists of three parts. The first part elaborates on three theoretical assumptions/propositions of this study. The second part
explains the core theory of the theoretical framework: Power Transition Theory, and how PTT relates to IOs. The third part defines the core concepts of this study: Power, satisfaction and conflict.
Theoretical propositions/assumptions
This section discusses three theoretical propositions/assumptions, which are key to the relevance of the research question. Despite, or probably because of the disagreements surrounding these assumptions, studies on the prospects for Sino-US conflict do not always make their choices regarding these assumptions explicit. For the sake of analytical
transparency, this research deliberately explains these assumptions and the rationale behind them. The three assumptions/propositions are:
1. China’s rise will continue for the foreseeable future. Several scholars writing on China from a PTT perspective (see Allison, 2017; De Wijk, 2019) operate from this assumption, not because it is a certainty, but because any meaningful discussion about the implications of China's rise for international security requires that one, at least for the sake of argument, assumes this rise will continue. Additionally, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and considering that even between 2010-2017 China's average annual GDP growth rate was still 7.95% (The World Bank, n.d. B), it is safe to assume that China's rise continues into the foreseeable future.
2. Whether Sino-US conflict will break out is not predetermined and cannot be predicted by solely relying on Chinese or American foreign policy or the theoretical assumptions of the main International Relation Schools. Both China and the US emphasize that their bilateral relationship is centred around issues of common interest and that it is important to resolve disputes (U.S. State Department, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, n.d.).
14 Nevertheless, as Allison (2017) shows, a dominant and a rising power can be dragged into a war neither party intended. Subsequently, official policy is in itself insufficient to determine the prospects for a Sino-US conflict. Moreover, predicting whether war or peace will prevail in the Sino-US relations (almost) only based on realist or liberalist theoretical assumptions, as Mearsheimer (2010) and Ikenberry (2008) attempt, does not lead to satisfactory conclusions either, as it ignores the specific dynamics of the Sino-US relations. This assumption is mentioned to stress that neither foreign policy nor theoretical assumptions can by themselves provide a credible prediction regarding the prospects for Sino-US conflict, which is why it is worthwhile to combine the two elements and look at other factors, such as IOs.
3. IOs matter to international politics, and what China does in IOs matters to the prospects for Sino-US conflict. This study operates on the liberal institutionalist proposition that IOs do matter to international politics (see Keohane & Martin, 1999). However, this research does not a priori assume that IOs improve international cooperation, as IOs can also be used for rivalry (Blake & Payton, 2009). This is an important insight, because it is necessary to bridge the gap between the cooperation-oriented field on China's role in IOs and the more conflict-cooperation-oriented field on the
potential for Sino-US war. What China does in IOs can both increase and decrease the prospects for conflict with the US.
Core theories
This section addresses the core of the theoretical framework: Power Transition Theory, and explains how PTT relates to IOs. PTT is a theory on the power distribution in global politics and the changes herein (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). The theory originates from Organski's book World Politics (1958), and can be seen as a critique on the Balance of Power Theory (Tammen, 2008). PTT is commonly associated with realism because of its focus on power, but contrary to realism views the international system as hierarchical, with the great powers essentially ruling the system (Tammen, 2008; Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). Within this hierarchical structure, PTT focuses on the changes in relative power among countries, whereby a major war can erupt when a rising power (China) rapidly catches up with a dominant power (US) (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). War is likely if two conditions are met: 1) The rising power approaches power parity with the dominant power
15 and 2) The rising power is dissatisfied (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017).
Organski and Kugler (1980) argue that national power can be measured by GDP. If one accepts this measure (and later on it will be explained why GDP is used as the measure for national power), than the power transition at stake is the process whereby China’s GDP overtakes the GDP of the US. Some scholars thereby assert that when the rising power is 80% as powerful as the dominant power, potentially conflict-invoking power parity has been reached (Lemke & Werner, 1996). According to the World Bank (n.d. C), the GDP of the US in 2017 was $19.391 trillion, while China’s GDP was $12.238 trillion, making China's GDP 63.11% of the US' GDP. Hence, the critical power parity point has not been reached yet, but if the Centre for Economics and Business Research’s (2015) prediction that China’s economy will surpass the American economy in 2029 is even remotely accurate, power parity will be reached very soon. Though this assumption is controversial, it is both reasonable and important for this research question. The main takeaway of this assumption is that China is rapidly moving into the direction of power parity with the US.
Having made this assumption, power parity will mostly play a background role in this study, the implication for this study basically being that the outbreak of Sino-US conflict will materialize if China is dissatisfied (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). It is thus interesting to examine what China's actions in IOs say about China's satisfaction, and what this according to PTT implies for the prospects of a Sino-US war. How IOs exactly relate to PTT, and how satisfaction will be investigated will be discussed shortly, but first it should be mentioned that PTT is not uncontroversial. The most prominent criticism on PTT is that it is deterministic, as illustrated by Harris’ (2014) work. This view is however unwarranted according to Tammen (2008), for PTT is not deterministic but rather probabilistic. The prospects for war increase or decrease depending on the degree of power parity and dissatisfaction, but PTT does not claim to make final predictions (ibid). This is why PTT is useful as a theoretical framework for this study, as this study also aims to gain insights into the prospects of war, without making final predictions. Moreover, PTT is relevant as a theoretical framework because it explicitly focuses on rapid changes in the distribution of power between a dominant and a rising state, and on the implications this has for possible conflict, which is evidently applicable to the current Sino-US relations (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). This is exemplified by the amount of scholars who have already applied the PTT to the current Sino-US relations, among which are Allison (2017), Tammen and Kugler (2006), and Lim (2015).
IOs are no common part of PTT studies, but some PTT scholars do acknowledge their relevance. The example of Johnston (2003) has already been mentioned in the previous
16 chapter. Besides, Tammen (2008) argues that IOs are soft power tools that dominant powers can use to keep the international community satisfied and augment their own positions. Reasoning along similar lines, Chan (2004) asserts that membership of intergovernmental organizations is a proper measure of state satisfaction. As will be discussed in the next
section, there are several more indicators of satisfaction, some of which can be directly linked to IOs. Thus, despite the fact that not many PTT theorists have focused on IOs, there is definitely room for IOs in the PTT tradition, a theoretical idea this study illustrates.
This necessitates a clear conception of what IOs are. As mentioned, PTT and IOs do not go together naturally, and as such there is not a straightforward theory on IOs that can be invoked to connect IOs and PTT. Therefore, it is necessary to combine several theoretical notions to make clear how IOs will be treated in this study, and how this relates to PTT. To start off, it is essential to come up with a definition of ‘international organizations’. There is no agreed upon definition of IOs (Duffield, 2007), but in this research IOs are defined as a combination of how Simmons and Martins define IOs and international institutions, to refer to both "associations of actors, typically states" (Simmons & Martins, 2002, p.329) and "sets of rules meant to govern international behaviour" (Simmons & Martins, 2002, p.328). This definition is useful because it includes a broad range of multilateral arrangements that are relevant to Sino-US relations. For example the sometimes used criterion of a permanent secretariat (Pevehouse, Nordstrom & Warnke, 2004, p.103) is left out to include entities such as the G20 in the analysis. Furthermore, despite the fact that the bulk of scholarship on IOs has focused on the ability of IOs to foster peace and cooperation (Hafner-Burton &
Montgomery, 2006), IOs are regarded as having the potential for both cooperation and power politics, whereby powerful states can use IOs to advocate their own interests, but not
unrestrictedly so. Being a middle ground between realism and liberalism, this position is similar to the views of Abbott and Snidal (1998) and Hafner-Burton & Montgomery (2006), and supports the notion that IOs can be venues for power politics (Blake & Payton, 2009). Consequently, contrary to scholars such as Liping (2001), China's participation in IOs will not be uncritically taken as an embracement by China of these IOs and their purposes. The reason this is important to stress, is that in some IOs China’s membership seems to be a willingness to engage, while in other IOs China appears to have alternative motives. As will become clear in the analysis, China’s membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency is a case where China appears to be generally willing to engage and cooperate. Yet, it would be absurd to claim that because China is currently part of the UN Human Rights Council (2019), China promotes human rights. In both cases, China participates, but in very different ways. Hence,
17 China's specific actions in IOs, not merely its participation, will be considered. Additionally, IOs are seen as not being underpinned by purely rational functionalistic motives, such as cutting the costs for cooperation, but as having other rationales as well, such as being a platform for international norm setting, creating legitimacy and prestige and being a social network (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Simmons & Martin, 2002; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2006). To sum up, in this research IOs are viewed in a broad sense, as vehicles for both cooperation and rivalry, having both functional and normative roles. The focus on both cooperation and rivalry, and on both the functional and the normative aspects of IOs make this conception of IOs well-suited to examine China’s satisfaction through various lenses, which is central to PTT. Moreover, the broad conception of IOs enables the inclusion of all relevant IOs in the analysis.
Concepts
Having outlined the general theoretical framework, it is crucial to define this study’s key concepts: Power, satisfaction and conflict.
Power
Power is a complex concept with many different facets that can be defined in several ways. According to Nye, “power is one’s ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants. There are three basic ways to do this: coercion, payment, and attraction” (Nye, 2009, p.160). Applying this to the state level, power might be defined as “the ability of one nation to advance policy goals by altering the policies of other nations” (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017, p.3). Accurately defining power is already a complicated task, but measuring national power is arguably even more difficult. According to Tammen, Kugler and Lemke (2017), there are three common ways in which PTT scholars measure national power:
1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as proposed by Organski and Kugler (1980). 2. The Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC), consisting of six aspects:
military spending, military personnel, consumption of energy, production of steel, production of iron, urban population and total population (Tammen, Kugler and Lemke, 2017).
18 3. Political Performance, a measure invented by Tammen and Kugler (2013) that looks at
how well governments are able to achieve their policy aims.
As has been argued by several authors (see Layne, 2018; Ross, 2019), the power transition that is taking place between the US and China is mainly driven by China’s tremendous economic growth. This dimension of economic growth is directly captured by the first measure, but only indirectly by the second and the third measure. Therefore, this study uses the first measure, GDP, as the lead measure for national power. Having assumed earlier that China’s rise will continue and that China is approaching power parity with the US in the foreseeable future, the focal point of the analysis is going to be China’s satisfaction, and not China’s power or power parity per se. Consequently, the less-than-ideal conceptualization of national power is no obstacle to an accurate analysis.
Satisfaction
According to PTT, satisfied states support the international status-quo, while dissatisfied states have revisionist intentions (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). The dominant nation, the US, is thereby thought to be a satisfied power that defends the status-quo (ibid). Hence, the dominant and the rising power will likely be able to cooperate if the rising power, China, is satisfied as well, whereas conflict might prevail if the rising power is dissatisfied (ibid). This makes satisfaction a central concept to PTT, it is (along with power parity) the main variable that shapes the prospects for war between a dominant and a rising power (ibid). Provided that the approaching power parity between China and the US will be treated as a given, examining what China's actions in IOs imply about the prospects for a Sino-US war, as the research question does, thus requires one to assess what China's actions in IOs say about China's satisfaction. ‘Satisfaction’ will in line with Rauch’s (2016) work be treated as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Hence, the analysis seeks to determine to what extent and in which aspects China is satisfied or dissatisfied. To consider what China's actions in IOs mean for China's satisfaction, one must come up with proxies for satisfaction, which can subsequently be connected to China's actions in IOs. Unfortunately, the measurement of satisfaction remains an underexplored topic (Rauch, 2016), but the PTT literature mentions the following four relevant proxies:
19 1. Membership of IOs (Chan, 2004). China’s membership of US-led or US-dominated
IOs within the US-led international order denotes satisfaction, whereas China’s membership of rivalling IOs attests dissatisfaction. The term ‘US-led international order’, or similar terms, are used to refer to a range of IOs that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War and via which the US grants public goods (Nye, 2017).
2. Adherence to international norms, rules or the dominant power’s ideology (Tammen and Kugler, 2006; Lemke & Werner, 1996). This proxy means that when China acts in congruence with the rules of an IO, international norms, or US ideology, this signifies satisfaction while China’s disregard hereof marks dissatisfaction. 3. The amount of benefits gained from the current international order (Rapkin &
Thompson, 2003). Logically, the more China benefits from a certain IO the more this points to satisfaction, unless the IO falls outside the realm of US-dominated IOs, in which case the benefits might mark dissatisfaction.
4. Relations with other states (Lim, 2015). More concretely, the presence of relations between China and other rising powers, pariah states, US allies or US adversaries indicates dissatisfaction on the part of China (Kastner & Saunders, 2012). The logic is that China wants to forge relations with these countries to revise the current
international order (ibid).
These proxies will be explained in more depth in the next chapter. Other commonly
mentioned indicators are military build-up and differences in domestic politics between the rising and the dominant power (Lim, 2015), but these indicators are less relevant to the realm of IOs. These four proxies are all directly relevant to IOs, underscoring the possibility to bring PTT and IOs together.
Conflict
The research question is focused on prospect for Sino-US conflict, and it is thus helpful to discuss what is meant by conflict. Please note that the terms 'war' and 'conflict' are used interchangeably. Remarkably, studies on the prospects for Sino-US war, including those belonging to the PTT tradition do generally not clearly define what is meant by 'conflict' or 'war' (see for example Allison, 2017; Tammen & Kugler, 2006; Lim, 2015). Allison (2017)
20 does however mainly discuss historical power transitions in which a major war took place, making it evident that his idea of Sino-US conflict is a major war as well. However, since the war is (still) a hypothetical event there is no need to restrict one’s idea of a Sino-US conflict to a major war. A major Sino-US war, as stated by PTT scholars such as Allison (2017), could very well be the result of a dissatisfied China, but there is a wide range of smaller conflicts conceivable that could precede this major war, such as minor armed clashes or naval disputes. Therefore, this study emphasizes that China’s dissatisfaction heightens the prospects that the Sino-US relationship moves more in such a conflict-prone direction, which includes those smaller forms of conflict and may accumulate in a major war. As such, this study’s idea of Sino-US conflict differs somewhat from that of conventional PTT scholars such as Allison (2017) and Tammen and Kugler (2006). This way, PTT can be used describe a general direction that the Sino-US relations are taking, rather than fixating on the hypothetical event of a major war. This helps to place China’s actions in IOs to the broader Sino-US relations.
To sum up, the core of this study's theoretical framework is formed by the PTT and a broad conception of IOs. Since this study operates on the assumptions that China will continue to rise and that China will approach power parity with the US in the foreseeable future, the focus of the study will be on whether China's actions in IOs indicate satisfaction or dissatisfaction. (Dis)satisfaction will be evaluated using four proxies for satisfaction, which have been retrieved from PTT literature. The next chapter is the research design, which explains more elaborately how the analysis has been conducted.
21
5. Research design
This chapter discusses the research design, starting by giving a general overview of the design. Thereafter, the sampling of themes and IOs, the operationalization of the proxies for satisfaction and the limitations of the research design will be addressed.
General overview of the research design
According to PTT, a Sino-US war looms if China approaches power parity with the US and if China is dissatisfied (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2017). Using World Bank (n.d. B; n.d. C) data and referring to a prediction from the Centre for Economics and Business Research (2015), the reasonable assumption has been made that China will reach power parity with the US in the foreseeable future. This leaves China’s satisfaction as the variable that largely shapes the prospects for Sino-US war. To examine what China’s actions in IOs show about China's satisfaction, four proxies for satisfaction, based on PTT literature (such as Chan, 2004), have been outlined. Additionally, literature on Sino-US relations (Dumbaugh, 2009; Kissinger, 2011) has been used to, inspired by Foot and Walter (2010), identify five themes and fifteen IOs that are the most relevant to this research. For every IO, all four proxies have been assessed using relevant sources, such as academic literature, speeches, voting records etc. Combining the conclusions of all IOs within each theme, each theme forms an analysis of its own with its own conclusion. The patterns across the themes have contributed to the overall answer to the research question, which offers insights into China’s satisfaction and in turn into the prospects for Sino-US war.
Sampling of the themes and IOs
As mentioned, the analysis is centred around themes, to make sure that the findings include the most important topics and IOs, and are not too much linked to specific institutional issues of certain IOs while losing sight of the broader Sino-US relationship. The themes have been selected using two criteria:
22 1. The theme must be salient in the Sino-US relations.
2. The theme has to have the potential for tension between China and the US.
These criteria and the ultimate selection of the themes are informed by the literature on Sino-US relations, most notably Dumbaugh (2009), Kissinger (2011) and Foot and Walter (2010). Because the chosen themes cause friction between China and the US they are very relevant to the research question.
Per theme 2-4 IOs have been sampled. The IOs, which can be regarded as cases, have been selected by a combination of what Seawright and Gerring (2008) would call the diverse case method and the influential case. To elucidate, within each theme IOs have been chosen that reflect a diversity in purpose, membership composition and distribution of power. Additionally, certain IOs have been included because they are so influential that a discussion of a certain theme without considering that particular IO would make little sense. For
instance, the theme ‘Security’ has to include the UN Security Council to be useful. Besides the criteria of diversity and influence the IOs have been selected using the criteria for
selecting themes: Salience in Sino-US relations and the potential for tensions between China and the US. This led to the selection of the following themes and IOs:
1. Security: United Nations Security Council, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
2. Trade and economic cooperation: World Trade Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Group of 20.
3. Development financing: World Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the New Development Bank.
4. Monetary affairs: International Monetary Fund and the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development.
5. International laws and norms: Permanent Court of Arbitration, World Intellectual Property Organization and the UN Human Rights Council.
The sample of themes and IOs covers the most relevant aspects of the Sino-US relationship, ranging from security, to trade, to international law, and includes the IOs that are the most important to the Sino-US relations. The large amount of IOs is really a strength of the
research design, as it allows for a comprehensive assessment of China's degree of satisfaction in the realm of IOs. Please recall that the literature review referred to China’s actions in both
23 the more traditional and the newer IOs. The sample represents both categories well.
Additionally, the theoretical framework advocated a broad conception of IOs, which is reflected in this sample, and made clear IOs can be venues for power politics (Blake & Payton, 2009), which is also true for the selected IOs. To differing extents, all of these IOs have been places for Sino-US rivalry. To give a few examples, in the World Trade
Organization China and the US have had many trade disputes (Appendix 5), while China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank partly because it was fed up with Western dominance in the World Bank (Callaghan & Hubbard, 2016). In this manner, all fifteen IOs have their story of Sino-US rivalry. In the analysis there will be more attention for why specific themes and IOs are relevant to this study.
Operationalization of proxies for satisfaction
As suggested, contrary to scholars such as Liping (2001) this study does not cheer at China’s mere participation in IOs, but investigates what specifically China’s actions in these IOs are, and how these reflect on China’s satisfactions and the prospects for Sino-US conflict. This requires one to connect China’s actions in IOs to the proxies for satisfaction. To do so
systematically, in the analysis of each of the aforementioned fifteen IOs all four proxies have been looked at. The proxies have been operationalized as follows:
1. Membership of IOs. Whereas Chan (2004) takes participation in IOs per se as sign of satisfaction, this study only looks at what China's membership of an IO can tell about China's satisfaction. Two factors are important here:
• Is the IO at stake initiated or led by the US, by China or by neither country? China's membership of a US-led/initiated IO means China is engaging in the US-led international order, which points to satisfaction, while China's initiation of new IOs means China operates outside that order, indicating dissatisfaction. If an IO is led or initiated by neither China nor the US, China's membership hereof implies neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction.
• How and when did China ascend to the IO? If China joined with help from the US this indicates satisfaction.
24 This proxy has been examined using academic articles, the websites of the IOs, news sources and policy documents.
2. Adherence to international norms, rules or the dominant power’s ideology. This proxy is based on the studies of Tammen and Kugler (2006) and Lemke and Werner (1996) and focuses on how China's actions in the IOs relate to the rules of that IO, international norms in general or US ideology. Chinese actions that are in line with the IO rules, international norms and US ideology foster satisfaction, Chinese actions that counter these reflect dissatisfaction. Depending on which relevant sources were available per IO, this proxy has been evaluated using sources such as:
• Voting records • Official statements
• Speeches by Chinese representatives
• Comparisons between Chinese actions in an IO and official US policy, as stated on the website of the US State Department.
• Online information, reports and news releases provided by the IOs. • Dispute settle mechanisms.
• Examinations of which norms China advocates through such IOs. • Academic articles.
3. The amount of benefits gained from the current international order. This proxy is based on a study by Rapkin and Thomson (2003) and says that when China benefits from an IO this generally stimulates China's satisfaction. IOs that are China-initiated or otherwise outside the US-led international order are exceptions, in which case the fact that China benefits denotes nothing or dissatisfaction, for China is able to gain benefits outside the US-led international order. The aspects used to address this proxy are:
• How does China's participation in the IO relate to China's foreign policy goals? IOs that directly support China's foreign policy goals are obviously very beneficial to China.
25 • Did China establish the IO or does China play a leadership role in the IO? If
so, this gives China considerable influence in the IO, which is beneficial to China.
• How does China obtain influence inside and through the IO? The more influence China can gain, the better for China.
• Is China striving for governance reforms within the IO to gain more
influence? If so, this means China is currently dissatisfied with the distribution of power in the IO.
This proxy has been researched by using IO websites, websites of the Chinese government, policy documents, news sources and academic articles.
This proxy has been researched using IO websites, websites of the Chinese government, policy documents, news sources and academic articles.
4. Relations with other states. Please recall that according to a study done by Kastner and Saunders (2012) collaboration between China and other rising powers, pariah states, US allies or US adversaries reveals dissatisfaction. These categories are in this study defined somewhat different from how Kastner and Saunders (ibid) define them, namely:
• Rising powers: In line with Kastner and Saunders (2012), rising powers will be defined as G20 members that are not part of the G7 (see G7, 2019; G20, n.d.). Additionally, Nigeria and Iran are regarded as rising powers (see Ogunnubi & Isike, 2015; Eisenstadt, 2015).
• Pariah states: Similar to Kastner and Saunders (2012), countries that are sanctioned by the UN Security Council are seen as pariah states, but contrary to Kastner and Saunders (ibid) authoritarian states are not.
• US adversaries: Akin to Kastner and Saunders (2012), countries sanctioned by the US are seen as US adversaries, but differing from them voting in the UN General Assembly is not considered.
• US allies: Kastner and Saunders (2012) are only interested in US allies in China's region, but it is also interesting to see how China relates to US allies in other parts of the world, for example in the context of the Asian
26 Infrastructure Investment Bank, so this proxy looks at US allies in general. Differing from Kastner and Saunders (ibid), US allies in this study are all NATO members and Major Non-NATO allies. Appendix 0 provides a more elaborate explanation of all categories and also mentions all countries falling into these categories.
In the context of this proxy, this study looks at whether China cooperates with such countries in IOs, for example by looking at voting records or coalitions. If such cooperation was found, this was taken as a sign of dissatisfaction.
It is important to emphasize that the methodology and sources that have been utilized differ per theme and IO and depend on which relevant sources and information is available. This variation notwithstanding, the fact that China's actions in IOs are constantly related back to the same proxies for satisfaction ensures the analysis remains cohesive. The
abovementioned operationalization of the proxies gives a general overview of how China's actions in IOs have been related to China's satisfaction, which in turn yields insights about the prospects for Sino-US war.
Limitations of the research design
This research design resulted in several methodological challenges. Firstly, when using academic literature, there was the risk of over-reliance on American authors. This problem was partly insurmountable, since I do not read mandarin, but including Chinese authors whenever possible and being aware of this bias in the analysis were good steps to countering the problem. Secondly, because PTT is a relatively abstract theory, this research design assumes all IOs have an equally large influence on the prospects for the Sino-US war, while in reality some IOs are more important than others. However, considering how important exactly all the different IOs are for the prospects of Sino-US war would have been very complicated and is well beyond the scope of this study. Thirdly, the question still remains to what extent a given action of China in an IO really influences the prospects for a Sino-US war. As the war is a hypothetical event, the answer to this question will remain uncertain. Yet, testing causality was never the intention of this study in the first place. Instead, the aim of this research is to examine what China’s actions in IOs say about China’s satisfaction and how this moves the Sino-US relations in a general direction towards or away from conflict. The
27 outlined limitations, though these are important to acknowledge and counter as much as possible, do not impede this overall objective of the research. The next five chapters form the analysis, starting with the theme security.
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6. Security
"We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war"
- United Nations Charter (United Nations, n.d.)
This quote illustrates that an important function of many IOs is to foster international security. Especially since Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ in 2009, security became an essential strategic aspect of the Sino-US relations, making this theme a logical place to start the analysis (Saunders, 2013). This chapter starts with addressing the UN Security Council (UNSC), one of the most important security organs globally. Thereafter, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), a relatively young, China-initiated IO (Yuan, 2010), will be covered. Lastly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be discussed, because of the importance of nuclear weapons in the Sino-US relations (Cunningham & Fravel, 2015). The three IOs differ a lot in their aims and activities, but examining these three IOs together gives a good view of how satisfied China is with the current security order.
United Nations Security Council
Being one of the UN’s main organs, the UNSC carries "primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, for international peace and security" (United Nations, n.d. A). China and the US are two of the five members with a permanent seat and a veto in the UNSC (Weiss, 2003). Interestingly, the US helped China to take Taiwan's seat in the UNSC in 1971, as part of a Sino-US rapprochement process, after which China rapidly started to join other IOs (Kent, 2013; Kissinger, 2011). China's ascendance to and membership of the UNSC is therefore a sign of China's satisfaction for the proxy ‘membership of IOs.’
For the proxy ‘adherence to international norms, rules or the dominant power’s ideology’, it is insightful to look at how China uses its UNSC seat. Accordingly, all votes on UNSC draft resolutions between 1994 and February 2019, 1602 votes in total, have been examined to see how often the Chinese and American votes align (Appendix 1). China and the US voted the same 1495 (93.32%) out of 1602 votes, the Chinese and the American vote
29 diverged only 107 (6.68%) times (ibid). Of these 107 votes, 77 votes were instances where the US abstained while China voted in favour or vice versa, meaning that China and the US outright opposed each other only 30 times (1.87%) in the last 25 years (ibid). This high voting alignment indicates that there is not much ideological dispute between China and the US in the UNSC, pointing to China's satisfaction for this proxy. Furthermore, China used its veto only eleven times, the lowest number of all permanent UNSC members (Däg Hammerskjöld Library, 2019), underscoring this notion.
The next proxy to be addressed is 'the amount of benefits gained from the current international order'. O'Neill (1996) argues that China is one of the countries with the most voting power in the UNSC, because it can use its veto to defend its outlying policy positions. Moreover, Foot (2014) and Yu (2004) claim that China attaches a lot of importance to the prestige that comes with its permanent UNSC seat. Evidently, China is benefitting from its UNSC seat that it gained thanks to the US (Kent, 2013), which indicates satisfaction.
As for the proxy 'relations with other states', China's latest nine vetoes were cast jointly with Russia (Däg Hammerskjöld Library, 2019), while China and Russia also often abstain together at votes (Appendix 1). China's closeness to Russia, a fellow rising power (Appendix 0), signals dissatisfaction. Furthermore, China's growing number of vetoes, 7 of China's 11 vetoes took place after 2011 (Däg Hammerskjöld Library, 2019), signals this dissatisfaction is growing. To conclude, the importance China attaches to its permanent UNSC seat, China's high voting convergence with the US and the low number of vetoes indicate China's satisfaction with the international order. Yet, China's growing number of joint vetoes with Russia indicates there is a certain degree of Chinese dissatisfaction (see Däg Hammerskjöld Library, 2019; Appendix 1), which appears to be growing.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Established in 2001, for a significant part by China, the SCO is a security IO with eight members: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2017; Yuan, 2010). According to its charter, the SCO aims towards "strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region", "joint combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism" and "the prevention of international
conflicts and their peaceful settlement" (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2002, p.2). The US' request for observer status at the SCO was rejected in 2005 (Patrick, 2011), so the SCO
30 falls outside the US-created international order, hence, as for the proxy 'membership of IOs’ China is dissatisfied.
The proxy ‘adherence to international norms, rules or the dominant power’s ideology’ should be considered based on three factors. Firstly, the SCO aims to fight terrorism, as underscored in article 1, 3 and 10 of its charter (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2002). Congruently, the US State Department mentions that fighting terrorism is among America's highest priorities (US State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2018). Thus, a key priority of the SCO and the US overlap, an ideological convergence pointing to China’s satisfaction. Secondly, to examine how the SCO relates to international rules, all documents in the ‘Documents’ section of the SCO website (English version), 105 in total, have been scanned for references to other IOs (Appendix 2). Given China’s leadership role in the SCO (Qingguo, 2007; Yuan, 2010), it is reasonable to assume that these documents are supported, if not shaped by China. Interestingly, the 33 joint statements of the heads of the SCO member states contain 210 references to the UN (Appendix 2). These references reiterate the
importance of the UN charter or a UN body or decision. Furthermore, the SCO charter, conventions, regulations and agreements also contain references to the UN and its charter (Appendix 2). The SCO charter states for example: “Reaffirming our adherence to the goals and principles of the charter of the United Nations” (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2002, p.1). The fact that this China-led IO repeatedly expresses its support for the UN’s work and incorporates the UN charter into its own policy documents (Appendix 2), reveals that China is at least somewhat satisfied with the US-initiated UN and its rules and norms.
Thirdly, Ambrosio (2008) argues that the SCO promotes authoritarianism as it favours regime stability over democratic change. Here the SCO directly opposes the US’ ideology of
promoting democracy across the globe (US State Department Bureau of Democracy, n.d.), reflecting China’s dissatisfaction. In short, the China-led SCO has an ambiguous relation to international rules and US ideology, so this proxy denotes neither satisfaction nor
dissatisfaction.
Concerning the proxy 'the amount of benefits gained from the current international order', China has played a large role in initiating and institutionalizing the SCO, because it wants to use the SCO to counter ethnic separatism and terrorism and to increase its regional influence (Yuan, 2010). China's sway over the SCO obviously helps China to utilize the SCO for its own policy goals (ibid), but since these benefits are derived from an IO outside the US-led international order, these benefits point to dissatisfaction.
31 Saunders (2012), that strong ties between China and other rising powers, pariah states, US adversaries and US allies reveal dissatisfaction. Through the SCO China collaborates with Russia and India, two major rising powers, and Pakistan, a country that is an important ally to both China and the US (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2017; Appendix 0). Moreover, the SCO is expanding, with US NATO ally Turkey as a dialogue partner and US adversary Iran as an observer state (ibid). The security ties China maintains through the SCO, an IO from which the US has been actively barred (Patrick, 2011), thus reveal China's
dissatisfaction. Summarily, though the norms the SCO advocates are not necessarily opposed to the US, the very fact that China initiated a novel security IO and the connections China fosters in this security organization show China's dissatisfaction with the current international security order set up by the US, and that China is increasingly confident to manoeuvre around it when it sees fit.
International Atomic Energy Agency
In 1964, China conducted its first nuclear test, after which nuclear weapons became important in the Sino-US relations (Roberts & Montaperto, 2000; Cunningham & Fravel, 2015), making the IAEA relevant to this research. According to its statute, the IAEA “shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1989). Founded in 1957, the idea for the IAEA originates from a UN speech by US president Eisenhower (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.), making the IAEA US-initiated par excellence. Thus, taking the proxy 'membership of IOs' into account, China's membership of the IAEA since 1984 implies satisfaction (Malik, 2000).
To examine the proxy 'adherence to international norms, rules or the dominant power’s ideology', China's adherence to IAEA standards should be evaluated.The China-IAEA agreement of 1988 states: “whereas the People’s Republic of China (…) has declared that it neither stands for nor encourages nuclear proliferation, nor does it help other countries to develop nuclear weapons” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1988, p.1). China reinforced its commitment to this agreement by ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992 (Malik, 2000). China’s conduct is in line with IAEA rules on three levels. Firstly, China's defense policy aligns with the agreement and the NPT, for China’s Ministry of National Defense states “China remains committed to the policy of no
32 first use of nuclear weapons, pursues self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country” (The People’s Republic of China: Ministry of National Defense, n.d.). Secondly, China reiterates these principles in its speeches, which have been examined by summarizing the main points of 63 IAEA speeches that are available on the website of China’s representation to IOs in Vienna (Appendix 3). In its speeches, China repeats that it only supports the peaceful use of nuclear energy, opposes nuclear proliferation and encourages a larger role for the NPT (Appendix 3). China’s rhetorical support for the IAEA's principles even applies to North Korea, while China is considered North Korea’s closest ally (Appendix 2; Nanto & Manyin, 2011). In all 23 speeches China gave at the IAEA on the Korean Peninsula between 2010 and 2017 China mentioned it wants a denuclearized Korean Peninsula (Appendix 3). Thirdly, China's support for the UNSC sanctions on North Korea following its nuclear tests in 2006 (Xu & Bajoria, 2014) shows China's rhetorical support to IAEA principles also translates into action, which the IAEA confirms. An IAEA mission to China in 2017 concluded that China is exemplary in its use of the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance (International Atomic Energy Agency, September 8 2017). It has been argued by scholars as well that over the decades China has gradually become more supportive of the non-proliferation regime (Malik, 2000; Combes, 2011). Hence, regarding the proxy 'adherence to international norms, rules or the dominant power’s ideology' it can be concluded that China’s policy, rhetoric and actions adhere to the IAEA norms, pointing to China's satisfaction.
The next proxy is: 'the amount of benefits gained from the current international order'. China is one of the largest financial contributors to the IAEA (Epstein & Kerr, 2017) and receives two gains in return: Stability and influence. Firstly, China utilizes the IAEA to counter nuclear proliferation in the areas it wants to keep stable, most notably the Korean Peninsula. At the Board of Governors meeting of June 23 2017, Chinese ambassador Shi Zhongjun said: “China always stands for denuclearization and the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” (Shi, June 23 2017), meaning that China views the prevention of nuclear proliferation and international stability as closely intertwined, making the IAEA useful for China to foster stability. Secondly, the IAEA grants China influence as Deputy Director General Dazhu Yang is a Chinese national (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d. A). According to De Wijk (2019) China puts its nationals on leadership positions in IOs to increase its influence in the international order. Thus, China is willing to make large contributions to the IAEA (Epstein & Kerr, 2017) and benefits in return, flagging satisfaction with respect to this proxy.
33 Moreover, China's speeches reveal China’s commitment to solve the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran, which can be taken as signal of satisfaction for the proxy ‘relations with other states’, as China pressures two US adversaries to solve their nuclear situations (Appendix 3; Appendix 0). To conclude, the IAEA is a US-initiated IO which China supports in policy, rhetoric and practice and from which China benefits in terms of stability and
influence, indicating China's satisfaction.
Conclusion
This chapter examined what China's actions in three security IOs: The UN Security Council, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency, show about China's satisfaction, which in turn affects the prospects for a Sino-US war. The table below provides an overview of the results.
Proxies/IOs UN Security Council Shanghai Cooperation Organization International Atomic Energy Agency
Membership of IOs Satisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied
Adherence to international norms, rules or the dominant power’s ideology
Satisfied Neutral Satisfied
The amount of benefits gained from the current international order
Satisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied
Relations with other states
Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied
As the table shows, China's actions in these security IOs provide a very mixed picture but in general China leans towards satisfaction regarding this theme. This implies that in the security realm China's actions in IOs may slightly reduce the prospects for Sino-US conflict. There are three additional interesting insights to be derived from this chapter. Firstly, the fact that China is fine with participating in US-led security IOs operating on a global scale, as exemplified by the UNSC and IAEA, but wanted to create an IO on the regional level, the SCO, where the US was kept out of (Patrick, 2011), shows that China is especially expanding its regional influence. Secondly, China's relative satisfaction with the UNSC appears to depend partly on the UNSC's acknowledgement of China as a great power through the permanent seat and the
34 veto (Foot, 2014; Yu 2004). Thirdly, China's growing number of joint vetoes with Russia (Appendix 1) and China's role in initiating the SCO (Yuan, 2010) may indicate growing Chinese dissatisfaction over the past years. This chapter thereby confirms Rauch's (2016) claim that satisfaction operates on a scale, not a dichotomy. The next chapter is about the theme trade and economic cooperation.
