How can the diversity of private security company involvement in the public domain within
Europe be explained?
JELLE BOUWHUIS
MASTERTHESIS EUROPE: BORDERS
IDENTITIES AND GOVERNANCE
RADBOUD UNIVESITY NIJMEGEN
October 2018
II
Private security in
the public domain
Author: Jelle Bouwhuis
Student number: S4638654
Supervisor: prof. dr. H. van Houtum
Master thesis Europe: Borders identities and
governance (GPM)
Faculty of Management sciences
Radboud University Nijmegen
Title page image: Pexels free stock photos
How can the diversity of private
security company involvement in the
public domain within Europe be
explained?
III
Acknowledgements
In front of you lies the master-thesis ‘Private security in the public domain’. This thesis has been the final obstacle to breach in the process to graduating the master Europe: Borders identities and governance. This thesis gave me the opportunity to get involved in a specific topic that caught my attention since the start of the pre-master program 2016, namely: global safety and security. In my opinion global safety and security should be a necessity and not luxury.
The research was conducted over a period of six months, from November 2017 till April 2018 and gave me new insights to the security market as a whole and especially the private sector. From this period what will stay with me is that although being a commercial enterprise, private security companies are there to serve and protect society.
I would like to use this space to take the opportunity to thank Michiel de Weger for his experience, help and input during the process of establishing this research. In addition, I would like to thank the rest of the colleagues at G4S Risk consulting for giving me the opportunity to get an in-depth look into the workings of the private security sector. The Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) also deserves a special word. Thanks to Catharine Piana and Chantal Verlaet, I was able to distribute a European wide survey that really helped to confirm and readjust my findings. Finally, I would like to thank Henk van Houtum for his guidance, input and critical view on this research project.
Thank you, and for now, please enjoy reading. Jelle Bouwhuis
Amsterdam/ Best, October 2018
Disclaimer: The researcher cannot guarantee the correctness of the used material, and therefore does not accept liability for further use of this research.
IV
Abstract
Security has always been one of the top agenda items around the globe. However, over time, the focus on national security shifted. Instead of confrontations between international superpowers, the contemporary focus is found in a threat coming from non-state actors. Most threats to security these days emerge from international terrorism, religious extremism, radicalism and state collapse in northern-Africa and the middle-East (Bilandzic, 2014). The rise of these new security risks makes that national and local governments sometimes are overburdened with tasks to fulfil. This raises the attention for possibilities regarding cooperation between public and private security actors. In fact, a worldwide trend is already noticeable. In many counties worldwide, tasks which traditionally were undertaken by public law enforcement agencies are increasingly outsourced to private companies (Richards & Smith, 2007). However, in a national, as well as in an international context these developments face some challenges.
Where nationally, the debate is focused on the acceptance of private security involvement in the public domain, internationally the debate is mainly aimed at the lack of European regulations considering private security services are part of the free movement of services. Therefore, the overall objective of the thesis is focused on explaining the diversity in private security service provision between countries in Europe. The goal is to gain more understanding on how the contemporary private security sector is shaped and what this means in a European context. The research therefore is focussed on the public domain involvement of private security actors throughout Europe and has the following research objective:
How can the diversity of private security company involvement in the public domain within
Europe be explained?
To answer this question several techniques are used based on a mixed method approach. Desk research was used to gain a better insight into the overall security sector, a survey was used to explore the practical side of this research and statistical and empirical data was used for the final analysis. Using this mixed approach it was examined what variables potentially influence private security company involvement in the public domain and how this differs throughout Europe.
Based on the first evaluation of the sector, crime threats and fear, regulatory systems, public-private relations and government expenditures were determined the factors with a potential influence on public domain involvement. However, in trying to prove this, this turned out to be not entirely true. Where certain factors seem to indicate a direct influence on private security companies, for others it
V was not possible to find any direct relation. However, it can be suggested that variables interact with each other because of their common relation to the political arena. Still, must be kept in mind that private security involvement in the public domain is a very complex subject which can be looked at from many different angles. Therefore it is not possible to rule out every potential relation.
Nonetheless, it is possible to confirm certain relations. From this research we can derive that the main and foremost influencers on private security company involvement in the public domain are regulations and government attitude toward outsourcing traditional public law enforcement tasks. In every country the foundation for private security involvement in the public domain lies with the authorities national governments grant to private companies. Their attitude toward maintaining the monopoly on violence, maintaining their feeling of sovereignty and respecting democratic principles is what defines the extent to which private security companies can provide services in the public domain. Therefore this is also where the explanation for the diversity of private security company
involvement in the public domain in Europe lies. Underneath the question of diversity lays the
issue on what cannot, or should not, be privatized in the first place. The justification for such limits lies with national government institutions. They are the ones that need to regulate whether certain services can be executed by private entities in a legal, political and historical sense. Only when legal, political and historical circumstances align, local circumstances like the level of crime in combination law enforcement capacity problems and potentially economic variables can explain the diversity of private security company involvement in the public domain.VI
Table of content
Acknowledgements ... III Abstract ... IV List of tables and figures... VII
1. Introduction ... 1
1.1 Context ... 1
1.2 Relevance ... 2
1.3 Research objective and research questions ... 5
1.4 Thesis outline... 6
2. Sectoral insights... 7
2.1 Private security companies ... 7
2.2 Framing the public domain... 10
2.3 Magnitude of the sector ... 13
2.4 Regulatory systems ... 16
2.5 Motives ... 19
2.5.1 Crime, threats and fear ... 20
2.5.2 Public security provision ... 21
2.5.3 Public–private relations ... 22
2.6 Explanatory model... 24
3. Methodological approach ... 26
3.1 The research narrative ... 26
3.2 Data Collection ... 27
3.3 Data analysis ... 29
3.4 Limitations of the approach ... 31
4. Service provision in practice ... 33
4.1 Industry segmentation ... 33
4.2 Sectors and end-users ... 35
4.3 Services and activities ... 38
4.4 Classification and results ... 40
5. The practical reality ... 42
5.1 Crime and fear ... 42
5.2 Government regulations ... 49
5.3 Economics and expenditures ... 54
VII
6. Conclusion and discussion ... 60
6.1 Conclusion ... 60
6.2 Limitations and recommendations ... 64
Literature ... 67
Annexes ... 72
Annex A: League table on European regulation ... 72
Annex B: Survey ... 76
Annex C: Content evaluation results ... 84
Annex D: Classification and results ... 88
List of tables and figures
FIGURE 1.POLICE VERSUS PRIVATE SECURITY ... 15FIGURE 2.EXPLANATORY MODEL ... 24
FIGURE 3.CRIME STATISTICS ROBBERY, BURGLARY, THEFT AND DRUG OFFENCES (EUROSTAT,2017) ... 43
FIGURE 4.CRIME STATISTICS RAPE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE AND ASSAULT (EUROSTAT,2017) ... 44
FIGURE 5.PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS IN EUROPE (COESS,2015;COESS,2013;COESS,2011) ... 45
FIGURE 6.EUROPE: CRIME STATISTICS PER 100.000 INHABITANTS (EUROSTAT,2017)... 46
FIGURE 7.NUMBER OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS PER 100.000 INHABITANTS (COESS,2011;COESS,2013;COESS,2015; EUROSTAT,2018) ... 47
FIGURE 8.GDP PER CAPITA IN PURCHASING POWER STANDARDS AND THE NUMBER OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS PER 100.000 INHABITANTS (COESS,2011;COESS,2013;COESS,2015; EUROSTAT,2018) ... 54
FIGURE 9.GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY IN PERCENTAGE OF THE GDP IN EU MEMBER STATES IN 2015 (EUROSTAT,2018A) ... 55
FIGURE 10.PERCENTAGE OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON POLICE SERVICES BASED ON THEIR TOTAL EXPENDITURES AND THE AMOUNT OF PRIVATE OFFICERS PER 100.000 INHABITANTS (EUROSTAT,2018A;COESS,2011;COESS,2013;COESS, 2015) ... 57
FIGURE 11.THE EXPLANATORY MODEL REVISED ... 58
TABLE 1.RELATIVE SIZE OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR PER COUNTRY IN 2015(COESS,2015;EUROSTAT,2018;EUROSTAT, 2017). ... 14
TABLE 2.TOTAL SCORE LEAGUE TABLE (BUTTON &STIERNSTEDT,2016) ... 18
TABLE 3.SECTOR DIVISION OF INDUSTRY SEGMENTS (ECORYS,2015) ... 35
TABLE 4END-USERS PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (ECORYS,2015;G4S,2018;SECURITAS,2018;PROSEGUR, 2016) ... 37
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1. Introduction
‘’ The development of the knowledge base in security science depends on its advancement as a discipline, and the extent of interaction between academia and professional practitioners of the security industry. The knowledge base for the emerging discipline of security will be enhanced by ongoing research both in the fundamental context of theory development and the applied context of asset protection. It is necessary for government, academia, and the commercial security industry to contribute to this knowledge base’’.
- Clifton L. Smith and David Jonathan Brooks, 2013
The above-mentioned quotation was written for a publication called ‘Security Science, The Theory and Practice of Security’. Smith and Brooks, with this quotation, capture how relatively immature security science is as a discipline and that the knowledge base is still emerging. While security and protection have been around since the beginning of humankind, research on the current private industry is relatively young. Where on the one hand this means many concepts are open for research, it also means the research base is limited. Nonetheless, like Smith and Brooks mention, the discipline will only progress by continuing doing research and collaboration of all participants in the field.
1.1 Context
Security has always been one of the top agenda items around the globe. However, over time, the focus on national security shifted. Instead of confrontations between international superpowers, the contemporary focus is found in a threat coming from non-state actors. Most threats to security these days emerge from international terrorism, religious extremism, radicalism and state collapse in northern-Africa and the middle-East (Bilandzic, 2014). The rise of new security risks makes that national and local governments sometimes are overburdened with tasks to fulfil. For instance, in the Netherlands, both the police and the Royal Dutch Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) are having capacity problems dealing with the currently raised threat on security (Groothedde, Lardenoye, Nieuwenhuizen, de Zeeuw, Schilderpoort, & Harte, 2016). Therefore, the attention for possibilities regarding cooperation between public and private actors grows. At this point in many counties worldwide, tasks which traditionally were undertaken by public law enforcement agencies are increasingly outsourced to private companies (Richards & Smith, 2007). According to Button and Stiernstedt, popular functions for private security companies nowadays include security at major public places, security at places critical to national infrastructure, monitoring prisoners, guarding crime scenes and even taking part in police investigations (Button & Stiernstedt, 2017).
2 In this context, actors outside of the traditional law enforcement agencies thus have become increasingly active in society as a maintainer of order. As a result, whether desired or not, this changed the monopoly position of the police being the predominant provider of public security (McLaughlin, 2007). Therefore, in order to regulate the sector one would expect both national and international governments would have regulations in place to regulate private security service provision in the public domain. And indeed on a national level, in most countries, the private security sector is regulated. However, on a European level, the sector is mostly regulated by sector initiated non-binding documents. The result is that international regulations remain vague and are even contradicting. To be more specific, the national orientated character of the private security sector is highly contradicting one of the main principles of the European Union.
Till this day the European institutions in place have been unable to intervene in this matter and set minimum standards on private security regulation. The CoESS, almost fourteen years back, argued that the specific nature of private security services, in particular, its close links to the issue of public security are a sensitive subject (CoESS, UNI-Europe, 2003). Nonetheless, how come that till this day, in a period of time where we have never been freer to cross the European internal borders, international service provision is still an issue?
1.2 Relevance
Scientific relevanceRecent events have shown us that threats to the EU vary heavily and became increasingly international and fluid. These threats include, but are certainly not limited to organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime and irregular migration. In the globalised world we live in today, with endless communication possibilities and relatively easy cross-border travel, these threats have become increasingly difficult to foil (HM Government, 2017). This in combination with the knowledge that government institutions are not able to resolve all problems raises the attention for possibilities regarding the role of private security companies in the public domain (Van Motfort, van den Brink, Schulz, & Maalsté, 2012).
Although there are substantial differences between the public and private security actors, both actors are involved in social control and the prevention of crime, disturbances and the sense of insecurity. The differences are argued to be found in that for public actors such as the police, societal issues are their main concern, while for private actors it is a commercial interest. Still, being commercially orientated does not necessarily mean these companies are not aware of their
3 responsibility to society (Bervoets & Eijgenraam, 2014). Actually, from a theoretical point of view, the involvement of private security actors in the public domain should create an extra value in threat evaluation. Private security companies typically gain their information from their clients, which may be unavailable to government authorities. By combining the knowledge from private firms with government information it seems plausible that more insights can be gained (van Buuren & den Boer, 2009). Having said that, still, there are concerns regarding the deployment of private security companies in the public domain. It is argued that the work field gets too complex and cluttered, resulting in a situation in which obstacles may occur (Sparrow, 2014). These concerns come from the assumption that profit-driven organisations like private security firms will rarely do activities that do not compromise with profit-driven goals. Besides, law enforcement authorities will be dealing with non-governmental staff handling tasks which are seen as government responsibilities (den Boer, Bosma, de Graaf, Horrevorts, van Lunteren, & Stolwijk, 2007).
Still, in the eyes of Max Weber the state is the institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and although the state may outsource its force, it is still the owner (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011). However, the current presence of private security in society, providing traditional law enforcement tasks cannot be ignored. Aside from a few studies from amongst others Terpstra, Van Stokkom and Spreeuwers and the European Journal on Policing Studies, international comparative research is relatively scarce. The result is that the general statements on private security involvement in the public domain remain undisputable (Devroe & Terwel, 2015). The lack of international comparisons has led to a point in which explanatory models only discuss the theoretical forms of plural policing and legislative measures and not focus on concrete service provision in the public domain. Therefore this thesis aims to fill the existing knowledge gap. An international comparison of the contemporary private security sector in relation to traditional law enforcement agency tasks serves as an attempt to understand the complexity of the sector.
Societal relevance
The second relevant debate regarding the private security industry can be found in a more international perspective. As stated, till this day the European institutions in place have been unable to set minimum standards on private security service provision (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016). This, however, seems fairly strange since the fact that the court of justice of the European Union mentioned that private security companies are seen as no different as any other service provider in the internal market (Born, Caparini, & Cole, 2007). Meaning that private security services are considered an economic sector of the EU and therefore are part of the single market structure based on the assumption of free movement of labour, undertakings, and services.
4 Therefore, with the lack of international regulation, it is argued that the international position of the market appears to be problematic. In the current situation with private security services being closely linked to key tasks of the state, many states apply sector-specific legislation on private security service provision. These national orientated standards created barriers for the cross-border operation of private security companies in Europe and in a certain sense seem to undermine the treaty of Rome (Loxa & Siagkou, 2016).
Looking at the main motives for countries to have their own standards on private security service provision, the debate shifts to the judicial and cultural differences between countries. It is argued that by enabling free movement of the sector, this would create a situation in which it would be possible for companies from countries with fewer standards to move to countries with higher standards and thereby undercut security providers already present in a country (Button, 2007). Button even mentions, that for the sector, opening up the borders for private security companies is undesirable because the purpose of private security is interpreted differently across the EU. In some countries in EU, for example, security guards are armed with firearms and/or non-lethal weapons emphasizing an assisting function to public law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, some Member States see the private security sector just as a preventive mean designed to keep undesirable criminal behaviour from occurring (Button, 2007).
Still, with these differences in mind, a number of states even have been found to not be sufficient with the single market regulations in their legislation on private security service provision. Amongst others countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Hungary have been made aware by the European court that they needed to enhance their regulatory system in order to not undermine one of the general principles of the European Union; the free movement of persons, goods and services (Button & Stiernstedt, 2017).
Although these interventions took place, still, there is no European regulation on private security service provision and currently there is a wide variety of national regulatory systems throughout Europe. This thesis will aim to provide insight into the rationale behind this diversity and how this diversity of regulatory systems relates to practice.
5
1.3 Research objective and research questions
The aim of this research is to capture the essence of two debates. On the one hand, a debate which is mostly conducted on the national level and on the other hand a debate that is conducted on a European level. Nationally, the debate is focused on private security involvement in the public domain, while internationally the debate is mainly aimed at the lack of European regulations considering private security being part of the single market. The overall objective of the thesis therefore will be focused on explaining the diversity in private security service provision between countries in Europe. The goal thus is to gain more understanding on how the contemporary private security sector is shaped and what this means in a European context. Keeping in mind the debate on private security performing traditional public tasks, the analysis will focus on the public domain involvement of private security actors in Europe. Therefore the main question of this thesis is:
How can the diversity of private security company involvement in the public domain within
Europe be explained?
The main research question is supported by a number of sub-questions. These serve as an additional tool to answer the main research question and assess whether private security company involvement in the public domain can be explained. First, of course, it is important to get a clear understanding of the contemporary private security sector. Therefore, the first question is designed to provide insight into what is actually meant by private security, what the size of this sector is and what its proportions are regarding the deployment of private security officers in Europe.
I. How is the private security sector currently arranged in terms of meaning and proportions?
Concerning the second question, being a relatively young and under-researched topic, no standard definitions are formulated and therefore need to be defined along the way. Focussing on private security services in the public domain, it is important to get a clear understanding of what the public domain is. For this reason, the dominant theories of the public domain will be deconstructed. Therefore the second sub-question is:
6 Third, before making any kind of comparison, in order to explain the differences between countries, it is important that it becomes clear why private security companies operate in the public domain in the first place. Therefore the third sub-question will go in-depth on the motives for private security companies to operate in the public domain in the first place.
III. What are the motives for private security companies to be active in the public domain?
Having identified how the sector is shaped and what potential motives are, the next step is to actually measure whether the national regulatory differences as argued are visible in practice. Therefore the fourth question is focussed on comparing offer of private security services in the public domain between countries.
IV. To what extent are the national differences in private service provision in the public domain visible in practice?
Finally, after examining how the national differences are visible in practice, the aim is to find out what the origin of these differences is, and thus why it is probably so difficult to generate European regulations. Therefore, the last sub-question is:
V. Where lays the origin of the current diversity in private security service provision in the public domain?
1.4 Thesis outline
This first part of the thesis provided an introduction in terms of its relevance, aims and questions that structure the research. In the following chapter, attention will be paid to the construction of the sector and the relevant theoretical debates which serve as a framework for the remaining thesis. Chapter three describes the methodology used and why certain choices are made during the process. Following, chapter four aims to examine the practical side of the private security sector and come up with practice-related prove of diversity within the sector in Europe. Chapter five will then outline the framework as stated previously by examining multiple statements through statistical and empirical data. Finally, chapter six presents the conclusion to the questions mentioned in this introductory chapter.
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2. Sectoral insights
Security science is a rising discipline that is developing its own structures of knowledge within its domain (Smith & Brooks, 2013). Although discipline-specific theories are developed, many theories from other disciplines are adopted. It is therefore argued that security science is in its formative phase and is evolving into an accepted science. However, it is not only security science in general that is in its formative phase. The private security industry is also seen as a relatively young discipline. It has not been long since the private security sector has been acknowledged as a sector for commercial security in actions against global security threats, national security concerns and local community safety needs (Smith & Brooks, 2013).
Being a relatively young discipline makes that the private security sector is not easy to define and quantify. This chapter focusses on defining and explaining the meaning and scope of private security companies in the public domain. The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical insight into the notion of private security companies in the public domain and relevant variables to this matter.
2.1 Private security companies
In order to gain a profound understanding of the sector, it is important to understand the notion of private security companies. Starting with the term security itself, this is a diverse and cross-disciplined term and therefore lacks a clear definition. Defining security thus is all about understanding why it is such a diverse term used in so many circumstances. Smith and Brooks therefore emphasize that:
‘’Security is a human characteristic that is objective, perceived, expected, and demanded by people in many different forms. It is perhaps one concept that over many decades has not changed in its original use; rather, it has become more broadly used to encompass greater and more diverse meaning’’ (Smith & Brooks, 2013).
For example, to a certain degree, everybody has concerns about either their own well-being or the well-being of others. This suggests that security is related to an emotional appeal. On the other hand, words such as national security, human security and global security are terms used to mobilise political support. This imposes that the understanding of security thus is always context related (Smith & Brooks, 2013). It is therefore important to consider this when proceeding in private security-related matters.
8 Focussing on private security companies, it is argued that security is a multi-dimensional concept. In practice, society often refers to private security as the security guards patrolling a local warehouse or the in-store security guards at the supermarket. This according to George and Kimber, however, is best described as the ‘public facing’ of private security. The reality points out that the sector is way more global and complex (George & Kimber, 2014). In fact, just like the general definition of security, there is no harmonised definition of private security companies (Loxa & Siagkou, 2016). Due to the fact that security services are regulated nationally the definition differs amongst European States, resulting in an endless list of possible definitions. However, one possible distinction that can be made, is the distinction between ‘private security company’ (PSC) and ‘private military company’ (PMC) (Carmola, 2010). While these terms are often used interchangeably, Holmqvist describes the distinction between ‘private military companies’ (PMCs) and ‘private security companies’ (PSCs) is based on the tasks they perform. She states that ‘PMCs are defined as private companies providing offensive services, designed to have a military impact, whereas PSC is taken to refer to companies offering defensive services, intended mainly to protect individuals and property’ (Holmqvist, 2005). An even clearer distinction of these companies, based on their activities, comes from Richards and Smith. Based on Brooks his UK green paper they established a broad definition of the activities these companies perform. Private security companies according to them provide services mostly related to industrial/commercial site protection, humanitarian aid protection, embassy/mission protection, VIP/close protection, surveillance and investigation and risk assessment and analysis. Private military security companies, on the other hand, tend to focus more on military training, military intelligence, and offensive combat (Richards & Smith, 2007).
Delving deeper into the meaning of private security companies, it becomes clear that over the last decades multiple theories have been developed on private security and policing. One of them, and probably the most influential, is the one that explains the role of private security as one which emphasizes the connection of private security with state efforts to reduce crime and disorder and decrease costs for the state. Private security in this sense is often given high importance implying private security is almost as important as important as police. Nonetheless, another theory emphasizes private security as a mean to reduce the costs of public policing. This theory legitimizes private security by its financial impacts underlining that tasks traditionally performed by the police are transferred to private security companies, resulting in lower costs for the state (Sotlar & Meško, 2009).
9 These two types of theories each emphasise another main purpose for private security companies and depending on the period in time, both theories have viable concepts. Despite these different perspectives various authors claim to have found the meaning of private security. One of these definitions dates back to 1975. In 1975 Wildhorn states that private security companies are ‘’all types of private organisations and individuals providing all types of security-related services’’ (Wildhorn, 1975). However, this definition is fairly broad and leaves us with many questions unanswered. Who or what are these types of organisations and individuals? And what are the services provided? Another definition by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) partly answers these questions. They define private security as ‘’the nongovernmental, private-sector practice of protecting people, property, and information, conducting investigations, and otherwise safeguarding an organization‘s assets’’ (ASIS Foundation, 2009). Despite being clearer than Wildhorn his definition, the comprehensive character of this definition still might not cover the full extent of private security companies.
What the definitions above have in common is that they either direct or indirect refer to PSC’s being nongovernmental and involved in the protection of individuals or property. Still, there is not one definition that is relatable to all companies. Therefore, in this research, the description of the security sector as a whole will be used. The U.S. Department of Justice describes the private security sector as
‘’A wide range of organizations specialised in security, where the personnel hired can be armed or unarmed, can be employed as either in-house or contract employees and can have different powers, depending on where they work and what duties they fulfil’’ (Storm, et al., 2010).
While still this definition is very broad and does not provide all the answers, the strong aspect of this definition is that it indicates that there are multiple variables that must be taken into account when referring to a private security company or the sector.
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2.2 Framing the public domain
Since the scope of this research is located in the public domain it is highly important to gain a clear understanding of this concept. When exploring the ontology of the public domain there are basically two major academic disciplines. One can be considered as the spatial discipline which includes architecture, planning and geography. The second is considered to be the social sciences, which includes disciplines like sociology and political science. Where spatial disciplines focus mainly on the physical interaction between individuals in open spaces, in social disciplines the focus seems to be at the public sphere as a participatory space for individuals to steer government's laws and policies. Nonetheless, despite the differences between these disciplines, similarities can be found.
To find an answer to what distinguishes the public domain from the private we need to understand the very basics. One of the first philosophers that conceptualised the foundations for the principles of our contemporary conception of the public domain is Jürgen Habermas. In his dissertation, published in 1962, called Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit:Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, or translated The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere – An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, he describes the public sphere as the ‘’sphere that may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public’’. Thereby he refers to public as areas of common use where the interaction between private individuals takes place (Habermas, 1991). The public sphere as described by Habermas is an idealistic freely accessible space localized in for example coffeehouses and salons. He creates an image of the public sphere as an autonomous space, separated from economics and the state, in which civilians are in dialogue with each other (Habermas, 1991). Although, Habermas also describes the social breakdown of the early-modern European public sphere he left us with some fundamentals for the notion of the contemporary public domain. His understanding of the public sphere as a space which is shared and in which interactions between individuals take place is still applicable to the contemporary philosophy of the public domain.
Also in the planning and geography discipline, although not mentioned directly, Habermas his philosophy is still noticeable. For example, Parkinson (2012), drawing upon the literature from Dewey (1924), Arendt (1958), Waldron (1988), and Geuss (2001), describes a very broad definition of what he refers to as public. He defines public space by a quote of Guess, which says public places are places where ‘’everything that happens can be observed by anyone, where strangers are encountered whether one wants to or not, because everyone has free right of entry’’ (Guess, 2001; Parkinson, 2012). This, in a sense, is relatable to what Habermas mentions as a space which is shared and in
11 which interactions between individuals take place. However, the difference is that Parkinson refers to spaces in the essence of a physical place, whereas in Habermas his theory, space or sphere can be interpreted as a societal infrastructure.
Looking at Parkinson his interpretation of what is public, his definition faces several dilemmas. The criteria mentioned by Parkinson do not necessarily relate to only public places, but are also relatable to certain privately owned spaces. Some privately owned spaces can be in fact really open to the public, while some publicly owned places are more closed. Privately owned spaces like shops in a shopping centre are privately owned but have a really open character. While on the other hand, collective facilities like government buildings can have a very private character (Parkinson, 2012).
In trying to define more concrete boundaries the UN provided the Global Public Space Toolkit. In this toolkit, the UN focusses on making a spatial divide between public and private by dividing public space into three categories of physical space (Garau, 2015). First, they distinguish the streets as public spaces. By the streets they refer to public space in the sense of boulevards, squares and plazas, pavements, passages and galleries and bicycle paths, which according to the UN is public space at ‘fullest sense’, because everything is publicly owned and maintained and is accessible to everyone at all times (Garau, 2015). The second category distinguished is public open spaces, referring to urban features used on a daily base. Examples of these spaces are parks, playgrounds, public beaches riverbanks and waterfronts. Although showing a lot of similarities to the first category, it is argued that while these spaces are publicly owned and maintained, they may not be accessible at all times (Garau, 2015). The third category of physical spaces refers to what they call public urban facilities. Characteristics of this category are that these are high-maintenance public spaces which are publicly owned and maintained and are accessible free of charge. Examples are: public libraries, civic/community centres, municipal markets and public sports facilities (Garau, 2015). While being a relatively detailed description of categories, still it does not cover the whole field and leaves a gap on whether to include for example publicly owned facilities with a private character as part of the public domain. This confusion on what can be seen as part of the public domain is directly relatable to privatisation. Multiple scholars argue that is no longer possible to even speak about only private or only public places. They argue that boundaries fade and that there are no longer clear-cut distinctions between the two. In addition, Hajer and Reijndorp argue that the public domain is so much more than just the public space. They mention the public domain is not the physical space only, but is also about the experience between people. The experience of interaction between people with different backgrounds and interests is also part of what makes something part of the public domain (Hajer & Reijndorp, 2001).
12 Part of the discourse on what is public and what can be considered as private lies within the perception of the concept. On the one hand, the public domain is conceived as all open spaces which are accessible to anyone at all times, while on the other hand the notion of the public domain is interpreted as publicly owned and therefore is part of the common good (Parkinson, 2012). Having explored the very broad definition of the public domain still, no single definition seems to cover the interests of this research. Therefore, based upon these understandings from both the sociological and spatial disciplines, a sector-specific demarcation is desirable.
Referring back to the definition of private security, traditionally clients for private security services are non-governmental organisations that need protection for non-governmental property or individuals. Public security, on the other hand, is described as “the function of governments which ensures the protection of citizens, organizations, and institutions against threats to their well-being – and to the prosperity of their communities’’ (DRDC, 2013). The distinction these two definitions make is that private refers to serving the non-governmental sector, while public refers to a government service serving the community. This exact distinction, however, is no longer obvious. Increasingly, public and private security actors voluntarily cooperate to reduce crime and other security-related issues in the public domain. This makes that public and private security actors have a shared responsibility when it comes to securing the public domain (van Rooij, 2017). Focussing on private security service provision in the public domain, this research will make use of the following definition to indicate private security services in the public domain:
‘Private security services in the public domain are services executed by private authorities, that serve a communal goal by protecting citizens, property, a public good, commons goods or collective goods, mostly in public places to which the public has access by right or by invitation, whether by payment of money or not, either during limited opening hours or at all times’ (USLegal, 2016).
This definition is different from the others because it covers 1) the kind of authority involved, 2) the goal of organisations involved and 3) what is considered to be public. However, when reading this as a stand-alone definition, the terms public good, commons goods and collective goods raise questions. While these three terms all seem relatively the same, there is a difference. Farnham describes these differences by the hand of rivalry and excludability. According to him, public goods are non-rival and non-excludable, collective goods are non-rival but excludable and common goods are non-excludable but rival. However, it should be noted that the level of use of a good affects
13 rivalry. For example, as Farnham describes, an empty road is non-rival, but in a traffic jam the road becomes congested and other people’s use influences your use (Farnham, N.D.). Excludability, on the other hand, can be explained through wealth. Where the road we described may be vulnerable to rivalry, when one does not have the means to utilize any means of transport one can be excluded. Still, infrastructure for example, can be seen as a publicly utilizable good. Despite these remarks, it is important to note that although this definition might be one which can raise questions it is comprehensive includes the aspects important for making a distinction between public and private.
Additionally, this definition indicates that the public domain is not limited to outdoor places such as streets, boulevards, squares and plazas and pavements, but also includes non-privately owned spaces that serve a communal task. Still, for the implementation of this definition, in this research physical space is the main aspect. Based on this definition, chapter 5 further elaborates on the segmentation of the private security sector.
2.3 Magnitude of the sector
Both the introduction and the previous paragraph already mentioned the relation regarding private security companies and the public domain. However, it remains relatively vague what the impact and significance of the sector is when it comes to the public domain. Therefore an explanation of the size of the sector is in place. Nonetheless, measuring the size of the private security sector is a bit problematic. Due to the fact that the industry is not clearly defined the industry knows a large variety of niche markets and services. This together with the fact that it is hard to make an accurate classification leaves us with the assumptions made by other parties. One of the earliest extensive studies on the size of the security sector comes from de Waard (1999). However, the numbers formulated in this research are no longer accurate. Currently, the most recent document on the size of the European private security sector comes from the CoESS. Their facts and figures document contains numbers on active private security personnel in European countries. Despite being from 2015 these are the most recent numbers available. In order to give a representative image of the sector, instead of just showing the numbers, table 1 shows multiple ratio’s to indicate the relative size of the sector per country. First, the private guard- inhabitant ratio resembles the number of individuals per private security officer. Second the police- inhabitant ratio to indicate how much enforcement authorities are already in place. Third, the private guard- police ratio indicates the number of private security officers in relation to the number of police officers in a country.
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Table 1. Relative size of the private security sector per country in 2015 (CoESS, 2015; Eurostat, 2018; Eurostat, 2017).
P o p u latio n P o lic e o ff ice rs Se cu ri ty p e rs o n n el Rat io se cur it y / p o p u latio n Rat io p o lic e / po p u latio n Ratio se cu ri ty / p o lic e Pr iv ate v s. p u b lic cl ie n ts Austria 8.584.926 27.957 12.259** 1/700 1/307 1/2,3 : Belgium 11.237.274 38.437 18.000 1/624 1/292 1/2,1 81% Bulgaria 7.202.198 22.465 123.000 1/59 1/321 1/0,2 45% Croatia 4.225.316 20.687 14.538 1/291 1/204 1/1,4 50% Cyprus 847.008 4.922 1.700** 1/498 1/172 1/2,9 : Czech Republic 10.538.275 39.768 44.997 1/234 1/265 1/0,9 : Denmark 5.659.715 10.533 5.000** 1/1132 1/537 1/2,1 : Estonia 1.314.870 3.916 13.234 1/99 1/336 1/0,3 : Finland 5.471.753 7.691 9.000 1/608 1/711 1/0,9 : France 66.456.279 214.095 160.400 1/414 1/310 1/1,3 75% Germany 81.197.537 245.072* 246.903 1/329 1/331 1/1,0 72% Greece 10.858.018 51.887 32.000 1/339 1/209 1/1,6 50% Hungary 9.855.571 8.897 10.020 1/984 1/1108 1/0,9 : Italy 60.795.612 273.341 41.000 1/1483 1/222 1/6,7 : Latvia 1.986.096 8.758 21.500** 1/92 1/227 1/0,4 : Lithuania 2.921.262 8.915 11.000** 1/266 1/328 1/0,8 : Luxembourg 562.958 1.804 3.200 1/176 1/312 1/0,6 70% Macedonia 2.069.172 10.792** 2.878** 1/719 1/192 1/3,7 : Malta 439.691 2.162 3.604** 1/122 1/203 1/0,6 : Netherlands 16.900.726 50.509 27.928 1/605 1/335 1/1,8 : Norway 5.166.493 8.603** 11.000 1/470 1/601 1/0,8 : Poland 38.005.614 98.892 250.000** 1/152 1/384 1/0,4 : Portugal 10.374.822 46.852 37.104 1/280 1/221 1/1,3 80% Romania 19.870.647 52.302 91.586 1/217 1/380 1/0,6 : Serbia 7.114.393 42.426 26.000 1/274 1/168 1/1,6 60% Slovakia 5.421.349 22.401 23.000 1/236 1/242 1/1,0 : Slovenia 2.062.874 6.827 6.551 1/315 1/302 1/1,0 60% Spain 46.449.565 169.821 78.200 1/594 1/274 1/2,2 82% Sweden 9.747.355 19.903 20.000** 1/487 1/490 1/1,0 : Switzerland 8.237.666 18.150 20.000 1/412 1/454 1/0,9 70% Turkey 77.695.904 377.931*** 321.558 1/242 1/206 1/1,2 64% United Kingdom 64.875.165 141.327 231.680 1/280 1/459 1/0,6 : Total 604.146.104 2.058.043 1.918.840 1/315 1/294 1/1,1 : * Figures from 2014 **Figures from 2013 ***Figures from 2012
15 While table 1 includes the most recent numbers on private security personnel, unfortunately, these were from 2015. Therefore both population numbers and the number of police officers in a country also come from 2015, if not labelled differently.
By not showing only the amount of security officers in a country, but these ratios, the numbers are much more comparable. Looking at the extremes, these can be found in Spain, Macedonia, the United Kingdom and Poland. Spain, for example, has a relative small security force compared to its police force. With a security – police ratio of 1 security guard to 2,2 police officers, Spain has more than double the number of police officers in relation to security guards compared to the average. The same however applies to Macedonia which is more than three times above the average ratio of security guards in relation to police officers. On the other side of the spectrum are the United Kingdom and Poland. With security guard – police ratios of 1/0,6 and 1/0,4 these countries have a relatively big private security force. Figure 1 visualises these ratios in a map of the countries included.
Table 1 and figure 1 show there is much divergence between European countries when it comes to public versus private security actors. Van Buuren and den Boer claim it is possible to place European
Belgium
Cyprus Slovakia
Macedonia
16 countries into multiple major categories when comparing the number of public forces and private agents (van Buuren & den Boer, 2009).
Countries having more private agents than public officers: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom.
Countries having more or less identical numbers of private agents and public officers: Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland.
Countries having less private agents than public officers: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and Turkey
Remarkable about this categorisation is that there is a minor geographical distinction to make. Looking at the countries having more private agents than public officers, besides from the U.K., Norway, Malta and Luxembourg, all countries included are referred to as Eastern European countries. A similar distinction can be made for the countries having less private agents than public officers. Besides from Turkey, Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia the countries included are mostly referred to as the Western European countries. Aside from the geographical distinction, the categories, as mentioned by van Buuren and den Boer, indirectly suggest possible cultural differences between countries. When the security force is bigger than the police force there are two explanations possible. First, it is possible that the larger the private security force in relation to the police force the more likely it is these countries lean towards a more neoliberalist model in favour of free-market capitalism and privatization. Secondly, it is possible that the security industry in a country is so large because of a lack of public security. In this case, private security is often hired by individuals or companies to secure their assets. The opposite can be said for countries where there are less private agents than public officers. These assumptions, however, can only be validated by doing more specific case research.
2.4 Regulatory systems
As elaborated in previously the public domain knows many approaches and the meaning can differ depending on the perspective. However, when referring to public, often the government is involved. Therefore this paragraph elaborates the regulatory systems in place based on the most recent evaluations.
As mentioned, despite Europe being a single market based on the assumption of free movement of labour, undertakings, and services, security services are regulated nationally and therefore differ throughout Europe (Button & Stiernstedt, 2017). Currently, on a European level, little to no
17 regulation exists regarding private security companies and in most cases the sector depends on self-regulation and non-binding initiatives. Only a few types of private security services are regulated by European regulations. Regulation (EC) 300/2008 sets out the rules in the field of aviation security. The document was established to lay down common rules and basic standards on aviation security. While the document does not specifically aim at private security companies, it lays down the standards for security guards in the aviation sector. Also, a less binding document was established by UNI-Europa and the CoESS. These two organisations have managed to promote a minimum level of standards for the private security sector in 2003 and thereby created the ‘Code of conduct and ethics for the private security sector’. This document, according to UNI-Europe and the CoESS, contains the fundamental conditions for guaranteeing the minimum necessary degree of professionalism (CoESS, UNI-Europe, 2003). Besides these two documents, relatively little to no European regulations are in place for the private security sector.
However, nationally every country has its own regulations and policies. One of the most recent inventory systems of European regulations on private security comes from Button and Stiernstedt (2016a). The authors created a league table showing the criteria and score for the EU Member states. The purpose of the league table according to the authors is to provide an insight into the current state of private security regulation in European member States. They realised this by identifying a series of questions relevant to the subject, and ascribing a relative weight to each question. The questions used to examine the regulations concerning private security regulation in European Member States is based on several documents. Button and Stiernstedt used the 2014 UN Handbook on state regulation concerning civilian private security services, the CoESS Facts & Figures document, the ECORYS report on security regulation and the article Assessing the regulation of private security across Europe by Button as their main guidelines to formulate their questions (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016).
The total amount of points a country can receive is 100. However, there is a division. Legislation represents 58 of the total points and societal foundation represents 42 points. By legislation Button and Stiernstedt mean the aspects that directly penetrate to the actual national legislative framework, the societal foundation, on the other hand, is mentioned to be the direct or indirect consequences of the implementation of that legislation into society. The higher the total score the more narrowly regulations are defined in a country. Table 2 shows the countries analysed by Button and Stiernstedt. The European countries not included in table 2, unfortunately, were not analysed by Button and Stiernstedt, possibly due to insufficient data. Annex A contains the overall table and the criteria for measurement (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016).
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Table 2. Total score league table (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016)
EU Member State Total score EU Member State Total score
Belgium 94 Netherlands 62 Spain 92 Estonia 62 Slovenia 82 Poland 60 Greece 80 Denmark 58 Sweden 78 Latvia 56 Portugal 78 Bulgaria 56
Finland 69 United Kingdom 54
Romania 68 Slovakia 50
Luxembourg 68 Italy 46
Germany 66 Cyprus 42
Malta 65 Lithuania 42
France 64 Austria 40
When looking at the total scores it is clear that there are large differences between the scores of each country. For the countries mentioned in table 2, the average score is 62, with a rounded standard deviation of 17. Assuming a normal distribution, the countries outside the normal distribution can be considered the countries outside the range of the average plus one standard deviation. This presents us with a range between 79 and 45 points. Top performers thus are Belgium, Spain, Slovenia and Greece with 94, 92, 82 and 80 points, while Cyprus, Lithuania and Austria seem to fall behind with 42, 42 and 40 points.
First, when referring to the criteria in the league table in Annex A, Button and Stiernstedt mention that the amount of mandatory training addresses the proficiency and efficacy of security personnel. Based upon the CoESS European Training Manual for a Security, the minimum training effort security personnel is 120 hours. However, only a handful of countries comply with this standard. Romania, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands meet this standard. The rest of the counties do not meet this standard. The second point coming forth out of the league table in Annex A, addresses the complexity of the implementation of regulations. Button and Stiernstedt mention that due to the division of regulation in Europe it is necessary EU institutions address this situation and harmonise regulation. They argue that harmonisation of regulation will benefit the social effects, not necessarily by resolving discourses, but as a benefit to the overall security European citizens (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016).
19 Third and finally, Button and Stiernstedt argue that of the wide range of regulations in Europe is partly a caused by the enormous growth of the sector over the last decades. They argue that an effective regulatory system needs to be in place, because of the growing nature of the sector, and the increasing trend of private security companies fulfilling public tasks. Regulation according to them needs to pay more attention to sensitive areas such as data protection and the use of violence. Main challenge according to them is to incorporate EU institutions considering it concerns the ambition to secure European citizens (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016).
The most important findings from the league table are that there are significant differences between national legislation in the European Member States. Different legislation means different potentials and different risks. For example, a country with relatively little legislation can encounter the advantage of ‘limitless’ possibilities for private security companies to operate within the Member State, on the other hand, a lack of legislation can be restrictive due to the fact that nothing is defined. This can result in severe risks to national security and can potentially harm civilians. However, until this point, it is unclear how to proceed in this matter. Where one says a supranational EU regulatory system on private security is the solution, others argue this will contravene with the sovereignty of the Member States (Button & Stiernstedt, 2017). Pending on the stance one has regarding the unification of private security legislation, still it should be noted that legislative reforms, especially the creation of a supranational legislative system, are not a simple task. Therefore a more realistic approach to the unification of private security legislation, according to Button and Stiernstedt, would be setting minimum standards for all member states. However, still this will be a long and extensive process. Thus, for now, it is argued that, if preferred, further unification of private security legislation comes down to the sector itself. Non-binding documents such as the ‘Code of conduct and ethics for the private security sector’ will have the primary role in the process (Button & Stiernstedt, 2017).
2.5 Motives
It is clear that the contemporary private security sector is complex, and knows a lot of diversity within Europe. Nevertheless, it seems like there is an increasing demand for private security, especially seen the increase in security personnel over the last decades (CoESS, 2013). Smith and Brooks argue there are multiple reasons why the demand for private security increased over the last decades. They mention the following factors attributed to this growth:
• The general increase in the fear of threats;
• The reduction in the public provision of services by nation-states;
20 However, rather than seeing this as reasons for growth they can also be seen as motives for private security involvement in the public domain.
2.5.1 Crime, threats and fear
The current president of the European Council Donald Tusk released an open letter starting with "United we stand, divided we fall" on January 31st of 2017. In this letter, he describes that the challenges currently facing Europe are far more dangerous then since the establishment of the Treaty of Rome. President Tusk describes three threats, that according to him Europe is dealing with today. First, he mentions the external threat related to the current geopolitical situation on the continents surrounding Europe. An assertive China, aggressive Russian policies, wars, terror, anarchy in the Middle East and Northern African region and the new American administration are the main concerns according to him. Second, mister Tusk refers to the rise of nationalism and xenophobic sentiment as an alternative egoism to integration. Third, he addresses the decline in faith for a European integration and the rise of populist movements (Tusk, 2017). Although these threats, as described by Donald Tusk, do not immediately translate into roles for private security companies in Europe, it does give an indication of security concerns at a European level.
Although the treats mentioned by Donald Tusk are treats on a European level, many scholars have connected the increasing presence of private security to a lack of safety and insecurity. More than that, the lack of safety and insecurity is considered to be a common factor in western society (Bauman, 2000). Europeans, from this perspective, live in a culture of fear that currently seems to increasingly worry about their safety, which seems odd, because historically seen Europeans have been relatively safe. So where do these feelings come from? Van Steden, in his book ‘Privatizing Policing’, explains this phenomenon by the hand of Giddens his ‘Consensus of Modernity’ (van Steden, 2007). He describes that Giddens argues that living in the western world has two sides. On the one hand, the inhabitants of the west have relatively greater opportunities than ever before to create their own lives. In principle one is free to do as they please with little restrictions to social structures such as social bonds, religion or family. On the other hand, the price to pay is a disassembly of the social structure s that come with trust. The result is a relatively individualised society with a higher sense of unpredictability (Giddens, 1990). This unpredictability is a part of the growing feeling of unsafeness to a point where one can say that western/ European culture becomes obsessed with risk avoidance and risk management.
21 Given the arguments above it is important to mention that for contemporary society the constant influence of media on our daily lives triggers people’s emotions. In contemporary society, if we need to believe the media and politicians the world becomes less safe each day. Reports of violence and crime-related offences are commonplace and influence our vision on our surroundings. However, what often seems to be forgotten is that over the last decades instead of becoming less safe the world has become safer. Both national and international researches from among others Clingendael confirm this (Duchateau-Polkerman, 2016). An example of how media influences our sense of security comes from a research conducted by EenVandaag in the Netherlands. This research analysed how people felt after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris. The conclusion was that the feeling of unsafeness and fear increased as the media started to report more and more on radical Muslims (Duchateau-Polkerman, 2016). Indirectly it is thus not a lack of safety that drives the private security market, but also our perception of security.
2.5.2 Public security provision
It is increasingly argued that law enforcement agencies are dealing with capacity problems and therefore possibly are not able to resolve all problems. This raises the attention for private security companies to fulfil certain roles in the public domain (van Motfort, van den Brink, Schulz, & Maalsté, 2012). Chairman of the European Commission Jean- Claude Junker, in April 2016, said:
´´The time for action has come. In the area of security, as in many other areas in Europe, fragmentation is what makes us vulnerable. Europe needs a genuine Security Union´´ (European Commission, 2017).
Indeed, as stated by the chairman, in the past few years action has been taken and multiple decisions were made to tighten security law in the European Union (European Commission, 2017). However, there is no indication that law enforcement agencies will expand and will gain more capacity to combat threats. Actually, the opposite is true. The overall amount of police officers across the European Union decreased from 2010 to 2013, which then was compensated in 2014. However, according to the last numbers available, the overall number of officers dropped again in 2015 by 1,2% across the European Union (Eurostat, 2017a). Where 1,2% seems to be a relatively little drop, in a period of time in which it is argued that police forces in multiple European countries are under-staffed, under-funded and underequipped it is arguable that such a drop should not even occur (European Police Union, N.D.). Therefore, in order to maintain the correct level of security, multiple scholars suggest involving the private sector in the public domain (Montgomery & Griffiths, 2015). Since a lot of private security personnel is already engaged in preventive activities, such as
