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MA Thesis Culture and Politics
5184VCP01Y
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Pyeongchang 2018 and Inter-Korean Relations
An analysis of inter-Korean relations and sports diplomacy leading up to, during and following the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in South Korea
Thesis Research Paper
MA Culture and Politics Thomas Roberts s2126125 t.j.roberts@umail.leiden.univ.nl Word Count - 14,994 Examiner: Dr. E. Veldkamp Submission Date 04/01/2019
2 Contents
Introduction ... 3
Literature Review ... 8
Section 1 – The Beginnings of Sports Diplomacy ... 8
Towards a “New” Sports Diplomacy – Emerging Powers ... 9
A “New” Sports Diplomacy ... 10
Section 2 - Sporting Mega-Events ... 12
Challenges of Hosting Sporting Mega-Events ... 14
North Korea and Sporting Mega-Events ... 15
South Korea and Sporting Mega-Events ... 16
Section 3 - Sports Diplomacy and Political Breakthroughs ... 18
Sports Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations ... 20
Findings ... 23
Analysis ... 25
Section 1 - South Korea wins bid for 2018 Winter Olympics in 2011 ... 25
2012 London Olympics ... 27
2014 Incheon Asian Games ... 29
2015 & 2016 - Rio Olympics ... 31
2017 - Lead up to Pyeongchang 2018 ... 33
Section 2 - North Korea agrees to participate in the 2018 Winter Olympics ... 35
2018 Winter Olympics Opening Ceremony ... 36
2018 Winter Olympics Competition ... 38
Section 3 - Developments after Pyeongchang 2018 ... 41
27 April – First Inter-Korean Summit ... 43
26 May - Second Inter-Korean Summit ... 43
18-20 September - Third Inter-Korean Summit ... 44
China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations ... 46
The US’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations ... 48
Sporting Unity Continues ... 50
Future Prospects ... 52
Conclusion ... 54
Further Research ... 57
3 Introduction
Since the end of the Korean War in July 1953, North and South Korea have remained divided nations, with seemingly little hope of reunification. Other divided nations such as Vietnam and Germany have set aside their differences and become one state. North and South Korea are divided politically, socially and economically and, thus, reunification appears to be the only objective they share.1 Although North and South Korea differ politically as the North employs an ideology based on Juche (self-reliance) and the South is democratic, the Koreans remain bound by ethnic roots.2 Since the 1970s, inter-Korean relations have thawed to a certain extent and there has been an increase in communication between the two states.3 However, for reunification to take place, South Korea, in combination with the US insist that denuclearisation must occur on the Korea Peninsula. Tensions in the region have continually been inflamed due to persistent missile testing since North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and the breakdown of the six-party reunification talks in 2008.4
Recently, the global public witnessed a joint march by the two Koreas in the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics held in Pyeongchang, South Korea, with the Korean Peninsula flag representing the two teams.5 This occurrence has not been uncommon in inter-Korean relations.6 The two nations marched together at the opening ceremonies in the 2000, 2004 Summer Olympics, and the 2006 Winter Olympics.7 Conversely, before and during the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, relations were tense and, as a result, a joint march was not held.8 Moreover, the 2002 Busan Games was the first time North Korea had participated in a
1 Udo Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. London & New York: Routledge, 2016).
2 Ibid.
3Armstrong, Charles K. Inter-Korean Relations in Historical perspective.’ International Journal of Korean
Unification Studies, 14, No.2 (2005):1.
4 Evan J.R Revere. ‘Korean Reunification and US Interests: Preparing for One Korea.’ Brookings (20/01/2015). https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/ Accessed 31/12/2018.
5‘Winter Olympics: Six incredible moments from opening ceremony.’ BBC News (09/02/2018). https://www.bbc.com/sport/winter-olympics/43005870 Accessed 14/10/2018.
7Udo Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.’ The International Journal of the History of
Sport, 31, No.3 (2014):383.
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sporting competition held in South Korea.9 Previously, Pyongyang had conducted two terrorist attacks before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the second resulting in the deaths of 115 people on Korean Air Flight 858.10 Thus, historically, sport and inter-Korean relations have had a complex relationship with each other.
Previously, scholars such as Brian Bridges have played down the importance of sport in inter-Korean relations.11 However, following the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in February, there has been an increase in communication between the two states. North and South Korea entertained three summits in 2018, whereas before, only two had been held since the end of the Korean War.12 Moreover, these summits have led to North Korea agreeing to close one of its nuclear missile test facilities.13 The discourse between the two states has been one of harmony and cooperation. For example, the two leaders of North and South Korea, Kim Jong-Un and Moon Jae-In, were pictured hand-in-hand during the April summit of last year.14
Consequently, the relationship between sport and politics deserves a re-think. Sports diplomacy is a recent discipline which has been reintroduced by Stuart Murray.15 Murray envisaged a reanalysis of the relationship between sport and politics and eventually argued that sport diplomacy could be embedded into foreign policy by states.16 Thus, sports diplomacy cannot be limited to one-off exchanges with politics, such as in the case of US-China’s ‘ping-pong’ diplomacy in 1971.1718
99 Jung Woo Lee. ‘The Politics of Sports Mega-events in South Korea.’in Routledge Handbook of Sport and
Politics, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. (London & New York: Routledge, 2016).
10 Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ 11 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p166.
12 ‘North Korea’s Kim Jong-un agrees to shut missile site.’ BBC News (19/09/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45569924 Accessed 14/10/2018.
13 Ibid.
14 ‘South Korea seeks to hold inter-Korean summit Sept. 18-20: reports.’ The Korea Times (04/09/2018). https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/09/103_254994.html Accessed 26/10/2018.
15 Stuart Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 8, No.3-4 (2013):192. 16 Ibid.
17 The ping-pong diplomacy involved a series of table tennis matches in China between the US and China. Eventually, US President Richard Nixon visited Beijing, helping to improve relations between the two states. ‘From Ping Pong Diplomacy to the Beijing Games.’ Team USA (12/06/2008).
https://www.teamusa.org/News/2008/June/12/From-Ping-Pong-Diplomacy-to-the-Beijing-Games Accessed 04/01/2019.
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In my paper, I intend to analyse the relationship between sports and politics in inter-Korean relations from 2011, when Pyeongchang won the rights to host the 2018 Winter Olympics, to the present day. It will be determined whether sports diplomacy during this period have directly influenced inter-Korean relations. My analysis will proceed with three sections. It will begin with an examination of inter-Korean relations from 2011 to the commencement of the 2018 Winter Olympics. Succeeding this will be an analysis of the opening ceremony of the Games and the sports and political happenings relating to inter-Korean relations during the competition. Finally, developments in inter-inter-Korean relations following the Games will chartered and examined. The period of analysis provides ample scope to determine whether sporting mega-events19 have causally affected inter-Korean relations.
The first section of the literature review will cover sports diplomacy in the sense of “new” sports diplomacy versus traditional sports diplomacy. The second section of the literature review will then highlight the benefits and pitfalls when hosting a sporting mega-event. Historically, North and South Korea’s use of sporting mega-events will then be detailed to understand the context in which these two states view and use this form of sports diplomacy. Finally, the third section of the literature review concerns itself with the debate whether sport, in general, can truly make political breakthroughs for hostile nations and inter-Korean relations.
The research is a within-case analysis of inter-Korean relations before, during and after the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Primary and secondary sources will both be collected and analysed. Primary sources will include newspaper articles, academic discussions, websites, videos etc. I have endeavoured to avoid tabloid or sensationalist newspapers in order to reduce the amount of biased data. A large section of the data includes news websites such as Reuters, BBC News, Quartz and The Diplomat among others. South Korean news websites such as The Korean Times, The Korean Herald and The Chosun Ilbo have also been utilised. Moreover, other primary data includes scholars from institutes pertaining to the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, for example. Secondary data includes journal articles discussing the relevant topic.
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The lack of available information from North Korea put limitations on the objectivity of the data. I was able to collect information second hand from the Korean Central News
Agency (KCNA) and first hand from the Rodong Sinmun.20 However, I found that the Pyongyang Times did not archive information and the Rodong Sinmun had a dearth of
available data as well. Furthermore, I was able to gather data from North Korean watch groups such as 38 North and North Korea Leadership Watch.
Academically my research is relevant as scholars have debated whether sports diplomacy can lead to political breakthroughs. A thorough critique of inter-Korean relations in the context of the 2018 Pyeongchang has not be theorised as of this present time. Several scholars such as Bridges, Lee and Merkel have written about inter-Korean relations and sport dating back to the 1980s and further; however, in the last decade sporting mega-events in regards to inter-Korean relations have been undertheorised. Moreover, whilst it is well known that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who replaced his father in 2011, is a sports fan21 there has not been research covering his period in charge determining his policy towards sports and inter-Korean relations. So far, research in this field has been related to one-off sporting mega-events such as 2012 London Olympics and 2008 Beijing Olympics. My research attempts to scrutinise the chain of events leading up to the 2018 Pyeongchang and the cause and effect relationship between sporting mega-events and inter-Korean relations.
Outside the academic context, my research is policy relevant as well. A divided Korea ensures that the border will remain heavily guarded by the military and we may continue to see missile tests from Pyongyang. Debate remains as to the extent of human right abuses in North Korea and food shortages for the people.22 Thus, even without reunification North Korea needs to remain on good terms with other states in order to receive food and economic aid. If sporting mega-events can provide an opportunity to improve relations, create dialogue between the two Koreas or even assist in the initiation of reunification talks then sports
20 The Rodong Sinmun is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. 21 Angela Moon. ‘North Korea Decision on Olympics Participation Seen as Last Minute: South Korea Official.’
Reuters (14/11/2017). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-2018-northkorea/north-korea-decision-on-olympics-participation-seen-as-last-minute-south-korea-official-idUSKBN1DE2TS Accessed 09/12/2018. 22 Paul Chisolm. ‘The Food Insecurity of North Korea.’ NPR News (19/06/2018).
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/19/620484758/the-food-insecurity-of-north-korea Accessed 16/12/2018.
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diplomacy becomes relevant for foreign policy objectives in inter-Koreans relations and potentially other divided or warring nations as well.
Some of the questions that I will attempt to resolve include: has sports diplomacy facilitated cooperation between North and South Korea or have external factors played the more significant role? To what extent can sporting mega-events establish dialogue and communication between hostile states? How can we compare Pyeongchang 2018 to other, previous sporting mega-events in regards to inter-Korean relations? Finally, to what extent can sport diplomacy be embedded long-term as part of foreign policy?
Thus, my research question will be:
What role has sports diplomacy played in inter-Korean relations leading up to, during and following the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games?
8 Literature Review
Section 1 – The Beginnings of Sports Diplomacy
The importance and relevance of the relationship between sport and politics has continually been debated. In the last 5-7 years, sports diplomacy has become more researched, primarily led by Stuart Murray.23 Murray argued that there are two components in adopting sports diplomacy.24 First, sport can help states achieve foreign policy objectives and, second, there are complex networks of exchanges involving international sporting committees, civil society organisations and leading government figures in which increased communication can occur.25 Essentially, the first theory limits sports diplomacy to the application of states and traditional concepts of power, whilst the second focuses on non-state and state interaction and leans towards the subtleties of soft power. Therefore, we can immediately identify two theories regarding sports diplomacy.
In the mid-20th century, early sports diplomacy scholars associated sport with Murray’s first theory. Sport was thought to be employed by states in order to gain prestige, as a vehicle for propaganda and to reinforce old rivalries.26 Strenk’s historical research highlighted the Nazi’s use of sport as political propaganda, the US-Soviet Union’s Cold War rivalry and the determination of states in general to be top of the pile in Olympic medal tables.27 Moreover, in 1945, George Orwell argued that sport was equal to “war minus the shooting.”28 Orwell strongly maintained that sport evoked violent tendencies and merely reinforced state nationalism.29 Orwell’s article provided a deeply pessimistic view of sport in which he theorised that sport pertained to nationalistic pride and power over others, often through violent means. Thus, originally, sports diplomacy scholars concluded that states utilised sport for self-gain and achieving political power.
23 Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ p192. 24 Ibid p193.
25 Ibid.
26 Andrew Strenk. ‘What Price Victory? The World of International Sports and Politics.’ The ANNUALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 445, No.1 (1979):140.
27 Ibid
28 George Orwell. ‘The Sporting Spirit.’ The Tribune (December 1945)
http://www.orwell.ru/library/articles/spirit/english/e_spirit accessed 27/11/2018. 29 Ibid.
9 Towards a “New” Sports Diplomacy – Emerging Powers
As previously demonstrated, the traditional theory of sport involved prestige, nationalism and power; however, with globalisation and the rise of international organisations, scholars have theorised that foreign policy objectives can also be achieved through soft power. Cornelissen advocates the importance of soft power with her example of South Africa, who since the end of Apartheid in 1994, have continually attempted to display new-found democratic values through sporting mega-events.30 In 1995, South Africa hosted and won the Rugby World Cup. This victory was followed by several other sporting mega-events hosted by South Africa, culminating in the 2010 South African World Cup.31 The World Cup was promoted by South Africa as ‘the African World Cup,’ in which the state attempted to bring together the African nations and bolster the African continent.32 South Africa also wanted to show the public the positive changes occurring in the state, far removed from the era of Apartheid.33 Therefore, the World Cup was identified as an opportunity to achieve South Africa’s idea of projecting their democratic values and African identity globally.
Moreover, sports diplomacy can bypass or negotiate traditional political challenges for emerging states. China, for example, hosted the Olympics in 2008 despite not adhering to traditional Olympic values such as peace, harmony, solidarity and fair play.34 Horton notes that the International Olympics Committee (IOC) knew about China’s poor human rights record but chose not to engage with the problem and allowed China to precede with the games, which became one of the most successful in history.35 To sum up, sports diplomacy appears to have had a positive influence on international affairs and is able to create dialogue between state and non-state actors even if their fundamental values do not agree.
Finally, Merkel argues that implementing sport as a foreign policy tool can be easier than going through non-sporting diplomacy.36 Engaging with the public can be a simpler
30 Cornelissen. ‘The Geopolitics of Global Aspirations.’ p3008. p3017. 31 Ibid.
32 Ibid p3018. 33 Ibid p3017.
34 Zhang Qingmin. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ The Hague Journal of
Diplomacy, 8, No.3-4 (2013):214.
35 Peter Horton. ‘Sport as Public Diplomacy and Public Disquiet: Australia’s Ambivalent Embrace of the Beijing Olympics.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 25, No.7 (2008):953.
36 Udo Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea: One Nation, Two Countries and Three Flags.’ International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 43, No.3 (2008):307.
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process than entering into complex, bureaucratically limited negotiations with political organisations and individuals.37 Merkel argues that using sport as a foreign policy tool can help rid a state of negative stereotypes, flatten seemingly insurmountable political barriers and help initiate dialogue between states.38 Sport provides the opportunity for states to implement soft power tactics in a more efficient and less cumbersome way. The earlier examples of the South African 2010 World Cup and Beijing 2008 demonstrates that engaging in public diplomacy is an effective strategy for changing global attitudes and attempting to move beyond past troubles.
Thus, the rise of emerging powers and the global communication between the different states and cultures hosting these mega-events dictates that perhaps sport is not solely about violence and one-upmanship. Sport can be about personal achievement or glory for the nation but perhaps a “new,” more cooperative and peaceful sports diplomacy has been emerging.
A “New” Sports Diplomacy
A “new” sports diplomacy relates to Murray second theory regarding the multitude of actors involved. Murray notes the many actors involved in sports diplomacy range from states to civil society organisations and even sporting teams.39 Thus, communication and negotiation becomes normalised between different actors.
In an article regarding the world first sports diplomacy strategy, Murray notes that diplomacy is a “plural effort.”40 Murray argues that states seek to create networks as they recognise that they can achieve their foreign policy goals by more frequent engagement with other actors.41 Murray points to Australia’s first sports diplomacy strategy, which worked together with other Australian departments to showcase Australia on the world stage and connect with people from all walks of life in growing and enhancing sporting development.42
37 Ibid. 38 Ibid p290.
39 Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ p193.
40 Stuart Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy in the Australian Context: Theory into Strategy.’ Politics and Policy, 45, No.5 (2017):845.
41 Ibid. 42 Ibid p849.
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The strategy assisted Australia in connecting with other nations, such as an international football match with Brazil, in which a multitude of events surrounding the match involving Brazilian children, businesses and politicians were hosted.43 Implementing sports diplomacy in this way can strengthen relations between two nations, both publicly and politically. In support of Murray’s theory, Rofe insists that sports diplomacy encompasses a multi-layered network of beneficial, complex interactions and arrangements. In particular, Rofe emphasises the role of the individual in sports diplomacy.44 Rofe refers to Chinese President Xi Jinping who visited Manchester City football team to conduct a business dealing, (where British Prime Minster David Cameron was also present) in which his presence became known worldwide through Manchester City player Sergio Aguero’s Twitter feed.45 Consequently, the whole world knew about the Chinese President’s visit and his business activity.46 The actors included state leaders, players, teams and the general public, emphasising the wide variety of actors involved.
Other scholars reinforce Rofe’s focus on the individual. Zhang proposes that sports diplomacy has moved beyond its original theories and into, what he refers to, as a “new” sports diplomacy.47 Zhang refers specifically to Yao Ming, the first Chinese basketball player to play in the National Basketball Association (NBA) in America.48 Yao Ming was a great success in the NBA and the positive attitude shown towards him by Americans helped build bridges between China and the US.49 Furthermore, Goldberg, writing in 2000, advised the US to invite North Korean basketball star Michael Ri to play in the NBA, where he could potentially act in a facilitating role between the two states.50 Moreover, if the US sent a basketball team to North Korea, Goldberg suggested that this would replicate the
43 Ibid p851.
44 J. Simon Rofe. ‘Sport and Diplomacy: A Global Diplomacy Framework.’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, 27, No.2 (2016):212.
45 Ibid p213. 46 Ibid.
47 Zhang. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ p231. 48 Ibid p228.
49 Ibid p228-9.
50 Jeremy Goldberg. ‘Sporting Diplomacy: Boosting the Size of the Diplomatic Corps.’ Washington Quarterly, 23, No.3 (2000):68.
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American ping-pong diplomacy.51 Evidently, the individual can play an important role in sports diplomacy as well.
In order to understand sports diplomacy fully, we must take on board the idea that sport diplomacy is not limited to state-state interaction, power and prestige. Sports diplomacy now encompasses more actors, which enables increased communication and flexibility when conducting diplomacy. Individual sports stars can be used as ambassadors, political leaders can be involved in social media stories and competition between two national teams can spread goodwill. It is from this framework that we can understand sports diplomacy.
Section 2 - Sporting Mega-Events
Firstly, sporting mega-events can boost a state’s image. A state has the opportunity to showcase a positive image of their nation to the global audience. Sporting mega-events can be watched on television the world over and a successful event can transform the state’s image from negative to positive. The hosting of a sporting mega-event provides an emerging state with the opportunity to present itself as a modern, economically successful nation. In the last 20 years, we have witnessed an increase in the number of emerging nations hosting sporting mega-events. Last year we saw Russia host the 2018 Football World Cup, Brazil hosted the previous World Cup and the 2016 Olympics whilst China hosted the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
Cornelissen discusses the BRICS nations52 and their reasons for hosting sporting mega-events. 53 Cornelissen focuses on Brazil, India and South Africa and concludes that sporting mega-events can be employed as an opportunity for states to display their vast improvements.54 China is a good example, as the 2008 Beijing Olympics highlighted their economic modernisation of the previous 30 years.55 Similarly, India has significantly improved
51 Ibid.
52 BRICS – A group of emerging nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).
53 Scarlett Cornelissen. ‘The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration: Sport Mega-events and Emerging Powers,’ The
International Journal of the History of Sport, 27, No.16-18 (2010):3008.
54 Ibid. 55 Ibid p3014.
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its economy in the last 20 or so years and, as a result, hosted the 2010 Commonwealth Games.56
Furthermore, hosting a sporting mega-event provides an opportunity for a state to engage with the public through public diplomacy, which encompasses an important part of sports diplomacy. Grix and Lee state that public diplomacy is the idea of attracting the public through hosting a sporting mega-event.57 For example, opening ceremonies of sporting mega-events can win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the audience.58 Short el al agree with Grix and Lee in that the opening ceremonies are part of the spectacle in which the idealisation of the host country is presented through ambitious and spectacular routines to the global audience.59 Short et al argue that globalisation has had the effect where sporting mega-events are continually in the public eye and they refer to, specifically the Olympics as a “global media spectacle.”60 Short et al also state that the Olympics is “a vessel for conveying and enhancing the host’s cultural identity.”61 Sporting mega-events give the global audience the opportunity to learn about other cultures and broaden their view of the world, thus helping to banish negative stereotypes.62
To summarise, hosting sporting mega-events can be incorporated as a positive and simple tool of sports diplomacy. Sports diplomacy moves beyond traditional state-state interaction and involves the public. The public has access through the media to every occurrence that happens in a sporting mega-event. Thus, for emerging nations, hosting a sporting mega-event can provide an opportunity for showcasing the state in the public domain.
56 Ibid p3020.
57 Jonathan Grix & Donna Lee. ‘Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction,’ Global Society, 27, No.4 (2013):529.
58 Ibid.
59 John Rennie Short, Carrie Breitbach, Steve Buckman & Jamey Essex. ‘From world cities to gateway cities: Extending the boundaries of globalisation theory.’ Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 4, No.3 (2010):321
60 Ibid p320. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.
14 Challenges of Hosting Sporting Mega-Events
Hosting a sporting mega-event is a substantially useful tool for emerging nations; however, constant media exposure can emphasise negative aspects of a state. In Brazil, the mass protests surrounding their 2014 World Cup were broadcasted to the global audience, conveying a divided, unequal state.63 Sebastiao et al point out that the media control the information that the public views and that the sporting mega-events, amongst other forms of entertainment, merely divert the public’s attention away from what is really happening in the world.64
The media can control the information given to the audience and several discourse analysis studies have highlighted this. A significant number of scholars have implemented a discourse analysis study in order to examine the type of language used by the press regarding a particular sporting mega-event. For example, Hammett conducted a discourse analysis on British media representations of South Africa’s 2010 World Cup.65 In Hammett’s analysis, he concluded that the British press referred to the South Africans during the World Cup negatively, as exotic or barbaric, and that the issue of security threats were continually problematised by the British media.66
Other separate research by Mishra and then Osborne, Sherry and Nicholson also found similarities in the discourse of the 2010 Delhi Commonwealth Games. Mishra, in particular, determined that the Western press67 negatively stereotyped Indians and also focused on the perceived inability of India to host the Commonwealth Games.68 Osborne et al expanded on Mishra’s work by conducting a larger study using Australia’s press and state that the themes covered by the Australian press include India’s incapability of hosting the
63 Sónia Pedro Sebastiao, Ana Isabel Lemos & Isabel Soares. ‘The Coverage of Opposing Events: Brazil’s Sporting Mega-Events Preparation and the Host Community Civil Protests.’ in Media Events: A Critical
Contemporary Approach,’ eds. Bianca Mitu & Stamatis Poulakidakos (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan,
2016):89. 64 Ibid p88.
65 Daniel Hammett. ‘British media representations of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup,’ South African
Geographical Journal, 93, No.1 (2011):63.
66 Ibid p67.
67 Mishra’s study included press from Australia, Canadia, New Zealand and the UK.
68 Suman Mishra. ‘” The Shame Games”: a textual analysis of Western press coverage of the Commonwealth Games in India,’ Third World Quarterly, 33, No.5 (2012):875.
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games and how an unsuccessful hosting of the games could harm the Commonwealth institution’s reputation.69
In their studies Hammett, Mishra and Osborne et al all highlight the perils that can come with hosting a sporting mega-event. Whilst sporting mega-events give the hosting state an opportunity to show off their culture and infrastructure, states need to be wary of domestic problems being highlighted to the world, particularly with the media.
Essentially, the media control, to a certain extent what the public view. Different media agendas mean that it can be difficult for a state to overcome negative stereotypes, and this can be a complex, lengthy process to change a public’s opinion of the state through hosting sporting mega-events. Furthermore, what the public view through the media and the sporting mega-events may not constitute the reality of the hosting state.
North Korea and Sporting Mega-Events
North Korea has hosted sporting-events with the intention of boosting their nation’s domestic and global image but has also suffered from a critical Western media agenda. Whilst North Korea has not hosted any major international sporting mega-events such as the Olympics, it has however, hosted a couple of domestic mega-events. One of these is the Arirang festival, which Merkel has argued, has provided a platform for North Korea to display its achievements to the domestic and global audience.70 For North Korea, this is particularly important, as it is an isolated nation, which has been branded a “rogue state” or the “axis of evil” by Western states and their media.71 Moreover, more Western and Chinese tourists are now visiting North Korea and the Arirang festival, thus, increasing its visibility to the global world.72
The Arirang festival emphasises the importance of the Kim dynasty but also conveys that idea that eventual reunification will lead to prosperity for ethnic Koreans.73 Moreover, the festival is employed as a political tool as Lee and Bairner highlight the “Korea is best”
69 Angela Osborne; Emma Sherry; Matthew Nicholson. ‘The Delhi Dilemma: media representation of the 2010 Commonwealth Games,’ Sport in Society, 19, No.2 (2016):206.
70 Udo Merkel. ‘Bigger than Beijing 2008: Politics, Propaganda and Physical Culture in Pyongyang.’ The
International Journal of the History of Sport, 27, No.14-5 (2010):2487.
71 Ibid p2468. 72 Ibid p2488.
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slogan and the anti-American imperialist narrative, which conveys an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomy.74 The event ‘Prosper our Motherland,’ a new mass event in 2008, highlighted similar themes as the Arirang Festival.75 The show’s narrative displayed 60 years of North Korea and celebrated the greatness of former leader Kim Il-sung in combination with political events such as nuclearisation and inter-Korean relations.76 Thus, these are two festivals which are employed as political tools of the North Korean state.
Similarly, the North Korean state-owned KCNA promotes a pan-Korean identity during international sporting mega-events.77 North Korean athletes’ achievements have been celebrated in combination with several South Korea athletes such as Park Ji-Sung, the South Korean footballer who scored an important goal against Iran which allowed the North Korean football team to advance to the 2010 World Cup finals.78 Park Ji-Sung was celebrated by players and fans in a similar fashion to how a North Korean national hero would be treated.79 This was not an isolated incident as South Korean medal winners in the 2010 Guangzhou Asian games were also praised by the KCNA.80 Therefore, North Korea’s narrative towards sports significantly focuses on the pan-Korean ethnicity, which demonstrates how sport can mould a nation’s identity. Domestically, North Korea focuses on positive branding of their nation and the Korean identity.
South Korea and Sporting Mega-Events
In the last 30 or so years, South Korea has been able to host or co-host several international sporting mega-events to raise the position of the state in the global world.81 South Korea has risen from one of the world’s poorest countries in the 1950s to one of most developed presently.82 Lee refers to the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics Games in Seoul as a
74Lee & Bairner. ‘The Difficult Dialogue.’ p405.
75 Merkel. ‘Bigger than Beijing 2008: Politics, Propaganda and Physical Culture in Pyongyang.’ p2484. 76 Ibid p2485.
77 Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.’ p383-4. 78 Ibid p384.
79 Ibid. 80 Ibid p385.
81 Jung Woo Lee. ‘A Game for the Global North: The 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang and South Korean Cultural Politics.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 33, No.12 (2016):1411.
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“coming out party” in which South Korea’s rapid economic rise was celebrated by the South Korean government and public.83
Hosting these two sporting mega-events in the late 1980s also contributed to the democratisation of South Korea. The Olympics served as a democratising catalyst as the people demanded political participation and protested en masse on the streets.84 With this pressure, the South Korean government eventually gave in and announced several democratising reforms in June 1987.85 The IOC also leaned on the South Korean government by threatening to move the Olympics and South Korea felt the pressure to conform to the majority of the Western world.86
Sporting mega-events have also sent waves of national pride through South Korea. Tosa states that the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games provided South Koreans with a great sense of national pride.87 Following these two games, the South Korean public became more interested in international sporting mega-events than domestic ones.88 The 2002 joint South Korea-Japan World Cup provides a great example of South Korea’s interest in international sporting mega-events, in which South Korea reached the semi-finals. The South Korean public watched the games during the World Cup on public screens and seven million people cheered on their team in the streets for the semi-final against Germany.89 The President Kim Dae-jung stated that it was South Korea’s greatest day since the creation of the Korean nation90 and the South Korean people reflected this sentiment by displaying great pride in the team’s success.91 The 2002 World Cup semi-final provided the opportunity for the South Korea to celebrate their nation’s achievement and demonstrated that they could compete with more developed states.92 For the South Korean public, sport formed part of their rapid rise to become an economically successful and democratic nation. Evidently, South
83 Ibid p1417.
84 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p77. 85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Tosa. ‘Sport Nationalism in South Korea: An Ethnographic Study.’ p6. 88 Ibid.
89 Ibid p5.
90 Korean nation referring to the legend of Dangun, the god-king who is believed to have founded the Korean nation.
91 Tosa. ‘Sport Nationalism in South Korea: An Ethnographic Study.’ p6 92 Ibid.
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Korea has taken great pride in its hosting and participation at sporting mega-events and, as a result, has employed the competitions successfully in order to boost their nation.
Section 3 - Sports Diplomacy and Political Breakthroughs
Scholars have debated whether sport can truly make political breakthroughs. It has been argued that sports diplomacy can be used to lessen bilateral tensions. Zhang’s study on China shows that Sino-American and Sino-Korean relations have improved due to sports diplomacy.93 The ping-pong diplomacy in 1971 brought an end to the hostilities between China and the US, whilst support for each other’s Asian Games in Seoul 1986 and Beijing 1990 led to harmonious relations between China and South Korea.94 For China and South Korea, supporting the Games helped to build trust, particularly following China’s global isolation due to the Tiananmen Square massacre.95 Bridges observed that, in 1992, China recognised South Korea as a sovereign state and the South Koreans also began to build diplomatic relations with other socialist states in the early 1990s.96
However, Zhang is cautious when stating whether sport can really have a profound influence on international affairs.97 He states that the positive relations between two nations creates the environment in which sports diplomacy can effectively take place.98 For example, Zhang observes that Beijing and Washington were already planning to cool relations before the ping-pong diplomacy in the 1970s.99 Therefore, his argument is that sports diplomacy cannot produce political change on its own. The relations between the two states must be peaceful beforehand.
Moreover, sport has been argued to have little effect on reuniting divided nations. Bridges conducts his own analysis specifically on this topic.100 Bridges analyses East/West
93 Zhang. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ p221. 94 Ibid p221-223
95 Ibid p223.
96 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p74-6.
97 Zhang. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ p233. 98 Ibid.
99 Ibid p221.
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Germany, North/South Vietnam, North/South Yemen and China/Taiwan.101 Bridges attempts to find the role of sport on the reunification of these divided states and concludes that sport played a minimal role at best in all of the states’ reunification.102 Sport played a pacifying and uniting role but only following reunification.103 Bridges’ study supports Zhang in that sports diplomacy cannot make significant breakthroughs on its own in hostile bilateral situations.
However, sports diplomacy has the potential to pull isolated states more prominently into the global arena. Goldberg suggests that sport can help to break down barriers for isolated states.104 Goldberg cites the example of the US and Iran who played each other in the 1998 World Cup in France following previous tensions between the two states.105 The Iranians won, but there was no animosity between the Iranian general public and the US and, as a result, the Americans were able to regard the Iranians as fellow people.106 Goldberg advises that sport is the most effective way for the US to positively engage with isolated states such as Cuba and North Korea.107 Thus, sport can play a role in creating dialogue with isolated states.
Perhaps the most concrete example of sports diplomacy smoothing tensions between two warring states is the 2004 India-Pakistan cricket matches. Bandyopadhyay argues that these cricket matches broke down political barriers and created goodwill and harmony between India and Pakistan.108 Relations between India and Pakistan had been on edge over the conflict in Kashmir, terrorism and their nuclear arms race;109 however, the consensus in the media and by politicians and sportspeople alike was that the cricket matches in 2004 had created peace, temporarily at least.110 India and Pakistan provides an example of cooperation and peaceful relations between fundamental opposed neighbours through sport.
101 Ibid. 102 Ibid p157. 103 Ibid.
104 Goldberg. ‘Sporting Diplomacy: Boosting the Size of the Diplomatic Corps.’ p68. 105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. 107 Ibid p69.
108 Kausik Bandyopadhyay. ‘Feel Good, Goodwill and India’s Friendship Tour of Pakistan, 2004: Cricket, Politics and Diplomacy in Twenty-First Century India.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 25, No.12 (2008):1664.
109 Ibid p1664. 110 Ibid p1659.
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To conclude, scholars agree that sports diplomacy can help to foster peace and harmony between opposing nations. Organising sporting events can help bring isolated nations out of their isolation and into the global arena. Even two states who despise each other such as India and Pakistan can reconcile through sports diplomacy. However, scholars maintain that sport cannot reunite two divided states on its own.
Sports Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations
Scholars have debated the true level of influence sport can have towards political breakthroughs and this discussion has carried on to inter-Korean relations. Lee argues that sport cannot contribute significantly to eventual Korean reunification.111 Lee states that sport can play a role in resolving conflict between the two nations but cannot transform relations between the two states from hostile to peaceful or vice versa.112 Similarly, Bridges finds that sport follows political communication and interaction.113 Thus, good relations precede positive sporting dialogue and, similarly with hostile relations and negative sporting dialogue. Sport cannot make significant political breakthroughs for Bridges and Lee.114
Merkel however argues that if sport diplomacy is implemented as part of a state’s foreign policy then it can be highly effective.115 Merkel says that sport can be a “powerful diplomatic tool” if the “systematic and lasting use of sport” takes place.116 Moreover, Merkel argues that inter-Korean dialogue is the best example of sport being effectively used to achieve foreign policy goals.117 Merkel does maintain that sport must be closely interlinked with the foreign policy agenda and highlights the ten years before the 2008 Beijing Olympic games as a period where sport played a huge role in inter-Korean relations.118 Therefore, Merkel is quick to emphasise that sport can be hugely effective in creating dialogue if it is part of long-term policy.
111 Jung Woo Lee. ‘Do the scale and scope of the event matter? The Asian games and the relations between North and South Korea.’ Routledge, 20, No.3 (2017):380.
112 Ibid.
113 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p67. 114 Ibid p166.
115 Udo Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ 116 Ibid.
117 Ibid. 118 Ibid.
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Similarly, Goldberg argues that sports diplomacy is the optimum method for North and South Korea to facilitate dialogue.119 He highlights the example in December 1999 where the North Koreans sent their national basketball team to play South Korea in a four game series in which the North Koreans were received well by the public and South Korean President Kim Dae- jung.120
Moreover, sport has been successful in promoting a pan-Korean identity. Merkel argues that in both Koreas, a myriad of events promote the ethnic identity of the Korean people.121 Merkel contrasts this narrative with the ideological competition between East and Germany before their eventual reunification.122 For Merkel, sport has played a more pacifying role in inter-Korean relations than in the previously divided Germany.123 However, Merkel argues that North and South are unlikely to reunite as ethnic sentiment only highlights the fact that politically, the Koreans are fundamentally opposed and unable to reconcile.124
However, South Korean sporting mega-events have contributed to creating peace for inter-Korean relations, albeit in a peaceful environment. Following the World Cup, the 2002 Busan Asian Games brought about a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations as it was the first time North Korea had participated in a sporting mega-event held in South Korea.125 The North Koreans provided a delegation comprising 318 athletes and inter-Korean relations did not display any signs of hostility, showing a united front.126 The North Korea flag was raised and their anthem sung which had previously been banned in South Korea.127
This was a period where South Korean President Kim Dae-jung actively engaged North Korea with his “Sunshine Policy” which included South Korea contributing aid towards its neighbours who were suffering from severe famine.128 Two years previously, in 2000, the first ever inter-Korean summit took place and represented, at the time, a new beginning for the
119 Goldberg. ‘Sporting Diplomacy: Boosting the Size of the Diplomatic Corps.’ p68-9. 120 Ibid p69.
121 Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.’ p376. 122 Ibid p386.
123 Ibid. 124 Ibid p387.
125 Jung Woo Lee. ‘The Politics of Sports Mega-events in South Korea.’in Routledge Handbook of Sport and
Politics, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. (London & New York: Routledge, 2016).
126 Ibid.
127 Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ 128 Ibid.
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Korean Peninsula.129 Moreover, North Korea had boycotted the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the state infamously conducted two terrorist attacks before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the second resulting in the deaths of 115 people on Korean Air Flight 858.130 Thus, this example, in combination with Busan 2002, demonstrates the close linkage between inter-Korean relations, the context of the external environment and sport.
As a result, it is evident from the literature that sport can create dialogue and open up avenues for communication. However, scholars doubt that sport will be able to reunify North and South Korea. Perhaps if sport is embedded as part of foreign policy in the long-term, it may be able to make a significant political breakthrough. Used as one-off tool, state-state sport diplomacy is not effective for achieving reunification.
129 Ibid. 130 Ibid.
23 Findings
Sporting mega-events and public diplomacy encompass what can be referred to as a “new” sports diplomacy. This was highlighted in section one where sports diplomacy now involves a wide variety of actors, helping to increase communication between state and non-state actors. Individual sportspersons, teams, political leaders and international organisations are examples of the types of actors who can be involved in sporting diplomacy. The increase in the number of emerging nations hosting sporting mega-events has propelled non-Western states such as China into the limelight and has provided an opportunity for them to engage with the public and more international organisations such as the IOC.
In section two, we concluded that sporting mega-events are an effective and simple tool of sports diplomacy. Public diplomacy can help to increase a state’s international standing whilst the media provides the medium from which the public can watch and discuss the games. The media can control the information that the public views which can work positively or negatively for a hosting state. North and South Korea both regard sport and sporting mega-events as crucial in creating a feel-good factor for their citizens. Moreover, the North and South Korean media often praise each other’s achievements in sporting mega-events and focus on their Korean ethnic identity and hopes for reunification.
Finally, in section 3 we discussed whether sport can truly make political breakthroughs. The literature suggests that sport on its own cannot reunite divided nations. However, sport can increase the communication between two opposing states, which can help to break down difficult barriers. For inter-Korean relations, sport appears to be the most viable and effective way for North and South Korea to communicate. Both states have a vested interest in the Korean identity and, thus, want to see athletes from both nations succeed. Sport may not provide reunification between the two states; however, it has to the potential to provide a working relationship between the North and South.
Through analysis before, during and after the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, I will attempt to scrutinise the effect that sports diplomacy has had on inter-Korean relations. Has the 2018 Winter Olympics created political breakthroughs for inter-Korean relations or has this been as a result of the external environment? How can a sporting mega-event contribute to ameliorating relations between the two hostile states? What role do non-state actors such as individuals, international sporting organisations and the media play in sports
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diplomacy? Finally, does sports diplomacy need to be embedded as part of long-term foreign policy to be effective?
25 Analysis
The analysis continues in three sections. Section one covers the period before the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics,131 section two analyses the opening ceremony and the sporting and political events during the Games and section three discusses inter-Korean relations after the games.
Section 1 - South Korea wins bid for 2018 Winter Olympics in 2011
South Korea won the rights to host the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics on the 6 July 2011, finally winning after narrowly missing out on three previous two Olympics by a few votes on each occasion.132 Upon the announcement of South Korea’s successful bid, the Chosun Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper, reported that North Korean IOC official, Jang Ung, welcomed the decision, declaring that Pyongyang would be open to hosting some events.133 Jang Ung pointed towards the poor state of inter-Korean relations and the need to ameliorate these tensions.134 However, shortly after, discussions between North and South Korea regarding the possibility of sharing some of the skiing events broke down.135 Evidently, whilst there was some intention from both sides at this early stage to discuss joint ventures for the Olympics, nothing concrete was implemented.
Although reunification was a key theme of South Korea’s failed bid for the 2010 Winter Olympics, and a partial theme of their 2014 bid, South Korea did not employ the issue of reunification in their bidding application for the 2018 games.136 South Korea focused on the idea of advocating for itself, in combination with Asia, to be the new hub of winter sports.137
131 North Korea did not compete at the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi due to not having any qualifying athletes, thus will not be include in the analysis as North Korea would not have interest in the games and therefore, sporting diplomacy between the two Koreas would not occur.
132 Victor Cha. ‘South Korea Wins Bid to Host 2018 Winter Olympics.’ Center for Strategic and International
Studies (07/07/2018). https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-wins-bid-host-2018-winter-olympics Accessed 07/12/2018.
133 ‘North Korean IOC Member Hails Pyeongchang Olympics Win.’ChosunMedia: The Chosun Ilbo (12/07/2011). http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/07/14/2011071400874.html Accessed 07/12/2018. 134 ‘Olympics-N.Korea Official Says Want to Co-host Games.’ Reuters (13/07/2011).
https://uk.reuters.com/article/olympics-korea-north-idUKL3E7ID05L20110713 Accessed 07/12/2018. 135 Jeré Longman. ‘With the 2018 Olympics in South Korea, Will the North be Participant or Provocateur.’ The
New York Times (23/05/2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/sports/2018-winter-olympics-pyeongchang-north-south-korea.html Accessed 07/12/2018.
136 Udo Merkel & Misuk Kim. ‘Third Time Lucky!? PyeongChang’s bid to host the 2018 Winter Olympics - Politics, Policy and Practice.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 28, No.16 (2011):2372-2376. 137 Ibid p2376.
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During the 2018 bid, inter-Korean political relations had been tense following the sinking of the Cheonan navy corvette and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in March and November 2010, both caused by North Korea and both leading to the deaths of a number of South Koreans.138 Thus, this may have contributed to the absence of a reunification theme for the bid.139
Finally, since the election of conservative Lee Myung-Bak as President on 25 February 2008, the political leadership of South Korea had adopted a tougher approach to inter-Korean relations.140 Lee Myung-Bak demanded an apology for Yeonpyeong island attacks but did not receive one from Pyongyang, thus tensions remained tense during the 2010-2012 period, after which, his presidency ended.141 Later in 2011, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il passed away and his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, took over.142 The Western media had been unsure of Kim Jong-il’s health since he was thought to have cancer in 2009; however, the KCNA reported that his health was in good order.143 Thus, it cannot be certain whether Kim Jong-il was fully leading the country in its decision-making.
To conclude, in December 2011, the leadership passed to Kim Jong-un, resulting in a period of transition for North Korea. Furthermore, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak had adopted a stiffer approach in inter-Korean relations. At this early stage, issues with differing inter-Korean policy determined that peaceful relations were not possible. Therefore, the environment surrounding the period of South Korea’s bid for the 2018 Winter Olympics in 2011 was not conductive to the two Koreas being able to work together. The attack by North Korea on Yeonpyeong Island and the Cheonan vessel suggested hostile inter-Korean relations and any attempt towards sporting diplomacy was ineffective.
138 Ibid. 139 Ibid.
140 Daniel Wertz. ‘Inter-Korean Relations.’ The National Committee on North Korea (Last Updated January 2017). https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/inter-korean-relations Accessed 07/12/2018.
141 Ibid.
142 Justin McCurry. ‘Kim Jong-un declared ‘supreme leader’ in North Korea.’ The Guardian (29/12/2011). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/29/kim-jong-un-supreme-leader-north-korea Accessed 31/12/2018.
143 CNN wire staff. ‘North Korean leader Kim Jong-il dead after heart attack, state media reports.’ CNN
(19/12/2011). https://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/18/world/asia/north-korea-leader-dead/index.html Accessed 31/12/2018.
‘Obituary: Kim Jong-il.’ BBC News (19/12/2011). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10745725 Accessed 31/12/2018.
27 2012 London Olympics
At the 2012 London Olympic opening ceremony, North and South Korea did not march together, reflecting Beijing 2008.144 Since Beijing 2008, inter-Korean relations had fractured considerably and at the London Olympics no agreement was put in place for a joint march.145 Tensions remained high due to the, aforementioned Yeonpyeong Island and Cheonan ship bombing in 2010 and South Korea was evidently still angered from this attack.146
In the 2012 London Olympics, the South Korean media, individual athletes and coaches displayed positivity towards their North Korean counterparts, particularly in the sport of table tennis. The North and South played a team table tennis match against each other, with the South Koreans winning overall 3-1.147 The coach of the South Korea team, Yoo Nam Kyu said after the match that whilst political relations were tense between the two countries, when they played each other they were “the same people” and that they also “speak the same language.”148 In contrast, the North Korean players did not attend any media briefings afterwards.149 Moreover, another inter-Korean table tennis match took place in the men’s singles between the favourite, Joo Sae-hyuk of South Korea, and underdog Kim Hyok-bong from North Korea.150 Kim Hyok-bong won the match and again did not face the media afterwards whilst Joo Sae-hyuk maintained that the fact he was playing a North Korean had no bearing on the result and his poor performance.151 In the South Korean media, reports on the matches did not refer to a rivalry and instead expressed regret at the division of two nations.152
144 Justin McCurry. ‘North Korea v South Korea: the opening Olympics Skirmishes.’ The Guardian (02/08/2012). https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/aug/02/north-south-korea-olympic-table-tennis Accessed
08/12/2018.
145 Udo Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ The International
Journal of the History of Sport, 30, No.15 (2013):1811.
146 Steve Slater. ‘Olympics - Table Tennis – South Korea Beat North in Tense Battle.’ Reuters (04/08/2012). https://www.reuters.com/article/oly-tabt-ttmtem-rnd1-day8-koreas/olympics-table-tennis-south-korea-beat-north-in-tense-battle-idUSL6E8J42RF20120804 Accessed 08/12/2018.
147 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’p1811. 148 Slater. ‘Olympics - Table Tennis – South Korea Beat North in Tense Battle.’
149 Ibid.
150이주희. ‘North Korea Beats South Korea in Men’s Table Tennis.’ The Korea Herald (30/07/2012). http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120730001323 Accessed 08/12/2018.
151 Ibid.
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Hence, the individual players and coaches played a role in conveying the discourse of peacefulness, ethnic unity but also sporting rivalry between the opposing players. The media was able to convey the discourse to the public audience, thus engaging in public diplomacy. Politically, positivity shown towards each other ensures that inter-Korean relations can remain peaceful, for the time being at least.
The media of both North and South Korea also helped to lessen the North Korean flag blunder in one of the women’s football matches, ensuring inter-Korean relations remained cordial. Before the North Korea-Columbia match at Hampden stadium in Glasgow, the screen in the stadium displayed the South Korean flag, resulting in the North Korean players refusing to enter the pitch.153 After an hour of negotiations and apologies, the players arrived on the pitch eventually winning 2-0 against Columbia.154 The coach, Sin Ui-gun was reported to be extremely upset and even the British Prime Minster David Cameron made an apology, showing the political significance of such an error.155 However, the North Korea state media KCNA did not mention the incident156 and similarly, the South Korean media emphasised the mistake on the British part rather than suggesting that the issue was problematic.157 Thus, the North and South Korean media assisted in underplaying the incident, whereas the Western media and politicians anticipated a potential political disaster.
The North Korean media also reported positively regarding their athletes, reflecting the opportunity sport provides to celebrate achievements. North Korean success during the Games was unprecedented as they finish 20th in the medal table above such traditional sporting nations as Brazil, South Africa and Spain.158 The KCNA were keen to emphasise the success for the athletes and the nation in their reports159 and the same followed for the South Korean media who praised the achievements of the North Korea athletes.160
153 Ewan Murray & James Meikle. ‘London 2012 Organisers Apologise for North Korea Flag Blunder. ‘The
Guardian (26/07/2012). https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/jul/26/london-2012-north-korea-flag Accessed 08/12/2018.
154 Ibid.
155 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ p1817. 156 Ibid.
157 Yoon & Wilson. ‘”Nice Korea, Naughty Korea:” p516. 158 Ibid.
159 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ p1818. 160 Yoon & Wilson. ‘”Nice Korea, Naughty Korea:” p512.
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In spite of the South Korea media reporting on the North Korean athletes’ achievements, the KCNA did not cover South Korea’s participation in the games at all.161 Politically, inter-Korean relations were indeed strained following North Korea’s frequent missile testing and the Yeonpyeong Island incident.162 The discourse from the coaches, players and media from both sides suggests that they would have preferred politics to be kept separately from sport. The fact that North Korea refused to give any interviews or report on South Korea implies that they were politically lukewarm towards their neighbours but importantly did not inflame tensions. Similarly, from the South Korean side, they did not exacerbate any unwanted tensions by expressing unity for ethnic Korea. Consequently, London 2012 represented a highly tense political period for inter-Korean relations, but the Games provided an outlet to ease tensions. Therefore, it appears that during the Olympics both North and South Korea were keen to stray away from political issues, focusing instead on the Korean ethnicity and the actual competition itself.
2014 Incheon Asian Games
Preceding the application process for the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, South Korean Incheon City Mayor Ahn Sang-soo announced that the North and South had agreed upon a deal to apply to co-host the competition. 163 However, attempting to find data relating the outcome of the statement reached a dead end and, as a result, it can only be concluded that the joint agreement fell through due to the fact that Incheon eventually competed with New Delhi, India for the Games.164
The 2014 Incheon Asian Games focused on South Korean culture, which, at the time was becoming globally popular165 and there was also an emphasis on Incheon as the city
161 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ p1819. 162 Yoon & Wilson. ‘”Nice Korea, Naughty Korea:” p521.
163 ‘Asian Games: Incheon, Pyongyang to conduct joint Asian Games bid.’ Asian Political News (06/06/2005). https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=1544444985608023689938348273576 Accessed 10/12/2018.
‘Incheon, Pyongyang to offer joint bidding of co-host of Asian Games.’ SINA English (02/06/2005). http://english.sina.com/sports/p/1/2005/0602/33334.html Accessed 31/12/2018.
‘North, South Korea bid to co-host games.’ China Daily (02/06/2005).
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/02/content_448088.htm Accessed 31/12/2018. 164 ‘South Korea’s Incheon wins bid to host 2014 Asian Games.’ CCTV.com (18/04/2007).
http://www.cctv.com/program/sportsscene/20070418/101018.shtml Accessed 31/12/2018. 165 Lee. ‘The Politics of Sports Mega-events in South Korea.’
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wanted to be a regional economic hub for northeast Asia.166 Moreover, South Korea also intended to boost the Asian region and support smaller nation’s efforts in winning medals by hosting the tournament.167 Thus, improving relations with North Korea were not considered as a reason for hosting the event.
North Korea sent a huge delegation to the games, 273 people strong, including 150 competing athletes with high medal hopes aiming to finish in the top 10 of the medal rankings. However, similarly to London 2012, the two Koreas marched separately.168 South Korea welcomed the participation of the North Korea as they looked to strengthen the region but faced protests from the conservative wing of the public regarding the inclusion of North Korea’s flag on the streets and had to remove all 45 competing members’ flags as a result.169 However, in the closing ceremony both delegations took to the stage together in a show of unity with the North led by top political officer Hwang Pyong-so.170 Inter-Korean relations proved to continue to be a sensitive issue domestically, in particular for South Korea; however, the closing ceremony provided the opportunity to showcase Korean unity.
Following the games high-level officials involving Hwang Pyong-so and two other North Korean elites met with their counterparts to discuss the possibility of future cooperation.171 However, due to protests by South Korean citizens another meeting did not materialise despite both parties appearing to be enthused by the idea.172 Members of the South Korea public had been sending balloons filled with anti-North Korean messages over the border, angering Pyongyang.173
166 John Duerden. ‘Incheon Hopes Asian Games Help Put It on the map.’ The New York Times (19/09/2014). https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=154444514902506440787498989555 Accessed 10/12/2018.
167 ‘2014 Asian Games to promote regional harmony.’ The Korean Herald (7/06/2014). http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20100607001600 Accessed 10/12/2018.
168 Kim Boram. ‘(ASIAD) NK’s boxing coach named ASIAD flag bearer.’ YONHAP News Agency (19/09/2014). https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20140919005100320 Accessed 10/12/2018.
169 Duerden. ‘Incheon Hopes Asian Games Help Put It on the map.’ 170 S. Kannan. ‘Finish with a Whimper.’ Mail Today (05/10/2014).
https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=154444509824409939296341285273 Accessed 10/12/2018.
171 Nicholas Hamisevicz. ‘Inter-Korean Relations in 2014 and Impact for 2015.’ Korea Economic Institute of
America http://keia.org/inter-korean-relations-2014-and-impact-2015 Accessed 14/12/2018.
172 Ibid. 173 Ibid.
