What do developed Countries Owe to the
Global Poor?
A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Pogge’s Cosmopolitan Position on
Global Poverty Reduction
Simon Putman
Student number: s4277880
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master in Political Science (MSc)
Specialization: Political Theory
Supervisor: dr. Bart van Leeuwen
Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Academic year: 2019-2020
Date of submission: 28-06-2020
Table of contents
Chapter 1 – Introduction...3
Chapter 2 – Global poverty...7
Global poverty: the concept...7
Global poverty: the current situation...8
Global poverty: the public debate...8
Global poverty reduction policy...9
Chapter 3 – Thomas Pogge’s position on global poverty reduction...12
Theory of distributive justice...12
Non-cosmopolitan positions...12
The cosmopolitan framework...13
Negative duties as strong global duties of justice...13
Three approaches...14
Global Resources Dividend...17
Chapter 4 – The limited significance of negative duties...19
The prosperity of developing countries...19
Causes of global poverty: a more complex genealogy...20
Beyond negative duties: the role of positive duties...22
Civic and personal responsibility...24
Chapter 5 – Towards a system of both negative and positive duties...26
The restricted magnitude of prosperity...26
The insufficiency of repairing damage...28
The crucial role of fulfilling positive duties...30
Chapter 6 – Conclusion...33
Chapter 1 – Introduction
Figures show that over a billion people have left a situation of extreme poverty in recent decades. Although this is unquestionably a positive and desirable development, the image that can arise from this does not tell the full story. In the same period, major inequalities in prosperity increased. If we take a closer look at the use of global resources, we see that only 1.3% of these resources are used by the poorest 20% and no less than 86% by the richest 20% of the world's population (Meade, 2013; World Bank, 2014). Furthermore, the poorest 40% of the world's population receives only 5% of the global income, while the richest 20% receives no less than 75% of the global income (United Nations Development Programme, 2007). Although the situation of millions of people seems to have improved, it is still a small group of people who receive the bulk of the global income and make use of the available resources. Over the years, many thinkers have made proposals concerning global poverty reduction. However, cosmopolitanism can be seen as the school of thought with the most radical proposals to eradicate global poverty. What are its core elements? Thomas Pogge accurately describes cosmopolitanism and states the following: ´Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally – not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like’ (Pogge, 2002, p. 169).
Although adherents to cosmopolitanism share the three principles of individualism, universality and generality, there are also major differences in moral views between them (Caney, 2005). Some cosmopolitan thinkers defend an institutionalist position in which institutional reform is crucial. Although citizens also play a role in the eradication of global poverty, it is primarily countries that can and must bring about reforms. Thomas Pogge (2001, 2002) is one of these thinkers. He argues that we can conceive global poverty as a moral challenge to us in two different ways. The first is failing not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or profit from the unjust impoverishment of others, what he calls failing to fulfil our negative duty. The second is failing to help persons in situations of emergency, what he calls failing to fulfil our positive duty. In other words, a negative duty is a duty not to harm others, while a positive duty is a duty to actively promote the well-being of others.
According to Pogge, the world community has a negative duty not to harm the global poor by imposing on them a global order that either allows or exacerbates existing economic inequalities. He argues that developed countries have failed to fulfil this negative duty. They have harmed developing countries by creating and upholding an unjust global structure. Pogge argues that whoever is responsible for damage must repair that damage. This entails that developed countries have to reform the global order so that the damage caused by them is repaired (Pogge, 2001, 2002).
To demonstrate that developed countries have failed to fulfil this negative duty, Pogge (2001, 2002) distinguishes three approaches that provide an answer to the question what conditions must be met before radical inequality can be considered as something caused by the negligence of the wealthy: 1) the effects of shared institutions; 2) the uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, and; 3) the effects of a common and violent history. All three approaches regard existing inequality as something unjustifiable and agree on reforming the status quo to take a major step towards justice.
Pogge proposes to eradicate global poverty through the introduction and implementation of a Global Resources Dividend (GRD) (Pogge, 2001, p. 61). ‘The GRD proposal envisions that states and their governments shall not have full libertarian property rights with respect to the natural resources in their territory, but can be required to share a small part of the value of any resources they decide to use or sell. This payment they must make is called a dividend’ (Pogge, 2001, p. 66). Pogge argues that a Global Resources Dividend ensures that citizens can meet their basic needs with dignity and avoids any appearance of arrogant generosity. Moreover, a Global Resources Dividend would be far more efficient than the current system. Some thinkers criticize Pogge's position on global poverty reduction in which he assumes that negative duties entail responsibility for developed countries to eradicate global poverty. Mathias Risse (2005) wonders if negative duties entail responsibility for developed countries to eradicate global poverty. According to Risse, it is correct to assume that the global order harms the global poor more or less. However, he argues that Pogge overlooks that this global order has also greatly improved the well-being of citizens worldwide. The global order is not fundamentally unjust, but rather incompletely just. Therefore, Pogge’s claims concerning duties and associated responsibilities should be considered as largely false.
Debra Satz (2005) argues that it is difficult to determine if situations of extreme poverty have been caused by how developed countries have organized global institutions. Therefore, Pogge should not only focus on the global order but also take into account the effects of factors such as poorly designed local institutions and bad local policies. Furthermore, Satz believes that Pogge's view on duties is too one-sided. Although Pogge does not deny the existence of positive duties, negative duties are central to his position on global poverty reduction. According to Satz, certain positive duties would be at least as strong as negative duties. Pablo Gilabert (2005) argues that the global order undoubtedly has caused damage to the global poor. Pogge's assumption that developed countries have a negative duty to repair the damage done can also be justified. However, he argues that repairing this damage may not be enough to completely eradicate global poverty. While negative duties are normatively stronger than positive duties, Gilabert argues, contrary to Pogge, that certain positive duties, like negative duties, should also be considered as strong global duties of justice rather than as weak duties of benevolence. Therefore, Gilabert advocates a cosmopolitan view on global poverty reduction in which, in addition to negative duties, certain positive duties are included as enforceable duties of justice.
The critical comments of Risse, Satz and Gilabert on Pogge’s position on global poverty reduction raise some relevant questions that require further investigation. The central research
question is therefore as follows: ‘Do developed countries have a responsibility to eradicate global poverty based on negative duties? And if so, do only negative duties legitimately assign such a responsibility to developed countries or do positive duties also play a crucial role?’
Several considerations underlie the choice to specifically study Pogge's cosmopolitan position on global poverty reduction. First of all, Pogge (2001, 2002) is seen as an authority concerning cosmopolitan proposals in which institutional reform is central to eradicating global poverty. His most relevant contributions to the debate have received many responses and he is often quoted when different cosmopolitan basic principles and positions are compared. Furthermore, by studying Pogge's position, we can delve deeper into the more normative question of what duties legitimately assign responsibility to developed countries for global poverty reduction, as well as the underlying question to what extent the global order damages the global poor. Finally, since global poverty is still a major issue and most cosmopolitan thinkers regard it as an urgent soluble problem, the practical feasibility of a position should also be taken into account. Pogge’s specific proposal to introduce a Global Resources Dividend meets the demand that a theory of global justice ought to be feasible. This makes it worthwhile to examine the basic principles underlying this specific proposal. The critical evaluation of Pogge's position will take into consideration the positions of Risse (2005), Satz (2005) and Gilabert (2005). These positions were chosen because they directly address Pogge’s most relevant contributions to the debate on global poverty reduction. These works are: Eradicating Systemic Poverty: brief for a global resources dividend in which Pogge (2001) introduces the conditions that must be met before it can be established that developed countries have harmed the global poor and World Poverty and Human Rights in which Pogge (2002), based on empirical studies, argues that these conditions are met in reality. Furthermore, what is specifically attractive about the three aforementioned critiques is that they offer different views on the various aspects of Pogge's position that are relevant for answering the central research question. As such, the critiques complement each other very well. For example, while Risse focuses in particular on the extent to which negative duties entail responsibility for developed countries to eradicate global poverty, Gilabert does not question the significance of fulfilling negative duties. Above all, he wonders whether certain positive duties, like negative duties, should not also be considered as strong global duties of justice rather than as weak duties of benevolence.
This study derives its scientific relevance from its contributions to the cosmopolitan debate on global poverty reduction. Specifically, this study adds to the debate by examining to what extent Pogge's position can be considered as morally justified. By including and evaluating positions of several thinkers who elaborate on aspects of Pogge’s position that are relevant for answering the central research question, the strengths and weaknesses of his position are revealed. The critical evaluation of Pogge’s position will determine to what extent developed countries have harmed the global poor and what global duties of justice these countries have. Relevant insights that emerge here show how a cosmopolitan position on global poverty reduction should look like. Moreover, this study is societally relevant because its conclusions can provide policymakers and citizens with new insights into the strengths and weaknesses of
certain institutional reforms. This can help policymakers and citizens with determining to what extent certain proposals are convincing and what institutional reform should look like. To be able to answer the central research question, several steps must be taken. Chapter 2 will provide some background information on global poverty. Central to chapter 3 is Pogge’s position on global poverty reduction. In chapter 4 Risse, Satz and Gilabert’s critiques of Pogge’s position will be introduced. Chapter 5 will present a philosophically grounded position of my own based on a substantive assessment of the positions outlined, emphasizing the significance of enforcing the fulfilment of both negative and positive duties. In chapter 6 an answer will be formulated to the central research question and recommendations for further research will be made.
Chapter 2 – Global poverty
This chapter will discuss how poverty is defined and what the global poverty reduction policy looks like nowadays. An outline of the current global poverty situation contributes to a better understanding of the positions that are central to this research and provides insights into how situations of extreme poverty emerged and how global poverty is currently eradicated.
Global poverty: the concept
Among scientists and journalists, there seems to be little or no consensus on how the concept of global poverty can best be described (McComb, 2016). News programs often refer to citizens in developing countries who are hungry and suffer from various diseases, but according to several scientists, the concept encompasses more than that. Merriam-Webster (2019), an American publishing company known for its reference works, describes poverty as ‘the state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable amount of money or material possessions’. This conception of poverty presupposes that poverty needs to be interpreted differently in different parts of the world, depending on socially constructed standards. In other words, this would entail that the actual meaning of poverty varies from country to country and from city to city.
Several statisticians in the United States and India consider living on less than $ 1.90 a day as a situation of extreme poverty. Some statisticians in other countries argue that not only the amount of money someone has at their disposal but also the degree of access to health care, clean drinking water, food and education matter (McComb, 2016). This latter definition of the concept of global poverty seems to be more accurate than the previous one, since the lack of access to clean drinking water and food is seen as a major cause of poverty in developing countries (Shah, 2010, 2013, 2014).
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between absolute and relative poverty. Absolute poverty includes the amount of money a person needs to be able to meet their basic needs such as food, water and housing. This concept does not include how poor someone is compared to someone else. Relative poverty is based on relationships between different individuals in a particular society. Citizens are poor if they fail to achieve certain living standards that are leading in a certain area. Context plays an important role in the concept of relative poverty. However, both the concepts of absolute and relative poverty have been criticized for the fact that they mainly focus on income and consumption while failing to properly consider other factors such as access to good education and good health care (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017).
According to Allison Meade (2013), global poverty is a state of life that affects not only specific individuals but also society as a whole. Extreme poverty can lead to an increase in acts of despair, violent conflicts, human trafficking and prostitution, but also to an increase in illness and bad medical conditions among citizens which entails higher costs for society. Furthermore, Meade indicates that the concept of poverty is generally defined based on economic norms and basic human needs, but that those specific definitions diverge. She also
notes that there is widespread agreement that the limit of extreme poverty must be around $ 1.25 per day. However, further research shows that since October 2015 $ 1.90 and no longer $ 1.25 per day has been used as the international standard. This standard is periodically updated due to changing living costs in different parts of the world (World Bank, 2015).
Global poverty: the current situation
Research shows that in 2013, 767 million citizens still live below the poverty line of $ 1.90 per day. Another more than 2 billion citizens have no more to spend than $ 2.50 per day (Shah, 2014). As much as 80% of the world's population has no more to spend than $ 10 per day. In developing countries, the percentage is even higher than 95% (Chen & Ravallion, 2008). The lack of available resources has great consequences for this group of people, including limited access to good education and good health care. According to Eric Jensen (2009), situations of extreme poverty also entail emotional and social challenges and cognitive delays. However, not only citizens who live below the poverty line suffer from poverty. The welfare of millions of other citizens is also at stake (EA Concepts 2019c, 2019d; World Bank, 2018c).
Citizens in developing countries suffer the most. Almost 1 billion citizens in these countries were unable to read and write their names at the beginning of the 21st century (Shah, 2014), while more than 1.1 billion citizens in developing countries have insufficient access to clean drinking water (Shah, 2013; McComb, 2016) and no less than 1.6 billion citizens have to live without electricity (United Nations, 2007). Good safety nets and facilities to help the poor are often lacking in developing countries. These countries, in part due to a large number of poor citizens, often do not have the potential to structurally eradicate poverty and offer support to those who need it the most (McComb, 2016).
Mainly children have a hard time. Over 1 billion of them live in structural poverty. 640 million of them do not have permanent accommodation, while 400 million children do not have structural access to safe drinking water, 270 million children do not have access to good health care and 121 million children do not have access to good education (World Bank, 2012). Figures of the United Nations (2007) even show that in the year 2005 72 million children did not go to school at all. According to the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2005), as a result of structural poverty, in the year 2003, as many as 10.6 million children in the age group 0 to 5 years old died. That amounts to around 21,000 to 22,000 children per day who die unnecessarily (Shah, 2011; United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, 2009). Some 8 million of these children died as a result of unsafe drinking water and malnutrition (Meade, 2013).
Global poverty: the public debate
In the public debate on global poverty reduction, there is one thing that most people seem to agree on, namely that poverty is a real, large and complex multi-layered problem that affects millions of citizens worldwide and that needs to be addressed. Most people also seem to agree that poverty should not only be defined economically. The definition must also have a political and cultural element and take into account the consequences of poverty for issues
such as access to good education and good health care (Meade, 2013). However, there seems to be less agreement as to what it is like to be poor and above all about how poverty can be eradicated most effectively. As a result, many different proposals are suggested to counteract the problem (McComb, 2016).
One of the major issues in the public debate on global poverty reduction is whether economic growth and poverty reduction go hand in hand. Some researchers argue that growth is generally good for the poor. Figures show that the poverty rates in all developing countries that have experienced sustained growth over the last decades have fallen (Lukauskas et al., 2013; Rodrik, 2000a, 2000b; World Bank, 2006). Other researchers reopened the debate on the impact of economic growth on poverty and show that evidence of a positive impact of growth on poverty is mixed (Dohlman & Soderback, 2007).
Another ongoing discussion is about the overseas aid programs intended to support the poor. It is said that these programs entail an incredible amount of costs with hardly any effect, that they are too one-sided and that they include a certain form of paternalism that cannot be justified (EA Concepts 2019a, 2019b; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009). Other people disagree with this point of view. They argue that critics of the overseas aid programs underestimate how many citizens have been supported by these programs over sixty years: around 400 million (EA Concepts, 2019b; MacAskill, 2015). Critics would also focus too much on aid programs that are driven by the government and hardly examine simple interventions aimed at specific vulnerable citizens (EA Concepts, 2019b; Karnofsky, 2016).
Global poverty reduction policy
Developed and developing countries, international organizations as well as citizens cooperate regularly to eradicate poverty worldwide. Some relevant organizations that work on global poverty-related issues are the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The United Nations is an organization with 193 Member States that sets up both general reform plans and reform plans for indigent countries (United Nations, 2019a). The World Bank is the world’s largest institute for development cooperation and provides developing countries with loans which for example can be used for structural reforms of the education or the healthcare system (World Bank, 2019). The International Monetary Fund is a United Nations organization for international monetary cooperation. The organization grants credits to countries with payment issues (International Monetary Fund, 2019a).
According to the World Bank (2018b), there are at least two universal measures countries have to take to reduce poverty sustainably, though the ultimate effectiveness of poverty reduction policy depends on the context of a country and citizens’ specific needs. First and foremost, countries must achieve growth in both an inclusive and labour-intensive manner. This entails that investing in human capital is essential. The main focus must be on citizens who, through no fault of their own, are not independently able to benefit from essential basic services. Furthermore, it is important to ensure poor and vulnerable citizens against shocks that can put them in an even more miserable and hopeless situation. Examples of these shocks are economic crises and the variability of food prices. The World Bank (2018b) emphasizes that implementing the above two universal measures in countries is not a guarantee for the full
eradication of global poverty. Global challenges such as climate change and the high level of inequality between citizens when it comes to both income and opportunities form an obstacle for progress. Besides, specific attention must be paid not only to poverty in developing countries but also to the poorest citizens in other parts of the world. After all, more than half of the citizens who live below the poverty line live in a country that is not considered a developing country.
A crucial part of the current global poverty reduction policy is the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative. This initiative was set up in 1996 by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank specifically for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries to ensure that no country is left with an unsustainable debt burden. Eligibility for debt relief is not self-evident. Aid is conditional in the sense that national governments must achieve certain objectives and implement both economic and social reforms (World Bank, 2018a; International Monetary Fund, 2018a).
Being able to deliver a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is one of the requirements set by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund before a country is eligible for debt relief within the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (Dijkstra, 2011; International Monetary Fund, 2018b; World Bank, 2011). Most other large donors also demand these papers before they consider poor countries eligible for their help (Dijkstra, 2011). The papers are intended to help the recipient countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (International Monetary Fund, 2018b; United Nations, 2015a; World Bank, 2011).
Also countries outside the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative adopt Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and are supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through another route (World Bank, 2005). According to the World Bank (2005) and the International Monetary Fund (2018b), it is important to explicate a development model that gives countries specific responsibilities to eradicate poverty effectively. The Poverty Reduction Strategy approach provides countries with a framework to formulate their priorities and to map out the policies, the various programs and the resources needed to achieve the set goals. It encourages governments to set clear priorities and makes them responsible for achieving good results (Driscoll & Evans, 2005; Klugman, 2002; Lazarus, 2008; Miller & Ziegler, 2006; World Bank, 2005). Besides, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers describe a country’s associated external financing needs and important sources of funding (World Bank, 2011). Both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the current poverty situation within a certain country forms the basis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy used. National governments have to involve citizens in the creation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. However, in reality, not every country succeeds equally well (Driscoll & Evans, 2005; Klugman, 2002; Lazarus, 2008; Miller & Ziegler, 2006).
The Poverty Reduction Strategy approach has ensured that many diverging countries put more emphasis on poverty reduction when formulating and implementing their development strategy. The approach has also ensured that, in general, citizens are more involved in participatory processes that aim to eradicate poverty, that money spent on poverty reduction is more clearly mapped and better managed, and that more attention is paid to the results of specific poverty reduction policies (World Bank, 2011).
This chapter has provided more insights into how distressing situations of extreme poverty are and what developed countries and international organizations funded by developed countries are doing right now to make these situations less distressing. However, the question is whether or not the current approach to global poverty reduction can be justified. To what extent are developed countries responsible to eradicate global poverty? And what principles underlie this responsibility? The following chapter shows what Pogge’s argumentation looks like.
Chapter 3 – Thomas Pogge’s position on global poverty reduction
This chapter focuses on Pogge's position on global poverty reduction. Before delving deeper into Pogge's position, it makes sense to briefly introduce non-cosmopolitan and some other cosmopolitan positions in the debate. Insights into the similarities and differences between several positions on global poverty reduction are useful for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of Pogge’s position.
Theory of distributive justice
According to Simon Caney (2005, p. 103), a theory of distributive justice must provide an answer to the following four questions:
1. ‘What sorts of entities are included within systems of distributive justice (humans, all sentient creatures, collective entities such as states or nations)?’(p. 103).
2. ‘Who are the rightful recipients of goods, and who is obligated to distribute these goods?’ (p. 103).
3. ‘What should people have fair shares of (income, happiness)?’ (p. 103).
4. ‘According to what criterion of distributive justice should goods be distributed (equality, according to desert, or the market)?’ (p. 103).
We will see that based on the above questions, Pogge's position on global poverty reduction is more or less at odds with both non-cosmopolitan positions and some other cosmopolitan positions.
Non-cosmopolitan positions
Non-cosmopolitan thinkers, unlike Pogge, argue that developed countries have no responsibility for global poverty reduction. Libertarian and liberal nationalist thinkers agree with Pogge that we have strong duties not to harm others and only weak duties to help citizens we have not harmed. However, they disagree with Pogge’s argument that the global structure has to be taken into account as a factor of poverty. Libertarian and liberal nationalist thinkers only consider local and national factors to be of importance. Coimbatore Krishnarao Prahalad and Gary Hamel (2005), two libertarian thinkers, argue that people themselves are in all cases responsible for the choices they make. Poorer citizens should be considered as capable and willing. They participate voluntarily in the free market economy, are fully aware of their consumer behaviour and are therefore themselves responsible for situations of extreme poverty. David Miller (2002), a liberal nationalist thinker, holds national states responsible for eradicating poverty. National states are autonomous, have the right to determine their state structure without interference from outside, and are therefore themselves responsible for the consequences of decisions taken. Furthermore, he argues that citizens have stronger moral duties towards their fellow-citizens than towards citizens in other states.
The cosmopolitan framework
Cosmopolitan thinkers, unlike libertarian and liberal nationalist thinkers, argue that developed countries have a responsibility to eradicate global poverty. Global poverty is an urgent soluble problem that needs to be tackled on a global scale. However, cosmopolitan thinkers disagree about the duties underlying this responsibility and how global poverty has to be tackled (Caney, 2005). Are only governments of developed countries responsible to eradicate global poverty or do citizens in developed countries also have a responsibility to improve the situation of the global poor? And if institutional reform is part of the solution, what exactly should this reform look like?
According to Caney (2005, pp. 105-106), the following four points reflect the nature of cosmopolitan positions. First, the question is who is entitled to redistributed goods. Most contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers argue that individual citizens rather than states are entitled to these goods.
Second, it is important to distinguish between different kind of principles. This concerns in particular a distinction between fundamental principles and principles that follow from these fundamental principles. Cosmopolitan thinkers argue that, at least based on fundamental principles, all citizens worldwide should be taken into account when redistributing goods. Third, it is important to distinguish between different types of cosmopolitanism. The central distinction is that between modest cosmopolitanism and ambitious cosmopolitanism. Modest cosmopolitan thinkers argue that we must apply principles of distributive justice on a global scale. Ambitious cosmopolitans add to this that citizens have no special additional duties towards their fellow-citizens that go beyond the duties towards all citizens worldwide.
Fourth, it is important to distinguish between different kind of approaches. Here we can distinguish institutional approaches from interactional approaches. An institutional approach assumes that principles of justice are based on common institutional links between countries. In partial contrast, an interactional approach assumes that these principles also apply if there is no common institutional link between countries.
In particular, the distinction between institutional and interactional approaches is relevant to further elucidate in light of the central research question. Thomas Pogge (2001, 2002) defends an institutional approach. Those who are responsible for situations of structural and long-term poverty are responsible to repair the damage done. Peter Singer (1972, 2009) defends an interactional approach. Even if you are not responsible for inflicting damage directly, you can still be held responsible for repairing it. He argues that citizens in developed countries are obliged to help all citizens in need worldwide. If you do not act accordingly, you are behaving immorally. Singer’s central point is that individuals should do as much as possible to help eradicate global poverty.
Pogge (2002) argues that negative duties (not harming others) outweigh positive duties (actively promoting the well-being of others). Although Pogge does not deny the existence of positive duties, he believes that it is dangerous to focus too much on positive duties. By mainly focusing on positive duties and thereby particularly helping citizens in need, the structural causes of poverty are not addressed. According to Pogge, it is better to eradicate poverty structurally so that citizens do not end up in a situation of extreme poverty at all. Before we consider options to save citizens from a situation of extreme poverty, it is important to ensure that citizens do not end up in a situation of extreme poverty at all.
Pogge argues that negative duties should be regarded as strong global duties of justice. If you have inflicted damage to another person and have thus violated a negative duty, you are obliged to repair the damage done. More specifically, this entails that if you are responsible for a situation of extreme poverty, you have a strong duty to repair the damage done. According to Pogge, positive duties should not be regarded as strong global duties of justice and should only be considered as weak duties of benevolence. If a situation of poverty exists that you have not caused yourself, you have no strong duty to repair the damage done. Although it is noble to do repair the damage done out of charity, you cannot be held responsible if you fail to do so. In concrete terms, this entails that the global rich only have a responsibility considering global poverty reduction if they are to some extent responsible for its emergence. 'The basic negative duty involved would be that one ought not to cooperate in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that avoidably leaves human rights unfulfilled without making reasonable efforts to aid its victims and to promote institutional reform’ (Pogge, 2002, p. 170).
Three approaches
Pogge (2001, p. 60) indicates five conditions that, when met, show the existence of radical inequality:
1. ‘The worse-off are very badly off in absolute terms’ (p. 60).
2. ‘They are also very badly off in relative terms – very much worse off than many others’ (p. 60).
3. ‘The inequality is impervious: it is difficult or impossible for the worse-off substantially to improve their lot; and most of the better-off never experience life at the bottom for even a few months and have no vivid idea what it is like to live in that way’ (p. 60).
4. ‘The inequality is pervasive: it concerns not merely some aspects of life, such as the climate or access to natural beauty or high culture, but most aspects or all’ (p. 60).
5. ‘The inequality is avoidable: the better-off can improve the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming badly off themselves’ (p. 60).
Some thinkers argue that the existence of radical inequality is enough to show the violation of a negative duty. However, Pogge argues that these five conditions only indicate that we have to fulfil our positive duty. Therefore, he examines ‘what further conditions must be satisfied for radical inequality to manifest an injustice that involves violation of a negative duty by the
better-off’ (Pogge, 2001, p. 61). Pogge distinguishes three approaches that provide an answer to this question: the effects of shared institutions, the uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, and the effects of a common and violent history. All three approaches regard existing inequality as something unjustifiable and share the conviction that reforming the status quo is required to take a major step towards justice.
The first approach, concerning the effects of shared institutions, introduces three additional conditions that, when met, show the violation of a negative duty by the better-off (Pogge, 2001).
6. ‘There is a shared institutional order that is shaped by the better-off and imposed on the worse-off’ (p. 61).
7. ‘This institutional order is implicated in the reproduction of radical inequality in that there is a feasible institutional alternative under which so severe and extensive poverty would not persist’ (p. 61).
8. ‘The radical inequality cannot be traced to extra-social factors (such as genetic handicaps or natural disasters) that, as such, affect different human beings differentially’ (p. 61).
If these three conditions are met, negative duties are violated and dealing with existing global poverty becomes morally urgent.
Pogge (2002) argues that in reality the above conditions are met. Developed countries and developing countries are linked as they are part of the same global economic and political-legal order. The current order tends to perpetuate and even exacerbate existing economic inequalities. Developed countries have far more expertise and negotiating power during international negotiations on trade agreements and are guided only by the interests of large companies and their citizens. The interests of poor countries matter much less.
To empirically strengthen these claims, Pogge (pp. 15-20) provides some examples of situations in which developed countries put their interests first in such a way that the interests of the global poor were harmed. According to Pogge, several developed countries advocated protectionist measures to protect their economies during multiple World Trade Organization negotiations. These measures include quotas and granting subsidies to domestic producers. Pogge argues that if developed countries did not take these protectionist measures, developing countries would have a lot more export opportunities, employment and wages for workers would increase, and as a result, fewer citizens would live in situations of extreme poverty. Furthermore, developed countries ensure that their intellectual property rights increase in size and duration by imposing them on developing countries. Developing countries have to pay a lot of money to companies in developed countries to get access to markets in areas such as pharmaceuticals. As a result, many citizens in developing countries have no access to medicines that can help them get rid of their illness, after which some of them die unnecessarily.
According to Pogge (2002), a couple of privileges held by (corrupt) leaders of developing countries maintain absolute poverty. Examples of these privileges are the possibilities of selling natural resources to and borrowing money from developed countries on behalf of the
country and its citizens. It is no coincidence that leaders of developing countries have these privileges: it is in the interest of developed countries that these privileges continue to exist. Pogge argues that developed countries have an interest in a reliable supply of raw materials for products they want to use and in providing loans that are very lucrative for themselves. However, it is very unfavourable for the citizens in developing countries that these privileges exist. Leaders of developing countries can maintain their power through these privileges without popular support, as it is partly through these privileges that they have the money and military strength to oppress citizens. Developed countries often pay large sums of money to leaders of developing countries for their services and because developed countries sell weapons to corrupt leaders of developing countries, these leaders are better able to maintain their military power.
Pogge (2002) argues that oppression is a means that is often used by leaders of developing countries. As a result, citizens in developing countries are in many cases unable to govern themselves. Leaders of developing countries generally govern in their name and against their will. Citizens in developing countries are also often burdened with debts and denied access to natural resources. After all, it is far more lucrative for leaders of developing countries to cooperate with leaders of developed countries than to eradicate poverty at the local and the national level. According to Pogge, given the current global order, it is difficult to directly assign responsibility for global poverty reduction to leaders of and citizens in developing countries. Mainly developed countries cause local and national malpractice by imposing global rules that are disadvantageous for the global poor. Therefore, Pogge argues that responsibility for the emergence of situations of extreme poverty cannot be shifted to local and national factors, but lies with the global order that developed countries impose on developing countries.
The second approach, concerning the uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, introduces one condition that, when met, shows the violation of a negative duty by the better-off (Pogge, 2001).
9. ‘The better-off enjoy significant advantages in the use of a single natural resource base from whose benefits the worse-off are largely, and without compensation, excluded’ (p. 63). Developed countries violate the negative duty if they disregard poorer citizens in developing countries when distributing and sharing resources.
Pogge (2002) argues that in reality the above condition is met. Both developed and developing countries depend on the same natural resources to keep their economies running and generate prosperity. However, developed countries own disproportionally larges shares of resources like oil. Moreover, developed countries do not compensate developing countries for the external effects of depleting natural resources.
According to Pogge (2002), it is not necessarily problematic if developed countries appropriate more natural resources than they need for their use. It becomes problematic when these developed countries appropriate so many natural resources that not enough resources are left for the global poor. Pogge argues that the negative duty not to exclude the global poor from a proportionate share of natural resources is currently being violated. Developed
countries cooperate with corrupt leaders of developing countries who act in particular in their interest, denying the global poor access to a sufficient amount of natural resources.
The third approach, concerning the effects of a common and violent history, also introduces one condition that, when met, shows the violation of a negative duty by the better-off (Pogge, 2001).
10. ‘The social starting positions of the worse-off and the better-off have emerged from a single historical process that was pervaded by massive grievous wrongs’ (p. 65).
The central point here is that extreme inequality must not be upheld in starting positions when by the allocation of these positions historical processes in which moral principles and legal rules were massively violated play a significant role.
Pogge (2002) argues that in reality the above condition is met. The social starting positions of both developed and developing countries are part of the same historical process. While developed countries enjoy a high level of prosperity, many developing countries suffer from situations of extreme poverty. According to Pogge, current situations of extreme poverty have partly arisen from a common and violent history in which some crimes have played a major role. Back when developed countries still had colonies and reigned over developing countries, political systems and cultures were toppled, natural resources were seized, and residents of developing countries were used as commodities. Pogge argues that these crimes were so horrific that the current uneven starting positions occupied by developed and developing countries cannot be considered as legitimate. Because the historical process, of which these crimes are part, is the same for both developed and developing countries, developed countries' moral claims to their current prosperity have been weakened. The moral claims of developing countries, which have suffered from crimes committed by developed countries, are much stronger.
Based on these three approaches, it can be concluded that the global poor have a compelling moral claim to some of the prosperity developed countries currently enjoy and that these developed countries have a moral duty to repair the damage caused to the global poor. According to Pogge (2002), developed countries after all have a basic negative duty not to harm developing countries through the global order. Yet the three approaches show that developed countries have not fulfilled this basic negative duty: the global order imposed by the better-off to the worse-off reproduces inequality, the better-off disproportionately use natural resources without compensating the worse-off and the social starting positions of the worse-off are also considerably worse than those of the better-off, partly due to violent historical processes. By showing that all ten previously mentioned conditions are met, Pogge tries to demonstrate that the current global poverty situation is unjust and that institutional reform is key for changing the current global order. Developed countries have to establish an alternative global order in which international rules will no longer harm the global poor.
Global Resources Dividend
Pogge proposes the introduction and implementation of a Global Resources Dividend (GRD) (Pogge, 2001, p. 61). ‘The GRD proposal envisions that states and their governments shall not
have full libertarian property rights with respect to the natural resources in their territory, but can be required to share a small part of the value of any resources they decide to use or sell. This payment they must make is called a dividend’ (Pogge, 2001, p. 66). A Global Resources Dividend can be seen as a type of tax on consumption since a dividend (a tax) makes natural resources more expensive. Countries are not obliged to use natural resources or obliged to sell them. However, if they decide to do so, they will pay a dividend.
According to Pogge (2001), a Global Resources Dividend must ensure that the damage caused by the current unjust global order to the global poor is repaired and that a fairer global order is created in which the global poor are compensated when natural resources are used or sold by their country or by their fellow-citizens. If some countries do not comply with the duty to pay a dividend, other countries may impose additional taxes on these countries when trading with them. In this way, non-paying countries can be put under pressure and Global Resources Dividend payments can be enforced. Scarce resources are an exception to this mechanism. As these resources are inalienable, they should not be used or sold indefinitely. Countries must ensure that enough of these resources are left for the global poor. An international organization can ensure that Global Resources Dividend payments are used to ensure that citizens in developing countries can meet their basic needs.
The proposal consists of four additional conditions considering the implementation of a Global Resources Dividend (Pogge, 2001, p. 67).
1. It must be easy to understand and to apply a Global Resources Dividend. 2. The overall collection costs have to remain low.
3. The price of goods consumed to satisfy basic needs should only be affected by the Global Resources Dividend to a small extent.
4. Discouraging the use of natural resources that are harmful to the environment needs special attention.
Pogge (2001) argues that a Global Resources Dividend ensures that citizens can meet their basic needs with dignity and avoids any appearance of arrogant generosity. Moreover, a Global Resources Dividend would be far more efficient than the current system. ‘While affluent countries now provide $52 billion annually in official development assistance, a 1% GRD would currently raise about $300 billion annually. This is $250 per year for each person below the international poverty line, over three times their present average annual income’ (Pogge, 2001, p. 67).
This chapter has clarified the position of Pogge in the debate on global poverty reduction. Unlike non-cosmopolitan thinkers and some other cosmopolitan thinkers, Pogge assigns responsibility for global poverty reduction to developed countries based on negative duties. However, have developed countries failed to fulfil the basic negative duty not to harm the global poor through the global order? And should positive duties not be given a more prominent place in a cosmopolitan position on global poverty reduction? The following chapter shows what Risse, Satz, and Gilabert’s argumentations look like.
Chapter 4 – The limited significance of negative duties
This chapter discusses to what extent developed countries have harmed the global poor and what duties legitimately assign a responsibility to developed countries to eradicate global poverty. Insights that emerge in this discussion are useful for the substantive assessment of Pogge’s position on global poverty reduction that is central to the next chapter. Mathias Risse, Debra Satz and Pablo Gilabert's critiques will be discussed systematically per an aspect of Pogge’s position. A separate discussion of the several critiques per author is not necessary, as in this research the separate critiques themselves will not be assessed in their totality.
The prosperity of developing countries
Mathias Risse
One of the central aspects of Pogge's cosmopolitan position on global poverty reduction is that developed countries harm the global poor through the global order. Risse (2005) argues that it can be demonstrated that developed countries have harmed the global poor. However, he emphasizes that the global poor have not only been harmed by the global rich. Actions by developed countries would also have caused a huge increase in prosperity and well-being in developing countries. According to Risse, compared to decades ago, these countries have undergone a tremendous development: a development largely attributable to developed countries.
Therefore, Pogge's position, in which the focus is on repairing damage, is too one-sided. Risse (2005) argues that Pogge should pay more attention to the prosperity developed countries have produced in developing countries. Risse considers the current global order as incompletely just rather than fundamentally unjust. ‘I argue that this global order does not harm the poor according to the benchmarks of comparison used by Pogge, but that on the contrary, according to those benchmarks, this order has caused amazing improvements over the state of misery that has characterized human life throughout the ages’ (Risse, 2005, p. 2). By going through several steps, Risse explains how he came to that conclusion.
Risse (2005) starts his argument by referring to the past. More than 200 years ago, almost everyone was poor. The situation today is very different. Developing countries are far richer in the 21st century than developed countries were in the 19th century. Also, in the past, developed countries considered the interests of developing countries as subordinate to their own. As a result, negotiations between developed countries and developing countries were often detrimental to the latter group of countries. That would be much less the case today. According to Risse, it is striking that so many citizens no longer live in poverty. Two important developments underlie this fact. The industrial revolution has improved the division of labour and has made possible technological progress. This progress, which has taken place mainly in developed countries, has also led to a better quality of life for the global poor. Besides, numerous international organizations have been established that symbolize the current global order. Risse argues that without the support of these organizations, developing countries would be much worse off.
Causes of global poverty: a more complex genealogy
Mathias Risse
Risse (2005) argues that historical data are difficult to use as a measure for whether developed countries have harmed the global poor. These data in particular tell us something about how the current situation relates to situations of the past and not so much about who is responsible for the emergence of current situations of extreme poverty. Therefore, Risse investigates if there are additional suitable methods for measuring the damage caused to the global poor other than the method that makes use of historical data. However, he concludes that there are none. For example, we cannot use counterfactuals. We cannot trace what would have happened if the past had turned out differently. Then you should mimic reality based on possible developments that have never happened in reality with possible people who have never been in power in reality. It is simply not possible to find out what the world would have looked like today if the current global order had not, or only partly, been developed in the way it has currently been developed. The only option left is to investigate what the global order has brought about based on historical data. According to Risse, it can be concluded that this order has led to great progress. Among other things, developed countries have brought about better food production and have made medicines widely accessible. In other words, the global order has brought more prosperity than harm to the global poor.
Hence, Risse (2005) argues that the damage inflicted on the global poor cannot be fully attributed to an unjust global order. He acknowledges that some of this damage is caused by actions of developed countries. After all, they allow leaders of developing countries to sell natural resources and borrow money on behalf of their country without benefiting their citizens. However, it would be incorrect to assume that a bad economic situation in a developing country as a whole result from the actions of developed countries and the adverse effects of negotiations between developed countries and developing countries. According to Risse, several factors underlie a country's economic situation. In addition to global and multilateral factors, this also concerns local and national factors. If for example a policymaker in a particular area of a developing country implements bad measures and subsequently harvests fail and thousands of citizens end up in a situation of famine, it is incorrect to hold developed countries directly responsible for this misery.
Finally, Risse (2005) emphasizes that most cosmopolitan thinkers, including Pogge, in general question the legitimacy of states and the global order imposed by states. Due to the existence of states, the life prospects of citizens differ across the world and consequently, their moral equality is not respected. According to cosmopolitan thinkers, because the place where you are born is just an arbitrary factor, it should not determine one’s life prospects. Risse (2005) argues that it is questionable whether the existence of states in themselves harms the global poor. Moreover, if citizens within states are allowed the opportunity to own, set up projects and pursue other wishes, states should also be enabled to pursue their own goals. In this sense, a state can legitimately prohibit its citizens from leaving its territory and deny citizens of other states access. According to Risse, cosmopolitan positions such as Pogge's are
unable to demonstrate that the existence of states harms the global poor. The global order is imperfect rather than unjust. Therefore, reforming the current global order is more appropriate than overthrowing the current global order and replacing it with a completely new order.
Debra Satz
According to Satz (2005), what is innovative about Pogge's position is that his focus on negative duties is in line with the normative premise of libertarian thinkers, namely that we have strong duties to citizens we have harmed and only some weak duties to citizens we have not harmed and that he links this to an empirical claim that assigns responsibility to developed countries to eradicate global poverty. In her argument, Satz criticizes not only the one-sided focus on negative duties but also the aforementioned empirical claim.
Satz (2005) argues that it is difficult to establish to what extent developed countries have caused situations of extreme poverty in developing countries. While developed countries have certainly contributed to the emergence of global poverty, Satz has some empirical reservations concerning Pogge’s supposed causal link. According to Satz, it is empirically difficult to identify the main causes of global poverty. Many factors underlie situations of extreme poverty. In other words, it is unclear what the exact contribution of developed countries to these situations is. Does global poverty largely result from the effects of the global order and its institutions? Satz emphasizes that we simply do not know.
According to Satz (2005), the extent to which international institutions have contributed to global poverty is open to debate. It is difficult to distinguish domestic factors from international factors. Sometimes domestic factors can be traced back to decisions made at the global level, but this is not always the case. Satz emphasizes that Pogge admits that in addition to global factors, domestic factors also influence situations of extreme poverty. However, it is incorrect to assume, like Pogge, that local institutions are always and completely influenced by global factors. Besides, it is difficult to establish how differences in prosperity persist over time. Nowadays, all kinds of technological developments are taking place that are not limited to a particular country or region. Developments are cross-border and yet certain countries do not know how to make optimal use of them. Is this due to the global order? Satz does not think so.
Hence, Satz (2005) argues that Pogge's position in which explanations for global poverty are traced back to the global order is unsatisfactory. The endogenous effects of local institutions are completely overlooked. Although local institutions do in some cases have a relationship with the global order, it has not become clear that this order dictates local institutions. According to Satz, it is important to strictly distinct causation from correlation. Pogge does not notice how difficult it is to establish a connection between the two. ‘While it may be true that bad local institutions are correlated with certain features of the international order, Pogge hasn’t really shown that this order causes those institutions’ (Satz, 2005, p. 50). Therefore, it is unlikely that the different countries at the negotiating table will agree on the extent to which the global order has harmed the interests of the global poor. Satz agrees with Pogge that global institutions need to be reformed, but argues that it is unrealistic to expect reform of these institutions to lead to complete eradication of global poverty.
Pablo Gilabert
Gilabert (2005) emphasizes that if we could show that there are endogenous causes of severe global poverty, then logically we could also argue that global poverty is not necessarily eradicated if developed countries stop harmful practices and fulfil the negative duty to repair the damage caused to the global poor. After all, in that case, local and nationals factors exist that underlie situations of extreme poverty over which developed countries have no influence. Gilabert argues that Pogge is right in saying that situations of extreme poverty cannot be fully traced back to local and national factors. However, this does not automatically entail that these situations can be fully traced back to global factors.
Beyond negative duties: the role of positive duties
Debra Satz
Satz (2005) disagrees with Pogge’s claim that only negative duties should be considered as enforceable duties. Some positive duties would be at least as important and sometimes even more important than negative duties. Why should we not have a strong positive duty to help those in need? For example, why should we not have a strong positive duty to provide citizens with food and shelter in the event of an acute disaster, like a flood, in which they have lost all of their possessions? Although Pogge does not deny that positive duties exist, he argues that they are not enforceable and therefore much weaker than negative duties. Satz argues that this is incorrect.
According to Satz (2005), a cosmopolitan position on global poverty reduction should value positive duties more and emphasize the importance of helping those in need, especially when it is with little effort. One of those duties is to protect the most vulnerable citizens worldwide. ‘An ecumenical approach has room for both positive duties to those in dire need and negative principles of reciprocity, fairness, and nonexploitation. It includes both duties of humanity and duties of justice. It is also compatible with explanatory views of world poverty that favor local causes and remedies’ (Satz, 2005, p. 54).
Pablo Gilabert
Gilabert (2005) argues that Pogge is right in saying that negative duties should play a crucial role in a theory of distributive justice. However, he believes that positive duties are crucial as well. ‘Though it is true that if the global rich harm the global poor by causing their poverty they have a duty of justice to assist them in eliminating their poverty, it is not true that the global rich have this duty only if they are responsible for the poverty of the global poor’ (Gilabert, 2005, p. 538). This entails that harming the global poor (violating the negative duty) is sufficient reason to assign responsibility to developed countries to eradicate global poverty, but that violating this negative duty is not a necessary condition for assigning responsibility. Also if a positive duty is violated, developed countries are responsible for improving the situation of the global poor. When situations of extreme poverty cannot be fully traced back to global factors, then the mere fulfilment of negative duties would not lead to
complete eradication of global poverty. In that case, the fulfilment of positive duties could play a crucial role in eradicating global poverty.
Gilabert's goal is not to demonstrate that positive duties are normatively as strong as negative duties. He argues that there is abundant evidence that the negative duty not to harm the global poor is violated by developed countries and that they have to repair the damage done. However, repairing this damage is not enough to completely eradicate global poverty. According to Gilabert, general enforceable positive duties of justice should be given a place in a cosmopolitan position on global poverty reduction as well. Therefore, he tries to demonstrate that some positive duties should also be regarded as strong duties of justice. ‘My point will not be that positive duties have the same weight or stringency as negative ones, but that some of them are strong duties of justice (with global scope) rather than weak duties of beneficence’ (Gilabert, 2005, p. 545).
To demonstrate that it is correct to regard some positive duties as enforceable duties of justice, Gilabert (2005) sets up a multi-step argument. According to Gilabert, you have a strong positive duty to help other citizens in need if you can provide that help with little effort. Of course, the duty to help is stronger if you have personally caused an emergency, but the duty to help, even if you did not cause the emergency yourself, is still strong as ever. Especially if you can prevent someone from dying. These kinds of duties can be considered as ‘interpersonal positive duties to rescue those in distress’ (Gilabert, 2005, p. 545). Furthermore, if society needs money to help congenitally disabled citizens, why should the wealthy citizens of this society not have a strong duty to make money available? Gilabert argues that while these wealthy citizens are not responsible for the fact that some members of society face congenital disabilities, they can be held responsible for preventing congenitally disabled citizens end up in a situation of extreme poverty. These kinds of duties can be considered as ‘institutional positive duties to assist citizens whose disadvantages are morally arbitrary’ (Gilabert, 2005, p. 545). According to Gilabert, the above kind of duties should be considered as enforceable global positive duties of justice that provide protection and assistance to the vulnerable.
Furthermore, Gilabert (2005) argues that global poverty can only be eradicated if positive duties, like negative duties, are considered as enforceable global duties of justice. Just enforcing negative duties and repairing damage is not enough to completely eradicate global poverty. Repairing past damage does not prevent new situations of extreme poverty from arising. This requires establishing a fairer global order. A fairer global order will prevent morally arbitrary inequalities from arising and will prevent citizens from ending up in situations of extreme poverty in the future.
According to Gilabert (2005), the above considerations call for a broader view of solidarity than the view taken by Pogge. Gilabert distinguishes three forms of solidarity:
a. ‘Beneficence or charity’ (p. 548).
b. ‘Reasonable assistance securing the conditions of autonomous agency’ (p. 548). c. ‘Harm avoidance’ (p. 548).
All three forms of solidarity require citizens to help other citizens in need under certain circumstances. However, Gilabert (2005) argues that Pogge only distinguishes between the first form of solidarity (a) and the third form of solidarity (c). He completely overlooks the second form of solidarity (b), even though this is an important form of solidarity that can be achieved partly through enforcing the fulfilment of positive duties.
Finally, Gilabert (2005) mentions that one could argue that a cosmopolitan position that includes the second form of solidarity and, therefore, enforceable positive duties is too demanding. However, we should not attach too much value to this argumentation when setting up a theory of distributive justice. After all, moral views can change over time. If incorporating enforceable positive duties into a theory of justice is currently too demanding, it may not be the case in the future. According to Gilabert, completely eradicating global poverty is worth a lot and therefore it is necessary to include both negative and positive duties in a theory of distributive justice. ‘Moral and political philosophy can in this sense be seen as part of an ongoing movement of change in our emerging global moral culture which is beginning to take a more robust universal solidarity seriously. This emerging global moral culture calls us to eradicate global poverty, and to see this duty as being both negative and positive’ (Gilabert, 2005, p. 549).
Civic and personal responsibility
Debra Satz
Satz's philosophical concerns stem from the varying degrees of human relationships to global institutions (Satz, 2005). Even if it can be established that developed countries have contributed significantly to global poverty, it is difficult to determine if citizens can be held responsible for the emergence of situations of extreme poverty. A leader of a developed country has most likely operated to a greater extent within global institutions than the owner of the neighbourhood supermarket around the corner. Is it reasonable to let the owner of the neighbourhood supermarket and a leader of a developed country contribute to repairing damage caused to the global poor to the same degree? Satz does not think so.
Satz (2005) emphasizes that we must distinguish between personal responsibility and civic responsibility. If citizens are not personally responsible for the emergence of situations of extreme poverty and the country in which they live is, do these citizens then have a responsibility to make a proportionate contribution to the countries’ duties on global poverty reduction? Pogge argues that "we" are responsible for the emergence of global poverty. However, it is unclear what that "we" means. Who are we? Governments of developed countries or also citizens? And are citizens equally responsible for the emergence of situations of extreme poverty, or not? According to Satz, many decisions at the local, national and global levels are made by government officials on behalf of citizens. To what extent is a teacher in a developed country responsible for decisions made by world leaders at an international summit? And what is the role of citizens if the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank turn out to be disadvantageous for the global poor, especially if citizens have declared that they do not actively support these policies? Satz wished Pogge had written more about this.
Finally, Satz (2005) is not convinced of the assumption that citizens in developed countries have actively harmed the global poor. If they are partly responsible for the damage done, we can say at most that citizens are negligent in achieving better international regulations to eradicate global poverty. According to Satz, individual citizens in developed countries do not have negative duties towards the global poor. Therefore, it is incorrect to assign responsibility to them for repairing part of the damage caused to the global poor based on negative duties. This chapter discussed Risse, Satz and Gilabert's critiques of Pogge's position on global poverty reduction. It provided insights into the strengths and weaknesses of Pogge's position on issues such as the degree to which developed countries are responsible for the current global poverty situation and what duties entail responsibility for developed countries to eradicate global poverty. In the next chapter, it will become clear how legitimate several critiques are when Pogge's position is assessed.
