Where the Global Level Fails, the Local Level Succeeds

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Where the Global Level Fails, the

Local Level Succeeds

The UNFCCC, Copenhagen and City Networks

Jaap Jansen

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Introduction

Addressing climate change at the global level through the United Nations (UN) has so far not brought the GHG reduction targets that it is expected to bring and that are needed to tackle the problem. Since the beginning of the 1990s negotiations within the UN have been going on in order to address the issue. Yet, until this day there is no globally agreed upon strategy for reducing the excessive CO2-emissions that cause climate change. Evidently there is the Kyoto Protocol that entered into force in 2005. However, it is lacking the support of the United States (US). Additionally, the aims of the Protocol are too low to achieve the results that are needed.1_Furthermore,

participating countries such as Canada are failing to meet their targets and the Protocol itself will expire in 2012 while an adequate successor treaty is still not in place.2

In contrast to this grim global picture there are local levels of government which are undertaking more prominent action towards limiting the effects of climate change. These measures include voluntary targets ranging further than any of the targets set by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and further than what science says is needed.3_{For example, the city of}

London has set itself the goal to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by sixty percent below the 1990 levels in 2025.4_{Executive order No. 24 of New York City has set the}

goal to reduce the city’s green house gas (GHG) emissions by eighty percent below the 1990 levels by 2050.5_{The Brazilian city of São Paulo has law no. 14.933 which}

aims to reduce GHG emissions by thirty percent from the 2005 levels by 2012.6_The

city officials of Sidney have a climate action plan that targets an eighty percent

1_{Andrew Light, “Has Japan Killed the Kyoto Protocol?:}_{Even If It Has There’s Still Hope for a}

Climate Agreement,” Center for American Progress,

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/japan_kyoto_announcement.html (Accessed: April 10, 2012).

2_{“Canada Under Investigation for Kyoto Compliance,” National Union of Public and General}

Employees, http://www.nupge.ca/issues/env-6May-08.htm (Accessed September 28, 2011).

3_{“Fact sheet: Climate change science - the status of climate change science today,” UNFCCC,} http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf (accessed September 30, 2011)

4_{“Climate Change Action Plans.” C40 Cities: Climate Leaders Group. http://www.c40cities.org/ccap/} (accessed August 22, 2011).

5_{New York State Climate Action Council, http://www.nyclimatechange.us/ (accessed September 28,} 2011).

6_{Caleigh Robinson, “Sao Paolo Adopts Comprehensive Climate Change Policy,” World Resources}

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reduction of GHG emissions from the 2007 level by 2050.7_{These are just some}

examples out of many that show how cities are acting swiftly and ambitiously to address the issue of climate change.

Very differently, the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements, meant to bring a truly global successor for the Kyoto Protocol, brought forward only a mere call upon the developed countries to achieve a 25-40% reduction below 1990 levels by 2020.8_And

the December 2011 Durban Summit did even worse, since it postponed a decision on a new agreement until 2015 that will then become active in 2020. This goes against the UNFCCC plans to have an adequate follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol before 2012. The results of Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban mean that countries have not yet committed to any binding targets for the future in order to limit climate change sufficiently. As a result, many countries will postpone some of the policy measures on climate change that are needed at the national level. This global failure happens despite that every member nation to the UNFCCC agrees on the need to limit the global temperature rise to two degrees Celsius.

With regard to the pledges that have been made in Cancun, Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, states that they only amount to sixty percent of what is needed to limit the temperature increase to two degrees Celsius.9

So, there is a substantial gap between the content of the talks by the Parties to the UNFCCC and the aim of limiting the temperature rise to two degrees.10_{For example,}

7_{“Town of Sidney Climate Action Plan,” Town of Sidney,}

http://www.sidney.ca/Assets/Development+Services/Climate+Action+Plan/Climate+Action+Plan+201 0.pdf (accessed September 29, 2011).

8_{“Modest steps in Cancún keep UN climate process alive,” Euractiv.}

http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-environment/modest-steps-cancun-keep-un-climate-process-alive-news-500551 (Accessed August 22, 2011).

9_{“Energy Efficiency Global Forum Brussels, 14 April 2011:}

Statement by Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” UNFCCC,

http://unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/pdf/110414_speech_ee_global_brussels.pdf (Accessed September 30, 2011), 2.

10_{“Mitigation,” Gateway to the United Nations Systems Work on Climate Change,}

http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/themes/mitigation (Accessed: April 12, 2012); “Council conclusions Follow-up to the Cancún Conference: 3075th ENVIRONMENT Council meeting Brussels, 14 March 2011,” Council of the European Union,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/119875.pdf (April 12, 2012); A.P. Jones, “Copenhagen Accord Reaffirms 2 Degree Goal, but Gap with National Proposals Remain. The Sooner the Action, the Cheaper and Easier,” Climate Interactive,

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the European Union has committed itself to twenty percent reductions from the 1990 levels by 2020, while a minimum of twenty-five percent is needed.11_{Similarly, the US}

has only shown willingness to limit its carbon emissions with seventeen percent below the 2005 levels by 2020.12_{This offer by the US means only a cut of about four}

percent from the 1990 levels.13

The above figures underline the divergence between global and local climate change mitigation policies. Where cities are able to bring forth adequate and even ambitious policies towards limiting the effects of climate change, the UNFCCC summits like that of Cancun bring only insufficient policy results on the issue. Where countries are unwilling to commit themselves to modest targets for 2020, cities have already set ambitious targets for 2020 and beyond. This calls for research in order to explain why and under what circumstances the global negotiations have not been able to provide the public good of climate security and why and under what circumstances cities have been able to set sufficient policies.

This thesis is well aware of the fact that climate policies in cities have, in general, been more recent in comparison to national and global efforts to create substantial and comprehensive policies.14_{However, it also recognizes the value of an}

early analysis of the climate policies that have been set in motion. Given the importance of the subject of climate change as well as the limited window of opportunity for governments, citizens and businesses to take action. Furthermore, strong, analytical value is placed on the fact the cities account for up to seventy percent of global GHG emissions.15_{Once again and as a final remark regarding the}

analysis, the thesis will remain sceptical as to the results that cities will present in the years to come. Assumptions will only be based on policies as they are set and on results that have already been achieved.

11_{“Council conclusions Follow-up to the Cancún Conference: 3075th ENVIRONMENT Council} meeting Brussels, 14 March 2011.”

12_{“US won't agree to Kyoto Protocol,” China Daily,} http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2011-11/23/content_14147097.htm (Accessed: March 17 2012).

13_{“Where Countries Stand on Copenhagen,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8345343.stm (Accessed:} March 17, 2012).

14_{“About Us,” C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group, http://live.c40cities.org/about-us/ (Accessed:} March 17, 2012); “Chronology of Efforts of ICLEI on Local Climate Action,” ICLEI Local

Governments for Sustainability,

http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/Progams/CCP/Introduction/ICLEI_Clim ate_Chronology.pdf (Accessed: March 17, 2012); “A History of Climate Change,” DirectGov, http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Environmentandgreenerliving/Thewiderenvironment/Climatechange/DG_ 072901 (Accessed: March 17, 2012)

15_{“Hot Cities: battle-ground for Climate Change,” UN Habitat,}

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With regard to the structure of the thesis, this will be as follows. The first Chapter, named ‘Climate Change Mitigation Policies – Four Strategies’ will discuss the theoretical framework which evolves around four different strategies that describe how climate change mitigation can be dealt with or not dealt with. The framework will start off by analyzing the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) in relation to climate change mitigation. From this will follow the first strategy that can be identified as being relevant for analysing the attempts to formulate climate change mitigation policies at the global level. This will be followed by a discussion of repeated games, and the consequent second strategy, the Tit-for-Tat strategy. After that, theory on public goods and its accompanying Public Goods strategy will be dealt with. Yet, given the signalled failure to implement a successful climate change mitigation strategy at the global level and the local success in doing so, there is a need for another strategy and a supplementary theory explaining the global-local divergence. This results in the formulation of the fourth strategy, namely the Unilateral-Voluntary strategy as well as a coherent number of factors that are able to explain the different outcomes of city and UNFCCC policy-making on climate change. This all should provide the paper with sufficient analytical depth. The fourth strategy and supporting theory have been specifically designed for this thesis.

After the theoretical discussion in chapter one, the second chapter, which is titled “The UNFCCC – A Failing Public Goods Strategy” will discuss the unsuccessful attempt to use the Public Goods strategy at the global level. The global level currently acts as the main policy level for climate change mitigation. The analysis will be based on an examination of the UNFCCC negotiations from the preparation of the Copenhagen Summit (2009) until the Durban Conference (2011). The factors that were presented in chapter one will form the basis for analyzing the failing global attempts towards formulating adequate climate change mitigation policies.

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PRESENTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Where the Global Level Fails, the Local Level

Succeeds

Chapter 1: Climate Change Mitigation – Four Strategies

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1. Theoretical Framework

Tackling climate change via policies made in the UNFCCC seems logical since the problem impacts the oceans, the weather, the ecology, the wildlife, and so forth. So, the effects are not merely limited to a single nation, group or individual. Furthermore, because one nation, group or individual cannot solve the issue by itself; it needs a combined effort. However, despite many forms of organisation and regulation worldwide, the decision-making on climate change is still taken in an anarchical world that lacks a government or an institutional arrangement that is able to coerce parties to contribute to the formation of the collective good of climate security.

As said, there is the effort to cooperate on the issue through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted before the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in September 2010, while “the UN remains the single most important global institution …… we are also constantly reminded of its limitations.”16 _{In that same meeting she}

mentions that the US has, due to the UNFCCC failure at the Copenhagen Climate Summit, felt the need to seek other options such as negotiating through the Major Economies Forum (MEF). Joseph Nye accurately describes the situation of a global power vacuum as “the main dilemma that the international community faces is how to include everyone and still be able to act.”17

As said in the introduction of this thesis, the UNFCCC is struggling to implement the climate change mitigation policies that are needed. Yet, at the same time the policies by city governments indicate the development of encompassing climate change mitigation policies. Their policies exemplify an approach at a lower level and one that is unilateral and voluntarily but differentiated, yet still is able to have a global impact. In order to explain this local success, as opposed to the global failure, this chapter focuses on different theories and strategies that analyze and are applicable to the behaviour of groups or individuals in an environment that lacks any element of force. Firstly, four strategies that are to a varying extent applicable to

16_{“Transcript: A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,” Council on}

Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy/conversation-us-secretary-state-hillary-rodham-clinton/p22896 (November 3, 2011).

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climate change mitigation will be presented and after that the focus will shift towards two strategies and how these can be compared on the basis of several factors.

1.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Defection Strategy

The concept of a Prisoner’s Dilemma is part of a strand of thought that is called ‘Game Theory.’ The essence of the PD evolves around two individuals who are faced with a potential dilemma between individual and collective rationality. The collective rationality states that the individual should choose ‘cooperate.’ Yet, the individual logic states that the choice to ‘defect’ is the most fit under the circumstances.18_These

circumstances are that there is a lack of information and most definitely trust about what the other individual will do. Furthermore, the individuals have only each other and no authority above them to influence the outcome. The best outcome for a single individual in the dilemma is when the other cooperates and you yourself defect. Evidently, the worst outcome occurs when you cooperate and the other defects. A player will try to avoid the worst outcome. Therefore the dominant strategy for both players in the PD is to defect given that choosing cooperation would expose them to the chance of receiving the worst possible outcome.

The image ‘Figure 1’ illustrates the pay-off structure for the Prisoner’s Dilemma ‘game’ when there are only two players. ‘Four’ means the largest utility for a player and ‘one’ is the least. When looking at the aggregated utility of each of the four game outcomes, then cooperation would give the largest combined utility, namely six instead of five or four. Only, as said, there is uncertainty about what the other player will do and therefore the safest option for both is to choose defect since this avoids the worst outcome namely one of the players gaining only a utility of ‘one.’

18_{Huib Pellikaan, Anarchie, Staat en het Prisoner’s Dilemma (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Eburon, 1994),} 19; John Simley and Karl Hell, “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Reference for Business,

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Figure 1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Pay-off Matrix

Source: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/prisoners_dilemma/

When defining the global attempts to cooperate on mitigating climate change, then the Prisoner’s Dilemma seems to portray this difficult situation very well. Let us therefore look at the characteristics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma that climate change portrays. First of all, in a Prisoner’s Dilemma there is no higher authority that can force the players to cooperate. The same goes for states across the globe trying to come to agreement on climate change. Secondly, the individual decision-unit has only partial control.19_{The fates of the players in the game are intertwined. Tackling climate}

change takes a combined effort and therefore nations as well as people all over the world are also dependent on the participation of others for curbing the threat.

Thirdly, in a PD the interests are partly opposite from and partly coincide with the interests of the other player or players. By not participating in reducing greenhouse gases, while the other states do so, a state may gain some short term and possibly long term competitive advantage. Fourth and finally, the Prisoner’s Dilemma assumes that each player strives towards maximizing its own interest, its own utility. States think selfishly and some may feel that other nations are better equipped to transition to a low carbon economy and therefore they will demand compensation or otherwise they will not participate.

By using the PD as a way to characterize the issue of climate change, the core elements of the issue are well represented. Yet, the downside of using the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that it does not fully grasp the urgency of the problem of climate change. The Prisoner’s Dilemma indicates that one party defecting and the other cooperating gives the defecting party an advantage by gaining added utility. Climate change, however, only allows for a very small margin of defectors, and even that is critical since the projections on future climate developments already indicate that a rise in

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temperature has been reached and very significant efforts are needed to not make this rise more critical. That would result in extreme weather effects and a significant rise in sea levels, which would cost nations, firms, and individuals a great amount of their wealth. Despite this shortcoming, the Prisoner’s Dilemma still gives the best theoretical reflection of what the core problem is about.

The image ‘Figure 2’ represents the Prisoner’s Dilemma for the issue of climate change. Based on this pay-off matrix, cooperation on climate change would be the best outcome for ‘the world’ since cooperation gives a total aggregated utility of six. This explains why there are attempts to cooperate through the UNFCCC. Cooperation would involve a nation to reduce its GHG emissions by at least fifty percent below the year 1990 levels by 2050. This would also involve taking adequate intermediate steps such as having emissions peaked by 2015 and afterwards steadily declining.20_{For simplicity this is called ‘sufficiently reduce’ in the pay-off matrix for}

climate change mitigation here below. These global reduction targets are the vision of the United Nations and will serve as a reference point for this thesis.

Despite the attempt and possibility for cooperation, uncertainty lures in the anarchic global environment. This means that countries will be distrustful of whether other nations will contribute their share of the mitigation efforts. Even worse, some countries will see the possibility to gain by not contributing while other countries are doing so. According to the PD this will give sufficient reason for a country to choose defection. Despite the applicability of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on the situation of climate change mitigation, the defection strategy is not useful when attempting to analyse the cooperation through the UNFCCC. This is because there is no automatic defection, countries return on a yearly basis to negotiate a possible climate change mitigation treaty. They have created the UNFCCC and the intent to cooperate is there.

20_{“Fact sheet: Climate change science - the status of climate change science today,” UNFCCC,} http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf (accessed September 30, 2011); “The Cancun Agreements,” UNFCCC,

http://cancun.unfccc.int/cancun-agreements/main-objectives-of-the-agreements/#c33 (accessed September 29, 2011); “Cancún summit delegates battle clock for climate deal,” Euractiv,

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Figure 2. Pay-off structure for climate change mitigation

Pay-off structure for climate change mitigation based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma A: Other Nations Cooperate: sufficiently reduce CO2-emissions Defect: No or insufficient reduction of CO2-emissions Cooperate: sufficiently reduce CO2-emissions 3, 3 1, 4 B: The Nation Defect: No or insufficient reduction of CO2-emissions 4, 1 2, 2 Source: J.J.W.M. Jansen

1.2 The Tit-for-Tat Strategy

Despite the grim picture deriving from the Prisoner’s Dilemma of climate change and its dominant strategy of defection, Robert Axelrod offers relief when he explains in his book “The Evolution of Cooperation” how there are often multiple attempts to cooperate on the same issue. This concept of repeated games illustrates how many Prisoner’s Dilemmas are redone over time and therefore his theory offers a different dominant strategy based on maximizing the total utility of all subsequent games and not just the one game.21_{So in many cases where a collective good is}

needed there are repeated possibilities to cooperate in order to provide the good. Talks on climate change within the UNFCCC have taken place frequently over the years. Each meeting offers a new opportunity to cooperate or to defect. States will take into

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account that they will encounter each other again in the future. They will realize that given the future encounters, there may be more to gain by adjusting the behaviour towards mutual cooperation.

In his aforementioned book Axelrod discusses the Tit-for-Tat strategy that advises a player to start the first of the repeated games with cooperation and afterwards the player needs to copy the behaviour of the other player during the previous game. By doing so it will give the other player the incentive to cooperate. The total utility of the series of games will be the most when the other player recognizes the benefit of cooperation. If not, then both will continue to defect and both gain less. This strategy gives players the opportunity to cooperate and gain a higher result than when they would use another strategy. This tactic was thought up by Anatol Rapoport and was delivered to Axelrod for use in his study on the Prisoner’s Dilemma in repeated form. Tit-for-Tat comes out of the multiple tests and simulations by Axelrod as a highly successful strategy and must therefore be taken seriously when evaluating the issue of climate change mitigation.22

Even though the Prisoner’s Dilemma of climate change mitigation is repeated, the use of the Tit-for-Tat strategy has not occurred at the global level. If this was the case then countries would have taken measures towards tackling climate change that are in line with what needs to be done in order to solve the issue. They would then look at if other countries follow their example, if not they would halt their strategies and ‘retaliate’ by not cooperating either. However, what can be seen at the global scale is that some countries are unconditional front-runners when it comes to implementing climate change mitigation policies. Denmark, China, Germany and England are examples of this.23_{Other countries like Canada and the United States are}

reluctant when it comes to implementing policies that aim to prevent the severe effects of climate change from occurring.24_{So, despite the front-runner behaviour by}

countries like Denmark, China, Germany and England this does not lead to an

22_{Axelrod, 30-51.}

23_{“OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Germany 2012,” OECD,}

http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_2649_37425_49934983_1_1_1_37425,00.html (Accessed: July 16, 2012); Gloria Gonzalez, “China, Germany and UK Have the Most Stable Clean Energy Policies,” OilPrice.com, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/China-Germany-And-UK-Have-The-Most-Stable-Clean-Energy-Policies.html (July 16, 2012).

24_{Sandro Contenta, “Canada: a climate change loser,” GlobalPost,}

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alteration of the strategy by Canada and the US. Therefore Tit-for-Tat is not applicable and another strategy needs to be at work at the global level.

Figure 3. A visual representation of Axelrod’s repeated games

Source: J.J.W.M. Jansen

The figure shows that the Prisoner’s Dilemma frequently returns and so does the possibility for cooperation.

1.3 The Public Goods Strategy

Theory on public goods evolves around goods, tangible or non-tangible, that are not being provided by the market or by individuals collectively. This happens despite the added value that these goods would have. Public goods will often not be provided due to their specific characteristics. These characteristics are excludability and non-rivalry. Non-excludability means that the use of the good, in this case climate security, cannot be excluded to those who are not contributing to the creation of the good. In some cases it also means that excluding those who are not participating in the production of the good from consuming the good cannot be done at reasonable cost.25_{For halting climate change it would be impossible to exclude any individual or}

group from the benefits it will bring. Less extreme weather and lower sea levels are favourable elements that cannot be denied to any country or individual. Yet, because of this countries and individuals may be sceptic in contributing their resources to reduction efforts while others may be profiting from that. This free-rider problem is

25_{“Public Goods, non-rivalrous and non-excludable,” Blacksacademy.net,}

http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/3402.html (Accessed: September 31, 2011).

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grave since it may discourage action from being undertaken. Public goods’ theory indicates that if a good is excludable, there will be a greater stimulus to provide it through the market.26

Then the other characteristic of a public good, that is non-rivalry, means that the good can be consumed by many different entities without affecting the quality or amount of the good. This goes the same for climate security. When this is delivered, meaning the avoidance of extreme weather circumstance, sea levels remaining the same or just slightly rising, fewer droughts in certain areas, etc., then any individual can profit from it without affecting the share and quality that others will enjoy of the good. Furthermore, with regard to non-rivalry, there is no direct relation between the costs of providing an extra unit of the public good and the number of people consuming it.27

Due to these reasons of non-excludability and non-rivalry climate change mitigation efforts are not undertaken to the extent that is needed. Political negotiations and efforts by policy-makers are therefore necessary in order to realize the policy measures that are needed to counter climate change. This is the classical solution for providing public goods, namely that through the intervention of a centralized institution with some means of force or bribes the goods are realized. Through this centralized institution like a national government or the UNFCCC, it is assured that the benefit of the public good can be enjoyed. In the case of climate change the UNFCCC tries to make sure that the necessary measures will be taken through negotiating a binding global agreement. The UNFCCC will only have the legal power of a binding agreement when its member nations come to agreement and sign a document formalizing their common understanding. Yet, as said before in this thesis, the efforts by the UNFCCC towards developing a binding agreement are troublesome and have until now not brought forward the necessary policies towards mitigating climate change.

26_{Tyler Cowen, “Public Goods,” Library of Economics and Liberty,}

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (Accessed: March 22, 2012)

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1.4 - The Unilateral-Voluntary Strategy

Many cities worldwide operate their own climate change mitigation policies. These policies are very much different from each other. Yet, many of the city policies share high targets and a high ambition towards reducing GHG emissions. Their strategy is unilateral, since cities appear not to be influenced by the behaviour of others. This contrasts strongly with the prescribed reciprocal strategy by the Tit-for-Tat method. A large number of cities are willing to aid in providing climate security regardless of the fact that there are cities that have not acted in a similar fashion. Voluntarism is also part of the strategy because there is no force, no binding agreement or other form of outside pressure or obligation that makes them act this way. This is different from the public goods strategy.

The work and research done by Elinor Ostrom provides a basis for the existence of a voluntary strategy as a way to provide a collective good. She refutes the notion that an external authority is necessary in order to enforce collective action.28

Ostrom indicates that there are voluntary associations possible that lead towards the provision of a public good.29_{Voluntary action, would in the case of climate change}

mitigation efforts by cities, mean that there are only policies at work that have come into existence without any obligations towards other cities and that they are done at a city’s own convenience.

Ostrom talks about a type of ‘enlightened reciprocity’ by saying that “individuals frequently are willing to forgo immediate returns in order to gain larger joint benefits when they observe many others following the same strategy.”30_Her

remark indicates that in order for an individual to participate in the provision of a public good, it may be sufficient for the individual to know that there are others out there that will behave in a similar fashion. So, Ostrom is already providing theory that points in the direction of voluntary action on public goods. In this thesis voluntary action refers to the contacts of city officials through networks and through meetings

28_{Elinor Ostrom,“A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action:} Presidential Address,” American Political Science Association, Vol. 92, No. 1 March, 1998. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585925 (March 24, 2012). 1-22; Scott London, “Book Review,” Scott London, http://www.scottlondon.com/reviews/ostrom.html (Accessed: March 24, 2012).

29_{Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Indiana University,} http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/reprints/R00_11.pdf (Accessed: March 24, 2012).

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and conferences.31_{These gatherings and contacts are, whether formal or informal, a}

way to exchange thoughts as well as motivate and stimulate others to act more climate friendly. Yet, this is done without any obligation and without pressure or force.

With regard to the connection between voluntary action and the theory by Ostrom, it must be critiqued that she has only a focus on institutions as a way of facilitating collective action. Ostrom sees the solution of the issue of providing common goods through agreements between individuals and an institutional structure resulting out of those agreements.32_{In the approach that cities take with regard to}

climate change, there is neither an institutional structure nor is there a binding agreement. There is only a network through which information sharing, cooperation and agreements are all loosely based.33

1.5 Analysing the Divergent Success of the Public Goods Strategy and the Unilateral-Voluntary Strategy

When comparing the Public Goods Strategy applied by the UNFCCC and the unilateral-voluntary strategy by cities, the analysis will focus on the decision-makers and their interaction among each other. The implementation of climate change policies will be scrutinized and therefore the central units of analysis should be the persons and institutional structures in charge of making these policies. In support of this, sometimes there will be looked at theory on how groups work since this will help the understanding of policy-makers having to decide within a group on the basis of consensus. The UNFCCC, the Copenhagen City Council and city networks are examples of such relevant policy making ‘groups.’ For example, cities worldwide that want to tackle climate change can be considered a group given the common characteristics and interests that they share. These groups can also form the basis for policies being created. This is the case for the UNFCCC in which a group of nations come together in order to develop policies regarding climate change. Yet, it is

31_{“ICLEI Events: 2012,” ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability,}

http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=11537 (Accessed: March 24, 2012); “Global Energy Basel – The Sustainable Infrastructure Financing Summit,” C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group,

http://live.c40cities.org/c40-events/ (Accessed: March 24, 2012); “About Us,” C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, http://live.c40cities.org/about-us/ (Accessed: March 24, 2012).

32_{Ostrom, 1-216.}

33_{“The Agreement,” World Mayors & Local Governments Climate Protection Agreement,}

http://www.globalclimateagreement.org/ (Accessed: March 22, 2012); “About Us,” C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, http://live.c40cities.org/about-us/

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important to note that these groups can operate at different levels. National policy-makers operate internally at the national level, yet in the UNFCCC they operate at the global level. City policy-makers operate internally at the local or just simply said city level, yet when connecting with other cities worldwide through a network, they also operate at the global level.

What is important to remember is that each of the aforementioned political bodies or mechanisms deals with climate change mitigation and they are therefore comparable. However, city networks must be seen as a complement to cities and their respective city councils. The city networks provide an additional tool to the city policy efforts on climate change mitigation. Individual cities working together within city networks are attempting to achieve the global public good of climate security. This is comparable to what the UNFCCC is doing and therefore it should be laid next to an individual city in combination with the city networks in order to compare which method is more effective and why that is so.

Copenhagen has been chosen as a case study example of city climate change policy-making. Other cities would also have made a good case study, however for Copenhagen data in English was easily accessible and retrievable. Furthermore, the city is very prominent when it comes to implementing climate change mitigation policies. With the help of the example of Copenhagen, the research provided in this thesis will show how ambitious climate policies are able to be created at the city level and how they through the help of city networks are able to have an overall global effect. This represents a type of multi-level governance.34_{Meaning that different}

levels and types of government or better-said governance are used in order to achieve the objective.

At global and local (city) level there are factors at work that can either discourage climate change mitigation policies from being put into place as well as encourage certain policies being created. All the factors (1-9) that are presented in figure 7 are applicable to the UNFCCC decision-making. In relation to the individual city and the role of city networks, there are some factors that refer to the individual city and its efforts to implement unilateral, voluntary measures against climate change and there are those that explain the role, existence and usefulness of city networks.

34_{Corfee-Morlot, Jan, Lamia Kamal-Chaoui, Michael G. Donovan, IanCochran, Alexis Robert and} Pierre- Jonathan Teasdale, “Cities, Climate Change and Multilevel Governance,” OECD

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This is logical since the individual city efforts together with the city climate change mitigation networks provide a direct alternative to the efforts made in the UNFCCC. Seven factors trigger city climate policy-making and the three others they stimulate the creation of city networks that promote climate policies by cities. For the UNFCCC all the factors have a negative effect on the development of climate policies through this institution.

Figure 4. City Policy Strategy in Overcoming the PD of Climate Change Mitigation

Source: J.J.W.M. Jansen

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1.5.1. Decision-making

With regard to the divergent success of the UNFCCC and of major cities to create climate change mitigation policies, this thesis has identified two decision-making factors that are considered to have a strong influence on this. These factors are ‘degree of complexity’ and the ‘degree of connection between decision-making and execution’ Both factors are the result of studying the decision-making structures of the UNFCCC and of the city of Copenhagen as well as news reports on the decision-making of the UNFCCC before, during and after the summits of Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban.

The first factor ‘Degree of Complexity’ will be used due to the persuasiveness of Bendor and Mookerherjee’s argumentation on the difficulty of large groups to decide. They argue that decision-making in a large group is difficult because it brings problems of communicating, organizing and deciding. The UNFCCC is, as was explained earlier, a large group of decision-makers and therefore it can find the burden of the problems mentioned by Bendor and Mookerherjee. The city, on the contrary has a somewhat smaller and more compact group of decision-makers.

The thesis will focus on the process of deciding by the UNFCCC and cities and not on communicating and organizing since these two aspects are well established in the UNFCCC and in cities in general. Within the UNFCCC communication happens frequently between the parties by gathering several times a year. With the annual global summits on climate change mitigation being the most prominent of those.35_{Furthermore, the organization is also well established by the existence of the}

UNFCCC as the specially designed structure for climate talks under the guardianship of the United Nations.36_{So, communication and organizing are explicitly excluded}

from the comparison of UNFCCC and city climate change policy-making.

35_{“Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2012,” UNFCCC,} http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6240.php (Accessed: March 18, 2012).

36_{UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/files/inc/graphics/image/gif/2011_bodies_large.gif (Accessed: March 18,} 2012).

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Variables for the ‘Degree of Complexity:’

- The institutional structure: how many decision-making bodies are there? The more bodies there are, the longer the decision-making process and the more chance for failure and disagreement there is.

- Are the members of the different bodies the same or does each body have different members with each body having its own mandate? If the decision-makers of different bodies are more or less the same, and just their tasks differ depending on which body they are in, then decision-making is easier and more coherent than when the decision-makers are different and more ‘isolated’ because each is trying to ‘over-perform’ its own task.

The second factor, the ‘Degree of Connection between Decision-making and Execution,’ deals with the fact that when a decision-making body has no capacity of its own to implement measures that have been decided or that will be decided, then this will further complicate the achievement of certain policies and policy results. This would mean that an institution that decides on a matter is dependent upon other bodies for the actual implementation of measures that it has decided upon. When these different bodies have no clear connection and are operating under different responsibilities and different motives, then the implementation and even the decision on certain policies becomes less likely. An institution like the UNFCCC is only able to make policies, but for the execution as well as often the approval, it is dependent on national bodies such as the parliaments of countries. When national parliaments disagree with decisions made by the UNFCCC, then it may have the constitutional and legal ability to frustrate the approval of a UNFCCC agreement as well as to complicate the execution of the policies. A policy-making entity like the city, in contrast, often has its own executive capabilities in addition to its decision-making powers.

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processes.37_{This thesis would like to place more importance on the execution of}

climate policies, which for the UNFCCC lies within the domestic jurisdiction of its member states. The thesis will analyze whether the institutional gap between deciding through the UNFCCC and execution nationally aids in the failure of making adequate climate policies and whether this is different for city climate policy-making.

This thesis will show that aiding in the occurrence of a unilateral city climate policy strategy is the fact that the decision-making group is the same group as the one that executes the measures as agreed upon. A city controls important services that have the ability to significantly reduce the CO2-levels. Local policy makers have control over public transportation, electricity supply, water supply, waste management, infrastructure, and building regulation. These are crucial fields where major CO2-reduction can be achieved.38_{Therefore decision and implementation are}

not made in isolation from each other and by different policy-making groups, as is the case with the UNFCCC and its member states. When the decision-making body is differentiated from the executive body and the members of the body are also different and carry no real connection to the other then there is a lesser chance that certain policies will be put in place or are executed.

Variables of ‘Degree of Connection Between Decision-making and Execution:’ - The making body is or is not the executive body. If the

decision-making body is also the executive body, then a flawless execution of policies as well as easier and faster decision-making is more probable.

- The measure of difference between the interests of the decision-making and executive group. When there are major differences of interest then a frustration of the policy-making is more likely to occur.

37_{Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”}

International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785. (Accessed: January 26, 2012). P. 427-429.

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1.5.2 Group Characteristics

With regard to the first factor, ‘Natural/Geographical Coherency,’ differences in the geography and ecology of nations play an important part in their struggle to come to agreement. The different circumstances such as the weather, the vulnerability to the ocean, the possession of fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal, the possession or presence of clean energy resources such as hydropower, solar, wind, and geothermal are all influencing the different interests of countries on the issue of climate change. This a difficult factor, because unlike the economy of a country the geographical location cannot be changed. Therefore the degree of natural/geographical coherency between countries is a strong the determinant for the successful provision of the public good of climate security.

The effects of climate change vary from country to country. For example, when there is state A that is a small island state, then it will be the most vulnerable to climate change and it is threatened in its survival by rising sea levels. Furthermore, if there is state B, that is a state with a large landmass, a mild climate and no coastal areas then it will be less severely threatened by the effects of climate change. Therefore, state B will feel less urge to move towards rapid and ambitious action on climate change. State A will indeed favour quick and substantial measures that provide the country with a safer prospect of the future. So, the more threatened a state is by climate change, the more willing it will be to take the necessary steps to prevent this, ergo help provide the public good.

While nations are facing complicated negotiations on cooperation due to geographical/natural differences, cities are providing the similarity that nations cannot provide. They share geographical characteristics of being small and compact territories of which many are located near the coast.39_{Many cities are therefore}

directly threatened by a rising sea level. So, cities are assumed to share a similar level of threat and therefore a similar aim for rapid and ambitious action. In short, it is

39_{“Cities and Climate Change: An Urgent Agenda,” The World Bank.}

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUWM/Resources/340232-1205330656272/CitiesandClimateChange.pdf (Accessed: December 10, 2012), p. 9.

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believed that the degree of similarity in the geographical location is of influence on the willingness of countries to cooperate in a rapid and ambitious way.

Another example showing the influence of the degree of natural/geographical coherency on the provision of the public good of climate security is the availability of fossil and clean energy resources. If country A has a vast supply of oil and coal in its soil it is inclined to try to make use of this and will favour a slower course of action toward shifting to a low carbon economy or it will demand to be compensated for the non-use of its resource. Country B, on the other hand, has vast sources of hydropower and geothermal at its disposal and will therefore favour a fast course of action. This is because it stands to gain by having climate security and does not have to fear a ‘loss’ of a natural resource like country A would when it is no longer allowed to make use of its fossil fuels.

Values of Natural/Geographical Coherency:

- The measure of threat that a country faces. This determines the willingness of a country to move fast and ambitious in mitigating the effects of climate change.

- The ability of a country to deal with the threat. Depending on the wealth of the country, it will be better or less able to address climate change and adapt to any possible changes in the climate.

- The availability of clean energy resources. When these are abundantly available, a country is less likely to oppose fast and ambitious mitigation efforts.

- The availability of fossil energy resources. The presence of large amounts of fossil fuels will make a country reluctant to support rapid and extensive measures against climate change.

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their competitive strength is similar. So, the only way to gain extra utility is through providing the public good and that is what they will do. However, when correlation is low, competition will be high and the individuals in the group will then favour investment in group-mechanisms that repress competition.

These elements of correlation and competition can be related to the groups of policy makers deciding on behalf of their country within the UNFCCC or to a group of city policy makers that form a network in order to establish the global public good of climate security. The thoughts by Frank give rise to look at the different economies and economic build up of the countries of the UNFCCC and that of major cities that are acting on climate change. These ‘group characteristics’ of countries in the UNFCCC and that of cities forming global networks are relevant since they influence the negotiations on a binding agreement or the efforts that will be unilaterally, voluntarily made. The policy makers acting on behalf of their country or city will take concerns on economic competitiveness into account when developing climate change mitigation policies.

The degree of correlation between the economies of countries or cities co-determines the possibility of providing the public good. If there are major differences between the economies of countries, then correlation is low and a move towards less carbon usage will have dispersed effects that will alter the economic strength of some countries. For example countries that derive a lot of strength from their dominance over fossil fuel resources will, when the popularity of clean energy technologies grows, most likely loose this dominance. In a situation of low correlation between countries, there will be major differences and competition will be high. Under such circumstances countries see gain by competing with other countries. There would in this situation be a need for a mechanism to repress competition, only if this institution fails to eliminate or reduce competitive behaviour when it comes to mitigating climate change, then the public good will not be achieved.

The possession of certain technologies, infrastructures, as well as patents is a part of the economic correlation. Countries that are producing oil, gas or coals and countries that also consume much of a certain type of fossil fuel will face difficulty in changing their economies. In addition, when changing to a low carbon economy they face rising costs and lower revenues.40_{This might affect their competitive strength.}

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The policy makers of these countries will be unwilling to enter into a climate change mitigation agreement with countries that use a lot of clean energy sources and that have the possession of clean technologies and infrastructure supporting those. What would persuade them is some form of bribe.

In short, it can be said that when the units under subject are more alike, for example cities, then it is much easier to provide the necessary public good given that all see use in benefiting from that good. The policy-makers of these entities will recognize that competition is useless and they will make attempts to provide the public good.

Values of ‘Economic Correlation’

- The measure of competition between the group members. When the policy-makers in the group see gains to be made through economic competition, then the public good is less likely to be provided.

- In the case of low correlation and so high competition, the degree to which group members are able to create mechanisms that repress competition matters. If these attempts fail, then the public good is less likely to be provided. In the case of high correlation, mechanisms to repress competition are not needed given the low competition between the members of the policy-making groups.

A high natural/geographical coherency and a high correlation between policy-making entities provide an impulse for these governing structures to look each other up and stimulate efforts to provide the global public good of climate security. This is the best way for all to gain.

Agreement Decision 1/CP16,” UNFCCC,

http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/saudiarabia_submission.pdf (Accessed: November 30, 2011); “China’s Future Energy Prospects,” Centre for Global Energy Studies,

http://www.cges.co.uk/resources/articles/2011/07/28/china’s-future-energy-prospects (Accessed: November 30, 2011); “For China Coal is still King,” Institute for Energy Research,

http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/01/21/for-china-coal-is-still-king/ (Accessed: November 30, 2011); “Top Coal Producing Countries,” CoalInfoMine,

http://coal.infomine.com/countries/ (Accessed: November 30, 2011); Jonathan Watts, “China's Coal Addiction,” Foreign Policy,

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1.5.3 Cost-Benefit Ratio

Olson as well as Bendor and Mookherjee indicate the role of the costs when providing a public good. However, they focus on the costs of organizing.41_{These are not}

relevant when it comes to existing institutions like the United Nations and cities that try to make policies that will enable the provision of the public good of climate security. These institutions remain in existence regardless of whether the issue of climate change is dealt by them. Yet, what can be seen is that the creation of policies is often linked to the costs that need to be made in order to execute them. This is even more relevant when talking about a non-rival and non-excludable good. Therefore, the thesis’ theory assumes that the cost-benefit ratio of climate policies is more relevant for determining the chances that policies will be made than are the costs of organizing.

When there are large costs associated with the provision of a non-rival and non-excludable good than there is a greater tendency for failure to provide the good. Smaller decision-making bodies that are more close to the population, are assumed to have a better position when it comes to finding financially attractive solutions for certain problems. They profit from their close proximity to citizens and businesses and they are able to see where the opportunities for low-cost solutions lie. An institution that is very distant from society itself, from everyday life, does not see where the best combination of low cost measures with high benefits is.

Concerning the benefits of measures it can be said that it is important for policy-makers to have sufficient knowledge of the overall benefits of actions that can be taken. When there is no sufficient knowledge then a policy-making body can be assumed to steer more in the direction of defection than in the direction of cooperation.42_{The presentation of large costs and at the same time uncertainty about}

the benefits that result from these cause much resistance within a policy-making group and within the general population. Important is to note that the thesis theory

41_{Bendor and Mookherjee p. 129; Olson p. 21-23, 33, 34, 44-47.} 42_{“Framework Convention on Climate Change,” UNFCCC,}

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/tp/02.pdf (Accessed: March 27, 2012); “Introduction to Mitigation Under the UNFCCC,” unfccc.int/resource/cd_roms/...1/Module1.ppt, (Accessed: March 27, 2012).

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makes a difference between ‘benefits’ and ‘side payments.’ Side payments concern the offering of goods that are not related to the public good, they are offered in exchange for contribution to the provision of the public good. Benefits on the other hand result directly from the provision of public good. Side payments will be discussed later on as a specific factor in the creation of climate policies.

Values of Costs-Benefit Ratio:

- The degree to which solutions are made cost-effectively. When a solution is made cost-effectively, then it has more chance to succeed.

- The degree to which external cost are taken into account. Often external costs are not actively recognized as a cost. When they are recognized and taken into the decision-making process as a real cost, then a policy is more likely to be formulated.

- The degree to which benefits and external benefits are created and taken into account. Often decision-makers do not have a good overview of the benefits that are related to certain solutions and certain types of action. When these are officially incorporated in the decision-making process, then climate policies are more likely to occur.

1.5.4 Participation

These factors relate to theory on groups in relation to the provision of collective goods. They are relevant in the light of climate change mitigation, given that at first sight they offer a plausible explanation for the divergent policy success of the global and local levels. This is due to the fact that global and local policy-makers are dealing with a different number of persons with whom they have to discuss and come to terms on the measures to be taken towards limiting the effects of climate change. The

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UNFCCC includes representatives of 195 parties, while the decision-makers of the city of Copenhagen are with merely fifty-five.43

Mancur Olson is a prominent theorist when it comes to analyzing the potential of certain groups towards successful collective action. He writes in his popular work “The Logic of Collective Action” that large groups, without an element of force or ‘bribe’ at their disposal, are unlikely to voluntarily provide a public good.44_{In support}

of this view he mentions that since “the state, with all the emotional resources at its command, cannot finance its most basic and vital activities without resort to compulsion.”45_{Olson says that only if the group is small, it will be able to voluntarily}

provide a public good. So, he makes a clear distinction between small and large groups in the potential to provide public goods when there are no means of force or bribe available.46

Another useful contribution on the size of groups and the potential for collective action has been delivered by Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee in their article “Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action.” There they come to the conclusion that a large group should, due to its size, adopt a kind of Tit-for-Tat type of strategy that is based on decentralized efforts. Yet, they advise this method to be combined with forceful guidance that results from a centralized institution or structure. They argue that a decentralized strategy in a large group is difficult due to factors such as high costs, difficulty in communicating, and problems in the processing and gathering of information.47_{Critique on Bendor and}

Mookherjee’s strategy is that there is no real centralized institution present when it comes to climate change. There is the UNFCCC but it has no significant responsibilities to act or to overrule its member states’ sovereignty.

What strikes out in the thinking of Olson as well as Bendor and Mookherjee is that they place too much emphasis on the numerical size of the group. Yet, this is peculiar since it is theoretically possible that a group large in size is able to come to

43_{“The City Council,” Copenhagen.com,}

http://www.copenhagen.com/thecity/copenhagen_brief/city_council.asp?Menu=City (Accessed: March 22, 2012)

44_{Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 15, 16.

45_{Olson, p. 13.} 46_{Olson, p. 1-65.}

47_{Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, “Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective} Action,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1987).